oQunwntof TheWorld Bank

FOROFFOCIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized

Rpw r. 9103

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT Public Disclosure Authorized

THIRD EDUCATIONPROJECT (CREDIT 1305-HA)

NOVEMBER 7, 1990 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized d Human ResourcesOperations Division tment III and the CaribbeanRegional Office restricteddistribution and may be usedby reciplentsonly In the perfornce of Its contertsmay not otherwisebe disclosedwitbout World Bank authorization.

c,, - .,I r ., t- ,,,,,, * ' ,: 1

CARS Cooperative for Amrican Relief to Xveryone GTOIO General International Trading Company IDA International Developmant Association IDS Inter-Amical Development Bank INAOHIX National Institute for Management and International Higher Studies (Institut National de Gestion et Hautes Etudes Intornationals) IPN National Pedagogical Institute (Institut Pedagogique National) M0E Ministry of Education PIU Project Implementation Unit VNDP United Nations Development Program aNESCO United Nations Scientific and Cultural organization USAID United States Agency for International Development THEWORLD SANK FOROMCIL US ONy Washington.D.C. 20433 U.S A.

OlhceCA OwDetw.Gt4 Op.tatmn, Evaluatim

November 7, 1990

MEMORANDUMTO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSAND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report: HAITI - Third Education Proiect - (Credit 1305-HA)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report: Haiti - Third Education Project (Credit 1305-HA)" prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this tim-.

Attachment

This documenthas a restricteddistribution and may be NWdby recipientsonly in the performance of their officialduties. Its contentsmay not otherwisebe disclosedwithout World Bankauthorization. FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

HAITI

THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1305-HA)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paae No.

Preface ...... Evaluation Summary ......

I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM IDA'S PERSPECTIVE ...... 1

Project Identity ...... 1 Background ...... 1 Sector Development Objectives ...... 1 Policy Context ...... 1 Linkages Between Project, Sector and Macro Policy Objectives ...... 2 Project Objectives and Description ...... 2 Project Objectives ...... 2 Project Components ...... 3 Project Design and Organization ...... 4 Project Implementation ...... 5 Critical Variances in Project Implementation ...... 5 Project Risks ...... 7 Major Results of Project ...... 7 Project Objectives ...... 7 Impact ani Sustainability of the Project ...... 7 IDA's Performance ...... 8 Major Strengths and Weaknesses ...... 8 Lessons Learned ...... 8 Borrower Performance ...... 9 Major Strengths and Weaknesses ...... 9 Leasons Learned ...... 9 Project Relationship ...... 9 IDA-Borrower Relationships ...... 9 Consulting Services. 9 Project Documentation and Data .9 Availability of Relevant Data to PCR Mission .10

II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .11

III. PROJECT PROFILE AT TIME OF COMPLETION ...... 15

ANNEX 1 - List of Schools Constructed and Rehabilitated and Housing Facilities ...... 27 ANNEX 2 - Participant on Completion Mission and People Met ... 30

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

HAITI

THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1305-HA)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Third Education Project in Haiti, for which Credit 1305-HA in the amount of SDR 8,400,000 (US$9 million equivalent) was approved on November 30, 1982. The credit was closed on December 31, 1987, one year behind schedule. It was fully disbursed, and the last disbursement was on February 3, 1988.

The PCR was jointly prepared by the Human Resources Division of the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, Department III (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III), and the Borrower (Part II and some statistical information included in Part III).

Part I is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Development Credit Agreement and its amendment; supervision reports; correspondence between IDA and the Borrower; internal IDA memoranda; and a mission to the country in December 1989. Part II was prepared by the staff of the Project Implementation Unit and submitted by the Government of Haiti. - iii -

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

HAITI

THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1305-HA)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Proiect Obiectives and Content

1. The principal objectives were to implement important elements of the Government's program of educational reform, involving curriculum change, including greater use of Creole in primary schools, and improved access to the lower primary education cycle; and to enhance efficiency, quality and management of primary education. The project was also designed to improve the training of accountants and to introduce a uniform examination for profes- sional qualification at the National Institute for Management and International Higher Studies (INAGHEI). The initial design of the project included: (a) constructing, furnishing and equipping schools for grades 1-4 totaling 180 classrooms covering 45 schools, including also a pre-school center and a family education room in each school to be used for literacy classes for young adults and for community meetings, and the provision of housing facilities for four teachers in all 45 schools; (b) accountants training at INAGHEI; (c) the support of the educational reform by improving the National Pedagogical Institute's (IPN) Curriculum Development Unit; and (d) the provision of technical assistance by the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) financed country assistance program. The project also financed ataff salaries of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and the Education Reform Committee, monitoring and evaluation studies, and technical assistance. Delays in project implementation, mainly the civil works aspects, and the need to limit recurrent expenditures, in view of austerity imposed on the budget by weak economic performance, forced the Government to request an amendment in project design. In June 1986 the credit was amended to: (a) limit construction to 11 schools or 81 classrooms instead of 45 schools, to construct ai,d furnish accommodations for 18 teachers instead of 180; (b) repair and expand 20 existing schools and rehabilitate 78 schools damaged during social disturbances of February 1986; (c) add a computer Laboratory at INAGHEI for use of private schools; dnd (d) increase the percentage of disbursement for construction from 65% to 99% due to the chronic lack of counterpart funds. By the end of the project, 11 new schools were finished, 20 existing schools were rehabilitated, 64 instead of 78 schools built under tho First and Second Education Projects were rehabilitated and accommodations for eight teachers only (two housing facilities) were constructed. Implementation Experience

2. The project encountered numerous difficulties that tended to reduce overall impact. Main entities responsible for project implementation were the Ministry of Education (MOE) and IPN. Lack of counterpart funds caused delays in the start up of civil works, and due to cost escalation the project had to be scaled down. An Education Reform Committee formed by representatives of the sector was created to develop a strategy to implement the reform and supervise its execution. However, frequent changes of ministers and turnover of high level personnel at MOE resulted in the dismantling of the committee after a few months. Lack of full consensus for the reform program by all concerned levels of the Goverunent, especially the policy for greater use of Creols, may have also contributed to lower public acceptance of the new methods. In addition, the MOE had not clearly instructed or prepared public school.directors and inspectors to implement the reform. Government officials judged that a gradual and successful introduction of the reform in the public schools would result in its acceptance by the important private sector (enrolling about 52% of students), which was not entirely the case. By the end of project implementation, of a total of 1,003 public schools only 7% introduced the integral reform program and 38% adopted it partially; in total the reform was introduced in 45% of the public sector. Of a total of 3,813 private schools, 2% adopted the reform program in full and 6% adopted it partially, i.e. 8% of the private sector adopted the reform program.

3. The lack of capability for planning and weak management at MOE and IPN, aggravated by frequent staff turnover, translated into poor coordination between these two key entities, especially in the field. MOE trained reform teachers through its secondary schools, and IPN was in charge of the training and retraining of school teachers in the field through its pedagogical advisors who, after being promoted to inspectors, were transferred to MOE. Consequently, IPN had access to the pedagogical agents only through MOE, which had the effect of reducing the amount and quality of pedagogical support services available for the reform. IPN was also in charge of the design and production of new curricula and textbooks. Annual reviews of work programs and budget, and yearly contracts between PIU and IPN staff directly involved in project execution, were introduced during project implementatior to counteract planning and managerial weaknesses in MOE and IPN and improve programming and project execution in view of the chronic lack of counterpart funds. Technical assistance offered by local consultants helped improve the accounting system both in IPN and the PIU. A sufficient quantity of educational materials was produced, but materials were often distributed late in the school year. Pre-service and in-service teacher training was improved, but the retrained teachers were not in all cases appointed to the targeted schools.

