ISSN 2054-2046

Justifying Militarisation; ‘Counter-Narcotics’ and ‘Counter Narco-Terrorism’

Ross Eventon Policy Report 3 | March 2015

Justifying Militarisation; ‘Counter-Narcotics’ and ‘Counter Narco-Terrorism’

Ross Eventon*

Policy Report 3 | March 2015

Key Points

• Three inter-related developments within US foreign policy have emerged in recent years: the militarisation of Central America states under the auspices of confronting drug trafficking organisations and improving human security; the deployment of militarised DEA agents overseas; and the emergence of ‘counter narco-terrorism’ as a means of justifying such policies.

• The DEA’s Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support Teams (FAST) carry out investigations and targeted interdiction operations overseas. They are an upgrade to a similar programme begun in the 1980s and later abandoned, and emerged in their recent form in Afghanistan in 2005 as a funding-focused counter-insurgency initiative. FAST have since been deployed in Central America where agents work alongside repressive security forces and have been implicated in a number of civilian deaths.

• A surge of US aid to Central American security forces justified largely as ‘counter-narcotics’ funding continues a well-established trend: ‘counter-narcotics’ is often a synonym for militarisation. Through its parallel support for ‘iron fist’ policies, Washington has deepened the repressive capabilities of the local security forces. The concern with drug trafficking and human security is superficial. The overarching aim of US funding is the opening of the local economies to foreign investment, and the support of local political groups amenable to this agenda.

• In justifying the increased aid to Central America, US officials present a simplistic interpretation of the local situation: drug trafficking and gangs are responsible for violence, and this means the ‘cartels’ must be ‘confronted’ militarily. The interpretation is useful in facilitating the fulfilment of strategic goals. In reality, the conditions in Central America - the rising levels of violence and trafficking, the poverty, the economic inequality, marginalisation and political repression - are in large part the result of Washington’s intervention.

• Linking these developments is the use by US officials of ‘counter narco-terrorism’ as a justification for chosen policies. In Afghanistan, FAST has been touted as such a programme - regardless of the fact that Washington does not officially consider the Taliban a terrorist group. In Central America, officials have publicly offered the same explanation for their policies without providing any substantiating evidence. A strenuous effort to generate such a connection appears to be underway, whether any link exists in reality or not.

• It is too easy to say ‘counter-narcotics’ operations are failing or misguided. Washington’s policies in Central America may well have disastrous results for many, but through the maintenance of a certain status quo and the improvement of the climate for business and investment, they are undoubtedly a success for others.

* Researcher, GDPO INTRODUCTION these other ‘wars’, it also serves to obscure In the decades since the US government context; to reduce the objective to fighting designated illicit drugs a threat to national or confronting an issue. FAST, which is touted security, overseas counter-narcotics policies as a spearhead of the counter narco-terrorism have become synonymous with militarisation. effort, provides a useful departure point for Funding justified under counter-narcotics has the discussion. served primarily to bolster local security forces, while Washington has advocated and directly taken part in a militarised approach to supply- side control, with an emphasis on fumigation THE RISE OF FAST and interdiction. Three recent and related The first of the US Drug Enforcement developments within this general trend will be Administration’s Foreign-Deployed Advisory discussed in this report. The first is the creation Support Teams began operating in Afghanistan of FAST (Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support in 2005.1 According to Michael Braun, a Teams), a relatively new Special Forces- former Chief of Operations at the DEA and style interdiction programme run by the US one of the founders of the programme, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The Afghan team was created following a request programme signifies a continued commitment from US Special Operations Command, which to militarised interdiction, a method wanted assistance ‘building criminal cases recognised as being ineffective and extremely against Afghan drug traffickers with ties to the cost-inefficient if the goal is reducing levels of Taliban.’2 The team has the following tasks: drug production. Second is the militarisation ‘[to] plan and conduct special enforcement of Central American governments over the operations; train, mentor, and advise foreign past decade via US aid ostensibly designed narcotics law enforcement units; collect and to confront drug trafficking organisations assess evidence and intelligence in support of and reduce violence. The impact has been US and bilateral investigations.’3 While building the emboldening of regimes supportive of US cases against traffickers, FAST members strategic objectives, including security forces are free to use ‘informants, [undercover] often guilty of severe human rights abuses. operations, interdiction operations, financial In Honduras, the case studied extensively investigations, and telephone intercepts’. The here, the impact has been to lock-in a post- Afghan-based operatives, who focus exclusively coup government friendly to Washington and on insurgency-linked traffickers, are justified committed to economic policies that prioritise on grounds of ‘counter narco-terrorism’ and are the interests of foreign investors and local closely integrated with the military campaign. elite groups. On investigation, there is little Quoting Braun: ‘virtually all counter narco- evidence of a genuine concern with counter- terrorism operations are now conducted by narcotics and violence in Central America. the DEA jointly with the U.S. Military Special But real strategic goals are being achieved. Forces, Afghan Army Commandos and the Third, and deeply entwined with the other Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan’ and developments, is the growing use of ‘counter the local team are ‘responsible for providing narco-terrorism’ to justify the continuation counter narco-terrorism support to the remote and expansion of old policies. With the War U.S. Military Forward Operating Bases spread on Terror and the War on Drugs coming under throughout the country’.4 Given the mandate, increasing scrutiny and losing their efficacy it is unsurprising that FAST members are often as motivators of public opinion, this amalgam ex-military; Richard Dobrich, the current head appears to provide a new means of garnering of the programme, is a former US Navy Seal. funds for the policies Washington wants. Like Armed like soldiers, FAST members are trained

2 like them too: before being sent overseas they if their local counterparts are attacked. undergo an 18-week programme hosted by US According to a US embassy spokesman the Special Operations that includes training in victim had reached for a holstered gun during ‘close quarter combat, shooting, surveillance the operation in which four individuals were detection, small unit tactics, combat arrested and 360 kilograms of cocaine seized, lifesaving, IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) leading the US embassy to praise what they and demolitions identification, counter-threat called ‘a great example of positive US- driving, land warfare, escape and evade Honduran cooperation’. A month later FAST methods, convoy operations, and counter- agents killed another suspected trafficker in narcotic tactical police operations.’.5 In 2009 equally murky circumstances. Self-defence the Afghan team drew some attention after was again the justification. Those killings they were involved in the capture of a well- followed a more prominent incident in May, known drug trafficker and Taliban supporter near the village of Ahuas, when a group named Haji Bagcho. Capitalising on the high- of civilians travelling along a river at night profile arrest the DEA requested funding from were fired upon by Honduran forces officially congress to expand the programme.6 The being advised, although evidence has since funding was granted. Reports suggest five suggested it was more like led, by FAST teams are currently active, one of which operatives.8 Four innocent people were killed remains stationed permanently in Afghanistan, in the attack. Villagers told reporters that the others based in Virginia and operating in after the shooting had subsided local forces the Western Hemisphere - in Honduras, Haiti, and ‘English-speaking commandos’ swept the Guatemala, Belize, and the Dominican Republic. area, breaking into homes and handcuffing The focus is on interdiction, although the residents.9 The killings caused outrage in tasks and level of involvement vary across the Honduras; protestors in the region demanded theatres of operation; according to available the foreign forces be expelled from the country. information, in Haiti and the Dominican But in standard Special Forces tradition there Republic FAST members are based in-country has been no accountability for killings in which for just a few weeks, operating helicopters FAST members played both direct and indirect and fixed wing aircraft with the sole aim of - although still substantial - roles. In the May tracking and intercepting drug flights.7 FAST 2012 case the DEA has refused to cooperate agents have also been involved in interdiction fully with the Honduran investigation.10 As around the coast of West Africa, although in other theatres of operations the US has there is as yet no evidence they operate on the consciously tried to avoid accountability for mainland in the same capacity as elsewhere. its forces. US helicopters flown in Honduras, for example, fall under the remit of the State FAST is a Bush-era initiative and, like many Department and Counter-Narcotics operations, such programmes, it has expanded under rather than the military, and foreign pilots Obama. But it was not until FAST members are used to avoid restrictions on weapon were involved in a number of killings in use applicable to US military forces; during Honduras that the first serious questions the fatal operation in May, FAST operatives were asked about the presence of heavily and local forces were accompanied by US militarised US law enforcement agents in a State Department helicopters equipped with growing list of foreign countries. In June 2012 machine guns and piloted by Guatemalans. If a FAST operative shot and killed a suspected past experience is a guide there will be no drug trafficker while on a mission with local repercussions for US agents. At the core of Honduran forces. Operatives are restricted the problem is the team’s legal status: FAST to using their weapons in self-defence or members are DEA employees, and hence

3 domestic law enforcement agents, but they THE MILITARISATION OF HONDURAS are trained like soldiers, armed like soldiers, often used to be soldiers, and are more free to

use their weapons than US soldiers in-country, Mexico who, outside of war zones, are only permitted Belize to open fire in self-defence. In a slideshow Guatemala presentation to a symposium on Special Honduras Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, FAST programme head Richard Dobrich confronts Nicaragua the critical question: ‘Is it a law enforcement mission or is it a military mission?’ And he Costa answers succinctly and enthusiastically: Rica ‘Both!!!’ Policing and warfare are thereby conflated with one core implication: US Panama domestic law enforcement agencies are now acting like the military overseas, even in Honduras countries not officially at war. For the past decade or so US funding has In Afghanistan, as officials have made clear, been flowing to Central America governments FAST concentrates exclusively on Taliban- with the ostensible aim of confronting drug linked traffickers: it is a funding-focused trafficking organisations and improving security counter-insurgency programme, not a serious in a region beset by rising levels of violence. The attempt to impact the drug trade. The leader focus of US funding is on the modernization of of the Afghan team has explained that the the security forces and interdiction operations focus is the insurgency: ‘It’s never just about targeting trafficking organizations. In Honduras seizing and destroying the drugs, it’s really (see map), there has been a parallel expansion more about the taking down, dismantling, of the US military presence. On analysis, it is the disruption of organizations’.11 The evident that recent militarisation continues involvement of the Afghan government in the an established trend, and serves long-held trade is substantial, as is the role of allied strategic goals. The local context in which the warlords, but they are not the targets. As funds are flowing is imperative in understanding the leading expert on opium production in Washington’s objectives. Afghanistan, David Mansfield, has pointed out, ‘A strategy that prioritises the “kill or capture” Like many countries in Latin America, almost of traffickers with links to the insurgency is most two centuries after independence Honduras likely to eliminate competition and increase remains burdened with the basic economic the market power of those government officials and political dispensation of colonialism. A involved in the trade.’12 The aim of FAST in small elite clique holds the vast majority of Afghanistan should not be separated from the the wealth and land, dominate the country’s wider strategic goals: it is part of a counter- political life, and dictate the national insurgency campaign, itself the military arm of economic agenda. At the other end of the an attempt to secure a client regime in Kabul. To social scale are the roughly two thirds of the determine the goals in the Western Hemisphere, population who live in poverty. In January it is worth considering the case of Honduras, 2006 the cycle of oligarchic dominance was host to one of the DEA’s new militarised teams interrupted by the election of Manuel Zelaya. and the local hub of the recently renewed US Zelaya had a conservative background and ‘Drug War’ in Central America. was hardly a radical, but on assuming office

4 he did institute various progressive reforms: the route has become more prominent, and he substantially increased social spending and the presence of Mexican ‘cartels’ in the region the minimum wage, and passed an agrarian has grown. This shift is the standard response reform law to try and correct the historic from traffickers to militarised crackdowns concentration of land among a small elite. He elsewhere, most notably in Mexico after 2006; also entered Honduras into ALBA, the coalition the famous ‘balloon-effect’. According to the formed back in 2006 by Cuba and Venezuela as US State Department, in 2012 ‘more than 80 a counterweight to the proposed Free Trade percent of the primary flow of the cocaine Area of the Americas, which was being led by trafficked to the United States first transited the US.13 Zelaya lasted just over 3 years in through the Central American corridor.’ office before being removed in June 2009 in a Estimates are that ‘as much as 87 percent coup.14 The reason was surmised afterwards of all cocaine smuggling flights departing by a local supporter: ‘In Honduras, we are South America first land in Honduras.’19 More accustomed to a government of the rich. And recently, as perhaps would be expected with the problem for our president, Mel Zelaya, a greater presence of trafficking organisations, was that he worked for the poor.’15 Although there is evidence of increased levels of illicit the coup was widely condemned, it is clear cultivation and drug production, including of from Washington’s behaviour at the time and opium poppy, taking place on Honduran soil.20 the subsequent support for the regime that US policy makers approved of the outcome. Expressing open opposition to state policies, 16 Moves towards land reform and other or defending those on the blunt end of them, progressive measures were halted by a post- remains a dangerous endeavour. Human coup interim government. Protesters went to rights advocates, trade unionists, journalists, the streets, and were violently suppressed. A environmental activists, opposition political crackdown on political opposition began: the activists, community leaders and others security forces and resurgent paramilitary working for the poor and marginalised groups linked to powerful sectors of society continue to be killed, threatened and harassed targeted opposition activists and the press, by paramilitary groups and the state security terrorising and killing with impunity; within forces, who collaborate and are often the same a year of the coup Reporters Without Borders people.21 Impunity for these attacks is the had identified Honduras as the world’s most norm; a situation that is unlikely to improve dangerous country for media workers, and any time soon: ‘After it arbitrarily dismissed in 2011 the Inter American Press Association four Supreme Court judges in December 2012,’ reported that ‘freedom of expression and the note Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Congress press have suffered an alarming reversal.’17 passed legislation empowering itself to remove justices and the attorney general, Assisted by rising levels of poverty and further undermining judicial and prosecutorial unemployment, and by a state and security independence.’22 According to the United apparatus heavily involved in the trade, drug Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of trafficking and organised crime have flourished Human Rights Defenders: in the post-coup environment.18 The movement of drugs through Central America to satisfy the ’The 2009 coup d’état aggravated institutional US market is not new - trafficking has existed in weaknesses, increased the vulnerability of Central America since the 1970s, and activity human rights defenders and provoked a major increased in the 1980s alongside massive US polarisation in society. Due to the exposed financial, diplomatic and military support for nature of their activities, human rights regimes involved in the trade - but recently defenders continue to suffer extrajudicial

5 executions, enforced disappearances, torture institutions is rife. Evidence suggests the and ill-treatment, death threats, attacks, public statements made by the former police harassment and stigmatisation.’23 commissioner Alfredo Landaverde are correct: the police are closely linked to drug trafficking Openly opposing the regime, explained local organisations, which also enjoy the protection radio station director Reverend Ismael Moreno of officials. In making such accusations publicly, Coto following the murder of a colleague, and claiming he had evidence that ‘major ‘means living with anxiety, insecurity, suspicion, national and political figures’ were involved distrust, demands, warnings, and threats. It in trafficking, Landaverde ‘uttered what few also means having to come to grips with the people have the courage to say out loud in this idea of death.’24 poor Central American nation’, reported the Miami Herald. The 71 year old appears to have The US government has been a staunch ally paid the price: he was shot to death when his of the post-coup regime. In the four years car stopped at traffic lights.27 following the removal of Zelaya, Tegucigalpa received a total of $350 million in assistance The police are notoriously corrupt, have been from Washington. Between 2010 and 2012, implicated in torture28, and regularly commit $50 million in aid was given to the security extra-judicial killings: between January forces guilty of widespread abuses against the 2011 and November 2012, 149 civilians were population.25 Citing this abuse, the New York- reported to have been murdered by the police, based Center for Constitutional Rights, which although Human Rights Watch consider the real has filed a lawsuit against the leaders of the figure to be higher. Public complaints about coup, called for funding to be stopped: these abuses go nowhere. 29 There is a growing body of evidence that the police do not just ‘The Honduran military and police have look the other way but are closely integrated engaged in systematic threats and violence with criminal gangs and drug traffickers, even against a number of groups and professions, acting as assassins-for-hire.30 Landaverde was including organized farmers, journalists, not an isolated case: many former high-level lawyers, members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, officials have accused the government and the and transgender (LGBT) community, members police of involvement in the drug trade and of the political opposition, and human rights cooperation with traffickers.31 The defence activists. The United States continues to fund minister has even gone so far as to claim 40 the Honduran police and military despite this per cent of the police force is involved in atrocious human rights record and despite trafficking.32 Efforts at reform have been half- numerous calls from members of Congress to hearted and ineffective.33 cut the funding.’26 The military forces have a similar history of More than 60 members of congress also abuse and corruption. Alongside side the official signed a letter requesting aid be cut, arguing forces are the growing number of paramilitary the continued funding of the local forces groups ‘often associated with government encourages the abuse. In their latest World officials, private companies and the security Report, Human Rights Watch find, ‘the forces, and linked to disputes over land and institutions responsible for providing public illegal mining concessions in rural areas.’34 security continue to prove largely ineffective Their role in these disputes has been to enforce and remain marred by corruption and abuse, the agenda of the local oligarchy, and to remove while efforts to reform them have made unwanted people from their land so that it can little progress.’ Corruption in government be exploited for business interests – a familiar

