Master

Public Discourse on Muslims and Foreigners

FEDDERSEN, Alexandra

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the public discourse on foreigners and Muslims in Switzerland between 2000 and 2009. In Switzerland, as elsewhere in Europe, the debate on immigration, cultural identity and citizenship seems to focus more and more on the Muslim minority. While the Muslim population belonged to the generic group of foreigners in the public debate until recently, it seems that Muslims have become the main problem for integration in Switzerland. In the past decade, two direct democratic campaigns targeted Muslims, raising the question about the compatibility of Swiss and Muslim cultures. What makes Muslims a special group? How does the public discourse on Muslims differ from the portrayal of foreigners in general? Are Muslims perceived as the main threat to Swiss culture and gender equality? To answer these questions empirically, a quantitative content analysis of four major Swiss newspapers was conducted covering three direct democratic campaigns in the last decade. The aim of the analysis was to inductively grasp the discourse of institutional actors on Muslims and on foreigners in general and to discover the main [...]

Reference

FEDDERSEN, Alexandra. Public Discourse on Muslims and Foreigners. Master : Univ. Genève, 2013

Available at: http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:35314

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1 / 1 Green Lab N° 3 • 2013

Public Discourse on Muslims and Foreigners

Alexandra Feddersen

Geneva Laboratory of Political Science

Afin de mieux se présenter, le Département de science politique de l'Université de Genève a lancé en 2009 deux nouvelles publications. Sous le nom de Geneva Laboratory of Political Science , ces publications aideront à diffuser les travaux qui se font au sein du Département et à nourrir les échanges avec l'extérieur. Le nom souligne la vocation de « laboratoire » de ces textes, c’est-à-dire de lieu de réflexion, d'expériences et de débat. La publication se distingue par deux couleurs.

La série Blue Lab a été créée afin de favoriser la diffusion de travaux en cours de la part des membres du Département. Il peut s’agir de communications présentées à des colloques ou d’autres textes théoriques ou de recherche. La série Green Lab accueille des travaux plus achevés et généralement plus longs. Elle est destinée en particulier à la publication des meilleurs mémoires de Master des étudiantes et étudiants qui achèvent leurs études auprès du Département.

Public Discourse on Muslims and Foreigners

______

Alexandra Feddersen

Mémoire de Master en Science politique

Directeur de Mémoire: Matteo Gianni

Copyright © Alexandra Feddersen 2013 Editor Département de Science Politique et Relations Internationales Université de Genève Boulevard du Pont d'Arve 40 1211 – Genève 4 Switzerland ISSN 1663-649X (Printed Version) ISSN 1663-8751 (On-line Version) Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Table of contents

1 Introduction and research question 3 2 Literature review 6 2.1 Basic concepts: the discourse on otherness in Switzerland 6 Culturalism Actors involved in the discourse on otherness 2.2 Discourse on otherness in historical prespective 10 Before the 1990s: a hardly integrable workforce The 1990s: the implementation of the cultural distance principle The turn of the millennium: the emergence of the Muslims population 2.3 Differences in representaitons between Muslims and foreigners: hypotheses 17 3 Research design 20 3.1 Case selection and data 20 The mass media as an arena of contention Three direct democratic campaigns Corpus 3.2 Coding method and most important variables 23 4 Analysis 25 4.1 Figures of otherness 25 4.2 Differences in topics 30 4.3 Differences in evaluations 33 5 Discussion 38 6 References 43 7 Appendix 49 7.1 Coding scheme 49 7.2 Tables 56

1

Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

1 Introduction and research question

International wars and terrorism, changing immigration flows and the success of populist right-wing parties has brought more public attention to the subject of immigration and intercultural relations in Western Europe than ever before. Particularly since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the Muslim community has been in the spotlight of controversies and political affairs. Since 2001, Muslims living in Switzerland found themselves in the center of several heated political debates - both on national and local level. They were targeted as a problematic group by two national direct democratic campaigns the last decade. The first debate took place during the referendum campaign about facilitated naturalization of second-generation immigrants in 2004. The referendum addressed the possibility of granting Swiss citizenship to the children of immigrants born in Switzerland, but the political and media debate turned into a discussion on the Muslim population. The second occasion was the well-known anti-minarets initiative in 2009. Through the tools of direct democracy, right-conservative circles tried - and succeeded - to register a ban on building minarets in the Swiss constitution. The debate reached far beyond the mere architectural construction and developed into a discussion on the place of Islam in Switzerland. The arguments raised in the debate circled around the idea that so-called Muslim and Swiss or Western cultures and religions are simply too distant to be able to live together in one political and social sphere. The assumed cultural distance between Muslim and Swiss values was often exemplified by the way women and girls are presumably treated in Muslim culture or religion. During the anti-minaret campaign, the argument about women being oppressed by Islam was recurrent. Today, the discourse on the incompatibility of Swiss and Muslim cultures is not limited to populist right-wing discourse1 any more, but is also found in the media (Burger 2006) and public policy (Gianettoni and Roux 2010). However, the Muslims living in Switzerland were not perceived as a distinct group until the beginning of the new millennium. Instead, Muslim immigrants were classified according to their country of origin (Ettinger and Imhof 2011) and thus identified for example as Bosniaks or Turks. Recently, this classification according to nationalities gave way to a perception of religious and cultural homogeneity among Muslims (Behloul 2009). Indeed, during the direct democratic debates mentioned above, the Muslim population of Switzerland was perceived as a religious group sharing a great number of

1 Definitions follow in section 2 Literature review

3 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners characteristics. Consequently, after having existed as a demographic reality for years, Muslims turned into a socially and politically relevant group (Gianni 2003) which, today, “[…] is indeed the main target of current social and political debates over the meaning of Swiss multiculturalism and of Swiss national identity […]” (Gianni and Clavien 2012:114). In sum, scientific literature holds that the Muslim population in Switzerland started to be visible about ten years ago and that the debate on immigration and intercultural relations suddenly dealt with new topics such as religion and gender. From being classified as foreigners2, Muslims seem to have become a religious minority in public discourse and gender seems to be an argument used to illustrate the cultural distance between Swiss people and Muslims. Did this shift in perception from foreign nationals to religious minority change the discourse on Muslims? Or does the debate on immigration and intercultural relations in general evolve around other topics today? It seems indeed that a systematic comparison with the representation of foreigners is crucial to be able to affirm the particularity or even uniqueness of the discourse on the Muslim minority. Put more bluntly, is the debate on foreigners in the public sphere very different from the one on Muslims? Are Muslims seen as worse - that is more problematic - than ordinary foreigners, not only threatening Swiss people’s jobs but also wanting to impose their presumed misogynous culture? The aim of this paper is to assess which arguments in public discourse make Muslims a special group and distinguish them from the generic group of foreigners. For that purpose, public discourse on foreigners and Muslims will be analyzed during three recent Swiss referendum campaigns. Besides the two campaigns in 2004 and 2009 mentioned above, a third referendum campaign which aimed at limiting the number of foreigners in Switzerland in 2000 will be included in the analysis. As will be shown later (3 Research Design), these periods of time are ideal to study public discourse since the debates taking place during direct democratic campaigns are characterized by a struggle of different actors to win the referendum and reveal a wide diversity of arguments. The red thread of my paper will be the following question: What are the main differences between the representations of foreigners and of Muslims in the public discourse in Switzerland during the referendum campaigns in 2000, 2004 and 2009?

2 In Switzerland, the common term for immigrant is “Ausländer•in” in German, “étranger•ère” in French and “straniero•a” in Italian. I will thus use the expression “foreigner” because it best catches the idea that immigrants are considered to be political and social “outsiders” (see also Giugni and Passy 2005:416).

4 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

As far as I am aware, there are no systematic comparisons of the discourse on Muslims and foreigners and the argumentations lying underneath. Through a quantitative discourse analysis, I propose to compare the differences and similarities between the discourse on Muslims and on foreigners in general. My analysis, therefore, has a heuristic and explorative ambition and is not a test of a specific model. The aim is to present an overview over the Swiss public discourse on Muslims and foreigners in the last decade and to highlight differences and similarities. It is also an attempt to clarify certain affirmations and assumptions found in scientific literature. Moreover, this paper places itself in a broader academic and political perspective. This first overview of a comparison between the discourse on Muslims and foreigners could indeed contribute to the ongoing academic and political discussions on integration. The discourse on minority populations in the public sphere is an important indicator of how intercultural relations and integration are seen upon in a society (Imhof and Ettinger 2007). As Gianni and Clavien (2012:115) put it: “[…] analysing how minority groups or individuals are depicted and represented in the public discursive sphere is an important step towards understanding and explaining tensions and conflicts in multicultural societies”. The representation of minorities in the public debate illustrates if and how the majority is willing to accommodate - or not - the minority’s specificities. Indeed, ideas and positions promoted in the public space can influence policy outcomes. In the Swiss system of direct democracy, the debates in the public sphere are particularly important because Swiss citizens are asked to decide on a wide range of issues. The results of direct democratic referendums are directly affecting policy making on local and national level. As Vatter (2011a and 2011b) shows, the direct democratic system in Switzerland plays an important role in the discrimination of cultural and religious minorities in the law. To a certain extent, public or media discourse has an actual impact on personal attitudes and policy outcomes (Ettinger and Imhof 2011:37, Mader and Schinzel 2012:128-129). As a consequence, analyzing how Muslims and foreigners are perceived in public discourse could provide new suggestions as to the coherence of the ongoing debate on integration criteria and of existing integration policies. Before proceeding to empirically finding answers to my research question, I will first define key concepts and critically assess previous research done in this field (2 Literature review). Afterwards, I will present the data and the empirical method (3 Research design) before proceeding to the analysis (4 Analysis). In the final section, the main results are discussed and implications on further research are evaluated (5 Discussion).

5 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

2 Literature review

As mentioned in the Introduction, the focus of this paper lies on the analysis of public discourse. The concept of discourse is used both by social scientists and linguists and is therefore hard to define unambiguously. In this paper, discourse is understood in a very large way as referring to “[…] groups of statements which structure the way something is thought about, and the way we act on the basis of that thinking” (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006:1693). Public discourse, therefore, is a group of statements made in the public realm, e.g. in the media, on a common and general issue. Many different academic disciplines take an interest in the subject of perception of otherness. Therefore, empirical results and theories generated in other fields than public discourse analysis, such as social-psychological and anthropological studies, might be helpful for a broader understanding of the subject and will thus be presented in the literature review.

2.1 Basic concepts: the discourse on otherness in Switzerland

The debate on immigration, intercultural relations and integration seems to have gained importance in Switzerland in the last decade. However, the problematization of what is foreign or culturally different is not a new phenomenon - it can be observed in every society throughout time (Schranz and Imhof 2002:2). The scientific literature on state and media discourse shows that immigrants in Europe often are represented as culturally different from Western people. Riaño and Wastl-Walter (2006), for example, analyze the historical shifts in state discourse in Switzerland and show how foreigners have been apprehended by immigration and naturalization policies during the last century. Despite some changes, foreigners have mostly been perceived as cultural others, or even as a threat to Swiss values.