4. Furniture and equipment were procured in sufficient quantities, using a procurement agent. The services of the selected procurement agent were not without problem, however, and, in retrospect, insufficient attention was devoted during project design to strengthening the Borrower's own capacity to manage procurement. Better technical specifications would have avoided the award of contracts for furniture that was less adapted to the climate and did not follow the widely accepted standard design. Supervision of civil works was enhanced with the contracting of an outside r nsulting enginozeringfirm that helped exercise quality control. School design was adapted to the rural setting, but adequate school maintenance is still not in place. UNESCO technical assistance was devoted to curriculum development, teaching materials, and radio education. A foreign consultant was involved in the setting up of INAGHEI's computer laboratory.

Proiect gesults

5. With some modifications, occasioned by the amendment of the Credit Agreement in June 1986, quantitative goals of the project relating to the provision of furniture, new curricula and educational materials have been essentially met. The fact that tight budgetary limits made it impossible to construct the full complement of 180 classrooms (45 schools) and corresponding housing units as envisaged during appraisal is still felt in the system. A better dissemination of the goals of the reform to the public at large and more involvement of the private sector would have promoted an earlier acceptance of the new educational system. The accountants education program was fully and adequately executed.

Proiect Sustainability

6. This project is part of a long term strategy. It has been in- strumental in initiating the process of educational reform prepared by the Government, and in setting the basis for further investments as under IDA Fourth Education Project and with financing from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Despite the controversy of the reform program, the project has made improvements in coverage and quality in selected locations of Haiti. Evaluation of the reform program, where it has been implemented under the most favorable condLtions (sufficient didactic materials, trained teachers and adequate physical infrastructure), has contributed to dispel doubts about its benefits. The decision to scale down new school and housing construction due to budgetary constraints, and to include instead rehabilitation works for schools constructed under the First and Second Education Projects and damaged during political unrest in 1986 has been beneficial to make available classrooms that otherwise would have been neglected because of lack of funds. The project has also been successful in providing training and retraining of school teachers. Moi effective monitoring by MOE and IPN could have enhanced execution. However, lack of counterpart funding was and remains a major constraint for education projects in the difficult political and economic conditions of Haiti. Moreover, broad support by citizens and public authorities for the reform needs to be strengthened by means of dissemination and dialogue on the tenets and content of the reform. A broader base of implementation, including the private sector, and decentralization of administrative responsibilities would also facilitate further progress. - vi -

Lndings and Le!sono Learned

The major lessons learned during project implementation ars ammarized as follows:

(a) Following chronic lack of counterpart funds, which was the reason for delays in construction, and to counteract planning and managerial weaknesses, joint IDA-Borrower annual budgetary reviews were introduced. These reviews helped clarify execution targets, specify annual budgetary requirements and strengthen programming capabilities. Furthermore, yearly contracts between IPN and PIU based on work programs to be approved by MOE and IDA reinforced IPN's planning capacity. The issue of lack of counterpart funds did not improve after the system of reviews was introduced. However, an increase in the disbursement percentage for construction from 65% to 99% facilitated timely execution of civil works, where lack of funds were highly felt.

(b) The use of a procurement agent, while justified because of inadequate local capacity tc manage all aspects of procurement, was not successful. A higher priority should have been given in project design to develop local procurement capacity, reinforce institutional development, and thus rely less on external agents.

(c) Since this project was built around a major education reform program, which proved controversial during implementation, a more concerted strategy should have been adopted to involve interested sectors of the population, includ.ng parents, in formulating the objectives of the reform. The lack of political support at the highest level of Government at the beginning of project implementation may have alsD lessened commitment for the reform. IDA should have asked for a clearer strategy during the project preparation period.

(d) Better coordination between MOE and IPN, including clearer definition of respective roles, would have enhanced project achievements. The respective roles of IPN pedagogical agents and MOE district inspectors needed to be clarified and communicated to inspectors, directors and teachers.

(e) Continuity of IDA staff and UNESCO consultants during preparation, appraisal, and supervision proved particularly effective in helping to sustain project implementation, as turnover of MOE personnel was quite frequent. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

HAIT

THIRi EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1305-HA)

PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Progect Identity

- Project Name: Third Education Project - Credit No.: 1305-HA - RVP Unit: Latin America and the Caribbean Region. Country Department III - Country: Haiti - Sector: Education - Subsector: Basic Education

2. Backaround

2.01 Sector Development Obiectives (at time of project appraisal). General education in Haiti had a late start. Traditionally, education had been an ecclesiastical function d rected to developing the urban elite. Historically, French pedagogical values and methods dominated the education system. The Second Five-Year Development Plan (1976-81) placed the provision of basic education services among its four priority objectives (the others being agricultural and industrial development, and investment in basic infrastructure). The Plan's targets in basic education were: (a) an enrollment growth of 5.1% annually; (b) the gradual reform of the curriculum with the introduction of Creole as the main language of instruction for grades 1-4, and the development of related teaching and learning materials; (c) the improvement and expansion of teacher training and recruitment to reduce the public student/teacher ratio in rural schools from 74:1 to 50:1; and (d) the st,engthening of educational manaqement by a reorganization of the ad- ministration.

2.02 Policy Context. The Government intended to address the problems of low enrollment, inefficiency and inadequate quality at the primary level by restructuring the education system and thus establishing the basis for new investment. A reform program prepared with the assistance of the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), responsive to the socio-economic and cultural conditions of Haitian society, was adopted in September 1982. It built upon changes underway since 1978, when the Government unified the urban and rural school systems under the Ministry of Education (MOE); and the National Pedagogical Institute (IPN) developed new curricula, textbooks, and teacher training programs. In 1979, Creole was introduced as the language of instruction in primary education and as a path to eventual literacy in Frenchi, which would remain the main language of instructioni at higher levels (i.e. after grade 7). Under the new struActure the basic level consisted of a 4+3+3 year cycle (called "Fundamental Education"). The important feature of the new structure was that school- leavers at the end of the first cycle were expected to be functionally literate, especially in Creole, and would have finished a self-contained education package. Scnool leavers at the end of the second cycle were expected to be fluent in French. The teaching 'nnovations under the reform program consisted of: (a) the use of Creole as the main language of instru.ction in grades 1 to 4. Reading and writing is in Creole; oral French is used in grade 1, written French starts in grade 3; (b) each teacher remains with a cohort of students for two yearE; (c) new curricila and myllabi are developed, adapted to the Haitian culture and educational needs; (d) discovery learning is used rather than memor.zation; and (e) teaching and learning activities are supported by improved schonl supervision and inspection. The reform was introduced gradually, starting with grade 1 and moving each year to a subsequent grade, with the expectation of having all 10 grades covered by 1990. An IPN evaluation study of April 1986 shows that the major objective of the first cycle of the reform program was attained: the majority of students have acquired literacy skills in Creole by the end of grade four. Under the traditional sys4-em, those students who leave primary school retain little or nothing from their two to six years of schooling because much of this period has been spent in learning French, which students lose after dropping out of school.