6 occurrence in Latin America.35 According to a over the rightful ownership of lands transferred study by the Norwegian Refugee Council and following a reform to the country’s agrarian the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre law’. The situation in Aguan is dire: between there are 17,000 internally displaced people in January 2010 and February 2012 there were Honduras. In the cities, displacement is often 88 murders in the region, and while the US the result of violent disputes among local gangs State Department described these as clashes ‘who provide security for drug trafficking cartels, between private security firms and farmers often with the complicity of local police forces’. trying to reclaim their land, the statistics imply Other factors driving displacement are ‘agrarian something more sinister. Seventy-eight of the conflicts, territorial disputes over trafficking murders, the international NGO Rights Action corridors and the political persecution of those found, ‘were targeted assassinations, 8 of who opposed the 2009 presidential coup’, and those preceded by abductions, their tortured the paramilitary and ‘private security’ forces bodies found later’. The report continues: who displace communities ‘at the behest of mining companies’.36 And, as in many other Latin ‘All of this points to one explanation: a death American cities, the displacement of people to squad is operating in the Aguan. This is not and within urban areas – overcrowding cities, news to anyone who lives there, where it is bringing inequalities into sharper contrast, considered common knowledge and it is widely creating a generation of disenfranchised youth – understood that police and military participate has contributed to growing levels of violence.37 in the killings. Dozens of acts of violence Poor, scared, lacking government assistance and intimidation have been carried out by and protection, many people have fled from the the Honduran military against campesino violence to the US – an illustrative development communities over the same time period and that will be discussed later in the report. geographical area where the death-squad killings have targeted campesinos, lending Given a free hand by the state, paramilitary greater credibility to the charge. While groups are enforcing the interests of elite masked gunmen have been killing campesinos, sectors; a UN Working Group has condemned the Honduran military’s 15th Battalion special the government’s refusal to regulate what forces unit and units or joint taskforces are known as ‘private security firms’ and associated with it, have been receiving training their ‘alleged involvement … in widespread from the U.S. armed forces Special Operations human rights violations including killings, Command South, SOCSOUTH, which is also disappearances, forced evictions, and sexual funding construction on the 15th Battalion’s violence’. One result is that land grabs by base in Rio Claro, Trujillo.’39 local elites and international corporations are on the rise. ‘Hundreds of thousands of At the crux of the conflict in the region are the peasants and indigenous people are being vast inequities in the distribution of land and violently displaced to make way for massive the suppression of local opposition struggling agrofuel projects, hydroelectric dams, paper against land grabbing. And in the background mills, gold mines and tourist resorts’, writes are the decades of neo-liberal economic Eric Holt Gimenez, the director of Food First, policies that have ‘set the stage for a massive a US based NGO focused on global hunger.38 re-concentration of land in the Aguan into the Likewise, HRW found, ‘Over 90 people have hands of a few influential elites,’ quoting Food been killed in recent years in land disputes in First researcher Tanya Kerssen in her book on the Bajo Aguán Valley, most of them since 2009’. the topic.40 ‘Militarization, supported by the These disputes ‘often pit international agro- U.S. government, will not resolve the underlying industrial firms against peasant organizations conflict and it clearly increases, rather than

7 decreases, the bloodshed,’ the Rights Action - 2014] has displayed in advancing national report concludes. In an attempt to justify the reconciliation and democratic and constitutional terror, local authorities have claimed, with no order’. Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas evidence, that a guerrilla group linked to drug Program for the Center for International Policy, trafficking is operating in the Aguan. With equal visited Honduras just before these comments empirical support the Israeli press has claimed were made (early 2012) and took away a Hezbollah is active on the Nicaraguan border, different impression of the situation on the something the local government picked up on ground. In an article titled ‘When Engagement and tried to use as justification for military Become Complicity: Honduran security forces operations. ‘The dangerous, unsubstantiated are murdering, raping, beating, and detaining and opportunistic accusations of narco-terrorism Hondurans — with U.S. Aid’, Carlsen quoted levied against the campesino movement in the the official statements and commented, ‘You’d Aguan by the military’, Rights Action observe, think they were talking about a different country ‘fit neatly into the U.S. objective of expanding from the one we visited just weeks before on a its military reach in the region’. fact-finding mission on violence against women. What we found was a nation submerged in Despite the record of the local security forces, violence and lawlessness, a president incapable Washington’s ambassador to the country, or unwilling to do much about it, and a justice while accepting ‘the police do not enjoy the system in shambles.’43 confidence of anybody in the country right now’, has stated they have shown themselves to be Throughout the region, the militarisation of ‘eager and capable partners’, thereby allowing local security forces with US funds is occurring the flow of money and the military cooperation under the umbrella of a fight against drug to continue. Some pauses on aid have taken trafficking and criminal organisations, and an place, but the funding is barely interrupted.41 attempt to improve citizen security. Writing A temporary freeze on aid to a police reform in the London Review of Books recently, programme was put in place in 2012 when the Nicaragua-based journalist John Perry points head of the Honduran National Police, Juan out, ‘The US under Bush and Obama has ramped Carlos Bonilla, was revealed to have previously up security spending to levels not seen since been involved with death squads. The freeze the “dirty wars” of the 1980s, in what amounts was soon amended so that only the police chief to the remilitarisation of Central America’.44 and his direct subordinates were technically Between 2008 and 2011, the Central American denied direct funding. And while US officials Regional Security Initiative was allocated $1.2 claimed they had no more involvement with billion in US funding. A further $708 million the police chief, ‘press reports suggest that US went to ‘non-CARSI funding that supports assistance continues to flow to police officers CARSI goals’; a report from the US Government who report to Bonilla,’ notes Human Rights Accountability Office found that data on this Watch, citing a subsequent interview with the extra funding was ‘not readily available’.45 In Associated Press in which Bonilla ‘said that he 2008, $4,469,000 was allocated to Honduras, receives ongoing logistical support from the US by 2012 this had reached $17,613,000. (In Embassy for police operations’.42 Guatemala the increase was even greater: $5, 464,000 in 2008; $20,812,000 in 2011). The cognitive dissonance in respect to the Last year, an Associated Press investigation, security forces extends to the nature of the ‘tracking a drug war strategy that began in government and the political climate. US Colombia, moved to Mexico and is now finding officials have, for example, praised ‘the fresh focus in Central America’, found the tremendous leadership President Lobo [2010 $2.8 billion worth of materiel – including guns,

8 radar equipment and tear gas - authorised to Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Western Hemisphere countries in 2011 was programme. ‘There is virtually no reporting four times the amount a decade earlier. Over on how much funding different security the same decade, ‘defense contracts jumped initiatives in Honduras receive through INCLE,’ from $119 million to $629 million’. reports the Security Assistance Monitor. It is known that ‘support has gone to initiatives such as an elite military-trained police force, community policing, increased border patrols, drugs and arms interdiction, and drug demand reduction. It has also supported training for military and police carried out by Colombian security forces in topics like drug interdiction, intelligence and asset forfeiture.’47

Collating information from State Department and other federal agency reports, an investigation by the Fellowship on Reconciliation maps a vast increase in foreign operations military aid, defence department contracts, Pentagon contracts (for US operations), and commercial arms sales to Central America between 2001 and 2012 (see graphs).48 In Honduras, ‘Pentagon contracts overwhelm the amount spent on both military aid and arms purchases, reflecting the lopsided military relationship between Honduras and the United States, and the level of activity on U.S. bases in Honduras.’ The published figures are not the full extent of the assistance: ‘An increasing amount of military aid, administered by both the Pentagon and the State Department, does not specify the country of its destination.’ Between 2010 and 2012 more than $300 million a year in Department of Defense and foreign operations funds went to countries that were not named.49

‘Counter-narcotics’ is the primary conduit Graphs compiled by the Fellowship for Reconciliation. for the money to the local security forces: in 2012, ‘almost $9 out of every $10 of U.S. law enforcement and military aid spent in the According to the State Department, CARSI, region, went toward countering narcotics, up which was created in 2010, ‘supports 30 percent in the past decade’.50 In 2008, when development of a regional capacity to respond the US reactivated the 4th fleet in Panama - a to drug traffickers and other transnational clear message to an increasingly independent criminal organizations’.46 Honduras also region, and vocally opposed by a number of receives funding through the International states including Brazil - the US Naval Operations

9 chief explained it would ‘conduct varying for the new regime, Washington has expanded missions including a range of contingency and upgraded its military facilities in the operations, counter narco-terrorism, and country since the coup, spending millions theater security cooperation activities’.51 The on its two navel bases and six military bases, US Government Accountability Office, in a including $25 million to upgrade the Soto report to the Caucus on International Narcotics Cano air base - home to a US force of 600 Control within the Senate, found that while and located near the capital, it is the only US enormous amounts of money are being given air base in Central America. The Associated to the security forces in Central America there Press investigation quoted earlier found that has been little attempt to assess the impact in 2012, ‘the U.S. Defense Department spent on the security of the population, one of the a record $67.4 million on military contracts in purported aims of the money.52 Thus, if the Honduras, triple the 2002 defense contracts goal is improving human security in Central there [and] well above the $45.6 million spent America, Washington appears uninterested in neighboring Guatemala in 2012’.56 A further in measuring the success of its own policies. $2 million went on training local Honduran This is not new. There has never been much military forces through 2011, and $89 million interest in assessing the impact of policies was granted to US forces stationed there for justified under counter-narcotics in genuine operations in the country. That same year, counter-narcotics terms. The findings of the $1.3 billion was authorised for the export of Government-linked National Research Council military electronics to the country, which Committee on Data and Research for Policy on ‘would amount to almost half of all U.S. arms Illegal Drugs, published in 2001, are typical: exports for the entire Western Hemisphere’. ‘Overall the committee finds that the existing According to AP, both the State Department and drug use monitoring systems and programs the Pentagon refused to provide any further of research are useful for some important details relating to the export authorisation. purposes, yet they are strikingly inadequate to support the full range of policy decisions that To defend the situation since the coup - the the nation must make … It is unconscionable management of the economy in the interests for this country to continue to carry out a of local elites and foreign capital - the public policy of this magnitude and cost Honduran government relies on a repressive without any way of knowing whether and to security apparatus and pro-government militia what extent it is having the desired effect.’53 and, crucially, US funding. As in the past, this Past experience shows that often, when the money has served to lock-in certain policies. facts are too obvious to deny, officials will In November 2009, in the midst of the simply praise ‘counter-narcotics’ policies as government’s attacks on political opposition, a successes, even though they may be failing by new president, Porfirio Lobo, was ‘elected’; the almost every conceivable metric if their public four main election observation organisations justification is accepted.54 The praise, however, - the United Nations, the Organization of serves to keep the money flowing, ensuring American States, the European Union and the the achievement of strategic objectives. Carter Center – boycotted in protest at the conditions. The Lobo regime continued the Funding Repression and Regression repression of political dissent, at the same Funding has increased substantially across time pushing through neoliberal economic the region in recent years, but Honduras, policies with the expected results. ‘During the reviving its role during the wars in the 1980s, period 2006-2008,’ reports the Washington- has emerged as the hub of US operations.55 based Center for Economic and Policy Research, Alongside the political and financial support ‘Honduras saw the implementation of a number

10 of new social programs, an increase in social was approving a law that would ‘guarantee spending by the central government and a capital repatriation, access to foreign currency, near 100 percent real increase in the minimum equal treatment of the assets of nationals and wage. These hard fought gains were, however, foreigners, patent protection, and a ban on reversed in just the first two years after land expropriation’, quoting an analysis by Zelaya’s removal from office’. Indicators of the Center on Hemispheric Affairs.59 Critics human development that had improved briefly pointed out that the initiatives ‘were merely with Zelaya have been worsening steadily since another scheme to exploit the country’s the coup. Poverty levels took off after 2010; resources, debauch its natural beauty by between 2010 and 2012, extreme poverty, selling its treasures to foreigners, and further which had decreased by more than 20% during concentrate power and wealth in the hands of the Zelaya administration, increased by 26.3%. a few’. Observed Lauren Carasik, the Director ‘Poverty has since increased to 66.5 percent, the of the International Human Rights Clinic at highest rate in the previous 12 years for which Western New England University School of there is data’, noted CEPR. The effects of cuts Law: ‘These laws made Honduras friendlier to in social spending as a proportion of GDP are resource extraction, biofuel production, “eco- being felt in the health and education sectors, tourism” developments and hydroelectric dam while ‘unemployment and underemployment projects that are dispossessing campesinos have also both increased’ since the coup, ‘with and indigenous peoples and engendering over 43 percent of the labor force working repression against those defending their full time but earning less than the minimum land, their livelihood and their lives.’60 An wage’. But not everyone is losing out: ‘In the opposition political party criticised ‘the total two years after the coup, Honduras had the surrender of our natural resources and national most rapid rise in inequality in Latin America territory to foreign investors’ in a country and now stands as the country with the most that has been dominated by foreign business unequal distribution of income in the region.’57 interests since the beginning of the twentieth Between 2006 and 2009, during Zelaya’s term, century.61 One widely touted initiative was the ‘both the top 10 percent and bottom 90 percent establishment of a number of ‘model cities’ of households had rising real income; but to be managed by international corporations those at the bottom captured a larger share in their interests, subverting any semblance of the gains’. In the two years after the coup, of national sovereignty on large sections of ‘over 100 percent of all real income gains went Honduran territory. The Supreme Court did to the wealthiest 10 percent of Hondurans’ initially deem the cities illegal, but after four and ‘the bottom 90 percent experienced a of the total five judges who voted the wrong sharp contraction in their incomes.58 Average way were illegally removed, the legislation real incomes for the bottom 90 percent are passed in 2013.62 ‘The project was opposed by now at their lowest level since 2006, the first civic groups as well as the indigenous people’, year of Zelaya’s presidency.’ The post-coup observed an Associated Press report. Since governments have reversed gains in labour these changes were implemented Foreign rights and enacted a wave of privatisation Direct Investment from the US, Honduras’ measures, including of schools and utilities, largest trading partner, has been flooding in: leading to widespread protests and then from $135.5million in 2010, to $199 million in repression in response. The overarching aim 2011 and then $232 million in 2012.63 is to improve the climate for investors. While then-President Lobo was declaring the country A key step in Washington’s economic agenda in ‘Open for Business’ to much international the region was the Dominican Republic–Central fanfare and applause, the Honduran Congress America Free Trade Agreement, known as DR-

11 CAFTA, passed in 2005. The agreement was that ‘the entry into force of the Dominican pushed through the US House of Representatives Republic-Central America-United States Free under dubious circumstances: after a long delay Trade Agreement in 2006 boosted U.S. export and suspicions of backroom deals it was passed opportunities’, and that ‘about 80 percent by two votes. Afterwards the NGO OXFAM of U.S. goods now enter the region duty-free, put out a press release. ‘In forcing passage with tariffs on the remaining 20 percent to be of an unpopular trade agreement,” read the phased out by 2016’. Exports to Honduras were statement, “the administration chose to ignore over $5 billion in 2012 and were expected to widespread concerns raised by many members double in the next 2 years. While coffee and of Congress and their constituents, as well bananas form the basis of Honduran exports, as by farmers, trade unions, and church and the country imports from the US soybean meal, community groups in the US, Central America wheat, corn, and pork and pork products.67 In and the Dominican Republic…Development and 2013, the value of US agricultural exports to democratic processes are being undermined Honduras was $576 million. through DR-CAFTA.’ ‘The Bush administration,” OXFAM noted, “bullied Central American This overview of the contemporary landscape governments into signing on to a bad agreement cannot be isolated from Washington’s historic that will have serious repercussions for those support for horrendous state violence, which who are already disadvantaged in these highly peaked in the 1980s. Over this period, unequal societies where most of the poor live officially the first War on Terror68, Washington in rural areas, rely on income from agriculture, supported the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran and must pay for medicines out-of-pocket.’64 dictatorships against populations struggling for OXFAM had previously called on Congress an end to oligarchic rule, and used Honduras, to reject the agreement, arguing it would long dominated by Washington and US business ‘endanger the livelihood of many thousands interests, as a base to launch attacks by US- of small farmers who already live in poverty’. organised terrorist gangs against the Sandinista Protests had taken place throughout the region government in Nicaragua.69 Superpower prior to the agreements passing, while civil support for the brutal regimes prevented any society groups in the US used the example of form of social revolution or genuine reform; the impact of the NAFTA agreement on the poor Nicaragua was the only country to have in Mexico, and explained how ‘CAFTA threatens succeeded in breaking with history, in the the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of process making substantial gains in areas like small-scale farmers in the region by opening the literacy, poverty reduction and healthcare. door to a flood of U.S. agricultural products.’65 The wars devastated the societies and killed OXFAM pointed out that the Central American hundreds of thousands of people. Washington’s countries ‘depend heavily on agriculture preferred economic model was protected: the for the livelihood of significant portions of economies of the region were open to foreign their populations’, and that the agreement investment, re-orientated for agricultural ‘will put the needs of U.S. agribusiness and export production to serve the US market, pharmaceutical companies above the basic and flooded with US subsidised goods. 70 In development needs of Central America’s these largely agricultural societies, the effect poor’. Touted as a free trade initiative, the was the exacerbation of poverty, particularly agreement conveniently ignores ‘the fact that in rural areas, and the undermining of food US farmers receive extensive subsidies and security; during the 1980s in Honduras, El domestic supports, estimated to be around $24 Salvador and Guatemala, food crops were billion this year alone’.66 It was a good deal exported to meet foreign demand while for certain groups. The US government reports sectors of the population were malnourished

12 and starving. Honduras produced beef for efficient, if not counter-productive, methods, export, observed one analysis at the time, but while pursuing policies that worsen the socio- not for ‘the estimated 58 percent of Honduran economic conditions conducive to trafficking, children under five years of age who suffer violence and crime, while preventing genuine from identifiable malnutrition’.71 development, supporting state violence and security forces connected to drugs, while The maintenance of a system in which a small largely discarding evidence-based approaches US-aligned elite prospered amidst a sea of to the issue of drug use and production, and suffering required massive levels of repression, continuously adopting policies that serve and the foreign currency brought in from agro- mainly to push trafficking into new areas with export was used to finance inflated military terrible consequences for the local population, budgets. In a vicious cycle, the regimes and so on - there is little doubt that support pushed through economic restructuring, put for harsh law enforcement and militarised themselves in debt with arms spending, were interdiction operations in Central America will pushed to enact further restructuring to meet ‘fail’ in the conventional sense. What have the repayments, and, because the policies been the implications of Washington’s drug- harmed the poor majority and drew resistance, related policies in the region - namely, the again unleashed repression. Today in Honduras, use of militarised interdiction and support for the second poorest country in Central America, harsh law enforcement policies – on the drug government military expenditure rises while trade? In response to rising levels of violence, human indicators like poverty and malnutrition El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the remain dire, particularly for the half of the three largest recipients of US counter-narcotics country’s population who live in rural areas. As funding, have adopted the so-called ‘Iron Fist’ of 2014, the government now spends more on approach to security. Earlier this year a report its police forces, who have a record outlined by the US Congressional Research Service above, than any other country in the region; noted that while these policies ‘initially local analysts meanwhile point out that the proved to be a way for Central American funds ‘for weapons and infrastructure, more leaders to show that they were cracking down [police] units and logistics’ are not directed at on gangs, studies have cast serious doubts on the cause of violence and crime’.72 Fully 17 per their effectiveness’.74 The Research Service cent of the country’s GDP is being spent on the reported that ‘largely in response to law military and police forces. This prioritisation enforcement tactics, gangs have developed of spending occurs in a country where two into more sophisticated criminal entities, thirds of the population live in poverty, and some of which are now running extortion where chronic malnutrition is considered to rackets throughout the region’. Furthermore, affect 31 per cent of the population - in the ‘Evidence also indicates that military most disadvantaged rural areas, where access involvement in public security functions has not to health services is most difficult, the figure reduced crime rates significantly.’ At the same is 53 per cent.73 time, mass arrests have swelled the prison populations in countries lacking the facilities The context outlined above is enough to suggest to cope, leading to overcrowding, increased that Washington’s statements of concern over conflict in prisons, and possibly a rise in gang trafficking and violence in Central America membership as non-affiliated individuals sent today cannot be taken seriously. Even if the to prison have been found to join gangs once context can be forgotten – accepting for a inside. But the policy does serve a purpose. It moment that the US can be concerned with presents a facade of concern in the media – a trafficking and violence while adopting the least sense that something is being done. It justifies

