Quarter 2018 st Issue 88, 1 88, Issue Future(s) of Future(s) Targeting HybridTargeting Threats Understanding Gender Bias Understanding Multidomain BattleMultidomain
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-EIGHT, 1ST QUARTER 2018 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 88, 1st Quarter 2018 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell
Book Review Editor Frank G. Hoffman, Ph.D.
Associate Editor Patricia Strait, Ph.D.
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Intern Victoria Sanker
Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; Col James D. Dryjanski, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col David J. Eskelund, USMC/Marine Corps War College; RADM Janice M. Hamby, USN (Ret.)/College of Information and Cyberspace; RADM Jeffrey A. Harley, USN/U.S. Naval War College; BGen John M. Jansen, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; MG John S. Kem, USA/U.S. Army War College; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Brig Gen Chad T. Manske, USAF/National War College; Col William McCollough, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; LtGen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Jeffrey Ruth, USN/Joint Forces Staff College; VADM Kevin D. Scott, USN/The Joint Staff; Brig Gen Jeremy T. Sloane, USAF/Air War College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/Center for Complex Operations; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/ National War College; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.); Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): World War II veteran Luis Perrone, 94, was part of Army Air Force’s 533rd Bomb Squadron from 1942 to 1945, completing 32 bombing missions over western Europe as B-17 Flying Fortress ball turret gunner (U.S. Air Force/Bennie J. Davis III); Navy Airman inspects wiring on EA-18G Growler in hangar bay of USS Ronald Reagan, November 16, 2017 (U.S. Navy/ Janweb B. Lagazo); East African Response Force Soldier in C-130J Hercules during validation exercise, at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, which tested Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa’s ability to rapidly deploy forces (U.S. Army Africa/Eric Summers, Jr.) About the Cover In This Issue Marines assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 262 (Reinforced) conduct pre-takeoff Forum checks on AH-1W Super Cobra 2 Executive Summary helicopter aboard amphibious transport dock USS Green Bay, 4 The Future Is Plural: part of Bonhomme Richard Multiple Futures for Expeditionary Strike Group, with Tomorrow’s Joint Force embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary By F.G. Hoffman Unit, operating in Indo-Asia-Pacific region, Buckner Bay, April 5, 2017 14 Multidomain Battle: Time (U.S. Navy/Chris Williamson) for a Campaign of Joint Experimentation By Kevin M. Woods and Thomas C. Greenwood 78 Joint Integrated Air and 128 Born Multinational: 22 The Power of Partnership: Missile Defense: Simplifying an Capability Solutions for Security Cooperation and Increasingly Complex Problem Joint, Multinational, and Globally Integrated Logistics By Gabriel Almodovar, Daniel P. Coalition Operations By Thomas Warren Ross Allmacher, Morgan P. Ames III, and By Charles W. Robinson Chad Davies 28 Surfing the Chaos: 132 Joint Doctrine Update Warfighting in a Contested 85 Achieving Secrecy and Surprise Cyberspace Environment in a Ubiquitous ISR Environment Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National By William D. Bryant By Adam G. Lenfestey, Nathan Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Rowan, James E. Fagan, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to Corey H. Ruckdeschel inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and JPME Today other partners on joint and integrated operations; 91 Implementing Guidance national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat 34 The Bureaucratization terrorism; homeland security; and developments in of the U.S. Military for Security Cooperation: training and joint professional military education to Decisionmaking Process Overcoming Obstacles to U.S. transform America’s military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting By Milan Vego Africa Command’s Efforts freedom today. All published articles have been vetted By Andrus W. Chaney through a peer-review process and cleared by the 46 Women, Regardless: Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. Understanding Gender Bias NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Recall cross-component, professional military and academic in U.S. Military Integration 102 Scipio Africanus and the Second publishing house. By Elizabeth M. Trobaugh The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations Punic War: Joint Lessons for expressed or implied within are those of the Center of Gravity Analysis contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of Commentary By Kenneth T. Klima, Peter Mazzella, the Federal Government. 54 Multidomain Battle: and Patrick B. McLaughlin Copyright Notice Converging Concepts This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions Toward a Joint Solution Book Reviews of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted By David G. Perkins and 112 Unwinnable without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ James M. Holmes should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted Reviewed by Carter Malkasian from or based on its content. 58 A 21st-Century Military Submissions and Communications 113 Elite Warriors JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Doctrine for America research from members of the Armed Forces, Reviewed by Bruce McClintock By Steve F. Kime security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration 64 The Need for an Innovative 114 Social Science Goes to War Reviewed by Brian R. Price to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. Joint Psychological manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: Warfare Force Structure Editor, Joint Force Quarterly NDU Press By Richard B. Davenport Joint Doctrine 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) 116 A COG Concept for Winning Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319 More Than Just Battles Features Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 70 Geographic Component Network By Jacob Barfoed Email: [email protected] JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm Analysis: A Methodology 124 Department of Defense 1st Quarter, January 2018 for Deliberately Targeting Terminology Program ISSN 1070-0692 a Hybrid Adversary By George E. Katsos By Chance A. Smith and Steve W. Rust U.S. Navy Airmen signal launch of F/A-18E Super Hornet on flight deck aboard Navy’s forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan during Carrier Air Wing Five fly-off in Pacific Ocean in waters south of Japan, November 28, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Kenneth Abbate)
Executive Summary
s a gift for a significant support military operations, and the military is faced with a range of chal- approaching birthday, my golf strategies developed for both, I found lenges, which it may or may not be fully A widow gave me a new set of a number of similarities between my prepared to meet. clubs that were the result of a 5-hour golf world and the military’s current War exacts a toll over time unlike any custom fitting at a local professional issues regarding operations, strategy, other human experience. And meeting shop. For years I wrestled with the and policy, especially as the Defense the demands of combat takes more than same issue: how to balance the expense Department nears breaking the $700 one individual’s effort, budget, and ideas of new equipment with my desire to get billion mark in annual budgets. to succeed. With the range of challenges lower scores. I am now precisely aware Just as Clausewitz wrote, the nature the Chairman has identified, including all of how average my swing and its results of war hasn’t changed much. It still has the other burdens of service on the joint are using technology such as radar ball political and human dimensions, is a force, we might ask ourselves, “What flight and swing tracking. And I now contest of wills, and exists in a world of should we do to prepare for the future have the best available tech that is cus- uncertainty. How one’s military meets while winning the fights we are currently tom-fit to my game. The field results the challenge of war is dependent on a engaged in?” The joint force has to are not yet in, but the data from the number of factors, including available adapt, adjust, acquire, repurpose, retrain, fitting was clear that I should expect to funds, the scope of available technology recruit, and perform a whole range of achieve better results on the course in in either the present or the near future, other functions to continue to meet the the coming year. As a longtime student and the physical and mental fitness of mission of protecting our Nation, allies, of military operations, acquisition to the people engaged in combat. Today’s and partners around the world. In some
2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 cases that means new programs and new will help all of us understand how far we as more than just a part of winning tac- technology, while in others it requires have to go to level the playing field in a tically. I honestly had not heard of the modifications to existing systems, train- way that improves the effectiveness of the Department of Defense Terminology ing, tactics, and procedures. Another joint force. Program until George E. Katsos sent us challenge we need to consider is how In Commentary, General David G. an article about this important effort. to handle the process of handing down Perkins, commander of the U.S. Army’s Getting joint operations right is just valuable experience as Servicemembers Training and Doctrine Command, and the start of the effort needed to be suc- constantly enter and leave the force. General James M. Holmes, commander cessful in today’s world, and Charles W. Many questions remain to be answered of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Robinson helps us see how to win when on how best to accomplish these critical Command, discuss how Service concepts involved in multinational and coalition tasks. Hopefully, this issue of JFQ will have been combined to create a joint operations. Closing out the issue, the provide you with some insights to that solution to the multidomain battle the Joint Doctrine Update lists the latest de- end. force now faces. Suggesting the U.S. velopments in joint publications. In our Forum section, we focus on military needs bring its game into the 21st The next edition of Joint Force the strategic level of war with four valu- century, Steve F. Kime offers his ideas on Quarterly will feature a number of im- able contributions by well-known JFQ how military doctrine should be updated. portant articles from the Joint Staff and authors and new voices. Currently serv- And Richard B. Davenport advocates for U.S. Central Command that continue ing as a special assistant to the Secretary a new force structure to advance our joint to explore where the joint force is today of Defense, our very own Frank Hoffman psychological warfare capabilities. and where we should be headed. Given maps a number of futures our joint force Chance A. Smith and Steve W. the talent we have, I am certain we will may have to confront and what should be Rust begin our Features section with find new ways to continue to improve done about them. As the idea of multi- an interesting set of ideas on how our and bring our A game to every place we domain battle gathers momentum across geographic combatant commands can go. JFQ the joint force, Kevin M. Woods and update their targeting methods to better JFQ Editorial Board member Thomas C. confront hybrid threats. Seeing a need William T. Eliason Greenwood discuss how joint experimen- to simplify our approaches, Gabriel Editor in Chief tation can greatly improve our fighting Almodovar, Daniel P. Allmacher, Morgan effectiveness. Stressing the value of part- P. Ames III, and Chad Davies offer us a nership, Thomas Warren Ross returns to different way to look at our integrated JFQ to discuss how security cooperation air and missile defenses. Helping us op- and logistics combine to create success in erate in a world where the joint force’s our efforts to help our friends around the every move might be available to stream world. These days it seems the Internet on the Internet, Adam G. Lenfestey, has taken over our lives, so you may find Nathan Rowan, James E. Fagan, and what William D. Bryant has to say about Corey H. Ruckdeschel suggest ways warfighting in cyberspace essential to secrecy and surprise can still be achieved. your future success. Recent events in Africa underscore the The JPME Today section features need for the joint force to conduct a both a JFQ-veteran voice and a new one, range of missions on the continent, and each with important considerations. Andrus W. Chaney offers recommenda- From the U.S. Naval War College, Milan tions for achieving success in U.S. Africa Vego has been writing for a long time on Command’s security cooperation efforts. operational art, strategic thinking, and Our Recall section welcomes a team the history of warfare. I think you will effort that takes us back a long time be- find his latest article on American military fore the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Kenneth decisionmaking to be another useful T. Klima, Peter Mazzella, and Patrick B. discussion on how our senior leaders McLaughlin offer their views on joint develop plans and execute joint opera- planning and center of gravity analysis in tions. After having spent a considerable the Second Punic War. amount of research and development of We also offer three interesting book her thinking, Elizabeth M. Trobaugh reviews along with an expanded Joint continues our discussion of the ongoing Doctrine section. If you read the article integration of women into combat roles about centers of gravity in the Second in our military. While her work will not Punic War, then you are ready for Jacob be the final word on this issue, I think she Barfoed’s article on how to see them
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Eliason 3 Marine provides tactical navigation assistance to pilots in UH-Y Huey helicopter embarked aboard USS Green Bay, during amphibious raid rehearsal as part of Talisman Saber 17, Coral Sea, July 8, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Sarah Myers)
The Future Is Plural Multiple Futures for Tomorrow’s Joint Force
By F.G. Hoffman
There is not a single discrete future out there in the time to come. Instead there are almost certainly an unknowable number of possible futures. . . . The past is singular . . . the future, in sharpest contrast, assuredly plural.
—Colin Gray
he formulation of sound strategy challenges, like crafting a long-term is inherently tied to the art of defense strategy, cannot rely on dart- T forecasting. Rather than precise boards or algorithms fed by Big Data. predications, any sound strategy has to As RAND’s Michael Mazarr has per- be founded on embracing uncertainty, ceptively noted, this is not the nature Dr. F.G. Hoffman is a Distinguished Research assessing risk, and testing hypothe- of the big national security challenges. Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, 1 Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the ses. This may be particularly true for “These are value-based judgment calls National Defense University. defense strategies. Multidimensional or one-off issues,” he has concluded,
4 Forum / The Future Is Plural JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 “where data and patterns will offer Table. Sources of Uncertainty and Friction in Strategy Formulation and Execution very limited guidance.”2 The central Activity-Based Bureaucratic Domestic Adversary Disruptive Allies and question for senior leaders in defense Intelligence Scripts Politics Actions Technology Partners is improving their assessment of risk in Diagnosis X + X + ambiguous contexts. This article examines the use of sce- Formulation + X X X narios to enhance the development of Testing or Gaming X X X defense strategy and explores three critical Implementation X X uncertainties that will frame a number of Assessment & Adaptation X X potential futures for U.S. security strategy to demonstrate the utility and application X = Major source; + = Minor source of effective scenario use. A sound strategy process is not, or as Peter Schwartz has long noted, do masked as operative strategies. With sce- at least should not be, an exercise in not spring forth from unexpected conse- narios, the same strategy team may have a eliminating uncertainty and making smart quences but rather from group denial.6 better feel for how its biases and preferred choices based on a clear-cut prediction. Most international shocks were envi- solutions create risks in different worlds. This is not an advisable approach since sioned by someone, warned about, but As noted, good strategy is ultimately our grasp of the future is so tenuous. resolutely ignored. Instead of grasping an art that employs forecasting, risk man- As Colin Gray once advised the North new contexts or potential circumstances agement, and the testing of hypotheses. Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), that alter our understanding, we tend to Good forecasters, including so-called any strategy starts with the recognition project trends as linear plots. In retro- Super Forecasters, are more scrupulous that its authors will be surprised many spect, after a strategic shock, we prefer about their personal biases and tend to times in the future. The key is not to be to construct a script about how signals become more empirical in their assess- disabled by the effects of surprise—we and vague omens were lost in the noise. ments to try to avoid a lack of objectivity.9 should plan with the intent of creating In reality, the signals were drowned by This empiricism is a learned skill as is the capabilities and consequences that are leaders who turned up the volume on use of good trend analysis and scenarios. surprise-tolerant. The goal in prudent comfortable preferences. These are the tools that every strategist defense planning is to avoid optimization This is where scenario-based planning should embrace. for one world, to plan flexibly, adaptively, comes into play, to break out of rigid There are many sources of uncer- and inclusively.3 To posture an institution mental frames and open up a discourse tainty in strategy, and they can occur at for the breadth of challenges for which among senior leaders about trends, different times in the strategy formulation adaptation may be necessary, we have to assumptions, and potential shocks.7 process. They do not have to serve solely open up the aperture to potential futures Scenarios and multiple futures help as illustrations or explain a future envi- via scenarios posited to test how inclusive policymakers foresee possible inflection ronment.10 The table depicts a summary or responsive our plans are. points and bring uncertainty into ac- of potential sources of uncertainty and History is not irrelevant when explor- count. Scenario-based analysis facilitates friction in the strategy formulation and ing the future. The challenge is to remain the incorporation of critical drivers and execution process.11 The first column engaged with the past but to unshackle trends that might fundamentally change details the basic steps in strategy devel- leaders from the worst kind of confirma- the future environment in significant opment, to include the need to assess tion bias, which assumes that since the ways. By identifying key trends and and adapt strategies in action. The first future is unknowable, it will be based on drivers along a plausible alternative path, row lays out potential sources of both what we now know.4 Instead of searching from the present to different futures, sce- uncertainty and friction that may im- for the unknowable Black Swan, smart narios can “help Pentagon leaders avoid pede an objective understanding of the planners should stop avoiding inconve- the ‘default’ picture by which tomorrow environment, the framing of potential nient trends that disturb organizational looks very much like today.”8 options, and decisionmaking. These preferences with new challenges and Scenarios, properly employed, can include both internal (like bureaucratic orphan missions, which some call Pink help reduce some of the critical influences resistance or internal scripts) and external Flamingos.5 of uncertainty and friction in strategy (the opponent being the most obvious) Large institutions, including the formulation. In particular, in the diag- sources.12 Good scenario testing can Armed Forces, tend to think about the nosis and formulation phases of strategy be an effective counter to that, perhaps future in linear and evolutionary steps development, scenarios can sharpen the by a Red Team, to challenge strategy and make implicit assumptions about diagnosis as well as shape options for group think. Red Teaming has recently the next war as merely an extension of tradeoffs in strategy options and formu- been emphasized as an important tool the last. This results in strategic and lation. Without scenarios, strategists may in helping decisionmakers better under- operational surprise. Yet most surprises, pursue bureaucratically favored solutions stand the vulnerabilities of a given course
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Hoffman 5 of action.13 The evaluation of effective of a gamble than a strategic method. It Critical Uncertainties strategies, ones that can adequately re- surely undermines flexibility for respond- In this article, three critical uncertainties spond to the world as it is rather than an ing to what cannot be known with any are selected that the author contends imaginary or preferred world, is a critical reliable detail. will significantly shape the context part of the strategy development process. While the 2010 QDR may have been for the execution of U.S. policy and Strategy testing against scenarios helps perceived as embracing uncertainty (and defense strategy over the next one to both the decisionmaker and strategy team was overly optimistic about resources), a two decades.20 There are many rele- by exploring consequences of seemingly better case study is the Defense Strategy vant megatrends that will impact our favorable strategic plans. There are risks Guidance of 2012. Every assumption future.21 Several of these can be bundled in inaction as well as unintended or made by the Barack Obama adminis- together into uncertainties for which unforeseen costs in preferred options. As tration and accepted by Secretary of there is a plausible path and for which Michael Mazarr has noted in his study of Defense Robert Gates and the Pentagon assumptions are perilous. If these three risk analysis preceding the 2008 financial at that time (Russia, benign; China, not uncertainties are taken out in time to crisis, “the most profound risk disasters in assertive; Sunnis, contented) all proved their natural conclusion or a plausible finance and national security come from completely wrong. Crimea, Ukraine, alternative future, existing U.S. national insufficient attention to and awareness the South China Sea, and the so-called security strategies would have to be of the potential risky consequences of Islamic State’s nova certainly ended the adapted, possibly in “ways and means” intended or favored strategies.”14 notion that narrow prediction was a that we are currently unprepared to rec- Bureaucracies, including planning good bet. It turns out that the creative ognize or accept. cells in institutions like the Department speculation was blind faith in prediction, These uncertainties are geopolitical of Defense, tend to make their outlook unbounded by any appreciation for what competition from major rivals, U.S. of the future match up well with their might happen. In this case, employing economic performance, and alliance co- preferred solutions. Scenarios provide a scenarios might have produced a more hesion and capacity. less threatening way to lay out alternative informed choice, one that expands rather Geopolitical Competition from Major futures in which the bias, preferences, than marginalizes analysis. Forecasting Rivals. This driver poses a polarity be- and assumptions underpinning today’s intelligently, as well as understanding the tween a highly collaborative world order strategy may no longer be true. This can probabilities and potential implications, largely within the extant rules-based help avoid groupthink.15 Decisionmakers are more important for long-range strate- international system that exists today. It should temper that possibility with astute gies than a prediction. may be adapted to better reflect post– use of scenarios founded upon the critical Scenarios help resolve an inherent Cold War adjustments in national power. assumptions or uncertainties that will tension in formulating strategy. Professor At the other end of the uncertainty factor impact their enterprise the most.16 Hal Brands of the Paul H. Nitze School is the existence of a conflict-ridden envi- Some analysts believe that uncertainty of Advanced International Studies ob- ronment of great power competition.22 gets too much credit and contributes to serves that strategy is beset with tensions Such a world would be based on the negative influences in the development of including “between the need for fore- collapse of many norms and values, a U.S. defense strategy. One analyst goes sight and the fact of uncertainty; between possible rejection of international mech- so far as to claim that defense planners the steadiness and purpose that are nec- anisms to mitigate direct confrontation over-privilege uncertainty, which retards essary to plan ahead, and the agility that in the economic or security domains, and difficult choices that can and must be is required to adapt on the fly.”18 That the rising potential for direct military made. Based on an assessment of the tension, between foresight and inherent conflict inside the established spheres quality of the analysis supporting the uncertainty, is the Holy Grail of sound of influence of the major powers. This Defense Department’s Quadrennial strategy. is a future of substantially higher risk of Defense Review (QDR) in 2010, Mark But while scenarios provide a good confrontation in which current force Fitzsimmons concluded that “Creative, way of evaluating strategies, the sce- development plans would leave the joint unbounded speculation must resolve to narios themselves do not generate the force outmatched in key dimensions of choice or else there will be no strategy. strategy. As Richard Danzig has noted, future war. Recent history suggests that unchecked “the propagation of scenarios, however Trend lines in this driver are ominous. skepticism regarding the validity of sophisticated, broad ranging or insightful, Russia’s announced defense spending is prediction can marginalize analysis, does not obviate the need for strategies slated to rise 44 percent over the next 3 trade significant cost for ambiguous for coping with uncertainty.”19 The years, the largest increase of any state.23 benefit, empower parochial interests in scenarios are a mechanism for that since China’s significant economic develop- decision-making, and undermine flexi- they are plausible contexts a strategy may ment and rapid military modernization bility.”17 This reflects an erroneous belief have to face, and for which responsible could conceivably produce circumstances that prediction is necessary to make deci- policymakers may have to prepare for or in which great power competition erupts sions and tradeoffs. In reality, this is more hedge against. into a war.24 Already, Chinese military
6 Forum / The Future Is Plural JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 modernization shows great progress Figure 1. Past, Present, and Future U.S. Debt Levels in offsetting U.S. power projection Percentage of GDP capabilities.25 Scholars of rising powers and transition periods show that periods 150 marked “by hegemonic decline and the simultaneous emergence of new great 125 powers have been unstable and prone to World War II 26 war.” As Harvard’s Graham Allison has 100 noted, the emergence of rising powers has resulted in war with existing powers 75 in 12 of 16 cases.27 At the upper range of this driver, we Great Depression could foresee a world in which the world 50 order was in complete disarray, and in Civil War World War I which China and Russia would be aligned 25 against the democratic and open liberal 28 order. 0 U.S. Economic Performance. This 1790 1810 1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 driver captures the potential range of U.S. domestic economic performance ranging from high growth rates in excess technological breakthroughs. However, resulted in prior debt surges and reflects of 3 percent at one end and flat or slightly the biggest challenge facing the future CBO projections for sharply higher debt declining economic performance at the U.S. economy is reflected in its growing levels, largely as a result of the retirement other. The negative end of this trend debt and interest payments required of the Baby Boomer generation. would be predicated on continued po- to pay for this financing of the U.S. A scenario of potentially signifi- litical polarization in the country, as well Government. cant risk would be one in which U.S. as continued gridlock on Federal budget The growth and resulting increase in debt-carrying costs were to increase sig- reforms to tame spiraling income security mandatory interest payments is equally nificantly, which would increase required and healthcare costs. Under this scenario, significant and may impinge on na- interest payments. This is why Admiral entitlement costs and interest payments tional economic growth and negatively Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the by 2030 consume 85 percent of the impact resources for required Federal Joint Chiefs of Staff, once claimed that Federal budget and the Federal debt activity, including national defense. The the greatest threat to U.S. security was climbs to 150 percent of gross domestic U.S. public debt was $909 billion in Federal debt levels.30 If interest costs product (GDP). 1980, an amount equal to 33 percent simply returned to their norms—higher The U.S. economy grew by an aver- of America’s GDP. That number had than 4 percent—our debt-servicing costs age of 3.8 percent from 1946 to 1973, more than tripled to $3.2 trillion—or 56 could rise by $4.4 trillion over the next while real median household income percent of GDP—by 1990. Total Federal decade.31 This would be a future in which surged 74 percent (or 2.1 percent a debt (including debt held by the public our current strategy and forward posture year). But real GDP (accounting for and foreign countries and the Federal would be unsustainable. inflation) grew by only an average of Reserve Bank) now exceeds $18 trillion Alliance Cohesion and Capacity. 1.7 percent from 2000 to the first half and approaches 100 percent of GDP. It This driver examines the assumptions and of 2014, a rate around half the historical will climb over $20 trillion in the next 5 trends related to our current alliance sys- average. Median income for middle-class years and is projected to be greater than tem. That system uses national advantage Americans was flat for the past 20 years, $24 trillion by fiscal year 2029 under as a source of access and influence in key although a distinct uptick of 5.2 percent current law. The Congressional Budget regions of the world. The U.S. alliance growth recently occurred.29 Office (CBO) estimates that our interest system is a source of capability that aug- Projections for U.S. economic growth payments will exceed $700 billion a year ments the joint force and is a collective are slightly higher in the next few years in 2027, up from $202 billion in 2009. mechanism for maintaining international (1.9 to 2.2 percent). These projections This would represent a tipping point, as norms and values. The bases in Asia, will be influenced by numerous variables interest costs would exceed funding for Europe, and elsewhere that are made including U.S. tax policies, infrastruc- the Department of Defense. available by this network of partners hold ture investments, potential health Figure 1 shows the historical track of immense value to U.S. global power pro- policy changes, reform of government publicly held Federal debt as a percentage jection and for conventional deterrence. entitlement programs, and how well of our gross economic capacity. The fig- At one end of this factor we might the U.S. economy adapts to numerous ure also shows how major conflicts have assume a highly cohesive suite of capable
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Hoffman 7 Figure 2. Allied Ground Force Levels security challenges.33 Prospects for in- creasing defense spending or collective 350,000 34 UK France Germany defense appear to be diminishing. As 300,000 seen in figure 2, the ground forces of our major partners in Europe have been in 250,000 decline for some time. In Asia, some of the same challenges 200,000 exist. Japan is aging rapidly and its de- 150,000 fense spending represents only 5 percent of its national budget, or 1 percent of 100,000 GDP.35 Japan’s debt is already at 245 per- Army End Strength cent of its annual GDP. Overall defense 50,000 spending by current U.S. allies is stable 0 but increasingly irrelevant given the large 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 increases allocated to China’s People’s Liberation Army. If current trends Source: Hal Brands, Dealing with Allies in Decline: Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy in an Era of Global Power Shifts (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017), 19, continue, as regional defense spending available at
Figure 3. Asia Defense Spending Multiple Futures 250,000 These significant uncertainties are not China Japan South Korea the only drivers of the future, but they Taiwan Australia arguably are the most stressing to the 200,000 positon the United States would prefer to operate from. Over two decades 150,000 ago, the U.S. economy was generating a surplus and growing at 3.5 percent annually, our debt was 33 percent of 100,000 GDP, and NATO stood as history’s greatest alliance. We found ourselves in a unique positon, a unipolar moment 50,000 that turned out to be just a moment in 37
Spending (Constant 2014 $ Millions) time. The challenge today is to secure 0 the Nation’s core interests and obliga- 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 tions in the world as it is, not as we wish Source: Brands, Dealing with Allies in Decline, 24. it to be. Of course, there are other trends in the security environment, including allies and an extended network of part- tepid trade. At the end of the decade, global economic integration, techno- ners that are politically and militarily these countries would be investing 1.25 logical diffusion, and both global and strong enough to export hard military percent of their GDP to defense spending domestic income equality. All of these are power beyond their borders. They would but have little expeditionary capability certainly influential, but for the purpose have robust conventional capability, at all. These allies might cling to NATO of this intellectual exercise, not as critical enough to contribute to NATO’s imme- but not contribute anything to its hard to future U.S. defense choices as those we diate borders, as an example. power. have discussed thus far. In this world, regional forces would Trends are not favorable at present. If we were to plot the identified driv- be supported by over 2 percent of their Europe faces a future that observers ers along three axes, it produces a future collective GDP and have sufficient mod- believe could fragment its integration via options space as depicted in figure 4. ernization funding to stay interoperable a “perfect storm.”32 Given low economic Each driver has potential signposts or with U.S. forces. At the other end of productivity, aging demographics, and stages that signal evidence of how each the driver, our allies would be politically internal security needs, many NATO bundle of trends is emerging. The inter- weak, demographically challenged by members have sharply reduced defense secting points, the antinodes, of these aging populations, and economically spending and could become more drivers produce options of potential frozen by poor productivity levels and domestically oriented against internal future worlds we may live in, as depicted
8 Forum / The Future Is Plural JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 in figure 5. The corners that have been income security, despite the rising global Figure 4. Three Critical selected represent plausible alternative reach and power of contending peer Uncertainties worlds if trends played out negatively for competitors. With flat defense spending Level of Geopolitical U.S. interests. over the ensuing decade, U.S. security in- Competition
The Base Scenario world is where vestments would be focused on securing High the three drivers intersect in a best-case the homeland first, with smaller numbers world—one in which China and Russia of much more sophisticated global strike were not competitive with the West, systems to provide some conventional de- U.S. economic growth was 3 percent, terrence. The emphasis for U.S. national Low Allied High Coherence/ and our allies and partners were highly security strategy would be to preserve the High Low Capacity capable and committed to the current Nation’s borders and domestic security.