2.03 Linkages Between Project, Sector and Macro Policy Obiectives. This is not a project in isolation, but part of a lo..gterm strategy. The project's key activities, providing infrastructure, furniture, and education materials; teacher preservice training and retraining; and improved training for accountants at the National Institute for Management and International Higher Studies (INAGHEI), clearly supported Government's objectives of moderniziig the education sector. However, lack of broad support imong the population, and even within ths Government, for the education reform, especially the controversial decision to emphasize the use of Creole language, hampe- d implementation. The mandatory introduction of the reform without an appropriate and widespread explanation of its philosophy led many to conclude that "Creolization" of education was a means for further discrimination instead of a tool for more efficient learning and a transition to French language literacy.

3. Project Obiectives and Descrintion

3.01 Proiect Obiectives. The principal objectives were to implement important elemen-s of the educational reform, improve access to the lower primary cycle, and enhance efficiency, quality and management of primary education. In addition, the project provided assistance to improve the t-aining of accountants and to introduce a uniform examination of profes- sional qualification at INAGHEI. The project was initially planned for an implementation period of five years, but tight limits in the availability of IDA funds dictated a reduction of the scope of the project and a decision to redesign the project for a period of only three and a half years. This first phase was expected to finance a progressive introducticn of the ruform starting with 40% of the crade 1 classrooms in 1982, 70% in 1983, and 100% in 1984, while grades 2, 3, and 4 would gradually follow, and grades 5, 6, anc 7 would test new educational materials. According to this plan, a new project would be appraised in 1985 to include, among other things, the activities originally planned for the fourth and fifth years. A credit for SDR 8,400,000 (equivalent to US$9,000,000) was signed on January 14, 19^.3,and became effective on March 28, 1983. Due to lack of sufficient counterrart funding, which was a major factor of delay in the implementation of the construction component, and evidence of some cost overruns, the Government and IDA decided to scale down construction of new schools in order to keep investment expenditares at the level of appraisal. Fol'lowingsocial unrest that led to a change in Government in February 1986, rehabilitation of classrooms constructed under the Firat and Second Education Project was judged a priority, 3nd funds from the Third Rducation Project were reallocated to that aim. The Credit Agreement was amended on June 12, 1986; an extension of the closing date of one year was granted in November 1986 to December 31, 1987. The Credit was fully disbursed on February 3, 1988.

3.02 Proiect Components. There were three main components of the prr'ect: to (a) improve access and enrollment, through the construction, furnishing and equipping of schools for grades 1-4 totaling 180 class-ooms (45 schools), including also a pre-school conter and a family education rcom in each school to be used for liter&cv programs for young adults and for community meetings, and the provision of housing facilities for four teachers in all 45 schools (about 180 teachers). The Care Foundation financed the furniture and equipment for the pre-school centers. The location of the schools in two geographic departments-- and Sud-Est--and one sub-depart- ment, , in Grande Anse, was done after a school mapping exercise of the region; (b) support the educational reform by improving IPN's Curriculum Development Unit; designing and producing educational materials; and reinforcing the pedagogical supervision service; and (c) improve education management through accountants training at INAGHEI, and the establishment of a national examination for accountants. The project also financed staff salaries of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and the Education Reform Committee; monitoring and evaluation studies; and technical assistance. Technical assistance was also provided by UNESCO under the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Because of delays in execution and ,esulting cost increases, by mid-1986 implementation of the school construction program would have cost US$1.0 million more than originally anticip=ted, and its completion would have required more time than available under the existing Closing Date. In -ecognition of the cost increase and in view of tight budgetary controls, the Government requested reduction of the program of new construction (from 180 to 81 classrooms). In June 1986 the Credit Agreement we._ amended to limit construction of new schools to the 11 schools already under construction instead of the original 45; to construct and furnish accommodations for 18 teachers instead of 180; to repair and expand 20 existing schools established under the First Education Project (Credit 618-HA); to increase the accountants' training component by providing a computer laboratory for use by private schools; to rehabilitate 78 existing schools established under the First and Second Education Projects (Cr. 618-HA and 770-HA), damaged during - 4 - social unrest in February 1986; and to increase the percentage of disbursements for construction from 65% to 99%, due to the chronic lack of counterpart funds. By the end of the project, 11 new schools were finished, 20 existing schools were rehabUlitater, 64 instead of 78 schools built under the First and Second Education Projects were rehabilitated (82% of compliance) and accommodations for eight teachers only (two housing units) were completed (see Annex 1).

4. Prolect Design and Organization

4.01 The need for expansion of coverage and improvement of quality of primary schooling in Haiti was shared by all parties concerned, and the project design was basically geared to provide physical infrastructure and the necessary education materials, including teachers training, to achieve an expanded and improved service. At the same time, a revised educational format and program of studies was designed for primary education under the aegis of the education reform. Among other changes, the reform called for greater use of Creole as a medium of instruction. However, there was no concerted strategy to inform and discuss with the general public the objectives of the reform through dissemination of information on the goal of the new education progra..s. An Education Reform Committee formed by representatives of the sector was created, aiming at developing a strategy to implement the reform and super;ise its execution. However, frequent changes of ministers and turnover of high level personnel at MOE resulted in the dismantling of the Committee after a few months. The proposed use of Creole, in p'.rticular, proved controversial. Opposition to the Creole language program was apparently two-fold: an articulate opposition to the reform came from some urban elites who were reluctant to have their children studying in Creole; also many parents of lower and middle class households questioned whether Creole would be as economically instrumental for their children as French. In view of this external opposition, the reform also failee to receive broad public defense by all concerned levels of the Government. The issue was also clouded in that the public was never informed clearly whether Creole literacy was seen as a more efficient route to French, as intended by the education authorities, or as an end in itself. Most of the support for the reform came from the educational authorities most closely associated with it.

4.02 The physical aspects of the project were well prepared. Although many elements of the curriculum reform were experimental, the scope of the project was, however, appropriate in that it was the only vehicle at Government's disposal to implement the reform of public education. And it was widely judged that gradual successful introduction of the reform in the public schools would result in its voluntary adoption by the private schools, enrolling as much as 52% of children. During the implementation of the Third Education Project, of a total of 1,003 public schools, 72 (7%) introduced the integral reform program and 383 schools (38%) adopted it partially. In total, the reform was applied in 45% of the public system. Of a total of 3,813 private schools, 86 (2%) adopted the reform program in full and 234 (6%) adopted it partially; which means that 8% of the private sector applied the reform program. Combining the public and private sectors, the reform was adopted by 16% of tha schools. However, the roles and responsibilities of the implementing institutions (MOE and IPN) needed to be better defined and coordination between the two needed to be strengthened. First, teachers were supervised at three levels: inspectors at the district level (depending from MOE), pedagogical advisors attached to Regional Pedagogical Centers (depending from IPN); and their own directors in the schools. The three levels were not well coordinated; nor were the tasks of each group with respect to implementation of the reform program clearly delineated. Second, IPN was in charge of the training and retraining of school teachers in the field through its pedagogical advisors. The latter were promoted to inspectors and eventually transferred to MOE. Consequently, IPN had access to the pedagogical agents only through MOE and this had the effect of reducing the pedagogical support services available for the reform. Moreover, teachers prepared in the reform curriculum were not always recruited or assigned to reform program schools, and often reverted to traditional teaching style. Third, IPN was responsible for developing textbooks, workbooks and teacher guides under specifications agreed with IDA/UNESCO before contracting with private sector enterprises for printing. By virtue of its superior technical capacity with respect to pedagogical aspects of the reform, IPN eventually assumed a leadership role. For its part, MOE often failed to support these efforts, for example with respect to the assignment to targeted schools of teachers trained in the new curriculum, or to monitor developments closely.

