Lancaster Castle and the British Civil Wars, 1642–1651

Contrebis 2019 v37 LANCASTER CASTLE AND THE BRITISH CIVIL WARS, 1642–1651

Michael Mullett

Abstract Early in the Civil Wars between King Charles I and Parliament, a Parliamentarian detachment took possession of Lancaster Castle in 1643. Following that capture, the Castle housed artillery seized from a Spanish ship that had been beached on the River Wyre. The Royalist commander, the Earl of Derby, attempted to take the Castle and the gunnery in March 1643 but, failing to do so, vented his frustration by plundering and devastating much of the town of Lancaster. Subsequently, the Castle became the base for a garrison of nominally Parliamentarian troopers, who in fact used the building as a base for raiding the surrounding countryside. Lancaster Castle had become a nest of disorder and was subjected to a government policy of ‘slighting’ (demilitarising) such ancient fortresses. Some damage was done to the fabric that was made good after 1660. Even so, Lancaster Castle’s long-term role as both a prison and court of justice secured its survival beyond the traumas of seventeenth-century civil conflict.

The First Civil War Lancaster lies at the geographical centre of the British Isles, between the three kingdoms of England, Ireland and Scotland and the Principality of Wales that made up the early modern British monarchy. Historians now generally reject the earlier anglo-centric view of an ‘English’ Civil War between Charles I and Parliament, in favour of a view of the conflict that took in all the components of the British Isles. In that light, Lancaster’s strategic centrality becomes all the more striking. The first Civil War was partly provoked by a Catholic Royalist uprising in 1641 in Ireland. With the entry of the Scots into the struggle in 1643, Lancashire’s role as a major focus of the battle for Britain was confirmed.

Lancaster was a vital tactical and strategic focal point in the Civil Wars. The townscape ascends to a hill overlooking the River Lune, a military prize whose value has been recognised by successive generations of warriors, from the Romans through the Normans, Lancastrians, Yorkists and Jacobites. All military forces aiming to control north-west England have had to secure the crossings of the great rivers of the region, the Eden at Carlisle, the Ribble at Preston and, crucially, the Lune at Lancaster. Alongside the parish church, the Castle occupied the hill above the town and was the most redoubtable fortification in the County Palatine of Lancashire. At the beginning of the conflict between the Crown and Parliament in 1642, King Charles I’s Royalists, failed to secure this asset: ‘they did not Garrison it neither the towne of Lancaster’ (Beamont 1864). The fortress was thus for the taking. Following the surrender of Preston on 8 February 1643 to an expeditionary force dispatched from Puritan Manchester, a Parliamentarian squadron, consisting of an infantry company and a troop of cavalry under the command of Major Thomas Birch, was sent from Preston to Lancaster (Beamont 1864).

This move may have been planned as a reconnaissance mission: ‘to view whether the townes were fortified strongly or no’ (Roper 1907). In the event, however, it paid dividends. Lancastrians lent assistance to Birch’s assault, indicating their pro-Parliamentarian stance in these early stages of the struggle between King and Parliament. A token Royalist occupying force in the Castle was quickly overcome and Birch allowed the senior Royalists of the area, the King’s High Sheriff, Sir John Girlington and the Member of Parliament for Lancaster, Roger Kirby, to depart in peace. Prisoners in the Castle’s gaol were set free: ‘Al the Prisoners they found in it eyther for fellonie or debt they

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Contrebis 2019 v37 sett them att Libertie’ (Beamont 1864). A Parliamentarian garrison was installed, under the command of Captain William Shuttleworth (Beamont 1864; Broxap 1910; Roper 1907).

These victories in the early weeks of the first full year of Civil War were strategically and symbolically significant for three reasons. First, the seizure of Lancaster gave Parliament the prize of the county town, which was the centre of its judicial and administrative activities. Second, the linked capitulations of Preston and Lancaster took Parliamentarian forces out of their south-east Lancashire Puritan heartlands and out into the wider shire, up towards the borders with predominantly Royalist Cumberland and Westmorland. Third, the bold and successful assaults on Lancaster and Preston, aided by the convictions of a formidable Puritan religious ideology, provided an early indication of the military prowess that in the course of the 1640s was to give victory in the first Civil War to Parliament.