international order. This may be the American leaders in this scenario would Low desired outcome of a potential grand be tired of carrying NATO and its unwill- U.S. Economic strategy. Less desirably, combinations of ingness to pay for its security and seek a Growth the three critical uncertainties produce more independent America free of bur- darker alternatives that are depicted and densome and entangling coalitions.41 described below. The development of any Contested Disorder. This future Figure 5. Three robust national security strategy or a U.S. represents an extension of all three un- Alternative Futures defense strategy should be tested against certainties to some degree. It posits an Indispensable these worlds. alternative future of poor U.S. economic Level of Geopolitical America Competition Indispensable America. This al- performance under 1.5 percent growth, ternative future reflects the potential continued political division, and a con- High Independent combination of rising revisionist powers stant erosion of U.S. security investments. America
(an entente between China and Russia) Economic order is distressed due to the Contested and a weakened international order with eruption of protectionist actions between Order Low Allied 42 a much-weakened Western alliance struc- the world’s two largest economies. At High Coherence/ High Low ture that offers little combat capability the same time, reduced alliance cohesion Capacity
and fewer bases for U.S. forward-de- in Europe and in Asia diminishes U.S. in- Low ployed forces.38 Weaker allies will pose terest and involvement with existing allies considerable challenges for U.S. security and partners. A majority of Americans U.S. Economic strategy over the next few decades. As in middle America do not agree that Growth Professor Brands has noted: the cost of U.S. leadership is worth it.43 NATO may still exist in such a future, world. With few shared values or insti- Regional military balances are shifting but its relevance and capacity are entirely tutions, it will be harder to manage and adversely as allies decline relative to their rhetorical. Complicating this world is the will require multiple compromises and regional competitors, making America’s continued encroachment of Russia along sharp tradeoffs.46 traditional responsibility as guarantor of the periphery of Europe and deep pene- The implications for the joint war- stability and security in Europe and East tration of the Old World’s governments fighting community are significant as Asia more difficult to uphold. In the event and information institutions. Russia well. A detailed analysis is beyond the conflict occurs, the United States will face manages to continue its modernization.44 scope of this article, but overall: even greater challenges in defending its In Asia, China’s reach has expanded both increasingly overmatched allies in these in economic terms as every country’s •• A large-scale increase in U.S. military regions.39 major source of trade, economic growth, force size, as proposed by several and investment. China’s economy has key congressional leaders and think In such a world, a greater burden displaced America’s as the growth engine tanks, would be unsustainable in to sustain a rules-based, liberal of the future.45 Independent America or Contested order would have to depend on the Disorder.47 The funding in a large United States, making it literally Implications buildup would be compounded by “indispensable.”40 The implications drawn from these dif- the resulting early outs/buy outs and Independent America. This plausible ferent futures is not comforting—bigger ship decommissionings. extension of trends depicts a world in enemies, fewer friends with diminished •• A joint force that assumes access to which U.S. economic performance has contributions, and a weakened govern- foreign bases and counts on export- weakened and a greater share of the eco- ment that has both less influence and a able combat power by an aging nomic output of the country is spent on smaller iron fist behind its diplomacy. NATO or Cold War partnership may domestic needs, especially health care and This is a more multipolar and chaotic become a bad bet in Indispensable
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Hoffman 9 Marine fires AT-4 missile launcher during Exercise Platinum Eagle 17.2, at Babadag Training Area, Romania, May 3, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Sarah N. Petrock)
America. Since allies and partners States might have to substantially an agreement on a new order. But the constitute a major source of advan- alter its defense posture and pick up conditions for such a concert are rare and tage, as the Chairman of the Joint a heavier burden. more difficult to obtain from revisionist Chiefs has publically emphasized, and rising powers.50 A smaller and less forward-deployed this strategic advantage may have to These scenarios may not come to force would be extremely strained and at be discounted in assessing the future fruition, but signposts for the variables greater operational risk if tasked to sustain operating environment and military involved can be identified and tracked. an open order overshadowed by China’s strategy.48 Certainly, over the last 15 More important, U.S. grand strategy global power in Contested Disorder or years, despite concerns about bur- should be tested against these potential even worse by a collective effort by the densharing, the U.S. alliance system worlds and incorporate some actions to two major revisionist states. Designated has proved to be material to U.S. increase the chances of our obtaining spheres of influence would be accorded global reach and power projection. the base case. Our defense strategy can immediately to both of the revisionists The question for the future is how also be stressed by testing it against these who would continue to press against well the United States manages three futures as well, to assess how resil- former U.S. allies, and eventually extract its alliance architecture and how ient it is against potential environments commercial advantages inimical to U.S. political, social, and economic forces that may evolve. A joint force design for economic interests, employment, and shape the contributory value of that a future U.S. military has to consider not prosperity. A world in which revisionist system. This potential risk could be only today’s canonical war plans but also powers were collaborating and in which offset by working to build up partner the breadth of these potential futures in the extant international order was eroded capacity with existing or even new some way.51 and undefended would necessitate a partners.49 Should this trend go com- Strategy is formed around a hypoth- significant shift in U.S. grand strategy and pletely negative, with Great Britain esis, since all strategy is purposeful and a higher order of defense spending and leaving both the European Union must rely on a causal relationship that force buildup. Some argue that the major and NATO, for example, the United expects that discrete decisions and actions powers should reach an accommodation,
10 Forum / The Future Is Plural JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 4 will generate desired effects.52 The use temic blinders, and no small amount of Paul Cornish and Kingsley Donaldson, 2020: World of War (London: Hodder and of scenarios can test that hypothesis to intellectual digging to develop and test Stoughton, 2017), 6. 56 help “future proof” the strategy that is reasonable hypotheses. It also requires 5 Nassim Nicholas Taleb made the Black selected.53 long-term thinking and imagination. Swan a well-known metaphor (an unpredict- Obviously, U.S. actions offer a power- In his opus Strategy: A History, Sir able event of great impact) in his Black Swan: ful input as to how these scenarios might Lawrence Freedman observed, “Having The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2010). See also Frank play out. They are not preordained, and a strategy suggests an ability to look up Hoffman, “Black Swans and Pink Flamingos: U.S. actions or lack of action will con- from the short term and the trivial to Five Principles for Force Design,” War on the tribute to which future evolves. These view the long term and the essential, to Rocks, August 19, 2015, available at
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Hoffman 11 Airman with 6th Force Support Squadron at MacDill Air Force Base participates in 2017 OpenWERX Hackathon, sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Shapiro)
48, no. 4 (Winter 2006–2007), 144. Emphasis Phillip C. Saunders et al., The Chinese Navy: 30 Ed O’Keefe, “Mullen, Despite Deal, added. Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Wash- Debt Still Poses a Risk to National Security,” 18 Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strat- ington, DC: NDU Press, 2011). Washington Post, August 2, 2011, A1. egy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft 25 Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China 31 Phil Gramm and Thomas Saving, “The from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Itha- Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Economic Headwinds Obama Set in Motion,” ca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 193. Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Wall Street Journal, May 2017. 19 Richard Danzig, Driving in the Dark: Monica, CA: RAND, 2015); Roger Cliff, 32 Richard N. Haass, “Managing Europe’s Ten Propositions about Prediction and National China’s Military Power: Assessing Current and Perfect Storm,” Project Syndicate, October 2, Security (Washington, DC: Center for a New Future Capabilities (New York: Cambridge 2015, available at
12 Forum / The Future Is Plural JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 35 Yoichi Funabashi, “Japan’s Silver Paci- article, General Dunford is quoted, “From a fism,”The National Interest, January/February U.S. perspective, I would tell you I believe our 2016, 25–31. center of gravity as a nation, through a security New from 36 Hal Brands, Dealing with Allies in De- lens, is the network of alliances. Russia is trying cline: Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy to erode that.” NDU Press in an Era of Global Power Shifts (Washington, 49 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Preserving for the Center for the Study of DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess- the Balance: A U.S. Eurasia Defense Strategy Chinese Military Affairs ments, 2017), 21, available at
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Hoffman 13 SOFWERX hosts Cyber Capability Expo at its newest facility in Tampa, Florida, to identify cyber technologies to meet current and future Special Operations Forces requirements, October 19, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Barry Loo)
opportunities in order to justify the disruptive effects of the change. This, Multidomain Battle as it should be, is a high bar. The desks of the Pentagon are Time for a Campaign of Joint littered with “transformative” joint warfighting concepts that have appeared with great fanfare only to fall into ob- Experimentation scurity. Despite serving as a vehicle to explore ideas, in the end, concepts like By Kevin M. Woods and Thomas C. Greenwood Rapid Decisive Operations and Air-Sea Battle failed to move beyond the nascent stage. Some of this can be attributed to he term multidomain has reached original, the rapid growth of capabili- a natural resistance to top-down joint beyond mainstream military ties tied to the newly minted space and concepts, the difficulty of exploring T parlance to dominate defense-re- cyber domains is forcing a re-examina- future concepts while maintaining lated discussions, concept papers, and tion of all previous military concepts readiness, the lack of coherent institu- op-eds. While the idea of operating and doctrine. This article explores the tional processes for examining concepts across warfighting domains is hardly debate around multidomain battle across organizational boundaries, and, (MDB). Developing a new warfighting ultimately, the lack of patience for what concept (as opposed to a slogan or can be an intellectual slog. As a result, bumper sticker) is difficult because new many such efforts were never sufficiently Dr. Kevin M. Woods is Deputy Director of the Joint concepts need to demonstrate that they examined so as to generate compelling Advanced Warfighting Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). Colonel Thomas C. are sufficiently better than the status evidence to drive more than cosmetic Greenwood, USMC (Ret.), is a Researcher at IDA. quo at addressing the challenges and changes across the force.
14 Forum / Multidomain Battle: Joint Experimentation JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 This article advocates two approaches Concepts are narrative descriptions of domain—is neither logical nor practical. to exploring MDB. The first is to link suppositions formulated from historical As one observer notes, “the word [do- the MDB concept to the existing body and contemporary experiences; however, main] contains some built-in assumptions of available evidence. The second is to as debatable propositions, they must be regarding how we view warfare that can generate new evidence through experi- validated before they transition from con- limit our thinking . . . [and] could actu- mentation. These approaches are offered cept to capability. This requires settling ally pose an intractable conceptual threat not because Service concept developers the debatable elements. This article thus to an integrated joint force.”9 have not already begun this process—as argues that concepts on the scale of MDB Joining the critics are the cynics, evidenced by the MDB draft concepts require a campaign of experimentation some of whom see MDB’s real purpose and plans for U.S. Army MDB experi- that provides compelling evidence for the as programmatic: a ploy to restore or mentation in 2018 and 2019. Rather, concept by fleshing out its operational preserve force structure by returning this article argues that in addition to the and institutional contexts.2 land power to the tip of the spear in joint bottom-up development of what could operations.10 Others see the concept arguably be deemed a joint concept, The State of the Debate as requiring deep institutional reforms there should also be a parallel effort to Proponents of the emerging MDB that are simply unattainable.11 As one explore the top-down or explicit joint, concept make the case that the joint pessimist argued, “without consistently theater-level implications of MDB. force must adapt to the times, or, as one organizing, training, and equipping as The term multidomain itself is most author put it, “multi-domain battle . . . a joint team, the Services will be ill-pre- often used as a modifier for a particular doctrine is being developed to address pared to provide multi-domain capable application of military force, such as the interconnected, Omni domain bat- forces to combatant commanders, con- (multidomain) battles, (multidomain) tlespace of the 21st Century.”3 One of tinuing history’s trend of falling short operations, or (cross or multidomain) MDB’s strongest proponents, Admiral of the vision of jointness.”12 The institu- fires; however, more substantially, MDB Harry Harris, commander of U.S. tional questions loom large here. At one promises more fluid, adaptive, and ef- Pacific Command, argues that “MDB end of the spectrum there are calls to fective operations simultaneously across conceptualizes bringing jointness form separate Services for the space and five domains (land, sea, air, space, and further down to the tactical level [by] cyber domains.13 At the other end, one cyber). Although operations are con- allowing smaller echelons to commu- MDB proponent provides fodder for the ducted in and occasionally across these nicate and coordinate directly while cynics by arguing that the only way to im- five domains, the promise of a concept fighting in a decentralized manner.”4 plement MDB is to create a single force that makes domain integration the norm Regardless of the operating theater and and eliminate the independent Services.14 and not the exception is a tall order. specific mission, tactical-level MDB Running parallel to the ongoing Extraordinary claims require extraordi- operations, noted U.S. Army Pacific MDB debate are distinct theater versions nary evidence. Commander General Robert Brown, of the concept. Because practice trumps The logic of MDB’s underlying tenets will drive the Services to “change their theory in the application of military force, is widely accepted, but that is not the distinct Service cultures to a culture of how the MDB concept evolves will be same as demonstrating the concept’s inclusion and openness, focusing on a strongly influenced by how the operating viability. Will the application of a multi- purple (or joint) first mentality.”5 Rhe- theaters find a way to employ its promise. domain approach enable the Department torically, at least, the emerging MDB In the Pacific, where much of the ini- of Defense (DOD) to overcome current concept is progressing from the often tial energy behind the cross-domain idea warfighting challenges? Will it allow the stated but little realized goal of Service began, MDB has been described as: Services to seize new opportunities? Or, deconfliction to increasing interdepen- instead, will MDB distract the Services dency and, in the optimistic version of ground-based batteries of anti-aircraft, from restoring atrophied conventional MDB, seamlessly integrated operations anti-missile, and anti-ship weapons, sup- warfighting capabilities? Perhaps more across domains.6 ported by long-range sensors and jammers, importantly, can MDB serve as a unifying MDB critics dismiss its significance that can strike targets well out to sea. concept that DOD business processes can by arguing that it is old wine in a new Islands defended by such Army batteries (or be organized around for the development bottle.7 Even proponents agree that the Marine Corps outposts) could serve as un- of future concepts and capabilities? “idea and desire for cross-domain effects sinkable anvils, with the Navy and the Air MDB is a future concept (perhaps is not new” but contend the traditional Force as the highly mobile hammers.15 near-future, but future nonetheless). As Service-domain alignments are inade- such, it “must be stated explicitly in order quate for coping with the new security In support of developing MDB, the to be understood, debated and tested environment.8 A more fundamental chal- Army has recently established a Multi- to influence the development process.”1 lenge is made by those arguing that the Domain Task Force in U.S. Army Pacific The maturation of a concept is a critical categorization of future war by domain— to accelerate the process of overcoming first step in the birth of any capability. especially but not limited to the cyber the tactical and technical challenges
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Woods and Greenwood 15 associated with reincarnating the Army’s emerging MDB concept. Each perspec- applying combined arms in and across all capability to “sink ships.”16 This bot- tive brings a unique set of operational and domains. It provides a flexible means to tom-up approach to building a joint institutional contexts to the process of present multiple dilemmas to an enemy capability, as one commentator noted, concept development. Having a unique by converging capabilities from multiple has the potential to simultaneously work perspective can be a healthy part of a domains to create windows of advantage toward joint interoperability, interdepen- robust debate, but progress requires an enabling friendly forces to seize, retain, dence, and integration. But this may fall agreed-upon set of facts, or, in the case and exploit the initiative to defeat ene- short of answering how the Services can of an emerging concept, a common basis mies and achieve campaign objectives. organize, train, and equip themselves to of evidence. The concept development Employing the ideas in this concept, the sustain the readiness required to operate challenge is to generate credible evidence Joint Force can credibly deter adversary as an MDB capable force.17 that is relevant to decisionmakers from aggression, defeat actions short of armed Meanwhile in Europe, the Army is across the tactical-operational and con- conflict, deny the enemy freedom of action, offering MDB as a conceptual solution ceptual-institutional divides. overcome enemy defenses, control terrain, to a different, but in many ways familiar, compel outcomes, and consolidate gains for problem set. The Russian army is no The Emerging MDB Concept sustainable results. longer the colossus of the Cold War era, According to a new Army–Marine but it still presents the challenge of mass. Corps white paper, the MDB concept While these three tenets establish a Whereas the Russia’s army does not boast “describes how U.S. and partner forces useful framework for institutional con- a raw-troop-strength advantage over organize and employ capabilities to siderations of the concept, they do not the North Atlantic Treaty Organization project and apply power across domains, capture some of the explicit and tacit (NATO), it is threatening a multidomain environments, and function over time implications of MDB’s potential utility equivalence in long-range missiles, rock- and physical space to contest adversaries in a theater or joint campaign. To that ets, drones, sophisticated cyber attacks, in relative ‘peace’ and, when required, end, this article offers the following four jamming, and an integrated information defeat them in ‘war.’”21 The white paper attributes, derived from the current MDB campaign.18 The solution, argues the posits three key tenets or “interrelated concept, as potentially useful in develop- commander of the U.S. Army’s Training components of the solution,” as they ing a joint campaign of experimentation and Doctrine Command, is to take the are so labeled in the document. to better understand the concept and to multidomain fight to the adversary: First, MDB requires appropriate force develop evidence for or against its mili- posture for the “calibration of forward tary utility in the joint force. AirLand Battle started developing the presence, expeditionary forces, and inte- First, despite the battle suffix, MDB concept of “extended battlefield.” This gration of partner capabilities to deter the may have more to do with campaigns concept noted that different commanders adversary and, when necessary, defeat the than tactical actions. The battle aspects had different views of the battlefield in enemy’s fait accompli campaign.” The required to create windows of advantage geographical terms. [MDB] continues latter is defined as an enemy campaign are a necessary precondition to creating the concept of extended battlefield but that seeks to rapidly achieve military decisive overmatch.22 However, various now with a focus on the extension across and political objectives before an allied descriptions point to an operational-level domains and time. . . . [MDB] endeavors response can be generated. Next, MDB concept designed to maneuver friendly to integrate capabilities in such a way that will be executed by resilient forces that forces—and direct their kinetic and to counteract one, the enemy must become “can operate semi-independently in the nonkinetic fires or effects—simultane- more vulnerable to another, creating expanded operational area while project- ously across five domains. and exploiting temporary windows of ing power into or accessing all domains.” Second, overmatch in one domain advantage.19 Headquarters elements will use a mission may trigger cross-domain multiplier command philosophy to integrate oper- effects that theater commanders can This NATO-centric version of the ations with advanced capabilities. Finally, leverage to bypass, unhinge, and defeat MDB development process explicitly ar- converging joint force capabilities will an enemy. This, of course, works in both gues that, just as the earlier Soviet threat “detect and create physical, virtual, and directions, which is why failing to ade- drove large-scale change in the U.S. cognitive windows of advantage” during quately defend the force across multiple military’s warfighting doctrines, the new the three phases of an MDB campaign: domains may have an outsize impact on Russian threat will drive long-overdue competition, defeat the enemy in armed war termination.23 updates to Army force structure and crit- conflict, and return to competition. The Third, cyber and space domains ical warfighting capabilities, especially in white paper concludes by offering that may become tomorrow’s most valued the areas of long-range fires and cyber/ the MDB concept battlespace given U.S. force dependence electronic warfare.20 on the electromagnetic spectrum and It is clear, then, that there are multiple allows U.S. forces to outmaneuver adver- satellite-enabled intelligence and commu- lenses through which one can view the saries physically, virtually, and cognitively, nications. The continued development of
16 Forum / Multidomain Battle: Joint Experimentation JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 sophisticated cyber weapons and employ- project combat power overseas. Although Guadalcanal.25 Although the Japanese did ment means—as well as the direct and he labeled the strategic pathways regimes partially penetrate the U.S. shields during indirect weaponization of space—could instead of domains, the underlying con- the campaign, they were unable to do so exacerbate this trend. cept remains the same. with sufficient combat power to alter the Fourth, MDB implies the need to re- Shutler observed that once enemy battle’s outcome. examine our approach to joint command airfield construction on Guadalcanal was Once U.S. air operations began at and control. The authorities needed completed, Japanese land-based aircraft Guadalcanal’s Henderson Field, a multi- by geographic combatant commanders were capable of attacking U.S. planes plier effect occurred because the Japanese charged with planning, coordinating, stationed 500 miles to the southeast on fleet was largely restricted to conducting integrating, deploying, and employing Espiritu Santo—threatening the supply night operations. This was due in part to forces (and their effects) simultaneously lines connecting the United States with additive U.S. airpower projected from across five domains will increasingly Australia and New Zealand. Accordingly, ashore and concomitant flexibility gained challenge the very concept of boundaries the Marines were ordered to seize the from an untethered U.S. fleet that could and the traditional relationships used to airfield on Guadalcanal to deny its use to inflict serious losses on Japanese shipping conduct joint campaigns. the Japanese. In other words, U.S. land during daylight hours. This reduced The MDB concept remains more forces, in effect, were directed to create Japanese flexibility and freedom of ma- aspirational than practical at this point. an antiair warfare shield at Guadalcanal to neuver with implications well beyond the To overcome the cognitive challenges protect Espiritu Santo. But as the opera- tactical area of operations and marked and bureaucratic inertia described earlier, tional campaign progressed, the Marines’ the start of the U.S. island-hopping the concept needs to demonstrate that it (and later the Army’s) mission shifted campaign. is both more than the sum of its parts and from antiair warfare to enabling U.S. Like many similar operations in the sufficiently better than the status quo. land-based aircraft to support subsequent Pacific theater, Guadalcanal had only island-hopping battles to the north and marginal tactical utility as an island ex- Operational Antecedents: the eventual reduction of the Japanese cept for its value to the air domain. The Two Case Studies strongpoint on Rabaul. airfield was the operational lynchpin Historical case studies aid the concept Initial success, however, required the that was denied to the enemy by adroit development process by contextualizing United States to prevent Japanese ground integration of multidomain activities on the problem. As critics and proponents forces from reinforcing Guadalcanal. A the land, sea, and in the air. This further alike have noted, “cross-domain” or successful landing would have turned enabled U.S. land-based airpower to sup- combined arms operations stretch the battle into yet another symmetrical port the drive from the Solomon Islands back into antiquity. The following and protracted, single-domain, attritional northward into the Central Pacific and case studies offer two examples of fight between opposing land forces— eventually to the Japanese homeland.26 multidomain operations. Like any case both of whom sought to control the Falkland Islands. Almost 40 years study, some imagination is required to airfield. As Shutler noted, accomplishing after Guadalcanal, we can observe the place the perceptions of the past into this required U.S. submarines, surface same multiplier effect in a more mod- a future context. These cases provide ships, and naval aviation to establish ern campaign—the 1982 Battle of the some insights for how cross-domain maritime and aviation “shields” (that is, Falklands—that revolved around a cen- capabilities, applied primarily at the tac- anti-submarine, anti-surface, antiair de- turies-old territorial dispute between the tical level, can have outsize operational fenses) that the Japanese had to penetrate United Kingdom and Argentina over the implications. before their ground reinforcements could Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.27 Like the Guadalcanal. The conceptual reach Guadalcanal.24 U.S. fleet in the Solomon’s Campaign, assumption in MDB is that the joint During the critical phases of the the United Kingdom established mar- force commander must leverage the campaign, Japanese forces were unable to itime and antiair shields around the interdependencies occurring between effectively penetrate the “multidomain” Falklands in order to isolate the objective diverse operational activities simultane- defensive shields, and the Marines were area, protect Royal Navy/Marines am- ously across multiple domains. It is not able to preserve their tactical overmatch phibious operations, and deny Buenos enough just to manage, coordinate, de- ashore on Guadalcanal (approximately Aires the ability to reinforce its forces. conflict, and integrate. In his 1987 article 11,000 Marines against 2,000 en- Multidomain actions in the Falklands “Thinking About Warfare,” Lieutenant trenched Japanese, many of whom were campaign were numerous, and the mul- General Phillip D. Shutler, USMC (Ret.), civilian laborers). The tipping point tiplier effects these actions had on the used the 1942 South Pacific campaign occurred on November 14, 1942, when campaign’s outcome were significant. to highlight the three strategic pathways U.S. naval forces attacked and sank seven The sinking of the 13,500-ton Argentine (primarily air, sea, and undersea) that Japanese troop transports that were cruiser General Belgrano (armed with 15 U.S. forces had to successfully transit carrying approximately 7,000 embarked 6-inch guns and 8 5-inch guns) by three during World War II before they could Japanese troops trying to reinforce conventional torpedoes fired from the
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Woods and Greenwood 17 Airman aboard KC-135 Stratotanker participates in Red Flag 16-3, one of four Red Flag exercises that focuses on multidomain operations in air, space, and cyberspace, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, July 18, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/David Salanitri)
British nuclear submarine Conqueror took helicopters and light aircraft were subse- less robust toolkit is necessary. To modify the lives of 323 Argentine sailors (slightly quently dispersed around the islands, the a quotation often attributed to Winston more than half of their total casualties raid forced Argentina to withdraw most Churchill, “Gentlemen we are out of suffered during the war). But more im- of its high-performance aircraft 400 miles overwhelming resources; Now we must portantly, this action had a cross-domain back to the mainland.30 Thus, Argentine think.”31 effect that forced the Argentine surface aircraft were required to fight at their It might be easy to dismiss military navy to remain inside its territorial wa- maximum operating radius, which greatly case studies of the previous century as ters for the duration of the campaign.28 reduced their time on station (Argentina irrelevant to the challenges faced when Additionally, the sinking of the Belgrano had only limited aerial refueling capabil- looking forward into the current one. dramatically relieved naval surface pres- ity). This was a major advantage for Great But it is worth considering how these sure on Great Britain’s fleet operating Britain’s amphibious fleet and embarked multiple domains were integrated in in the Falkland littorals, which in turn ground forces, who were worried they the first place. The process (including allowed Royal Navy vessels on picket duty would not have air superiority during the technical, conceptual, and instructional more time to visually detect Argentine amphibious landing. efforts) of integrating new-fangled flying aircraft being launched from the main- Dismissing the Falklands as noth- machines into the traditional warfighting land and alert the British Task Force.29 ing more than a creative use of limited domains of the land and sea began de- The multiplier effect continued assets under extreme conditions risks cades before a mature concept. It was not when British special operations forces, overlooking key multidomain insights a straight line or a preordained outcome. supported by naval gunfire, conducted that contributed to operational success. The associated technologies and tactical an amphibious raid on Pebble Island to If the notion of achieving dominance concepts were leavened by decades of further reduce the Argentine air threat. in one or more warfighting domains peacetime “experimentation” and war- The raid destroyed 11 forward-based is a thing of the past, then learning to time adaptation. The resulting capabilities Argentine aircraft. While Argentine leverage a broader but perhaps relatively for presenting an adversary with multiple,
18 Forum / Multidomain Battle: Joint Experimentation JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 simultaneous dilemmas across domains facilities, and policy initiatives that must joint experimentation, but they can also changed the way the United States fights be addressed before MDB can become a help co-develop Service concepts within a at both the tactical and operational levels deployable set of capabilities. joint context. of war. One of the most complex challenges As noted at the outset of this article, in debates about future joint concepts the MDB debate at this stage is a useful Developing Evidence is not the concept per se; it is the nature set of thought experiments, but it is The second source of evidence with of jointness as practiced in a post–U.S. not producing tangible evidence. Such which to examine the viability of the Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) evidence would shift the debate from MDB concept is to look at it from environment. Without digressing too far a primarily subjective one to a more operational perspectives and across a into the history of USJFCOM’s role in balanced and objective conversation. range of contexts. To do this, DOD joint concept development and exper- However, the recent history of joint should subject the MDB concept and imentation, it is worth contrasting the concept development and the very nature its supporting tenets to a rigorous cam- contexts. Formed in 1999, USJFCOM of institutional jointness as practiced in paign of joint experimentation—even developed a generally top-down approach DOD are not encouraging. According to as the specific capabilities are still being to joint concept development and ex- the Joint Staff, joint concepts are assessed developed. Joint experimentation in this perimentation. While this approach had “using various analytical methods; the context is an inclusive phrase meant some advantages, it often resulted in joint concept community evaluates both to indicate the exploration of ideas, excessively large experiments, with the developing and approved concepts to assumptions, and crucial elements of Services playing a limited or marginally determine whether they are feasible and nascent MDB capabilities. To be clear, productive role. When USJFCOM was promote informed decisions on develop- joint experimentation covers a wide disestablished in 2011, joint concept de- ing new joint capabilities.”34 range of activities (from structured sem- velopment reverted to the Joint Staff J7, One potentially more lucrative ap- inars, virtual and constructive environ- whose time and resources for experimen- proach would be to embark on a series ments, to field events) and should be tation was more limited.33 More recently, of parallel joint discovery experiments seen as complementary or undertaken Service or multi-Service–led efforts to designed to identify the specific character- in parallel with the development of spe- develop and experiment with new joint istics, demands, and challenges associated cific capabilities or tactical employment concepts are increasing. This can be seen with assessing the feasibility of MDB concepts. as a bottom-up, collaborative effort. transcending theater-specific applications We employ the term campaign in While this approach has many practical to serve as a more universal warfighting association with joint experimentation to advantages over the top-down approach, concept. Such a joint discovery experi- indicate that no single event can generate it is not without challenges—a key one ment has historically been at the heart of the quality or variety of necessary data. being that the longer joint stakeholders military experimentation.35 Moreover, only an experimentation (that is, combatant commands and pro- The objective of discovery experi- campaign utilizing iterative activities with spective joint force commanders) remain ments is to learn, so it is useful to begin learning feedback loops (including work- spectators to the Service-dominated joint with a set of well-defined conceptual and shops, wargames, constructive and virtual experimentation process, the less likely operational conditions. One does not simulation, and live field events) can MDB’s theater-wide and strategic-level seek a well-defined “concept,” rather a generate sufficient evidence to genuinely implications will be subjected to a full statement of the military problem and a assess what it will take to realize, adapt, or examination by the customer. clear understanding of the initial military abandon the MDB idea. Under Joint Staff policy for concept context. The discovery experimentation In terms of military experimentation, development, experimentation begins approach, supported by an initial data no single method has ever worked. The after concept development. This may collection plan, is designed to tinker with complex nature of military problems, and be adequate for narrow concepts or the variables, modify the conditions, and especially ones with interactions across mission/domain capabilities where one challenge the assumptions and constraints five domains, argues for diverse forms of Service has the lead. But this approach in a way that dynamically helps refine a “discovery experimentation” to introduce seems ill-suited for complex and multifac- nascent concept and identify the kinds novel systems, concepts, organizational eted warfighting concepts such as MDB. of capabilities worth considering. This structures, and technologies into settings As the two case studies indicate, cross-do- notion of progressive learning through where their use can be observed and Red main overmatch and multiplier effects experimentation generates feedback that Teamed.32 The results of such a com- are often discovered and subsequently enables concept framing, definition, and prehensive assessment will help identify leveraged in the course of operations. refinement to occur dynamically. MDB similarities and differences between Early discovery experimentation with The ability to use experimentation to the theaters, and will inform future doc- some level of joint analysis and sponsor- explore the utility of emerging technol- trine, organization, training, materiel, ship is essential. Not only will such early ogies and concepts is a force multiplier. leadership and education, personnel, experiments increase the capacity to do Technology cannot be optimized until
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Woods and Greenwood 19 8 its impact on warfighting concepts and the conclusions reached by conducting Brown. 9 Erik Heftye, “Multi-Domain Confu- doctrine is fully appreciated. According experiments. If all these constraints are sion: All Domains Are Not Created Equal,” to the National Academy of Sciences in a observed, discovery experimentation Real Clear Defense, May 26, 2017, avail- study done for the Navy: could be a valuable tool and a useful able at
20 Forum / Multidomain Battle: Joint Experimentation JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Concept in the early 1980s. See Don Starry, Navy commanders were also overly complex, of Staff Instruction 3010.02E, Guidance for “Extending the Battlefield,”Military Review which led to unnecessary friction. For a more Developing and Implementing Joint Concepts 61, no. 3 (March 1981), 31–50. detailed account, see Jeter A. Isley and Philip (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 17, 20 J.P. Clark, “In Defense of a Big Idea for A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious 2016), A-10. Joint Warfighting”War on the Rocks, December War: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific 34 Ibid., A-1. 22, 2016, available at
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Woods and Greenwood 21 Iraqi soldier speaks with commanding officer of 407th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, deployed in support of CJTF–Operation Inherent Resolve, near Qayyarah West Airfield, Iraq, July 23, 2017 (U.S. Army/Rachel Diehm)
The Power of Partnership Security Cooperation and Globally Integrated Logistics
By Thomas Warren Ross
nyone who has ever been guns, and artillery as they fought—and millions of dollars’ worth of military involved with efforts to build lost—a decisive battle to defend Mosul equipment fell into rust or disrepair the military capacity of U.S. against the so-called Islamic State because of a logistics system unable A 1 partner countries has stories. There (IS). Then there were the elite Malian to integrate and maintain the new were the Iraqi soldiers, thoroughly commandos who had been trained and assistance. equipped and armed by the United equipped to undertake counterterror- U.S. efforts in Afghanistan epitomize States, who nevertheless found them- ism missions by U.S. special operations these struggles. As the independent selves short on ammunition, machine forces for years, only to wither before Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) assess- ragtag Tuareg and al Qaeda in the ment of the Afghan National Security Islamic Maghreb fighters because they Forces (ANSF) in 2014 noted, the Thomas Warren Ross is a Senior Associate at lacked mobility and were not depend- “ANSF’s ability to maintain its vehicles the Center for Strategic and International ably resupplied.2 And, of course, stories and aircraft is the most essential factor in Studies. He previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security are numerous from dozens of countries the ANSF’s ability to be—and remain—a Cooperation from 2014 to 2017. where U.S. personnel have watched as mobile force.”3 Yet its military has faced