4.03 Original project design did not include the annual reviews of work goals, plans and budget introduced during project implementation, to facilitate adjustment and response to changing conditions and to counteract the challenge of chronic shortage of local counterpart financing. The expansion and improvement of education started with this project are also the subject of a follow up project (Fourth Education Project, Cr. 1592-HA).

5. Project Implementation

5.01 Critical Variances in Project Implementation. Three factors were principally responsible for the slowness in project implementation and ultimately for a project reformulation: (a) chronic shortages of counterpart funds that were at the source of a delay of over one year in completion of civil works; (b) the implementation of the reform falling behind schedule, due to lack of broad public support, absence of full consensus within the Government (the Presidency and the Cabinet), and the fact that the schools were free to choose which program to implement (traditional or reform); and (c) frequent turnover of high level personnel in MOE, weak management at MOE and IPN, and poor coordination between the two institutions, especially in the field.

5.02 After a year of project implementation, MOE had not yet clearly instructed public school directors and inspectors on their role in supporting the reform, nor had it publicly announced that the reform would continue after grade 4, the first cycle of primary education. The respective roles of IPN pedagogical agents and the district inspectors needed to be clarified and communicated to inspect i, directors and teachers. Distribution of teaching materials frequently did not take place at the beginning of the school period. Programs and courses for pre-service and in-service teachers training were performed on time, with varying degrees of success; but the retrained teachers were often not appointed in reform schools because MOE did not know until well into the school year which schools would implement the reform. Furthermore, budgetary restrictions were another factor in the failure to appoint teachers to schools that had chosen to introduce the reform program, and general lack of coordination and cooperation between IPN and MOE was evidently a contributing factor.

5.03 During implementation, planning, management and coordination remained weak. Some steps were taken to reinforce IPN planning and management capacities through the introduction of yearly contracts between IPN and the PIU based on yearly work programs to be approved by MOE and IDA. The appointment of an administrator in IPN, and technical assistance offered by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. to reorganize the accounting system both in IPN and the PIU, strengthened their capabilities to implement the project.

5.04 A positive outcome of project implementation was the creation of a civil works unit which was absorbed by the MOE at the end of the construction period and became the Directorate of School Engineering. During the construction period, supervision of civil works had to be strengthened with the contracting of an outside consulting engineering firm, which helped exercise quality control. Consistent with the space requirements of the new reform curriculum, the project constructed schools with seven classrooms, thus improving the teaching conditions in all levels of primary education in rural areas. School design was also less elaborate than the design of schools included in previous IDA-financed projects, and more adapted to the rural setting. However, visits to project sites confirm that an adequata system for school maintenance is still not in place, largely because of budgetary constraints and the failure to assign high priority to preservation of existing assets.

5.05 During a major political upheaval in 1986, civil unrest resulted in the burning of some schools, and the stealing of classroom furniture and of raterials and furniture used in the family education rooms. Generally, vandalism was performed by people not living in the communities and over the opposition of residents benefitting from the schools in their village. It is believed that the revolt was not directed against the educational reform, but an expression of opposition to the previous political leadership. It should be noted that some furniture and materials have been subsequently returned to the schools.

5.06 Chronic lack of counterpart funds, delays in the implementation of the civil works component, as well as the damage caused during the social disturbances of early 1986, led to a reformulation of the project in June 1986. New construction was reduced to 81 classrooms in 11 schools instead of 180 classrooms in 45 schools, and rehabilitation, repair and expansion was increased to cover 98 schools constructed under the First and Second Education Projects. This decision also allowed construction costs to remain within the limits of credit funds. By the end of project activities, new construction was finished but only 84 schools were rehabilitated and two housing units (for 8 teachers instead of 18) were constructed. 5.07 Because of the judgement of the appraisal mission that the capacity of MOE to manage procurement was wee';,it was decided to contract procurement services from an external procurement agent. However, the option of using an agent for the procurement of furniture and vehicles was not successful in this case. The agent selected became bankrupt during the project period. Furthermore, the agent was unable to ensure that the supplier of the furniture would honor its obligation of subcontracting a local firm for the assembly of the furniture delivered unassembled. In addition, the PIU was unable to prepare detailed specifications of furniture reflecting local needs and taste; consequently furniture provided by the lowest evaluated bidder were not well adapted to the climate and did not follow the widely accepted traditional design. In retrospect, greater attention to strengthening the Borrower's own capacity for management of procurement would have been justified.

5.08 The accountants education program was fully and adequately ex- ecuted. Accounting manuals were prepared and distributed according to schedule; and training proceeded on schedule.

5.09 Project Risks. Project risks were correctly identified and realistically calibrated by the appraisal mission. Due to the nature of the project, the timely availability of counterpart funds was of significant importance. This risk materialized during implementation of the civil works aspects. To overcome it, in June 1986 the Credit Agreement was amended to increase the percentage of disbursements for construction from 65% to 99%. The reform failed to receive broad public support and even within the Government (the Presidency, the Cabinet, and MOE) it received different degrees of support. Despite intensive supervision by IDA, which allowed for thorough discussions on the issue with the Government, a major political upheaval in 1986 and frequent turnover of MOE persornel affected continuity in the policy of informing the public at large about the restructuring of the education system. These circumstances ultimately slowed effective implementation.

6. Maior Results of Proiect

6.01 Project Obiectives. Continued MOE budget shortages and political unrest obliged IDA and the Government to change quantitative objectives. With the exception of a significant decrease in new school and housing construction, the project objectives of assisting the Government with the provision of furniture, new curricula and educational materials were met. lNAGHEI received appropriate technical assistance and now offers a good program for training accountants. Qualitative objectives were less successful, as the reform program, particularly the Creole language aspect, yet lacks a broad acceptance despite continuing assistance under the Fourth Education Project.

6.02 Impact and Sustainability of the Project. The conditions of education in Haiti remain inferior to most countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. However, educational development in such a resource-constrained environment is a long-term process composed of many challenges. Despite the - 8 - controversy of the reform program, the project has made undeniable improvements in coverage and quality in selected locations of Haiti. Evaluation of the reform program, where it has been implemented under the most favorable conditions (sufficient didactic materials, trained teachers and adequate physical infrastructure), has contributed to dispel doubts about its benefits. The project has also been successful in providing training and retraining of school teachers. A Teacher Charter spelling out a career path and salary levels differentiated by years of service and qualifications was signed into law in October 1984, providing for modest salary increases for qualified teachers. Ill-defined lines of authority between MOE and IPN produced ineffective field supervision. More effective monitoring by MOE and IPN could have enhanced execution. The reduction in school and housing construction affected the impact of infrastructure development. However, the decision to rehabilitate schools built under the First and Second Education Projects and damaged during political unrest has proven beneficial to maintain existing assets and to make available classrooms that otherwise would have been neglected because of lack of funds.

6.03 The main constraint that limits the reform program is not its philosophy but its translation into educational programs with full acceptance by the public and public authorities. Moreover, commitment of the Government to expanded coverage and improved quality of basic education in both political and financial terms is needed. A broader base of implementation, including the private sector, and decentralization of administrative responsibilities would also facilitate further progress. Timely distribution of educational materials is essential.