Culturalism

Discourse on otherness is based on a culturalist rhetoric. Culturalism “[…] refers to an understanding of culture as a kind of package that presumes the cultural homogeneity of people of a particular ethnic or geographical origin. Culturalism emphasises differences of cultural heritage, and predictive behavior based on that heritage […]” (Wessendorf 2008:188). In this view, cultures are perceived as compact and homogenous entities,

6 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners each culture posing a threat to the integrity of the other. Even if some authors use other terms for the same phenomenon - Stolcke (1995), for example, in her analysis of the exclusionary rhetoric of the political right in Europe, writes about cultural fundamentalism - the concept of culturalism, I think, best refers to the related word racism. While racism builds on the belief that there are different, hierarchically ordered human races, culturalism is based on the assumed fundamental differences between cultures. However, Stolcke (1995) warns of understanding culturalism simply as a new, better accepted form of racism. There are indeed important differences between culturalism and racism. The most important one is the potential ability of immigrants to change culture. While cultures are incommensurable, an immigrant is still supposed to be able to choose - by the force of his•her will - to change culture by leaving all of his•her cultural heritage behind and adopting the culture of the host country. Hence the demand made to immigrants to integrate to the national culture of their host country, or to leave (Gianni 2009). This claim is found in the political as well as in the academic realm - see e.g. Linder (2011) for a culturalist analysis of the Swiss challenge of multicultural conflict. Besides underlining the homogeneity, incommensurability and incompatibility of cultures, culturalism often orders cultures hierarchically. Green, Fasel and Sarrasin (2010) measure the impact of different types of cultural diversity on anti-immigration attitudes in Swiss municipalities. They hold that there is a consensus on ethnic hierarchy in society: “,Culturally distant’ immigrant groups, whose members may wear visible signs of cultural or religious affiliation such as headscarves or other attire (and are sometimes also ,visible’ in terms of skin color or ethnic features differing from national majority), usually rank low on the ethnic hierarchy” (Green et al. 2010:179). The perceived cultural distance to the majority culture is frequently linked to the social status of immigrants, where “[…] ,culturally distant’ and ,devalued’ immigrants often have low social status and come from poorer countries, whereas ,culturally similar’ and ,valued’ immigrants come from wealthier countries” (Green et al. 2010:180). In the present political and social situation, Muslim immigrants rank lowest on ethnic hierarchy in Europe, while Western culture is seen as the most enlightened and liberal one (Green et al. 2010:181). The presence of immigrants perceived as culturally distant has a strong effect on anti- immigration attitudes (Gianettoni et Roux 2010, Green et al. 2010). The more distant a culture is, the more it is perceived as threatening to the integrity of the majority culture. While immigrants which are seen as culturally close are better accepted, they are nevertheless often perceived as an economic threat, mostly on the job market (Green et

7 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners al. 2010). As mentioned before, immigrants are perceived as cultural others because of their origin, ethnic features or skin color. The more distant their culture is assumed to be from Western culture, the more it is supposed to be determining their way of thinking and acting. Volpp (2000) analyses public and legal discourse on race and immigrant status in the context of several affairs involving minors in forced or voluntary marriage in the United States. The author convincingly shows that the culture of people perceived as being foreign to the United States is seen as conditioning them in their every day life: “This tendency to submerge only certain groups into the forces of culture is linked to the assumption that the behavior of devalued and less powerful groups is somehow more culturally determined - that they behave in certain ways and make particular choices because they follow cultural dictates. […] The notion that non-Western people are governed by culture suggests they have a limited capacity for agency, will or rational thought” (Volpp 2000:96). This kind of discourse is closely linked to colonialist discourse which contrasts nature-driven primitive peoples with the ideal of the white, rational and enlightened man. Viewing actions of culturally distant immigrants as simple results of their culture has two implications. On the one hand, culture is seen “[…] as the primary signifier of identity” (Dhamoon 2006: 357), an individual’s essence, leaving no space for other features shaping an individual, such as e.g. gender or social class. On the other hand, problematic behavior is explained by culture and thus attributed to the culture itself. As is shown in the next section, societal problems like sexism are outsourced to non-Western culture or culturalized. Culturalization is the process of essentializing “[…] social groups as having a specific, innate culture […]” (Clycq 2012:159)3. As a consequence, cultural difference becomes moral difference. In Switzerland, the concept of Überfremdung is a recurrent example in the culturalist rhetoric. Since the 1970s this concept is encountered in the debate on immigration and integration. Using culturalist rhetoric, it relates to the idea that the foreign population living in Switzerland threatens the national identity and culture: “Überfremdung […] creates a binary opposition between nationals and foreigners by which nationals are

3 In the scientific literature, “culturalization”, “ethnicization” and “racialization” are often used as closely related terms (racialization e.g. is defined as being “[…] the practice of distinguishing certain groups from others through the attribution of certain negatively evaluated features […]” (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006:1703)).

8 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners constructed as ,normal’ and ,desired’ and foreigners are constructed as ,deviant’ and ,undesired’. Überfremdung easily provokes fear, and thus public opinion and action can be mobilised. Überfremdung produces an essentialist cultural discourse based on the idea that when two cultures come together they do not mix but one dominates the other” (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006:1708).

Actors involved in the discourse on otherness

Riaño and Wastl-Walter (2006) hold that state discourse on otherness allows Switzerland to define its own identity regardless its lack of cultural and linguistic unity. More generally, by designating certain perceived ethnic, cultural, social or religious features as other or foreign, a society simultaneously defines its own identity: “Die Problematisierung des Fremden steht stellvertretend für die Konstitution von Identität eines Gemeinsamkeitsglaubens also, der das Zugehörige vom Fremden unterscheidet” (Schranz and Imhof 2002:2; see also Gianni 2003, Imhof and Ettinger 2007, Lutz 1997, Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, Tabin 1999 i.a.). According to several authors, the main actors structuring the public discourse on otherness are the State, the main governmental parties, Foreigners’ associations, Pro- foreigners’ associations, extreme-right parties and, last but not the least, the Swiss people’s party (SVP/UDC) (Baumann and Stolz 2007, Guigni and Passy 2005:430, Mahnig 2005b). Xenophobic circles and the SVP succeed not only in leading the discourse, but more importantly in the determination of public policy about immigration because of their frequent use of the direct democratic tools (initiatives and referenda) and the tergiversation of the left parties (Giugni and Passy 2005, Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, Skenderovic 2007): “Xenophobic groups, working together with right-wing parties, have been particularly successful in influencing the government in formulating policies of exclusion towards foreigners. Centre-oriented and left-oriented political parties in Switzerland have had an ambiguous position on foreigners. The left, for example, has defended immigrants’ rights while trying to attend to the interests of the trade unions they represent, which are primarily interested in securing jobs for their members and not in open policies of immigration” (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006:1709). Once more, this suggests how public discourse - especially during direct democratic campaigns - could have an impact on policy outcomes. After having laid out the general theoretical perspective of this paper, the following

9 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners section (2.2) presents scientific results from studies on discourse and attitudes on otherness in a historical perspective. The aim is to extract the main arguments used to characterize foreigners and Muslims, to follow their evolution and change over time and to crystallize the main differences between the discourse on foreigners and the one on Muslims (which will be presented in section 2.3).

2.2 Discourse on otherness in historical perspective

The public discourse on otherness, as mentioned before, is not a new phenomenon. In recent years, different populations have been targeted by a changing discourse on otherness. According to Gianni (2003), the principle figures of otherness in Switzerland since the end of World War II first were the Italian and Spanish guestworkers in the 1960s. In the 1980s, asylum seekers were the main targets of the public discourse on otherness, closely followed by immigrants and refugees from the Balkan states in the 1990s. Today, however, Muslims have gained visibility in this debate, both due to international events and to own claims regarding cultural rights (Gianni 2003:40-41). A small historical retrospection will help to highlight the shifts in the perception of otherness in Switzerland.

Before the 1990s: a hardly integrable workforce

The recent history of immigration in Switzerland starts in the 1960s with the arrival of Italian guest workers. They are seasonal workers who are not meant to stay in Switzerland for a long time nor to integrate into the local society. They live as a quite segregated parallel society (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006). Some voices already make themselves heard about the possible problems Italian immigration to Switzerland could trigger. Fears concerning the confessional belonging of the workers, of communism and of Überfremdung are expressed by different political actors (Cerutti 2005:98). As we can see, culturalist discourse on otherness is used in the 1950s and 1960s: “Already in postwar period southern Italian labour migrants in Switzerland were doomed to be unable to integrate into Swiss society because of cultural differences” (Wessendorf 2008:191). Today, however, the culturalist discourse on Italian migrants has changed and Italian culture is seen as positive: “[…] Italianità, Italianness, is hip, and it is now described as part of Swiss culture […]” (Wessendorf 2008:192). The discourse on the Italian immigrant minority in Switzerland is one the most telling examples of how

10 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners perception of otherness can change over time. Regarding other nationalities in the 1960s, a circular letter issued in 1962 by the Department of Justice and Police, advises against the recruitment of culturally distant workers from Asia, Africa, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus and Portugal because it would create more conflicts resulting from different political, social, cultural and religious traditions (Cerutti 2005:133). Despite these recommendations, Turkish and Yugoslavian migrant workers are recruited throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. However, they are not perceived as Muslim immigrants, but rather as Turkish or Yugoslavian nationals (Ettinger and Imhof 2011:13). In the 1970s and 1980s, xenophobic movements rise and become more and more important in defining the Swiss immigration policy. They launch several referenda and initiatives against the threat of Überfremdung, communism and unemployment for Swiss workers. Their arguments are mainly based on a racist and ecological principle: the Swiss living space should be preserved for Swiss people (Mahnig 2005a). They therefore request and obtain the establishment of so-called stabilization policies which limit the amount of immigrants admitted into Switzerland using annual immigration quotas (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006:1701). Überfremdung is thus understood for a long time as a numeric threat: the more foreigners on the Swiss territory, the more the Swiss territory and culture are threatened. In 1988, though, the cultural distance argument is introduced into the public debate and a politician of the xenophobic party Nazionale Aktion uses Islam to give an example of a threatening distant culture (Mahnig 2005b:167).

The 1990s: the implementation of the cultural distance principle

In the 1990s, globalization and the European integration accelerate and xenophobic movements launch several anti-foreigners and anti-refugees initiatives (Mahnig 2005b:176). Immigration policy and the structure of the public discourse about foreigners undergo many changes during this period (Giugni and Passy 2005). The authorities have to resolve the tension between, on the one hand, the economic need of foreign workforce and the desire to move closer to the European Union (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006:1702) and, on the other hand, the demand to preserve national identity and culture (Mahnig 2005b:177). The fears linked to immigration expressed in the public debates are often questions of delinquency, drug trafficking, insecurity and illegal immigration

11 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

(Gianni and Parini 2005:216-219, Giugni and Passy 2005:430). The so-called three- circles policy is installed. This policy places immigration candidates in three different categories (from the culturally closest to the culturally most distant) and thus determines on ethno-cultural criteria whether or not someone can enter Switzerland (Mahnig 2005b:162-63): “The racialised representation of non-EU citizens as ,culturally distant’ and thus as less able to ,assimilate’ has had the function of legitimising their exclusion from the right to immigrate and settle and has validated the introduction of a dual system of immigrant rights giving priority of admission and employment to EU citizens” (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006:1703). Überfremdung therefore becomes a matter not only of the amount of foreigners living in the country, but also of cultural distance. While this argument was already present in the 1960s, it is translated into official discourse and public policy in the 1990s and enters the academic debate as well. In 1998, the three-circles model is abandoned because of the increasing public protest. A new system is introduced, but de facto the three-circles model becomes a two-circles model which differentiates EU-citizens (who are granted free movement since 2001) and non-EU-citizens, the so called third-country foreigners (Drittstaatenausländer) (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006:1703)4. In the public discourse of the 1990s, Muslims are not yet present as the most problematic foreign group, but questions about problems to accommodate cultural and religious differences are being raised: “The public attitudes as displayed in mass media […] continue not to be favorable to ,alien faith’, especially towards Islam” (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2004:79-80). However, during the admission of war refugees from ex-Yugoslavia, the religious issue is not the most important one (Ettinger and Imhof 2011:13).