22 Forum / The Power of Partnership JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 a constant battle against malfunctioning investment in fostering effective logistics under-investment in logistics at home and damaged equipment, and its inability systems among our partners could pay and increasing investment in antiaccess/ to maintain and repair such equipment tremendous dividends in helping the U.S. area-denial (A2/AD) and cyber threats has sharply limited its operational profi- military continue to project power and that can effectively disable logistics sys- ciency. The Washington Post reported that maintain battlefield superiority around tems by adversaries abroad. For the JCL, one battalion, for example, fighting in the world. It is every bit as much about the answer to this challenge is “globally one of the more violent and contested re- us and our ability to fight as it is about integrated logistics”—that is, the “capa- gions in Afghanistan, included a company our partners. bility to allocate and adjudicate logistics with 75 percent of its armored vehicles The lessons drawn from these tales of support on a global scale to maximize unusable; some battalions were forced to security cooperation gone wrong lead to effectiveness and responsiveness, and to wait 3 years to get needed spare parts or a simple but powerful premise: logistics reconcile competing demands for limited replacements due to bureaucratic ineffi- ought to be substantially integrated into logistics resources based on strategic ciency.4 The 2014 CNA analysis found security cooperation efforts, and security priorities.”8 The JCL elaborates on this major shortcomings across the logistics cooperation ought to be thoughtfully concept by suggesting elements such as system, including shortfalls in spare parts integrated into the discipline of logistics. a transportation system that can move inventories, challenges in forecasting and While this premise may seem obvious, equipment quickly within and between ordering parts, challenges with inventory it is too often overlooked or misunder- theaters, a worldwide network of logistics distribution, lack of trained personnel, stood. Forging a deeper collaboration nodes, and prepositioned capabilities and and insufficient contracting mechanisms.5 between the two disciplines requires a stocks. A key (albeit somewhat under- When we examine the history of U.S. firm understanding of how this collabora- stated) implication for the JCL is that and international support for the ANSF, tion can concretely enhance U.S. military we will—and we must—work through these systemic logistics failures should operations and objectives, along with a partners to realize this vision. Globally come as no surprise. Relatively little was roadmap for achieving this partnership. integrated logistics means multilateral invested in developing logistics systems This article considers both these factors. solutions. for the first decade of the war effort, even This partnership, should it take root, of- It is only in coordination with as billions of dollars of equipment flowed fers the potential to dramatically improve partners that we can achieve globally into the country. By 2011, a Department the ability of the U.S. military to work distributed logistics stocks, capabilities, of Defense (DOD) Inspector General with and through partner counterparts, and infrastructure; partners provide report noted that the “Coalition has only while also creating innovative new ave- access to and often security for such recently been able to focus on fielding nues for solving some of our more vexing arrangements. Moreover, partners have [Afghan National Army] enabling organi- logistics challenges. the potential to substitute for preposi- zations, to include logistics/maintenance tioned U.S. capabilities in some cases and units and supporting structure/infra- Enhancing U.S. can contribute to far more rapid, agile, structure.”6 Likewise, advisory efforts at Military Logistics and dependable intra- and inter-theater the ministerial level to develop national The strategic challenges facing mili- transportation systems. In key cases, logistics systems have been slow to begin, tary logistics planners are daunting, partners can address critical logistics underresourced, and subject to constant perhaps as daunting as any time in challenges confronting U.S. contingency shifts in strategic direction. recent memory. As the 2015 Joint plans by providing alternative overland These stories generally end with the Concept for Logistics 2.0 (JCL) suggests, transportation routes with the support same takeaway: the United States can the “tension between increasingly of indigenous transportation companies, spend all the money in the world to train demanding logistics requirements and enable dependable U.S. access to key and equip partner military units, but this constrained and degraded logistics ports and air bases through improvement money will be wasted if those partners resources within the context of globally of their management and security of such lack logistics systems to support new integrated operations creates a dilemma facilities, and develop capabilities that can capabilities. In many cases, the failure of that will be the essential challenge joint undermine adversary A2/AD strategies. U.S. security assistance to ensure that key logistics will have to overcome for the Finally, globally integrated logistics will partners accounted for logistics gaps has foreseeable future.”7 be effective only to the extent it accounts contributed to strategic failures such as Logistics requirements are increas- for partners in operations, given that the takeover of much of Sunni-dominated ingly demanding because the U.S. U.S. military operations will take place Iraq by IS or the transformation of north- military is being asked to perform more almost exclusively through multilateral ern Mali into the world’s largest terrorist diverse and complex operations with coalitions. When partners can ensure in- safe haven. Yet it is not only partner mil- increasingly sophisticated technology, teroperability with U.S. forces—meaning itary operations that are undermined by often simultaneously in geographically that their logistics units can support U.S. inadequate logistics—it is also our own dispersed areas. Yet logistics support for fighting units, and vice versa—coalition operations. Put another way, greater U.S. such operations is challenged by both
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Ross 23 Deployed in support of CJTF–Operation Inherent Resolve, Soldier talks with truck crew before movement to advise and assist patrol base in neighborhood liberated from Islamic State, Mosul, Iraq, June 8, 2017 (U.S. Army/Jason Hull) operations become far more effective and partners must be strategic and sustained nearly all military missions—depends on create far fewer headaches. over time. However, the returns can be effective, sustainable logistics, and the Security cooperation offers the pri- tremendous: a network of capable part- failure to help partners adapt their logis- mary tool for combatant commands to ners actively participating in operating tics systems to support new capabilities engage partners in support of globally an agile, globally distributed, multilateral often spells doom for those capabilities. integrated logistics. In many cases, such logistics system, and all for a small frac- Integrating logistics focus and expertise engagement means building the military tion of the cost to the United States of into capacity-building efforts can help capacity of partners to carry out specific operating such a system itself. partners more effectively absorb, deploy, roles or missions, as well as to enhance in- Security cooperation has a range of and sustain capabilities that can make teroperability. It also means undertaking uses beyond attending to requirements concrete and lasting contributions to bilateral or multilateral exercises in which for supporting globally integrated logis- U.S. national security. logistics elements feature prominently; tics; capacity-building initiatives seek to exercising key concepts can help improve help partners develop capabilities to fight Current Efforts interoperability, identify challenges with alongside the United States in coalition So how do we get there? How can we operational concepts, and help partners operations, carry out counterterrorism or forge a deeper collaboration between understand the importance of investing counterproliferation operations, deepen the security cooperation and logistics in their own logistics systems, processes, military professionalism and institutional communities, resulting in more effective and policies. And it often means engag- governance, or contribute to a shared capacity-building and more flexible, ing with partners to build support for, intelligence picture in relation to shared integrated, and distributed logistics achieve, and implement agreements for threats. As suggested above, these ini- networks? access, prepositioning, or other opportu- tiatives can also benefit from a deeper Over the past few years, an import- nities to enhance the globally distributed collaboration with the logistics commu- ant effort has emerged in the Pentagon U.S. logistics posture. Investments in key nity. Each of these mission areas—like to bring these communities together
24 Forum / The Power of Partnership JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 and bring high-level emphasis to this U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense Program. It will offer an opportunity challenge. In late 2014, during my (OSD) offices, and several other stake- for partners to transition from focused tenure as Deputy Assistant Secretary of holders in Georgia. Georgian logistics capacity-building through VILA into Defense for Security Cooperation, the systems have been taxed by that nation’s exercising key concepts in real-world Vice Director of the Joint Staff J4 (then participation in coalition operations in scenarios through LOGDEV, and then to Major General Lee Levy, USAF) and I Afghanistan and elsewhere while it simul- continue to build capacity and interoper- launched what has become known as the taneously prepared for and engaged in ability through follow-on engagements Logistics Capacity-Building Advisory defensive operations at home; the initial with state partners or other activities. Group (LogCAG) to bring together a di- assessment through the VILA pilot iden- In addition to LOGDEV, the verse group of stakeholders to tackle the tified a range of opportunities to enhance LogCAG has fostered the development challenge of deepening cross-pollination the efficiency and durability of Georgia’s of several logistics interoperability forums between security cooperation and logis- logistics systems. That assessment has across different combatant commands. tics practitioners. Almost immediately, now fed into a range of programs de- The flagship forum, the joint OSD- the group drew senior-level participants signed to seize these opportunities. and USEUCOM-hosted Logistics from the Acquisition, Technology, The VILA model is steadily evolving, Interoperability Symposium, brings and Logistics Undersecretariat, Joint moving from a single effort in Georgia together logisticians and senior leaders Staff J5, Defense Security Cooperation to now being applied in U.S. Africa from dozens of partner nations, along Agency, U.S. Transportation Command Command, U.S. Southern Command with a variety of senior U.S. and NATO (USTRANSCOM), and several other (USSOUTHCOM), and elsewhere in stakeholders, to discuss logistics interop- key stakeholders. Over the past few years, USEUCOM. As the model evolves, there erability challenges. The Africa Logistics thanks to the remarkable leadership of is great potential for it to be applied more Forum was launched a few years ago three successive J4 vice directors (Levy, broadly around the world. Indeed, the to facilitate similar conversations in the Major General John Broadmeadow, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in African context, while USSOUTHCOM USMC, and Brigadier General Tracy coordination with the LogCAG, is taking is currently planning its first partner-fo- King, USMC), it has advanced an inno- initial steps to transition VILA from a cused logistics forum. vative agenda of efforts to institutionalize pilot to a full-fledged security cooperation Finally, the LogCAG has sought to logistics security cooperation—that is, program available to security cooperation enhance the DOD infrastructure for the application of security cooperation in offices and combatant commands when- supporting logistics security cooperation. support of both U.S. and partner logistics ever there is an identified requirement to Part of this effort has focused on pro- requirements. engage with key partners in building their moting greater collaboration between J4 One of the early successes of the logistics capacity. and J5 communities, both at combatant LogCAG has been the development and The LogCAG has also driven progress commands and within the Pentagon. piloting of a new model for engaging on several other logistics security coop- Part of it entails examining authorities with partners to build logistics capacity. eration initiatives. It has overseen the available to DOD to ensure they are The model, the Vertically Integrated transition from the Logistics Exchange sufficient to support envisioned activities; Logistics Approach (VILA), is founded (LOGEX)—a long-running USEUCOM wide-ranging reforms to security coop- on the acknowledgment that effective program engaging mid-career logisti- eration authorities in the fiscal year 2017 logistics is built on complex, intertwined cians from NATO partners in real-world National Defense Authorization Act have institutional systems that span from the scenarios to enhance logistics capacity largely closed prior gaps in authorities. tactical to the strategic level, and that an and interoperability—to the Logistics And a third part has emphasized improv- intervention at one point in this complex Development (LOGDEV). LOGDEV ing education for security cooperation web is unlikely to produce lasting im- will adapt the LOGEX model and sup- officers and for logisticians, ensuring provement. Rather, what is needed is an port similar logistician engagements enough familiarity across disciplines to approach that assesses logistics systems around the world. LOGEX has a proven support the practical collaboration be- holistically, from the strategic to the track record of success, and it is one of tween security cooperation and logistics tactical level, and designs interventions at strikingly few programs bringing together communities that is vital to success. multiple points throughout the system to senior logisticians to build capacity and These efforts have generated a range produce mutually reinforcing, institution- interoperability; through LOGDEV, this of new opportunities for changing the alized change. While still developing, that proven model will be available to each way both logistics and security coop- is exactly what this approach aims to do. combatant command. Furthermore, eration communities think about their The VILA model was first piloted LOGDEV’s global expansion promises missions. They tie in with a number in coordination with the North Atlantic opportunity for synergy with the VILA of other important efforts, such as the Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. program, along with several other se- USTRANSCOM Turbo Transition European Command (USEUCOM), the curity cooperation programs, such as exercise, a senior logistics-focused event nation of Georgia’s national guard, key the National Guard State Partnership involving a growing number of partner
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Ross 25 logisticians, or the increasing inclusion First, logisticians must be included of defense systems, such as Russia or of logistics elements in other bilateral not only in planning, particularly se- China, which tend to transfer equip- and multilateral exercises. Yet ultimately, curity cooperation planning, but also ment without any such support. Yet the they represent only a light scratch of the in the development of contingency full-spectrum approach ultimately only surface of what is possible. For a true and posture plans. Too often, plans are provides partners with spare parts and collaboration to take root, these efforts developed with little regard for logistics contracted maintenance support, often must continue—and expand. Leaders in concerns, leading to plans that are either terminating after 3 years unless the part- both communities must steer this grow- unlikely to be successful or far more ner chooses to re-up. Because the United ing momentum toward taking on larger complicated—and costly—than they States provides maintenance and repairs, challenges, in search of larger rewards. need to be. Security cooperation plans this model does not incentivize partners and contingency plans are generally to develop their own maintenance sys- Tying It All Together developed by combatant commands tems, develop dependable supply chains Achieving the full benefit of integrating out of J5 directorates, with individuals or inventory management, or even take logistics and security cooperation will from the J4 directorates only included in particularly good care of their equipment. require moving from individual pilot reviewing near-final products; similarly, We ought to consider a full-spectrum efforts dispersed across different stake- opportunities abound for greater inclu- approach that helps partners improve holders and different partners toward a sion of USTRANSCOM logisticians in their own logistics systems, rather than more integrated, more robust approach such planning. Including logisticians in continuing to foster such dependency on to collaboration. the initial stages of plan development the United States. To begin with, existing efforts must be could help security cooperation planners There is a rationale to the current woven together into a more connected, identify and address key opportunities to model. As the logic goes, the sale of a mutually reinforcing approach. Planners engage partners on logistics requirements weapons system begins a long-term re- should consider how partner-focused in support of U.S. operations, or it could lationship that is stoked by the ongoing logistics symposiums in different regions help to identify key partner logistics needs cooperation around the maintenance and could promote global collaboration and in support of broader capacity-building repair of those systems; in other words, contribute to global logistics networks. In activities. Likewise, logisticians could help contracted maintenance leads to a mutual addition, they should examine how such contingency planners ensure that plans dependency that undergirds a tighten- symposiums could generate participation are fully executable. More important, ing of broader bilateral relations. This in and suggest areas of focus for multi- collaboration between all three groups logic deserves qualification in two ways, lateral logistics exercises, how they could could help combatant commands identify however. First, a customer or recipient support planning for VILA and LOGDEV where there are logistics-related risks to of U.S. technology will be, at least to a engagements, and how they might iden- contingency plans and where and how we degree, dependent on U.S. military and tify opportunities for multilateral logistics might engage partners to mitigate those contractor personnel for the operation frameworks—in short, how they could risks in advance of conflict. That is the of that technology regardless of whether spark more practical capacity-building kind of collaboration that could produce they have a sophisticated, independent and interoperability efforts with key part- the greatest rewards: working with part- logistics system or contract their entire ners. Likewise, activities through VILA, ners to buy down logistics risk in advance maintenance system to U.S. companies. LOGDEV, and other efforts should feed of contingencies could save lives and The technology would still need to be into both multilateral conferences and ultimately enhance our military’s ability acquired, updated, and serviced by quali- broader U.S. planning efforts. to win wars. fied experts, generally from the originator Integrating current efforts is im- Second, DOD ought to consider how of the system. Thus, contract-based portant; however, to truly integrate it could transition to teaching our part- maintenance offers only marginal, if any, the logistics and security cooperation ners to fish, rather than simply fishing for benefit to deepening bilateral relations communities, collaboration must be them. The Defense Security Cooperation in comparison to a logistics capaci- institutionalized, embedded in the pro- Agency advertises a “full-spectrum ty-building approach. It is the partner’s cesses and structures both communities approach” to delivering capacity to acquisition of the weapons system itself use to develop strategies, make decisions, partners, meaning that it will not only that drives the relationship. Second, while allocate resources, and prepare per- provide partners with a piece of equip- it is unrealistic to expect that the United sonnel. Without such systemic change, ment but also support to the recipient States could help partners improve their efforts like those promoted by the nation regarding personnel operating logistics standards to U.S. standards, even LogCAG are likely to remain essentially the equipment, maintenance of the modest improvements could pay signif- ad hoc and of limited utility. To insti- equipment, and other support services. icant dividends. For example, let us say tutionalize collaboration between the This full-spectrum approach is a relatively the United States determines it must foot security cooperation and logistics com- recent evolution and sharply differentiates the bill entirely for the maintenance of a munities, three steps are essential. the United States from other providers certain capability provided to a partner
26 Forum / The Power of Partnership JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 military. If that partner has the basic ca- Chiefs of Staff, wrote in preface to the Notes pacity to monitor and track requirements 2015 National Military Strategy: for routine maintenance, it would enable 1 Jeremy Bender, “One Paragraph Explains the United States to provide such mainte- Global disorder has significantly increased How ISIS Managed to Seize Iraq’s Sec- nance in a timely and preventive way. while some of our comparative military ond-Largest City,” Business Insider, October The third intervention necessary to advantage has begun to erode. We now face 14, 2014, available at
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Ross 27 Parachute bundle with Joint Precision Air Drop system, using GPS navigation, drops from C-130J Hercules to remote Forward Operating Base, November 27, 2011 (U.S. Air Force/Tyler Placie)
Surfing the Chaos Warfighting in a Contested Cyberspace Environment
By William D. Bryant
n a crisp fall day in mid-Oc- Admiral Villeneuve, had even correctly and self-synchronizing forces defeated tober 1805, two fleets met to deduced the battle strategy of his the French and Spanish fleet on a scale decide the fate of Europe at the opponent. Contrary to the accepted not matched until modern times. O 1 Battle of Trafalgar. The combined naval practice of lining up parallel so What can a battle from the age of sail fleets of the French and Spanish navies that respective admirals could maintain and wooden ships possibly teach us about were larger, with heavier and more control, Admiral Lord Nelson divided modern warfare? In a cyber-contested powerful ships, and their commander, his smaller force into two columns environment and facing a competent foe, directed perpendicularly against the the side that embraces the chaos, confu- enemy fleet. This produced a chaotic sion, and lack of control on the modern Colonel William D. Bryant, USAF, is the Deputy but decisive battle. And even though battlefield is more likely to emerge victo- Chief Information Security Officer for the U.S. Nelson was killed, his more aggressive rious, much like Nelson’s force. To win Air Force.
28 Forum / Surfing the Chaos JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 in the new cyber-contested battles of the turn of the millennium thought that self-contained cyber-physical systems. future, a combatant must still command, ubiquitous semi-autonomous and smart An F-18 fighter or Abrams tank falls but let go of control and surf the chaos. command and control systems would into this category. If we open the panels largely dissipate fog and friction.5 That and look inside an F-18, we will find Future Warfare prediction turned out to be incorrect a large number of boxes full of elec- In the strategic community, conven- due to unexpected advances on the of- tronic components connected by wires. tional wisdom holds that capable fensive side of cyberspace and the other While these boxes are mostly running nation-states will fight future wars not domains, which made it far easier to specialized software and are generally only in the traditional land, maritime, penetrate operational battle networks. not using the Transmission Control air, and space domains but also in cyber- When some sensors and command and Protocol/Internet Protocol, they still space. Analysts also often argue that the control systems give false information, fog comprise a network and are part of United States will be at a disadvantage and friction greatly increase as command- the cyberspace domain.10 Thus, these in this type of warfare because it has a ers stop trusting the information they cyber-physical systems are hybrids with higher reliance on cyberspace-enabled receive and are hesitant to act on it.6 This physical and cyberspace components systems.2 Combatants will fight future is deeply uncomfortable for command that combine to make a coherent whole. wars in all domains, but the United staffs who work hard to reduce fog and Using these three categories, what will States is not naturally at a disadvantage friction, so they can carefully orches- warfare that includes modern cyber- when cyberspace conflict is included in trate a plan that leads to a clear victory. space forces look like? warfare. While it is true that U.S. forces However, the vision of a frictionless IT systems are the most obvious and are heavily dependent on cyberspace, cybernetic war machine that flawlessly familiar targets of cyber attack in a con- potential foes are every bit as dependent executes some grand design was illusory flict. Combatants should expect creative on their cyberspace-enabled systems, long before attackers in cyberspace could enemies to penetrate their IT systems and which in some cases are more modern easily insert false information and take introduce some amount of false informa- and sophisticated than those used by down command and control systems at tion. Adding even small amounts of false U.S. forces. It is important to look at will.7 To make matters more complex, information can be extremely effective, potential near-peer foes of the United command and control systems are not as it makes adversaries question all their States as they actually are, not how they the only cyber-enabled systems that will information.11 What would it look like for were 30 years ago. Accordingly, it is come under attack in a cyber-contested a warfighter if 10 percent of the orders key to understand that both sides will environment. received through command and control be dealing with a contested cyberspace systems were false and the enemy altered domain full of deliberate misinformation Warfighting in and 5 percent of intelligence reports? Major and sabotaged systems. In this environ- through Cyberspace effects on the ability of units to maneuver ment, victory will most likely go to the Cyberspace attacks will affect warfighting and function will occur at even low per- side best able to function effectively with in different ways depending on the type centages, as a handful of false messages high levels of fog and friction. In this of system under attack. The different will call into question the validity of all type of setting, the United States and types of systems can be broken down other messages as well.12 A young, ag- other nations with strong cultures of into information technology (IT), gressive infantry lieutenant may think the openness, innovation, and adaptability operational technology (OT), and plat- unit can “fix bayonets” and take the hill have some key advantages that will be forms.8 Traditional IT systems include anyway, but where did the bayonets come hard to replicate in less free societies. A the Department of Defense (DOD) from? Most logistical systems will be key element of any cyber-contested envi- Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router easy targets compared to command and ronment is the level of fog and friction and Secure Internet Protocol Router control or intelligence systems, as they experienced by the combatants. networks as well as IT-based weapons generally rely on the Internet backbone Despite the hopes that some analysts systems such as the Air Operations and unsecure communication links. It is once placed on improved information Center and numerous other personnel worth mentioning again how completely in warfare, fog and friction will greatly and logistics systems. Operational tech- dependent the U.S. military has become increase in a contested cyberspace envi- nology refers to computer-controlled on complex cyber-enabled logistical ronment. The concept of fog and friction physical processes such as industrial systems to enable warfighting in all the refers to the uncertainty and cumulative control systems or other types of control physical domains. While we understand small mishaps that make outcomes in systems such as building automation or our reliance on IT, we do not yet clearly warfare difficult to predict.3 Theorists heating, venting, and air conditioning.9 grasp our reliance on OT. from the time of Sun Tzu have explored This category is a relatively new one in Adversary attacks can be devastat- ways to decrease fog and friction through military circles but has achieved wide ing because operational technology is improved intelligence or better command acceptance in the civilian world. The highly vulnerable, yet it provides the and control.4 Some theorists around the final category is platforms, which are infrastructure that modern militaries
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Bryant 29 operate on. While once considered largely addition, any antenna with a processor education, training, exercises, organiza- untouchable, OT systems have already behind it is a potential entry point for tional structures, and planning. come under attack numerous times. The an adversary. Automobile hacking has heart of Stuxnet was an attack on pro- shown both these avenues of attack to be Education grammable logic controllers, which are feasible and practical.17 Education is a critical component of a subset of OT.13 The Ukrainian power a force able to execute on the tactical grid has also come under attack several Responding to Cyber Attacks edge because it provides a foundation times, which shows that attackers can use All three types of systems—IT, OT, and of how to think and respond to any OT to put pressure directly on the civilian platforms—will be under continuous number of situations, whether the war- population, much like the early days of attack from cyberspace in a contested fighter has encountered them before. strategic bombing.14 OT can be the “soft cyberspace environment, but defenders Carl von Clausewitz himself was a major underbelly” of military operations. For have several ways to prepare for and proponent of education and theory for example, an enemy that wanted to attack fight successfully in this arena. One young officers, not because education a command center could use a sophis- option is to focus exclusively on keeping provided answers to tactical problems ticated social engineering attack with the enemy out of important systems; but because it helped to guide and stim- multiple vectors intended to jump across joint forces will want to exclude enemies ulate development.20 There is no need air gaps—or it could connect to the rel- from their systems and networks as for more time spent on education in the atively unprotected building automation much as possible. However, recent career path of a U.S. military officer— system and turn up the heat in the data history shows that using IT-based the current sequence of professional center and cause computer hardware to defenses alone is ineffective when under schools is sufficient. fail. Much of OT is largely unprotected, attack from less-capable adversaries What our force needs instead is a since engineers connected it for conve- than nation-states, so it is unlikely that greater emphasis on developing the types nience and efficiency with little thought this approach would work against more of agile and self-synchronizing individ- of security or mission impact. There is capable adversaries. The best solution uals who can thrive at the tactical edge increasing recognition of the importance to the problem of warfighting in a when an enemy successfully attacks our of protecting OT, but securing it will be contested cyberspace environment is command and control systems. We need difficult—partially because key elements not a frontal assault on misinformation to adjust our curriculum to place greater of OT are often outside military control. and uncertainty. The answer instead emphasis on creative maneuver and find Major OT systems on which the military lies in an indirect approach that attacks innovative ways to achieve commander’s relies, such as civilian power grids, are the problem from a different angle intent in a contested cyberspace envi- normally defended (or not) based on and builds a force that can thrive and ronment where much of the equipment business decisions instead of national maneuver in a chaotic and uncertain is not functioning correctly, many com- security concerns. Attacks on OT can environment.18 munications systems are unavailable, and cripple a combatant by removing critical Authors who depict warfare in a the enemy has compromised some of the support infrastructure or by directly tar- contested cyberspace environment command and control links that appear geting weapons systems. often seem to forget that the United to be functioning. An adversary can directly attack plat- States also has highly capable cyberspace forms through cyberspace to hamstring forces that will presumably be attacking Training military forces.15 Platforms and weapons enemy IT, OT, and platform systems in In addition to knowing how to think, systems now exist in the physical and accordance with appropriate authorities which comes from education, agile cyber worlds simultaneously and are and the laws of war. The enemy will forces must learn specific skills to cope thus significantly vulnerable to cyber be dealing with all the same issues of with a cyber-contested environment attack. Some military planners have been compromised command and control, through improved training. To be slow to recognize the danger, since they intelligence, infrastructure, and weapons effective, training must be realistic and think weapons systems such as airplanes systems. So if both high commands will focused on those skills needed in an and ships are isolated and secure from be essentially blind, deaf, and dumb, will environment where many systems will cyberspace threats because they are air it come down to simple mass and who be under attack. For example, modern gapped, or physically disconnected, from can throw the biggest battalions into fighter aircraft are capable of updating the Internet.16 Engineers also often refer the fray? On the contrary, victory will go their navigation systems using a number to these types of systems as standalone. to the side best able to observe, orient, of methods, only some of which rely on However, warfighters routinely connect decide, and act at the tactical edge in the global positioning system (GPS), these systems to maintenance devices the absence of detailed instructions or but operators rarely practice these that are conduits to the wider cyberspace a complete picture of the situation.19 capabilities because GPS is so much world, and they are thus vulnerable Building a joint force able to accomplish more accurate and easier to use. In a to attacks through those systems. In that will require significant changes in cyber-contested environment, a pilot’s
30 Forum / Surfing the Chaos JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Servicemember from 3rd Infantry Division (left), trainer, and Servicemember of division’s 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, observe spectrum of frequencies used in Red Team exercise (U.S. Army/Aaron Knowles) theoretical ability to update an aircraft’s strike the right balance based on expected complex exercises.21 The rules of exer- position using ground references is of mission sets and adversaries, but there is cises should clearly reward innovation little use if the pilot is not trained or some minimum level of competency in and agility, and referees should grade proficient, and that proficiency will both environments that all forces should forces against not how closely they only come from focused training and reach. Today, few forces deliberately train adhered to the plan, but how effective repeated practice. for a cyber-contested environment at all, they were at executing the command- It is important to note that there are so more training will be needed for this er’s intent when everything went only a finite number of minutes in any type of warfare. Training is an important wrong. It is critical that these exercises given day to accomplish training, and building block that provides needed be difficult and full of surprises, much every training event has an opportunity skills, but that training will only truly take like the enemy. If friendly forces end cost of a training event that the individ- root when the force also exercises it on a up winning every exercise, the scenario ual or team did not accomplish instead. large scale. is too easy. In exercises, adversary Training for fighting in a cyber-contested forces should routinely defeat friendly environment means that forces will train Exercises forces, which will force a higher level of less with everything working, and more Agile forces ready to execute on the learning than is generally accomplished with backup and degraded systems. tactical edge need to put all the edu- when the exercise invariably has the This type of training regime will greatly cation and training together in large- joint force winning on the last day, increase the joint force’s ability to fight scale exercises so they are familiar with no matter how badly friendly forces in a cyber-contested environment, but operating and self-synchronizing in bungled things. Commanders should it comes at the cost of proficiency and chaotic environments. Smaller exercises replace individuals who handle their capability when the enemy does not con- are useful in a building block program, forces poorly and who are not able test the environment and all systems are but, much like Red Flag, maximum to operate effectively in a contested working as intended. Commanders must learning will come from large-scale, environment before lives are lost in
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Bryant 31 F/A-18C Hornet, assigned to Sharpshooters of Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron, flies over flight deck of aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush in Atlantic Ocean, January 24, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Kevin J. Steinberg) combat. Once agile forces are devel- As leaders are cultivated to be agile is helpful even if the actual plans are not, oped, DOD must support them with and innovative, DOD needs to provide as it forces staffs and maneuver forces appropriate organizational structures. them with an environment that enables to think through problems to grasp the success. The joint force will accomplish a commander’s intent and general scheme Organizational Support large part of this requirement by setting of maneuver. These elements provide the DOD needs to couple an agile and resil- the conditions through changing from key to success. ient force with a strong organizational directive to emergent planning, which The joint force has made great strides structure and incentives for maximum is a different type of planning than the in recent years to embrace mission-type effectiveness. Personnel systems must military typically does.22 Today’s plan- orders, and DOD is now discussing the reward agile and resilient behavior in ning focuses on detailed scenario-driven need to acknowledge and plan for com- promotions and increased responsibility plans that lay out precise schedules manders who are still in command but if other young leaders are going to and timelines not that different from cannot directly control their forces due focus their own efforts in that direction. the Schlieffen Plan of World War I. to a contested cyberspace environment.23 Too often, military personnel systems Commander’s intent is part of the pro- This distributed command provides field reward a particular behavior such as cess, but it is only one step in a long series commanders with the overall command- agility of thought, but what they actu- that produces documents running many er’s intent to keep them focused in the ally reward is precisely following a set thousands of pages no one reads, except right direction, and the structure that of rules and norms that are comfortable a few experts reading about their small allows them to self-synchronize into the for the organization. Senior leaders sliver of an operation. In a contested cy- largest and most effective warfighting will have to go beyond talking about berspace environment, the detailed plans elements possible in given circumstances. the importance of agility or taking risk will be worse than useless and will do Meanwhile, the theater-level commander, and failing, and start promoting those great harm if commanders attempt to fol- who has had direct control over units in people who do so instead of those who low them in a radically changed context the conflicts of the last few decades, will follow the safer path. from the planning assumptions. Planning at best be able to provide broad guidance
32 Forum / Surfing the Chaos JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 updates while pushing resources and illustrates the connected nature of “supposedly Notes closed system[s].” See Peter W. Singer and reinforcements to particular geographic Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: areas and continuing to fight for as ef- 1 The details on Trafalgar in this paragraph What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: fective a command and control as can be are found in John Keegan, The Price of Admi- Oxford University Press, 2014), 63. Also see achieved.24 ralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare (New Martin C. Libicki, “Cyberspace Is Not a War- York: Penguin Books, 1988). fighting Domain,”I/S: A Journal of Law and 2 For a modern fictional version of what a Policy 8, no. 2 (2012), 323–324. Conclusion conflict might look like with cyberspace attacks, 17 Stephen Checkoway et al., “Comprehen- These strategies will help set the see P.W. Singer and August Cole, Ghost Fleet: A sive Experimental Analyses of Automotive At- conditions for victory on a modern Novel of the Next World War (New York: First tack Surfaces,” USENIX Security Conference, cyber-contested battlefield. Fortunately Mariner Books, 2016). While I do not take is- August 10–12, 2011, 3–5. 18 nd for the United States, we have the raw sue with any of the types of attacks they discuss, B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2 ed. (New I do find the idea that an enemy could achieve York: Penguin Books, 1967), 5. material available to us to execute at the that level of surprise when tens of thousands 19 There are many excellent discussions tactical edge. Our population is flush of people knew about the attack ahead of time of John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, Act with potential young warfighters who rather incredible. Instead, I posit that cyber (OODA) loop. For further information, see want to be innovative and agile and are attacks would be flying in both directions and David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden: comfortable with a pace of change and both sides would be dealing with them at the Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis,” in same time. The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower maneuver that was quite challenging for 3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and Theory, ed. Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell Air earlier generations brought up in more trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Prince- Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), controlled hierarchical structures. Many ton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 366. potential adversaries do not have the 4 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel 20 Clausewitz, 141. same raw material because their societies B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 21 Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Crosswinds: The Air 1971). Force’s Setup in Vietnam (College Station: Texas are still far more command driven and 5 John Arquilla, “The Strategic Implications A&M University Press, 1993), 201. less agile than ours. This will provide of Information Dominance,” Strategic Review 22 Simon Reay Atkinson and James Moffat, an important edge that our potential 22, no. 3 (1994), 25. The Agile Organization: From Informal Net- adversaries cannot easily replicate. 6 A good example of this can be seen in the works to Complex Effects and Agility (Washing- The commander who, like Admiral results of “Eligible Receiver” in Fred Kaplan, ton, DC: Department of Defense Command Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War and Control Research Program [CCRP], Nelson, educates, trains, equips, and ex- (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016). 2005), 130. ercises his forces to execute on the tactical 7 Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way 23 Gilmary Michael Hostage III and Larry edge and provides clear commander’s of Warfare (New York: Columbia University R. Broadwell, Jr., “Resilient Command and intent while eschewing direct control is Press, 2009), 222. Control: The Need for Distributed Control,” 8 much more likely to find victory than the William Young at Air University developed Joint Force Quarterly 68 (1st Quarter 2014), 39. this typology as part of his work on determin- 24 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, one who insists on attempting to control ing key cyberspace terrain. Power to the Edge: Command . . . Control . . . in forces directly in a carefully synchronized 9 “Operational Technology (OT),” Gartner the Information Age (Washington, DC: DOD plan. Detailed control will be impossible IT Glossary, available at
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Bryant 33 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician conducts post-mission analysis on sonar imagery that IVER unmanned underwater vehicle collected during Exercise Clear Horizon, Republic of Korea, November 2, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Daniel Rolston)
The Bureaucratization of the U.S. Military Decisionmaking Process
By Milan Vego
In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it.