7. IDA's Performance

7.01 Major Strengths and Weaknesses. During preparation, appraisal, and a greater part of supervision IDA maintained the same team, with the help of consultants from UNESCO. Supervision missions were fielded frequently and at regular intervals (see Table 8 B), and included a task manager, an education planner, and an architect. IDA staff contributed to the success of the project through supportive working relationships and professional advice, which also allowed for quality control. Lack of institutional memory caused by chronic changes of Government officials were counterbalanced by the stability of IDA's team and UNESCO's consultants.

7.02 Lessons Learned. To overcome weaknesses in project programming and execution, a system of joint IDA-Borrower annual work program and budgetary reviews was introduced. This arrangement helped ensure achievement of annual agreed targets, but project impact remained lower than expected at the time of appraisal due to lack of counterpart funds. Furthermore, yearly contracts between IPN and PIU based on work programs to be appi ved by MOE and IDA reinforced IPN's planning capacity, although IPN capacity deteriorated after 1987. In addition, IDA should have asked for a clearer strategy to ensure the support of a broader segment of the population to the reform during the project preparation period, and as part of an effort of Hissemination of the objectives and methods of the reform during implementat. i. A higher priority should have been given in project design to develop loca. procurement capacity, reinforce institutional development, and rely lese on external agents. Continuity of IDA staff and UNESCO consultants during preparation, appraisal, and supervision proved particularly effective in helping to sustain project implementation, as turnover of MOE personnel was quite frequent.

6. Borrower Performance

8.01 Maior Strengths and Weaknesses. Chronic lack of counterpart funds affected project implementation. Frequent turnover of people responsible for project implementation and decision-makers at MOE did not allow for continuity in policy implementation. Management and coordination between MOE and IPN was weak, and work programs were not always adequately formulated or implemented. MOE did not design a strategy to involve the population in the reform or to disseminate for broad public understanding the rationale and objectives of the reform, in particular the use of Creole as a vehicle to literacy. Technical assistance at PIU helped strengthen its civil works supervision capacity and its accounting procedures, as well as the accounting procedures of IPN. Lack of coordination between implementing divisions delayed technical assistance offered by UNESCO. The PIU managed, with technical assistance, to achieve a new, more functional standard design for schools, more in accordance with the requirements of space for teaching, administration and support under the reform curriculum. Improved equipment specifications prepared by the PIU could have avoided the selection of furniture that is less adapted to the climate and does not follow the widely accepted traditional type. MOE should have exercised better coordination with IPN to ensure hiring and appropriate assignment of teachers retrained in the reform curriculum. The respective roles of IPN pedagogical agents and MOE district inspectors needed to be clarified and communicated to inspectors, directors and teachers. Budgetary constraints, as well as failure to assign priorities, have prevented the development of a well organized maintenance system.

8.02 Lessons Learned. The major lesson learned is that a more concerted strategy should have been adopted to involve interested sectors of the population in formulating the objectives of the reform. The lack of political support at the highest level of Government at the beginning of project implementation may have also lessened commitment for the reform. Better coordination between MOE and IPN, including clearer definition of respective roles, would have enhanced project achievements. Also, the ability to prepare technical specifications should have been strengthened.

9. Project Relationship

9.01 IDA-Borrower Relationships. The continuity of IDA supervision mission members was sufficient to develop with the PIU and other Government officials close professional rel-tionships essential to support effective project implementation. The major lesson learned here is that continuity and composition of supervision missioni were an important element of project success. - 10 -

10. Consulting Services

10.01 Continued support of UNESCO strengthened the dialogue on the reform with the Government. Pzoject specialists worked in the PIU and in IPN (financed under UNDP country assistance in cooperation with UNESCO). UNESCO technical assistance was devoted to curriculum development and teaching materials. A private consultant was involved in setting up INAGHEI's computer laboratory. The quality of the consultants was very good.

11. Proiect Documentation and Data

11.01 The loan documents for the project, including the Credit Agreement dated January 14, 1983, the Amendment dated June 12, 1986, that reduced the scope of the project for cost containment purposes, and the Staff Appraisal Report were adequate for purposes of project execution and supervision.

11.02 Availability of Relevant Data to PCR Missicn. Despite efforte throughout 1989 by IDA staff to have the Borrower rrupare sufficient data for the PCR, none was readily available when a mission arrived in the field on December 5, 1989. However, the mission was able to discuss with staff involved with the execution of the project (see Annex 2), and staff of the PIU prepared Part II of the PCR and provided some statistical information included in Part III. - 11 -

PART II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

12.01 The Third Educatior.Project, considered as a logical follow-up to the First and Second Education Projects that constructed and equipped schools in different departments of the country, was conceived to continue to build up the school infrastructure needed as part of the reform of the education system. The specific objectives of the project were: the extension of primary education by the construction of new schools; the improvement of the effectiveness and the quality of the education system; the strengthening of the management capabilities of MOE; and the organization of an accountants training program and final examination for the candidates to the Certified Public Accounting title at INAGHEI. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the professional teaching capabilities, assistance was given to the National Institute of Professional Teaching through the program of teachers training for professional schools.

12.02 In spite of the difficult socio-political context in which it was implemented, the project nonetheless achieved its principal objectives. However, during project implementation, some changes were introduced aiming at tatter adapting the project to the evolving financial and educational conditions of the country.

12.03 Taking into consideration that the Departments Nord and have benefitted from school construction under the First and Second Education Projects (79 in total), under the Third Education Project it was decided to concentrate construction in the Departments Sud, Grande Anse, and Sud-Est as they had less coverage. It is important to note that, at the time, a school mapping service was introduced in the Planning Directorate of MOE, and reliable statistical information available in this Directorate helped to orientate the decision makers in the selection of the sites for school construction. This was a very positive element of the project, because previously the selection of the communities was done on a routine basis based on a rudimentary school mapping exercise.

12.04 In the School Departments of Grande Anse, Sud and Sud-Est, the physical status of the schools that were utilized was very bad. A high percentage of children in that region did not live in a community with a school. When a school was available, it functioned in poor physical conditions generally failing to meet minimal standards. It was with very much satisfaction that this project was adopted by the population of said Departments, who facilitated the process of making the sites and other resources available for the construction of some schools.

12.05 At the beginning, the project was designed for 180 classrooms to be built as follows: 56 in the Sud Department, 64 in Grande Anse, and 60 in Sud- Est, with 45 housing facilities for the teachers. This plan was changed. Eleven schools totalling 81 classrooms were built, of which 56 (equivalent to eight schools) in Sud, 11 classrooms (two schools) in Nippes, Grande Anse, and 14 classrooms corresponding to a double school in the Sud-Est; and two - 12 -

residences for the teachers in Sud, at Ti Coma and Saut Mathurine. Twenty schools built under the First and Second Education Projects were finished, and 64 schools of said projects that were damaged during the incidents of February 1986 were repaired.

12.06 At the time of project inception, the Fundamental Education Program consisted of 10 years divided into cycles of four, three and three years. With the aim of adapting the new structures to this pattern, and in order to receive the children of the two first cycles, the school designs of the First and Second Education Projects prepared for four and six classrooms were modified, and the Third Education Project generally provided schools with seven classrooms. All the schools had space for a pre-school center and a center for family education that received the young people of the community and gave then, practical training that would allow them to function efficiently in the community in the future. The pre-school centers in the First and Second Education Projects were located in separate buildings built by the community with the assistance of the Care Foundation. In the context of the Third Education Project, the PIU built the buildings for such centers. The Care Foundation financed the furniture and equipment.