The turn of the millennium: the emergence of the Muslim population

In the last ten years, much of the academic research about immigration focuses on the minority which gained the most visibility in the new millennium: the Muslims. It seems indeed that this minority raises a substantial academic, political and public concern. The representation of the Muslim minority in the Swiss press has been subject of

4 For a very clear summary of the changes in the conceptualization of foreigners in Swiss immigration and naturalization policies see the recapitulative table in Riaño and Wastl-Walter (2006:1704).

12 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners several empirical discourse analyses in the last decade. The results show that, since the beginning of the last decade, Muslims get increasingly negative media attention and are regarded with suspicion in the political debate (see e.g. Burger 2006, Clavien 2009, Dahinden 2009, Ettinger and Imhof 2011, Gianni 2003, Gianni and Clavien 2012, Imhof and Ettinger 2007, Parini, Gianni and Clavien 2012, Schneuwly Purdie, Gianni and Jenny 2009, Schranz and Imhof 2002). Despite their different approaches, these studies conclude that there is a prevalence of negative and generalizing typifications of the Muslim population in the Swiss public discourse (Imhof and Ettinger 2007, Pahud de Mortanges 2012). Other fields of academic research reveal similar trends. Giugni and Morariu (2010) conclude their analysis on xenophobic and Islamophobic attitudes in Switzerland claiming that “[…] clearly many people today see Islam in Europe as a threat to Western values and culture, which reflect on negative attitudes towards Muslims” (Giugni and Morariu 2010:95). Despite smaller discrepancies, authors seem to agree that Muslims appear as the principle figures of otherness after the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001 (see e.g. Bennani-Chraïbi 2011, Ettinger and Imhof 2011, Ruedin and Berkhout 2012, Ureta and Profanter 2011). The Muslim population in Europe then gains even more visibility after the bombings in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively (Ureta and Profanter 2011:241) and during the protests against the Mohammed-caricatures published by a Danish newspaper in 2006 (Ettinger and Imhof 2011:13). In Switzerland, two direct democratic campaigns increase awareness of the presence of the Muslim minority: the referendum on “facilitated naturalization of second- and third-generation foreigners” in 2004 and the well-known “anti-minarets” initiative in 2009 (Bennani-Chraïbi 2011). Before that, as already mentioned in the previous section, immigrants from Muslim - or partly Muslim - countries were not perceived as Muslims, but as foreign nationals (Ettinger and Imhof 2011:13). For Behloul (2011:303; see also Mader and Schinzel 2012:130), “[t]he ,foreigners’ (Turks, Bosniaks, Pakistanis, Albanians, Arabs) have evolved into a ,Homo islamicus’ […]”. In correspondence to culturalization, Behloul (2011) speaks of an Islamization of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries. The nationality of Muslim immigrants vanishes and their religion becomes their most important characteristic. This representation of Muslims does not correspond to the demographic situation of this minority (Behloul 2009, Behloul 2011). Indeed, 4.3 percent of the population residing permanently in Switzerland in 2000 was affiliated to the Islamic belief. Of the 311 000 Muslims living in Switzerland in 2000, 56 percent

13 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners came from ex-Yugoslavia, 20 percent from Turkey and approximately 12 percent had a Swiss passport. Only 6 percent stemmed from the Middle East or the Maghreb and spoke arabic (Bovay and Broquet 2004, Schneuwly Purdie 2009:26-27). In 2010, Muslims represent 4.5 percent of the population living in Switzerland. The most recent figures published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office5 and cited in the recent Report on the Federal Council on the situation of Muslims in Switzerland (2013) show that the composition of the Muslim minority still is very European: approximately 42 percent are ex-Yugoslavians, 14 percent are Turkish nationals and 3 percent come from elsewhere in Europe. Surprisingly, 31 percent of the Muslims living in Switzerland are Swiss nationals. Only 10 percent are non-Europeans and mostly come from Northern Africa or the Middle East. Despite this national and cultural heterogeneity, Muslims are depicted as an increasingly homogenous group in the public discourse: “Die Wahrnehmung muslimischer Akteure wird zunehmend durch Pauschalisierungen geprägt” (Ettinger and Imhof 2011:36; see also Behloul 2011:306 and Gianni 2009:81). The distinction between the individual term of Muslim, the generic term of Muslims and the religion Islam is increasingly blurred (see also Report of the Federal Council 2013:12). By attributing certain fixed characteristics to all the Muslims, the individual is classified in a religion he•she cannot escape from (Gianni 2009:81, Parini et al. 2012:212). This means that all of his•her thoughts or actions are meant to be influenced by certain religious practices. Most of the time, such behavior is regarded as problematic (Tabin 2006:23). By reducing individual identity in this way, one not only ignores other aspects of identity (such as gender, sexuality, social class of political identity), but also declares identity to be unchanging and unchangeable (Erel 2009:33). As Muslim culture and religion6 is seen as monolithic and unable to adapt to modernity, this not only means that individuals belonging to this religion are seen as difficult to integrate in the Swiss society, but also that Muslim values are perceived to constitute a threat to Switzerland’s integrity (Gianettoni and Roux 2010, Gianni 2009). As a consequence, the change from national to religious or cultural typification of Muslim

5 The figues for 2010 were calculated based on a new method and apparently raise a certain degree of mistrust in the scientific community. Facts and figures available under http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/ portal/fr/index/news/04/01.html (13/01/15). 6 In scientific literature on the discourse and attitudes on Muslims, culture and religion are closely linked concepts which often are hardly differentiable. In section 3. Research design, I will address the attempt to distinguish these concepts more clearly in my analysis.

14 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners immigrants and the perception of increasing intra-group homogeneity runs parallel with the belief in the incompatibility of Swiss and Muslim cultural values (Ettinger and Imhof 2011:13). As mentioned before, the fundamental differences between cultures are often exemplified by pointing at the persistence of strong gender stereotypes and sexism7 in the others’ culture: “[…] the prevalence of themes such as crime among young migrant men, forced marriage, and wearing scarves at school, in the 2000s exemplify that gender is still central in constructing the ethnicized Other. In this sense, gender relations are used as an argument to polarize debates on migration” (Erel 2009:37). In their analysis about the interconnection of attitudes on race and gender in Switzerland, Gianettoni and Roux (2010) hold that “[…] the sexism of immigrants, or the sexism of the Other, is seen to be an intrinsic characteristic of the immigrants’ culture, which is understood to be radically different from Swiss culture” (Gianettoni and Roux 2010:374). The gender argument functions as a marker for cultural difference, which has two main implications. On the one hand, the culture of the other is being viewed as less gender-equal, the other men are constructed as being more sexist and the other women as more submissive due to their cultural heritage directly imported from their home countries. On the other hand, Swiss culture is suddenly seen as egalitarian, Swiss men are seen as highly respectful of women and Swiss women as emancipated and equal to their men (Roux, Gianettoni and Perrin 2007:95). As a matter of fact, the Federal Office for Migration8 included the principle of equality between men and women in the catalogue of “Swiss principles” which immigrants have to learn about when coming to Switzerland (Gianettoni and Roux 2010:377). This process of culturalizing sexism results “[…] in the justification and naturalization of the ordinary Swiss sexism […]” (Gianettoni and Roux 2010:374). According to Gianni and Clavien’s (2012) findings in their analysis of media

7 Put simply, gender is defined as the social significance of the biological sex: “Men and women are assigned specific positions and gender roles: men and masculinity are associated with productive activities and the public arena (politics, remunerative work, etc.), while women and femininity are associated with reproductive activities and the private sphere (family, care, etc.). […] The process of naturalization leads to the belief that gender differences and gender inequalities are not socially constructed but are the result of natural differences between men and women” (Gianettoni and Roux 2010:375-76). As a consequence, sexism is an ideological system “[…] that prescribes division by gender, differentiates the social roles attributed to women and men, and ranks them in a hierarchy” (Gianettoni and Roux 2010:375). 8 The Federal Office for Migration is the highest decision-making instance for the regulation of immigration and naturalization in Switzerland.

15 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners discourse on several political affairs involving Muslims in Switzerland, gender is present in the Swiss french-speaking media in almost every article about Muslims. The authors deplore that “[…] the systematic reference to practices that go against gender equality overemphasizes the potential inability of the Muslim population living in Western countries to adapt and endorse democratic values” (Gianni and Clavien 2012:118). In media discourse, gender equality, which is considered an exclusively Western value, is used to mark a boundary between Muslim and Swiss cultures (Gianni and Clavien 2012). Gender thus plays a very important role in representing Muslims as the current figure of otherness in Switzerland (Gianni and Clavien 2012, Parini et al. 2012). What consequences does this kind of discourse have on the individual? Muslim women are depicted as victims of their own culture (Mishra 2007), the total opposite of liberated European women: “Muslim women are often constructed as the prototype of migrant women, perceived as miserable victims par excellence, handicapped by their culture of origin” (Lutz 1997:96-97). While women are seen as in need of Western liberation out of their own culture, but still civilizable, Muslim men are often seen as more violent, oppressive and problematic (Cooke 2002). The actors involved in the representation of Muslims as a politically relevant and problematic category are mostly non-Muslim actors: “[…] the construction of Muslim groups as a politically relevant category is largely done by non-Muslim political actors” (Ruedin and Berkhout 2012:1-2). Muslim actors mobilize to make claims (Gianni 2003:40-41, Bennani-Chraïbi 2011) and to react to an increasing demand of the authorities to have in interlocutor in questions concerning Islam (Bennani-Chraïbi 2011). However, scholars point out that the perception of Muslims is largely influenced by their representation in the media (Mader and Schinzel 2012:118 and 128): “[…] other political actors, such as government policy makers, political parties or the news media, employ certain categories or identifications in public debate - strategically or as unintended policy consequence. […] In the interaction between journalists and political actors, the media ,validates’ the existence of specific groups in political terms” (Ruedin and Berkhout 2012:5). The actors leading the public discourse on Muslims are similar if not equal to the ones found in the public discourse on foreigners. Ettinger and Imhof (2011), for example, claim that right-conservative actors, mostly the SVP, played an important role in starting to depict Muslims as a religious minority: “Allen voraus die SVP betont jetzt neben der ethnischen auch die religiöse Herkunft muslimischer Migranten […]” (Ettinger and Imhof 2011:16).

16 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

At this stage, we have seen that the public and official discourse on otherness in Switzerland has undergone some changes since the 1960s. Most importantly, the principle figure of otherness has been redefined several times according to culturalist criteria. Since the turn of the millennium, the focus of attention has turned towards Muslims. Most interestingly, the perception of the ethnic and national groups which form the heterogenic Muslim minority has changed. Indeed, while religion was not an important feature of the Turkish guest workers in the 1970s or the ex-Yugoslavian war refugees in the 1990s, this part of their identity seems to gain visibility and importance in recent years. The next section lays out the hypotheses which can be tested to find out which differences exist between the discourse on foreigners and Muslims.

2.3 Differences in representations between Muslims and foreigners: hypotheses

As explained in the Introduction, the aim of this paper is to compare the discourse on Muslims and foreigners during three referendum campaigns in 2000, 2004 and 2009. The first two hypotheses focus on the target of the discourse on otherness and the shift in perception of Muslim immigrants. The other hypotheses address the main differences to be expected between the discourse on foreigners and the discourse on Muslims. They are mainly based on results from studies on public discourse in Switzerland. Most studies on the subject agree that the Muslim population emerged in the public discourse in the beginning of the new century. As seen before, Ettinger and Imhof (2011) and Schranz and Imhof (2002) hold that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 constitute a critical juncture in the way the media reports on Muslims in Switzerland. Since then, the attention for Muslim actors raises steadily, due to international events (e.g. the terrorist attacks in Europe in 2004). When Muslims started to enter the public discourse as a distinct group, the perception of immigrants from Muslim countries shifted from a perception of nationality or ethnic background to a classification according to the individual’s religion. Immigrants from e.g. ex-Yugoslavia or Turkey have undergone this process of Islamization (Behloul 2011, Ettinger and Imhof 2011).