One theatre of the European war of religion now known as the Thirty Years War (1618–48) was in the Low Countries, where Catholic Spain was struggling to regain its lost dynastic provinces from the Protestant Dutch Republic. During his reign, beginning in 1625, Charles I had been formally neutral during the Thirty Years War. Denied access by France to the overland route from Spain to the Low Countries, the Spanish, despite England’s official neutrality, were given leave by the Crown to transport their naval and land forces to the Netherlands via a British route. The freedom granted to the Spanish to navigate British inshore waters accounts for an extraordinary spectacle on the Lancashire coast in March 1643, with the appearance off the north Fylde shore of a wayward Spanish vessel: ‘a Spanish schip blowne in wth a storme to Weyre water’ (Broxap 1910; Beamont 1864; Roper 1907).

The ship was the Santa Anna, belonging to the Dunkirk squadron of the Spanish army of Flanders, a vast craft ‘of great Burden such a one as was never landed in Wyre watter in any mans memory’ (Roper 1907). She had been engaged as a transport for 400 recruits bound for training in the Low Countries, but as a result of the death of her pilot she had been blown very badly off a course that would otherwise have taken her back to her Dunkirk haven, via the English Channel. Besides her human cargo, the Santa Anna was a large-scale weapons-carrier, with 22 cannon, of the best Spanish make: ‘many great peeces of Brasse Ordenances … . It was a wonder to the Country to see such a one’ (Beamont 1864). The gunnery was designed to subdue the Dutch towns but would have been equally adaptable for a war of urban sieges and surrenders in civil-war England. In order to attract attention and assistance for her famished and weakened complement, the Santa Anna, riding at anchor off the Fylde coast, spent two or three days firing off her great guns, thundering across the marshes every time one of these mighty monsters of weaponry was discharged. The appeals for help resulted in the ship being towed into the safety of the Wyre estuary, on the western, Rossall, bank. There her presence and prize value alerted the rival forces into action. Over the Saturday and Sunday of 4–5 March, the county’s Royalist commander, the Earl of Derby, contended for the Santa Anna’s cargo against a Parliamentarian force sent from Preston. However, after the Earl had tried to keep the guns out of the enemy’s hands by sending them to the bottom of the Wyre, the Parliamentarian forces were able to retrieve them from the ship’s hold and from the river bed and convey them the few miles along Bernard Wharf into the Lune estuary: ‘down Loyne to Lancaster and laid in the Castle Guard’ (Roper 1907). This transfer opened a new phase in the contest for the Castle, as Lord Derby tried to make amends for his inability to take the Santa Anna’s artillery cargo in the first place by trying to secure both the Castle and the munitions it now housed.

The seizure of the Santa Anna and its cargo was one part of a remarkable Parliamentarian military achievement in the County Palatine in February and March 1643: ‘Lancaster, Preston, the Ship

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Contrebis 2019 v37 Ordenance, with the whole Country round about, being in the Parliaments power’ (Beamont 1864). The storage of the ordnance in Lancaster Castle now made it a high-priority target for a Royalist counter-offensive. The Earl of Derby assembled a large force of 600 infantry and 400 cavalry, supplemented by 300 Royalist volunteers in the Fylde. The combined force marched north and was joined near Garstang by 600 more men brought in by High Sheriff Girlington and the Catholic Royalist Colonel Thomas Tyldesley. They clashed with a Parliamentarian defence force of 600 musketeers.

The town of Lancaster had no stone walling, but with one account noting the ‘mud walls of the town’ (Roper 1907), it appears that some temporary defences had been improvised against a Royalist assault. On 18 March 1643 a message from Lord Derby to the townspeople attempted to win hearts and minds – ‘to free you from the bondage of those declared traitors’ – and tried to reduce the scale of his military operation by securing practical assistance or compliance from the town. The Earl’s address offered the options of ‘fair usage’ versus ‘what the law of the lande and of warre will inflict on you’ (Roper 1907). This meant the punishments of rape, massacre, plunder and destruction could be unleashed by the successful besiegers in the Thirty Years War in Europe on the towns that opposed them. The response of the townsmen in the person of the Mayor, directed by the Castle command, was to the effect that, since the Parliamentarian force had gained the military initiative over the town, the Castle and the artillery, any assistance to the Earl was out of their hands.