12.07 The Third Project benefitted from the experience of the First and the Second Projects in the aspects of civil works. The structure of the buildings has been changed. The metallic framework of the roof and the doors were replaced by elements made of wood; the windows by a more appropriate grid and transparent sheets were added to the roof to facilitate lighting and air circulation. Furthermore, the services of an external firm were requested to do the supervision of the civil works. In the PIU, a special section for supervision of civil works was organized which was mainly responsible for the follow-up of the 20 schools to be finished, and worked in close relationship with the external firm to inspect works and to make recormendations in order to achieve better results. Most of the schools had been functioning since 1986. The buildings are generally in good conditions with the exception of minor repairs to be done to the floors in some cases.

12.08 The proposal to use a procurement agent for the acquisition of furniture was not welcome by all the Haitian executors in MOE. And, in fact, the satisfaction that we expected to obtain by contracting the General International Trading Company (GITCO) was not attained. First, the furniture (chairs and desks for the children) were made of plywood that seems to offer no guarantee of security and durability taking into consideration the conditions of the rural habitat of Haiti. Second, GITCO did not hono= its obligations with a local firm for assembly and transportation of the furniture. The PIU had to pay the local firm to finish its work. The furniture is still in good shape with some exceptions that can be handled by the schools with limited budgetary consequences.

12.09 The qualitative aspects of which IPN was responsible, i.e. production, experimentation, training, distribution of materials, financed by the project, have been accomplished in a fully satisfactory way taking into consideration the particularly difficult conjuncture in which they were developed. Individual contracts on the basis of terms of reference covering - 13 -

at least one year were established between the IPN and the PIU for each member of such institution working for the project.

12.10 The strengthening of the implementation of the Reform Program by MOE through a Committee for the Supervision and Coordination of the Reform was initiated, but the committee worked only a few months. It was eventually dissolved by ministerial decision as also occurred with the Curriculum Committee during the implementation of the First and Second Education Projects.

12.11 Activities relating to the improvement of the training of accountants were well implemented. Manuals were distributed on time following requests from INAGHEI to the PIU. Training courses were well organized.

12.12 The project completion date of June 1986 could not be met due to constraints of the Haitian political environment and to delays in the availability of Haitian counterpart funds. This is the reason why civil works at Bas-Limbe and Dolan could not be carried out. Due to some supplementary works to be performed in some schools and the need to build cisterns, the closing date was changed to December 31, 1987, and the project unit ceased to work for the project in July 1988. The credit of US$9.0 million was fully disbursed. Concerning counterpart funds, of the US$1.0 million agreed upon, only US$713,724.60 were received. Hence, the total cost of the project was decreased by US$286,275.40. However, because of the exchange rate of the SDR vis-a-vis the US dollar, IDA actually disbursed US$9,151,471.08, which gives a total cost of the project as follows:

IDA US$9,151,471.08 Government of Haiti USS 713.724.60 TOTAL US$9,865,195.68

The total amount used was US$9,849,438.21. An amount of US$15,757.47 is deposited in an account in the Banque Nationale de Credit to be used to prepare the project completion report.

12.13 It should be noted that IDA participation was very positive. The credit helped finance construction and repairs that allowed five thousand children to attend school, and opened other services to young adults of the community who make use of the school facilities for literacy classes, community meetings, medical clinics, cooperative meetings, and other social activities of the community. In many cases, the school is a center for the community.

12.14 If the implementation schedule was not totally respected and if the program was modified, it was due to the financial constraints and the difficult socio-political environment in Haiti. But implementation was also constrained by the instability of the decision-making authorities. Key officials of MOE, including those responsible for project execution, were changed frequently during the implementation period. From 1982 to 1988 seven Ministers were appointed in the MOE, each of them having their own interpretation of an educational reform in Haiti. There have been periods of - 14 -

hesitation and the expectation that by 1990 all the public and private schools were going to function under a fundamental education system totally renewed did not materialize; on the contrary, what we find at present is that much of the infrastructure remains in bad shape, parents are not convinced of the benefits of the program, teachers are, in many cases, badly trained or insufficiently trained and unmotivated, many schools still function under the traditional system.

12.15 In such a context of instability and discontinuity, the PIU acted as an effective liaison and motivating force for project execution. It guaranteed the continuity of the actions bringing the financial, material and technical contributions that were necessary for the execution and eupervision of the project. The PIU's relative stability also assured internal coherence and respect for the norms of operation and requirements of IDA in project management, accounting and auditing.

12.16 The Third Education Project has again demonstrated the benefits of cooperation between the Government of Haiti and IDA. Returns on the investment cannot be seen in the short term but its effects are evident on the coverage of school attendance and in the improvement of the quality of the education services. Furthermore, in spite of the recurren_. costs created by the project, the needs for a Fourth Education Project were felt in order to secure the yields of ongoing actions and protect achievenments of the Third Project. However, the lessons learned from the implementation of this project indicate that a greater margin for maneuver should have been given to the people responsible for the project, and supported by clearer articulation of key project indicators and outputs and local technical assistance. - 15 -

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Table 1: RELATED IDA CREDITS

Credit Year of Title Purpose Approval Status Comments

0618-HA Construction of 1976 Completed Completion was First primary schools December 1981 one year behind Education and community schedule due to learning centers lack of counter- in rural and part funds and urban areas, conatruction three primary delays. The teacher training project was a institutions and catalyst for revision of modernizing the teacher training education system. curriculum.

0770-HA Expansion of 1978 Completed The educational Second basic education, December 1984 components were Education secondary o.n schedule; vocational and however, infra- agricultural structure was cne training. Other year behind components schedule due 'to consist of uneconomical teacher training, contracting a radio component arrangements, and limited which were primary education amended to a reform. system of negotiated contracts under direct supervision by the project unit. - 16 -

Table 2: PROJECT TIMETABLE

Date Date Date Item Planned Revised Actual

Identification 12/80 06/80 (ExecutiveProject Summary)

Project Brief 09/80 02/81, 06/81 08/81

Preparation 03-04/81 03/81

Appraisal Mission 06-07/81 07/81

Post Appraisal 11/81 03/82

Credit Negotiations 03/82 09/82 09/82

Board Approval 05/82 07/82 11/82

Credit Signature 06/82 01/83

Credit Effectiveness 09/82 01/83 03/83

Project Completion 06/86 03/87

Closing Date 12/86 12/87

Closing of Credit Account 02/88

Comments on Timetable: At the time of project identification,68% of rural school-agechildren did not participatein primary education. The education system was inefficientand education inputs (funds spent, teacher qualifications,curriculum, learning facilities,etc.) and outcomes were of poor quality, as indicatedby high student grade repetitionand dropout rttes. Starting as early as grade 1, repetitionrates were 31% for rural &reas and 191 in urban areas, with dropout rates of 13% in rural areas and 142 in urban areas. Although these percentagesdecrease toward the end of the vrimarygrade cycle, it was estimated that 59% of the urban students and 76% of the rural students drop out before they attain full literacy.

No legal instrumentexisted to support the far-reachingeducation reform, i.e., new school cycle, universalizationof a 10-year basic education program and curriculumdevelopment, restructuring of decentralizationof Educationadministration and institutionof Creole as the language of instruction. However, a decree was paseed by the Governmenton March 30, 1982 for the introductionof the planned country- wide reform which was scheduledto begin in September 1982. - 17 -

Table 3At CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS

CumulativeEstimated and Actual Disbursements

(US$ million)

IDA FY 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Appraisal Estimates 0.90 2.25 4.50 9.00 Actual 0.97 3.00 4.84 7.28 8.51 9.15 Actual as S of Estimktes 107.78 133.33 107.56 80.89 94.56 101.67

Date of Final Disburs. February 3, 1988

Time Line of Planned, Revised and Actual DisbursementSchedules

TABLE 3 B Tlme Line of Planned. Revised and Actual Disbursement Schedules

(in us MiliHon) 10

86 7 6

23 / 1!