Hypothesis 1: While still perceived as foreigners in 2000, immigrants from ex- Yugoslavia and Turkey are perceived as Muslims in 2004 and 2009.

Parallel to this shift, Muslims are subject to an increasing process of essentialization

17 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners despite their demographic heterogeneity (Behloul 2011, Ettinger and Imhof 2011 and Gianni 2009). With increasing levels of attention for this minority, we can expect that statements on Muslims and Islam become increasingly generalizing. With other words, statements about the whole group or Islam in general are expected to be more common than nuanced statements about an individual or a part of the group. Furthermore, we can expect this trend to be inverted for foreigners, since the public attention is not focused on this minority any more and allows more differentiated views.

Hypothesis 2: From 2000 to 2009, statements made about Islam and the Muslim population become increasingly generalizing, while the level of generalization decreases in statements on foreigners.

The next hypotheses address the actual differences or similarities between the discourse on foreigners and the discourse on Muslims. Since Muslims are in the focus of the public discourse on otherness after 2001, integration should be a topic related to Muslims (Ruedin and Berkhout 2012:23). Many authors agree on the prevalence of religion as the main topic addressed in the discourse on Muslims (Burger 2006, Dahinden 2009, Ettinger and Imhof 2011, Gianni and Clavien 2012). Gender is a topic almost exclusively mentioned in studies analyzing the discourse on Islam (Gianni and Clavien 2012, Parini et al. 2012) and culture seems to be an important component of this discourse as well (Gianni and Clavien 2012). While culture is mentioned in conjunction with foreigners, too (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, Wessendorf 2008), economy certainly is a foreigner-specific topic (Riaño and Wastl- Walter 2006).

Hypothesis 3: The discourse on otherness evolves around different topics accordingly to the targets of the discourse: while integration, religion and gender are topics addressed in relation to Muslims, economy is addressed in the discourse on foreigners. Culture, on the other hand, is a topic mentioned both in conjunction with foreigners and Muslims.

Since Muslims became the main concern of the public discourse on otherness, they are perceived as a problem for the Swiss society (see e.g. Burger 2006, Clavien 2009, Dahinden 2009, Ettinger and Imhof 2011, Gianni 2003, Gianni and Clavien 2012, Imhof and Ettinger 2007, Parini et al. 2012, Schneuwly Purdie et al. 2009, Schranz and Imhof 2002). According to Burger’s (2006) analysis of news headlines in french-speaking Switzerland, journalists always report about Islam and Muslims negatively. Dahinden (2009) comes to the same conclusions in his analysis on the news coverage on religion

18 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners in Swiss media. Muslims are depicted as a problem for Switzerland, regardless the topic.

Hypothesis 4: Muslims are perceived as problematic9 , regardless the topic addressed. They are seen as more problematic than foreigners.

Before proceeding to testing the hypotheses, the next section clarifies the analytical method.

9 For further explanations see section 3.2 Coding method and most important variables or the Coding scheme in the Appendix.

19 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

3 Research design

3.1 Case selection and data

In order to test the hypotheses laid out in the previous chapter, public discourse was analyzed in four major Swiss newspapers during three direct democratic campaigns from 2000 to 2009. Problematic issues become most salient during direct democratic campaigns and a large diversity of arguments - pro and contra - are being voiced.

The mass media as an arena of contention

According to scientific literature, the mass media is the main and most visible arena of contention between political actors during direct democratic campaigns: “[…] les médias […] fonctionnent, dans le cadre des campagnes politiques de votations, comme un lieu de mise en visibilité du débat public” (Clavien 2009:108; see also Imhof and Ettinger 2007, Schranz and Imhof 2002). Data was gathered from newspaper articles published in four Swiss newspapers (see below) two weeks before and one week after the voting. One can reasonably expect that the public debate is most salient a few weeks before the voting date since all political actors, even the ones with little financial resources, will be involved in the campaign. Furthermore, by analyzing the debates and reactions which take place after the decision, I was able to catch the discourse of actors which react to the campaign, with or without previous involvement. The advantage of analyzing claims and declarations made in the media by different political actors is that one is able to show which discourses and representations gained legitimacy in the public discourse. If an actor does not appear in the media, he•she•it is not considered part of the public discourse, and his•her•its arguments are unlikely to be heard by a large public. It would be too simplistic, of course, to consider the mass media as a neutral platform for political communication. Several authors have shown the important role of the mass media in choosing which information is newsworthy, and thus in setting the public agenda, or in presenting an issue in a certain way (e.g. Marquis 2006, Van Dijk 1991). However, in the Swiss direct democratic system, the press is rather limited in choosing which information to prioritize in times of direct democratic campaigns since the political agenda is set. Moreover, several authors underline how political parties (Hänggli 2010) and governmental actors (Marquis 2006:234) are the driving force during Swiss referendum campaigns: “The direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland are a contest of thematic framing, a clash of arguments which, in the final analysis, allows

20 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners the voters to evaluate the merits of alternative ways of framing issues. […] the input of the political actors plays a decisive role in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. It is the political actors who introduce the most important frames into the public discourse” (Hänggli 2010:20). Given the large number of possibilities to analyze mass media, I chose to focus on newspapers only. Newspaper articles are easily available online and most suitable for quantitative content analysis. The four large Swiss newspapers included in this analysis are Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), Le Temps, Le Matin and Blick. Le Temps and NZZ are the largest quality newspapers read in the French-speaking and the German-speaking part of Switzerland respectively. Blick is the largest Swiss tabloid in German and Le Matin is its counterpart in the French-speaking region. This choice is based on two postulates holding that the four newspapers differ in their discourses about foreigners and Muslims. Firstly, the Swiss public and media space is segmented along linguistic borders (Kriesi, Wernli, Sciarini and Gianni 1996), each language area being influenced by its respective neighboring country. As a consequence, it can reasonably be expected that Muslims appear earlier in the public discourse in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. As a matter of fact, discourse about immigration in France focuses on Muslim integration since the beginning of the 1980s (Battegay and Boubeker 1993:8-9) due to a increasing presence of North African immigrants. Furthermore, topics involving gender also entered the public debate earlier in France than in Switzerland (e.g. the burqa ban; see Mayer 2011). Secondly, quality newspapers are more likely to publish nuanced claims about Muslims and foreigners than tabloid newspapers. As Schranz and Imhof (2002:4- 5) and Ettinger and Imhof (2011:24) show in their analysis of media discourse about Muslims in Switzerland, the quality press relies on reflective discussion about Islam in Switzerland, while the boulevard press focuses on isolated stories and scandals. By including four newspapers, the aim is to catch the most differentiated picture possible of public discourse on otherness in Switzerland.

Three direct democratic campaigns

The discourse on foreigners and Muslims was analyzed during three direct democratic campaigns. I chose to include one campaign which took place before 2001. According to several authors (Bennani-Chraïbi 2011, Ettinger and Imhof 2011, Ruedin and Berkhout 2012, Ureta and Profanter 2011), the Muslim minority should not yet be an issue during this campaign. The initiative was voted upon on September 24, 2000. Officially it was

21 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners called “Initiative in favor of immigration regulation”, but it is better known as the “18% initiative”. Its aim was to limit the number of foreigners on Swiss territory. The second case marks a turning point in the public debate about Muslims (Belhoul 2009, Bennani-Chraïbi 2011). On September 26, 2004, Swiss citizens voted on the “Facilitated naturalization of second- and third-generation foreigners” referendum. Interestingly, the opponents’ campaign was mostly targeted towards young Muslims and the fear of Islamization of Swiss society. As a consequence, the debate suddenly turned towards the Muslim minority. I therefore expect both foreigners and Muslims to be thematized in public discourse on otherness. The third campaign which was included is the well-known “Anti-minarets” initiative, approved on November 29, 2009. The campaign preceding this vote was the first one in Swiss history directed openly and only against the Muslim minority and is considered as the “culminant point” of the national discourse on Muslims (Bennani-Chraïbi 2011:2). It can be reasonably expected that the focus of public discourse will lie on this minority, and that the debate is centered around religion10.

Corpus

The analyzed corpus consists of 48411 newspaper articles which were collected online for three periods of time12 according to certain keywords13. Irrelevant articles14, as well as articles in the sports, stocks markets and finance, literature and arts, tourism and “letters to the editor”15 sections were excluded. In total, 765 statements were identified, whereof 499 statements on foreigners and Muslims in Switzerland.

10 Due to practical constraints, I was not able to include the last initiative targeted against foreigners into the analysis. Swiss people voted on the “Expulsion of criminal foreigners” on November 28, 2010. This initiative was the first one targeted against foreigners in general after the anti-minarets initiative. The results would have allowed me to refine the analysis of the discourse on otherness in Switzerland. 11 For more details see tables 4 to 6 in the Appendix. 12 2000/11/09 - 2000/10/01; 2004/09/13 - 2004/10/03; 2009/11/16 - 2009/12/06 13 French keywords: étrang*, musulman*, islam*; German keywords: ausländ*, muslim*, moslem*, islam* 14 e.g. articles mentioning “à l‘étranger” (“abroad”) or “Islamabad” 15 As will be explained later, this choice was made because the analysis focuses on the public discourse of institutional actors in the press.

22 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

3.2 Coding method and most important variables

According to my research question, I focused on the differences and similarities of the public representations of foreigners and Muslims in the press by analyzing which topics are addressed and how they are evaluated. For this purpose, a database was created16 using quantitative content analysis method and focusing exclusively on the first sense of manifest discourse as defined by Burger (2006:204). This means that presupposed or implied meaning of discourse was left aside since it is subject to personal interpretation. The unity of analysis is a statement made by an institutional actor in Switzerland. I deliberately distance myself from the better-known claims analysis. Claims are generally defined as being “strategic demands made by […] collective actors within a specific contested issue field” (Koopmans and Statham 1999:206). However, I would like not only to include strategic political demands in my analysis, but also general statements made by both state and non-state actors. The purpose of this choice is to capture the overall discursive climate prevailing in the debate on otherness in Switzerland. Every statement in direct or indirect speech made by an institutional actor on either foreigners, Muslims or Islam was coded according to the coding scheme listed in the Appendix. A statement repeated by the same actor in the same article was not coded twice. Institutional actors are understood as being actors belonging to a political institution (e.g. government, parliament, political party), an institution in the civil society (e.g. unions, foreigners‘ association, churches, Universities) or the media (journalists). This choice is based on the assumption that institutional actors represent the institutions they are part of and gain more visibility and power in public discourse than individual actors during direct democratic campaigns (see also Hänggli 2010 and Marquis 2006). Moreover, institutional actors have a strong decisional power, both on legislative and executive level (Mader and Schinzel 2012:117-118). In an exploratory analysis conducted on a small sample of 60 newspaper articles (five articles per newspaper per year), the coding scheme was established inspired by the EURISLAM Project17. After many tests, a list of six exhaustive topics was determined. A statement could therefore be coded as referring to integration, economy, criminality, culture, religion or

16 The newspaper articles were coded manually by one single coder. However, a intercoder reliability test was conducted on 30 articles by a second coder. The results of this test were encouraging: 70% of the statements coincide. 17 For more information see www.eurislam.eu (13/06/18). I would like to thank Elisa Banfi for her precious advice during the elaboration of the coding scheme.