13 funding for the armed forces and the police, stream of measures designed to increase the thus increasing the repressive capabilities of repressive capabilities of the state.77 The the state while allowing a freer hand to attack creation of a military police force is one such opposition. Aside from detailing the tactical example. Emergency laws meant the military failures of the publicly stated objectives, the had assumed a police-style role since mid- congressional report does add that in response 2011, but the constitution, which banned any to the government’s adoption of these tactics military involvement in policing duties, had there have been ‘objections from human rights to be amended in order to make the changes groups about their potential infringements permanent.78 The militarisation of the police, on civil liberties and human rights’.75 It has a report by the Security Assistance Monitor long been understood, and demonstrated points out, ‘has threatened human rights and in practice, that the approaches supported diverted resources away from civilian police under the War on Drugs lead to an increase in operations and reforms while crime and violence and insecurity; a conclusion that has violence levels have remained high’.79 Recent recently permeated even the highest levels in indications are that the force, known as ‘The Latin America, the traditional battleground Tigers’, is to be expanded. 80 for the war.76 Latin American governments, often made up of groups that see their own ‘Confronting’ the ‘cartels’ in this manner, as people as a threat to their social and economic Washington claims to be doing, using law position, have historically accepted ‘counter- enforcement and militarised interdiction, will narcotics’ money from the US, which has in most likely increase violence – the Mexican turn improved their repressive capabilities government has understandably rejected any and allowed Washington to dictate local policy presence of FAST operatives on their territory related to drugs. The significant US role in – and will have little effect on ‘cartel’ activity drug policy in Latin America historically has aside from pushing routes around the region and meant the emboldening of corrupt, repressive forcing traffickers to adopt more sophisticated regimes and abusive militaries; the stifling operating methods. One particularly visible of progressive political movements; and effect is deforestation, which is happening increased violence; and, as a result of policies throughout the region as airstrips and roads are focused on enforcement and prohibition, the built by traffickers moving into more remote expansion of means of social control and areas. According to a recent study led by Dr rocketing drug-related incarceration rates, Kendra McSweeney of Ohio State University, mostly of the weakest links in the trafficking deforestation has surged, driven by the rise chain, leading to a crisis in many national in drug trafficking but also the pressure on prison systems. traffickers that forces their activities across borders.81 A BBC summary of the study points The Honduran government has, like out, ‘Buying and clearing the forests helps Washington, placed the blame for violence launder profits, and the traffickers usually have in the country almost entirely on drug enough political influence to ensure their titles traffickers and general criminal activity. This to the land are not contested. Through this transparently serves a purpose. Not only is process, the “improved” land can then be sold it an attempt to exonerate their own role on to corporate concerns,’ a common outcome in the violence and the trafficking, it allows in other Latin American who have hosted a War for the passing of repressive measures to on Drugs.82 McSweeney asks environmental defeat ‘criminality’. Publicly justified groups to join others in pressuring the US as initiatives to confront criminality and to change the ‘appallingly inappropriate, violence, the government has passed a militarised approach to the drug problem’.

14 America, and faced with few employment From the discussion so far, it is evident which options, many of them had reformed the gangs of the State Department’s goals, quoted below, they had joined while imprisoned in the United are real concerns with a long history, and States; Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18, the which are necessary platitudes: two most prominent gangs in the region, were both formed in Los Angeles. Gang violence ‘Our policy in Honduras is focused on then became a serious problem in countries strengthening democratic governance, barely recovering from the devastation of the including the promotion of human rights and 1980s.85 While US border patrol apprehended the rule of law, enhancing economic prosperity, 16,546 Honduran children crossing the border and improving the long-term security situation between October 2013 and June 2014, over the in the country. U.S. Government programs same period only 178 Nicaraguan children were are aimed at promoting a healthy and stopped. Journalist Judy Butler suggested a more open economy capable of sustainable reason: after the Sandinistas had removed the growth, improving the climate for business Somoza dictatorship there followed ‘a cleaning and investment, protecting U.S. citizen and out of the military and other structures corporate rights, and promoting the well- of government that never happened in ... being and security of the Honduran people.’83 Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras’, where US power was vital in preserving the status US ‘counter-narcotics’ funding might be quo against popular opposition. Moreover, ‘the a failure, or misguided, according to the Sandinista Party has relatively good forms of ostensible aims, just as it is a disaster for grass-roots organization that incorporate young those struggling for social change. But it has people into healthy activities’, notes professor been an unambiguous success in ensuring the at the University of California San Diego, Richard domination of allied political groups, building Feinberg, a former adviser to President Clinton. military partnerships, and ‘improving the Even though Nicaragua is the poorest country climate for business and investment’. in Central America, it does not suffer problems of violence and corruption on the same scale as other countries in the region. Nicaragua, which has the smallest proportion of the population DISMISSING HISTORY in prison and the smallest police force relative Recent events have provided another insight to population, is considered relatively safe into the legacy of Washington’s involvement in compared to its neighbours. Military spending Central America. Earlier this year a spike was per head is the lowest in the region. ‘Something recorded in the number of Central American has gone really wrong here’, comments José children apprehended while trying to cross Miguel Cruz, a Florida International University the US border - 63,000 between October 2013 professor: ‘The U.S.-trained institutions are and August 2014, twice the figure for the same the worst able to deal with crime.’86 Honduras, period the previous year. The majority were Guatemala, and El Salvador – the US bastions from Honduras and were fleeing ‘poverty and during the 1980s, the largest recipients of US violence’. 84 The other primary countries of funding in the region today – have the highest origin were Guatemala and El Salvador. When crime and murder rates in Central America. gang violence was cited as a factor, many commentators remarked that it was the Butler quotes Jeffrey Gould, a US historian of decision in the 1990s by President Clinton to Nicaragua: ‘There seems to be a lot of amnesia deport immigrants with criminal records that in terms of our policy toward Central America, had sent a stream of individuals into Central the kinds of regimes we were bolstering

15 back in the ‘80s, the kind of societies that came out of that.’ The contemporary socio- The context of US policies, and the policies economic landscape in Honduras – the poverty, they have chosen to ‘confront’ trafficking and the inequality, the oligarchic control of the violence, demonstrate clearly enough that economy and political life, the polarisation of they have little to do with serious efforts at society, unemployment, gangs, the presence counter-narcotics or violence-reduction. The of traffickers – cannot be discussed in superficiality of official statements enforces ignorance of this past; of Washington’s policies the point. In official discourse, history and and objectives in the country, of the kinds of context are eviscerated, the US role is forgotten. devastated societies left smouldering in the The former US ambassador to Honduras, for wake. Social reforms, like those initiated by example, has argued that violence is solely the Zelaya’s administration, and which local civil result of the aggressiveness of drug ‘cartels’ society groups continue to fight for, could and gangs.90 The solution? ‘The evils of the alleviate the preconditions for violence. The drug trade must be met by an increased focus link between inequality and higher levels of by the United States government to counter violence is well-established.87 Improving cartels’. In a typical formulation of the issue, general human development and supporting Vice President Joe Biden has spoken of helping equitable economic development could have Honduras in a ‘battle against the narco- an impact. But the US has, successfully, traffickers’. The official approach is echoed in sought and used military power to enforce the US media. ‘Much of the press in the United an economic and political arrangement that States has attributed this violence solely preferences foreign capital, to the detriment to drug trafficking and gangs’, argues Dana of equitable development. Frank, a history professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz, writing in the New York Even high-level, conservative sources make Times. ‘But the coup was what threw open the this connection. A World Bank report, for doors to a huge increase in drug trafficking and example, has argued that what is needed to violence, and it unleashed a continuing wave overcome the elevated levels of crime and of state-sponsored repression.’91 While the violence in the region is development.88 They murder rate in Honduras has been increasing criticise the prevailing and US-backed ‘mano steadily since 2005, a significant jump is dura’ (Iron Fist) response to crime and violence, noticeable after the coup; the homicide rate adopted mainly in El Salvador, Guatemala and of 91.6 per 100,000 recorded in 2011 was the Honduras, which has received ‘poor reviews’. highest in the world.92 There is little doubt that Instead, they ‘suggest strongly that alternative drug trafficking contributes to escalating levels courses of action should be explored, with due of violence.93 But the presentation of drug regard for human rights’. And, following an trafficking and criminality as the sole cause of evidence-based approach, they recommend the violence is a useful foil for American and local governments ‘devote resources to address Honduran officials. In both cases, it detracts domestic drug use through public health and from their own role in creating and worsening harm reduction programs, including greater the underlying conditions. Reversing the investment in education campaigns, treatment causality, the head of US Southern Command, for users, and drug use prevention’. Needless General John F. Kelly, has argued that ‘Drug to say, militarisation and law enforcement have cartels and associated street gang activity in been Washington’s priorities. A newly unveiled Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala … have funding plan for the region exhibits a strict left near-broken societies in their wake’. In commitment to the usual priorities, and looks set an article titled, ‘Central American Drug to take advantage of the child immigrant surge War Dire Threat to US National Security’, to push through neo-liberal economic reforms.89

16 written for the Air Force Times, he argues extrajudicial killings by the military: ‘Based that ‘without appropriate application of U.S. on data on 5,763 reported executions in military support it will remain fertile ground Colombia and extensive documentation of for every threat to regional security and U.S. assistance to the Colombian military, we stability’.94 US involvement is also required found a positive correlation between the units to improve human rights. According to Kelly: and officers that received U.S. assistance and ‘I have found over my years of working with training, and the commission of extrajudicial partner nations around the globe, that nothing killings.’ Many of the officers who oversaw changes countries for the good like working the largest number of killings, ‘received alongside the U.S. military in a close and significantly more U.S. training, on average, continuous relationship.’ ‘I challenge anyone than other officers’. According to FOR director, to argue differently,’ he adds, ‘unless of course John Lindsay-Poland, on average ‘when there one does not trust U.S. intentions in the region were increases in U.S. military aid, in those and also does not have faith in the decency of areas there was an increase in killings. And our military men and women.’ more importantly, when U.S. aid decreased… the killings did too’.99 The report continues: Honduran human rights and civil society groups, ‘we identified Colombian Army officers with who have good reason not to trust US intentions the largest number of extrajudicial executions in the region, have taken up the challenge. In under their brigade command, and found that a statement, the Committee of Families of the four of six with the most such killings under Detained and Disappeared of Honduras called their command were subsequently promoted to the drug war ‘only a pretext for a greater command the Army. This includes current Army military occupation by the United States and commander General Jaime Lasprilla Villamizar, to block the wave of political change driven by who oversaw at least 75 killings of civilians the national resistance’. Julieta Castellanos, when he led the brigade in southern Huila the rector of the largest University in Honduras Department in 2006–2007’. But ‘instead of and a member of the government’s Truth being held accountable, officers like Lasprilla Commission, has recommended a simple way have received extensive U.S. assistance and the US could curtail abuses by the security risen in rank’. The seriousness of Kelly’s forces: ‘stop feeding the beast’.95 Kelly’s human rights commitment is exemplified in comments are perhaps to be expected, but are his comments made elsewhere regarding the hardly a reflection of reality.96 There is a well- way the Colombian military - which Amnesty established and long-standing correlation in USA has been arguing for more than a decade Latin America between abusive regimes and US should be denied any US arms or assistance funding.97 In Colombia, to take a prominent - provides a useful means to circumvent example, US military assistance has increased Congressional restrictions. Kelly calls this, along with human rights violations, including ‘The beauty of having a Colombia’: ‘When we the period in the 1990s when the country ask [the Colombian military] to go somewhere had the worst record in the hemisphere. US else and train the Mexicans, the Hondurans, funding has bolstered a repressive regime, the the Guatemalans, the Panamanians, they will security forces connected to drug trafficking do it almost without asking … It’s important and paramilitaries, and served as an enabler for them to go, because I’m – at least on the of state and paramilitary violence.98 The military side – restricted from working with correlation has even been shown to extend some of these countries because of limitations to individual army units. A study by the that are, that are really based on past sins.’100 Fellowship for Reconciliation (FOR) examined the link between US assistance and cases of Returning to Central America, in 2013 more

17 than 145 organisations based in the region and the ‘solutions’. As is discussed later, it is the US co-signed a letter to President Obama wildly inaccurate, but convenient and self- and Central American heads of state. The letter serving, for US officials to claim the violence outlined a more nuanced understanding of the is a phenomenon borne of gang and ‘cartel’ causes of violence, and made the important activity alone.102 connection between economic policy and the region’s current straights:

‘Human rights abuses against our families and OLD WINE, BIGGER BOTTLES communities are, in many cases, directly The use of the drug issue to facilitate the flow attributable to failed and counterproductive of military aid to allied governments and the security policies that have militarized our construction of overseas military bases is not societies in the name of the “war on drugs.” new. FAST, while recently created, is also not a The deployment of our countries’ armed forces novel invention. It is in fact a rehash, or better to combat organized crime and drug-trafficking, put, an upgrade, of a programme developed and the increasing militarization of police units, by the DEA during the 1980s called ‘Operation endanger already weak civilian institutions Snowcap’ (see infographic).103 Initiated in and leads to increased human rights violations. 1987, Snowcap sent DEA Special Agents with … The violence we face today has its roots in military training to Latin America to work with the poverty, injustice and inequality of our local police forces. Like FAST, the focus was on societies. National and bilateral investment disrupting organisations and transport routes: policies enshrined in Free Trade Agreements Snowcap operatives conducted interdiction exacerbate these problems.’101 operations, and destroyed cocaine processing facilities and landing strips. ‘They aren’t This brief discussion of Honduras has explored military’, reported the LA Times in 1990, ‘but the context in which Washington is funnelling they wear camouflage, carry guns and look money to a local allied regime, justified under for trouble’. The programme reportedly cost counter-narcotics and confronting ‘cartels’ $8 million a year and involved 140 agents on and violence. It has also demonstrated that rotation every three or four months through violence in contemporary Honduras is a complex a number of countries in Latin America - phenomenon with various sources. Factors primarily Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. It was, include: poverty, displacement to urban areas, at the time, the largest US counter-narcotics lack of opportunities, an economic model that operation ever launched in the region. creates vast inequalities in wealth and land, state repression against political opposition, In 1990, the US House of Representatives and the resurgence of elite-linked paramilitary Committee on Government Operations forces. The combination has created fertile convened to review the effectiveness of ground for traffickers pushed into the region Snowcap. Their report defines the programme by Washington’s policies elsewhere. Crucially, as ‘a joint U.S.-host country effort to curb Washington has played a significant, perhaps the flow of cocaine from the producing and definitive role in exacerbating many of the processing countries of South America’. While factors underlying poverty, violence and ‘primarily a joint law enforcement effort’, drug trafficking. In fact, in a region in which they add that ‘it is conducted by means of Washington has played such a devastating role paramilitary tactics’. The committee found a historically it is remarkable that US officials tiny percentage of the coca produced in the can openly pontificate in the manner they region had been destroyed over the course of have on the local problems, let alone dictate Snowcap operations, something they attributed

18 FAST training Fort Benning

Haiti Belize

Guatemala Dominican Republic FAST operatives implicated in killingof civilians 2012 Honduras

Peru

Bolivia

FAST operations

Operation Snowcap Afghanistan FAST initiated, 2005 Operation Blast Furnace

Infographic: US militarised Counter-Narcotic Operations largely to a pause on operations in Peru and just as it is known now, that militarised the incompetence of their local counterparts; interdiction is one of the least effective they did record, as was well known, that the means of confronting drug trafficking, and Bolivian, Peruvian and Colombian security subsequent years have displayed no distaste forces were heavily involved in drug trafficking. among US administrations for adopting the Snowcap had been suspended shortly in Peru same tactic, which is ‘the highest profile, the through 1989 and was reportedly stopped most dangerous, and the least effective of all completely by the mid-1990s. A tranche of the options available’, quoting a confidential declassified documents from this period suggest strategy paper written in 1989 by a member the reasons for its eventual cancellation. of the State Department’s Office of Andean While the lack of effectiveness is alluded to Affairs.104 Worth noting is that this conclusion in the internal discussions, it does not seem came at the dawn of Washington’s push into a plausible explanation. It was known then, the Andean region under the rhetoric of a drug