1983 1984 1985 19861 1987 1988

- Appraisal Estimate Aotual Revied 01/01/84 -0- Revised UG/30/86 Revised 03/31/86 - 18 -

Table 4: PLANNED AND ACTUAL COMPLETION DATES OF COMP,.ENTS

Planned Actual Months of Project Components Completion Completion Delay

Civil Works 06/86 06/88 24 Furniture 06/86 10/87 16 Equipment 06/86 10/87 16 Staff 06/86 06/86 Local Consultants 06/86 12/87 30 Foreign Consultants 06/86 08/87 14 Education Materials 06/86 06/86 Project Administration 06/86 06/86 School Mapping 12/84 05/83 Advanced

Comments:

Due to the lack of counterpart u';2.c.7 and the difficult socio- political situation of the country since 153x 1 hat paralyzed many activities in the fielO, the schedule fo- th?v implementation of certain activities could not be respected.

There was a 24 mionths delay in the c2v:1.l works component. The works initially consisted in the construction c 180 classrooms, but circumstances obliged to change this and only Ui zlassrooms were constructed, schools that were damaged during icoco-political upheavals of February 1986 were rehabilitated, and schools coastructed under the First and Second Education Projects were repaired.

Due to the same reasons there were delays in the distribution of furniture and equipment for the schools by the firm in charge. The MOE decided to give to the schools temporary furniture belonging to schools of the First and Second Education Projects while waiting for the distribution of the final furniture.

There were delays in implementation in other areas with the exception of the production of educational material and the school mapping exercise that was finalized 19 months ahead of Schedule. - 19 -

Table 5A: ALLOCATIONOF PROCEEDS

ORIGINAL ACTUAL CATEGORY ALLOCATION DISBURSEMENTS

------in SDRs ------

(1) Civil Works 930,000 1,791,711.29

(2) Building materials 560,000 730,989.05

(3) Furniture and 930,000 310,453.68 equipment;paper and printing for textbooks and learning materials

(4) Consultants'and experts' 3,700,000 5,125,256.58 services; training; operating costs and staff services

(5) Refunding of Project 510,000 377,824.28 PreparationAdvance

(6) Initial Deposit in 470,000 63,765.12 Special Account

(7) Unallocated 1.300.000 0.00

Total 8,400,000 8,400,000.00 - 20 -

Table1 l: PROJECT FINANCING (in US$)

Planned Credit Agreomnt Actual Project Costs Source of Funds Total Total Total Total S I

IDA 9,000.000 90 9,151,471.08 93

Gorerment 1.000 000 10 7131724.60 7

Total 10,000,000 100 9,865,195.68 100 u.muinuu. unW =*mumumuau== emu.

UNDP/UUSCO Participation U0 000 860.00

Mt UNSCO financedconsultants under their country program assistance.

Comments:

The total cost of the project vas estimtedat SDR 8,400,000or US$9,000,000financed by IDA and US$1,000,000financeo by the Goveriment of Haiti. Due to the exchange rate of the SDR to the dollar, IDA disbursedUS$9,151,471.08 and the Goverme nt of Haiti only disbursed US$713,724.60as indicatedabove.

The total amout disbursedunder the projectvas USS9,849,438.21. An amount of US$15,757.47Is depositedin the Danqus Nationalade Credit to be used in the preparationof the project completionreport. - 21 -

Table 6 : PROJECT RESULTS - DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOLS

------Appraisal 3tc te.------Tachehr CClaaroas Student Places Schools Housing Now Ropl. Total Total Retion

Sud-Eat 10 10 20 20 40 2,000 Sud 13 13 28 24 52 2,600 Grand'Anso U ii 44 a4 8 8 4400

Total 45 45 92 88 180 9,000

------Actual------Teacher Clasroo. Student Places Schools Housing New Repl. Total Total

Sud-Ent 1 14 14 700 Sud 8 2 21 56 2,800 Grand'Ane 2 _ 1 _ 1 550

Total 11 2 25 21 81 4,050 Table 63, PROJECTRESULTS - TEKTBOOS AND TEACES GUIDES PlODUCED BY THE NAITIOUL PEDtAOGICAL InSTITUTE

Total let Grad. 2nd Grad. 3rd Grade 4th Grad. 5th Grade 6th Grade Teachers Teacher. T.achers Teachers Tebcher. Teachers Actual Textbook. Gulde. Textbook. GuLdes Textbook. Guides Textbooks Guides Textbooks Guide. Textbook. Guides Planned

Planed 21.100 * 21.100 1982183 103,665 Actual 24,000 4,500 16,000 45,815 4,800 350 2,800 4,000 ** 800 e

306.650 Planned 14,000 * 3.450 22.500 200,000 11,400 40,500 14,800 1993164 230,450 Act:al 3,450 22,500 182.000 5.300 13.500 3.700

689,300 Plamed 15.200 * 1,800 31,500 350,000 12,100 228,000 19.200 13.500 3.850 12.500 1.500 7th 150 7th 1964185 Actual 1.600 31,500 310,000 11,900 119.000 14.000 11.500 2.150 514,350 12.500 0-7th 0-7th

157.000 Planed 143,000 14,000 1965185 130.270 Actual 119.620 10,650

15,000 4,000 1,174.050 Planed 50,300 C 1,800 3,450 44,000 22,500 693,000 37,500 268,500 34,000 Total Actual 28,000 6.300 :0 250 89,615 27,300 611.970 30.650 132.500 17,700 11.500 2.150 976,135

years due to Notea etlteted figure. based aaid*-_moiree and progress reports kept by tbh Project lupleaentation Unit. Actual production he.s aimd down ear tbh progrm. delays La construction work that finlly led to a reduction on new school construction, and lose than expected ber of echoola adoptin the rafor. Nowevr, in dditio to the total umber of book. ldicated in the tables, 65,000 workbooks wre distributed.

C iguree based n Appraisal Report of November 2, 1982, other planned figure. provided by Goverment. ** 4,600 printlg plates are lueluded in the total.. - 23 -

Table 7: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS

Compliance Section Covenant Deadline Status of Compliance

3.01 (b) StrengthenPIU by the none In full compliance addition of two specified assistant educators, one assistant accr.,untantand a procurementassistant

3.01 (c) Periodic consultation with the Association on the: (a) proposed budget Annually in In full compliance allocation March (c) adequacy of funds Before August 15

3.02 Employment of No date In full compliance consultants up to 95 specified staff months of foreign specialists and 66 staff months of local specialists

3.06 Construction of new No date In full compliance. schools on sites specified Criteria taken into chosen on basis of consideration by the criteria acceptable School Mapping Unit. to the Association

3.07 Definition and Textbooks Prices for grades 1, 2 3.08 implementationof to be kept within acceptable price control provided by limits. Better mechanisms for the Aug. 1 of distribution systems productionof school each year established books and distributionof textbooks in grades 1 to 3 of schools involved in the education reform

3.09 Establish curriculum and examination procedures for accountants: (a) first standard Sept. 1, Law amended to extend examination 1984 deadline for compliance by one year to 1985. - 24 -