23 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners gender. As mentioned before, culture and religion are topics which are closely related and sometimes hard to distinguish. I therefore chose a relatively narrow definition of religion, coding only statements which explicitly referred to religion, such as e.g. religious freedom, Islamophobia, or Christian values. Culture was understood in a broader sense including statements about e.g customs, Swiss identity and (non-religious) values. Furthermore, I created a variable which should seize the way an institutional actor evaluates the target (foreigner or Muslim). This variable almost corresponds to Koomen, Tillie, van Heelsum and van Stiphout’s (2013:193) position variable which aims at “[…] captur[ing] the problems of stigmatization and the creation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories. An increasing negative position in the debate emphasies the problematisation of Islam/ Muslims […]”. Instead of using only two categories (negative/positive) in my analysis, statements were assigned an evaluation determining if the target was depicted as being either problematic, unproblematic or as a victim. As can be seen in the coding scheme, in a statement about the incompatibility of Swiss and Muslim lifestyles, for example, the target would be coded as problematic. A statement deploring that foreigners are unrightfully accused of crimes would be put into the victim category. A target could be evaluated as unproblematic when an institutional actor claimed foreigners not to be more criminal than natives.

24 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

4 Analysis

4.1 Figures of otherness

Analyzing the targets of the public discourse on otherness, table 1 shows the results regarding the level of attention which Muslims and foreigners get in public discourse in the last decade in Switzerland. Following Ruedin and Berkhout (2012:10), the level of attention for a target or the importance of a topic, for example, are measured by its salience.

Table 1: Salience of statements on Muslims and foreigners % (N) 2000 2004 2009 Target Foreigners 82.8 (72) 63.0 (97) 18.2 (47) Muslims 12.6 (11) 33.1 (51) 49.6 (128) Islam 4.6 (4) 3.9 (6) 32.2 (83) Total 100.0 (87) 100.0 (154) 100.0 (258) N=499; Cramer’s V=0.40

It is obvious that the results contain a certain bias. Indeed, the level of attention was measured during direct democratic campaigns targeting foreigners or Muslims respectively. However, it is interesting to see that discourse on Muslims is already present in 2000, invalidating the assumption about the appearance of the Muslim population after 9/11. Of the 15 statements made about Muslims in 2000, 14 were found in newspapers from the French-speaking part of Switzerland. This result confirms the postulate about the segmentation of the Swiss media space (Kriesi, Wernli, Sciarini and Gianni 1996): the debate on the Islamic headscarf is already present in the French-speaking part of Switzerland before 2001. Since then, the level of attention of the Muslim minority is steadily growing. Interestingly enough, one third of the statements made in 2004 were about Muslims, even though the referendum clearly targeted foreigners. The direct democratic campaign drifted towards Muslims after the publication of a poster stating that the majority of the Swiss population would soon belong to the Muslim faith if second- and third-generation immigrants had an easier access to the naturalization procedures (Behloul 2011:304-305). In 2009, Muslims and Islam clearly become the most important targets of public discourse. While quite invisible in 2000 and 2004, one third of the claims made in 2009 are about Islam. With other words, the Muslim faith

25 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners becomes the second-largest concern during the debate on the anti-minaret initiative. Does this phenomenon illustrate a process of generalization of statements on the Muslim population in public discourse?

Graph 1: Level of generalization of statements on Muslims and foreigners (N=497)

Graph 1 shows the level of generalization of statements made about Muslims and foreigners from 2000 to 2009. The level of generalization measures if a statement was made about one individual only, about a minority within the group, or about the whole group. The results show a most definite relative increase in generalization of statements about Muslims. While 53.4% of all statements about Muslims concerned the whole group (Muslims) or the religion (Islam) in 2000, it was 70.2% in 2004 and 85.3% in 2009. The inverted trend can be observed for statements about foreigners. Let us now turn to the question whether certain foreigners became Muslims, as e.g. Ettinger and Imhof (2011) state. The idea, as put forward by the authors, is that the focus of attention shifted from a minority’s nationality to their religion.

26 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

In practice, this hypothesis is difficult to assess since the target’s nationality is not mentioned often in the analyzed statements and some samples were too small to analyze. Interesting results were found concerning immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia and Turkey, Switzerland’s two largest immigrant groups with Islamic background (Behloul 2009). As table 2 clearly shows, ex-Yugoslavs and Turks were classified as foreigners in 2000 and still mostly perceived as foreign in 2004 (68.8% of all statements). However, in 2009, more than half of all statements about ex-Yugoslavs and Turks categorize them as Muslims.

Table 2: Classification of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks in 2000, 2004 and 2009 % (N) 2000 2004 2009 Identity Foreign 100.0 (3) 68.8 (22) 45.5 (5) Muslim 0.0 (0) 31.2 (10) 54.5 (6) Total 100.0 (3) 100.0 (32) 100.0 (11) N=46; Cramer’s V=0.28

Even though a consequential shift can be observed, the classification of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks according to their cultural or ethnic background is still persistent. This result could be explained with Behloul’s (2011) findings. In his study on the strategies of self-representation of Bosnian Muslims in Switzerland, the author holds that Bosnian Muslims succeeded in underlining their European cultural heritage to create a positive image in public discourse. The distinction between European and non-European immigrants plays a greater role for characterizing Bosnian Muslims than their religion (Behloul 2011). As a consequence, the Islamization process was not uniform across immigrant groups. The first hypothesis, holding that certain immigrant groups became Muslim after 2001 is verified considering 2009 as a turning point. While the identifying characteristic of ex- Yugoslavs and Turks is their nationality in the public debate on otherness before 2009, the focus shifts towards their Islamic belief during the anti-minarets campaign. While this result can seem quite intuitive in the first place given the nature of the initiative, it certainly raises questions as to how the change of perception of a minority can change both the tone and the content of the discourse on that minority. As will be shown in the next section (4.2), the topics addressed and the evaluations made in the discourse on otherness depend on who is targeted by this discourse. Classifying ex-Yugoslavian and

27 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Turkish nationals into the generic group of Muslims automatically leads to attributing them a certain range of problems, problems which they did not seem to have when they still were perceived as foreigners. As a consequence, depending on the identifying characteristic stressed, another type of discourse is hold about – demographically speaking – the same minority. The results presented in this section show that there has been a change concerning the main target of the discourse on otherness: while Muslims get increasing attention in the public sphere, foreigners shift into the background. However, this result is mostly due to the fact that the first two direct democratic campaigns targeted foreigners, whereas the last one addressed Muslims and Islam. It would therefore have been interesting to compare these results with data from more recent events to establish whether there is a lasting trend towards more attention for Muslims. It can indeed reasonably be expected that the level of attention for foreigners increased during the direct democratic campaign for the “Expulsion of criminal foreigners” in November, 2010. Furthermore, the results show that the raising attention for the Muslim population is accompanied by an increasing generalization of the statements made about this minority. The second hypothesis is therefore verified as well. After this close look at the targets of the discourse on otherness, table 3 shows which institutional actors are involved in this discourse. The patterns of institutional actors involved in the discourse on Muslims and on foreigners are, as expected, quite similar. The journalists18 and the governmental parties stand for most statements on foreigners and on Muslims. Surprisingly, the government is more active in the discourse on foreigners. This result is due to the very active engagement of Ruth Metzler, member of the federal government at that time, against the initiative for the limitation of foreigners’ quotas in Switzerland in 2000. Without surprise, foreigners’ associations participate in the discourse on foreigners, while Muslim actors mobilize in the discourse on Muslims. Muslims’ and foreigners’ associations, however, are not granted much space in the discourse on otherness. The relatively scarce participation of Muslim actors can certainly partly be explained by the lack of organization of the religious minority. Indeed, Muslims in Switzerland are mostly organized according to ethnic lines in civil society and do not have an official spokesperson or organization recognized as

18 The great majority of statements (70.2%) made by journalists do not contain any kind of personal opinion. In the analysis, both statements with and without a personal opinion were included since the aim is to give general overview on the topics and evaluations found in the discourse on Muslims and on foreigners in Switzerland.

28 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners the main negotiator by the public authorities (Report of the Federal Council 2013:22- 24 and 90). As Behloul (2011:307) and Ruedin and Berkhout (2012) observed as well, the discourse on Muslims is mostly made by non-Muslim actors. Indeed, many experts express themselves about Islam and its role in the Swiss society. Actors representing economic institutions, on the other hand, make more statements about foreigners than about Muslims. This result will be underlined by the following analysis on the topics addressed in the discourse on foreigners and on Muslims. Moreover, a complimentary analysis19 shows that one governmental party introduced the Muslim minority into the public discourse before other parties. Indeed, two candidates of the Christian Democratic Party (CVP/PDC) wearing the Islamic headscarf were running for office in the canton of Basel in 2004. The candidates and the party got increased media attention and expressed themselves on issues regarding the Muslim community and women’s role in Islam. However, the question whether this discussion in particular had an influence on the general level of attention for Muslims cannot be answered with the data at hand.

Table 3: Institutional actors involved in the discourse on otherness % (N) Foreigners Muslims Actors Government and administration 14.4 (31) 8.5 (24) Parliament 1.4 (3) 1.1 (3) Judiciary and police 2.3 (5) 1.1 (3) Governmental parties 22.7 (49) 30.7 (87) Other parties 1.9 (4) 2.8 (8) Civil society Foreigners’ associations 2.3 (5) 0.4 (1) Muslim actors 0.0 (0) 7.8 (22) Economic actors 4.6 (10) 0.7 (2) Other civil society 2.3 (5) 4.6 (13) Specialists/Experts 4.6 (10) 11.6 (33) Journalists 40.7 (88) 26.5 (75) Other actors 2.8 (6) 4.2 (12) Total 100.0 (216) 100.0 (283)

19 See tables 20 to 22 in the Appendix.

29 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

After having observed the targets of the public discourse on otherness, let us now turn to the differences between the perceptions of Muslims and of foreigners. The following section will examine the topics addressed and the evaluations of the targets.

4.2 Differences in topics

The first difference which can be observed in the discourses on Muslims and on foreigners are the topics addressed in the statements. As can be seen in graph 2, the most important topic mentioned in statements about foreigners in 2000 is integration (40.3% of all statements on foreigners). While this topic looses its significance for foreigners, it becomes increasingly important in the discourse on Muslims in 2004 and 2009. The results clearly show a shift in public discourse where Muslims replace foreigners as the main targets in the debate on integration.