19 war, in which interdiction and eradication in Drug Interdiction’. The study concluded: were touted as the mechanisms through which ‘Increased drug interdiction efforts are not the problem should be confronted. The report, likely to greatly effect the availability of written a couple of years after Snowcap began, cocaine in the United States.’107 In 1994 goes on to argue, ‘The US must reconsider the RAND produced another now famous report advisability of operations like Snowcap ... the on the cost effectiveness of supply vs demand results do not justify the expense and danger programmes. The findings were clear: when compared with the results that might be demand side programmes are vastly more obtained by increasing aid to local forces. US effective in reducing drug use. The study police agencies like the DEA should engage in estimated the cost of decreasing cocaine police work and liaison abroad, not paramilitary consumption in the US by 1 per cent using the operations.’ (According to the report, the State various options available. The results were as Department’s main ‘challenge’ is as follows: ‘… follows: eradication (supply country control), to place the traffickers on a collision course near $783 million; interdiction, close to with local forces, and ensure the local forces $366 million; domestic enforcement, $246 have the wherewithal to prevail’. That is, to million; and treatment, $34 million. ‘Cut send countries to war with drug traffickers. back on supply control and expand treatment The more modern version is more nuanced, of heavy users’, states the papers primary although not so different. The U.S. National recommendation.108 But the spending Drug Control Strategy, the official goal of which focus has remained essentially the reverse, is to reduce illegal drug consumption in the overwhelmingly aimed at source country US, includes among its priorities the disruption control, and interdiction and enforcement of the drug trade abroad ‘by attacking the measures at home. In a 1992 paper, Peter power structures and finances of international Reuter, then a RAND employee, noted that criminal organizations’. 105 The implications ‘source-country programs, whether they be of this strategy in practice can be seen most crop eradication, or refinery destruction, prominently today in the devastation wrought hold negligible prospects for reducing cocaine throughout Mexico.106) consumption in the long run’. ‘It seems unlikely’, Reuter wrote, ‘that eradication, In respect to cultivation, the ultimate crop substitution, or any related effort outcome of the operations of which Blast aimed directly at coca growing and cocaine Furnace and Snowcap were a part was to shift refining in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia will production to Colombia. Following years of make a significant difference to total Andean eradication and interdiction operations there, cocaine production, though it may affect the cultivation has now begun moving back to distribution of cocaine production among Peru. Such an outcome was predictable. The these countries.’ The years since have borne impact of these policies on the drug trade is out the validity of this point. Another of not disputed. And, while the facts have only Reuter’s comments also continues to hold reinforced this understanding since Snowcap, true: ‘despite the continued failure of [supply- it was well understood at the time, as the side] programs and the analytic arguments internal documents show. against them, they continue to flourish budgetarily (sic).’ ‘Why do these programs With Snowcap in full flow, the RAND continue to generate political support?’ Corporation, essentially the think-tank of Reuter asked, especially given the fact they the US Department of Defense, produced ‘have demonstrably failed in the past.’ He a study titled, ‘Sealing the Borders; The offers some suggestions: institutional factors Effects of Increased Military Participation that create policy inertia, for example. But

20 a more evident and common sense answer concerned primarily with interdiction is simply seems to be that ‘counter-narcotics’ policies a return to the Snowcap model, albeit with as they have been framed achieve goals that more heavily armed and better trained agents. are not publicly stated by policy makers. Snowcap was not an isolated policy, distinct The internal record suggests that the from wider objectives. The internal record cancellation of Snowcap could not have been demonstrates how the operation and related made with counter-narcotics goals in mind. ‘counter-narcotics’ funding were consciously The crucial factor appears to have had nothing integrated with strategic goals, reinforcing to do with the efficacy of the ostensible aims what the historical record suggests: US officials of the programme. The problem was that US expected allied governments to use funds personnel were being placed in harms way justified under counter-narcotics to repress in the course of their duties and were not political dissent. In 1989, for example, the sufficiently armed or trained to respond; the National Security Council produced a directive reason for the suspension in Peru in 1989 titled ‘International Counternarcotics was the rise in confrontations between DEA Strategy’. The funding for programmes in operatives and the insurgent group Sendero Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, would involve Luminoso (Shining Path). ‘DEA managers ‘expanded assistance to indigenous police, must realise that our agents on operation military, and intelligence officials … for the snowcap have crossed the line from the purpose of assisting them to regain control of commonly accepted role of domestic narcotic their countries from an insidious combination law enforcement, to the role of an infantry of insurgents and drug traffickers’. An annex to combat advisor’, reads an internal DEA report the directive, marked ‘secret’, adds that each written in 1988. ‘This line, whether we want country’s drug programme ‘increased military to accept it or not, was crossed when Snowcap assistance to neutralize guerrilla support for agents started to wear camouflage jungle trafficking’. The same year, a National Security uniforms, and jump out of Huey helicopters, Council Interagency Working Group Draft carrying M-16 rifles, which the Bolivians noted that the strategy to be implemented in call the “black sticks of death.”’’109 The the Andean region ‘has the corollary benefit of problem, the report argued, was that agents helping democratic governments fight growing were exposing themselves to attack - from insurgent movements’, although they recognise disgruntled coca farmers, drug traffickers, and the support to the militaries ‘could have human guerrilla groups. The remedy: give Snowcap rights implications’.110 One NSC document operatives more powerful weapons and the states, ‘military assistance will go toward kind of training necessary to allow them to two uses: narco-insurgents and traffickers’.111 operate more like Special Forces. With the In Peru, a 1989 State Department cable, creation of FAST, the report’s recommendations describing a discussion with Peruvian President have been belatedly realised. At the time, Garcia on the Andean Summit, argued there however, the argument of the strategy paper was ‘significant overlap’ between counter- was preferred: ‘Our goal should be a steady narcotics operations and the governments withdrawal of DEA from such a role as military war against Sendero Luminoso.112 Another and economic assistance allows local [military] cable from the US embassy sent in late 1989 forces to take up these tasks.’ And this is concedes that funding for anti-drug policies what happened. The policies were outsourced. was a ‘deal’ made with the local government The Snowcap programme was cancelled. in order to assist them with their ‘number The recent adoption of militarised US law one problem’: ‘subversion’. ‘The program is enforcement agents operating overseas and repeat is an anti-subversive program’ states

21 the embassy cable.113 Meanwhile, Peru’s stealing their goods and money. Arbitrary repressive and brutal security forces were arrests and detentions are routine.’ ‘A number engaged in a war on ‘subversion’ and in doing of Bolivians detained on drug trafficking so were guilty of massacres, assassination, charges allege torture by Bolivian law disappearances, kidnapping, operating enforcement personnel’, the report continues. death squads and torture. ‘These counter- ‘They also allege DEA complicity with abusive subversive programs make sense to us,’ states interrogations. DEA personnel acknowledge the embassy cable. ‘Counter-narcotics’ funds that they do not intervene to stop abuse.’ given to Latin American governments were part There is total impunity for abuses committed of counter-insurgency operations, which were by the local forces: ‘Even complaints of serious unequivocally wars on political opposition, human rights violations, including torture, are armed or otherwise. rarely investigated. Charges of human rights abuse by DEA agents are left unanswered. A The same was true in Bolivia and Colombia. mantle of diplomatic immunity and agency Prior to Snowcap, Bolivia had hosted a secrecy impedes public investigation and predecessor, known as Operation Blast accountability ... U.S. officials dismiss or Furnace. The core of the operation was the downplay abuses by the U.S.-supported use of US military helicopters to transport DEA Bolivian counternarcotics forces.’ agents and local police during raids on cocaine labs. Facilitated by President Reagan’s 1986 The record of the Colombian armed forces directive on narcotics control, (National and their paramilitary allies is far worse. In Security Decision Directive; April 8, 1986) 1996 HRW released a report that demonstrated Blast Furnace marked a watershed in the US conclusively what had been inferred in a report military’s involvement in such operations. published seven years before: Colombian (Coming afterwards, Snowcap represented military commanders ‘have not only promoted, the next step in encroaching militarisation. encouraged and protected paramilitary groups, The FAST programme is a modernised version: but have used them to provide intelligence agents are better armed, better trained, and assassinate and massacre Colombians and it circumvents the problem of direct US suspected of being guerilla allies’. The military involvement via the use of domestic evidence of collaboration was extensive. law enforcement agents.) As is generally the Officers who had worked with the murderous case, US funding had an enormous effect. ‘The paramilitaries, ‘far from being punished … impact of U.S. counternarcotics pressure on have been promoted and rewarded and now Bolivia cannot be overstated’, noted a Human occupy the highest positions in the Colombian Rights Watch Report written in 1995. ‘Bolivia army’. The report found: has passed laws, created institutions and adopted antinarcotics strategies shaped by U.S. ‘Under the stated objective of fighting drugs, concerns and dependent on U.S. funding.’114 the U.S. has armed, trained, and advised Thereafter the document describes abuses Colombia’s military despite its disastrous committed by local forces tutored and funded human rights record. Strengthened by years by Washington. ‘In the Chapare, the rural of U.S. support, the Colombian military area in which most of Bolivia’s coca is grown and its paramilitary partners instead have and cocaine base produced, the antinarcotics waged a war against guerrillas and their police run roughshod over the population, suspected supporters in civil society, including barging into homes in the middle of the members of legal political parties, trade night, searching people and possessions at unionists, community activists, and human will, manhandling and even beating residents, rights monitors. Far from moving to address

22 the mounting toll of this war, the U.S. has and Government-supported military actions apparently turned a blind eye to abuses and are not traffickers but political opposition is moving to increase deliveries of military aid, figures, community activists, trade union including weapons, to Colombia.’ leaders and human rights workers.’119

Twenty-four Colombian army units, ‘comprising Throughout this period, and regardless of the a significant percentage of total troop strength’, facts, recipient countries were presented as had received money under the rhetoric of ‘democracies’, the problem they needed to counter-narcotics, HRW reported, also observing confront was the ‘narco-guerrilla’, and the way that ‘U.S. Military assistance officials have made to confront it was with the military. In the a virtue of their failure to distinguish between late 1980s, this strategy was applied to Central counternarcotics and counterinsurgency America to justify support for highly repressive, support by designating Colombia’s insurgents and US-allied, regimes, which were presented as across the board as “narco-guerillas”’.115 being under threat and in need of help. History Drugs proved useful for evading congressional is essentially repeating: the contemporary restrictions: ‘U.S officials pointed to the analogues are clear, but unremarkable given “narco-guerilla” phenomenon as vitiating the consistency of policy objectives. the distinction between counterinsurgency and counternarcotics objectives, in so doing Officials were aware such an approach this neatly sidestepping the intent of Congress to could be an effective means to garner public insulate the United States from Colombia’s and congressional support. Toward the end dirty war.’116 The paramilitaries, who the US of the 1980s, analyst and author Michael was tacitly supporting and had actually played Klare observed, ‘advocates of an expanded a substantial role in creating117, were more U.S. role in low-intensity warfare ... view the deeply involved in the drugs trade, at all levels, drug issue as a useful vehicle for mobilising than the guerrilla, and were responsible for a public support behind their interventionist far greater share of the violence, but they were policies’. ‘Without providing much evidence, not the target.118 As is standard practice, a these ideologues claim that leftist guerillas in military advisory group found US funding was in Latin America are cooperating with narcotics compliance with legislation and that counter- dealers in order to finance arms purchases’, he narcotics efforts were in fact effective. As wrote. Klare cited a US Colonel who argued a result of this decision, ‘U.S. arms sales to these connections be made in public in order Colombia not only continue unimpeded, but are to create an ‘unassailable moral position’ for expected to reach a record level’, as they did ‘the necessary support to counter the guerilla/ in the following years in conjunction with rising narcotics terrorists in this hemisphere’, as well state and paramilitary terror. Amid talk of a as to combat the ‘church and academic groups’ failure to reduce drug production, the funding critical of US operations in Central America.120 justified under counter-narcotics was effective for something: fighting a dirty war in which In the decades prior to Snowcap, recent Washington remains a major player. The aim history in Latin America had indicated clearly of this war was explained in a New York Times Washington’s aims in the region. In the op-ed written in 1992 by Jorge Gomez Lizarazo, 1980s, Washington backed local oligarchies a Colombian judge and human rights activist: against popular uprisings seeking democratic reform and measures to assist the poor. In ‘While Americans are told that all this is the 1960s and 1970s, Washington supported necessary to fight the drug war, we Colombians the brutal neo-facsist regimes known as the don’t agree. The main victims of Government ‘National Security States’, the first of which

23 emerged in Brazil after the overthrow of an expended than these training programs’.123 elected government by military generals in Cooperation with military forces has also been 1964, ushering in a period of dictatorship and a means of checking political developments in state terror. (In the aftermath of the military Latin America. Military coups throughout the coup in Brazil, the US ambassador reported region have often had at their helm graduates to the State Department that it had been ‘a of the infamous training centre known as the great victory for the free world’, which would School of the Americas, based in Fort Benning, ‘create a greatly improved climate for private Georgia and recently renamed. (One of the investment’.)121 Over the same period, social leaders of the 2009 coup in Honduras, General movements based in the peasantry and inspired Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, is an alumni of the by the Catholic Church had begun struggling School of the Americas.) In the late 1990s, when for changes to the unjust social order. In the drug threat had replaced the communist response, the US stepped in to assist regimes threat, Martin Jelsma, a leading policy analyst in this war on their own people, and to re- with the Transnational Institute, observed focus the militaries towards ‘internal security’. that, ‘For the military, the counter-narcotics Official documents from the post Second World mission has been the most important vehicle War period discuss the aims openly. The threat available allowing for the intensification of to be contained was the rise of governments in transborder collaboration.’ The importance of the region who embrace ‘policies designed to this utility cannot be underestimated. And it bring about a broader distribution of wealth and should be kept in mind that the contemporary to raise the standard of living of the masses’, militarisation is taking place amid a tide of and who believe ‘the first beneficiaries of the independence and a waning in Washington’s development of a country’s resources should historic domination of the region. be the people of that country’.122 ‘Following the break up of the Soviet Bloc’, The most important aim has been the wrote Jelsma, ‘the Pentagon had to come protection of the kinds of economic policies up with a new enemy in order to justify its outlined above. And in this sense militarisation defense budget and to maintain a global has historically been very successful. But in presence.’124 The answer was a War on Drugs. maintaining a close relationship with foreign Then-President Bush re-declared the War in militaries, Washington also achieves other 1989, just as the Cold War ended, seven years aims. Policy makers have long appreciated that after it was declared by Reagan (1982), who military training and cooperation engender made drug trafficking a ‘threat to national influence over future leaders, ensuring security’ in 1986 meaning far greater military US priorities are paramount inside foreign involvement in interdiction, and more than military institutions. In 1959, for example, a two decades after it was first announced by committee formed by President Eisenhower Richard Nixon (1971).125 to assess the Military Assistance Program, which had the goal of arming and training By the end of the 1990s ‘drugs’ had become Latin American militaries and was justified as firmly entrenched as the main national threat a means of protection against the threat of to be confronted. Old counter-subversive the Soviet Union, applauded the programme wars justified as part of counter-insurgency based on the level of influence it had given operations against communists and their Washington within these organisations. ‘There sympathisers were replaced by counter- is no single aspect of the military assistance narcotics, with little actual alteration in program,’ stated the committee, ‘that practice.126 Since 2001, the War on Terror produced more useful returns for the dollars has assumed prominence. Both the War on

24 Terror and the War on Drugs have come under of areas around the world. And what else are increasing scrutiny in recent years, largely they doing? Based on over 37 years in the law as a result of their abject failures to achieve enforcement and security sectors, you can their stated aims. The latest tendency mark my word that they are most assuredly seems to be to try and combine the two talking business and sharing lessons learned.’ justifications: TheNew York Times pointed out As discussed earlier, the narco-guerilla in 2011 that the creation and expansion of the connection served the same purpose since the FAST ‘commando-style squads’, signified one 1980s, although post 9/11 it is terrorism that more step in ‘blurring the line between law has proven far more effective in rallying public enforcement and military activities, fusing opinion. Writing in the journal Military Review elements of the “war on drugs” with the “war back in 1987, a US army colonel and counter- on terrorism”’.127 Back in the 1990s, the drug insurgency theorist argued for the linking of threat and the ‘narco-guerrilla’ allowed old guerrillas with drug trafficking, and described policies to find new funding streams. The the benefits of the approach: same process appears to be at work with the contemporary claims of confronting cartels ‘A melding in the American public’s mind and and countering “narco-terrorism”. in congress of this connection would lead to the necessary support to counter the guerilla/ narcotics terrorists in this hemisphere. Generating this support would be relatively JUSTIFYING POLICY easy once the connection was proven and In Afghanistan, officials speak of FAST as a an all-out war was declared by the National counter narco-terrorism programme. In Central Command Authority. Congress would find it America however, FAST is justified in the same difficult to stand in the way of supporting our way as the funding: as counter-narcotics, as allies with the training, advice and security a means to confront ‘cartels’ and, to use assistance necessary to do the job.’128 the official phrase, ‘transnational organised crime’. But there have been scattered Braun’s ‘Star Wars’ comments cited above efforts to transpose the ‘narco-terrorism’ were made at a meeting with the title, ‘Iran, justification to Central America, regardless Hezbollah and the Threat to the Homeland’, of the facts. However, as with the War on part of a sustained and futile effort by US Terror, attempts to garner support for policies, officials to try and conjure a link between to make reality fit the rhetoric, are often organisations designated as terrorist in the crude and border on straight scaremongering. Middle East and insurgencies and drug ‘cartels’ Here is Michael Braun, FAST founder, in Latin America and to present this as the explaining to a congressional subcommittee next great threat facing the American people. why the DEA must conduct ‘counter In a similar attempt to present a dehumanised, narco-terrorism’ in ‘ungoverned spaces’: malevolent enemy, Dobrich’s presentation mentioned earlier includes the following ‘If you want to visualize ungoverned space or quote from Frankie Shroyer, Inter Agency a permissive environment, I tell people to Task Force Director at US Southern Command: simply think of the bar scene in the first “Star ‘When your job takes you into the swamp to Wars” movie. Operatives from FTOs [Foreign hunt snakes, you’ll have opportunities to kill Terrorist Organisations] and DTOs [Drug or capture some crocs as well –cause they live Trafficking Organisations] are frequenting the and multiply in the same, nasty surroundings.’ same shady bars, the same seedy hotels and Another recent example comes from a House the same sweaty brothels in a growing number of Representatives Committee on Homeland

25 BOX 1 – Creating a Narco-Terror Connection A recent US DEA investigation is illustrative of how the terror-drug nexus can be used and manipulated. Begun in 2012, the operation led to the arrest of five individuals from Guinea- Bissau, including the former head of the navy, and two Colombians.130 One side of the undercover operation ended with FAST operatives arresting the Guinea-Bissau nationals off the coast of West Africa. The case against the men said they had ‘agreed to receive and store multi-ton shipments of FARC-owned cocaine in Guinea-Bissau … pending its eventual shipment to the United States, where it would be sold for the financial benefit of the FARC’. Three of the men ‘agreed to arrange to purchase weapons for the FARC, including surface-to- air missiles, by importing them into Guinea-Bissau for the nominal use of the Guinea-Bissau military’. And the Colombian nationals had ‘agreed to facilitate the receipt of approximately 4,000 kilograms of cocaine from the FARC in Guinea Bissau, approximately 500 kilograms of which would later be sent to customers in the United States and Canada’. The comments of U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara in respect to the case are worth quoting in full:

’The narco-terrorism conspiracy alleged in these indictments shows the danger that can grow unchecked in far away places where unfortunate circumstances can allow narcotics traffickers and terrorism supporters to transact unseen at great risk to the United States and its interests. The link between narcotics traffickers and terrorists, their financers and supporters, needs to be broken wherever it is found. But thanks to the extraordinary efforts of our DEA partners, who have for years attacked the narco-terrorism threat, this conspiracy was thwarted and we can claim yet another victory in our unrelenting campaign against those who would harm Americans and American interests abroad.’