Covenant Compliance :ion Deadline Status of Compliance

(b) Employ one No date In full compliance consultant specified (c) set examination July 1, Decree on curriculum fee and publish 1983 issued Aug. 83. the standard Teachers were trained in curriculum use of curriculum

(c) Implementadequate No date In compliance auditing procedures specified - 25 -

Table 8At USE OF IDA RESOURCES

Staff Input. Staff Weeks

Stage of ?roiectCycle Planned Revised Final

?rep. to Appraisal Departure 29.49

'ppraisalthrough Board Approval 41.31 legotiationsThrough Board Appraoval 5.25

-upervision 37.91

?CR 8.0 10.0 7.21

TOTAL 121.17 ,______

uomments:

Planned and revised otaff weekc are unavailable due to loss of ile materials during IDA reorganization. - 26 -

TbLe 8B: MISSIONS

Stage of Month/ No. of Days in Specilaizat. Prolect Cycle Le Persons field Represente */

1. Identification 12/80 2 8.0 GE,E

2. Prep ration 3-4/81 3 51.0 A,E,GE

3. Appraisel 7/81 4 68.0 A,E,GE,S

4. Post Appraisal 3/82 2 au A,S

TotaL 147.0

Performance Type of _Status b/ _pro. c/

F N I S

Supervision I 05/83 2 10.5 A,S 2 1 2 1 CF SupervisionII 10/83 3 10.0 A,S,EP 2 2 1 2 CF,M,P SupervisionIII 01/84 2 16.0 A,S 3 2 2 2 CF,M Supervision IV 3-4/84 3 10.0 A,S,EP 3 2 2 2 CF,M,SA Supervision V 05/84 2 23.0 A,EP 3 2 2 2 CF,M,P SupervisionVI 02/85 1 7.0 FA Not Rated AS SupervisionVII 03/85 2 15.0 A,EP 2 2 2 2 D,M SupervisionVIII 05/85 1 10.0 S 3 3 2 2 F,M SupervisionIX 10/85 2 24.0 EP,S 3 2 2 2 F,CF, SupervisionX 04/86 2 24.0 EP,S 2 2 2 2 SA Supervision XI 08-09/86 1 6.0 A 2 1 2 1 D Supervision XII 11/87 2 12 E,E 1 1 2 1 D

Total SPN 167.0

msss

PCR 12/89 1 5.0 OA

.3.3.

j/ A a Architect; E a Economist;EP * EducationalPLareer; FA * Fininclal AnaLyst; GE a General Educator; S a SocioLogist, OA a OperatiorsAssistant

y F a Availabilityof Furds; N * Project Management; I a Development Inpact; S * OveraLL Status LI AS * Audit System; CF * CounterpertFunads; 0 . Disbursements;F a Financial; X Management; P a Procurement; SA * SpeciaL Account ANNEX 1 Page 1 of 3

HAITI

THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT

List of Schools Constructed and Rehabilitated and Housina Facilities

Name of the School District No. of Classrooms

1st. Phase: 11 new schools

St. Michel du Sud Miragoane 7 Fond des Negres Miragoane 4 Ti Coma 7 Cherettes Aquin 7 Cavaillon Aquin 7 Laurent Cayes 7 Guilloux- Cayes 7 Melon Cayes 7 Mersan Cayes 7 Saut Mathurine Cayes 7 Jacmel 14

2nd. Phase: 20 schools rehabilitated (First Education Project)

Hatte Desdunes Gonaives 4 Aux Sources Gonaives 4 La Tapie Grande Saline 4 Dolan Terre Neuve 4 Daryanne Terre Neuve 4 Fosse-St-Jean Terre Neuve 4 Ka Philippe Terre Neuve 4 Grand Rac Pte. Riv. Artibonite 4 Las Cidras St. Michel Att. 4 Nan Guillaume St. Michel Att. 4 Bas de Sault St. Michel Att. 4 Cana 4 Welsh Ouanaminthe 4 La Souffriere Limbe 4 Fond Lagrange 4 Port-Margot Borgne 4 St-Michel Acul du Nord 4 Bas-Limbe Limbe 4 Duty Acual du Nord 4 Roches Plates Trou du Nord 4 - 28 -

ANNEX 1 Page 2 of 3

Name of the School District No. of Classroomi

3rd. Phae: 64 Schools Rehabilitated (First and Second Education Projects)

Fort St-Michel Cap Haitien 6 Breteau Ode. Riv. Nord 4 Bonamy Gde. Riv. Nord 4 Gde. Riv. Nord Gde. Riv. Nord 6 St-Raphael Plaine du Nord 12 Robillard 4 Campeche Limonade 4 Dericourt Limonade 4 Dereral Limonade 4 Bois de Lance Limonade 4 Dubourg Limonade 4 Leroux Pilette Trou du Nord 4 Dubuisson Trou du Nord 4 Savane au Camp Trou du Nord 4 Leroux Cachiman Trou du Nord 4 Bilee 4 Tarvisee Marmelade 6 Platon Marmelade 4 St-Michel Att. St-Michel Att. 6 Trou Jn-Pierre St-Michel Att. 4 L'Attalaye St-Michel Att. 6 Petites Desdunes Gonaives 4 Bassin Gonaives 4 L'Estere Gonaives 4 Souvenance Gonaives 4 Bardon Marchand Gonaives 4 Poteau Gonaives 6 Docine St-Martin Gonaives 4 Mapou Lagon Gonaives 4 Mapou Rollin Ennery 4 Lacroix Gonaives 4 Hatte Grammont 4 Hatte Chevreau Dessalines 4 Niel Dessalines 6 Rossignol Grande Saline 4 Chevreau Lombard Grande Saline 4 Jean Denim Pte. Riv. Art. 4 Payen 4 Savane Tapion Verrettee 4 Moreau Drouet Verrettem 4 Hirebalais 6 - 29 -

ANNEX 1 Page 3 of 3

Name of the School District No. of Classrooms

Crete Brulee Mirebalais 6 Ville Bonheur Mirebalais 4 Los Pinos 6 Croix Fer Belladere 6 Cabral Thomonds 6 Thomonde 6 Bassin Zim 4 Savane Haleine Maisaade 6 Maiseade Maissade 6 Fortuna Guery Port-au-Prince 12 Republique Argentine (Sans Fil) Port-au-Prince 12 Morne St-Georges Aquin 6 St-Louis du Sud Aquin 12 Sulon Aquin 6 Dumarsais Estime Cayes 8 Michel Lazarre Cayes 8 Rossaux 6 Jeremie 12 Marie Kerotte Moron 6 La Hatte Dame Marie 6 Desormeaux Dame Marie 6 Baryadelle Anse d'Hainault 6 Appl. de Bigot (Ka Georges) Gonaives 6

Housing Facilities

Ti Coma Aquin Saut Mathurine Cayes - 30 -

ANNEX 2

HAITI

THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Participant on Comoletion Mission and Peoole Met

IDA

Maria Victoria Lister, LA3HR

Ministry of Education

Jean St. Fort, Director General Jerome Jean-Noel, Programming Director

Proiect ImDlementation Unit

Joseph Herns Henry, Director of Programs Denis Cadet, Chief, Education Section Claire Ange Saintil, Chief, Procurement Section

National Pedaaoaical Institute

Amary Joseph Noel, Director General

Others

Roger Delmas, ex Project Director Juliette Nicolas, ex Project Administrator Mireille Merove-Pierre, Auditor