Graph 2: Topics addressed by target and year (N=499)

The discourse on Muslims evolves primarily around religion: religion stays the most important topic in relation to Muslims throughout the entire timeline (around 40% of all statements on Muslims). Culture and religion follow very dissimilar patterns. While

30 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners culture is mentioned only in relation to foreigners in 2000, this topic brought up as often in statements on foreigners as in statements on Muslims in 2004 and 2009. Interestingly, Muslim culture does not seem to be an important topic in 2009 (12.8%), and it is mentioned at the same frequency as the culture of foreigners (12.3%). As a consequence, it seems that the direct democratic debate on the anti-minarets initiative was mostly a debate about religion and integration, and only marginally about culture. As culture and integration move into the background in the discourse on foreigners, economy comes into view in 2004 and becomes the most important topic in 2009. In contrast, economy is almost never mentioned in statements on Muslims. These results resonate with Giugni and Morariu’s (2010) study on the perception of Muslims and foreigners in the Swiss public opinion: “Here [in the attitudes about Muslims] the crucial issue is not competition on the labor market, but Swiss and, more generally, Western, identity. Thus, regardless of whether this is a rational or irrational response, clearly many people today see Islam in Europe as a threat to Western values and culture, which reflect on negative attitudes toward Muslims” (Giugni and Morariu 2010:95; see also Green et al. 2010). The authors conclude that the two populations represent different kinds of threats: religious threat in the case of Muslims and economic threat for foreigners. The frequency of gender issues fluctuates in the discourse on Muslims. 40% of all claims on Muslims were about gender in 2000. As seen before, this depends on the debate on the Islamic headscarf in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. The attention for gender issues dropped relatively to the other topics in 2000, to grow again in 2009 (from 5.3% in 2004 to 10.9% in 2009). In relation to foreigners, gender appeared in 2004 to stay at a similar level of attention in 2009 (4.1% and 4.2% of all claims respectively). More than looking at the distribution of the different topics between the two subgroups, the gathered data allows me to assess more exactly if certain topics have a bigger or smaller chance to appear in relation to Muslims or to foreigners. To that purpose, a multinominal logistic regression model was calculated including all three periods of time, the target of the statement being the independent variable and culture being the reference category among the dependent topic variables. Newspaper and year were introduced as control variables20. Except for integration, the influence of the target of a statement on the topic addressed is highly significant. The effects of the newspaper and the year are significant only in certain cases, but the influence always stays weaker

20 See table 25 in the Appendix.

31 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners Graph 3: Occurrence of topics by target, predicted probabilities (N=499, confidence intervals=95%, Newspaper=NZZ, Year=2009)

32 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners than the main effect. The only exception is gender, where the control variables have a stronger effect on the topic than the target. Graph 3 shows the medium predicted probabilities for the occurrence of the analyzed topics in the NZZ in 2009. From the marginsplot in the upper right corner, e.g., it is apparent that, relatively to the topic culture, the topic criminality is more probable to be addressed when the statement is about foreigners than if the statement is about Muslims. This fact is already revealed by Schranz and Imhof (2002): even though Muslims are seen as problematic in Swiss society, criminality is not a topic related to this minority. Indeed, this topic is mentioned far more often in the discourse on foreigners. Religion is more probable to appear in relation to Muslims, while economy clearly is a subject specific to foreigners.Integration , culture and gender have slightly higher chances to be mentioned in relation to Muslims than to foreigners, but the position of the confidence intervals show that the differences are not very sharp. These results thus only partly verify the third hypothesis.

4.3 Differences in evaluations

As is apparent from graph 4, foreigners and Muslims are mostly seen as problematic in public discourse. However, it is interesting to see that Muslims are depicted as relatively more problematic (80.0% of all statements on Muslims) than foreigners (50.0%) in 2000, even though the direct democratic campaign is targeting foreigners as being the country’s largest problem at that time. Once again, this is due to the debate on the Islamic headscarf in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. In 2004 and 2009, the differences are minimal. In 2009, even though the focus of public discourse lies on the Muslim population, foreigners are still seen as problematic. As a consequence, we cannot generally claim that Muslims replaced foreigners as Switzerland’s only problematic minority in public discourse on otherness.

33 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Graph 4: Evaluations by targets and year (N=499)

Graph 5: Evaluations by topic and target (N=499)

34 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

The results displayed in graph 5 show that certain topics are seen as being more problematic than others in public discourse. Both Muslims and foreigners are perceived as highly problematic when integration or criminality are addressed. Interestingly, in relation to cultural issues, both Muslims and foreigners are seen as mostly unproblematic. On the other hand, Muslims are seen as mostly problematic when the statement concerns religion, while this is not the case for foreigners. In relation to gender issues, negative evaluative frames are much more recurrent in statements on Muslims (68.7%) than on foreigners (42.9%). Finally, foreigners are clearly perceived as more problematic than Muslims when economy is addressed. Muslims are indeed seen as 100.0% unproblematic on this subject. These results resonate with Giugni and Morariu (2010) and Green et al.’s (2010) findings: Muslims seem to be perceived as a religious problem, whereas foreigners are perceived as an economic threat. As opposed to what was expected, Muslims are not seen as being problematic regardless the topic. The fourth hypothesis thus has to be rejected. There are differences as to how parties perceive and evaluate foreigners and Muslims respectively as well. As we can see in graph 6, the SVP sees Muslims as mostly problematic (96.3%).

Graph 6: Evaluations by party and target (N=148)

35 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Without surprise, the results show that other parties do not evaluate Muslims so negatively (16.7% for the Social Democratic Party, SPS/PSS to 73.5% for the CVP). The discourse of the CVP, which sees Muslims as very problematic as well (73.5%), was mostly done by Christophe Darbellay, president of the party, who campaigned for a ban of the Islamic burqa in Switzerland. In the discourse of the SPS, Muslims are considered to be mostly victims (50.0%). Both parties at the opposite poles of the political spectrum, the SVP and the SPS evaluate foreigners similarly to Muslims, whereas the Liberal Party (FDP/PRD) and the CVP see Muslims as clearly more problematic than foreigners.

Furthermore, Muslims and foreigners are evaluated differently according to their sex. As mentioned in the Literature Review, several authors who examine the gendered perception of immigrants claim that Muslim women are seen as victims in need of Western liberation, while Muslim men are seen as oppressive and therefore problematic (Cooke 2002, Lutz 1997, Mishra 2007). Even though the sex of the target was not mentioned often in the statements, some interesting results are shown in graph 7.

Graph 7: Evaluations by sex and target (N=68)

36 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

As expected, male targets are always seen as more problematic than female ones. Foreign women are mainly seen as victims, whereas Muslim women are seen as problematic, even if much less than Muslim men, which are never perceived as unproblematic. This negative evaluation of Muslim women is due to the debate on the Islamic headscarf, which is considered to be an obstacle to integration. These results contradict the conclusions of some studies on the gendered perception of Muslims (e.g. Lutz 1997): in Switzerland, Muslim women are not mainly perceived as victims.

37 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

5 Discussion

The reason why I decided to analyze the public discourse on otherness in Switzerland began with the observation that the Muslim population, which was still invisible in the late 1990s, suddenly became the minority which raised most political controversy. Muslims were targeted by two national direct democratic campaigns and countless political affairs and they found themselves at the heart of the current Swiss debate on immigration, inter-cultural relations and national identity. Despite this drastic increase of attention for the Muslims, their relative share in the entire population almost stagnated: “Looking at the debate in Switzerland, it is apparent that the political debate is disconnected from the share of Muslims in the population. The proportion of Muslims in Switzerland has not changed dramatically between 1995 and 2009” (Ruedin and Berkhout 2012:20). Moreover, several studies highlight the increasing homogenization and generalization of statements on Muslims (Behloul 2011, Ettinger and Imhof 2011, Gianni 2009) ever since the discourse on otherness focuses on this minority. However, the composition of the Muslim population in Switzerland has not changed much since 2000, except for the higher proportion of Swiss citizens within this minority. According to the literature certain topics, such as religion and gender, become more salient with the appearance of the Muslim minority in the public debate on otherness and contribute to the construction of the Muslim minority as the main threat to Swiss identity. Without having the possibility to compare the discourse on this minority with the discourse on the generic group of foreigners, however, it seems hardly possible to affirm the specificity of the discourse on Muslims. A database was created in order to confront affirmations and hypotheses on the discourse on the Muslim population found in scientific literature with the discourse on foreigners empirically. Almost 500 newspaper articles from four major Swiss newspapers were coded, extracting the statements made by institutional actors on both foreigners and Muslims during three direct democratic campaigns in 2000, 2004 and 2009. The results show that there are significant differences between the discourse on foreigners and on Muslims. First of all, the data indicates an increasing focus on the Muslim minority in Switzerland, even though this result might be relativized by more recent direct democratic campaigns. Nevertheless, the statements made by institutional actors show a rising concern about Islam, which is accompanied by a tendency for generalizing statements

38 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners about the entire Muslim minority. Secondly, the topics addressed in the discourse differ according to the target of the discourse. While it was expected that religion turned out to be the most important topic in relation to Muslims, it was interesting to note that culture was equally salient for both foreigners and Muslims. Moreover, both groups were considered to be mostly unproblematic when it comes to cultural issues. It seems that problems with the Muslim minority are attributed to Islam and not to ethno-cultural heritage. A qualitative analysis would be necessary, though, to get a better understanding of this apparently clear- cut distinction between religion and culture. Gender issues could not be attributed to Muslims, as the literature and the expectations suggested. It seems, however, that this topic is getting increasingly important, both in relation to Muslims and to foreigners. In my opinion, it is possible that future debates on inter-cultural relations and integration could include arguments on gender to illustrate a presumed border between Swiss and other values (Gianni and Clavien 2012). During the direct democratic campaign on the initiative on the “Expulsion of criminal foreigners” in 2010, for example, the right- conservative initiative committee launched a campaign referring to violence towards women21 to justify their demand to deport criminal foreigners. Further research on this subject should be done to assess more thoroughly if and how gender is an argument which contributes to a wider discourse on otherness. Thirdly, both Muslims and foreigners are mostly seen as problematic, but concerning different issues. Muslims, for example are clearly not perceived as a problem concerning economical issues, while integration and gender seem to be contentious topics. The evaluation changes according to the political parties as well. Muslims are considered as mostly problematic by all governmental parties, except by the SPS. Interestingly, the FDP and CVP hold them to be much more problematic than foreigners, while there are no noticeable differences between how Muslims and foreigners are perceived, both by the SPS and the SVP. Finally, the result which spans all findings mentioned above and stroke me the most, is that some immigrant groups are no longer identified according to their ethnicity or nationality, but in relation to their religion (see also Ettinger and Imhof 2011). Ex- Yugoslavs and Turks who are mostly categorized as Muslims in 2009 were perceived

21 The figurehead of the campaign was the imaginary Ivan S., rapist (see http://www.ausschaffungsinitiative. ch/de/komitee/index.html; 13/01/20)

39 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners as foreigners in 2000. Along with this change of focus concerning the identifying characteristic of this group comes shift in problematization of the group: other topics are addresses, other evaluations made – even though the demographic realities do not change. As a consequence, the discourse on Muslims can indeed be considered to hold certain specificities. More than being perceived as more problematic than foreigners for the Swiss society, the public discourse on this minority also circles around different issues. In my opinion, however, the specificity of the discourse on Muslims is not only the topics addressed and the evaluations made, but a more general change of public perception of a minority. Through this analysis, I was able to show that the awareness of the presence of the Muslim minority grew steadily and became increasingly generalizing since 2000, despite the fact that the relative share of Muslims in the whole population remained more or less the same. Of course, the responsibility for this shift in perception cannot be imputed to Swiss institutional actors only. International events certainly play a very important role on the changing view on Islam in Switzerland. Unfortunately, it was impossible to say how newspaper articles about Islam abroad influence the discourse on Islam and Muslims in Switzerland based on the data gathered in this project22. As mentioned in the Introduction, the results presented in this paper could contribute to the ongoing academic and political debate on integration. The observed shift in the public perception of the Muslim minority in Switzerland should indeed raise some questions about the coherence of the definition of integration norms and policies. Indeed, since the shift of perception, Muslims are seen as posing an integration problem as a religious minority, while this problem was less serious before when they were perceived as national minorities. Indeed, according to the idea lying behind what I called the two-circles policy, EU and EFTA citizens are considered to be culturally

22 For an analysis on the impact of dramatic events on the national debates on Islam in Europe see Vanparys, Jacobs and Torrekens (2013). This paper contains further limitations, mostly due to restrictions made for reasons of feasibility. As mentioned before, the inclusion of the public discourse during the direct democratic campaign on the initiative for the “Expulsion of criminal foreigners” in 2010 would have been helpful for the sake of comparison. The additional coding work would have taken more than the available time. A more in-depth approach including a qualitative content analysis to understand the finer differences in argumentation had to be abandoned as well. Moreover, it would have been interesting to include more keywords in the search for newspaper articles. This may have allowed a further comparison with the discourse on asylum seekers, another controversial group in Switzerland.