Lord Derby and his officers decided to strike a double blow against Lancaster, to ‘recover the Ordenances to themselves with Lancaster Castle allso’ (Beamont 1864). On about 18 March Royalist troops entered the town in house-to-house and street-to-street manoeuvres, until the Earl himself, pike in hand, led his men in what might have been a successful assault. The Parliamentarians suffered casualties, including the death of their commander, Captain William Shuttleworth, but the garrison retreated into the Castle, carrying out only a brief sortie, not to defend the townspeople but to pick up some provisions for themselves.

Cheated of their strategic prize, the Royalists wreaked their vengeance on the defenceless town. As the pro-Parliamentarian Discourse of the Warr, recorded: Such was their cruelty that they set fyre upon the towne in several parts of it, having none to withstand them. In the hart of the Towne they burned divers of the most eminent houses. That long street called the Whit croft [the length of Penny Street, running down from White Croft] all was burned Dwelling houses barnes corne hay cattell in the stalls (Beamont 1864).

The invaders ‘plundered unmercifully carrying great packets home with them’ (Beamont 1864). The ‘Castle [the Royalists] could not enter; yet spoyled the Towne … finding that the Castle was too strong for them, [they] plundered the town’ (Beamont 1864; Roper, 1907). There was a cruel contrast between the safety of the garrison, with its ‘heartinesse’ and ‘comfortable provision’, and the wretchedness of the plundered town populace. Their plight stirred the senior Parliamentarian officer, Ralph Assheton, ‘to greef’ at the ‘pitifull rewings [ruins]... with the clamour of the people for it and their plunderings by the souldiers’ (White 2001).

Was there worse in store for the county town than the loss of an estimated 90 houses and 86 barns destroyed by the Royalists? Was there any truth in the insinuation, recorded by Roper, that the Royalists ‘massacred the inhabitants in the most horrible manner’? (Roper 1907). Derby’s account implies that, in the light of what he took to be the townsmen’s insolent response to his appeal of 18 March, he was justified in burning the town: ‘enraged to see their sauciness against so good a

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Contrebis 2019 v37 Prince [Charles I], [he] made bold to burn the greatest part of the town’. His action, he claimed, was a purely military operation, not a war crime, without any atrocity, a two-hour long struggle in which three or four Parliamentarians, but no civilians, were killed, and the Earl insisted that there ‘was no woman or child suffered’. Derby even claimed that the outcome was a kind of victory: ‘we beat them into the Castle ... Having got some advantage which was the first that I had ever since these unhappy times’. It was, however, ‘well to slip on to Preston’ (Roper 1907).

The stance adopted by Lancastrians in the course of this contest for the possession of their town’s streets must have been largely passive, if not neutral. The Royalist paper, the Mercurius Aulicus, made the unsubstantiated – and demographically improbable – claim that 3,000 Lancastrians came out to bid the Earl welcome, whereas the Discourse of the Warr devised propaganda around the idea that the town ‘was no Enemie to him’ (Beamont 1864: Bulmer 1913) and was thus much more unfairly treated by the Earl than if it had been Royalist. Derby himself, in his 18 March call on the town to submit and assist him, recalled their ‘former neglect of the King’s service’ (Roper 1907). Thus it appears that, at that stage of the wars, Lancaster was for Parliament rather than the King. So it may have been as a reward for the town’s Parliamentarian partisanship that in 1645 Parliament ordered that Lancaster should receive a damages payment of £8,000 in recompense: ‘for the Burning of the Said Towne, The Amount to be equally divided amongst the [non-Royalist] Inhabitants’ and to be raised by the arson victims themselves out of the estates of Royalists who had taken part in the March assault. Compensation seems to have been awarded again in 1647 with a new maximum of £2,000. Whether anything substantial was ever actually paid to the devastated borough is unclear, but the various sums specified – amounting to several millions in modern values – do give us a kind of index of the scale of damage done to the town’s building stock by the burning (Lancaster Central Library 1645, 1647)