To these words were added the assessment of DEA Administrator Michele Leonhart: ‘These cases further illustrate frightening links between global drug trafficking and the financing of terror networks. These DEA arrests are significant victories against terrorism and international drug trafficking.’131 The remarkable thing about the case is that in this instance the ‘narco- terrorism conspiracy’ is entirely a concoction of the DEA. No members of the FARC were involved in the investigation. The DEA used ‘confidential sources ... who purported to be representatives and/or associates of South American-based narcotics traffickers’. Equally remarkable is that four of the defendants are being charged with ‘terrorism’ offences. The narco-terrorism conspiracy, then, is traffickers selling to customers put-up by the DEA. The ‘Drug/Terrorism Nexus’ list outlined by Dobrich provides an inclination of where more arrests for ‘narco-terrorism’ could occur in future.

Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism members in prisons are being written in Farsi. and Intelligence, titled ‘Hezbollah in Latin We have typically seen tattoos in Arabic, but America- Implications for US Homeland Farsi implies a Persian influence that can likely Security.’ The evidence presented of the be traced back to Iran and its proxy army, Hezbollah presence in Latin America could Hezbollah. These tattoos in Farsi are almost generously be called ‘spurious’. According always seen in combination with gang or drug to US Representative Sue Myrick: ‘Across cartel tattoos.’129 Media reports have claimed states in the Southwest, well trained officials Hezbollah is training and providing weapons to are beginning to notice the tattoos of gang Mexican ‘cartels’, although the evidence never

26 goes beyond quotes from undisclosed US sources. militarise allied governments and increase Running alongside efforts to demonstrate a military cooperation, and they want to do this drugs-terror connection are attempts to link via policies that are entirely ineffective, if political opponents in Latin America and the not outright counter-productive, in achieving Middle East. At the congressional hearing on their publicly stated goals. This has always Hezbollah in Latin America, demonstrations presented a public relations problem. Hence of insidious connections between Venezuela the feverish attempts to find a new enemy and and Hezbollah include the fact that ‘the new justifications for extant policies. Venezuelan airline, Conviasa, conducts regular flights between Caracas and Damascus and If successful, and there is substantial evidence Teheran’. All of the purported supporters it will be successful, the blending of the Wars of Hezbollah – ‘Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, on Drugs and Terror will essentially allow for Nicaragua, and others’ - happen to be both the transfer of methods across theatres. To left-leaning and part of the trend towards mention a few concrete examples, in 2004 independence in the region. then head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, referring to the US-led FAST itself is an unashamedly political operations in Afghanistan, stated that ‘fighting programme with official US enemies as its drug trafficking equals fighting terrorism’.133 targets. In his presentation, Dobrich lists the This ideological framework has provided the following groups considered to make up the cover for the extra-judicial assassination ‘Drug/Terrorism Nexus’ with which FAST is of suspected drug traffickers who under concerned: ‘FARC, AUC, Hizballah, Hamas, al- international law are considered civilians. In Qa’ida, Al-Shabaab’. ‘FARC is the case study’ 2009, an act in the US Congress on the use (emphasis in original) he adds. (It is worth of aerial spraying in Afghanistan noted that noting that FAST’s commitment to counter it could only be undertaken if the president ‘narco-terrorism’ operations in Afghanistan of Afghanistan requested such measures does not seem to be undermined by the fact ‘for counternarcotics or counterterrorism that the Taliban are not designated as a purposes’. (Italics added)134 In Latin America, terrorist organisation by the US government.) the US House Committee on Homeland We can assume the strategy in future will be Security has proposed the classification of to try to find any link whatsoever, or even drug trafficking organisations as terrorist perhaps to invent one, in order to adopt groups, with the hope being this will lead to policies justified as ‘counter narco-terrorism’ an ‘increased ability to counter their threat efforts against these groups. As noted in Box to national security’, presumably through 1, this process is well underway. the usual methods.135 The picture is of a government committed to certain policies and The point here is not to argue that traffickers searching for ways to justify them, and it so and insurgent groups are unconnected – they happens that the ‘emerging threats’, arising may well be linked, just as US allies are deeply just as the previous mechanisms for garnering involved in trafficking.132 The aim is to highlight public support are coming under increasing the attempt by US officials to present this as scrutiny, need to be confronted with the same an existential threat to the American people policies as the old ones. - a threat that requires a military presence overseas and continued military funding for There are two further implications of the strategic allies. It is obvious what ends such ‘narco-terrorism’ rhetoric that are important propaganda efforts serve. Officials want to to draw out. The first is that, as it has in the militarise the drug war to fight insurgencies, past, such a designation, even where true,

27 serves to dismiss any discussion of context or Yorker journalist Mattathias Schwartz writes the political claims of the groups designated how US operations in Honduras combine ‘the terrorist; in this case the FARC actually is the legal framework of a police action with the case study. Second, while counter-narcotics hardware and the rhetoric of war’.137 operations have some obvious metrics of success, the same cannot be said for ‘counter The Times article quotes a US Colonel based narco-terrorism’, or even for confronting in Honduras, who outlines US aims in the ‘cartels’ – a far cruder formulation than region: ‘By countering transnational organized counter-narcotics. Efforts against ‘narco- crime’ - which is to say, by funding the armed terrorism’ have no need to show progress forces and police and running interdiction against drug use at home. Interdiction operations - ‘we promote stability, which is operations and arrests can be presented as necessary for external investment, economic victories in themselves – as is repeatedly done growth and minimizing violence. We also are - but there is no indication they will have any disrupting and deterring the potential nexus significant impact on trafficking; the impact between transnational organized criminals and may in fact be to splinter the groups, drive terrorists who would do harm to our country’. them further underground and so on. Such The terrorist-criminal connection is made captures, however, provide a valuable PR entirely unchallenged and apropos of nothing opportunity, a chance to try and convince – there is no mention in the article of terrorist the public that something is being done; a or insurgent groups in Honduras (incidentally, shamefaced captive flanked by masked and local forces are also being inculcated with heavily armed members of the security forces the notion they are fighting terrorists. At the is now a common image in Latin America, closing ceremony of a US Special Forces training symbolic of official claims to be combating course for the Tigers unit, the US commander traffickers, claims which are often impossible told the Honduran soldiers: “I promise you to sustain as soon as context is introduced.136 at some point in time, together, we’ll be on target killing terrorists and drug traffickers Counter narco-terrorism, like confronting together.”). Later in the article, Vice Admiral ‘cartels’, presents the problem as an Joseph D. Kernan, the second highest officer organisation, as a target that needs to in US Southern Command, raises an ‘insidious’ be attacked. The New York Times has parallel between ‘criminal organizations highlighted this element in an article entitled, and terror networks’: ‘They operate without ‘Lessons of Iraq Help U.S. fight a Drug War in regard to borders.’ The one hint of criticism in Honduras.’ The Times reports that the new the article is the following line: ‘Some skeptics offensive in Central America, and particularly still worry that the American military might in Honduras, ‘emerging just as the United accidentally empower thuggish elements of States military winds down its conflicts in Iraq local security forces.’ US policy, which, the and Afghanistan and is moving to confront article points out, is a modified version of emerging threats, also showcases the nation’s methods used in Iraq, is nevertheless easily new way of war: small-footprint missions with justified: ‘Narcotics cartels, transnational limited numbers of troops, partnerships with organized crime and gang violence are foreign military and police forces that take designated as threats by the United States and the lead in security operations, and narrowly Central American governments.’ defined goals, whether aimed at insurgents, terrorists or criminal groups that threaten From the perspective of policy makers, American interests’. Echoing these comments countering ‘narco-terrorism’, like confronting in the profile of FAST mentioned earlier, New ‘cartels’, is almost flawless: it can be used

28 to justify a military presence; has no real violence apparently meant they were working metrics; narrows the public focus, diverting ‘because these guys are flailing. We’re taking attention from important context; it removes these guys out. The worst thing you could do any political element behind the existence of is stop now.’139 It was clear at the time, and insurgencies; and the US role is conveniently it is even clearer now, that this was not the sidelined in the face of a malignant national case. As noted, it is well established that US security threat. Needless to say, there is a policy led to a vast increase in violence and reason it has been used before, albeit in the human rights abuses, with minimal impact on slightly altered form ‘narco-guerilla’, then the drugs trade or use rates at home. more appropriate to circumstances. The lack of context in recent reports is worrying, as is Returning to Central America, Hillary Clinton the ease with which the media have accepted has described the funding sent to the region as the official line regarding the new threat and ‘money well spent’. Luis Arreaga, the Deputy the means to confront it. The subtitle of an Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Associated Press report is a typical example: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement ‘As the drug war in Latin America continues to Affairs has called the CARSI programme ‘a gain momentum, the United States continues comprehensive and integrated approach to do everything possible to try and combat it.’ to stem illegal trafficking’. Quoting these A US congressman is quoted as saying that US- words, an analyst writing in the Washington backed operations against Mexican ‘cartels’ Post comments: ‘One wonders how Clinton had made them ‘stronger and more violent’, and Arreaga define success—and at what cost. and that ‘billions upon billions of U.S. taxpayer For the populations of Mexico and Central dollars have been spent over the years to America, the toll in treasure and blood has combat the drug trade in Latin America and been enormous.’140 This report has attempted the Caribbean’, but, ‘in spite of our efforts, to demonstrate on what grounds officials may the positive results are few and far between’. define success, and to highlight how they This fact is not taken to undermine the claims may continue to justify them in the face of that Washington is ‘doing everything possible’, increasing scrutiny and criticism. Regardless only that counter-narcotics is difficult of the terrible impact in Honduras and Central business. The article presents a now familiar America, and the history and the context that paradox: officials, the military and the DEA, have been discussed here, if the issue continues ‘applaud the U.S. strategy’, but ‘critics say to be framed in the manner just outlined, if the militarizing the drug war in a region fraught public are bombarded with this picture by the with tender democracies and long-corrupt government and the media, then the narco- institutions can stir political instability while terror threat will seamlessly fit in alongside barely touching what the U.N. estimates is the wars on drugs and terror as ways to justify a $320 billion global illicit drug market’.138 policies that achieve long-held strategic goals. None of this is new. If strategic goals are For all the criticism, officials have made it clear being met, officials will find some angle that the policies as they have been framed over from which policies can be praised. Hence, the past decade in Central America are set to when Mexico was experiencing horrendous continue, perhaps to be expanded. ‘It’s not levels of ‘cartel’ related violence following for me to say if it’s the correct strategy’, Brick a crackdown in 2006, violence that may have Scoggins, head of counter-narcotics at the US killed as many as 100,000 people in the past Department of Defense, has been quoted as 8 years, US officials were quoted in the press saying. ‘It’s the strategy we are using. I don’t defending the policies on the grounds that know what the alternative is.’141

29 CONCLUSIONS to illicit drug production, namely poverty Washington’s strategic objectives have and marginalisation - both of which are developed an effective conduit in the form exacerbated by the economic policies US of ‘counter-narcotics’ operations. Central military assistance serves to defend. America is only the most recent example of a now familiar pattern: ‘counter-narcotics’ US funding and diplomatic support allow a free means the expansion and modernisation of hand to crush political opposition, and the a recipient country’s security forces, with repression has defended a political order and an dire consequences for those working towards economic model that Washington has supported progressive social change.142 We can also across Latin America with consistent effects: an observe the usual trends among commentators: improved climate for foreign investment and official praise for chosen policies, and a the concentration of wealth among a local elite diametrically opposed assessment from human friendly to foreign capital. The high price paid rights groups, progressive drug policy analysts, by the populations throughout Latin America has and civil society. In Honduras, the case discussed been necessary to enforce this model. There in this report, the inclusion of even the most are alternatives. Washington could stop fuelling minimal context is enough to conclude that talk abuses by the security forces. It could reverse of concern for drug trafficking and the human its policy of supporting what has been termed a security of the population of the region is ‘pro-rich development model’ in the region. It difficult to take seriously. Instead, a US-friendly could, as the World Bank recommends, support regime, committed to an economic model that genuine development along with evidence- benefits foreign investors and local elites at the based and human rights-sensitive approaches expense of the poorest, has been bolstered and to drug use and production. It could invest protected against people fighting for changes heavily in reducing demand for illicit drugs in to the post-coup political arrangement. the United States. But these policies lie outside of its strategic goals, and would most likely Amid the talk of failure and even counter- undermine them. It is not recognised often productivity in terms of drug production and enough that the struggle to create a genuine drug trafficking, there is substantial evidence ‘counter-narcotics’ policy is intimately linked that helps to explain why it is that certain with limiting Washington’s ability to carry out policies can be considered successful; why its strategic objectives as they are understood it is that interdiction and eradication, as by policy makers. Recent rhetoric regarding a oppose to more effective options, continue to focus on treatment and prevention, which has ‘flourish budgetarily’. Within the framework increased under the Obama Administration, has of Washington’s strategic objectives a military not translated to a change in policy overseas.143 approach makes sense. Such an approach can be used to justify a steady stream of funding In discussing Central America, US officials to allied armed forces; presents the impression present violence and drug trafficking as both something is being done about drugs while not the consequence and the source of the region’s impinging on strategic goals; expands the role problems. But this is not just a misinformed, and influence of the US military around the facile understanding of a complex situation: it globe; and enhances levels of collaboration, is an ideologically useful interpretation that and hence influence, with local armed forces. permits the attainment of long-held goals. Moreover, it prevents a focus on the role of The deliberate conflation of the War on Drugs demand for illicit drugs at home, and, within and the War on Terror into ‘counter-narco- producer countries, on the fundamental terrorism’ takes place in the same vein. As socio-economic conditions that are hospitable discussed, ‘counter-narco-terrorism’, which

30 is unhindered by problematic metrics of shift routes around the region and increase success, looks set to emerge as a serviceable violence as the traffickers come under attack. justification for preferred policies. The likelihood hinges on Washington’s successful The expansion of conventional ‘counter-narcotics’ ‘melding in the American public’s mind’ of funding and policies, the deployment of FAST, drug trafficking organisations and designated and the emerging ‘narco-terrorism’ narrative terrorist groups. The process is well underway, are related developments. And they should not and expanding. be separated from the whole range of policies – particularly economic policies - adopted towards With all of this in mind, it is perhaps a certain country or region. If history is a guide, understandable that Washington would once the expansion of these trends will coincide with again choose to send heavily armed, military- the media and analysts condemning misguided, style DEA agents into foreign countries, even counter-productive policies. But, while presenting the impression that this is what they are undoubtedly abject failures according confronting drug production and/or narco- to one set of metrics, they are outright successes terrorism entails. FAST is the latest step in the according to another. narrative that tries to present any issue first as a serious threat and second as an organisation, one that must be confronted militarily. This spearhead of the ‘counter-narco-terrorism’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS effort is also unashamedly political, targeted The author would like to thank Dave Bewley- at official enemies regardless of their role Taylor and Mo Hume. in the drug trade. Meanwhile, militarised interdiction will continue to have minimal Any errors of fact or interpretation remain impact on the drug trade, except perhaps to with the author.