40 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners close to Swiss values and easy to integrate into the Swiss society (D’Amato 2010). Muslims living in Switzerland, however, are not perceived according to their - mostly European - nationality any more, but according their religious belonging. In addition, religion is the most salient topic in public discourse on Muslims. The shift in focus on one composition of the Muslims’ identity to another - from ethno-national to religious belonging - thus renders them culturally more distant in public discourse and therefore more difficult to integrate than European citizens. Ettinger and Imhof (2011) come to the same conclusions. The shift in perception from national to religious typification of Muslims is connected to the belief, that Swiss and Muslim values are incompatible (Ettinger and Imhof 2011:13). Furthermore, there is an inadequacy between the newly emerged categories in public discourse and the existing integration policies. Koomen et al. (2013), find that discursive framing of Muslims in the French, British, Dutch and German print media depends on the conceptualization of group categorization and distinction in integration debates, and not on national integration policies. While current integration criteria mostly rely on professional qualification and economic independence (D’Amato 2010), religion appears to become a relevant category in public discourse on integration. Ruedin and Berkhout (2012:25) make the same observation: “Policy and political arenas seem to operate in relative isolation. More bluntly, it seems that religious categories are not used in (citizenship) policy arenas whereas they are, or have become, part of political discourse”. In the face of this discrepancy, Gianni (2005) raises the question about whether current integration criteria which focus on economic viability are adequate to include a population which is defined as a religious minority in public discourse. This question seems even more accurate considering the fact that Muslims are perceived as mostly unproblematic in relation to economic issues and therefore should not raise so much concern for integration as it is defined by current policy. The author therefore suggests a more intense dialogue between the authorities and the Muslim communities in order to find practical accommodation to issues concerning Islam specifically, e.g. cemeteries (Gianni 2005). However, existing issues attributed to Islam or the assumed cultural distance of Muslims can often be explained by other factors than religion. Radtke’s (2003) analysis of multicultural policies in Germany, for example, cites institutional discrimination and unequal treatment as the main sources for the potential social exclusion of Muslims in society. Even the Swiss Federal council admits in its report on the situation of Muslims

41 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners in Switzerland (2013:81) that the religious belonging mostly is unproblematic: “[…] ce n’est pas l’appartenance religieuse en soi qui crée des problèmes en matière d’intégration. En effet, ces problèmes ont le plus souvent des causes socioculturelles, économiques et migratoires.” Nevertheless, public or media discourse can influence both attitudes and – in the Swiss system of direct democracy – public policies (Ettinger and Imhof 2011, Mader and Schinzel 2012, Vatter 2011a and 2011b). It therefore is crucial to get a better understanding of the dynamics of the public discourse on otherness, the causes and impacts of the shift in perception of Muslims and the increasing interest for this minority. Further research is needed to understand the importance of public representation of minorities for their integration. Demographic realities - as we saw - do not measure up to public perceptions.

42 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

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‣ Vatter, Adrian (2011b). „Direkte Demokratie und religiöse Minderheiten in der Schweiz: Tyrannei der Mehrheit oder ausgebauter Minderheitenschutz?“. NFP 58 „Religionsgemeinschaften, Staat und Gesellschaft“. http://www.nfp58.ch/ d_kommunikation_publikationen_projektpublikationen.cfm (13/01/10)

‣ Volpp, Leti (2000). „Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior“. Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, 12: 89-116.

‣ Wessendorf, Susanne (2008). „Culturalist discourses on inclusion and exclusion: the Swiss citizenship debate“. Social Anthropology, 16(2): 187-202.

‣ Report of the Federal Coucil on the situation of Muslims in Switzerland: Rapport du Conseil fédéral sur la situation des musulmans en Suisse, eu égard en particulier à leurs relations plurielles avec les autorités étatiques, en réponse aux postulats 09.4027 Amacker-Amann du 30 novembre 2009, 09.4037 Leuenberger du 2 décembre 2009 et 10.318 Malama du 1er mars 2010 (2013/05/08). http:// www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/pressemitteilung/2013/2013-05-08/ber-f.pdf (13/05/11)

48 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

7 Appendix

7.1 Coding scheme

Source: General information Variable label Variable name Codes Modalities np Newspaper 1 Le Temps 2 NZZ 3 Le Matin 4 Blick year Year YYYY month Month MM day Day DD title Title - section Section 0 no section 1 Suisse/Schweiz 2 International 3 Opinons 4 Society 5 Economy 9 Front page (UNE) 10 Edito

11 Temps fort 12 Communication 13 Eclairages 14 Air du temps 15 Zooms

21 Eidgenössische Räte 22 Vermischtes 23 Fernsehen (Text) 24 Mensch und Arbeit 25 Hintergrund

31 Mode de Vie 32 Points Forts 33 Débat 34 Zoom, enquête 35 Actu

40 Blick news 41 Blick Duell

49 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Author: Which actor is the author of the statement? Variable label Variable name Codes Modalities author Author of statement 1 Journalist

100 National govnerment 110 Local governements

200 National parliament 201 Commissions 210 Local parliaments

300 Public authority/administration

400 Police and security agencies

500 Juridical authorities

Politicial parties 600 FDP/PRD 601 SVP/UDC 602 SPS/PSS 603 CVP/PDC 604 GPS/PES 605 SD/DS 606 LPS/PLS 607 EDU/UDF 609 other parties

Civil society 700 Union 701 Emloyers‘ organization 702 Economiesuisse 710 Foreigners‘ association 711 Muslims‘ association 712 Pro-minority/anti-racist/solidarity group 713 Racist/extreme-right group 714 Feminist organization 715 Chritstian organization 720 Christian authority (Church/Priest etc.) 721 Muslim authority (Mosque/Imam) 722 Jewish authority (Synagogue/Rabbi)

800 Specialist

900 Schools

999 other/actor unknown

50 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Variable label Variable name Codes Modalities authgen Author Gender 1 female 2 male 9 gender unknown/both authdist Author 1 own opinion Distance to statement 2 „Certain people think that...“ / „The people of Switzerland think that...“ 4 facts; no opinion

Target: Who is the target of the statement? Variable label Variable name Codes Modalities target Target 10 foreigner(s) 11 naturalized foreigner(s)/Swiss nationals with immigration background

20 Muslim(s) 21 Muslim(s) being Swiss nationals 22 Islam in general [go to scary; other variables not coded] 23 Muslim(s)/Islam abroad [go to musab; other variables not coded]

99 origin unknown tartype Target Type 10 group in general

20 some members of the group/a minority 21 extremists 22 moderates 23 youth 24 rich 25 2nd/3rd generation

30 individual

40 organization representing group

51 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

taremig Target 10 Western Europe Region of emigration 11 Eastern Europe 13 Ex-Yugoslavia 14 Turkey

20 Maghreb 21 Sub-Saharan Africa

30 Middle East

40 Asia

50 South America

60 USA, Canada, Australia

99 region of emigration unknown targen Target Gender 1 female 2 male 9 gender unknown/both tarlegal Target 1 legal Legal status 2 illegal/abusive 9 legal status unknown tarpermit Target 1 citizenship Kind of permit 2 permit in order (residence etc.) 3 asylum seeker 9 permit unknown

52 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Topics & Evaluations: What is the statement about? Evalutations: p=problem (1); v=victim (2); n=no problem (3) Variable label Variable name Codes Frame Modalities integ Integration 10 p integration impossible (no respect of democracy or Western world; refusal of integration) 11 p integration possible 12 p too many 13 p no special favors 14 p certain aspects not compatible with integration 15 p target scary 16 p certain aspects/symbols only scary

20 v fears exacerbated

30 n integration completed 31 n need to be accepted in CH 32 n not to be worried about crim Criminality 10 p endanger national security/terrorism 11 p violence/crime 12 p traffic offense 13 p asylum abuse/against Ausländergesetz

20 v false accusations of crime

30 n respect of law and order cult Culture 10 p no respect of customs 11 p Swiss identity in danger

20 v victims of xenophobia/racism

30 n some values shared 31 n respect customs 32 n cultural tolerance, anti-racism

53 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Variable label Variable name Codes Frame Modalities relig Religion 10 p against laïcité 11 p against Christian values 12 p religion-based terrorism 13 p fundamentalism 14 p conquest/islamization

20 v islamophobia 21 v against freedom of religion 22 v false accusations of terrorism 23 v confusion and mix-ups about religion

30 n religion must be respected in the name of freedom of religion 31 n shared fundamental values 32 n religion practiced peacefully gender Gender 10 p machismo 11 p against equality between the sexes 12 p against women‘s body integrity

20 v women victims of their culture/ religion 21 v women victims of Swiss discrimination (men/system)

30 n principle of equality respected 31 n women free to choose eco Economy 10 p job competition/wage dumping 11 p don‘t work 12 p swindle social security system 13 p work on black market 14 p don‘t pay taxes

20 v discriminated on working market 21 v exploitation

30 n work well 31 n workforce needed 32 n contribution to social security system needed 33 n foreign investment needed 34 n contribute to Swiss wealth/ economic growth

54 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Other variables Variable label Variable name codes modalities ex1 - ex3 Symbols/examples 10 minaret used to illustrate 11 burial ground statement about 12 imam Islam/Muslims 13 charia (up to 3) 14 halal 15 fundamentalism

20 veil 21 burqa 22 genital mutilation 23 honour crime 24 forced marriage 25 exemption from swimming classes/ against mixed swimming 26 sexual harrassment/rape

99 other musab Article on Islam 1 terrorism abroad 2 religious extremism 3 gender 9 other authcom Comment on author -

tarcom Comment on target -

topfrcom Comment on topic or - frame

55 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

7.2 Tables

Table 4: Number of articles N Le Temps NZZ Le Matin Blick Total Year 2000 15 54 24 15 108 2004 40 90 36 34 200 2009 58 67 24 27 176 Total 113 211 84 76 484

Table 5: Number of total statements N Le Temps NZZ Le Matin Blick Total Year 2000 24 62 43 19 148 2004 75 99 47 57 278 2009 113 118 53 55 339 Total 212 279 143 131 765

Table 6: Number of statements on foreigners and Muslims in Switzerland N Le Temps NZZ Le Matin Blick Total Year 2000 12 25 37 13 87 2004 47 28 28 51 154 2009 86 79 46 47 258 Total 145 132 111 111 499

Table 7: Level of generalization in 2000 % (N) Foreigners Muslims Target group in general 73.6 (53) 53.4 (8) some members of the group 22.2 (16) 33.3 (5) individual 4.2 (3) 13.3 (2) Total 100.0 (72) 100.0 (15) N=87; Cramer’s V=0.19

56 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners

Table 8: Level of generalization in 2004 % (N) Foreigners Muslims Target group in general 62.9 (61) 70.2 (40) some members of the group 25.8 (25) 10.5 (6) individual 11.3 (11) 19.3 (11) Total 100.0 (97) 100.0 (57) N=154; Cramer’s V=0.20

Table 9: Level of generalization in 2009 % (N) Foreigners Muslims Target group in general 54.3 (25) 85.3 (179) some members of the group 19.6 (9) 11.4 (24) individual 26.1 (12) 3.3 (7) Total 100.0 (46) 100.0 (210) N=256; Cramer’s V=0.36

Table 10: Topics addressed in 2000 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Topics Integration 40.3 (29) 20.0 (3) Criminality 20.8 (15) 0.0 (0) Culture 16.7 (12) 0.0 (0) Religion 0.0 (0) 40.0 (6) Economy 20.8 (15) 0.0 (0) Gender 1.4 (1) 40.0 (6) Total 100.0 (72) 100.0 (15)

N=87; Cramer’s V=0.84

Table 11: Topics addressed in 2004 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Topics Integration 30.9 (30) 24.6 (14) Criminality 17.5 (17) 0.0 (0) Culture 21.7 (21) 26.2 (15) Religion 2.1 (2) 43.9 (25) Economy 23.7 (23) 0.0 (0) Gender 4.1 (4) 5.3 (3) Total 100.0 (97) 100.0 (57)