—Napoleon Bonaparte, Military Maxim II
aking a decision is one of the central role that the commander has in most important responsibili- the entire decisionmaking process; the M ties of a military commander commander, and nobody else, should at any level of command and is espe- be solely responsible for making a cially critical in combat. Traditionally, decision. Hence, the commander must combat decisions are made by using be deeply involved in each step of the Dr. Milan Vego is Admiral R.K. Turner Professor of Operational Art in the Joint Military Operations the commander’s estimate of the situa- estimate process. Making a decision is Department at the U.S. Naval War College. tion. The term estimate highlights the largely an art and not a science. The
34 JPME Today / Bureaucratization of the Decisionmaking Process JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Table 1. Estimate Formats for U.S. Services and Joint Force Service Army Marine Corps Navy Air Force Joint Doctrine Document FM 6-0 MCWP 5-10 NWP 5-01 AFMAN 10-40 V2 JP 3-0 Steps • Receipt of Mission • Problem Framing • Mission Analysis • Mission • Planning Initiation • Mission Analysis • COA Development • COA Development • Situation and COAs • Mission Analysis • Course of Action (COA) • COA Wargame • COA Analysis • Analysis of Opposing • COA Development Development • COA Comparison and (Wargame) COAs • COA Analysis and Wargaming • COA Analysis Decision • COA Comparison and • Comparison of Own • COA Comparison (Wargame) • Orders Development Decision COAs • COA Approval • COA Comparison • Transition • Plan or Order • Decision • Plan or Order Development • COA Approval Development • Concept of Operations • Orders Production, • Transition Dissemination, and Transition commander’s experience and judgment for the commander for almost every step reasoning is applied in conducting the are the most critical factors in making a of the estimate. If a commander is fully estimate of the situation.7 The potential sound decision. involved in the decisionmaking process, danger is that commanders and staffs however, there would be no need for might become prisoners of the format. The Problem any of these briefings. Another negative There is also often a great temptation to The decisionmaking process as trend is an overemphasis on so-called risk steadily expand scope and the amount described in U.S. doctrinal documents management in almost all the steps of of information in the estimate. All this violates some key tenets of German- the estimate—apparently, caution is more could be avoided if commanders and style mission command (Auftragstak- valued than boldness in action. staffs are focused on the mental process tik). Among other things, the mission and making a quick and good decision. statement consists of essential tasks and Commander’s Estimate The format of the estimate should be purpose(s) instead of being identical to Traditionally, the main method in flexible so that commanders can modify the objective. The commander’s intent making a decision is the commander’s or adapt the form to their particular should be far more important than the estimate of the situation. In generic needs. The relative importance of the mission, but it is not. The commander’s terms, the commander’s estimate is elements of the situation should be intent is too wordy. It includes ele- described as a logical process of reason- easily recognized so that the com- ments that do not belong there. It also ing by which a commander considers mander is focused on the essential ele- resembles a long list of tasks or even all the factors affecting a military situ- ments of the situation.8 Rigidly applying concept of operations (CONOPS). ation to determine a course of action the estimate’s format will invariably lead Since the early 1990s, the trend has to accomplish a given mission. The to a faulty application of the process been to progressively clutter each step estimate involves a thorough study of and may well result in an unsound deci- of the estimate with poorly related or all the conditions affecting a given situ- sion. Clarity of thinking also suffers even unrelated considerations. This, ation.1 No relevant factors should be when more time and effort are spent on in turn, has made the decisionmak- omitted or, worse, willfully ignored. formalities rather than on the essence of ing process cumbersome, rigid, and Hasty and superficial considerations the estimate.9 time-consuming. should be avoided.2 All the steps should In conducting the commander’s Perhaps the single biggest problem follow in a logical sequence. Each step estimate, what matters most is the mental is that the commander’s estimate has should incrementally lead to a deci- process itself, not the format used. The become de facto an integral part of the sion that, without these steps, could be commander must weigh all factors bear- planning process. But it should not be. arrived at only by accident.3 And each ing on the situation and then arrive at Many elements of planning and staff step must be justified by that which a sound decision in the quickest time functions/actions have been meshed with precedes it.4 Afterward, the decision possible.10 The soundness of the estimate decisionmaking. The result is the blurring is used as the basis for drafting plans/ ultimately rests on the commander’s or even eliminating distinctions between orders, followed by its execution.5 Yet earnest thought, mental ability, character, decisionmaking and planning. Also the process in itself will not necessar- and experience.11 (and despite the statements in various ily result in the best or even a sound Service doctrinal documents), the role decision.6 Estimate Formats in and importance of a commander in the the U.S. Military decisionmaking process have been greatly Format vs. Process In the U.S. military, each Service uses reduced. Throughout the decisionmak- A standardized format is highly useful in a different format for conducting esti- ing process, the staff prepares briefings ensuring that a certain logical process of mates. They have many similarities with
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Vego 35 Table 2. Estimate Formats and Solution Service U.S. Air Force German Wehrmacht* Suggested Solution Document JP 3-30 1937 Steps • Operational Description • Own Mission • Mission Analysis • Purpose of the Operation • Considerations of Own Situation • Enemy Options • References • Assessment of the Enemy Situation • Friendly Options • Description of Military Operations • Conclusions • Operating Area Estimate • Narrative • Decision • Analysis of the Opposing Options a. Mission • Comparison of Friendly Options b. Situation and Course of Action (COA) • Decision c. Analysis of Opposing COA d. Comparison of Friendly COA e. Recommended COA • Remarks
*Helmuth Greiner and Joachim Degener, Taktik im Rahmen des verstärkten Infanterie-Bataillons, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Verlag “Offene Worte,” 1937), 25–28. each other but also many differences. Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff priority intelligence requirements, a list A new version of the same document is Organization and Operations, cites not of high-value targets and unrefined event issued after only 1 or 2 years after the fewer than 18 substeps as part of mission templates. IPB should also “provide an last version was published. Within each analysis.16 Obviously, this number is too understanding of the threat’s center of Service, several documents address some large. Instead of consisting of relatively gravity, which then can be exploited by aspects of the decisionmaking process. few substeps directly related to the deri- friendly forces.”19 However, the IPB Often, they describe the same issue in vation of the mission, substeps include should only collect and evaluate informa- very different ways. This, in turn, makes several planning and administrative mat- tion on enemy forces and the operating it difficult to know what the commonly ters (for example, substep 9: Develop area. Clearly, a list of high-value targets is accepted view on some aspect of the Initial Information Collection Plan; not related to decisionmaking but plan- decisionmaking process is within a given substep 10: Update Plan for the Use of ning. It is the commander and staff’s Service. There seems to be less emphasis Available Time; substep 14: Present the responsibility to identify the enemy’s (and on warfighting, which is exemplified by Mission Analysis Briefing). The com- friendly) center of gravity. That critically the extensive use of the term adversary mander’s intent, one of the most critical important responsibility should not be or the threat instead of simply enemy. parts of the Mission Analysis, is barely delegated to the intelligence staff. If one wants to kill you, is the enemy mentioned. It is listed as substep 15.17 It Several other substeps in the Army’s not a political opponent or adversary? is almost an afterthought. Mission Analysis (for example, Review Current decisionmaking documents Perhaps the most illogical inclusion of Available Assets, Identify Resources in the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy is the intelligence preparation of the Shortfalls) seem premature. Shortfalls in encompass six or seven major steps battlefield (IPB) as part of the mission forces are not known until the decision is (table 1).12 Each step consists, in turn, analysis in the latest version of the Army’s made and CONOPS is fully developed. of a relatively large number of substeps. MDMP Handbook, issued in 2015. Likewise, the Risk Management step In contrast, estimate formats prior Intelligence estimate, however, should is already one of the tests (for accept- to the 1990s were much simpler and be one of the staff’s estimates, not an ability) for each friendly option.20 The more straightforward.13 The Air Force integral part of the mission analysis. Once Developing Initial Themes and Messages apparently uses older Army methods of the commander receives the mission substep belongs to planning, not deci- conducting the estimate.14 The Joint Air from the higher commander, intelligence sionmaking. The mission analysis briefing Estimate, which reflects the Air Force’s should focus its efforts to provide all is aimed to inform the commander of views, includes five steps of the tradi- information pertaining to accomplishing the results of the staff’s analysis of the tional estimate (table 2). Like the Army, the mission. The MDMP Handbook situation.21 Yet one must ask why such the format in the latest version of the stipulates that IPB should include a a brief is necessary if the commander Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Opera- “description of the operational environ- is in fact deeply involved in the entire tions, cites seven major steps (table 1).15 ment’s effects [by identifying] constraints process and not a bystander. There is In the Army and Navy, Mission on potential friendly [courses of actions] possibly no greater responsibility for Analysis is the first and most critical COAs, [developing] detailed threat COA a commander but to make decisions step of the decisionmaking process. models,” and so forth.18 It also explains on the employment of subordinate The Army’s Military Decisionmaking that the intelligence staff, in collabora- combat forces. Mission analysis in Navy Process (MDMP) Handbook and Field tion with other staffs, develops initial Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01, Navy
36 JPME Today / Bureaucratization of the Decisionmaking Process JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Soldier, assigned to 2nd Cavalry Regiment, adjusts aim of M777 towed 155mm howitzer, while conducting simulated call for fire missions during Saber Junction 17, at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, May 3, 2017 (U.S. Army/Zachery Perkins)
Planning, consists of many substeps, but that design is “appropriate to problem it includes commander’s orientation, not all are directly related to decision- solving at strategic, operational, and understanding the environment, analysis making. For example, the Determining tactical levels. Its purpose is to achieve of task (specified, implied, essential), Critical Factors and a Friendly Center of a greater understanding of the environ- analysis of center of gravity, developing Gravity substep properly belongs to the ment and the nature of the problem in assumptions, determining limitations, estimate of enemy situation; also, decisive order to identify the appropriate concep- developing the mission statement, and points play a role in determining methods tual solution.”23 Despite these claims, presenting problem framing briefs.25 of how to defeat the enemy’s center of design deals with understanding all Its results are a commander’s course of gravity. Yet it is a stretch to include it in aspects of the situation at the respective action guidance and issuing a warning mission analysis. As in the case of the levels of war. It can provide only under- order.26 Again, an analysis of the center MDMP Handbook, mission analysis in standing of the strategic, operational, of gravity should not be part of the mis- NWP 5-01 includes a substep on initial or tactical situation and thereby create sion analysis. risk assessment.22 a framework within which the decision- The first step in the Joint Air Estimate In contrast to the Army and Navy, making process would take place. is a model of simplicity. It consists of only the Marine Corps adopted “design” as Mission analysis in MCWP 5-10 the joint force commander (JFC) mission an integral part of its decisionmaking includes six substeps. Some belong to statement and deduced Joint Force Air process. It even went so far to use the traditional mission analysis while others Component Commander (JFACC) mis- phrase problem framing instead of the pertain to design (for example, Civil sion statement.27 more traditional mission analysis. This Consideration, Difference Between Each Service has a different approach decision is hard to understand; the pur- Existing and Desired Conditions, in describing the meaning and content pose of design is very different from the Information Environment).24 Problem of the commander’s intent. This criti- decisionmaking process. Marine Corps framing is actually an unnatural mix of cally important part of the estimate does Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-10, design elements and those related to not have high priority in U.S. doctrine Marine Corps Planning Process, claims decisionmaking. Among other things, and practice. In German-style mission
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Vego 37 Republic of Korea tanks with 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, head off firing line in formation during Korea Marine Exercise Program 17-6, at SuSong Ri Range, Pohang, Republic of Korea, March 23, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Anthony Morales) command, the intent was more important (or so-called operational content of the The intent should not include ele- than the mission. It was virtually sacro- mission) and key tasks.30 Adding a long ments of CONOPS. The intent should sanct. The intent provided a framework list of key tasks to already existing essen- reflect the commander’s firm belief in the within which a subordinate commander tial and specified tasks only unnecessarily success of the mission. Hence, the intent could act in the spirit of the mission is- complicates mission execution. The key should not include a discussion of risk sued by the higher commander.28 tasks are usually larger in number than that the commander is ready to accept (or Although the term intent is exten- essential tasks. Moreover, some or most not ready to accept). sively used by the U.S. military, its true of them might either duplicate or be NWP 5-01 stipulates that the com- meaning and purpose are not always directly contrary to essential tasks. The mander’s intent should consist of a properly understood. In its simplest commander should not include in the purpose, method, and endstate.32 Yet terms, the commander’s intent is a con- intent the methods (the how) by which properly understood, the intent should cise description of the military conditions subordinate commanders should ac- consist solely of a military endstate. In or the effect the commander wants to see complish their assigned missions. Both NWP 5-01, including the purpose and after the mission is accomplished. The key tasks and methods would greatly method is redundant. The purpose of the intent should inform subordinate com- limit subordinate commanders’ abilities contemplated action is already known manders of what needs to be done to to act creatively and exercise initiative. and should not be repeated. The method achieve success, even if the initially issued Moreover, they clearly violate the purpose is described as the commander’s explana- orders become obsolete because of unex- of the commander’s intent. The latest tion of the offensive form of maneuver, pected changes.29 Generally, the broader version of FM 6-0 has a three-paragraph- the alternative defense, or other actions the commander’s intent, the greater the long description of the commander’s to be used by the force as a whole.33 Yet room for freedom of action for the sub- intent. Among other things, it states that this should be clearly seen or implied in ordinate commanders. the intent is “clear and concise expression the commander’s CONOPS. A properly formulated commander’s of the purpose of the operation and the The Marine Corps seems to have a intent should only express the (military) desired military end state that supports different understanding of commander’s endstate. It should not include, as the mission command.”31 Apparently, the key intent than the other Services. For ex- Army’s FM 6-0 (2014) did, the purpose tasks were dropped. ample, the 2014 version of MCWP 5-1
38 JPME Today / Bureaucratization of the Decisionmaking Process JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 (now MCWP 5-10) explains that the freedom of action.37 The latest version in writing or in message format. It “Commander’s intent is the command- of JP 5-0 (dated June 16, 2017) speci- should: er’s personal expression of the purpose of fies that the commander’s initial intent be written in the first-person singular the operation. It must be clear, concise, should “describe the purpose of the oper- •• and use compelling language and easily understood. It may [emphasis ations, desired strategic end state, military fully reflect the personality of the added] also include end state or condi- end state, and operational risks associated •• commander tions that, when satisfied, accomplish the with campaign or operation.” Moreover, be read quickly and with full purpose.”34 MCWP 5-1 correctly notes it includes “where the commander will •• understanding that the and will not accept risk during the op- be concise so subordinate command- eration.” It also states that intent may •• ers can remember it41 commander’s intent helps subordinates include “operational objectives, method, be no longer than four or five understand the larger context of their ac- and effects guidance.”38 •• sentences42 tions and guides them in absence of orders. Clearly, the latest version of JP 5-0 be written in clear and precise It allows subordinates to exercise judgment further compounds the problem of •• language43 and initiative—when the task assigned is the proper understanding of the com- be issued to subordinate command- no longer appropriate given the current mander’s intent. For example, it is a •• ers two levels down.44 situation—in a way that is consistent with major error to include a desired strategic the higher commander’s aims. This freedom endstate as part of the operational com- The subordinate commander’s intent, of action, within the framework of the mander’s intent. A properly understood in turn, must support the intent of the commander’s intent, creates tempo during desired strategic endstate encompasses higher commander. In the U.S. military, planning and execution.35 political, diplomatic, military, economic, the intent is inserted as subparagraph 3a social, ethnic, religious, and other of an operation plan/order. However, A major error here is equating intent nonmilitary conditions that the highest if the true mission command is applied, with the mission’s purpose, that is, with political-military leadership wants to the intent should follow paragraph 1 the objective. Only the military endstate see in a part of the theater at the end of (Situation) and ahead of paragraph 2 can provide that broader framework hostilities. It is not part of the operational (Mission). within which a subordinate commander commander’s intent but of strategic None of the Service decisionmaking can have sufficient freedom to act and guidance formulated and issued by the process documents makes a clear distinc- exercise initiative. The mission itself highest political-military leadership. The tion between the processes of estimating is inherently much narrower than the operational commander’s intent should the enemy and friendly situation and properly formulated commander’s in- contain simply only a military endstate developing, respectively, the enemy and tent. It is also incorrect to state that the and nothing else. Both JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 friendly COAs. The emphasis is clearly intent “may” instead of “must” include include risks as part of the operational on developing friendly COAs, which is the endstate. For some reason, the sec- commander’s intent. This cannot but reflected in the titles of the individual tion “Commander’s Initial Intent and further stifle the initiative on the part steps for the estimate. For example, the Guidance” is omitted in the current of a subordinate commander. It is also MDMP Handbook contemplates eight version of the same document (MCWP contrary to the very purpose of the com- substeps in the COA Development 5-10). mander’s intent. step. This includes Assessing Relative In the Joint Air Estimate, the intent The commander should be solely re- Combat Power, Generating Options, is part of the second step, Situation and sponsible for formulating and articulating Arraying Forces, Developing Broad Courses of Action. It consists of the JFC’s his intent. However, he should consult Concepts, Assigning Headquarters, intent and JFACC’s intent statements, with his chief of staff and other staff Developing COA Narratives and respectively. This step also includes air members before issuing his intent to sub- Sketches, Conducting COA Briefings, component objectives and “effects re- ordinate commanders.39 Yet the Army’s and Selecting or Modifying COAs for quired for their achievement.”36 FM 6-0 (2014) assigns the responsibility Continued Analysis.45 The most recent version of JP 3-0 for briefing the current mission and com- One of eight substeps in the Army’s (dated January 17, 2017) defines intent mander’s intent to the chief of staff or COA Development is to develop a as the “commander’s clear and concise executive officer.40 broad concept aimed at describing expression of what the force must do and In articulating intent, the commander how friendly forces would accomplish the conditions the force must establish should seek input from these subordinate the mission within the commander’s to accomplish the mission. It includes commanders to ensure their full under- intent. However, this step has little the purpose, end state and associated standing. The intent statement can be resemblance to the traditional way of risk.” It also states that the commander’s written or issued orally. The higher the describing friendly COAs. It is more like intent supports mission command and command echelon, the more likely that a CONOPS. Among other things, it allows subordinates the greatest possible the commander’s intent will be provided includes:
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Vego 39 •• purpose of the operation unit deployment/employment; control support forces, respectively, and personal •• statement where the commander graphics; sequencing of events; designa- recovery capabilities.55 would accept the risk tion of the main supporting, shaping, and The MDMP Handbook and FM •• identification of critical friendly sustaining efforts; and adversary known 6-0 envisage eight substeps in the COA events and transitions between or expected locations.50 Analysis. The focus is on wargaming. phases (if the operation is phased) MCWP 5-10 stipulates that dur- The supposed purpose of this step is to •• designation of reserve, including its ing COA Development, planners use enable commanders and staffs to identify location and composition the products carried forward from difficulties or coordination problems and •• information collection activities problem framing to generate options also probable consequences of planned •• essential stability tasks or COAs that satisfy the mission in ac- actions for each friendly COA. It is •• identification of maneuver options cordance with the commander’s intent also meant to identify potential execu- that may be developed during an and guidance.51 This step includes sub- tion problems, decisions that must be operation steps such as Establishing Battlespace made, and requirements for contingency •• assignment of subordinate area of Frameworks, Arraying Forces, Assigning planning COA analysis (wargaming).56 operations, scheme of fires, themes, Purpose and Tasks, Integrating Actions It requires that each critical event is messages (and means of delivery), Across Time and Space, Determining wargamed by using an action-reaction- military deception operations, key Control Measures, and Considering counterreaction model of friendly and control measures, and designation the Adversary’s Most Dangerous/Most enemy forces interaction. This should of the operational framework (deep- Likely COAs for Every Friendly COAs. help the commander to synchronize close-security, main and supporting This step also includes COA graphics and warfighting functions. In addition, the effort, or decisive-shaping-sustaining, narratives, task organization, synchroni- commander would be able to anticipate and designation of the decisive zation matrix, and supporting concepts operational events, determine condi- operation, along with its task and (such as intelligence, fires, or logistics in tions and resources required for success, purpose, linked to how it supports the order or plan).52 In a Marine Corps’ determine when and where to apply the higher headquarters’ concept).46 textbook on the decisionmaking pro- force capabilities, identify coordination cess, the initial COA includes forms of needed to produce synchronized results, If this template is literally followed, maneuver, type of attack, designation of and determine the most flexible COA.57 it is difficult to see how to make a clear main attack, requirements for supporting MCWP 5-10 stipulates that the main distinction which friendly COA would efforts, scheme of maneuver, sequenc- purpose of the COA War Game step of offer higher chances of mission accom- ing essential task accomplishment, task the estimate is to “improve the operation plishment than the other. Similarly, the organization, use of reserve, and rules of plan.” Wargaming is conducted in terms step Developing COA Narratives and engagement.53 of action-reaction-counterreaction.58 Sketches is so complex that it defies logic. The MCWP 5-10 section The COA Analysis step in NWP 5-01 Among other things, each friendly COA “Commander’s Wargaming Guidance also includes many planning elements requires a narrative unit, subordinate unit and Evaluation Criteria” greatly expands such as synchronizing warfighting func- boundaries, line of departure or line of the traditional evolution criteria for tions and determining decision points contact, information collection graphics, friendly COAs (feasibility, suitability, ad- and branches.59 Like actions of the assembly area, battle positions, strong equacy, acceptability). It includes a list of main forces, warfighting functions are point, engagements area and objectives, some 19 criteria including limitations on wargamed in terms of action-reaction- fire support coordination and airspace casualties, defeat of the adversary’s center counterreaction.60 However, all this coordinating measures, main effort, of gravity (COG), information opera- clearly belongs to planning. It should location of command posts or template tions, opportunity of maneuver, speed, be obvious that so-called warfighting locations, and population concentra- risk, phasing, balance between mass and functions (intelligence, fires, sustain- tion.47 This in essence is a mini-plan, not dispersion, weighting the main effort, ment, command and control, protection, a description of a friendly COA. This timing of the operation and reserve, movement, and maneuver) cannot be step of the estimate also envisages a COA logistical supportability, force protection, synchronized until the entire plan/order briefing.48 political considerations, and impact on is prepared. But most fundamentally the The NWP 5-01 step COA local population/issues.54 Clearly, this problem is that this should not be part Development includes analyzing relative large number of criteria makes their true of wargaming at all.61 NWP 5-01 also combat power, generating COA op- value highly problematic. includes part of the COA Analysis testing tions, testing for validity, recommending In the Joint Air Estimate, COAs are validity of measures of effectiveness and command and control relationships, pre- part of the step Situation and Courses of measures of performance and further re- paring COA sketches and narratives, and Action. Each COA must include informa- fines assessment plan development.62 preparing COA briefings.49 COA sketches tion on required combat; intelligence, The Army tends to use more than include unit or command boundaries; surveillance, and reconnaissance; and the other Services’ various quantifiable
40 JPME Today / Bureaucratization of the Decisionmaking Process JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Air Force Combat Controller, part of 23rd Special Tactics Squadron, watches Jordanian UH-60 helicopter approach during Eager Lion 2017, annual U.S. Central Command exercise, Amman, Jordan, May 11, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Christopher Lange) methods in assessing the combat poten- the physical and human elements of the this step of MCWP 5-10, it is the com- tial of both friendly and enemy forces situation. mander’s responsibility to evaluate each (for example, relative combat potential, COA Analysis should not include friendly COA and compare it with the historical minimum planning ratios, and any planning elements (for example, syn- others. A COA believed to be the best to measures of effectiveness).63 Yet there chronization matrix, task organization, accomplish the mission is then selected as is a great danger in overemphasizing timelines) because they are not directly the basis for the decision.67 the importance of these methods. Any related to making a decision. Moreover, In NWP 5-01, the COA Comparison force includes a multitude of intangible task organization and synchronization and Decision step includes substeps such elements, and they are difficult if not are based on the sequencing of actions as Providing Staff Estimates, Applying impossible to quantify in any meaning- by friendly forces, and they are not defi- Risk Mitigation, Comparing Friendly ful way. The tactical commander should nitely known until a decision is made and COAs, Summarizing Advantages and not allow mathematical computations to CONOPS is fully developed. Disadvantages, Reviewing COAs, drive his analysis.64 The commander and In contrast to other Services, the Testing for Validity, Conducing the staff must fully consider human factors, Joint Air Estimate step Analysis of the COA Decision Briefing, Stating the such as the enemy’s intentions, will to Opposing Courses of Action seems Commander’s Decision, Preparing the fight, morale, and discipline.65 Despite pretty simple. It requires highlighting Synchronization Matrix, and Developing many claims to the contrary, quantifiable the “adversary” capabilities and intent (if the CONOPS.68 methods are of limited usefulness. It is known) that may have “significant impact In the comparison of friendly COAs inherently difficult and uncertain to prop- on friendly COAs.”66 The last step of the of the Joint Air Estimate, the com- erly assess and anticipate the results of estimate in MCWP 5-10 and NWP 5-01 mander is required to submit to the JFC the highly dynamic interactions between is the COA Comparison and Decision. In only the conclusions and a short rationale
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Vego 41 Landing craft air cushion vehicle lands on beach, in tandem with Australian counterparts, as part of large-scale amphibious assault during Talisman Saber 17, Townshend Island, Australia, July 13, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Sarah Villegas) for the favored air COA. Also, the JFC the commander issues the final planning mate of the situation and the decision” has to discuss relative advantages and dis- guidance. The staff then issues warning should be restored. The commander’s advantages of the alternative air COAs in orders to subordinate headquarters.71 personal involvement is driven by the case this could assist the JFC in reaching The last step in the Joint Air Estimate is time available for the estimate, his or her a decision.69 Recommended COA in which the JFACC personal preferences, and the experience The MDMP Handbook explains recommends the best COA to JFC.72 and accessibility of the staff. Yet ideally, that the COA Comparison step is aimed Common to all three Services is the commander alone (but with inputs to evaluate each friendly COA indepen- that none of their currently used deci- of the staff) should write the estimate of dently from each other and against set sionmaking process documents clearly the situation and the decision. criteria approved by the commander and highlights the paramount importance of The commander’s estimate should staff and to identify strengths and weak- the decision. This is, after all, the main be restored to its previous importance nesses. It includes two substeps: Analysis reasons for conducting the estimate of in the U.S. decisionmaking process. of Advantages and Disadvantages and the situation. Hence, the estimate should Conceptually, the commander’s estimate Comparison of COAs. Those COAs of- end with the Decision as a separate step. is simple and should be easily understood. fering the highest chances of success are Also, Decision and its constituent parts, It does not mean that making a sound retained for further development into a and CONOPS in particular, should be decision is easy. It is not. The commander plan or order.70 In this step, the MDMP described in some detail. must not only be well educated but also Handbook and NWP 5-01 include so- have experience and good judgment in called decision matrix, while MCWP A Possible Solution making decisions. Both the process and 5-10 does not. The Services need to reevaluate and format used by Services are ill-suited for For some reason, the MDMP then make drastic changes in both doc- quick decisionmaking. It requires a lot of Handbook calls the last step in the esti- trine and the decisionmaking process. people and time to conduct the estimate. mate COA Approval instead of Decision. Perhaps there is nothing more impor- The ultimate purpose of the estimate is After the decision briefing, the com- tant than making sound decisions in lost because so many planning and admin- mander selects the COA that offers the combat. That responsibility cannot be istrative steps are included in the format. best chances of accomplishing the mis- delegated to anyone else. It must be, The commander’s estimate must sion. If the commander rejects all COAs, as the term clearly implies, solely the stand alone. This means that it must be the staff has to start COA Development responsibility of the commander. Hence, decoupled from the planning. Each step again. After the best COA is selected, the old name “the commander’s esti- of the estimate must be literally purged
42 JPME Today / Bureaucratization of the Decisionmaking Process JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 from all elements that are unrelated to commander trusts his subordinate com- Figure. Commander’s Estimate the decision. Staff functions/actions dur- manders and would further enhance the and the Decision (in generic terms) ing the decisionmaking process should need for their professional education and Source of be described in an appendix to the deci- training. The higher commander always the Mission sionmaking manual. The decision must has the opportunity to review the tasks be clearly highlighted throughout the derived by subordinate commanders and Mission Analysis process; it must also stand as a separate either approve or reject them. Estimate of the and the very last step in the estimate of The Mission Analysis step of the Enemy’s Operating Area Friendly Options • Conclusion Options the situation. estimate should contain relatively few • Effects On The number of steps in the estimate substeps. Each substep should be directly Analysis of is not as important as making sure that all related to the decision. If the mission Opposing Options the aspects of the situation are properly equals the objective, then a subordinate Comparison of assessed. The steps in the commander’s commander only needs to derive tasks. Friendly Options estimate might differ depending on the There would be no need to identify level of command and whether predomi- specified, implied tasks and essential The Decision nantly ground, naval, or air forces are tasks. Besides the mission, key elements employed. Perhaps most importantly, in the mission analysis is obviously the format must not dominate the decision- commander’s intent, planning assump- time) or how the particular task should making process. The aim should always tions, and limitations (constraints and be carried out. The timeline should be be to conduct a quick estimate ending restraints) in the employment of friendly part of only the CONOPS. Each enemy with a good, but not necessarily best, forces. If the estimate is conducted and friendly option should be presented decision. Full involvement of the com- quickly, as it should be, then planning both as a narrative and on a map/chart. mander should drastically reduce the guidance and warning orders should not The higher the level of war, the broader number of various briefings. They require be issued until the decision is made. the terms in which an option should be involvement of many members of the In general, making a combat decision described and depicted. staff and are time consuming. Ideally, the would require from commanders and Instead of the phrase COA Analysis, number of briefings for a tactical com- their staffs sound estimates of enemy and the phrase Analysis of the Opposing mander should be zero. friendly situations. The focus should be Options should be used. This step should In generic terms, the commander’s on these enemy or friendly forces that be the heart of the estimate. It is the first estimate might encompass the following would be engaged in the course of mis- time that friendly and enemy options main steps: sion accomplishment. The end result of interact in a dynamic setting. The com- these estimates should be enemies and mander and staff should first reexamine Mission Analysis •• friendly options; respectively, the term the mission to make sure that it is still Enemy’s Options •• option rather than course of action should valid. Instead of the action-reaction- Friendly Options •• be used. A course of action implies that counterreaction method, perhaps the Estimate of the Operating Area •• the commander knows for certain what simpler and more effective method is to Analyses of Opposing Options •• the enemy commander’s intentions are. array each friendly option against each Comparison of Friendly Options •• While the friendly commander is more enemy option. If the outcome of an Decision (see figure). •• in control of his own actions, he is really interaction is negative (mission failure), The mission statements used today weighing various options in the course of then a given option must be revised and by the U.S. military do not reflect true the estimate. The option offering the best played against the same enemy option. mission command but at best a semi- chances of accomplishing the mission Some quantifiable methods can be used centralized command and control. In could be called the friendly course of ac- in assessing combat potential of the contrast to longstanding practices, the tion, but it is not identified until the very opposing forces for each interaction. U.S. military should emulate the German end of the estimate process. However, such methods should never model; that is, the mission statement is Enemy and friendly options should be allowed to drive the analysis. It is the identical to the objective to be accom- be expressed clearly and succinctly. Each commander’s experience and judgment plished. This would not only simplify option should include deployment of a that are critical in assessing probable writing the mission but also greatly force as a whole, followed by the possible outcome of each interaction. The com- reduce the time for the mission analysis. actions against enemy forces, answering mander should then judge whether a But most importantly, a subordinate the questions who (Service/functional given outcome of an interaction accom- commander would be solely responsible component or force element), what plishes the mission. Friendly options with to deduce tasks that have to be carried (type of action), and where (location the largest number of positive outcomes out to accomplish a given objective. of action). At this step in the estimate should be retained for the next step of This would also show that the higher process, it should not include when (the the estimate.
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Vego 43 Marines with 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force, post security on patrol during Forest Light 15-1, at the Oyanohara Training Area in Yamato, Kumamoto prefecture, Japan, December 9, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Warren Peace)
In the step Comparison of Friendly estimate, not the so-called production of execution, include deception, and ensure Options, the focus should be exclusively plans and orders. It should always stand smooth cooperation among diverse forces on evaluating advantages and disadvan- alone as a separate step. The commander of one or more Services. A CONOPS tages of each friendly option. Identified should make a decision based on his should explain in some detail where, why, disadvantages must be remedied and knowledge and experience. Again, the and when each force functional/Service thereby improve the chances of success of responsibility for making a decision rests component or force element would be individual friendly options. Each friendly solely with the commander.73 employed and contain sufficient detail to option should be then tested for feasibil- A written decision should contain the allow the planners to draft operation plans ity and acceptability. After weighing the decision statement, final commander’s and orders—but not too many details, relative merits of each friendly option, the intent, and CONOPS for both the best which might limit flexibility during the commander should select the best and and second-best courses of action. The subsequent planning process. second-best friendly options. Afterward, decision statement should express in The single most important responsi- these should be converted into the best broad terms what the force as a whole bility of the commander in combat is to and second-best courses of action. has to do, where, and why. It should be make decisions for combat employment of The commander should present both expressed in the first person. It should subordinate forces. Making a decision at the best and second-best courses of action be written clearly, concisely, and in com- any level of command is an art rather than to the higher commander. He should point monly accepted and understood doctrinal a science. Hence, each commander should out what could be accomplished under the terms. The commander should review be free as possible to find the best method circumstances and, if necessary, request ad- the initial intent and change or modify of conducting estimates and making a de- ditional forces or more time. It is then the it to be fully aligned with his decision cision. This means the commander should responsibility of the higher commander to and also the higher commander’s intent. modify, alter, or even abandon various approve, modify, or reject the subordinate The main purpose of a CONOPS is to substeps in the estimate format if they do commander’s best courses of action. further clarify the commander’s restated not contribute to a decision. What matters The Decision is the final and most mission and intent. Among other things, most is not the method (how a com- important step in the commander’s a CONOPS should be simple, avoid pat- mander reached the decision) but whether estimate of the situation. The decision terns and stereotyped schemes, be novel that decision was made in a timely manner is the true purpose of the commander’s and thereby ensure surprise and speed of and ensured mission success.