31 ENDNOTES

1 This section is drawn from a GDPO Situation com/mark-weisbrot/another-us-spying- Analysis of the FAST programme available online problem_b_5515096.html here: http://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/GDPO%20 10 M.Shwartz Op cit. http://www.newyorker.com/ Situation%20Analysis%20FAST_%20(1).pdf reporting/2014/01/06/140106fa_factschwartz? 2 M.Schwartz, (2014), A Mission Gone Wrong, The printable=true¤tPage=all#ixzz37iE4NuE2 New Yorker, 6 January. http://www.newyorker.com/ 11 K.Russo and R.Esposito, (2009), DEA Agents Apply magazine/2014/01/06/a-mission-gone-wrong?printabl Expertise Far From Home, ABC News, 20 August. e=true¤tPage=all http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=8366287 3 R. Dobrich, Presentation to NDIA SO/LIC Symposium. 12 D.Mansfield (2010), Where Have All The Flowers Available online here: http://www.dtic.mil/ Gone? Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, ndia/2011SOLIC/Tues2Dobrich.pdf May. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/sbhrap/ 4 M. Braun, Responses to Senate Drug Caucus: http:// research/pdf/Wherehavealltheflowersgone.pdf www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/Michael-Braun-QFR.pdf 13 The FTAA was proposed in 1994 but ultimately 5 Dobrich, op cit. Schwartz, op cit. C.Savage (2011), rejected in 2005 after massive popular displays of D.E.A. Squads Extend Reach of Drug War, New opposition throughout the region. York Times, 5 November. http://www.nytimes. 14 Once in office, Zelaya proposed a non-binding com/2011/11/07/world/americas/united-states- referendum to decide whether the government drug-enforcement-agency-squads-extend-reach-of- should create a constitutional assembly to amend drug-war.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 the constitution, which, drawn up by civilian- 6 BBC (2012), Taliban-funding Afghan drug lord jailed military government in the 1980s, does little to for life in US, 12 June. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ protect the rights of most Hondurans. Many social news/world-us-canada-18414075 movements and civil society groups supported the 7 House of Representatives (2007), Overview of move and the opportunity to have greater political U.S. policy toward Latin America: hearing before inclusivity enshrined in law. It was obvious that any the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere such changes were certain to undermine the elite of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of groups in the country who do well from the current Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, constitution, exclusionary as it is. The referendum first session, March 1, 2007. Available online was to be voted on at the next election via an extra here: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- ballot box asking Yes or No to the formation of a 110hhrg33620/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg33620.pdf constitutional assembly. Congress and the Supreme 8 See Schwartz (2014); Discussing the killings, an Court declared the referendum illegal, at which article in The New York Times adds: ‘It is routine point the proposal was changed so that there would for D.E.A. agents who are assigned to mentor the first be a non-binding poll to determine whether specially trained and screened units to accompany popular support existed for a future referendum. them on raids, but it has been unusual for Americans The day before the poll was supposed to take place to kill suspects. Several former agents said the the military made their move: Zelaya was arrested recent cases in Honduras suggested that the and removed from office. Supporters of the coup D.E.A. had been at the vanguard of the operations claimed his removal was constitutional because it there rather than merely serving as advisers in is illegal to make changes to the constitution. But the background.’C.Savage and T.Shanker (2012), as was very clear at the time, a non-binding poll U.S. Drug War Expands to Africa, a Newer Hub for to determine if a referendum should be held could Cartels, The New York Times, 21 July. http://www. hardly qualify as an alteration to the constitution. nytimes.com/2012/07/22/world/africa/us-expands- The US embassy in Tegucigalpa agreed: in a cable drug-fight-in-africa.html?_r=3&hp& to the White House, embassy staff wrote that 9 AP (2013), U.S. Miliary Expands Its Drug War in the removal of Zelaya “constituted an illegal and Latin America, USAToday, 3 February. http://www. unconstitutional coup.” A better explanation for usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/03/us- the coup is that the poll had given certain groups expands-drug-war-latin-america/1887481/; The DEA in Honduran society the opportunity they had been has been involved in a number of scandals recently, waiting for. The real reasons for Zelaya’s removal which include the use of the agency as a conduit for lie in his growing tendency to work with the poor NSA programs. See J.Shiffman and K.Cooke (2013) and social movements, and undermine powerful Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up program conservative forces. For the cable, see The New used to investigate Americans, Reuters, 5 August. York Times (2010), A Selection From the Cache http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us- of Diplomatic Dispatches, 28 November. http:// dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805 www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/ M.Weisbrot (2014), Another US Spying Problem world/20101128-cables-viewer.html?hp&_r=0#report/ in Latin America: The Drug Enforcement Agency, cables-09TEGUCIGALPA645. For a summary of the Huffington Post, 20 July. http://www.huffingtonpost. way the US media has often whitewashed the history

32 of the coup, see A.Figueroa, Honduras Down the 21 According to local human rights groups, the Memory Hole, FAIR, 1 August. http://fair.org/extra- paramilitaries are increasingly sensitive to negative online-articles/Honduras-Down-the-Memory-Hole/. publicity and are targeting less prominent, more For examples of international organisations and local members of the political opposition. human rights groups’ condemnations of the situation 22 Human Rights Wartch (2014), World Report 2014; following the coup, discussed in-depth later in the Honduras. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/ report, see: Amnesty International (2009), Beatings country-chapters/honduras and detentions follow Honduras demonstrations, 23 UNHCR (2012) Statement of the United Nations 24 September. http://www.amnesty.org/en/news- Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human and-updates/news/beatings-and-detentions-follow- Rights Defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, on the honduras-demonstrations-20090924. conclusion of her official visit to Honduras. http:// For a report on torture by the coup regime, and www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. impunity for those responsible see: Physicians for aspx?NewsID=11830&LangID=E#sthash.FqFUpAR6.dpuf Human Rights (2014), Impunity in Honduras: Torture 24 For a recent overview of the situation for media and Ill-Treatment after the Coup d’État, February. workers see COHA (2014), More Than a Number; https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Honduras- Violence and Freedom of Expression in Honduras. Impunity-Report-February-2014.pdf. Human Rights http://www.coha.org/more-than-a-number- Watch (2011), Honduras: Stop Efforts to Discredit violence-and-freedom-of-expression-in-honduras Human Rights Prosecutors, 31 May. http://www.hrw. 25 P.J. Meyer, (2013) Honduras-U.S. Relations, org/en/news/2011/05/31/honduras-stop-efforts- Congressional Research Service, 24 July. http://fas. discredit-human-rights-prosecutors. org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf And for more comment from the NGO and Human 26 Center for Constitutional Rights, Urge the U.S. to Rights communtity, see: Human Rights Watch (2009), Stop Funding Honduran Police and Military! http:// Honduras: Stop Blocking Human Rights Inquiries, 16 ccrjustice.org/get-involved/action/urge-u.s.-stop- October. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/16/ funding-honduran-police-and-military!; and see the honduras-stop-blocking-human-rights-inquiries. dedicated page for further information: http:// Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ccrjustice.org/honduras-coup (2009) IACHR Presents Preliminary Observations on 27 F. Robles (2012), Honduras becomes murder Its Visit To Honduras, 21 August. http://www.cidh. capital of the world, Miami Herald, 23 January, oas.org/Comunicados/English/2009/60-09eng.htm Available online here: http://www.mcclatchydc. 15 J.Beaubien (2009), Rich Vs. Poor At Root Of Honduran com/2012/01/23/136610_honduras-becomes- Political Crisis, 5 October. http://www.npr.org/ murder-capital.html?rh=1 templates/story/story.php?storyId=113504873 28 ibid. 16 M.Weisbrot (2009), Obama’s deafening silence on United Nations (2010), Report on the visit of Honduras, The Guardian, 21 August. http://www. the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/ Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment aug/21/honduras-coup-us-foreign-policy. or Punishment to Honduras, Optional Protocol M.Weisbrot (2009), The high-powered hidden support to the Convention against Torture and Other for Honduras’ coup, LA Times, 23 July. http:// Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/23/opinion/oe- Punishment, 7 February, http://www.refworld. weisbrot23; M. Weisbrot (2014), Hard choices: Hillary org/publisher,CAT,MISSION,HND,4ef0bd812,0. Clinton admits role in Honduran coup aftermath, Al html. Physicians for Human Rights (2014) https:// Jazeera America, 29 September. http://america. s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Honduras-Impunity- aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/9/hillary-clinton-hondu Report-February-2014.pdf raslatinamericaforeignpolicy.html 29 According to the Honduran human rights 17 Inter American Press Association (2011), Honduras organisation COFADEH, between the coup and mid- Country Profile. http://www.sipiapa.org/en/ 2012 more than 10,000 complaints were filed against asamblea/honduras-90/ the police with no effect. See D. Frank (2012), 18 M.A. Martinez (2010), Honduras since the coup: Honduras: Which Side Is the US On?, The Nation, 22 Drug Traffickers’ Paradise, Center For International May. http://www.thenation.com/article/167994/ Policy Americas Program, 31 August. http://www. honduras-which-side-us cipamericas.org/archives/3029 30 A.Arce (2013) Honduran gang member missing 19 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law after police arrest suggests pattern of forced Enforcement Affairs (2013), International Narcotics disappearances, Associated Press, 1 May. http:// Control Strategy Report (INCSR); Honduras, 5 March. bigstory.ap.org/article/honduras-police-accused- http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/ death-squad-killings vol1/204050.htm 31 El Heraldo (2014), Policía ayudó a capo chapín a 20 T.Mejia (2014), Drug Trade Takes a Turn for the Worse extender su red en Honduras, 29 June. http://www. in Honduras, IPS News, 15 March. http://www.ipsnews. elheraldo.hn/sucesos/723909-219/polic%C3%ADa-ayudó- net/2014/03/drug-trade-takes-turn-worse-honduras/ a-capo-chap%C3%ADn-a-extender-su-red-en-honduras

33 32 D. Frank (2012) The Nation. El Heraldo (2014). 37 Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011), Global The Miami Herald reports an example of the Burden of Armed Violence 2011, Cambridge collaboration in practice. In 2010, Fernando Zelaya University Press. Maldonado, a lieutenant in the Honduran army’s 38 E.Holt-Gimenez (2013), Honduras: The War on counter-intelligence unit, was sent to investigate a Peasants, The Huffington Post, 12 February. http:// kidnapping: www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-holt-gimenez/ “Two law enforcement sources told The Herald honduras-the-war-on-peasa_b_2632033.html?utm_ that Zelaya irked corrupt members of the police hp_ref=tw and military, because his team not only killed the 39 A.Bird (2013), US Special Operations Command Trained kidnappers but recovered both the hostage and Military Unit Accused of Death Squad Killings in the ransom money. Someone close to the operation Honduras, Center for International Policy Americas leaked his name to the drug traffickers responsible Program, 25 February. http://www.cipamericas.org/ for the kidnapping, a law enforcement source archives/9100; the full report is available here: A.Bird said. He was ambushed and shot dozens of times (2013) Human Rights Violations Attributed to Military just before Christmas 2010. His 20-year-old sister Forces in the Bajo Aguan Valley in Honduras, Rights Johana in the passenger seat suffered the same Action, 20 February. http://rightsaction.org/sites/ fate. “Authorities know very well who the narcos default/files/Rpt_130220_Aguan_Final.pdf are, and they do nothing about it,” Zelaya’s father, 40 The government’s historic management by elite Francisco, said. “Everybody has been bought.” sectors means their interests are paramount. Neo- Someone apparently believes the elder Zelaya, liberal reforms are one manifestation. Another is 56, is out for revenge. A month after the death of the process of state-sanctioned land concentration, two of his children, another of his sons, 36-year- imposed violently or otherwise, that has outstripped old Javier, was also gunned down. In November, any mild reforms. A non-violent example is the Law of the Zelaya home was attacked with grenades. Agricultural Modernization passed in 1994, “allowing Protected by a single soldier in their current large producers to extend their territories beyond hideaway, the family was denied visas to travel the maximum legal property limits. As a result, large to the United States. “There will come a day,” landowners began to buy up the land of small farmers, Zelaya said, “when they will find us here.””F. effectively reversing whatever limited land reform Robles (2012) Op Cit.http://www.mcclatchydc. had been achieved. The human costs were immense. com/2012/01/23/136610_honduras-becomes- According to Juan Chinchilla of the Unified Campesino murder-capital.html?rh=1 Movement of Aguan (MUCA), “it forced masses of 33 One ‘reform’ tactic has been simply to shift people farmers to migrate to the cities and to the U.S. under around between high level positions. See A.Bird terrible conditions.”” At the time it was estimated (2011), Feeding the Monster: Militarization and that more than 40% of the rural population either Privatized Security in Central America, Latin did not own land or owned less than a hectare. T.M. America Bureau, 1 December. http://lab.org.uk/ Kerssen (2013). Grabbing Power: The New Struggles feeding-the-monster-militarization-and-privatized- for Land, Food and Democracy in Northern Honduras, security-in-central-america Food First Books, 2013. 34 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center R.Wong (2012), Carbon Blood Money in Honduras, (2014), Global Overview. http://www.internal- Foreign Policy in Focus, 9 March. http://fpif.org/ displacement.org/assets/publications/2014/201405- carbon_blood_money_in_honduras/ COHA (2014), global-overview-2014-en.pdf Human Rights Violations in Honduras, 7 March. 35 In a repeat of the situation elsewhere in Latin http://www.coha.org/human-rights-violations-in- America, most notably in Colombia, local activists honduras-land-grabs-peasants-repression-and-big- have observed that paramilitary forces have picked companies/ For a useful overview of the history, up the slack when state violence declines: “They’ve see:FIAN (2000), Agrarian Reform in Honduras. pulled away from the mass repression in the streets http://www.fian.org/fileadmin/media/publications/ and gone for individual assassinations. You don’t Agrarian-Reform-in-Honduras-2000.pdf look like a military regime, and it’s cheaper than 41 A report by the Security Assistance Monitor provides sweeping up people in the streets. But it terrorizes an overview of the various aid suspensions: In large groups of people, perhaps more effectively than FY2012 and FY2013, Congress withheld 20 percent the mass repression.” K.Lydersen (2010), Welcome to of State Department security assistance until the the New Honduras, Where Right-Wing Death Squads Secretary of State certified Honduras had taken Proliferate, Alternet, 26 April. http://www.alternet. steps towards improving human rights. These org/story/146608/welcome_to_the_new_honduras%2C_ human rights conditions do not apply to Defense where_right-wing_death_squads_proliferate Department security assistance. In both years 36 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (2014). the aid was later released, a move questioned by http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/ some lawmakers given the criminality within the publications/2014/201405-global-overview-2014- security forces. In FY 2014, Congress increased the en.pdf amount withheld to 35 percent but exempted border

34 security funding from the requirement. Congress L.Carlsen (2012), When Engagement Becomes has also cut off State Department-managed aid Complicity, Foreign Policy in Focus, 15 March. following the military coup in 2009 and in 2012, http://fpif.org/honduras_when_engagement_ after U.S.-backed counternarcotics operations becomes_complicity resulted in the deaths of several civilians. In 2013, 44 J.Perry (2014), The Nicaragua Model, London funding for a failing police reform was cut while Review of Books, 11 July. http://www.lrb.co.uk/ aid was greatly reduced for much of that year blog/2014/07/11/john-perry/the-nicaraguan-model/ after reports linked the country’s police chief to 45 United States Government Accountability Office death squads. In March 2014, Congress suspended (2013), Central America, Report to the Caucus cooperation on aerial radar assistance after the on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate. passage of a law permitting the Honduran air force http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658145.pdf to shoot down suspected drug-trafficking aircraft. 46 U.S. Department of State, Description of Office of Between May and July of 2012, three out of five Western Hemisphere Programs. http://www.state. such joint interdiction operations carried out by DEA gov/j/inl/whp/ agents or Honduran officers trained, equipped and 47 Security Assistance Monitor, Country Profile: vetted by the United States resulted in the deaths Honduras. http://securityassistance.org/ of trafficking suspects and innocent civilians. As publication/country-profile-us-security-assistance- of November 2014, there had still been no justice honduras for the families of victims in these cases. Security 48 A slight dip in military aid and arms sales after Assistance Monitor, Country Profile: Honduras. 2009 was accompanied by a corresponding rise in http://securityassistance.org/publication/country- Pentagon contracts, meaning money for US military profile-us-security-assistance-honduras operations, which served to almost cancel-out 42 The 2013 foreign aid bill, which included conditions the decrease. J.Lindsay-Poland (2012), Metrics of on aid to Honduras (conditions that are not U.S. Militarization in Latin America, Fellowship of monitored in practice), also included $18.6 million Reconciliation, 29 March. http://forusa.org/blogs/ to be given to Colombia so that the security john-lindsay-poland/metrics-us-militarization-latin- forces could train allies in the region, thereby america/10416. circumventing congressional restrictions. The latest 49 Ibid. foreign aid bill has been presented in two forms, 50 AP (2013), U.S. Miliary Expands Its Drug War in both of them passed by the House of Representatives Latin America. http://www.usatoday.com/story/ and the Senate appropriations committees. The news/world/2013/02/03/us-expands-drug-war-latin- committees approved the two bills - essentially america/1887481/ separated into a Senate (democrat majority) version 51 B.Loveman (2012), No Higher Law: American Foreign and a House (Republican majority) version - but did Policy and the Western Hemisphere Since 1776. not pass them. The House version is far more lenient University of North Carolina Press in allowing foreign aid to flow to Honduras, and 52 United States Government Accountability Office all restrictions are removed on aid to the security (2013), Central America, Report to the Caucus forces. In reality, it may be that, on the ground, on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate. there is little difference between the two bills. One http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658145.pdf; A year version will now be passed following the November long study by the Wilson Center reached similar 4th legislative elections, which reduced the democrats conclusions, see: C.Eguizábal, K.M. Curtis, M.C. to an 18-17 edge in the senate. For a summary see: Ingram, A.Korthuis , E. Olson, and N. Phillips (2015) A.Davis (2014), Comprehensive Analysis: Major Ways Crime and Violence in Central America’s Northern the U.S. Foreign Aid Bill for FY 2015 Could Affect Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses are Helping, U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, Hurting, and Can be Improved, Wilson Center. Security Asistance Monitor 5 October. http:// http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/Crime- www.securityassistance.org/blog/comprehensive- and-Violence-in-Central-Americas-Northern-Triangle_ analysis-major-ways-us-foreign-aid-bill-fy-2015- CARSI_Dec-2014 could-affect-us-assistance-latin; Human Rights 53 The National Research Council is part of the US Watch (2014), World Report 2014; Honduras. http:// National Academies, government founded research www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/ institutes that provide analysis to guide policy- honduras?page=3 making. National Research Council Committee 43 In their latest annual report, Human Rights Watch on Data and Research for Policy on Illegal Drugs, point out that the Guatemalan and Honduran justice Informing America’s Policy on Illegal Drugs: What systems are failing: corruption is institutionalised We Don’t Know Keeps Hurting Us, National Academy and powerful criminals are able to avoid prosecution. Press, Washington D.C. 2001 The impunity facilitates the drug trade and related 54 See footnote 135 violence. Superficial reforms have had little impact. 55 In reviving this role for the country, the US has Human Rights Watch (2015), World Report 2015. reactivated a number of old military bases, http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015; including the installation Oliver North was using