Following this battle for the Castle, a 2,000-strong infantry force, commanded by Assheton, was despatched in order to secure Lancaster fully for Parliament, at the cost, though, of leaving Preston with only four companies of infantry to hold it. Derby moved swiftly and covertly south to Preston which, with its popular Royalism, fell into the Earl’s hands, giving the Crown’s forces a new military advantage within north-west England. For Assheton the loss of the county’s strategic and communication centre was a price not worth paying for the guns laid up in Lancaster Castle’s cellars: ‘This schip has bin the cause of all our sorrow having our troopes devyded onely to get these Canons’ (Roper 1907). The Castle itself was temporarily vacated but had been re-garrisoned before the end of March.

The fall of Preston to Lord Derby inaugurated a dramatic, if brief, revival in Royalist fortunes in the north-west, to the extent that the Mercurius Aulicus reported that all Lancashire, except for Manchester, was controlled by Royalist forces (Broxap 1910). Derby’s startling success at Preston encouraged him to mount an advance on Blackburn Hundred. There, Assheton, leaving behind a guard unit in Lancaster Castle, joined other Parliamentarian commanders in a counter-offensive, forcing Derby’s retreat via Lancaster and the Lune valley and up into Royalist Westmorland, eventually to seek refuge in his family’s Stanley quasi-kingdom of the Isle of Man. Having chased the Earl out of the county, Assheton fell back on Lancaster Castle. He had 14 of the great guns transported to Manchester where their sonic boom once more caused great wonderment. In the Lune Valley, Lancaster’s sister castles at Hornby and Thurland acted as an irritant from the Parliamentarian point of view, providing a base for a three-week Royalist siege against Lancaster Castle in the spring of 1643. The operation was halted when Assheton advanced into the Lune valley in order to take Thurland and Hornby Castles. Yet such was Lancaster’s strategic value that in the summer of 1643 a Royalist force from Westmorland moved down into Lancashire ‘north of

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Contrebis 2019 v37 the Sands’, mustering at Dalton-in-Furness in preparation for a crossing of Morecambe Bay in order to assault Lancaster from a coastal landing. Instead, the Parliamentarian commander, Alexander Rigby, crossed the Sands and crushed the Westmorland Royalists at Dalton.

By the autumn of 1643 Lancaster Castle, which had been the focus of hectic offensives and counter- offensives during that year, was firmly in Parliamentarian hands. Under the command of Colonel George Dodding, it was reinstated as a prison, now for prisoners of war. A devious move was proposed during Dodding’s command by Assheton, now commander-in-chief of the Parliamentarian armies in Lancashire. Aware that two of his officers, Colonels John Moore and Alexander Rigby, doubted Dodding’s ‘fidelity’, in April 1644 Assheton sent a secret order to the two colonels to march on Lancaster with 1,000 men ‘under the pretence of making a diversion only’ and ‘find means to possess yourselves of Lancaster Castle’, in order to head off the possibility of Dodding’s surrendering it. In the event, the preventive strike was not required (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1644).

In 1645, however, new troubles and dangers struck in a forceful reminder that Lancaster’s Castle was also its curse. These were now the closing stages of the first English Civil War, when Parliament’s victory at Naseby in June dispelled all hopes of a royal victory. The continuation of the conflict was now dissolving the citizen militias of the earlier phases of the conflict into military professionals who ‘saw themselves as separate from civilians’ (Purkiss 2007). From some point in 1645, Lancaster Castle was occupied by Parliamentarian troops who used it as a base from which to carry out bandit raids on the surrounding countryside: ‘the cruellest persons that ever this County was pestered with… an unmeasurable torment to the Hundreds of Lansdaile and Amonderness’ (Beamont 1864).

It was the fear that this brigandage would provoke a large anti-Parliamentarian backlash in the county that was one of the motives behind a proposal to neutralise the Castle for military purposes and, in doing so, reduce it to the status of a prison: ‘not [to] be tenable for a Garrison to shelter in though it might retaine the Prisoners for the County’. The Castle complex was to be de-militarised and turned over for purposes of government, justice and law enforcement in the county town: ‘leaving enough for the courts of justice and the county gaol’ (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649–50). Parliament ordered ‘that all the Walls about it should be throwen downe, only the Gate House, the buildings upon the West and South sides, with the Towers, retained’ (Beamont 1864).