44 JPME Today / Bureaucratization of the Decisionmaking Process JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 11 34 All the Services should drastically Department of Operations, Sound Mili- MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning tary Decision, 20. Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters United reduce the number of substeps in each 12 Center for Army Lessons Learned States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, step of the estimate. The trend toward (CALL), Military Decisionmaking Process, August 24, 2010), 2-3. adding more and more substeps must Handbook No. 15-06 (Fort Leavenworth, 35 Ibid. be reversed. Decisionmaking should be KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff 36 JP 3-30, B-1–B-2. based on a simple and easily understood College, March 2015), 8; Navy Warfare Pub- 37 JP 3-0, II-7. lication (NWP) 5-01, Navy Planning (Wash- 38 JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Washington, DC: process, which should be fully reflected ington, DC: Department of the Navy, Office The Joint Staff, June 16, 2017), IV-18–IV-19. in all manuals on decisionmaking; oth- of the Chief of Naval Operations, December 39 Walter N. Anderson, “Commander’s In- erwise, they would be of little or no use 2013), 1-4. tent—Theory and Practice,” Armor, May–June to commanders and staffs in the field. 13 For example, the U.S. Army’s Field 1998, 47. The Services should also drastically Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Organization and 40 FM 6-0, 1-11. Operations, issued in 1932, consisted of five 41 Filiberti, 55; R.W. Glenn, “The Com- deemphasize their literal obsession with steps (Mission, Opposing Forces, Enemy Situ- mander’s Intent: Keep It Short,” Military risk management or risk mitigation in the ation, Own Situation, and Decision). The same Review 67, no. 8 (August 1987), 52–53. decisionmaking process. This only further document issued in 1984 also had five major 42 FM 6-0, 9-14. reinforces the unhealthy zero-error toler- steps (Mission, Situation and COA, Analysis of 43 Anderson, 47. ance in the U.S. military. And the latter COA, Comparison of COA, and Decision). See 44 Glenn, 52–53. Rex R. Michel, Historical Development of the 45 CALL, 28; FM 6-0, 9–16. is a glaring contradiction to the very pur- Estimate of the Situation (Fort Leavenworth, 46 CALL, 32. pose of the mission command. JFQ KS: Field Unit, Systems Research Laboratory, 47 Ibid., 34. October 1990), 5. 48 Ibid., 36. 14 Joseph Anderson and Nathan K. Slate, 49 NWP 5-01, 3-1–3-9. Notes “The Case for a Joint Decisionmaking Pro- 50 Ibid., 3-8. cess,” Military Review, September–October 51 MCWP 5-10, 3-1. 52 1 Frank H. Schofield, “The Estimate of 2003, 12. Ibid., 3-3–3-4. 15 53 the Situation,” lecture delivered at the Sum- Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Opera- Student Guide Expeditionary Warfare mer Conference, U.S. Naval War College, tions (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Janu- Staff Planning, J-2G-0048 (San Diego: Newport, RI, June 1912 (1913 edition), box ary 17, 2017), II-6. Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific, 16 1901–1914, Record Group (RG) 4: Publica- CALL, 11; FM 6-0 C1, Commander and August 2014), 57. 54 tions 1915–1977, Naval Historical Collection, Staff Organization and Operations (Washing- MCWP 5-10, 3-4–3-5. 55 U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2; ton, DC: Headquarters Department of the JP 3-30, B-2. 56 Roger S. Fitch, Estimating Tactical Situations Army, May 11, 2015), 9-7. CALL, 39. 17 57 and Composing Field Orders (Fort Leaven- CALL, 12, 23; FM 6-0, 9-7. Ibid., 40. 18 58 worth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General CALL, 13. MCWP 5-10, 4-1. 19 59 Staff College, 1909), 1; Bruce Condell and Ibid., 14. NWP 5-01, 4-15–4-16. 20 60 David T. Zabecki, eds., On the German Art of Ibid., 18. Ibid., 3-16. 21 61 War: Truppenfuehrung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Ibid., 22. The list of these functions (actually, com- 22 Rienner, 2001), 28. NWP 5-01, 2-1–2-14. bat support—for tactical actions or operational 23 2 Department of Operations, The Estimate Marine Corps Warfighting Publication support for major operations/campaigns) is of the Situation with the Order Form, rev. ed. (MCWP) 5-10 (formerly 5-1), Marine Corps faulty; only intelligence, information opera- (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June Planning Process (Washington, DC: Headquar- tions, fires, logistics, and protection should be 1926), 1. ters United States Marine Corps, Department listed as combat support. 62 3 Condell and Zabecki, 28. of the Navy, May 2, 2015), 1-3. NWP 5-01, 4-21. 24 63 nd 4 G.B. Wright, The Estimate of the Situa- Ibid., 2-3. Norman M. Wade, The Battle Staff, 2 25 tion, July 21, 1933, folder 1663, box 55, RG Ibid., 2-2. rev. ed. (Savannah, GA: Lightning Press, 2005), 26 4: Publications 1915–1977, Naval Historical Ibid., 2-8–2-9. 2–28. 27 64 Collection, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint FM 101-5, Staff Organization and RI, 3. Air Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters 5 “Notes on the Applicatory System of Solv- Staff, February 10, 2014), B-1. Department of the Army, May 31, 1997), 3-30. 28 65 ing War Problems, with Examples Showing the John F. Natal, “Forward Command: Ibid., 2-28. 66 Adaptation of the System to Naval Problems,” The Wehrmacht’s Approach to Command and JP 3-30, B-2. 67 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 38, no. 3 (Sep- Control in World War II,” Armor, November– MCWP 5-10 (May 2, 2016), 5-1–5-2. 68 tember 1912), 1015. December 1991, 28. NWP 5-01, 5-2–5-5. 29 69 6 Wright, 5. Lawrence G. Shattuck, “Communicat- JP 3-30, B-2–B-3. 70 7 Ibid. ing Intent and Imparting Presence,” Military CALL, 59. 71 8 Ibid., 2. Review 80, no. 2 (March–April 2000), 67; CALL, 63. 72 9 Department of Operations, Sound Military Edward J. Filbert, “Command, Control and JP 3-30, B-3. 73 Decision (including the Estimate of the Situation the Commander’s Intent,” Military Review 67, Department of Operations, Sound Mili- and the Formulation of Directives) (Newport, RI: no. 8 (August 1987), 56. tary Decision, 3. 30 U.S. Naval War College, 1936), 20. FM 6-0, 9-14. 31 10 George H. Miller, “Logical Thinking Ibid. 32 in Military Situations,” U.S. Naval Institute Ibid. 33 Proceedings 74, no. 3 (March 1948), 1. Ibid.
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Vego 45 Army team at Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center wins Commandant’s Cup relay race at Presidio’s Price Fitness Center Field, Monterey, California, June 15, 2016 (U.S. Army/Steven L. Shepard)
Women, Regardless Understanding Gender Bias in U.S. Military Integration
By Elizabeth M. Trobaugh
omen have been part of the ees faced unofficial slander campaigns tudes and beliefs threaten the integrity U.S. military and its cam- that sharply reversed enlistment. Over of the Armed Forces as well as their W paigns since the American the last 70 years, women’s roles in the mission. Revolution. With the advent of the Army have morphed as fast as—or in The war on terror and the U.S. Women’s Army Corps in 1943, women some cases faster—than society has military’s use of counterinsurgency could officially enlist for military changed. Many of these changes have ushered in a new era of warfighting: service. During this time, female enlist- been good. For instance, many women there are no frontlines, and everyone have succeeded and excelled in newly must be prepared to fight. Regardless of accessible jobs, specialties, and skills. whether society thinks women should be However, women still face stereotypes in combat, the reality is they already have Captain Elizabeth M. Trobaugh, USAR, graduated from the School of International and Public about who they are and how capably been in the fight. Yet the current combat Affairs at Columbia University in 2016. they perform their duties. These atti- arms culture has been slow to adjust as
46 JPME Today / Understanding Gender Bias in Integration JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 evidenced by the ongoing commentary guidance and feedback. The results dominated professions, including the about what women can and cannot from the study stated: science, technology, engineering, and do in the military. As Marine Corps mathematics professions as well as the Commandant General Robert B. Neller The Army should proceed with integrating military.5 noted in his testimony to the Senate women into previously closed combat arms Drawing from my own experiences in Armed Services Committee, we can no MOS/units. To successfully integrate, the the Army, I devised an online survey as longer go to war without women.1 Army must address the following barriers: part of an independent study for Soldiers Therefore, as former Secretary of inconsistent enforcement of existing stan- to evaluate the areas where gender biases Defense Ashton Carter announced in dards and perceptions of double standards; may prevent women from succeeding in 2015, women will be (and subsequently incidents of unprofessional behavior and Army culture. This survey aimed to as- have been) integrated into previously indiscipline; fear of sexual harassment and sess where stereotypes may exist within closed combat jobs and training. To assault; cultural stereotypes; and ignorance Army training environments as well as promote the former Secretary’s proposal, of current Army policy.3 attitudes toward female integration into there also needs to be a change of culture previously closed jobs and schools. Army within the Army (the Service in which The data presented in this article culture may be a permissive environment my own experiences are rooted), as well underscore much of what was explored for attitudes that women do not belong. as in the broader military, to ensure the in the Gender Integration Survey. Similar For this reason, the survey also aimed to success of women entering combat arms. conclusions were extrapolated from address some of the institutional gender Policymakers often do not notice adverse many of the same concerns presented biases plaguing the Army and hopefully attitudes toward women serving in com- from research participants. Male Soldiers to inform the broader military commu- bat arms capacities. Although leaders may are afraid of lowered physical standards, nity of such biases. Out of these findings be aware of sexism when it takes the form increased sexual assault and harassment, come proposed policy recommendations of blatant comments, they may be less reduced readiness, and destruction of to course-correct as the joint force begins aware of more subtle forms of sexism that the masculine culture of brotherhood. to “gender integrate” all jobs within the manifest as reduced training standards However, much of what is discussed here Services. for women. Whichever the case, women goes beyond the thoughts and attitudes The online survey asked female may have to go above and beyond the about women integrating into jobs in respondents about their training in war- standard to prove themselves and may previously closed MOSs. This article rior-type tasks. Warrior-type training, for routinely have their work overlooked explores women’s thoughts about their our purposes, is defined in the survey as until there is an immediate benefit. These own abilities, Soldiers’ experiences with having the skills required to be success- commonplace events are indications of training women to perform physically ful on the battlefield or frontlines—for pervasive stereotypes that prevent women demanding tasks compared with what example, basic rifle marksmanship or from doing their jobs effectively and ac- they thought women could achieve, and patrolling. The online survey asked complishing the mission. how men think they would react to the women across all officer and enlisted presence of women. ranks—and across all MOSs available to Current Research women in 2015—about the quality of In 2015, the U.S. Army Training and Investigating Gender Bias training received, if they struggled, why Doctrine Command Analysis Center Gender stereotypes and institutional they might have struggled, if they re- published its Gender Integration Study.2 bias within the military come as no ceived additional help, and if they would The research team conducting the study surprise to anyone, least of all women, like to join combat arms jobs or training. looked to the U.S. Army Sergeants in the military. However, how to pin- The point was to identify each woman’s Major Academy and to the senior point these incidences as they occur view of her own abilities in this crucial noncommissioned officer corps to help and to formulate solutions seems to area and to determine if she felt sup- identify risks that may come with female befuddle leaders at all levels. Research- ported in training. Next, both male and integration into combat arms. Further- ers have distinguished between two female Soldiers were asked if they had more, the research team conducted a forms of sexism: hostile and benevo- trained women in the Army. The survey feasibility assessment to evaluate the lent.4 Whereas hostile sexism is more also asked respondents to think of one risks associated with integrating women obviously negative, benevolent sexism instance of training women in a warrior into previously closed military occupa- is often disguised as positive, portray- task. Furthermore, it looked at warrior- tional specialties (MOSs). The research ing women as needing and deserving type training among men and women in team contacted 4 Brigade Combat greater care and protection. Both forms order to establish whether women were Teams and interviewed 35 command deem women as less capable and com- or are receiving the same training and teams for the assessment. Additionally, petent, justifying lower expectations whether they were held to the same stan- the study engaged with senior Army of them and limiting their roles. These dards as male Soldiers. The survey asked leaders at high levels for additional beliefs are apparent in a variety of male- respondents if they had trained women
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Trobaugh 47 Georgia Army National Guard’s 648th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Soldier participates in Best Warrior Competition’s obstacle course event, Fort Stewart, March 9, 2017 (U.S. Army/James Braswell) in a warrior-type task, what the quality of warrior-type skills training. If anecdotal training in warrior-type tasks in basic that training was, and, ultimately, what evidence showed that women were not training or officer basic. Yet 70 percent may have prevented women from doing failing to meet the standard, why are gen- of respondents also stated they could better. The goal of this section was to der-based stereotypes so pervasive when have used additional training in a identify attitudes toward women and it comes to female integration? If women warrior-type task. Discouragingly, their abilities in training among both were failing en masse, what was the root nearly 53 percent responded “no” when male and female Soldiers, across military cause? Two outcomes could be extrapo- asked if their chain of command would ranks, and across military skills. lated from questions about culture. First, support additional training if they (the The online survey then sought to trainers either have been allowing women respondents) needed more training. evaluate the attitudes about women in- to pass at a lower standard by turning a The three answers most frequently tegrating into combat arms and combat blind eye to their failures or were refusing cited for why female respondents may arms training. It posed questions about to push women to retrain if they failed have failed a warrior-type task were, in the difficulty of such warrior tasks and the (I refer to this as the “if she fails, there- order, “need of additional training or ability to perform them. These sections fore she can’t” syndrome). The second familiarization,” “never failed or antici- also asked respondents to evaluate their conclusion is its reverse. In this scenario, pated failing,” and “lack of time and/or beliefs and attitudes about the biggest women were held to a harsher standard resources to properly train to meet the effect of integrating women into combat as a means to prove their capability above standards.” arms. The data collected in this section and beyond male standards. The survey showed female Soldiers can easily be compared to data about had a generally positive view of their how women were actually trained and Confirming the Bias abilities. They were willing to and capable performed during that training. In the first section of the survey of completing the warrior-type tasks. The survey also sought to discover (women only), 70 percent of respon- Moreover, respondents noted they were whether women were failing en masse in dents stated that they received adequate not perfect and would have liked more
48 JPME Today / Understanding Gender Bias in Integration JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 training in some areas, but their chains of meeting standards. However, among Respondent Comments of command would not support addi- male officers, enlisted, and across all job To get a better sense of opinions, the tional training. Not unsurprisingly, many demographics, negative effects of female survey asked respondents to provide women are still eager to prove themselves integration were ranked highest in a list comments or feedback. Respondents in combat arms jobs and training, but of possible results. “Logistical problems” who had trained women were asked to more often than not, they would like were ranked the highest among those provide comments on several questions, more training before even trying to enter demographics, while female respondents though not all questions. For instance, combat arms. ranked “increased readiness due to in- one question was, “During this same The next section of the survey asked creased training of force” as the highest event, what were the female trainees’ both male and female respondents if they effect of integrating women into all jobs. most significant deficiencies that might had trained women in a warrior-type task. Even though respondents experi- have prevented them from doing well in Results indicated that 72 percent of those enced women meeting the standards training?” Some responses included: who trained women in warrior tasks re- in their training, the section regarding “Lack of perseverance while under ported that they trained women the same thoughts and attitudes toward gender in- •• duress.” as they trained men. Furthermore, nearly tegration showed that 40 percent of male “Many MOS in the Army seem to 72 percent of respondents reported that respondents believed standards would •• have a lower standard for women. the women they trained met the stan- change to accommodate women. This It’s almost as though they don’t dard. The data are clear in showing that response to integration, regardless of ex- expect as much of them because most female trainees were trained about perience, suggests that women were not they feel it’s a waste of time. It is the same as their male counterparts. Yet being fully trained as well as men or that absolutely not true and saddens me both male and female respondents cited there was bias among respondents about thinking of all the lost potential.” lack of familiarization with the task as the the abilities of women. Respondents may “Stereotype that they ‘couldn’t do it’ most prevalent deficiency that prevented not have conducted training to standard, •• led to them being trained to a lesser female trainees from doing better. Male and they might have allowed women to standard.” respondents indicated a lack of physical “pass” even when they had not actually strength as the second most prevalent done so. Perhaps retraining was cumber- Written responses varied concerning deficiency, while female respondents indi- some, or they had to meet a quota for thoughts and feelings about integrating cated a lack of motivation. unit readiness. women. When asked, “Do you agree or The last section of the survey asked Respondents experienced women in disagree with the following statement: both men and women what they thought training passing the standard, and they If the Army decides to integrate females about women integrating into combat indicated that “lack of familiarization” into combat arms and combat arms– arms jobs and training. This section prevented them from doing better. related training, the standards will be aimed to evaluate the culture surround- Yet the idea of integrating women lowered to accommodate females,” some ing integrating women into previously into combat arms and jobs seemed to responses included: closed sectors. Contrary to previous evoke negativity about female ability. “There are two standards. The sections in the survey, wherein a lack of Male respondents cited “lack of physi- •• Army standard, and the female stan- familiarization with the task was the most cal strength” as the biggest obstacle to dard. Until the female standard is cited challenge, physical strength was women entering combat arms. Combat removed, females will never be equal the highest ranked challenge for female arms jobs and training are a compilation to males.” Soldiers who may integrate into combat of warrior tasks performed in succession. “Standards aren’t the problem. arms jobs, and training was cited among The endurance required may account •• [There are] plenty of strong women, men, enlisted Soldiers, combat arms, and for why respondents thought women the problem lies within the change in noncombat arms jobs. A dichotomy arose would perform at a lower standard. men around women. The biological in the survey: despite respondents hav- However, with successful female inte- and unpreventable reactions between ing experienced women in training pass gration into artillery, the inauguration males and females of the same species the standard in warrior-type tasks, they of women into the infantry, as well as [do] not equate to a good cohesive thought women were less physically capa- women passing Ranger training, women unit. If you want to make a combat ble of passing warrior-type tasks. Unlike are demonstrating they can and will suc- unit ineffective, assign women to it.” their counterparts, however, female (re- ceed. Additionally, it is unfair to state the “Political demands will result in a gardless of rank) and male officers ranked standard would be lowered for women •• degradation of standards to meet “attitudes toward women in training” as wanting to join the infantry if women quotas and to prevent fallout from the biggest obstacle to female integration. have not been afforded the same train- the imminent failure of a high major- The officers surveyed support female ing as men. As this survey demonstrates, ity of females with the current male integration, with 86 percent of officer re- women may not be receiving the same infantry standards.” spondents believing women were capable training.
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Trobaugh 49 Another question was, “If the Army The common thread throughout requires women to be on the battlefield, decides to integrate females into combat these comments is an acknowledgment new policies could be implemented to arms and combat arms–related training, by Soldiers that there is an institu- help ease the transition of women into do you think that those females who suc- tional difference created in the APFT. combat arms and break down gender- ceed in meeting standards will have (mark Furthermore, the differences in the test based stereotypes in order to improve all that apply) 1. Received special treat- for men and women lend themselves readiness. One positive step Army Chief ment; 2. Met standard; 3. Been allowed to Soldiers believing that women are of Staff General Mark Milley already to pass at a lower standard?” One person incapable even when they witnessed implemented subsequent to the first three commented: women meeting the standard in training. women passing Ranger training was to Many other comments expanded on the mask the names and number of women Physiologically, women are composed gender-based bias with sweeping gener- entering.6 However, more can be done differently than men and many cannot alizations about physical ability. Women to bolster an environment primed for fair perform the same physical tasks as men. It were viewed by respondents as weaker gender integration. is apparent even with the APFT [Army either because their institutional stan- Physical Fitness Test] grading scale where dards are so much lower or because they Practical Policies the men and women scoring scales drasti- perceive women to be physically weaker. The Gender Integration Study provides cally differ. Since this is such a big push by That leads to an important question: If a complex, detailed assessment of issues the Army to integrate women into combat women pass, will male Soldiers in the mil- and attitudes facing the Army as it arms, they will do whatever [is] necessary itary accept that women met or exceeded moves to gender-integrate the force to integrate as rapidly as the public wants the same standard as men, or will women completely. Yet many of the policy them to regardless of the level a woman is be forever viewed as having been accom- recommendations going forward are at in comparison to her male counterparts modated in order to meet some political lacking in substance and practical appli- within combat arms branches. agenda? These comments also highlight cation. Leaders at the highest levels male Soldiers’ beliefs that they will react can publish policy and issue statements Two contrasting responses to the inappropriately around women. The very in an attempt to mitigate many of the question, “Do you think that females are presence of women seems to elicit the issues discussed in the study. However, capable of meeting standards in combat belief that men themselves will become without follow-through and practi- arms units and training?” are telling: foolish, while readiness and cohesion suf- cal guidance for all levels down to the fer. The professionalism of men remains platoon or development of a way to “Can’t speak for entirety of combat •• a concern as women integrate into these measure effectiveness, the policies will arms, but if you’re asking if I could previously closed jobs. continue to fall flat. Stating that com- see a female in the ranks with the Furthermore, other comments spoke mands must create an equal opportunity pipe swinging meat eaters of a to the culture of the combat arms being environment and prevent sexual harass- Ranger Battalion, hell no. Can’t see too hostile to women or demonstrated ment and assault is not enough. Leaders them carrying around a mortar tube a respondent’s hostility. One person at all levels must have practical tools to living the gruntiest [sic] dirtiest life commented: encourage a climate of tolerance while in the military possible either. Physi- maintaining readiness. cally capable is indifferent to me. As far as combat arms units go, there U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-22, I have literally watched a group of would be an extremely negative effect Army Physical Readiness Training, can be professionals completely change for within units which are traditionally male. improved. The easiest way is to include the worse, become petty and show The things that go on there, the bonds, pictures of women demonstrating physi- offish because 1 attractive female was would be damaged. SHARPs [the Army’s cal tasks.7 There are currently no images attached to the platoon. If you want Sexual Harassment/Assault Response of women in FM 7-22 beyond how to to make [a] combat unit ineffective, and Prevention program] stuff would be measure a woman’s body for her body assign some women to it.” through the roof. I would almost rather die mass index. Young Soldiers who need to “I believe individual women cer- •• before changing my demeanor within my seek guidance in the regulation regarding tainly are [capable of meeting stan- unit. Standards need to be met and main- physical fitness will see pictures of both dards]. Once again, so long as we tained, but we should all strive to exceed the sexes completing tasks. Furthermore, limit accessions to those individual standard. showing women completing tasks with women, the force should be okay. I their male counterparts will make the am also far from confident we have This comment, and others like it, institutional statement that women are the political and organizational will reveal deep-seated attitudes that need capable. to pre-emptively weed out those to change within military culture to The physical fitness manual should [who] won’t [meet standards].” allow women to serve free of bias again read, as it did in 1980, “Just and stereotypes. Because the mission because women are different does not
50 JPME Today / Understanding Gender Bias in Integration JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Soldier qualifies with M4 rifle during New York Army National Guard Best Warrior Competition at Camp Smith Training Site, March 30, 2017 (U.S. Army National Guard/Harley Jelis)
mean they are incapable of achieving undermine teamwork, mutual respect, male(s). . . . They are doing a fine job and satisfactory levels of performance.”8 This loyalty, and shared sacrifice of the men have established an excellent record in sentence instills the belief that women and women of America’s Army.”9 The the Army.”10 Something similar could be are capable and are expected to perform rest of the chapter goes on to discuss in outlined, such as: alongside their male counterparts. The vague and legalistic terms an equal op- importance of this statement will rever- portunity command climate. This chapter Beware of the Soldier who speaks disrespect- berate through not only combat arms but does little to influence the culture inside fully of others. He or she is not to be trusted. also all training as well. This form of le- the Army or protect unfair treatment of Your friends or family may be his or her gitimacy puts all female Soldiers on notice minorities, including women. next victim. You will often see members of that they are expected to meet required The 1949 Army Pamphlet 21-41, the Army who are different from you. You standards. These standards apply whether Personal Conduct for the Soldier, did more are a professional and will treat all officers trainers or the women themselves be- for equal opportunity than the current and noncommissioned officers with the re- lieve they are capable of meeting such regulation. It brought good order and spect due to them and their rank, regardless standards. The Army as a whole would conduct to the force. It raised the expec- of how you feel about them. benefit from the institution of the Service tation that the Soldier was going to do and its leadership putting both in writing what was right because “what was right” The pamphlet could outline how and in pictures its confidence in its female was in a manual in the Soldier’s pocket to treat members of the opposite sex in Soldiers. as an inspectable item. The pamphlet subsequent chapters in order to further Additionally, in Army Regulation outlined conduct on and off duty, on and illustrate the importance of respect. 600-20, Command Policy, the off post. The regulation stated, “Beware Lastly, the changing character of Department of the Army outlines of the man who speaks disrespectfully of war reinforces the high level of physical in chapter 6, paragraph 1, that women. Your sister or one of your friends readiness Servicemembers must achieve. “Commanders are responsible for sustain- may be his next victim,” and stated of Anyone, anywhere, and at any time can ing a positive EO [Equal Opportunity] female Servicemembers, “In the Army be engaged by the enemy regardless of climate within their units . . . Create and you will frequently see members of the gender, MOS, or age. It is imperative sustain effective units by eliminating Women’s Army Corps. Accord them the to maintain high physical standards. discriminatory behaviors or practices that same respect and courtesies you extend Because the current standard is so low for
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Trobaugh 51 17- to 21-year-old women is not only in- sulting, but it also serves to reinforce that women are not as capable as their male counterparts. Many women may find it difficult to run faster or do more push- ups, but they should be brought up to a higher standard because war demands it. Implementing a single standard for all 17- to 21-year-olds should adequately test the baseline for a passing rate no mat- ter the gender, such as 16:30 for 2 miles, 30 push-ups, and 53 sit-ups. Since these examples lower the standard for men, a fear may develop among Soldiers that a broad standard may hurt the combat arms skills where physical fitness is paramount to the job. Therefore, it would be better not only to have one standard for a baseline (not based on gender), but also to apply minimally acceptable standards for each job skill, as Army leaders have discussed in recent years.11 For instance, if a score of 60 percent in each event on the APFT is passing, then a Soldier must meet an 85 percent requirement to stay within combat arms jobs, a 75 percent require- ment to stay in combat support, and a 70 percent pass rate within Service support. Thus, the 60 percent would be main- tained for Soldiers with professional jobs, such as lawyers, doctors, and chaplains. A benefit to restructuring the APFT is that it gender neutralizes the standard. Everyone must pass the same APFT to enter the Army, but their jobs will demand more of them with job-specific minimally acceptable standards. This model takes “male” and “female” out of the standard and replaces it with “Soldier” in combat arms, “Soldier” in combat sup- port, and “Soldier” in service support. It incentivizes staying fit because Soldiers Soldier learns survival skills during Exercise Kowari, designed to enhance U.S, Australian, and Chinese who love their jobs will work to maintain friendship and trust through trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, Northern Territory, Australia, August 30, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Osvaldo L. Ortega III) their job-specific standards out of fear they could be involuntarily reclassified women, many female Soldiers are often The differences noted above serve as the to another job for poor physical perfor- discounted as weaker, even when they can basis for institutional bias. Since the Army mance. Furthermore, this kind of APFT meet the same standard as men. Female policy requires women to do only fewer standard emphasizes quality at a time Soldiers between the ages of 17 and than half the push-ups males are required when the Army must sacrifice quantity. 21 are required to do 19 push-ups and to do, the message conveys that women Each job classification demands an appro- run 2 miles in 18:54 to pass, while male are half as capable as men. priate level of fitness and will ensure the Soldiers in the same age group are asked It would benefit the Army to close best Soldiers remain in the correct jobs. to do 42 push-ups and run 2 miles in or eliminate the gap altogether. The low A job skill differentiating standard 15:54. There is no difference for sit-ups. standard for push-ups and run time for might unintentionally create hierarchy
52 JPME Today / Understanding Gender Bias in Integration JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 2 among combat arms, combat sup- Lynette Arnhart et al., Gender Integra- tion Study (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army port, and service support. Promotions Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Cen- New from might be affected to favor combat arms ter, April 21, 2015). Soldiers. The bias might arise that since 3 Ibid., 11. NDU Press combat arms Soldiers would have to 4 Peter Glick and Susan T. Fiske, “The for the Center for Strategic Research do more physically, they must be better Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiat- Strategic Forum 298 ing Hostile and Benevolent Sexism,” Journal Soldiers. An answer to this unintended of Personality and Social Psychology 70, no. 3 Cross-Functional Teams in Defense consequence is to place more emphasis (March 1996), 491–512. Reform: Help or Hindrance? on education in the combat support and 5 Ernesto Reuben, Paola Sapienza, and By Christopher J. Lamb service support jobs. These jobs require Luigi Zingales, “How Stereotypes Impair There is organizational skills, technical expertise, Women’s Careers in Science,” Proceedings of strong bipar- the National Academy of Sciences 111, no. 12 and administrative management ability. tisan support (January 2014), 4403–4408. The Army should invest in the Soldiers 6 Michelle Tan, “First Official Integrated for Section who perform these essential functions Ranger School Underway, Army Won’t Talk 941 of the that require more brainpower than physi- About the Women,” Army Times, November Senate’s ver- cal ability. Providing education would 3, 2015. sion of the 7 U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-22, be a way to afford service support and National Army Physical Readiness Training (Washington, combat support Soldiers the same pro- DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, Defense motion opportunities as their combat October 26, 2012). Authorization Act for 2017, which arms counterparts. 8 U.S. Army FM 21-20, Physical Fitness requires the Pentagon to use cross- Training (Washington, DC: Headquarters functional teams (CFTs). CFTs are Department of the Army, 1980). Instead of arguing whether we should a popular organizational construct 9 U.S. Army Regulation 600-20, Army integrate women into the force, the bet- Command Policy (Washington, DC: Headquar- with a reputation for delivering bet- ter question would be to ask how we can ters Department of the Army, 2014), chapter 6, ter and faster solutions for complex better prepare all Soldiers for upcoming paragraph 1. and rapidly evolving problems. The global strategic challenges. The chang- 10 U.S. Army Pamphlet 21-41, Personal Department of Defense reaction to Conduct for the Soldier (Washington, DC: ing face of battle includes the fact that the bill has been strongly negative. Headquarters Department of the Army, 1949). women are part of the success equation. 11 Kevin Lilly and Michelle Tan, “Army’s Senior officials argue that Section If war is going to include winning hearts New Fitness Tests: New Details Emerge from 941 would “undermine the author- and minds, that will include the hearts Leadership,” Army Times, February 18, 2016. ity of the Secretary, add bureaucracy, and minds of women. Development and confuse lines of responsibility.” is severely hindered when women are The Senate’s and Pentagon’s dia- not included. Therefore, women in metrically opposed positions on the the military will continue to be on the value of CFTs can be partially recon- battlefield. As such, they should be as ciled with a better understanding of battlefield-ready as their male counter- what CFTs are, how cross-functional parts. Furthermore, we should expect groups have performed to date in more of our male and female Soldiers, not the Pentagon, and their prerequi- less. The fact that women are different sites for success. This paper argues from men does not make them incapable there is strong evidence that CFTs of meeting satisfactory levels of fitness. could provide impressive benefits if Female Soldiers have to be able to pull the teams were conceived and em- the trigger, traverse the battlefield, and ployed correctly. deal with casualties no differently from their male counterparts. In addition, the Army can expect its male Soldiers to act with decency and respect toward their fel- low Soldiers, regardless of gender. JFQ
Notes
1 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Visit the NDU Press Web site for “Testimony of U.S. Marine Corps Comman- more information on publications dant Robert B. Neller,” March 14, 2017. at ndupress.ndu.edu
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Trobaugh 53 U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey participates in U.S. Special Operations Command Exercise Emerald Warrior, Avon Park, Florida, March 7, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Keifer Bowes)
gence, nanotechnology, biotechnology, three-dimensional printing, and a host Multidomain Battle of others continue to accelerate and proliferate across multiple domains, and Converging Concepts Toward as our potential adversaries adjust their strategies by utilizing these advance- ments asymmetrically in order to a Joint Solution counter our strengths, we can no longer develop domain-specific solutions that By David G. Perkins and James M. Holmes require time and effort to synchronize and federate. The purpose of this article then is to he mission of the Department of Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, describe what the U.S. Army Training Defense (DOD) is to provide the and Coast Guard) has pursued separate and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) T military forces needed to deter and unique conceptual approaches to and Air Combat Command (ACC) are war and to protect the security of the the dual requirements of deterrence and doing to provide input to the Army and Nation. To accomplish this mission, the protection. These differences have been Air Force, collaboratively, to integrate various Services within DOD—individ- based largely on each Service’s primary and converge their individual land and air ually and collectively—must be trained operational domain—the limitations domain capabilities in order to create the and ready today, while simultaneously and opportunities presented by operat- merged multidomain capabilities that will preparing for evolving threats in the ing on land, on the sea, and in the air. be required for success in future combat. future. Historically, each Service (the We would then try to synchronize a series of federated solutions, developed Multidomain Battle: A New somewhat in isolation to deal with the Concept for a New World problems posed in a specific domain, Our potential adversaries have studied General David G. Perkins is the Commanding into a joint solution. But as advance- our battlefield successes since the First General of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. General James M. Holmes is ments in cyber and the electromagnetic Gulf War. It is now clear that they have Commanding General of Air Combat Command. spectrum, robotics, artificial intelli- learned three macro lessons. First, do not
54 Commentary / Multidomain Battle: Converging Concepts JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 let the United States and its allies gain Figure 1. Army Battlefield Framework access to the area of operations. Once Strategic Operational established, we have the operational Operational Deep Support Support Area Close Area Deep Fires Support Area Maneuver Area advantage and can provide overwhelm- Area Area ing logistic, firepower, and command AirLand Battle and control (C2) support. Second, try Rear Close Deep to fracture our operational framework by isolating the air domain from the land domain in order to defeat air and Continuum of Physical Geographic Space land forces in sequence. Third, fix us and do not allow our forces to maneuver Physical Manifestation of Capabilities & Effects Across Levels of War Tactical (Space, Cyberspace, EW, Information) and bring all of our elements of combat power (including leadership) to bear in Operational (Space, Cyberspace, EW, Information) order to gain a position of advantage. Strategic (Space, Cyberspace, EW, Information) In the future, we can expect all do- Key: Point of physical manifestation of capabilities/effects Pathways capabilities must traverse to create effect mains to be contested. Future adversaries will possess significant integrated defense capabilities, integrated air defenses, and ers and staffs in clearly visualizing and more on the functions conducted by long-range fires, as well as sophisticated describing the application of combat friendly and enemy assets and systems. intelligence, surveillance, and recon- power in time, space, and purpose (see Focusing on the functions conducted naissance (ISR); offensive and defensive figure 1). It then provides an organiz- by friendly and enemy forces allows information; electronic warfare; and cyber ing construct for the commander to coordinated employment and integra- capabilities. It will no longer be possible apply resources and capabilities. The tion of air, space, and cyber effects in to maintain total domain dominance in framework also guides the Army in the battlespace to protect or exploit all domains all the time. developing capabilities and echelons friendly functions while degrading or Multidomain battle (MDB) is a con- of command to apply combat power defeating enemy functions across geo- cept designed to address this changing and achieve given purposes as well graphic boundaries to create and exploit world. We must be able to get past our as develop doctrine to execute the enemy vulnerabilities and achieve a adversary’s integrated defensive capabili- concept. The Army’s operational continuing advantage. These efforts are ties, avoid domain isolation and fracturing, and battlefield framework is, by the typically centralized and planned within and preserve our freedom of action. We reality and physics of the land domain, the single echelon of an Air Operations must be able to penetrate their defenses at generally geographically focused and Center and led by the Combined Forces a time and place of our choosing, in more employed in multiple echelons. Air Component Commander. than one domain, by opening windows The Army’s objective with this con- The Air Force and Army share a com- of domain superiority to allow maneuver cept is to define problems as multidomain mon belief in the first order principles of inside our adversary’s integrated defense. and multifunctional from the start and to defining problems as multidomain and The rate and speed of current and future develop converged and integrated solu- multifunctional from the start, maintain- world events will not allow us the time tions that do not allow any domain to go ing a high operational tempo driving to synchronize federated solutions. In uncontested. the adversary to be reactive and denying order to present the enemy with multiple sanctuaries from which an adversary can dilemmas, we must converge and integrate The ACC Proposed Air Force safely operate. our solutions and approaches before the Operational Framework battle starts. We must also become sensor- The mission of the Air Force is to Impacts of the Differing shooter agnostic in all our platforms, and fly, fight, and win—in air, space, and Frameworks we must develop a common operating cyberspace. With this in mind, and with The Army’s multi-echelon framework picture. the inherent flexibility provided by the is designed to create freedom of action, range and speed of air, space, and cyber generate rapid tempo, and optimize The Army Operational and power, the ACC construct for visual- the use of available combat power. Battlefield Framework izing and describing operations in time Capabilities that could not be used The Army’s mission is to fight and and space has developed differently effectively or that would encumber win the Nation’s wars by providing from the Army’s (see figure 2). One key lower echelons are retained at higher prompt, sustained land dominance difference between the two constructs is levels in order to allow lower echelons across the full range of military opera- that while the Army’s is based on physi- to focus on the extremely demanding tions. An operational framework is a cal location of friendly and enemy assets lethal and physical aspects of close cognitive tool used to assist command- and systems, ACC’s is typically focused and deep operations. Higher echelon
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Perkins and Holmes 55 Figure 2. ACC Battlespace Construct Army’s multi-echelon approach of rapid Fires tempo. However, due to the inherent reach, speed, and flexibility of air, space, and cyber assets, the Air Force has the ability to disperse forces for protection while still maintaining the ability to mass
Function forces in execution to achieve coordinated Function
Friendly Strategic Strategic Friendly and integrated effects. These factors cre- Adversary Strategic Function Function ate the need for a more centralized C2 Function Friendly Operational Friendly Function structure for rapid planning of integrated Adversary Operational Friendly Support Friendly Adversary Support Space Domain missions. From the plan, orders that Cyber Domain provide effects throughout all functions of Air Domain Land Domain the adversary’s system are delivered to the Maritime Domain vastly dispersed friendly forces. Defensive Focus for Protecting Assets Offensive Focus for Targeting Adversary & MD Window Creation These frameworks have worked separately over the past 30 years. Recent advancements by peer adversaries across Figure 3. Army–Air Force Battlefield Framework the globe, including exquisite ISR capa- Fires bilities, ubiquitous long-range fires, and sophisticated integrated defenses, drive a requirement for the Services to adopt a new framework to achieve a continuing advantage in a contested, degraded, and
Function operationally limited environment. Function Friendly Strategic Friendly Adversary Strategic Function Function Army–Air Force Framework Function Friendly Operational Friendly Function Convergence and Integration Adversary Operational Friendly Support Friendly
Adversary Support Victory in future combat will be deter- Space Domain Cyber Domain mined by how successfully commanders Air Domain Land Domain can understand, visualize, and describe Maritime Domain the battlefield to their subordinate
Defensive Focus for Protecting Assets Offensive Focus for Targeting Adversary & MD Window Creation commands, thus allowing for more rapid decisionmaking to exploit the
Strategic Deep Operational initiative and create positions of relative Operational Strategic Support Support Area Close Area Maneuver Deep Fires Support Area Deep Fires Area Area Area advantage. In the coming year, the Army and Air AirLand Battle Force will be conducting a series of exper- Rear Close Deep iments and initiatives to help determine the essential components of MDB C2.