35 when he orchestrated the movement of money from 62 AP (2013), Honduras once again passes ‘model cities’ weapons sales to Iran to the brutal contra forces in law, Associated Press, 23 January. http://bigstory. Nicaragua; the so-called Iran-Contra affair. ap.org/article/honduras-once-again-passes-model- 56 AP (2013), U.S. Miliary Expands Its Drug War in cities-law Latin America. http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 63 US Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (2013), news/world/2013/02/03/us-expands-drug-war-latin- 2013 Investment Climate Statement – Honduras, america/1887481/ February. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ 57 J.Johnson, S.Lefebvre (2013), Honduras Since the ics/2013/204655.htm; It is worth noting that the Coup: Economic and Social Outcomes, Center for World Bank has invested in companies suspected of Economic and Policy Research. http://www.cepr. links to drug trafficking – something entirely ignored net/documents/publications/Honduras-2013-11. in US ‘counter-narcotics’ operations. Reuters (2014), pdf; Presidential elections took place again in 2013. World Bank again criticised for investments in Given the persistence of repression of political Honduras, 12 August. http://www.reuters.com/ opponents, it was unlikely that the elections article/2014/08/12/us-worldbank-honduras-ficohsa- would be fair. Fraud, violence and intimidation idUSKBN0GC04D20140812 were reported. “If the election were totally free 64 Oxfam (2005), Backroom Deals Enable DR-CAFTA to and fair,” wrote Dana Frank, Zelaya’s party, LIBRE, Pass, 28 July. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/ “might have a chance. But, in a spectacular run of backroom-deals-enable-dr-cafta-to-pass/ pre-election violence, at least 16 of its candidates 65 Citizens Trade Campaign (2011), Key Reasons to and activists have already been assassinated, more Oppose CAFTA. http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp- from all the other parties combined, including the content/uploads/2011/05/CAFTA_Talking_Points.pdf traditional parties.” 66 Oxfam (2005), DR-CAFTA: A Bad Deal for Poor D.Frank (2013), Hopeless in Honduras? The Election Countries, 20 April. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/ and the Future of Tegucigalpa, Foreign Affairs, press/dr-cafta-a-bad-deal-for-poor-countries/ 22 November. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 67 US Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs articles/140283/dana-frank/hopeless-in-honduras. (2013), 2013 Investment Climate Statement – Once the elections led to the victory of a pro- Honduras. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ US candidate they were, predictably, praised by ics/2013/204655.htm officials in Washington. Aside from the violence 68 A ‘War on Terror’ was first declared by President and intimidation, analysts have also noted the Reagan in 1981. The focus was on the Middle East myriad problems with the voting process itself: and Central America, where the ‘terror’ was intended “Leo Gabriel, an Austrian delegate from the EU’s to refer to the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua. observer mission, told Brazilian media that he The War on Terror declared in 2001 was run by witnessed considerable irregularities in the many of the same individuals; John Negroponte, for election, noting that living voters showed up as example, was ambassador to Honduras in the early deceased and dead people’s votes were counted. 1980s, and to Iraq 2004-2005. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Gabriel also asserted that votes were bought high-level analyses have looked back to the wars in and sold and that one-fifth of the original tally Central America as a guideline for counter-insurgency sheets were sent to an illegal server. Moreover, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. the murder of three Libre Party activists during 69 for extensive discussion of this period see: the weekend of the election underscored the N.Chomsky (1985), Turning the Tide, South End environment of fear and intimidation in which the Press; W.Blum (2003), Killing Hope: US Military election was held.” D.Frank (2013, ) A High-Stakes and CIA Interventions Since World War II, Zed Election in Honduras, The Nation, 6 November. Books, London.; M.Mcclintock (1985), The American http://www.thenation.com/article/177028/high- Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in stakes-election-honduras Guatemala, Zed Books; and, M.Mcclintock (1986), 58 The figure can be over 100 percent because real The American Connection: State Terror and Popular income losses are also factored in. Resistance in El Salvador, Zed Books. 59 COHA (2011), Honduras is Open for Business, 26 70 For a study on the agricultural legacy see: P. Howard- June. http://www.coha.org/honduras-is-open-for- Borjas (1995), Cattle and crisis: The genesis of business/ unsustainable development in Central America, UN 60 L.Carasik (2013), “Banana Republic” Honduras Food and Agriculture Organization. http://www.fao. Open for Business After Tainted Election, Truth- org/docrep/v9828t/v9828t10.htm#P2250_308434 Out, 3 December. http://truth-out.org/opinion/ 71 B.R.DeWalt, (1983), The Cattle are Eating the item/20388-banana-republic-honduras-open-for- Forests, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January, business-after-tainted-election Volume 39, No.1 61 T.Kavanagh (2011) Honduras is “open for 72 Telesur (2014), Honduran Law Enforcement Spending business”, The New Statesman, 8 May. http://www. Rises by 357%, 20 September. http://www.telesurtv. newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/05/ net/english/news/Honduran-Law-Enforcement- honduras-government-zelaya Spending-Rises-by-357-20140920-0023.html

36 73 M.C.Brun (2011), Documento del Banco G.Withers, L.Santos, A.Isacson (2010), Preach What Interamericano de Desarollo, Banco Interamericano You Practice: The Separation of Military and Police de Desarrollo, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/ Roles in the Americas, Washington Office on Latin getdocument.aspx?docnum=38904070 America. http://www.wola.org/sites/default/ 74 C. Ribando Seelke (2014), Gangs in Central America, files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/2010/ Congressional Research Service, 20 February. preachwhatyoupractice.pdf. It was recently reported http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf that a police cheif opposed to the militarised 75 ibid. approach was removed from his position. Telesur 76 See for example, Organization of American States (2014), Dismissed Police Chief in Honduras Refuses (2013), The Drug Problem in the Americas. http:// to Leave Office. http://www.telesurtv.net/english/ www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_ news/Dismissed-Police-Chief-in-Honduras-Refuses-to- and_Analytical_Report.pdf Leave-Office-20141121-0053.html 77 Dana Frank writes: 79 Security Assistance Monitor (2014), Country Profile: “Cofadeh and the Center for Justice and U.S. Security Assistance to Honduras, 1 December. International Law have raised alarms over recent http://securityassistance.org/publication/country- measures “that presumably are trying to combat profile-us-security-assistance-honduras criminality but that are restrictive of the human 80 For evidence of corruption inside the Tigers rights of the population,” including a law allowing unit seeEl Heraldo (2014), Honduras: 22 policías wiretapping with few restrictions and another hurtaron $1.3 millones del botín de los Valle Valle. permitting inspection of the bank records of http://www.elheraldo.hn/alfrente/774706-331/ nonprofits.” D.Frank (2012), The Nation. http:// honduras-22-polic%C3%ADas-hurtaron-13-millones- www.thenation.com/article/167994/honduras- del-bot%C3%ADn-de-los-valle-valle. It is worth which-side-us recalling that it was the US that founded the most 78 An example of the behaviour of these forces: In notorious military battalion in Honduras, battalion May 2012, soldiers on police duty at a checkpoint 3-16. Stephen Kinzer writes: caught a 15 year old boy who had gone through “American documents show that General Álvarez, the checkpoint on his bike without stopping, and who was chief of the Honduran security police shot him to death. It was later discovered that and then the country’s top military commander, the soldiers “turned out to be U.S.-trained and favored the simple expedient of murder. Among vetted, their equipment was U.S.-donated and the the special units he created to carry out this policy commanding officer who subsequently ordered a was Battalion 3-16 (or 316), which has become the coverup had been trained in the United States.” See most infamous military unit in Honduran history. D.Frank (2014), The Thugocracy Next Door, Politico According to a heavily edited version of a CIA report Magazine, 27 February. http://www.politico.com/ that was released in 1998, Brigade 3-16 emerged as magazine/story/2014/02/honduras-the-thugocracy- an independent entity ‘based on recommendations ext-door-103883.html#ixzz3IlSB3vBcA Washington from the “Strategic Military Seminar” between the Office on Latin America report has outlined the Honduran and the US military.’ Some of its members general implications of including the military in were flown to the United States for training by CIA police work: “Using the military for internal matters specialists.”S.Kinzer (2001), Our Man in Honduras, like crimefighting carries four main risks. First, it The New York Review of Books, 20 September. generates a potentially tense overlap between http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/ military and police institutional missions and sep/20/our-man-in-honduras/?page=2 responsibilities, especially for crime prevention 81 K.McSweeney, E.Nielsen, M.Taylor, D.Wrathall, and control. Second, it politicizes the military; as Z.Pearson,O.Wang, S.Plumb (2014), Drug Policy as Hunter (1994) warns, it ‘invites the armed forces to Conservation Policy: Narco-Deforestation, Science, remain an important political actor.... The symbolic Vol. 343 no. 6170 pp. 489-490. http://www. significance of military involvement in domestic sciencemag.org/content/343/6170/489 affairs should also not be underestimated, especially 82 M.McGrath (2014), Drug trafficking is speeding where a tradition of interventionism exists.’89 Third, deforestation in Central America, 30 January., it places military personnel in a situation for which BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science- they are not properly trained or equipped: constant environment-25960481 contact with the population. This entails risks of 83 US Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (2014), authoritarian behavior and human rights abuse. U.S. Relations with Honduras. http://www.state. Fourth, it carries a high institutional opportunity cost. gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1922.htm Recurring constantly to the military to solve internal 84 H.Park (2014), Children at the Border, New York security problems reduces political will to make the Times, 21 October. http://www.nytimes.com/ investments necessary to build a functioning civilian interactive/2014/07/15/us/questions-about-the- security and justice sector. This sector’s continued border-kids.html weakness, in turn, guarantees that the armed forces 85 M.Paarlberg (2014), Gangs, guns and Judas Priest: will be called on again in the future.” the secret history of a US-inflicted border crisis,

37 Guardian, 23 July. http://www.theguardian.com/ Interest, 8 February. http://nationalinterest.org/ commentisfree/2014/jul/23/history-border-crisis- feature/drug-money-obamas-reckless-1-billion- central-america-gangs payout-central-america-12272 86 J.Replogle, Why Nicaraguan Kids Aren’t Fleeing 90 J.R. Hernandez Alcerro (2012), U.S. Policy on to U.S, KPBS, 29 July. http://www.kpbs.org/ Honduras: Views of Two Diplomats, New York Times news/2014/jul/29/why-nicaraguan-kids-arent- Letters Section, 5 February. http://www.nytimes. fleeing-to-the-us/ com/2012/02/06/opinion/us-policy-on-honduras- 87 Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence (2010), views-of-two-diplomats.html More Violence, Less Development; Examining 91 D.Frank (2012), Op-ed: In Honduras, a Mess Made in the relationship between armed violence and the U.S, New York Times, 27 January. http://www. MDG achievement, September. http://www. nytimes.com/2012/01/27/opinion/in-honduras-a- genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/MDG_ mess-helped-by-the-us.html?_r=2& Process/MoreViolenceLessDevelopment.pdf 92 UNDP (2013), Human Development Report 2013. 88 R. Serrano-Berthet, H.Lopez (2011), Crime and http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/ Violence in Central America: A Development hdr2013_en_complete.pdf Challenge, World Bank. http://siteresources. 93 In 2011 the UNODC estimated over 25 percent of worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL_VOLUME_I_ intentional homicides were related to organised ENGLISH_CrimeAndViolence.pdf crime and criminal gangs. In Guatemala, according 89 The US Vice President Joe Biden recently announced to local sources, an estimated that 45% of homicides a $1 billion dollar funding plan for Central America are drug-related. See Organization of American that will aim to curb emigration from the region States (2013), The Drug Problem in the Americas, to the north. Information is vague at this point, p.76. http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/ but in Biden’s formulation it seems the emphasis Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf in the economic realm will be placed on the usual 94 J.F.Kelly (2014), SOUTHCOM chief: Central America areas. “Central American economies,” he wrote in a drug war a dire threat to U.S. national security, Air New York Times op-ed, “can grow only by attracting Force Times, 8 July. http://www.airforcetimes.com/ international investment.” He praises the example article/20140708/NEWS01/307080064/SOUTHCOM- of Colombia, which “reformed its rules of commerce chief-Central-America-drug-war-dire-threat-U-S- to open up its economy.” The plan essentially seems national-security to be a modified version of a proposal. 95 D. Frank (2012), Honduras: Which Side Is the US J.Biden (2015), A Plan for Central America, New On? http://www.thenation.com/article/167994/ York Times, 30 January. http://www.nytimes. honduras-which-side-us com/2015/01/30/opinion/joe-biden-a-plan-for- 96 Kelly recently presented the annual posture central-america.html?_r=1; The White House (2015), statement of the US Southern Command Fact Sheet: Promoting Prosperity, Security and Good before congress. The presentation is largely a Governance in Central America, 29 January. http:// demonstration in historical revisionism and scare www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/29/ mongering. The threat of Lebanese and Iranian fact-sheet-promoting-prosperity-security-and-good- influence in Latin America is highlighted, with little governance-central-ame substantiating evidence. Honduras is widely praised For discussion of the proposal that seems to have for investigations against “high-level officials formed the basis of the new plan, see D.Beeton involved in corruption” and for “making efforts to (2014), Central America’s “Alliance for Prosperity” swiftly arrest those security forces implicated in Plan: Shock Doctrine for the Child Refugee Crisis?, human rights abuse.” “Of note,” he says, “human Center for Economic and Policy Research, 26 rights groups have acknowledged to me that November. http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/ Honduras is making real progress in this area.” It the-americas-blog/central-americas-alliance- is not clear which human rights groups are being for-prosperity-plan-shock-doctrine-for-the-child- referred to. Kelly shares “a few examples of how refugee-crisis; The reaction from ‘critics’ is the our counterdrug efforts, conducted in coordination familiar one: the funding is well-intentioned but with DEA, are contributing to the region’s overall poorly conceived. “Giving $1 billion in aid to security.” Every example is related to improving governments with serious corruption issues just the training and interdiction capabilities of foreign because they are pledging to clean up their act is militaries. Colombia, he argues, is the model, and a triumph of hope over experience”, writes one US strategy there should be applied “to the region commentator in the journal National Interest. “In as a whole”. One beneficial outcome he alludes to the worst case, giving $1 billion to governments is Colombia’s role as a “regional stabilizer”: with dubious records on transparency and human “Colombia is a terrific example of how sustained rights will empower corrupt officials to the U.S. support can help a partner nation gain control detriment of ordinary Central Americans.” J. of their security situation, strengthen government Hidalgo (2015), Drug Money: Obama’s Reckless $1 institutions, eradicate corruption, and bolster their Billion Payout to Central America, The National economy. Colombia’s turnaround is nothing short of

38 phenomenal, and it stands shoulder-to-shoulder with As an interpretation of contemporary history, the the United States as together we work to improve testimony is clearly not to be taken seriously. But regional stability. Mr. Chairman, Members, as you Kelly’s presentation, and his interpretation of know, the United States has a special relationship events, is revealing in demonstrating how, after with only a handful of countries throughout the the cold war, the threat of “the technological world. These relationships are with countries that sophistication of third world powers” – quoting we rely on to act as regional stabilizers, countries George Bush Snr’s national security strategy – the that we look to for international leadership, drug threat, and the terrorist threat, organised countries that we consider our strongest friends criminal groups are being seamlessly adopted as the and most steadfast allies. Colombia unquestionably latest development that warrant the pursuit of core plays that role in Latin America.” Kelly is also foreign policy objectives. J.F Kelly (2015), Posture clear in elucidating a prime objective in Southern Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Command’s activities: Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern “Early this year we held a forum that brought Command, Senate Armed Services Committee, March together U.S. and partner nation government 12. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/ officials and private sector leaders to brainstorm media/doc/Kelly_03-12-15.pdf ways to improve security and economic investment 97 For discussion of this historic correlation see E.Herman in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The (1982), The Real Terror Network, South End Press; forum featured lessons learned from Colombia T.Carruthers (1993), In the Name of Democracy: U.S. and Mexico on the importance of security to Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years, economic development and identifying near-term University of California Press; and L.Schoultz (1992), activities to improve the security situation and, by Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin extension, the investment climate in these three America, Princeton University Press. countries. To quote Paul Brinkley, who wrote one 98 O.Dube, S.Naidu (2010). Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: of the most impressive books I have read on the The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict subject, the greatest element of our national power in Colombia, Center for Global Development. http:// is our “private-sector economic dynamism.” I am www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1423498_file_ hopeful American businesses will help advance our Dube_Naidu_Military_Aid_FINAL.pdf ; hylton; stokes President’s goal of a stable, prosperous, and secure 99 Fellowship of Reconciliation and Colombia‐ Central America.” Europe‐U.S. Human Rights Observatory (2014), The comments pertaining to Southern Command’s Report: The Rise and Fall of ‘False Positive’ Killings approach to human rights are worth quoting: in Colombia: The Role of U.S. Military Assistance, “As I have said before, the U.S. military doesn’t just 2000-2010. http://forusa.org/content/report- talk about human rights, we do human rights. We rise-fall-false-positive-killings-colombia-role-us- teach it. We enforce it. We live it. The protection military-assistance-2000-2010 ; K.Begg (2010), NGO: of human rights is embedded in our doctrine, our ’Alarming’ link between US aid and ’false positives’, training, and our education, and above all, in our International Peace Observatory. http://www. moral code. It is the source of our great strength peaceobservatory.org/en/1056320102/ngo-alarming- as a military power, and it is also our best defense link-between-us-aid-and-false-positives against losing legitimacy in the hearts and minds of 100 A.Isaacson (2014), Human rights laws in the way? the people we have taken an oath to protect.” Use Colombian trainers, Security Assistance Monitor, “Human rights improvements in this region,” he 5 May. http://www.securityassistance.org/latin- adds, “have largely come as a direct result of america-and-caribbean/blog/human-rights-laws- close and continuous dialogue and engagement by way-use-colombian-trainers the United States government.” (See main report 101 SICA (2011), Letter to Heads of States. Available for discussion, and footnote 97 for sources). The online here: http://www.ghrc-usa.org/wp-content/ presentation ends with a warning: uploads/2011/10/ENG-Letter-to-Heads-of-States- “Two decades ago, U.S. policy makers and the SICA-April-30-2013.pdf defense and intelligence communities failed to 102 The focus here has been Honduras, but the anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union or the situation is not unique. In Guatemala there is rise of international terrorism. Today, another considerable evidence that the local military challenge is in plain sight: transnational organized and the police involved in trafficking, and narco crime threatens not only our own security, but money is considered to have infiltrated the the stability and prosperity of our Latin American judicial system, congress, and the executive neighbors. As the Congress knows, the United States branch. Even the US State Department, in its latest and our partners worked hard to ensure the Western summary of the situation in the country, notes Hemisphere is a beacon of freedom, democracy, that the principal human rights abuses “included and peace. In the face of the corrosive spread of widespread institutional corruption, particularly criminal networks and other threats, we must work in the police and judicial sectors” and “police even harder to ensure it remains that way.” and military involvement in serious crimes such

