GAO-07-595T NASA: Issues Surrounding the Transition from The
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United States Government Accountability Office Testimony before the Subcommittee on GAO Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT Wednesday, March 28, 2007 NASA Issues Surrounding the Transition from the Space Shuttle to the Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems Statement of Allen Li, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management GAO-07-595T March 28, 2007 NASA Accountability Integrity Reliability Highlights Issues Surrounding the Transition from Highlights of GAO-07-595T, a testimony the Space Shuttle to the Next Generation before the Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences, of Human Space Flight Systems Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U. S. Senate Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found On January 14, 2004, the President NASA is in the midst of a transition effort of a magnitude not seen since the announced a new Vision for space end of the Apollo program and the start of the Space Shuttle Program more exploration that directs the than 3 decades ago. This transition will include a massive transfer of people, National Aeronautics and Space hardware, and infrastructure. Based on ongoing and work completed to- Administration (NASA) to focus its date, we have identified a number of issues that pose unique challenges to efforts on returning humans to the moon by 2020 in preparation for NASA as it transitions from the shuttle to the next generation of human future, more ambitions missions. space flight systems while at the same time seeking to minimize the time the United States will be without its own means to put humans in space. These Implementing the Vision will issues include: sustaining a viable workforce; effectively managing systems require hundreds of billions of development efforts; managing the supplier base; providing logistical dollars and a sustained support to the International Space Station; identifying and disposing of commitment from multiple property and equipment; ensuring adequate environmental remediation; and administrations and Congresses. transforming its business processes and financial management system. Some of the funding for implementing exploration activities is expected to come from funding NASA already has in place many processes, policies, procedures and support freed up after the retirement of the systems to carry out this transition. However, successful implementation of Space Shuttle, scheduled for 2010, the transition will depend on thoughtful execution and effective oversight. and projected termination of U.S. How well NASA overcomes some of the challenges we have identified will participation in the International not only have an effect on NASA’s ability to effectively manage the gap in the Space Station by 2016. U.S. human access to space, but will also affect the agency’s ability to secure a sound foundation for the President’s space exploration policy. Congress, while supportive of the effort has voiced concern over the potential gap in human space flight. Moving to the next generation of human space flight vehicles In the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, Congress stated that it is the policy of the United States to have the capability for human access to space on a continuous basis. NASA has made it a priority to minimize the gap to the extent possible. GAO provides no recommendations in this Transition statement. However, GAO continues to emphasize that given the Nation’s fiscal challenges and NASA’s past difficulty developing systems within cost, schedule, and performance parameters, it is Apollo/Saturn Space shuttle Orion/Ares I Ares V imperative that the agency 1958 -1975 1972-2010 adequately manage this transition in a fiscally competent and prudent Source: NASA images; GAO graphic . manner. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-595T. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. United States Government Accountability Office Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me to discuss the challenges faced by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in transitioning from the space shuttle to the next generation of human space flight systems. In 2004, the President established a new exploration policy—A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for U.S. Space Exploration (Vision)—which calls for the retirement of the space shuttle and the development of a new family of exploration systems. NASA’s implementation of the Vision is expected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. A NASA effort of this size and scope has not been seen since the end of the Apollo program and the start of the Space Shuttle Program more than 3 decades ago. The transition includes a massive transfer of people, hardware, and infrastructure. Although NASA has in place many processes, policies, procedures, and support systems to carry out this effort, successful transition will depend on thoughtful execution and effective oversight. The need for NASA to implement the Vision in a fiscally prudent and effective manner cannot be overemphasized given the competing fiscal demands facing the federal government and an already troubling funding profile projected for human spaceflight activities. We have issued a number of reports that touch on various aspects of retiring the space shuttle and transitioning its assets and people to exploration activities. These reports have questioned the affordability of the exploration program, NASA’s acquisition strategy for the development of new space vehicles, agencywide contract management, and workforce planning for current and future agency needs. We also have an ongoing body of work being performed at the request of the House Committee on Science and Technology regarding effective management of the industrial base, development of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, and the logistical support needed by the International Space Station (ISS). In addition, at the request of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, we are reviewing NASA’s ability to attract and retain a skilled workforce. My statement today will focus on the overarching challenges that NASA faces in transitioning from the shuttle to the next generation of human space flight systems and will discuss our prior work on shuttle workforce and development of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, one of the agency’s complex programs. I will also discuss areas where we have related ongoing work. Page 1 GAO-07-595T This testimony is based on work conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Summary NASA faces numerous challenges as it transitions from the Space Shuttle Program to the next generation of human space flight systems. We have undertaken a body of work over the past 3 years that has highlighted two of these challenges—sustaining the shuttle workforce and developing new systems. Sustaining the shuttle workforce through retirement and ensuring that the workforce is available to support future exploration activities presents an enormous challenge for NASA. In 2005, we reported that NASA has made limited progress toward developing a detailed strategy to retain a critically skilled workforce for shuttle operations. We recommended that the agency begin identifying the shuttle program’s future workforce needs. NASA has recognized that shuttle workforce management and critical skills retention will be a major challenge and has taken action to address this issue. In 2006, we reported that NASA’s acquisition strategy for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle was risky because it committed the government to a long-term contract before establishing a sound business case. We recommended that NASA modify the current Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle acquisition strategy to ensure that the agency does not commit itself to a long-term contractual obligation prior to establishing a sound business case. Although it initially disagreed with our recommendation, NASA subsequently revised its acquisition strategy to address some of the concerns we raised. We are currently conducting a body of work relating to the transition, including NASA’s management of the supplier base, development of the Crew Launch Vehicle, and logistical support of the space station. Our work to date has also identified other issues that NASA will face during the transition, including disposing of property and equipment, completing environmental clean up, managing the overall workforce, and integrating financial information into how NASA does business. Each area contains its own set of unique challenges, but they are all critical to NASA’s overall transition effort and will require significant management attention. Background The President’s Vision for Space Exploration for NASA announced in 2004 calls for the retirement of the shuttle upon completion of the ISS and the creation of new vehicles for human space flight that will allow a return to Page 2 GAO-07-595T the moon by 2020 and voyages to Mars and points beyond. The shuttle manifest currently consists of 16 flights—15 to complete assembly and integration of the ISS and a servicing mission1 to the Hubble Space Telescope. The first new space vehicles currently are targeted to begin operating no later than 2014—thereby creating a potential gap in U.S. human space flight. Congress has voiced concern over the United States not having continuous access to space. NASA has made it a priority to minimize the gap to the extent possible. NASA has begun planning for the retirement of the shuttle, scheduled for 2010, by identifying best practices in closing facilities and the transitioning of capabilities. Specifically, NASA has conducted a number of benchmarking studies of previous closures and realignment of large programs, including the Titan IV rocket fly-out, the F/A-18 C/D fighter production close, and the Navy Base Realignment and Closure activities.