This intended reduction in the size of Lancaster Castle would have spared the extensive western and southern ranges and their towers, along with the great gatehouse. However, what Parliament approved was essentially a military decommissioning of the Castle, through the taking down of its defensive walls. An ostensible impetus behind the planned part-demolition was to end the way that the Castle had been mis-used by the Parliamentarian soldiers who exploited it as a base from which to harry the surrounding territory: ‘that soe the country might be eased of that burden of unruly Troopers’ (Beamont 1864). However, that problem was solved by the removal of the troublesome garrison: ‘and so the Guard was gone, being taken off (Beamont 1864).

The Second Civil War Lancaster Castle was also targeted for extensive destruction for strategic reasons. In March 1648 a second Civil War broke out, when Charles I allied with Scottish Royalists against the settled Parliamentarian regime in England. In the conflict, castles around the country became foci of destabilisation. This attempted Royalist coup of 1648 began with an attempt to seize Pembroke Castle. In the north, the castle of Appleby-in-Westmorland was won by Royalist forces in July but

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Contrebis 2019 v37 then lost again in October. Elsewhere, the castles of Chepstow, Tenby and Pontefract invited attack between May and July 1648 as potential bases to attack the Parliamentarian government. Lancaster Castle was a member of this group of military prizes to be captured by opponents of the de facto government. The taking of Lancaster was written into the strategic plan of the Scottish Royalist general, the Duke of Hamilton, as he advanced south for a battle with Oliver Cromwell at Preston in August: one that would destroy the hopes of the royal cause in the British kingdoms for the next 12 years. The Lancashire Catholic Royalist Colonel Sir Thomas Tyldesley was put in charge of a large besieging force to take the Castle, an attempt called off only after Hamilton’s defeat at Preston.

After the second Civil War, a policy seems to have been adopted of dismantling castles as possible platforms for future assaults on the regime. In June 1649 a warrant was produced by the Council of State for the pulling down of Lancaster Castle, with similar directions for the castles of Montgomery and of the Downs (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649–50). For central government, Lancaster Castle was a particularly problematic structure, given the strength of Royalism in its region and its strategic location as the first Lancashire town on the direct route for invasion from Cumberland, Westmorland and Scotland: potentially under threat of ‘being surprised’ by enemies of the state (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649–50). That explains why the authorities in London kept up a steady fire of directives to the local military officials, the Governor and Deputy Governor, to ‘slight’ Lancaster Castle: ‘to dismantle Lancaster Castle, so as to unfit it for a garrison’ (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649–50). In key areas such as the surrender of important Royalist prisoners and the handover of gunnery, central government encountered passive resistance from the Governor of Lancaster Castle. The Council of State fulminated: ‘We ordered you to remove the arms and ammunition in the castle to Liverpool, but as yet there has been no obedience’ (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649–50). By November 1649 Thomas, now Colonel, Birch, and the Governor of Liverpool, had received the guns from Lancaster, though without the carriages that made them operable (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649–50). It was, however, in response to the refusal of the Lancaster Governor and his deputy to do anything about pulling down the designated sections of the Castle that the government issued dark threats: ‘so that we may not be necessitated to have recourse to other means to give effect to our directions’. Demolition commissioners were instructed ‘in case of refusal, to certify us, that some further course may be taken with [the Governor]’ (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649–50).

The Council repeated its instructions to the demolition commissioners twice in August 1649: ‘let the lead and timber and the portcullis taken down at Lancaster castle be reserved to be sent’ to the dilapidated castles at Liverpool and Chester (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649–50). Such directives were all ignored and it is thanks to the blank disobedience of those officials that we have the Castle as we do today.

By 1650 the Council of State was stepping up its campaign to designate Lancaster Castle primarily as a prison and a major detention centre for opponents of the regime: ‘great numbers’ of rioters from Preston, Manchester, Ormskirk and Rochdale protesting against government legislation and the excise were to be committed to ‘Lancaster gaol’ (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1650).