39 as kidnapping, drug trafficking, and extortion”. M.Flash (2013), Situation of Human Rights Poor campesinos defending their land rights are Defenders in Guatemala, Center for Human Rights targets of government harassment and attack. and Humanitarian Law, 1 November. http:// Those struggling for better conditions for the hrbrief.org/2013/11/situation-of-human-rights- poor and marginalised have been publicly accused defenders-in-guatemala-2/;Peace Brigades by officials of being terrorists, drug traffickers, International (2013), ALERT: Attacks increased even communists. Guatemala is one of the most against human rights defenders in Guatemala, 27 dangerous countries in the world for trade unionists, May. http://www.peacebrigades.org/newsroom/ and even international solidarity volunteers who news-item/?no_cache=1&L=0&tx_ttnews%5Btt_ accompany local human rights defenders have news%5D=3844&cHash=6f9e1905fe65022 themselves come under attack. Last year the 38f99c38461116ebf; O.J. Hernández (2014), country experienced the largest rise in attacks on Guatemala: Opposition to Mining, the New Threat human rights defenders since the official end of the to National Security, Upside Down World, 21 July. civil war in 1996. This year, Washington ended a 24- http://upsidedownworld.org/main/guatemala- year embargo on direct military aid, opting instead archives-33/4952-guatemala-opposition-to-mining- for ‘conditions’ to be placed on the money. In a the-new-threat-to-national-security;U.S. Bureau of recent move, the government designated those who Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2013), Country oppose resource extraction operations as a threat Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013. http:// to national security. A local digital investigative www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/ journalism project, based at a university, made the index.htm#wrapper; Author’s translation following comments: “A democratic government fromO.J.Hernandez (2014), La oposición a la or one that respects the rule of law would never minería, la nueva amenaza a la seguridad nacional, consider a social protest to be a threat against the Plaza Public, 16 July. http://www.plazapublica. State; it would never classify it as destabilizing com.gt/La%20oposici%C3%B3n%20a%20la%20 and dangerous to the security of the nation. On miner%C3%ADa%2C%20la%20nueva%20amenaza%20 the contrary, an authoritarian government with a a%20la%20seguridad%20nacional; military court and a profound history, placing it at R.C. Archibold (2012), Guatemala Shooting Raises the genesis of the counter-insurgency policy applied Concerns About Military’s Expanded Role, New during the civil war, will react and prioritize the York Times, 20 October. http://www.nytimes. same way it did before.” The country also has com/2012/10/21/world/americas/guatemala- the familiar socio-economic indicators: poverty is shooting-raises-concerns-about-militarys-expanded- severe, with half of children under five suffering role.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all& ;And for more from chronic malnutrition, and levels of wealth on Guatemala, and the kinds of security forces inequality are among the highest in the world. receiving US money, see: A.Isacson, L.Haugaard, (When a rise was recorded recently in the number A.Poe, S.Kinosian, and G.Withers (2013), Time to of children crossing the border, in the case of listen, Center for International policy, http://www. Guatemala they were found not to come from the ciponline.org/images/uploads/Time_to_Listen.pdf most violent regions, but the poorest.) As noted in 103 A former trainer on Operation Snowcap, writing in the report, the US is pushing the same militarisation 2011 of his experiences, noted the continuity: “As of the society. The New York Times reports: I write this, the current administration is moving “The Guatemala military, once one of the most forward with a similar counter-narcotics surge effort brutal and feared in Central America, is resurging in Afghanistan. The principle remains the same, to take on violent crime, forging closer ties with only the location and the flavor of the drugs has American troops and law enforcement even as worry changed.” B.Hartman (2011), Inside DEA: Operation over human rights abuses and corruption intensifies Snowcap, Trafford Publishing. … [The] government is training and deploying more of 104 State Department draft report (1989), Cocaine: A its famed and feared special forces unit, known as Supply Side Problem, 25 April. http://www2.gwu. the Kaibiles and for carrying out some of the worst edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col06.pdf abuses in this country’s civil war and ex-members’ 105 United States Government Accountability Office ties to brutal criminal gangs.” (2008), Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit The situation in El Salvador is also grave, although it Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance has a less corrupt judicial system than Honduras and Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed, Guatemala, and its police and security forces have not Report to Congressional Requesters, July. http:// been involved in repression on the same level. Again, www.gao.gov/assets/280/278210.pdf the correlation holds between greater US involvement 106 For some discussion of the impact of the War on and greater repression and human rights abuses (see Drugs in Mexico since 2006, see N.Steinberg (2013), footnote 82).For references and more information End Mexico’s Disastrous “War on Drugs” Once and see: UNICEF (2011), Humanitarian Action for Children: For All, The Financial Times, 2 December. http:// Guatemala. http://www.unicef.org/arabic/hac2011/ www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/02/end-mexicos- files/HAC2011_4pager_Guatemala_rev1.pdf; disastrous-war-drugs-once-and-all; and Human

40 Rights Watch (2011), Neither Rights Nor Security; supporting guerrillas.” Human Rights Watch (1996), Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico’s Colombia’s Killer Networks. http://www.hrw.org/ “War on Drugs”. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ reports/1996/killertoc.htm files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf 118 For a discussion of the way the “Narco-Guerilla” 107 P.Reuter, G.Crawford, J.Cave (1988), Sealing has been used in Colombia see: R.Vargas (1997), the Borders; The Effects of Increased Military Colombia: The Heresy of the Manicheans, The Participation in Drug Interdiction, RAND Transnational Institute. http://www.tni.org/article/ Corporation. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ colombia-heresy-manicheans rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3594.pdf 119 J. Gomez Lizarazo (1992), Colombian Blood, U.S. 108 C.P.Rydell, S.S.Everingham (1994), Controlling Guns, The New York Times, 28 January. http://www. Cocaine; Supply Versus Demand Programs, RAND nytimes.com/1992/01/28/opinion/colombian-blood- Corporation. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ us-guns.html rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/RAND_MR331.pdf 120 M.Klare, P.Kornbluh (eds) (1988). Low Intensity 109 F.E. White (1988), “Operation Snowcap,” 8 Warfare; Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and March, Internal Memorandum. http://www2.gwu. Antiterrorism in the Eighties, Pantheon Books. edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col02.pdf 121 The director of USAID told congress at the time that 110 National Security Council (1989), Interagency the organisation’s interest in the country was “the Working Group Draft: “Strategy for Narcotics Control protection and expansion, if possible, of our economic in the Andean Region,” 30 June. http://www2.gwu. interests, trade, and investment.” P.Lernoux (1980), edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col11.pdf Cry of the People, Double Day, p.166 111 State Department Briefing Memorandum (1989), 122 Internal state department documents, now M.Levitsky, Bureau of International Narcotics declassified, cited in N.Chomsky (1993), The Clinton Matters (INM) to R.Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Vision, Z Magazine. Available online here: http:// Political Affairs (P): “NSC Deputies Committee www.chomsky.info/articles/199312--.htm Meeting on Enhancing Anti-Narcotics Efforts in 123 Cited in P.Lernoux (1980) p.163. Assessing the Andean Region,” 7 July. http://www2.gwu. US aid to Central and South America between edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col12.pdf 2003 and 2008, the government accountability 112 State Department cable (1989), Discussion with office determined the primary success to be President Garcia on the Andean Summit, 8 December. the increased level of cooperation. Counter- http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ narcotics policies - “Assistance programs focused NSAEBB69/col16.pdf on three key areas: (1) intelligence-gathering 113 U.S. Embassy Peru cable (1989), Washington and investigations, (2) maritime and land-based Interagency Comments on Narcotics Implementation operations, and (3) criminal prosecutions.” - were Plan for Peru, 21 October, http://www2.gwu. considered unsustainable. United States Government edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col14.pdf Accountability Office (2008). http://www.gao.gov/ 114 Human Rights Watch (1995), Human Rights assets/280/278210.pdf Violations and the War on Drugs. http://www.hrw. 124 M.Jelsma (1997), Introduction: Damaging Side org/reports/pdfs/b/bolivia/bolivia957.pdf Effects - The War on Drugs, The Transnational 115 J.Wagley (2006), CRS Report for Congress: Institute, 1 April. http://www.tni.org/article/ Transnational Organized Crime: Principal Threats introduction-damaging-side-effects-war-drugs and U.S. Responses, Congressional Research Service, 125 In the Journal of American History, María Celia 20 March. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33335. Toro has discussed the legal shift in the 1980s that pdf#sthash.H3YyyF6u.6uIQQSq7.dpuf; The first facilitates modern day overseas counter-narcotics reported use of ‘Narco-Terrorism’ was in Peru operations: during the 1980s in reference to the insurgent group “The most striking and consequential development Shining Path. from the perspective of international relations 116 Human Rights Watch (1996), Colombia’s Killer has been the extraterritorial extension of United Networks. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer States criminal jurisdiction, most notably the toc.htm extension of its judicial capacities in the 1980s. For 117 In the early 1960s, a US delegation to Colombia (the many countries in Latin America, this represented Yarborough Commission) recommended the creation a drastic change in United States antidrug policy. of paramilitary forces. Human Rights Watch has The enforcement of United States laws beyond documented “the disturbing role played by the United States borders, considered illegitimate by United States in support of the Colombian military. practically all nations, has been unique in the case Despite Colombia’s disastrous human rights record, of drug trafficking, in comparison both with previous a U.S. Defense Department and Central Intelligence practice and with approaches to other so-called Agency team worked with Colombian military transnational crimes. Perhaps the most important officers on the 1991 intelligence reorganization legislation affecting international narcotics control that resulted in the creation of killer networks was the 1986 Anti–Drug Abuse Act, which outlawed that identified and killed civilians suspected of the manufacture and distribution of drugs outside

41 the United States if they were intended for export responsibility for counter-narcotics to their to American territory. This law provided the basis activities. In Argentina the police had a barbaric for United States federal grand jury indictments record, and were led by a paramilitary and drug of foreign nationals, a practice that has increased trafficker. Lernoux quotes an Argentine official who over the last ten years. …. Over the last fifteen justified the counter-narcotics funding as follows: years, the DEA has maximized its capacity to “We hope to wipe out the drug traffic in Argentina. gather evidence in foreign territories to be used We have caught guerillas after attacks who were in prosecutions in United States courts. It has also high on drugs. Guerillas are the main users of drugs consolidated its power to obtain formal extradition in Argentina. Therefore, the anti-drug campaign of fugitives to the United States and to take drug will automatically be an anti-guerilla campaign as traffickers and associated criminals to trial in well.” P.Lernoux (1980), p. 339 the United States, luring them into United States 129 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on territory or arranging an abduction.” M.Celia Toro Counterterrorism and Intelligence (2011), Hezbollah (1999), The Internationalization of Police: The in Latin America – Implications for U.S. Homeland DEA in Mexico, The Journal of American History, Security, 7 July. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 86 (2): 623-640. http://jah.oxfordjournals.org/ CHRG-112hhrg72255/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72255.pdf content/86/2/623.extract 130 The press release, from which the following 126 A US Special Forces trainer working in Colombia quotes are taken, is available here: United States during the early 1990s has described how the Attorney’s Office Southern District of New York handover operated in practice: Press Release (2013), Manhattan U.S. Attorney “The American public was being told, if they were Announces Arrests Of Drug Kingpin Jose Americo told anything at all, that this was counter-narcotics Bubo Na Tchuto, The Former Head Of The Guinea- training. The training I conducted was anything but Bissau Navy, And Six Others For Narcotics Trafficking that. It was pretty much updated Vietnam-style Offenses, 5 April. http://www.justice.gov/usao/ counter-insurgency doctrine. We were advised nys/pressreleases/April13/GuineaBissauArrestsPR. that this is what we would do, and we were further php?print=1 advised to refer to it as counter-narcotics training, 131 Ibid. should anyone ask. It was extremely clear to us 132 For a discussion of the way narco-terrorism has that the counter-narcotics thing was an official been applied in specific cases, see B.Gomis (2015), cover story.” D.Stokes (2005), America’s Other War; Demystifying Narco-Terrorism, GDPO, Forthcoming. Terrorising Colombia, Zed Books. 133 P.Tighe (2004), UN Says Coalition Forces, NATO 127 C.Savage (2011). http://www.nytimes. Must Help End Afghan Drug Trade, Bloomberg, 10 com/2011/11/07/world/americas/united-states- February. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ drug-enforcement-agency-squads-extend-reach-of- news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a9oJlvelOk8g&refer=asia drug-war.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 134 J.Nathan (2010), Poppy Blues: The Collapse 128 Cited in N.Chomsky (1991), Deterring Democracy, of Poppy Eradication and the Road Ahead in Verso Books, p. 121; Afghanistan, Defense & Security Analysis, 25:4, In the 1970s, when the Argentine police were p.331-353. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ torturing dissidents and running their own death pdf/10.1080/14751790903416699 squads, the US was supplying them with extra 135 United States House Committee on Homeland Security, training and funds from the International Narcotics Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Control Program of the State Department and the Management (2012), A Line in the Sand: Countering DEA, “which became the chief source of U.S. aid Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest Border, for Latin-American police agencies after congress US House of Representatives, November. http:// abolished the AID training program in 1974.” homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/ Studying this period, author and journalist Penny files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Lernoux refers to a Government Accountability 136 In Colombia, questions have been raised over Office study that suggested “U.S. narcotics the actual identities of the captures touted as assistance could well be serving the same objectives ‘high-profile’. See Noticias Uno (2012),Agente as those of the earlier AID public safety program, DEA condenado por narcotráfico denuncia falsos which was shown to have encouraged the use of positivos en extradición, 11 March. http:// torture and assassination by Latin-American police noticiasunolaredindependiente.com/2012/03/11/ and para-police organizations.” “According to the noticias/falso-positivo-dea/ GAO,” Lernoux writes, “U.S. aid to Latin-American 137 ‘What is remarkable,’ writes Schwartz in an police agencies through the narcotics program incredulous tone now common to discussions increased by nearly 600 percent between 1973 and surrounding US drug policy, ‘is how many times the 1974, compensating almost exactly for the money U.S. has tried such militarized counter-narcotics cut off from the public safety program.” The local programs and how long it has been apparent how police received the same kind of equipment and little they amount to.’ M.Schwartz (2014). http:// training as before, and had only to add a superficial www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/06/a-

42 mission-gone-wrong international sphere the U.S. “war on drugs” ShadowSpear (2015), Special Forces Soldiers Train continues apace.”C.Youngers (2011), The Obama Honduran Counter-Narcotic, Counter Trafficking Administration’s drug control policy on auto-pilot, Force, ShadowSpear 24 March International Drug Policy Consortium. http://idpc. http://www.shadowspear.com/2015/03/special- net/publications/2011/04/obama-administration- forces-soldiers-train-honduran-counter-narcotic- drug-policy-on-auto-pilot counter-trafficking-force/ 138 AP (2013). http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ world/2013/02/03/us-expands-drug-war-latin- america/1887481/ 139 J. De Cordoba (2009), Latin American Panel Calls U.S. Drug War a Failure, The Wall Street Journal, 12 February. http://online.wsj.com/ news/articles/SB123439889394275215?mg=reno64- wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj. com%2Farticle%2FSB123439889394275215.html 140 Writes Ted Galen Carpenter, an analyst at the Cato Institute: “A study last year from the International Centre for Science in Drug Policy found that “despite increasing investments in enforcement- based supply reduction efforts aimed at disrupting global drug supply, illegal drug prices have generally decreased while drug purity has generally increased since 1990.” The study concluded that “expanding efforts at controlling the global illegal drug market through law enforcement are failing.” T. Galen Carpenter(2014), The child migrant crisis is just the latest disastrous consequence of America’s drug war, The Washington Post, 21 July. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/ wp/2014/07/21/the child-migrant-crisis-is-just-the- latest-disastrous-consequence-of-americas-drug-war/ 141 AP (2013). http://www.usatoday.com/story/ news/%20world/2013/02/03/us-expands-drug-war- latinamerica/1887481/ 142 “Counter-narcotics” in Colombia, for example, may be a failure in terms of reducing drug production, but the funding it has facilitated has militarised the armed forces, heightened their repressive capabilities, and repressed resistance to what a group of NGOs working in the country have termed a “pro-rich development” model. It has also laid the ideological path for the installation of military bases in strategic regions of the country, where either the insurgency is considered to be operating or there is a concentration Colombia’s abundant natural resources. Fumigation has displaced poor farmers from strategically important areas. US officials are castigated by analysts for mistakenly persisting with a ‘failing’ policy, and no more. 143 A study on the gap between rhetoric and reality by the International Drug Policy Consortium notes: “With over two years in office, the Obama administration has had time to begin to make its mark on the government’s domestic and international drug policies. But has the welcome change in tone been matched by a change in policies? The track record to date is disappointing, with far more continuity than change.” Reforms at home have been modest, while “in the

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The Global Drug Policy Observatory aims to promote evidence and human rights based drug policy through the comprehensive and rigorous reporting, monitoring and analysis of policy developments at national and international levels. Acting as a platform from which to reach out to and engage with broad and diverse audiences, the initiative aims to help improve the sophistication and horizons of the current policy debate among the media and elite opinion formers as well as within law enforcement and policy making communities. The Observatory engages in a range of research activities that explore not only the dynamics and implications of existing and emerging policy issues, but also the processes behind policy shifts at various levels of governance.

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