Continuum of Physical Geographic Space Between the Services there is a common understanding of the future operational Physical Manifestation of Capabilities & Effects Across Levels of War environment, the macro-level problems Tactical (Space, Cyberspace, EW, Information) that must be addressed, and the capabil- Operational (Space, Cyberspace, EW, Information) ity gaps that currently exist. Potential Strategic (Space, Cyberspace, EW, Information) solutions require us to ask questions dif- ferently, to ask different questions, and Key: Point of physical manifestation of capabilities/effects Pathways capabilities must traverse to create effect in many cases to change our definitions. For example, the Services are discovering headquarters create the conditions for commander’s intent, the exercise of disci- that interoperability of information does subordinate echelons to succeed. plined initiative, mission-type orders, and not mean having the same hardware or Mission command is a principle of the acceptance of prudent risk. The focus even the same processes or frameworks— unified land operations that blends the art of C2 becomes the purpose of the opera- rather it means a shared appreciation of of command and the science of control. It tion rather than the details of execution. C2 as a weapon system, a common sense relies on cohesive teams built through mu- The Air Force’s single-echelon frame- of which data are critical, and how to tual trust, a shared understanding of the work strives for the same results as the protect and leverage that data to gain and
56 Commentary / Multidomain Battle: Converging Concepts JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Soldier with Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 172nd Infantry Regiment, 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Mountain), Vermont Army National Guard, prepares assault during annual training at Fort Drum, New York, June 24, 2015 (U.S. Air National Guard/Sarah Mattison) maintain positions of relative advantage. The Army and Air Force have been ing current technology to do more and Frameworks will tend to merge—not here before. The two Services had a provide greater capability, improving as an either/or binary choice—but as a shared understanding of the problem set future acquisitions across DOD, and, realization that effective cross-domain coming out of the Vietnam War and the most important, developing sensor-to- operations on the land and sea, in the need to develop a new warfighting doc- shooter webs. air, as well as cyber and electromagnetic trine. AirLand Battle Doctrine, developed In the future fight, we cannot de- domains will require a merged framework during the 1970s and 1980s, was the pend on disparate solutions developed and a common operating picture. result of rigorous experimentation and in- in functional Service stovepipes. Future The Army and Air Force currently tellectual debate that resulted in a shared commanders will have a profound have somewhat differing perspectives on understanding of the new battlespace. breadth and depth of information and mission command versus C2 and on a access to capabilities providing cross- battlefield framework that is oriented on Conclusion domain effects, maneuver, and fires. forces and geography versus one that is TRADOC and ACC are working col- Combat capabilities conceived and oriented on function and time. But these laboratively today to blend their warf- procured as disparate packages will be perspectives are not mutually exclusive. ighting concepts into a joint doctrine torn apart by peer adversaries, no mat- In fact, there is significant room for for the future. We recognize that we ter how well they are put together on convergence and integration between the must address our mindset across DOD a future battlefield. Now is the time to two (see figure 3). by changing our cultures to one of establish the framework by which we can The only noncommon area between inclusion and openness—true jointness. build the future force as a converged and these two frameworks is the Air Force’s We must shift from a model of interde- integrated solution. We are developing Adversary Strategic area. This area could pendence to one of integration, which a framework based on an informed con- easily be accommodated into the Army’s includes flexible C2 designs, better cept, associated capabilities, and a clear existing framework with the addition of integrated communications systems, and articulation of requirements, thus setting Strategic Deep Fires—an area over the development of tailorable and scalable the conditions to transform the military horizon beyond the range of land-based units, and, in key areas, policies that to fight and win in the increasingly systems, thus requiring cross-domain fires enable adaptability and innovation. We complex operational environment of the from the sea, air, and space. must address technology by repurpos- future. JFQ
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Perkins and Holmes 57 U.S. Air National Guard C-130J Hercules aircraft equipped with Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System drops line of fire retardant on Thomas Fire in hills above city of Santa Barbara, California, December 13, 2017 (U.S. Air National Guard/Nieko Carzis)
A 21st-Century Military Doctrine for America
By Steve F. Kime
e need to start thinking changes to long-held and entrenched and taught us some difficult lessons. about a military doctrine ideas about who we are and how we use Reality has begun to reveal the limits that W that is appropriate to the military power to express U.S. concepts we have been reluctant to recognize. realities the United States faces in the and values on domestic and interna- 21st century. This should prove to be a tional stages. It may take two or three Realities painful process because it will be forced decades to arrive at where we need to be, The new environment for nuclear strat- by unpleasant realities and will involve but we must start thinking about it now. egy includes the erosion of interconti- The United States emerged from nental nuclear power, basic changes to World War II as a superpower with the past thinking about nuclear escalation, Steve F. Kime was a Writer and Lecturer. doctrinal luxury of not having to come to and increased possibilities for the use of His most recent book is An Officer’s Story: A grips with the limits of our military power force at all levels of conflict, nuclear and Politico-Military Journey (AuthorHouse, 2015). for many decades. During that time, our nonnuclear. He was the President of the Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges from 1989 to 2005. Mr. open-ended approach to the construction A communications and technical Kime passed away in October 2017. and use of force has led the Nation astray revolution has altered the entire context
58 Commentary / A 21st-Century Military Doctrine for America JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 for international relations, including that “we could have won” cannot be security, combined with a sober approach the spectrum of potential and actual taken seriously, and continued posturing to threats abroad in careful coordination conflict and the options for building ap- to be able to try it again is not credible to with like-minded allies, can be an effec- propriate forces for the kinds of conflict astute observers. Americans, informed by tive approach to hard power. that are likely. a 24-hour news cycle and twice burned The military force component of The luxury of separating foreign by military overreach, realize that it is 21st-century U.S. posture must be a and domestic threats has ended, and the folly for a nation to confuse its friends, more focused one and a different one, Nation faces a pressing need to rediscover its enemies, and itself. It is insanity and but not a weak one. Domestically, secu- the geopolitical facts of life. We have for- hubris to think that, with leadership, rity of the homeland is active, effective gotten the “militia” focus of our ground policymakers can lead the population security. This U.S. foreign policy would forces, but a new awareness of domestic to conflict that would almost surely be result in a change in military doctrine, vulnerabilities, especially at our borders, is unsustainable over the long term and add and it would be decidedly neither passive beginning to rekindle thinking about the trillions of dollars to the national debt. nor pacifist. core purpose of the Army. The American people have been there Where direct threats to national se- An American concept of war has and done that. They will not go back. curity are concerned, the military part of evolved that is deeply embedded in American policy would be about sledge- public opinion and unlikely to change. It A Word to Reality Deniers hammers, not scalpels. Even smaller, accepts a “sledgehammer” approach to Some will argue that the price is high more “surgical” actions would be done clear threats to the Nation but does not and that unfriendly forces will fill any with overwhelming force. While our tolerate dabbling in unclear threats and vacuum. Those who argue this are doctrine should not seek to use force, incremental foreign military entangle- serious people with serious concerns we need to deal with a timeless reality: ments.1 Americans will support quick, that contain an element of truth and the best way to avoid a fight at any level decisive strikes on a clear enemy but must not be dismissed. of conflict is to be able to decide the will not support a lingering contest that There is no doubt that a reduced U.S. issue with force, if necessary. The most descends into a quagmire that saps the police role has left a vacuum. The price in credible American projection force is not economy and costs precious American a given region may indeed be high, the a spinoff of a world war–like force that lives. More contained applications of mili- need for America to shore up its coali- can threaten to invade and occupy; it is a tary force, done in coalition with other tions may be strong, and the necessity highly mobile power, appropriate to the countries and with clearly understood to endure regimes we loathe may be dis- situations where it is intended to be ap- goals, are more tolerable, but they have tasteful. The laudable American instinct plied and visible to all, a force that can hit limited staying power. to export our democratic values and great fast and hard, be done with it, and leave. The economic reality is that America, good fortune will suffer. Where more subtle or indirect threats in its post-industrial phase, cannot af- But accepting these realities is not of force are involved, or where regional ford to patrol the world as a policeman the end of the world, just the end of a issues demand multinational presence, and, perhaps more important, cannot world we dominate every day in every U.S. policy must lean heavily on diplo- afford the kinds of extended conflict and way. Those who would dispute the effect macy and international coalitions and maintenance of extended military pres- of these realities and oppose attempts to steer clear of unilateral projections of mil- ence abroad that we have supported in modernize our doctrine to meet them itary power. Every friendly world power recent decades. This economic reality might complain that they imply domes- knows that such coalitions work best with is accompanied by social and cultural tic policy isolationism and American American leadership and with credible change in the direction of softer power foreign policy tentativeness. In making force to back it up. Friendly powers must that has already had effect. The U.S. such an assertion, however, they would be made aware that the United States will world police are no longer on the beat. be wrong. A realistic, common sense lead only if all actors carry their fair share Nation-building, exporting democracy, military doctrine compatible with the will of the political and military burden. U.S. and stopping falling dominoes are already of the American people does not have politicians must understand and support things of the past. to relinquish the U.S. leadership role in a vigorous foreign service totally in tune A politico-military reality is this: pos- international affairs. There is plenty to do with our doctrine. turing forces and policies to do what we both at home and abroad. The response to those who would still are not actually prepared to start and fin- There is some consolation, however: insist that America must continue to be ish is dangerous and extremely expensive. American example and measured military the world police is not satisfying, but it is The cost in loss of American credibility action will continue to count. Ronald clear. The Nation must: on the international stage is enormous. Reagan’s “Shining City Upon a Hill” support an active, forward diplomacy Our failures in Vietnam, Afghanistan, has been our most successful contribu- •• backed up with visible and limited and Iraq will be in the calculations of our tion to the future of democracy. How but capable military presence. friends and enemies for decades. Claims we handle our domestic structure and
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Kime 59 •• be prepared to live with less-than- power and the need for numbers of ships in this century is not likely to be settled satisfying outcomes, unpleasant part- to bolster maritime presence. Runaway at sea. Even a clash at sea with China, ners, and ugly opponents. costs and the state of the economy ag- a prospect that will continue to require •• accept that building nations abroad gravate the tension between technology deployed forces in Asia, may be deterred in our own image is a chimera that and numbers of ships. We must seek there and even may start there, but would has been exposed. If the American balance here and not fail to see where not end there. This is not good news for way is to be imitated abroad, it will the future will take the Navy. We need to those who have tailored their doctrinal be because it is admired, not because keep an eye both to the need for presence thinking in terms of war-winning and it is cajoled, bought, or sold. Tril- abroad and the requirement for a modern world war scenarios. Nor is it good news lions of dollars and thousands of Navy clearly second to none. We are, in for those who, in spite of their denials, see lives have been wasted in feckless spite of the great changes that modern limited wars as spinoffs or subsets of the efforts to export our unique way of technology introduced into geopolitics great wars of the past that require massive life, and the American people are fed and space, a maritime nation. The Navy’s military outlays to prepare for extended up with it. role in a refocused U.S. military doctrine major conflict. •• understand that the Shining City is crucial. If the sledgehammer is needed, The truth is that conflict between Upon a Hill needs to shore up its the Navy and quick-strike elite forces will major powers, short of Armageddon, is domestic security and viability. This deliver the key blows. In some regional extended political, economic, and mili- should be seen as an international situations where U.S. interests are clearly tary competition without the territorial reality and not as isolationism. threatened enough to warrant congres- implications of the past. Superpower mili- sional approval to act, such forces will tary status focuses this long-term major Doctrinal Priorities deliver the fastest, surest strikes with the power competition but does not neces- and Directions most visible effect. If U.S. support of sarily determine outcomes. Especially A realistic military doctrine requires a a combined international projection of regarding competition with China, U.S. basic reordering of resources dedicated force is required by a determined coali- doctrine must see decades ahead and to our military posture. Significant tion and supported by Congress, the integrate political, social, and economic resources will continue to be needed for whole world would expect the crucial ele- factors with military ones. Limited, care- limited but decisive projection forces ment to be U.S. maritime power. fully tailored projection forces, combined and for beefed-up and reorganized Maritime visibility and presence with with strategic intercontinental ones aimed domestic security forces. Doctrinal unequaled strike capacity that fits the at the long haul, are key in this vision. priorities must be shifted in these refocused doctrine are key. This means directions and away from maintaining having enough carrier strike force to be Force Implications ground forces capable of deploying the sledgehammer if needed for rapid, The implications for nonprojection U.S. thousands of miles away and dominat- limited, independent U.S. action or forces are profound. Realities require ing distant battlefields for long periods the core of a joint international opera- an American force structure different of time. tion of larger scope, if appropriate. This from what we were used to maintaining Military budgets may suffer as the means increased resources for this facet in the second half of the 20th century. Nation, adjusting to the post-industrial of American military power because it Given the realities that have emerged, and changing global economic power is most likely to be brought to bear and resources must be shifted to match the balances, finds that it cannot maintain a most likely to deter potential adversaries will of the people to use force, the con- defense budget larger than several other in the first place. This also means atten- tingencies in which force makes sense, major countries combined. It is essential tion to the changing technical facets of and the resources that can realistically that our economic and political decision- limited warfare, such as antiaccess/area- be devoted to the military. makers think decades ahead about the denial challenges to projection forces. No nation is better positioned geo- role of the United States as they adjust We must tailor our forces for what graphically and economically to defend doctrine, defense budgets, and postures. we are actually prepared to do: smash a itself. Reagan was correct: the Shining There will probably be enough resources clearly identified and targeted enemy with City Upon the Hill is what America is for a thoughtful future military, but not overwhelming force in short order or really about and how we can best be the enough to keep rebuilding the past. provide standoff support of a somewhat model for the world. Our very existence Debates over inculcation of high longer commitment by an international is the best answer to those who choose technology and size of forces will tend to coalition in which U.S. Marines are not to be like us. This is what American be settled in favor of the former as reali- involved. At the same time, we must be exceptionalism really means. Protecting ties weigh in. Such debates will influence careful not to get drawn into fantasies the Shining City is what our Army should forces in varying ways. about “war at sea.” Naval forces can deter be about. We face intense debates between and, if necessary, determine the outcome In spite of the considerable innova- technological development of naval of localized conflicts, but major conflict tion that has taken place in military
60 Commentary / A 21st-Century Military Doctrine for America JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Department of Homeland Security delivers food and water to isolated Puerto Rico residents after Hurricane Maria destroyed infrastructure around Utuado, Puerto Rico, October 12, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Joshua L. DeMotts) affairs, our basic doctrinal outlook has they could happen without heated needed an elite force that can be decisive not changed much, especially regard- resistance and debate, but it is time for in necessary and small uses of force. The ing ground warfare. Two world wars America to come to grips with the fact Marine Corps is the core ground element distorted the nature of the Army, and it that it is the U.S.-Mexico border, not the of U.S. projection forces. The Marine is time to get back to a basic fact: we are North Korea–South Korea border, that Corps may be judged to be at about the a Reserve and National Guard nation. we must guard. For half a century, we right size to be capable of the kind of The purpose of the Army is to defend have not even tried to correct the Korean robust, decisive action it can be called the homeland. The posture, operations, abnormality as we harbored the illusion on to do, but adjustments for coalition and deployment of our Army should be that world war postures were normal for warfare and more modern deployment aimed at our borders and our internal America. Reality contradicts such illusions. techniques are in order. America only security. If America ever has to put troops on needs one Marine Corps. Some sacred The Army should maintain the armed the ground in massive numbers, it will organizational and cultural oxen should core of fighters and trainers who might require all of us to weigh in, not just a be gored: “Elite” forces in the Army and be needed if it is ever necessary to call few volunteers. The volunteer Army must Navy should be transferred to the Marine on the states and the people to provide evolve more highly integrated training Corps where they properly belong in a a massive force. It is not the function of and posture relationships among Reserve, 21st-century military doctrine. the Army to maintain forces for “boots Guard, and Active units. The Selective Airpower needs rethinking. It will on the ground” in foreign interventions. Service needs to be serious about the re- continue to be important both as a strate- Maintaining the force for “the well-regu- ality, though remote, of mobilization, and gic hammer in the triad and as a precision lated militia necessary to the security of a it must adjust to the gender revolution. instrument in coalition warfare. U.S.- free State” is the Army’s basic responsibil- The requirement to deploy U.S. based Air Force assets will be relevant ity, supported by the states. forces on the ground, short of a need throughout the spectrum of conflict. Because the changes required are to mobilize a mass Army, has changed The size of the forces can be reduced, fundamental, it would be naïve to think but not disappeared. We have always but their quality must be enhanced to fit
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Kime 61 Members of Joint Task Force Empire Shield ramp up operations at Fulton Street Subway Station on September 21, 2016, following bombings in Manhattan and New Jersey (U.S. Air National Guard/Christopher S. Muncy) a realistic idea of how and when projec- on quality rather than quantity. Thus, between a revamped Army and Coast tions of airpower will actually be needed some serious consideration of cheaper, Guard is in order. in addition to beefed-up aircraft carrier nonnuclear submarines in presence and Nuclear forces must be updated to deployments. The debate between advo- support missions is in order. reflect a second nuclear age increasingly cates of new technology and proponents Presence requires more than aircraft different from the old “balance of ter- of numbers of aircraft must tilt, unlike carriers. Numbers of ships and the ability ror” days. This need is far too complex the case with Navy construction, clearly to keep large numbers deployed without to explain in detail here, but some likely toward technology. Foreign-based Air ruining ships and destroying morale with changes are a modified triad with fewer Force fighter capabilities would be de- unreasonable operations tempo are all intercontinental strategic weapons, emphasized and might not fit at all into important. A shift to a maritime-oriented updated, and with concentration on the refocused U.S. doctrine. forward military presence in a new ap- most invulnerable weaponry. We also need Our strategic deterrent in submarines proach to U.S. military doctrine must a new focus on highly mobile, tactical, will be a vital element of American mili- recognize that resources must be devoted nuclear weaponry that would be credible tary doctrine for the foreseeable future, to the presence mission. Numbers count. in both deterrence and warfighting in an but we must come to grips with the We have the core of a maritime environment where uses, and threats of economic costs and the changed nature defense force, but new realities require use, of nuclear weapons at lower nuclear and relevance of nuclear intercontinental shifts in focus and orientation. The Coast levels of escalation are increasingly more deterrence. Fewer ballistic missile sub- Guard needs refocusing and probably likely. We must guard against surprise at marines can do the job. Similarly, the some buildup to cope with 21st-century the tactical nuclear level. attack submarine force must adjust to realities. Increased “militarization” of As the full implications of the need new realities. We must keep pace with the the Coast Guard is probably needed. We to integrate internal defense with foreign strategic submarine threat from China must reject the schizophrenic notion that projections of force in our thinking be- and Russia, and some submarine support the Coast Guard is not really a military come clear, a serious, refocused military of Navy projection forces is needed, but force. More Navy–Coast Guard integra- doctrine will cause some badly needed re- the nuclear submarine force must focus tion is needed, and tighter coordination configuration between the Departments
62 Commentary / A 21st-Century Military Doctrine for America JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 of Defense and Homeland Security. It may be that the evolution and growth of major institutions—the National Security Agency’s internal role and functions of Homeland Security, for instance—were mistaken. They must be rethought in terms of a serious military doctrine. We may find that, as in 1947, a comprehen- sive new approach to national security organization is needed to execute a new doctrine. It is also time to correct the legal relationships between “domestic” and “foreign” armed forces that have be- come skewed over time. The entire body of law regarding the Posse Comitatus Act needs thorough review and revision in light of the reality that domestic and foreign military functions can no longer be cleanly separated.
A Realistic Timeline Clearly, the context for the exercise of American leadership has changed. Also changed is the relationship of nuclear and conventional forces at all levels of conflict, the technical and communica- tions environments, and the interplay between domestic and foreign military challenges. It is a changed world both at home and abroad. New realities demand new approaches to the mis- sions, construction, and operation of U.S. military forces. Political realism is, of course, at odds with these stark realities. Perceptive lead- ers and military innovators see and grasp the realities, but it is unrealistic to hope that America will adjust quickly to them. Despite the growing awareness that our current military posture is out of sync with the times, no politician and no mili- tary officer could successfully confront the powerful array of vested interests in the status quo and suggest the kind of military revolution that reality requires. Detective with Asheville Police Department Bomb Squad places X-ray detection device in simulated The realities themselves will have to hazardous area during regional domestic operations and homeland security/defense exercise Operation weigh in, and eventually they will. We Vigilant Catamount, at Fontana Dam, North Carolina, June 12, 2017 (National Guard/Wayne Becton) may approach mid-century before they do. It may not yet be clear enough that might be irregular because revolutions Note politico-economic decisionmakers must can happen incrementally and by fits and 1 deal with it, but we are on the cusp of the starts. Let there be no illusions about Steve F. Kime, “Return to the American Way of War,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings day when reality will force a revolution how difficult this revolution will be, but 137, no. 5 (May 2011). in military doctrine. The doctrine sug- let us not fail to see the curve and get gested here constitutes a revolution, and ahead of it. JFQ revolutions take time. The arc of change
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Kime 63 Army Reserve Soldiers with U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) board CASA 212 aircraft during night airborne operation at Camp Mackall Airfield, North Carolina, March 12, 2013 (U.S. Army/Jacquelyn R. Slaughter)
The Need for an Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force Structure
By Richard B. Davenport
Twenty-first-century warfare—where hearts, minds, and opinion are, perhaps, more important than kinetic force projection—is guided by a new and vital dimension, namely the belief that whose story wins may be more important than whose army wins. This is especially true if one avoids kinetic engagement altogether.
—Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares
t has been over 30 years since the element could provide “DOD-wide first Department of Defense (DOD) psychological operations with strategic I Psychological Operations (PSYOP) focus and the capability to orchestrate Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Davenport, USA, is Master Plan was published in 1985, and coordinate the military PSYOP the Chief of Training for Psychological Operations at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare advocating for a permanent joint psy- effort in conjunction with other U.S. Center and School. chological warfare element. Such an Government agencies.”1 Since then, the
64 Commentary / An Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 authors of numerous other documents Struggle and Evolution of The disestablishment of the USIA and members of working groups such Unified Strategic PSYWAR in 1999 created a void in the U.S. as Unified Quest 2015 and 2016 have American PSYWAR has a long and Government efforts for global strategic all advocated for some type of strategic storied history that can be traced back messaging that allowed adversarial states influence command that could specifi- to the Revolutionary War, when Colo- and nonstates the opportunity to domi- cally align, synchronize, harmonize, nial forces threw strips of paper (con- nate the narrative in multiple regions. unify, integrate, improve, counter, taining promises of more money, food, This conceded global strategic space was collaborate, direct, and deconflict land, and freedom) tied to rocks at then only contested through disorga- all forms of influence and persuasion Redcoats to induce surrenders.6 Today, nized U.S. counternarratives that had no efforts among all elements of diplo- DOD influence efforts are taking place true unity of effort or synchronization. macy, informational, military, and in Syria and Iraq supporting Operation What made this problematic for DOD economic (DIME), and joint, interor- Inherent Resolve, with various techno- was that there was no strategic military ganizational, and multinational orga- logical dissemination platforms and organization that could act as a backstop nizations (JIMs).2 However, even with messages being used to reach select or complementary function to conduct all of these voices and efforts spanning foreign target audiences. The current strategic influence planning and global many decades, such an organization has PSYOP force structure dates to World synchronization. Some of these realities not come to fruition. War II, when PSYWAR was first date back to the 1980s when the first Today, the current operational envi- officially institutionalized and formal- major overhaul of U.S. military PSYOP ronment and information environment ized with the 1942 formation of the took place. have fragmented and decentralized, Psychological Warfare Branch, Allied The first modern-day overhaul and re- causing ethnic, racial, religious, national, Force Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ), structuring of the PSYWAR organization and tribal differences to increase and which was led by the “father” of U.S. started during the Ronald Reagan era. fostering complex hybrid warfare types PSYWAR, Major General Robert A. An official directive came from the 1984 of conflicts and scenarios all over the McClure. The PWB/AFHQ supported Presidential order that directed Secretary globe.3 To this mix we must factor in PSYWAR efforts in North Africa, Sicily, of Defense Caspar Weinberger to rebuild the growing and effective psychological Italy, and southern France; in 1944, military PSYOP capabilities. This was warfare capabilities of the likes of China, the Psychological Warfare Division, followed by the development of the which has a “Strategic Support Force . . . Supreme Headquarters Allied European 1985 DOD PSYOP Master Plan, which elevated to an equal footing with China’s Forces, was created by General Dwight Secretary Weinberger approved. One of other military services, the army, navy, D. Eisenhower to conduct PSYWAR in the key findings by the Service authors of air force”; Russia, which has “built up its the European theater.7 Some of today’s the PSYOP Master Plan was that subor- muscle by forming a new branch of the PSYOP units can trace their lineage to dination of PSYOP to special operations military—information warfare troops”; those original organizations. However, forces (SOF) was believed to detract from and the so-called Islamic State (IS), today’s DOD influence force structure, the recognition of the overall applicability which employs sophisticated propaganda specifically at the strategic level, has of PSYOP in times of peace, crisis, and efforts. Given these developments, there issues that need to be addressed and war. However, at that time PSYOP as an has never been a greater historical need corrected. organization was a part of the 1st Special and better opportunity to create this Strategic influence has always been Operations Command at Fort Bragg, strategic joint influence organization and a problematic reality not only for DOD North Carolina. In 1987, General Jim subsequent total joint influence force but also for the U.S. Government as a Lindsay, USA, the first commander of structure.4 whole. In 1953, the U.S. Government the U.S. Special Operations Command This article lays out the evolution under President Eisenhower established (USSOCOM), lobbied to overturn of psychological warfare (PSYWAR) as the United States Information Agency Secretary Weinberger’s decision on sepa- an organization and demonstrates the (USIA). The agency was highly successful ration of PSYOP from SOF, as did the need to create three strategic influence for decades during the Cold War until Army staff and Joint Staff. This decision organizations: a new Joint Influence it was officially shut down in 1999. It was due to the loss of all Active compo- Warfare Element (JIWE) to operate at had a massive $2 billion annual budget nent (AC) and Reserve component (RC) the National Security Council, DOD, focused on the ability “to streamline the PSYOP units and all the congressional and Department of State levels; a subuni- U.S. government’s overseas information money for PSYOP, which would have fied Joint Influence Warfare Command programs, and make them more effec- made it more difficult to justify a four-star (JIWC) to operate at the DOD and tive” in speaking to the values and truths command. Secretary Weinberger then Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) levels; and about the United States and countering reversed his decision and assigned Army Theater Director of Influence (TDI) or- the propaganda coming from Soviet and Air Force AC and RC PSYOP units ganizations to operate at the geographic active measures in about 150 different to USSOCOM.9 One could argue that combatant command (GCCMD) levels.5 countries.8 since that decision, DOD has not had
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Davenport 65 Soldier with 303rd Psychological Operations Company and Marine with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 watch leaflets fall over southern Afghanistan, August 28, 2013, in support of operations to defeat insurgency influence in area (U.S. Marine Corps/Demetrius Munnerlyn) a true strategic influence command to the events of September 11, 2001, and team positions at the corps and division plan, develop, manage, synchronize, and all the subsequent deployments to Iraq levels. However, these positions were deconflict all influence activities. This has and Afghanistan. Due to issues with long rarely filled, and the idea of synchronizing fostered a disorganized DOD-wide influ- mobilizations of the RC PSYOP forces, information-related capabilities was not ence force structure with no true unity of in 2006 Deputy Secretary of Defense well organized or managed by any one influence command and with inadequate Gordon England signed a memorandum organization throughout DOD. In the operational procedures for addressing that reassigned RC PSYOP units from late 1990s, the Army G3 reached out to transregional influence activities in the USSOCOM to the U.S. Army Reserve the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special operational environment.10 Command.11 This made the 4th PSYOP Warfare Center and School (SWCS), Since 1987, Army PSYOP has Group support primarily AC SOF. It also which at that time was the overall pro- fallen under USSOCOM and the U.S. made both 2nd and 7th PSYOP Groups ponent for SOF, to see if SOF would Army Special Operations Command support AC general purpose forces, want to take control of synchronizing (USASOC). Part of the command which was problematic because of a lack information-related capabilities and filling structure at that time involved one AC of year-round training support to AC the role of field support teams at corps and two RC PSYOP groups—the AC forces on Active duty. Finally, it broke up and divisions. SWCS rejected the idea, 4th PSYOP Group and the RC 2nd and true unity of command for all of PSYOP. and the Army G3 began formalizing 7th PSYOP Group, which fell under the Other dysfunctional influence efforts the IO organization as well as creating a U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological were coming from the information op- functional area for IO officers. Today, the Operations Command (USACAPOC), erations (IO) force structure. IO force structure falls under U.S. Army subordinate to USASOC. From a unity Another byproduct of September Cyber Command. The ultimate issue has of command perspective, this was not 11 was the continued growth and so- been a lack of true unity of command a bad solution in that all of AC and RC lidification of the IO force. During the that could provide the leadership, vision, PSYOP fell under one unified command late 1990s, IO was a nascent idea where guidance, management, and synchroniza- structure. However, this changed with officers were selected to fill field support tion of all influence efforts across not
66 Commentary / An Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 only the Army but also joint, DOD, and command and control of all of AC and of the Center for Information Analysis interagency elements. RC PSYOP forces. and Response.14 This bill was signed by The first idea for a strategic joint-level One aspect of the worldwide influ- President Barack Obama in December organization that could plan, coordinate, ence vision for the formation of the 2016 and became a part of the fiscal year and synchronize influence operations MISOC was to move the RC 2nd and 7th 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. began with the 1985 and 1990 DOD PSYOP Groups from the USACAPOC to These global organizations, however, PSYOP Master Plans, which advocated the MISOC for better unity of command do not have a unifying vision. On the for the creation of a Joint PSYOP Center. for influence. However, this was a short- one hand, the GEC approach to coun- There were several key features and rec- lived experience; in 2014, USASOC terinfluence is using primarily Web 2.0 ommended functions. The plan would: reorganized the MISOC into the U.S. 1st platforms. On the other hand, the future Special Forces Command with the 4th and Center for Information Analysis and preferably be subordinated directly •• 8th PSYOP Groups under its command Response will handle both Russian and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and control structure, and with the 2nd Chinese propaganda efforts using various of Staff and 7th PSYOP Groups remaining under other platforms and means to influence. act as the organizational and institu- •• USACAPOC. All these decisions led to The result will be no true unified joint in- tional front for PSYOP within DOD another strategic influence gap for DOD fluence organization that can synchronize be located in the National Capital •• and no true unifying type of command and deconflict all the DOD influencing Region for all things influence. Adding to these efforts with those coming from interorga- function as the key element for inter- •• issues was the lack of accomplishments nizational and multinational influencing agency coordination and cooperation coming from the strategically focused entities. Additionally, having so many have representation from Depart- •• Global Engagement Center (GEC). interorganizational entities for influence ment of State, Intelligence Commu- In 2015, Major General Christopher and a disorganized joint influence force nity, U.S. Information Agency, Voice Haas, USA, the USSOCOM Director of creates a complex approach to managing of America, and Board for Interna- Force Management and Development, influence efforts and therefore results in tional Broadcasting testified before the House Armed a lack of critical mass for influence against be responsible for long-range strate- •• Services Committee on Russian and IS adversarial states and nonstate actors.15 gic PSYOP plans propaganda. Congress had recognized Due to the identified strategic influence be responsible for the planning, •• that our adversaries were successful in gaps and lack of a unified influence com- coordination, and direction of the the art and science of influence and were mand structure for the entire joint force, DOD portion of national PSYOP asking the U.S. military why we were the recommendations in the following activities.12 falling behind in countering those ef- section provide innovative solutions to fix However, this type of joint influence forts. In Crimea, the Russians had been the DOD and joint strategic influencing organization as originally conceived overwhelmingly successful in conduct- force structure gap. would not come to fruition until 2004, ing hybrid warfare, which as its primary when the Joint Psychological Support effort was the use of propaganda and Solutions for an Element (JPSE) was established. But disinformation to achieve its ends.13 On Innovative Structure decisions were made to keep the or- the other side of the coin was the rise To fill the strategic influence gap, ganization under the command and of IS and its sophisticated and profes- DOD should consider the creation of control of USSOCOM and not the sional use of propaganda. In 2016, the a Joint Influence Warfare Element, a JCS. Additionally, the JPSE (which was Department of State responded to these Joint Influence Warfare Command, and renamed the Joint Military Information congressional observations by rebranding five to six regionally aligned Theater Support Command [JMISC] in 2009) its Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Director of Influence organizations. did perform some of those key functions Communications as the GEC. Additionally, a newly formed U.S. as articulated in the 1985 DOD PSYOP From 2010 to 2015, State had been Army PSYWAR Command and all three Master Plan, but the joint organization unsuccessful in its online social media Service influence organizations and lasted only 7 years and was disestablished operations to counter IS global propa- entities would fall under the command in 2011. It did not have an opportunity ganda efforts. One reason for its lack of and control of the JIWC. These organi- for continued growth and therefore was success against the warlike nonstate actor zational changes would ensure that all unable to reach its full strategic poten- is that State is primarily staffed by civil joint influence organizations maintain tial. Part of the decision to disband the servants who are trained to conduct diplo- their unique culture and identity at all JMISC was to form a new command at macy, not warfare. Additionally, Senator levels of war and across all domains and Fort Bragg, the Military Information Rob Portman (R-OH) and Senator spaces—physical space and cyberspace. Support Operations Command Chris Murphy (D-CT) introduced the JIWE would provide the highest level (MISOC), to conduct and manage Countering Information Warfare Act of of strategic influence representation at worldwide influence as well as have better 2016, which advocated for the creation the National Security Council, DOD,
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Davenport 67 and State Department levels. It would within the region. Each TDI would tions. If these recommended changes carry out specific influence strategy- have transregional authorities and would are made, the joint influence force will making responsibilities with an effort on coordinate for regional PSYWAR assets be in a much better unified position ensuring interagency, specifically State and dissemination and tactical assets, and to support and defend the Nation’s (also the GEC and Broadcasting Board would possess a theater Strategic Studies strategic interests against all propaganda of Governors), newly formed Center for Detachment/Cultural Intelligence efforts coming from the likes of adver- Information Analysis and Response, and Element cell. The organization would sarial states and nonstate actors well into Central Intelligence Agency deconfliction also possess a hybrid Army AC and RC the foreseeable future. JFQ and synchronization. Greater synchroni- PSYWAR element as well as other joint zation of a national narrative would be of Service influence representatives, giv- the utmost importance at this level. ing it a true joint influence capability. Notes JIWC would be a subunified strategic Additionally, there would be a mix of 1 influence command that falls directly interorganizational personnel, Army civil- Department of Defense Psychological Operations Master Plan (Washington, DC: under U.S. Strategic Command with ians, and contractors who would provide Department of Defense [DOD], 1990), 10, direct coordination with DOD, JCS, and various types of support. TDI would have available at
68 Commentary / An Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 January 3, 2017, available at
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Davenport 69 Dutch crew chief with 322nd Squadron (left) looks over flight records with U.S. Air Force Exchange Pilot at Leeuwarden Air Base, Netherlands, during NATO air forces’ Frisian Flag training exercise, March 27, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Brian Ferguson)
Geographic Component Network Analysis A Methodology for Deliberately Targeting a Hybrid Adversary
By Chance A. Smith and Steve W. Rust
n late September 2014, nearly 3 copious pages of academic publications months to the day after the so- have been devoted to analyses of the I called Islamic State (IS) declared group’s organizational structure, ideo- the establishment of its caliphate, logical appeal, centers of gravity, and Captain Chance A. Smith, USAF, is the Chief of Intelligence Strategy in the 612th Combined President Barack Obama noted that IS holistic strategies to counter its rapid Air Operations Center at Davis-Monthan Air represented a hybrid threat, calling the progress in securing and governing vast Force Base, Arizona. Steve W. Rust, Department group “a terror network with territo- swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. of the Air Force, is a Targeting Analyst in the 36th Intelligence Squadron at Langley Air Force rial ambitions and some of the strategy Curiously, this discussion has included Base, Virginia. and tactics of an army.”1 Since then, little regarding the proper method to
70 Features / Geographic Component Network Analysis JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 systematically analyze and deliberately that more fully characterizes the adver- at eliminating targets as soon as they target IS entities at the operational and sary’s military networks, degrades their were discovered on the battlefield. The tactical levels of war. operational centers of gravity, and aids in dynamic targeting cycle perfected during Targeting, a fundamental task of the achieving the joint force commander’s these conflicts allowed for pinpoint lethal joint fires function, is best conducted objectives in a more efficient, doctrinally strikes to occur in a rapid manner against through the use of systematic analysis sound manner. This method, which we time-sensitive targets. Strikes occurred to determine logical networks of targets refer to as geographic component network daily, all across the area of operations and that are of high value to the adversary analysis (GCNA), incorporates the in high numbers. commander.2 A well-developed targeting structure and terminology of both the Though this type of targeting strategy strategy is a vital component of any suc- target system analysis (TSA) and coun- would ultimately prove effective in aiding cessful military campaign. Unfortunately, terterrorism analytic framework (CTAF) efforts to disrupt insurgent networks, it the hybrid blend of quasi-state and insur- models, but narrows the scope of analysis had a secondary effect of conditioning gent group that defines IS, coupled with to a more manageable and meaningful military leaders to think of targeting as a a perceived demand from senior political defined geographic area. This in turn process that occurred in a matter of hours and military leaders for more targetable shrinks the timeline necessary to develop or days instead of weeks or months. It entities, has fostered an accelerated, “dy- an operationally relevant analytic under- created an unrealistic expectation of the liberate” targeting process in Operation standing of the adversary from months number of targets necessary to degrade Inherent Resolve (OIR) and resulted in (typically associated with a traditional an adversary under a more traditional, a lack of systematic analysis focused on TSA) to weeks. Furthermore, it incor- deliberate targeting approach. Even so, a adversary centers of gravity. The term dy- porates an inductive analytical approach distinction existed between the deliberate liberate targeting refers to a hybrid of the that is more conducive to understanding and dynamic targeting cycles and which deliberate targeting cycle and dynamic an adaptive, cell-like adversary than tradi- cycle should predominantly be used to targeting operations. This current process tional deductive approaches. counter both the state and the nonstate promotes the submission of single facil- actor, respectively. The hybrid nature of ity targets with reporting of IS activity, Challenges and Necessity of IS as a vast insurgent group with state- resulting in scattered, nonsequential Hybrid Network Analysis like qualities has blurred this distinction kinetic strikes on whichever targets are Early airpower advocate and Italian and, in the process, confounded attempts approved to the joint target list. This general Giulio Douhet noted in 1921 to analyze, understand, and target the type of strategy precludes the develop- that “the choice of enemy targets . . . group in a systematic fashion. ment or employment of measures of is the most delicate operation of aerial The flexible and adaptive structure effectiveness (MOEs), vital indicators of a warfare.”4 Starting in World War I, of IS, which allows it to rapidly toggle military’s progress in having an intended military planners and strategists began efforts among offensive, defensive, and effect against an adversary.3 Additionally, developing and employing method- sustainment operations in geographi- this whack-a-mole approach to target ologies to target adversary centers of cally defined areas it controls or seeks to development and approval results in gravity to achieve strategic, operational, control, is a distinct hybrid characteristic strikes that occur often before adversary and tactical objectives. These method- of the group.6 An ability to create a gov- networks or their significance are fully ologies were contingent upon in-depth ernance component to enforce order and understood, resulting in their incomplete preconflict planning efforts designed to maximize influence in IS territory is both disruption and allowing the adversary to formulate an understanding of a state representative of the group’s adaptability reconstitute its undisturbed capabilities in adversary’s capabilities and vulnerabili- and also a clear sign that IS is something short order and within close geographic ties and were employed with varying more than a textbook insurgency.7 It proximity to previous strikes. levels of success throughout the Gulf is precisely this hybrid characteristic— Hybrid warfare is not a new occur- War.5 “the combined ability to wage war and rence in military history. However, each A post-9/11 paradigm shift in build state capacity”8—that enables the hybrid threat exhibits itself uniquely. targeting strategy was ushered in with core strength of IS and distinguishes it As such, we must seek novel ways to U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency from many other insurgent organiza- systematically analyze and target the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The tions. Ultimately, any effective targeting various hybrid adversaries we face on deliberate targeting methodologies used strategy designed to counter IS must be the battlefield. In the case of IS, imple- in previous conflicts lacked utility against informed by an understanding of how it mentation and structured application the nonstate, asymmetric threats posed fits the profile of a hybrid threat, and the of an analytic methodology focused on by the Taliban and al Qaeda in Iraq, framework used to analyze the adversary defining the group’s component systems among others. The success of efforts to must account for both its state and non- within a geographically bounded area will target these adversaries was largely con- state characteristics.9 prove instrumental in the development tingent upon a time-constrained, tightly Current targeting doctrine provides and employment of a targeting strategy managed dynamic targeting cycle aimed two primary analytic frameworks for
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Smith and Rust 71 performing systematic analysis of an ad- networks that IS employs in the major with authorities at the intelligence, versary: TSA and CTAF.10 Unfortunately, strongholds it occupies across Iraq operations, and strategy divisions (at neither of these frameworks is designed and Syria. TSA, reliant upon deductive a minimum) within their respective for exclusive use against a hybrid adver- analysis to reach its conclusions, requires component or at the joint force to sary. The CTAF model is informative a predetermined understanding of the ensure a tight synchronization between inasmuch as the nine target systems it adversary’s military framework. The adap- the directorates and promote unity of provides are all applicable to understand- tive modus operandi of IS largely negates effort. Additionally, an output of this ing the flexible, adaptive networks IS the utility of this analytic framework. discussion should be a clear understand- presents at the operational level in the Its command structures are established ing on the part of the targeteer on towns it occupies and exerts governance yet flexible. Governance, revenue, and which geographic areas and component over. It is important to note, however, weapons facilities are often established in systems to focus targeting efforts. that there is no consensus on the target former civilian or government facilities in As the name implies, defining the systems that the CTAF model identifies an unpredictable manner to benefit from bounds of the geographic area in which for nonstate actors. Additionally, it fails to their protected status. Most important, to analyze the adversary is a critical step provide a clear scope for the geographic the component systems these facilities in conducting GCNA. In our experience, area it should be applied to, which is an comprise vary in their configuration focusing one’s analytic efforts at the city important consideration for a hybrid among IS strongholds. Performing a tra- level has been most effective against the adversary capable of governing numerous ditional TSA of the IS command, control, Islamic State. In the case of analyzing IS, cities with unique command structures communications, computers, and intelli- individual GCNA efforts focused on al and operational footprints in each area of gence system will aid a planner’s strategic Qaim, Rutba, al Ubaidi, al Shirqat, and control. understanding of the adversary but will Baa’j all yielded some measure of success Likewise, the more traditional TSA likely have limited utility in understand- in being able to discern distinct adver- framework is too broad in its scope to be ing criticality or vulnerability of individual sary networks. Widening the scope and particularly informative at the operational targets in a specific town or province focusing on Anbar or Ninewah provinces level of warfare against an adaptive hybrid under the group’s control. Similarly, un- instead would likely not have yielded the adversary. Admittedly, TSA has proved derstanding how IS operates at a city level same degree of analytical insight due to successful in the counter-IS campaign as generally will prove inadequate, since the the different operational footprints of the a method of systematically analyzing and adversary presents a different footprint adversary within each city. targeting the group’s oil infrastructure, in each area it occupies. Instead, separate Once the geographic bounds of resulting in huge losses in its annual analyses should be focused on each major analysis have been determined, formulat- revenue.11 The efficacy of TSA in this stronghold IS possesses, with the intent ing an understanding of the adversary example stemmed from its application being to understand the critical capabili- and the battlespace they occupy should against a closed system aligned along ties, requirements, and vulnerabilities then follow. GCNA analysts should scour function instead of geography. IS oil of the predominant component systems available intelligence products, includ- operations maintain a consistent struc- that exist in each geographic area. It is ing dynamic threat assessments, joint ture across the group’s area of control. precisely this understanding that GCNA intelligence preparation of the operating Additionally, it is nearly impossible to seeks to enable. environment, and any available TSA. present an adaptive, flexible posture in GCNA, with its focus on breaking down one’s petroleum industry; bulky, cumber- GCNA: The Process an adversary into discrete geographic some oil machinery cannot be quickly As with the joint targeting cycle as a component systems, must still be in- shuttled from location to location in the whole, the process of GCNA hinges on formed by a strategic understanding same way that small arms or improvised understanding the commander’s objec- of the adversary and its target systems explosive device components can. Thus, tives for a given operation. It is critical across the entire area of operations. It intelligence analysts and targeteers were that these objectives are clearly defined is vital when delivering a network of able to perform deliberate analysis against and understood by the components targets to senior planners, intelligence a fixed system without time constraint developing GCNA and performing directors, and validation authorities that to select the highest value oil targets and intermediate target development. Joint the significance of a given geographic eliminate them accordingly. Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, component system can be understood in As seen in the example above, tradi- makes it clear that “objectives are the the strategic context of the adversary’s tional TSA can be extremely effective in basis for developing the desired effects military operations. Civilian, historic, degrading the traditional target systems and scope of target development.”12 and geographic context is also vital at under a hybrid enemy’s control with the After these objectives have been con- this stage. Understanding the preexist- aid of deductive analysis. However, this veyed, the intelligence analysts and ing civilian infrastructure in an area and methodology lacks broad applicability targeteers who will conduct deliberate its historical, cultural, or religious value against the majority of open, adaptive analysis need to begin a robust dialogue are all factors in understanding how the
72 Features / Geographic Component Network Analysis JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Airman assigned to 72nd Expeditionary Air Support Operations Squadron, deployed in support of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, scans for Islamic State fighting positions near Al Tarab, Iraq, March 17, 2017 (U.S. Army/Jason Hull) adversary is likely to utilize the geography activity. The scalable geographic scope of understanding of the broader component and how certain areas provide strategic GCNA makes it well suited for use with system. It is the underlying analysis and value. For the targeteer developing enti- the activity-based intelligence tradecraft not the format of these remarks that is ties to the intermediate level, the value of alluded to above. By focusing on discrete important, since the intent is to inform such analysis is inestimable. geographic areas and defined component target validation authorities of the signifi- A thorough survey of the current systems, analysts are able to filter the cance of the network and the individual intelligence pertaining to the adversary data related to their particular analytic targets that it comprises. Once a network in the chosen geographic focus should inquiry down to a more understandable becomes clear and has been character- occur once the GCNA analyst has at- level. This all-source intelligence deep ized and summarized, targetable entities tained a strategic understanding of the dive will provide context on how the with associated reporting of adversary adversary. This is a time-consuming step adversary organizes itself and operates activity should begin to emerge. In this in the process of deliberate analysis, but within the given focus area. Perhaps most sense, the process begins to resemble the it is necessary due to the dynamic nature importantly, a review of available current dynamic targeting process; an analyst of the adversary. Fortunately, advances intelligence will allow analysts to identify discovers what he or she believes to be in the assimilation and tagging of intel- gaps, thus enabling the refinement of an adversary point of interest, seeks out ligence reporting in databases available priority intelligence requirements and additional intelligence to more fully to the military intelligence analyst have submission of collection requirements characterize the target, and submits the increased both the speed of data retrieval to more fully understand adversary target to the joint force for validation as and the discoverability of available intel- networks. a lawful military target. But because the ligence reporting. Additionally, the ability As the relation between individual entity can be tied to other entities as part to visualize reporting through an array targets becomes clearer and the network of a larger network due to the GCNA of geospatial and temporal tools provides is more fully discerned, the analyst process, the analyst can now effectively analysts with near-instant geographic can begin to craft network descrip- assess its significance to the adversary and chronological context of adversary tion remarks that will allow for an and anticipate how its neutralization will
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Smith and Rust 73 RQ-4 Global Hawk descends during landing after completing sortie in support of Operation Inherent Resolve at undisclosed location in Southwest Asia, February 20, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Tyler Woodward) affect the system as a whole. It is this trait and repeatable in future iterations. in a manner to most effectively define that aligns GCNA with the deliberate tar- Furthermore, the analytic baseline of and disrupt their capability to achieve it. geting process and is the type of analysis adversary capabilities established through In the case of IS, the actions and public that lies at the heart of deliberate target this process will enable both the creation declarations of key leaders make it clear development. Ultimately, target develop- and validation of MOEs, which in turn that the group’s strategic objective is the ment nominations for all entities related will contribute to more effective overall establishment of a vast “Islamic” caliph- to the identified component system in campaign assessment. ate. This objective is a central tenet of the given geographic area, along with the the group’s ideology, a philosophy that analysis related to the characterization Strengths and Operational can only be actualized by securing ter- of the larger network, can be packaged Considerations ritory. At the operational level, IS must together and delivered to the target vali- There are five primary benefits that can be able to expand the caliphate through dation authority. be gained from applying GCNA against the seizure and governance of territory The format in which this analysis is a hybrid adversary with an operational to further its strategic objective and delivered is largely irrelevant; various objective of gaining and defending ensure the continued legitimacy of the components and joint forces will have territory. caliphate. Stated concisely, its operational differing requirements for how network Focuses on the Adversary’s objective is to gain and control territory. and entity characterizations should be Operational Objective of Controlling IS fighters, then, represent the group’s conveyed. What is important, however, Territory. Targeting an adversary’s center operational center of gravity insofar as is that there now exists a body of analysis of gravity will always be a daunting prop- they enable the acquisition and continued characterizing a network and its associ- osition. To effectively do so, we should control of territory; the security and ated entities that conveys the function seek to first understand our enemy’s governance functions these personnel and significance of the network and that objectives and then formulate our ana- provide in geographically defined areas of the process to attain said results is scalable lytic methodology and targeting strategy control are a critical requirement for the
74 Features / Geographic Component Network Analysis JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 group to meet its operational objectives. targets almost certainly stems from the limits the land mass and corresponding This assertion is supported by the work operational directive of coalition military nodal linkages an analyst must examine. of Daniel Smith, Kelley Jeter, and Odin leadership to conduct persistent strikes Consequently, the time necessary to gain Westgaard, who also cited the group’s against IS targets across the area of opera- a comprehensive understanding of the ability to control territory and people as tions. As an OIR spokesman noted in adversary in that area shrinks. Timelines “the decisive operational objective that January 2016, the intent of the coalition to conduct GCNA ranged between 2 defines the caliphate.”13 The cycle of is to “keep pressure on [IS] all the time, weeks and 1 month when conducted by expansion and defense of the caliphate are everywhere.” the Langley Target Development Cell, an critical to its legitimacy. As Jessica Lewis This strategy of persistent strikes organization developing targeting nomi- points out, IS “must be able to defend almost certainly “forces [the enemy] to nation on behalf of the air component in the territory within the Islamic Caliphate, have to make very difficult decisions” support of Combined Joint Task Force– like a modern state, or it is vulnerable to about where to direct efforts. Viewed OIR. To cite a specific example, GCNA counter-argumentation that its control this way, it is an understandable strategy conducted on an IS-controlled town in is insufficient to support its political to keep the enemy in a perpetual state western Iraq in the summer of 2016 took aims.”14 Again we see the importance of of adaptation and incapable of planning just under 1 month. During that time, analyzing the most prominent compo- for sophisticated conventional attacks. analysts were able to uncover a linked nent systems in the various geographic Additionally, it is an executable strategy network of 11 targetable entities, articu- strongholds IS occupies to determine in the permissive environment in which late the military capability the network the best way to deny its ability to achieve our coalition air assets operate that does provided to the adversary, and prepare the operational objective of gaining and not require exquisite mission planning to the individual target nominations for maintaining control of territory. fly sorties. However, it must be acknowl- validation and approval. This experience Aids in Satisfying the Competing edged that consistent strikes on single IS illustrates that a shorter timeline ensures Demands for More and Better Targets. It targets complicate the ability of coalition the analytic process is more adaptable to is our position that a decade-plus of con- intelligence analysts to perform system- the hybrid nature of the adversary and sistent dynamic targeting operations in atic analysis and form a holistic picture of is more conducive to producing targets the Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom the adversary’s structure and capabilities, at the pace of the dyliberate targeting campaigns have created an unrealistic since a strike on a single target will invari- process. GCNA integrates timeliness of expectation in the minds of senior politi- ably affect the system as a whole. We refer analysis and depth of content to generate cal and military leaders regarding both to this process of affecting targets in this a methodology that is content-focused the speed at which a deliberate targeting piecemeal fashion versus developing tar- with punctuality in mind. Consequently, cycle should occur and the number of gets as systems or networks and striking it incorporates many of the benefits from targets necessary to have a decisive effect them in close succession as dyliberate tar- both time-dominant fusion and content- on the adversary. All too often, the ques- geting, since it utilizes the process of the dominant analysis in an effort to rapidly tion asked in any one of the innumerable deliberate targeting cycle to approve and meet “the need for the deep content re- counter-IS targeting synchronization engage single targets in a manner much quired to help generate a rich contextual meetings is, “How many targets will more consistent with dynamic targeting understanding of the environment.”16 we have in [insert IS-controlled area] operations. Enables the Assembly of Intelligence by [insert date]?” instead of, “What is The consistent demand for more Data into a Useful Intelligence Product the critical capability we are trying to targets is not likely to ebb any time for Targeteers. Specifically, when intel- degrade in this operation?” or “What soon. Therefore, any analytic model to ligence data are gathered through effect do we intend to have on the ad- understand the networks of an adaptive structured observation management versary’s warfighting capabilities?” This hybrid adversary must be able to satiate and activity-based intelligence processes, idea is encapsulated in a statement from the desire for more targets while also pro- targeteers benefit. The Department of Lieutenant General Robert Otto, USAF viding the necessary level of analysis to Defense has recently made huge strides (Ret.), who served as the director of Air determine the most lucrative targets. In in its ability to provide services that en- Force Intelligence during a portion of the essence, any model must provide both a able the visualization of big data to the U.S. involvement in OIR. Commenting high quantity and high quality of targets. operational warfighter.17 There is a vast on the coalition’s ability to target IS, GCNA satisfies both these demands. amount of intelligence data, spanning the General Otto gave the effort a grade of Decreases the Time Necessary to Form spectrum of intelligence disciplines, that 5 out of 10, claiming that the problem a Coherent Understanding of Adversary pertain to IS. Data without any analytic did not lie in “not having enough fighter Networks. Timelines to generate a typical rigor applied, however, remain just that— jets to drop bombs,” but instead could target system analysis product generally data. GCNA offers a scalable framework be traced to not “having enough legiti- range from 8 to 12 months. By scoping to incorporate the massive amount of mate targets to strike that can put [IS] the focus down to the component system data available to today’s Intelligence on their heels.”15 This desire for more level in a distinct geographic area, GCNA Community at a level that is much more
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Smith and Rust 75 Airman with 407th Expeditionary Maintenance Squadron tests functionality of weapons rack releasing system of F-16 Fighting Falcon in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, February 4, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Benjamin Wilson) manageable to a small team of intelli- determine which targets possess the most simply effective employment of GCNA. gence analysts or targeteers. significance and therefore require further Military strategists and planners must Aids in Maximizing Coalition ISR deliberate development and consistent ensure they are providing intelligence Capabilities. The platforms and person- ISR coverage. and operations personnel with adequate nel used to collect, process, exploit, and There are also two operational con- time and proper signaling to conduct disseminate intelligence data used by siderations that leaders and analysts must deliberate analysis and target develop- joint and coalition forces are not infinite. keep in mind when employing GCNA. ment. Similarly, intelligence analysts and Like any finite resource, great care should Requires Patience. Even though the targeteers must ensure their efforts are be taken in determining how to utilize time commitment associated with con- consistent with guidance and satisfy the precious intelligence, surveillance, and ducting GCNA is significantly less than commander’s objectives. Finally, opera- reconnaissance (ISR) collection and pro- that of performing traditional TSA, time tors must affect the entities identified by cessing, exploitation, and dissemination and deliberate analysis are both still re- targeteers in a deliberate manner that capabilities. There is simply not enough quired. Leaders must be cognizant of this is synchronized with the operations of capacity to devote ISR resources to every planning factor and afford their personnel a ground force capable of seizing IS- point with reporting of adversary activity, the tactical patience to act accordingly, controlled areas after its defenses have nor would it be advisable to do so. This while intelligence analysts and targeteers been weakened through the deliberate peanut butter–spread approach to ISR must resist the pressure to submit target targeting process. allocation will only yield an incomplete development nominations that result understanding of all entities we collect from hurried or incomplete analysis. Conclusion on and perpetuate the ongoing struggle Necessitates Close Coordination Coming on the heels of over a decade to secure overtaxed assets. A priori- Between Strategy, Plans, Intelligence, of mostly dynamic targeting opera- tized collection strategy and systematic and Operations Elements. This applies tions, the counter-IS campaign has analysis of the adversary are necessary to to all deliberate targeting processes, not enabled the U.S. military to reacquaint
76 Features / Geographic Component Network Analysis JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 14 itself with a more traditional deliber- the rapid generation of targetable entities Lewis, 19. 15 Barbara Starr, “Air Force Intel Chief ate targeting cycle. Viewed this way, for submission into the joint targeting Gives Failing Grade to Airstrikes Targeting one could be tempted to view IS as process. JFQ ISIS,” CNN, June 29, 2016, available at
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Smith and Rust 77 USS John Paul Jones launches Standard Missile-3 Block IIA during flight test off Hawaii, marking first successful intercept engagement using Aegis Baseline 9.C2 weapon system, February 2, 2017 (Missile Defense Agency)
Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Simplifying an Increasingly Complex Problem
By Gabriel Almodovar, Daniel P. Allmacher, Morgan P. Ames III, and Chad Davies
The strength of any Joint Force has always been the combining of unique Service capabilities into a coherent operational whole.