N=154; Cramer’s V=0.63

Table 12: Topics addressed in 2009 57 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Topics Integration 21.3 (10) 34.1 (72) Criminality 27.7 (13) 3.8 (8) Culture 12.8 (6) 12.3 (26) Religion 0.0 (0) 38.4 (81) Economy 34.0 (16) 0.5 (1) Gender 4.2 (2) 10.9 (23) Total 100.0 (47) 100.0 (211)

N=258; Cramer’s V=0.67

Table 13: Evaluations in 2000 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Evaluation Problematic 50.0 (36) 80.0 (12) Victim 12.5 (9) 13.3 (2) Unproblematic 37.5 (27) 6.7 (1) Total 100.0 (72) 100.0 (15)

N=87; Cramer’s V=0.26 Table 11: Topics addressed in 2004 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Topics Integration 30.9 (30) 24.6 (14) Criminality 17.5 (17) 0.0 (0) Culture 21.7 (21) 26.2 (15) Religion 2.1 (2) 43.9 (25) Economy 23.7 (23) 0.0 (0) Gender 4.1 (4) 5.3 (3) Total 100.0 (97) 100.0 (57) Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners N=154; Cramer’s V=0.63

Table 12: Topics addressed in 2009 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Topics Integration 21.3 (10) 34.1 (72) Criminality 27.7 (13) 3.8 (8) Culture 12.8 (6) 12.3 (26) Religion 0.0 (0) 38.4 (81) Economy 34.0 (16) 0.5 (1) Gender 4.2 (2) 10.9 (23) Total 100.0 (47) 100.0 (211)

N=258; Cramer’s V=0.67

Table 13: Evaluations in 2000 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Evaluation Problematic 50.0 (36) 80.0 (12) Victim 12.5 (9) 13.3 (2) Unproblematic 37.5 (27) 6.7 (1) Total 100.0 (72) 100.0 (15)

N=87; Cramer’s V=0.26

Table 14: Evaluations in 2004 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Evaluation Problematic 48.5 (47) 40.4 (23) Victim 18.5 (18) 33.3 (19) Unproblematic 33.0 (32) 26.3 (15) Total 100.0 (97) 100.0 (57)

N=154; Cramer’s V=0.17

Table 15: Evaluations in 2009 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Evaluation Problematic 55.3 (26) 59.7 (126) Victim 21.3 (10) 20.9 (44) Unproblematic 23.4 (11) 19.4 (41) Total 100.0 (47) 100.0 (211)

N=258; Cramer’s V=0.05

Table 16: Evaluations by topics for foreigners 2000-2009 % (N) Integration Criminality Culture Religion Economy Gender 58Evalua Problematic 71.0 (49) 84.4 (38) 7.6 (3) 0.0 (0) 29.6 (16) 42.9 (3) tion Victim 4.4 (3) 11.1 (5) 46.2 (18) 100.0 (2) 11.1 (6) 42.9 (3) Un- 24.6 (17) 4.5 (2) 46.2 (18) 0.0 (0) 59.3 (32) 14.2 (1) problematic Total 100.0 (69) 100.0 (45) 100.0 (45) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (54) 100.0 (7)

N=216; Cramer’s V=0.49

Table 17: Evaluations by topics for Muslims 2000-2009 % (N) Integration Criminality Culture Religion Economy Gender Evalua Problematic 86.5 (77) 75.0 (6) 26.8 (11) 40.2 (45) 0.0 (0) 68.7 (22) tion Victim 3.4 (3) 0.0 (0) 34.3 (14) 36.6 (41) 0.0 (0) 21.9 (7) Un- 10.1 (9) 25.0 (2) 39.0 (16) 23.2 (26) 100.0 (1) 9.4 (3) problematic Total 100.0 (89) 100.0 (8) 100.0 (41) 100.0 (112) 100.0 (1) 100.0 (32)

N=283; Cramer’s V=0.36 Table 14: Evaluations in 2004 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Evaluation Problematic 48.5 (47) 40.4 (23) Victim 18.5 (18) 33.3 (19) Unproblematic 33.0 (32) 26.3 (15) Total 100.0 (97) 100.0 (57)

N=154; Cramer’s V=0.17

Table 15: Evaluations in 2009 % (N) Forgeigners Muslims Evaluation Problematic 55.3 (26) 59.7 (126) Victim 21.3 (10) 20.9 (44) Unproblematic 23.4 (11) 19.4 (41) Total 100.0 (47) 100.0 (211) Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners N=258; Cramer’s V=0.05

Table 16: Evaluations by topics for foreigners 2000-2009 % (N) Integration Criminality Culture Religion Economy Gender Evalua Problematic 71.0 (49) 84.4 (38) 7.6 (3) 0.0 (0) 29.6 (16) 42.9 (3) tion Victim 4.4 (3) 11.1 (5) 46.2 (18) 100.0 (2) 11.1 (6) 42.9 (3) Un- 24.6 (17) 4.5 (2) 46.2 (18) 0.0 (0) 59.3 (32) 14.2 (1) problematic Total 100.0 (69) 100.0 (45) 100.0 (45) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (54) 100.0 (7)

N=216; Cramer’s V=0.49

Table 17: Evaluations by topics for Muslims 2000-2009 % (N) Integration Criminality Culture Religion Economy Gender Evalua Problematic 86.5 (77) 75.0 (6) 26.8 (11) 40.2 (45) 0.0 (0) 68.7 (22) tion Victim 3.4 (3) 0.0 (0) 34.3 (14) 36.6 (41) 0.0 (0) 21.9 (7) Un- 10.1 (9) 25.0 (2) 39.0 (16) 23.2 (26) 100.0 (1) 9.4 (3) problematic Total 100.0 (89) 100.0 (8) 100.0 (41) 100.0 (112) 100.0 (1) 100.0 (32)

N=283; Cramer’s V=0.36

Table 18: Evaluations by sex for foreigners 2000-2009 % (N) Female Male Evaluation Problematic 25.0 (2) 69.6 (16) Victim 50.0 (4) 21.7 (5) Unproblematic 25.0 (2) 8.7 (2) Total 100.0 (8) 100.0 (23)

N=31; Cramer’s V=0.40

Table 19: Evaluations by sex for Muslims 2000-2009 % (N) Female Male Evaluation Problematic 44.8 (13) 87.5 (7) Victim 31.0 (9) 12.5 (1) Unproblematic 24.2 (7) 0.0 (0) Total 100.0 (29) 100.0 (8)

N=37; Cramer’s V=0.3

Table 20: Parties involved in discourse on foreigners and Muslims in 2000 % (N) SVP/UDC FDP/PRD CVP/PDC SPS/PSS Other parties Target Forgeigners 100.0 (8) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (3) 0.0 (0) Muslims 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (2)

Total 100.0 (8) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (3) 100.0 (2)59

Table 21: Parties involved in discourse on foreigners and Muslims in 2004 % (N) SVP/UDC FDP/PRD CVP/PDC SPS/PSS Other parties Target Forgeigners 47.4 (9) 50.0 (3) 36.4 (4) 66.7 (8) 80.0 (4) Muslims 52.6 (10) 50.0 (3) 63.6 (7) 33.3 (4) 20.0 (1) Total 100.0 (19) 100.0 (6) 100.0 (11) 100.0 (12) 100.0 (5)

Table 22: Parties involved in discourse on foreigners and Muslims in 2009 % (N) SVP/UDC FDP/PRD CVP/PDC SPS/PSS Other parties Target Forgeigners 15.0 (3) 15.4 (2) 10.0 (3) 20.0 (2) 0.0 (0) Muslims 85.0 (17) 84.6 (11) 90.0 (27) 80.0 (8) 100.0 (5) Total 100.0 (20) 100.0 (13) 100.0 (30) 100.0 (10) 100.0 (5) Table 18: Evaluations by sex for foreigners 2000-2009 % (N) Female Male Evaluation Problematic 25.0 (2) 69.6 (16) Victim 50.0 (4) 21.7 (5) Unproblematic 25.0 (2) 8.7 (2) Total 100.0 (8) 100.0 (23)

N=31; Cramer’s V=0.40

Table 19: Evaluations by sex for Muslims 2000-2009 % (N) Female Male Evaluation Problematic 44.8 (13) 87.5 (7) Victim 31.0 (9) 12.5 (1) Unproblematic 24.2 (7) 0.0 (0) Total 100.0 (29) 100.0 (8) Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners N=37; Cramer’s V=0.3

Table 20: Parties involved in discourse on foreigners and Muslims in 2000 % (N) SVP/UDC FDP/PRD CVP/PDC SPS/PSS Other parties Target Forgeigners 100.0 (8) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (3) 0.0 (0) Muslims 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (2) Total 100.0 (8) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (3) 100.0 (2)

Table 21: Parties involved in discourse on foreigners and Muslims in 2004 % (N) SVP/UDC FDP/PRD CVP/PDC SPS/PSS Other parties Target Forgeigners 47.4 (9) 50.0 (3) 36.4 (4) 66.7 (8) 80.0 (4) Muslims 52.6 (10) 50.0 (3) 63.6 (7) 33.3 (4) 20.0 (1) Total 100.0 (19) 100.0 (6) 100.0 (11) 100.0 (12) 100.0 (5)

Table 22: Parties involved in discourse on foreigners and Muslims in 2009 % (N) SVP/UDC FDP/PRD CVP/PDC SPS/PSS Other parties Target Forgeigners 15.0 (3) 15.4 (2) 10.0 (3) 20.0 (2) 0.0 (0) Muslims 85.0 (17) 84.6 (11) 90.0 (27) 80.0 (8) 100.0 (5) Total 100.0 (20) 100.0 (13) 100.0 (30) 100.0 (10) 100.0 (5)

Table 23: Evaluations by parties in discourse on foreigners 2000-2009 % (N) SVP/UDC FDP/PRD CVP/PDC SPS/PSS Other parties Evaluation problematic 90.0 (18) 28.6 (2) 44.5 (4) 15.4 (2) 25.0 (1) victim 0.0 (0) 42.8 (3) 33.3 (3) 46.1 (6) 25.0 (1) unproblematic 10.0 (2) 28.6 (2) 22.2 (2) 38.5 (5) 50.0 (2) Total 100.0 (20) 100.0 (7) 100.0 (9) 100.0 (13) 100.0 (4) N=53; Cramer‘s V=0.47

Table 24: Evaluations by parties in discourse on Muslims 2000-2009 % (N) SVP/UDC FDP/PRD CVP/PDC SPS/PSS Other parties Evaluation problematic 96.3 (26) 64.3 (9) 73.5 (25) 16.7 (2) 37.5 (3) victim 3.7 (1) 21.4 (3) 3.0 (1) 50.0 (6) 25.0 (2) unproblematic 0.0 (0) 14.3 (2) 23.5 (8) 33.3 (4) 37.5 (3) Total 100.0 (27) 100.0 (14) 100.0 (34) 100.0 (12) 100.0 (8) N=95; Cramer‘s V=0.43

60 Public discourse on Muslims and foreigners -3.791*** 499 -0.988* 0.290 2.798** 3.184*** 1.827* 1.481** Gender B 0.186 1.656*** -1.201** -0.970 -0.354 -0.318 -2.846*** -4.427*** Economy B -2.529*** -0.249 -0.103 -1.029* 0.272 -0.238 3.784*** Religion B 1.038** -1.578*** -1.014* 0.059 0.815 0.000 -2.544*** B Criminality 1.077*** -0.737** -0.107 -0.315 0.254 -1.143 -0.069 B Integration 2004 2000 Blick Le Matin Le Temps Le Topic (Culture) Topic 2 p ≤ 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 N R Constant Year (2009) Year Newspaper (NZZ) Muslim (foreigner) * (reference category) Table 25: Occurrence of topics by target (Multinominal logistic regression) of topics by target 25: Occurrence Table

61