But by March 1651 the de-militarisation of the Castle was further advanced by payments authorised by the Council of State to transfer the artillery to Liverpool, with a further order that ‘guns lying about the town’ be taken into the Castle (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1651). However, the events of that year led to renewed anxiety over the possibility of Royalist capture. On 1 January Charles I’s heir, Prince Charles, was crowned King of Scotland and the possibility of a Scottish Royalist invasion to make good his claim in England needed to be prepared for. The Earl of Derby raised 1,500 men in Lancashire and the Isle of Man in support of Charles and in this new crisis the ‘region of greatest

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Contrebis 2019 v37 danger lay in Lancashire and Cheshire’ (Woolrych 2002). Using the building primarily as a prison was still the Council of State’s policy, with the added element of the precautionary detention of Royalist suspects. However, the fact that the demolition had not been carried out once more focused attention on the possibility of the Castle’s capture by the Royalists. The Council of State’s intelligence was that the Castle had still not been made ‘untenable, but use may be made of it by the enemy, if they should seize upon it’. Consequently, the Council ordered ‘that a party of horse and foot be quartered in Lancaster, and put into the Castle, both for securing the place’ and for detaining Royalist suspects. (Cal. S. P. Dom. 1651).

Eventually, kingship, in the person of Charles II, was restored in 1660. Fears for the security of the restored monarchy meant that Lancaster Castle became a place of trial and detention of alleged insurgents, including the Quaker leaders, George Fox and Margaret Fell. The Civil War years had seen the last phase of Lancaster Castle’s historical function as a military installation.

After the Civil War After 1651, the history of the Castle’s walls can be traced using both documents and, importantly, pictures. Later in the 1650s Parliament renewed its desire to demilitarise several castles to prevent their use as garrisons, Lancaster Castle being one of these (White 1993, 73). Only such security as was needed for the Castle’s functions as a court and prison was to remain. Therefore the outer walls were levelled or greatly reduced in height. Yet in 1660 the High Sheriff and the Justices of the Peace petitioned Parliament for the Castle to be repaired and by 1664 there were emerging plans to re-roof buildings and repair walls, and work had begun by 1667, though the walls were a lower priority than the buildings. Even by the time of the Bucks’ engraving of the Castle in 1728 there was apparently still no wall between the Gatehouse and the Well Tower (Champness 1993, 13) hence the Castle could not be and was not defended during the first Jacobite invasion in 1715. However, Mackreth’s map of Lancaster in 1778 shows that a wall had been built there by then. Mackreth’s map also shows that all the walls were closer in towards the centre of the Castle then, each building/tower protruding fully beyond the walls towards the town, hence making it easier to defend the outer face of the walls from attack. Today the outer walls of the Castle are aligned with the outer walls of the buildings that the walls link. This change occurred during the building of the new prisons in the Castle between 1788/9 (when the Gaoler’s House was completed) and 1821 when the Female Penitentiary was finished (Champness 1993, 20–1). These new outer walls may have re-used some of the older stone blocks, but they were taller in several sections so as to be escape-proof from the inside rather than attack-proof from the outside. The outer wall was extended on the north side to accommodate and fully enclose the Male Felons’ Prison (1796) and on the south side for the Female Felon’s Prison (1792/3) and the Female Penitentiary (1821). These Georgian outer walls, which we can see today, are easily recognisable by their smooth sandstone ashlar facing which extended to re-facing Hadrian’s Tower. The western walls of the Castle were completely remodelled by the building of the Shire Hall, completed in 1802, which has never had any military role. In 2018 part of the northern outer wall was lowered by 2–3 metres to its pre-1802 height as part of the restoration of the Castle by the Duchy of Lancaster (BDP 2017).

Acknowledgements Michael Mullett acknowledges the considerable assistance from the staffs of Lancaster University Library and Lancaster City Library while researching this article and the generous help of the Editor, Dr Gordon Clark, in preparing it for publication.

Author profile Michael Mullett is Emeritus Professor of Cultural and Religious History at the University of Lancaster, where he taught for 40 years until official retirement in 2008. His many books and articles cover urban

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Contrebis 2019 v37 history, Catholic and Nonconformist history, Reformation studies and biographies of leading figures in the history of religion. Email: [email protected]

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