—General Martin E. Dempsey
Major Gabriel Almodovar, USAF, is a student in the Air Command and Staff College at Air University. s indicated in the Chairman Lieutenant Colonel Daniel P. Allmacher, USA, is Chief of the Intelligence Support Group, Joint Planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Support Element, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Lieutenant Joint Integrated Air and Missile Commander Morgan P. Ames III, USN, is an Observer/Trainer in the Deployable Training Division, Joint A Staff J7, Suffolk, Virginia. Major Chad Davies, USAF, is Chief of Strike Training for U.S. Northern Command Defense: Vision 2020, the joint force Special Activities Division at Cheyenne Mountains Air Force Station, Colorado Springs, Colorado. faces an increasingly complex array of
78 Features / Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 air and missile threats that have the Figure 1. Subcategories of Threats potential to overwhelm current U.S. Not adequately defined in joint doctrine integrated air and missile defenses Counter Air Defined in joint doctrine and lead to an operational or strategic Recently added to joint doctrine 1 Fighter failure in a future conflict. Our poten- SEAD Fighter IAMD Escort Sweep Includes active and passive defense tial adversaries are rapidly developing and some offensive operations emerging air and missile threat capabili- Air Defense
ties from new manned and unmanned C-A/C C-UAS Integrated Missile Defense (IMD) C-RAM Defense against Defense against Defense against rockets, aircraft systems, stealthy cruise missiles, conventional conventional artillery, and mortars manned A/C UAS or weapons hypersonic glide vehicles, and advanced carrying UAS ballistic missiles. These capabilities CMD BMD • IAMD: Integrated Air and Missile Defense Defense against Defense against all ranges of • SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses guided missiles Ballistic Missiles capable of could dramatically reduce the effec- endo & exo-atmospheric flight • C-A/C: Counter Aircraft tiveness of current U.S., allied, and • C-UAS: Counter Unmanned Aerial System Hybrid Hybrid • IMD: Integrated Missile Defense Hybrid threat may include partner air and missile defenses. As • C-RAM: Counter Rockets, Artillery, and airbreathing and Long-range rockets Mortars non-airbreathing traits. integrated with a these advanced threats become more • CMD: Cruise Missile Defense Ex: Maneuverable re-entry guidance system prolific and threaten to exploit gaps and • BMD: Ballistic Missile Defense vehicles • Airbreathing: Uses air for propulsion Hypersonic Glide Vehicles seams in traditional integrated air and and/or for maneuvering • Non-airbreathing: Does not primarily use missile defense (IAMD) architectures, air for propulsion and/or for maneuvering Combination of both the Department of Defense (DOD) must assess its ability to effectively and Airbreathing / Uses Aerodynamics for Maneuvering Non-Airbreathing / Ballistic Trajectory efficiently develop, field, and operate advanced IAMD capabilities.2 Accord- ing to Geoffrey F. Weiss: gap in coordination and synchroniza- mospheric and exoatmospheric stan- tion. While the current IAMD mission is dard ballistic trajectories. Additionally, The proliferating air and missile threat growing in complexity, it is made more rockets, artillery, and mortars—which and their advanced capabilities have fur- complicated by the current organizational are characteristically non-air-breathing, ther collapsed the old paradigm of separate structures within DOD tasked to develop short-range threats with ballistic flight IAMD domains—regional and homeland. and execute it. profiles—were recently included in the . . . Air and missile attacks can easily and IAMD mission area as part of the April rapidly cross area of responsibility boundar- The IAMD Construct 2017 update to JP 3-01. Each of these ies, placing a premium on coordination Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering threat categories poses unique technical and integration between Combatant Air and Missile Threats, defines IAMD and operational challenges that affect Commands, Services, and the Joint Force.3 as the “integration of capabilities and how the joint force should defend overlapping operations to defend the against them. Figure 1 depicts the Based on increasing levels of un- homeland and U.S. national interests, various subcategories defined within or acceptable risk and cost, emerging protect the Joint Force, and enable associated with IAMD. adversary air and missile capabilities may freedom of action by negating an Advances in adversary air and missile fundamentally alter the way future con- adversary’s ability to create adverse capabilities are blurring the lines between flicts are conducted and limit or negate effects from their air and missile capa- traditional air-breathing and non-air- current U.S. critical capabilities to project bilities.”5 IAMD is nested under the breathing threat categories, broadening joint military forces.4 counterair mission, integrating offensive the IAMD mission. Hybrid threats—such These emerging complex air and mis- and defensive operations to attain and as a ballistic missile equipped with a ma- sile threat environments demand that the maintain a degree of air superiority and neuvering re-entry vehicle or hypersonic joint force reassess future organizational protection by neutralizing or destroying glide vehicle, a lethal one-way UAS, or structures to ensure they are focused enemy aircraft and missiles, both before long-range, large caliber rockets equipped and empowered with the authorities and and after launch. When evaluating the with terminal guidance—demand a resources to synchronize joint capabili- IAMD mission, adversary capabili- multilayered defense to eliminate exploit- ties across the range of organizations in ties are typically categorized into air- able gaps between traditional IAMD the DOD IAMD enterprise. Analysis of breathing and non-air-breathing threats. subcategories. Additionally, advances in IAMD roles and responsibilities across Air threats comprise manned aircraft, longer range ballistic missiles, manned DOD identifies disparate doctrines and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and and unmanned aircraft, and cruise mis- policies. There is no single entity with aerodynamic missiles (to include cruise siles present new challenges that require the authority and resources to effectively missiles). Non-air-breathing threats tra- improved cross-combatant command and efficiently develop, field, and operate ditionally consisted of ballistic missiles integration. Further challenging the joint IAMD capabilities, resulting in a with flight profiles capable of endoat- IAMD mission is the counter-rocket,
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Almodovar et al. 79 Chairman discusses capabilities of USS Barry during tour of ship and Aegis Baseline 9.C2 weapon system, which includes air and ballistic missile defense, surface warfare, and undersea warfare capabilities, Yokosuka, Japan, September 7, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Leonard Adams)
-artillery, and -mortar (C-RAM) mission. of stakeholder organizations. To date, administration to conclude that “all The increased precision guidance capa- most of the efforts to address missile missile defense plans should be brought bilities of adversary rockets, artillery, and defense have focused on the integra- under one large umbrella.”7 However, mortars countered by new technologies, tion of various ballistic missile defense the BMD mission does not fit singularly such as the land-based Phalanx weapons (BMD) systems across the Services and into any one of the military departments’ system or Israel’s Iron Dome system, deployed with the combatant com- core mission areas. Therefore, DOD necessitated that joint doctrine be revised mands (CCMDs). Many of the newer redesignated the Ballistic Missile Defense to incorporate this threat and C-RAM BMD systems utilize cutting-edge hit- Organization as the Missile Defense capabilities into IAMD. This revision to to-kill technology to destroy incoming Agency (MDA) and granted it “full joint doctrine was necessary despite the ballistic missiles targeting the homeland agency rank and with it, the power and traditional belief that the C-RAM mission or friendly forces deployed in theater. influence associated with such position- is “not generally considered part of the The complexity of developing, fielding, ing.”8 The creation of MDA consolidated centralized joint AMD [air and missile and then integrating these advanced the responsibility for the lead develop- defense] network” because of the weap- weapons systems into a cohesive BMD ment of the BMD system under one ons’ localized effects in the battlefield.6 family of systems capable of defeating organization with authority to directly myriad ballistic missile threats has been effect change and development in the Solving Ballistic Missile Defense a formidable undertaking; however, a joint force. With its own budget, person- Executing the IAMD mission is already significant hurdle to the development nel, and resources, MDA could focus complex, but it is further complicated of BMD systems was the complicated on developing and integrating BMD by the organizational structure within organizational and bureaucratic struc- systems in coordination with the Services, DOD tasked to develop and execute it. tures within DOD. Joint Staff, and combatant commands. The Defense Department’s disparate In 2002, the threat of strategic MDA authorities allowed the organiza- efforts for developing IAMD solu- ballistic missile attacks to the home- tion to better synchronize development tions provide a basis for examination land prompted the George W. Bush of capabilities across DOD and invest in
80 Features / Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 capabilities that may have been lower in Figure 2. Organizations, Functions, priority for the separate military Services. and Threat Subsets of IAMD Mission Area The demonstrated capability to shoot down ballistic missiles launched toward OSD (AT&L) USAF • MDA • HAF A3/5, A7 the homeland or at friendly forces de- • Policy • ACC • AFSPC ployed in theater is a direct result of the CJCS • Force readiness Air Defense • JROC • AFMC • Capability gap and requirements • Counter A/C creation of the MDA. • J8 • AETC assessment • Counter UAS • JIAMDO • Lead advocacy for USA budgeting/capability requirements IMD • J3, J5, J7 • TRADOC • CMD • Doctrine/tactics, techniques, and • Fires COE Overview of IAMD Structures Combatant Commands procedures development • BMD The emerging complex array of IAMD • USSTRATCOM • SMDC • Joint training • Hybrid threats • JFCC-IMD • ASALT • Global/theater exercises systems faces many of the same hurdles • AAMDCs C-RAM • System architectures & technical • Rockets GCCs requirements that challenged DOD development of • Service Components Navy • Artillery • Operational support • NAVSEA • Mortars BMD capabilities because IAMD simi- Intelligence Units • NAVAIR • Acquisition execution • NASIC • Hybrid threats • ASN RDA larly requires capabilities from all the • MSIC • 3rd Fleet • ONI Services to operate in and across areas • NAMDC • NGIC of responsibility in each of the CCMDs. Analysis of the IAMD roles and respon- sibilities across DOD shows that there is In doing so, USSTRATCOM leveraged The AMD IA’s chartered mission was to no single entity with the authority and the Army’s Space and Missile Defense “provide a collaborative means for com- resources to effectively and efficiently Command’s (SMDC) commanding batant commands, Military Departments, develop, field, and operate joint IAMD general, who also serves as the com- and Defense Agencies to identify and capabilities. Instead, the joint IAMD manding general for Army Strategic assess desired AMD capabilities and mission area requires numerous DOD Command, and designated him as the characteristics, examine the operational organizations to develop, field, and commanding general for JFCC-IMD, risks associated with capability gaps and operate disparate IAMD capabilities. resulting in a tri-hatted position. In 2007, redundancies, and review possible solu- Each of the organizations in the the JFCC-IMD and SMDC command- tions and implementation timelines to IAMD enterprise contributes differently ing general, Lieutenant General Kevin support programmatic and milestone by performing one or more of the follow- T. Campbell, wrote that “the primary decisions.”10 The additional AMD IA ing functions: force readiness, capability mission [of JFCC-IMD] is to conduct mission forced USSTRATCOM to gap, and requirements assessment; lead functions for global missile defense to again leverage another organization, the advocacy for budgeting/capability re- protect the United States, its deployed Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense quirements, doctrine/tactics, techniques, forces, friends, and allies from ballistic Organization (JIAMDO). In 2015, and procedures (TTPs) development; missile attacks” and to synchronize BMD USSTRATCOM’s role as AMD IA was joint training; global exercise; system needs and operations across the combat- disestablished because of resourcing, and architectures/technical requirements; ant commands.9 Although the original the majority of AMD IA responsibilities operational support; and acquisition scope of JFCC-IMD was on integrated fell onto JIAMDO. execution. While these functions are not ballistic missile defense only, that mission JIAMDO is another key organiza- unique to how DOD executes the IAMD area is expanding to include defense of tion within the IAMD enterprise. It mission, the challenge is that a large set cruise missiles and hypersonic missile was established as a Chairman of the of diverse organizations perform one or threats. The joint community is cur- Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Controlled more of these different functions for vari- rently considering ways to better define Activity that reports to the Chairman ous capabilities to address one or more the USSTRATCOM role in integrated through the Joint Staff J8 Directorate. subsets of the IAMD threat. Figure 2 de- missile defense because the term global (“CCAs [Chairman’s Controlled picts the multiple organizations executing synchronizer is not properly defined in Activities] are specialized organiza- different functions to counter a variety of doctrine or used in other references. tions designed to address unique areas threat subsets. It is important to note this To complicate matters further, in that are of joint interest.”) JIAMDO figure is not all-inclusive. 2008, the USSTRATCOM commander is chartered to support both the CJCS The 2005 Unified Command Plan was also designated the Air and Missile and USSTRATCOM in their efforts “to assigned U.S. Strategic Command Defense Integrating Authority (AMD develop and integrate sensors, weapons, (USSTRATCOM) the role of “global IA). In this role, the USSTRATCOM command and control systems, and the synchronizer” for integrated missile commander not only was responsible concepts to employ them in the air and defense (IMD). To execute this mis- for synchronizing global IMD per the missile defense mission area.”11 While sion, USSTRATCOM created the Joint Unified Command Plan but also had JIAMDO’s authority is primarily limited Functional Component Command for to act as the lead integrating authority to performing the J8 function for the Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD). for all IAMD capabilities across DOD. CJCS in that it provides “support to
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Almodovar et al. 81 CJCS for evaluating and developing The U.S. Air Force views IAMD as the focus of the Army’s air defense artil- force structure requirements,” it addi- a subset of the much larger counterair lery has shifted to the defense of fixed tionally assisted USSTRATCOM as the mission area, as described in JP 3-01. critical assets, facilities, and infrastructure AMD IA to “advocate for warfighter’s One of the Air Force priorities for centered on BMD and C-RAM. This desired IAMD capabilities within DOD’s the joint force has been to obtain and has more recently come at the expense capability identification, development, maintain air and space superiority, a core of traditional short-range air defense budgetary and acquisition process” mission. The air and space superiority (SHORAD) capabilities that could be before the AMD IA role was disestab- mission requires much more than IAMD used to counter air-breathing threats such lished.12 In 2017, the Deputy Secretary capabilities, and, with that context in as manned/unmanned aircraft systems of Defense removed JIAMDO’s des- mind, one can understand why the Air and cruise missiles. With the evolution ignation as a CCA, but JIAMDO still Force may be less focused on certain and proliferation of adversary cruise mis- provides the Chairman and combatant areas within IAMD. On the contrary, JP siles and UAS, the Army is shifting its command assessment and analysis for 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air focus back to development of SHORAD the BMD, IMD, and remaining IAMD Operations, states that the Joint Force units with the indirect fire protection ca- mission areas so that DOD leader- Air Component Commander (JFACC) pability that will again provide air defense ship, including those from the military may also be designated as the Area Air coverage of maneuvering ground forces. departments, can make informed recom- Defense Commander (AADC).14 In more mendations and resourcing decisions. recent combat operations, the Air Force Ideas to Consider for While MDA is chartered to focus on has been designated as the JFACC and Improvement the development of BMD capabilities, in AADC; however, the Air Force does not While developing a comprehensive 2013 it was assigned the role of IAMD own most of the active IAMD capabili- solution to DOD IAMD organiza- Technical Authority (TA) to “lead IAMD ties, which are generally provided by the tional challenges may prove too dif- engineering and integration efforts to Army or Navy. Nonetheless, with limited ficult, improving the construct and its enable joint capability.”13 In this capacity, resources, the Air Force will continue to efficiency is fundamentally easier. Any the IAMD TA can create and recommend support capabilities vital to its core mis- ideas—big, small, radical, or simple— system standards, modifications, and sions, functions, and the joint force. could result in positive impacts on the other joint technical requirements to close The Navy sees IAMD in two major joint force. Although recommending gaps in interoperability and facilitate inte- mission areas: self-protection of its vital full solutions is beyond the scope of grating IAMD capabilities across DOD. carrier assets and, more recently, BMD this article, the following are ideas deci- This is especially important in establishing for critical assets. Given the nature of sionmakers could consider to provoke a joint architecture for command, control, maritime operations, the Navy must be further discussion about how DOD and communications of IAMD elements able to protect its assets from a diversity could improve the current IAMD enter- across the Services. The IAMD TA role of threats to ensure they can support prise construct. is limited in that it does not have the joint operations. Advances in ballistic DOD could create a new dedicated authority to execute its recommendations. missile systems are making them more ac- three-star joint IAMD command or The military departments must be the curate in targeting U.S. ships at sea. The agency with the mission, manpower, organizations that plan, budget, and ex- Navy, working closely with the MDA, expertise, and authorities to integrate ecute those requirements that the Services has fielded capable BMD assets associ- IAMD capabilities across DOD. This determine are worth the investment. ated with their Aegis SPY-1 radar and organization could focus on functions Each military department provides standard missile variants, proving itself and needs that cross organizational roles major contributions to the IAMD mis- critically important to BMD. Today, the and responsibilities and use its resources sion area, but departments also have Aegis weapons system has proved capable to implement technical solutions in other missions and priorities to balance. of defeating ballistic missile threats be- DOD acquisition programs or focus The military departments are responsible cause a single cruiser, destroyer, or Aegis on TTPs and nonmaterial solutions to for organizing, training, and equipping Ashore provides the ability to find, fix, solve combatant command needs. To military forces for combatant command- target, track, engage, and assess a variety accomplish these and other missions, ers and ensuring the U.S. military can of threats. this organization would require an ap- conduct operations in current conflicts The Army views IAMD as providing propriate budget authority to influence while balancing risks of future potential protection for critical assets and ground change across DOD and Service acquisi- conflicts. As such, any IAMD capability maneuver forces. Historically, Army tion programs. This budget authority will rely heavily on the programmatic IAMD forces focused on defending could be used to fund the development investments made by the Services, but the ground forces to support movement, of IAMD capabilities or establish and Services’ cultures, priorities, and available maneuver, and protection; however, since fund joint IAMD requirements in Service resources will likely dictate how they view the joint force has maintained air superi- acquisition programs that may otherwise and prioritize IAMD. ority over the past 30 years of conflicts, not receive Service priority and funding.
82 Features / Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Above Mount Fuji, five E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes, stationed at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, lead two E-2C Hawkeyes, stationed at Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Japan, as part of Asia-Pacific rebalance, May 11, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Artur Sedrakyan)
Alternatively, this organization could use analyze broadening the MDA mission Additionally, DOD could create a the resources to better focus the joint set to include developing capabilities to Joint Acquisition Executive (JAE) to IAMD community on developing inte- defend against all types of missiles, not support IAMD (and other joint) ac- grated TTPs or championing and funding just ballistic ones. This could concentrate quisition programs. As former Defense innovative concepts to more effectively the DOD effort in missile defense by Secretary Robert Gates stated, “We use existing IAMD capabilities. To do establishing a single organization respon- have really come to a point where we this, the organization needs the capabil- sible for the acquisition of DOD missile do extraordinarily well in terms of joint ity to support combatant commands in defense capabilities within the greater operations, but we do not do well in analyzing potential solutions to IAMD IAMD mission area. terms of joint procurement. It is still challenges and to support cost-versus- DOD could look at reconfiguring the very Service-centered.”15 The Defense benefit analysis of future investments. roles and responsibilities of the Services. Science Board concluded that a “JAE This joint organization could also In 2011, the Russian military combined would be more motivated than a Service- increase our effectiveness in the IAMD its air force, air and missile defense specific Acquisition Executive to resist mission set by using its manpower and troops, and space forces into a combined individual Service culture, parochialism, budget authority to influence improve- Aerospace Force. While this may not and component-unique requirements and ment across DOD. work for the U.S. military, we may find is more likely to reach out to CCMDs Similarly, DOD could focus on more utility in reallocating ground air defense for requirements, both before program effectively executing a smaller piece of the systems to the Air Force or rearrang- initiation and after baseline requirements IAMD mission area—missile defense—by ing other missions to consolidate more have been set.”16 Having a JAE could better enabling, resourcing, and empow- IAMD responsibilities into a Service. This reduce the stovepiped nature of the ering USSTRATCOM’s JFCC-IMD would allow the Service to better inte- departments and agencies that operate in with a dedicated three-star billet, sup- grate those capabilities into its command their own priorities and that often center port staff, subject matter experts, and a and control structure, facilitating training their attention on major platforms rather larger budget authority. DOD could also among other potential benefits. than capabilities.17
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Almodovar et al. 83 Furthermore, DOD could create ingly complex threat with the degree Battle Over Shielding America from Mis- sile Attack (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), general officer– or flag officer–level of agility required. If DOD fails in this 187–190, 199–200. IAMD centers of excellence within each endeavor, the United States and its allies 8 Richard D. Burns and Lester H. Brune, of the Services and combatant com- risk losing more than just access to the The Quest for Missile Defenses, 1944–2003 (Cla- mands. These centers could, with the global commons—the U.S. military remont, CA: Regina Books, 2003), 148. proper authorities, establish a dedicated risks losing current advantages in the 9 Kevin T. Campbell, “Integrated Missile Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly 46 (3rd Quarter cadre of IAMD operators and subject land, sea, and air domains. 2007), 64. matter experts to enhance and facilitate The current IAMD enterprise orga- 10 Gordon R. England, “Designation of the communication on cross-cutting IAMD nizational construct can be streamlined Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as the challenges, training issues, and require- and empowered to simplify the process Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority ments. As an example, Pacific Air Forces in which DOD deals with IAMD. (AMD IA),” January 17, 2008, 2. 11 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently established the Pacific IAMD While some proposed solutions require Instruction 5125.01, Charter of the Joint Infor- Center, which will train theater, joint, and significant change or restructuring, it is mation Operations Warfare Center (Washing- international IAMD professionals and important that DOD continue to focus ton, DC: The Joint Staff, September 30, 2015), coordinate IAMD exercises and training on how to improve its responsiveness available at
84 Features / Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 RQ-4 Global Hawk and U-2 Dragon Lady are Air Force’s primary high-altitude ISR aircraft, Beale Air Force Base, California, September 17, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/ Bobby Cummings)
Achieving Secrecy and Surprise in a Ubiquitous ISR Environment
By Adam G. Lenfestey, Nathan Rowan, James E. Fagan, and Corey H. Ruckdeschel
un Tzu could not have proph- when far away, we must make him (DOD) offset strategy was envisioned to esied the future any better when believe we are near.”1 How can today’s mitigate the Soviet Union’s numerical S he stated, “All warfare is based military planner execute a successful advantage in conventional forces through on deception. Hence, when we are able operational deception when the eyes of a credible nuclear deterrent. When the to attack, we must seem unable; when the world are always watching? Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent using our forces, we must appear inac- The notion of military offset strate- China, became nuclear powers, a new tive; when we are near, we must make gies has been widely discussed in recent offset strategy was required. The second the enemy believe we are far away; years. The first Department of Defense offset strategy consisted most promi- nently of antiaccess/area-denial (A2/ AD) capabilities, such as precision naviga- Lieutenant Colonel Adam G. Lenfestey, USAF, is Deputy Director of Space Programs and Operations tion and timing (PNT), precision-guided at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Commander Nathan Rowan, USN, munitions, and advanced intelligence, is Commanding Officer of the USS Billings (Blue) LCS 15. Lieutenant Colonel James E. Fagan, USAF, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).2 is Chief of Strategic Engagement in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau at the Department of State. Major Corey H. Ruckdeschel, USA, is Chief U.S. Pacific Command Deliberate Planner for Joint Force The second offset could be said to have Space Component Command at U.S. Strategic Command. culminated in 1991 during Operation
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Lenfestey et al. 85 U-2 Dragon Lady delivers critical imagery and signals intelligence to decisionmakers during all phases of conflict, Sierra Nevada Mountain Range, California, March 23, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Robert M. Trujillo)
Desert Storm, which was the first major Kuwait) caught Iraqi forces completely by 8 percent.3 The global aerial imaging U.S. combat operation since Vietnam. surprise. The combination of PNT, ad- industry, meanwhile, “including heli- To signal our warfighting superi- vanced ISR, and precision strike, coupled copters, fixed-wing aircraft, multi-rotor ority to the Iraqi regime and bolster with a massed ground attack enabled by unmanned aerial systems [UAS],” and so American public confidence leading operational secrecy and surprise, resulted forth, was valued at $1.1 billion in 2014 into this campaign, several capabilities in a resounding victory over what was the and is forecast to grow to $3.3 billion an- key to the second offset strategy were world’s fourth-largest military. nually within 10 years.4 declassified: high-resolution aerial and As the implications of second offset A strong U.S. CRS industry presents satellite imagery, precision strike, and technologies became known and battle- undeniable benefits to U.S. and coalition stealth technology. The 1991 U.S.-led field-proven over the ensuing decades, warfighters, policymakers, and interagency coalition against Iraq quickly achieved the world took notice. Governments partners through innovation, cost-sharing, air superiority and began an extended around the globe sought for themselves and its inherently unclassified nature. campaign of precision strikes, enabled the sort of results the United States Yet once a U.S.-based CRS provider is by air and space reconnaissance, against realized against Iraq—in some cases to licensed to operate, DOD has little ability Iraqi critical warfighting infrastructure reproduce these U.S. advantages and to affect its activities or prevent its prod- and forward-deployed forces in Kuwait, in other instances to counter them. ucts from falling into hostile hands. Also, such as Republican Guard units. Under Entrepreneurs, likewise, realized the while U.S. industry remains preeminent the blanket of air supremacy, the United potential market value of rapid global ISR in most areas of space-based CRS such as States massed ground forces in Saudi capabilities and began to develop them resolution, large constellations for rapid Arabia while deceiving the Iraqi regime for commercial sale. By 2015, commer- revisit, and advanced sensor phenom- to believe it intended an amphibious cial remote sensing (CRS) satellites, also enologies, foreign government and CRS landing in Kuwait. The ground war known as Earth observation services, had systems are advancing rapidly. Along with began when the now-famous “left hook” become a $1.8 billion-per-year industry the exponential proliferation of small UAS (the attack from the western desert comprising 14 percent of operational and handheld smart devices, these trends rather than the anticipated amphibi- satellites worldwide, while military sur- pose a serious challenge to the traditional ous assault from the southern shores of veillance satellites composed an additional military principles of secrecy and surprise.
86 Features / Secrecy and Surprise in an ISR Environment JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 DOD has begun to invest in a third evaluate current operation and contin- U.S. adversaries are nearing ISR parity, to offset strategy, designed to “offset gency plans, focusing on deployment regain battlespace advantage senior com- shrinking U.S. military force structure from garrison, transport, joint recep- manders may need to distribute authority and declining technological superiority tion, staging, onward-movement, and in new ways, such as disaggregating in an era of great power competition.”5 integration in theater, and the associated surface action groups at sea.7 As a histori- Third offset investments are necessary logistics footprint. It should assume a cal example, in the Battle of Austerlitz, because potential adversaries, and in some robust, nonfriendly ISR presence both Napoleon was successful in creating cases the private sector, are approaching prior to and during combat operations. self-sustaining battalions that allowed parity with the U.S. national security Combatant commands should evalu- him to surprise and attack the enemy on community in key areas of second offset ate the results of the signature study to multiple axes with a minimal logistics and capability. Yet while the proposed third identify and prioritize the operational sig- command and control footprint. It is im- offset strategy will develop new asym- natures we must hide to preserve secrecy perative that combatant commanders find metric U.S. military capabilities, it will and/or manipulate to facilitate surprise. innovative ways to emulate this technique not remove our responsibility to consider The commands may also find it neces- in a modern environment. fundamental warfighting principles. As sary to revise portions of some deliberate In terms of defensive measures, the foreign and commercial ISR capabilities plans against robust A2/AD scenarios. United States is being outpaced in opera- proliferate, our ability to leverage secrecy Develop Countermeasures. DOD tional denial and deception, such as the and surprise for battlefield advantage is in should baseline the current state of its use of decoys and dummy weapons sys- danger of being severely degraded or lost denial and deception capabilities, identify- tems. Decoy (systems that look, emit, and altogether. We must take prudent near- ing all such existing investments across all act like the real system) and dummy (ones term steps to address this concern. conventional military components and that look enough like the real system) assessing their potential for employment platforms are extensively used by U.S. Improving Counter-ISR in standing operation and contingency adversaries to complicate our targeting To leverage secrecy and surprise in plans. This baseline should include all cycle. Previous operations in Kosovo and today’s operating environment, DOD appropriate special handling caveats Serbia saw the United States targeting needs to improve its counter-ISR required to achieve a comprehensive pic- dummy surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites posture in five specific ways: ture of the existing pockets of excellence that were nothing more than plywood across the enterprise. Ultimately, unless sheets constructed and painted to look identify friendly force signatures that •• these capabilities are scalable in sufficient like real weapons. Recently, companies in require obfuscation numbers to meet combatant commander Russia, China, and India have begun to develop passive and active denial and •• needs and available for regular training make life-size inflatable SAM and aircraft deception capabilities and exercise, they will be suboptimally replicas that match real-world dimensions update DOD policy regarding aerial •• employed when needed most. and paint schemes. These inflatables can and space-based collection on mili- The military Services should reinvigo- be quickly erected, interspersed with real tarily sensitive sites rate tactics, techniques, and procedures systems, and relocated to create confu- work with U.S. industry, the inter- •• (TTPs) to manage operational signatures, sion against adversary analysts. agency communuty, and Congress to train forces to employ those TTPs, and DOD should consider investing in manage proliferation of militarily rel- exercise them regularly. The Services will similar systems for our own use to take evant CRS collection against friendly also likely need to develop new camou- advantage of the very adversary ISR that forces flage, concealment, and deception or currently presents such a challenge. The engage on a military-to-military •• other counter-ISR capabilities. It may Allies used dummy systems in World War basis with partner nations to develop even be necessary to adjust the DOD II to confuse German intelligence by bilateral and multilateral agreements steady-state force posture to achieve a providing false numbers and disposition and norms for operational and trans- robust presence in A2/AD areas by com- of forces. Effective ISR work can negate actional controls on CRS collection. bining secrecy and surprise with dispersal the confusion caused by dummy and Identify Signatures. First and fore- and displacement of forces, hardening of decoy systems, but this takes time that most, planners need to understand the key infrastructure, and rapid reconstitu- can be used to friendly advantage. While true nature of friendly force exposure to tion capabilities. 6 some investment within DOD has likely modern ISR collection during military Combatant commanders should already occurred, effective implementa- operations. DOD should baseline the also seek ways to mitigate the predict- tion will require a coordinated effort current temporal, spatial, and spectral able operational signatures of deploying to develop, field, operate, and maintain signatures of conventional military forces forces. Ubiquitous ISR makes surprise such systems on a strategically or opera- as they will operate in land, maritime, in mass extremely challenging, which is tionally relevant scale. and air domains in major deliberate why the United States invested in the Passive measures likely will not be planning scenarios. This study should second offset decades ago. Now that able to counter 100 percent of adversary
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Lenfestey et al. 87 United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket carrying second Mobile User Objective System satellite for U.S. Navy lifts off from Space Launch Complex-41, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, July 9, 2013 (Courtesy Pat Corkery)
ISR capabilities, however. In addition Cyber operations, for example, can collection value that supersedes its neu- to direct counter-ISR capabilities, DOD paralyze an adversary’s ability to defend tralization, or the action against the target should develop unique information and counterattack. The Russian war with may bring about undesired secondary operation TTPs to create doubt in the Georgia in 2008 made heavy use of cyber and tertiary consequences. Additionally, intelligence collected by near-peer com- attacks on Georgian command and con- once a cyber weapon is used, it is exposed petitors, working to sow inconsistencies trol, finance, and governmental networks and is potentially open to the adversary in the data generated from different before and during combat. These attacks to analyze, modify, and reuse against the sources of collection. We should create delayed a Georgian defensive reaction to originator. and leverage adversary uncertainty to Russian troops crossing the border into Cyber operations may not need to ensure U.S. decision advantage, since it South Ossetia, since Georgian forces were include penetration of protected adversary takes time to develop sufficient confi- dependent on electronic networks for networks, however. Instead, cyber opera- dence in intelligence analysis to enable command and control, targeting, fires, tors could focus on third-party sources quality decisions. This requires us to and logistics. However, cyber weapons of information and intelligence such as hone our skills in currently underutilized can be costly to develop and maintain. social media, which has developed into a mission areas. Currently, information A nation must first develop cyber tools method of rapid information dissemina- operations are often improperly planned to penetrate and surveil adversary net- tion where it is often difficult to validate and executed in military operations, works. Upon identifying critical nodes, individual users or the accuracy of their typically because they are difficult to additional tools must be emplaced for information. Manipulation of social simulate during planning and exercises, activation at the desired time. These tools media will not fool dedicated, analytic and thus their effects are hard to pre- must be built to remain undetected yet government agencies indefinitely, but it dict.8 However, such active measures accessible to the owner. Even then, the could provide valuable maneuver space, will become essential tools to complicate operator cannot be certain a given cyber as it takes time and resources to disprove adversary kill chains in a robust ISR effect will be executable when desired. misinformation and determine facts. Such environment. The target may have an intelligence operations can be compared to aerial chaff
88 Features / Secrecy and Surprise in an ISR Environment JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 dispersed to confuse radar. Advanced competitive commercial space sector is U.S.-based systems through the licensing radars may be able to work through the vital to continued progress in space.” process, the U.S. Government currently clutter and relocate the initial target, but One theme of the NSP is to encour- lacks clear statutory authority for trans- by the time this occurs, the target has age U.S. commercial industry growth, actional controls, such as the ability to likely escaped and possibly placed itself in both to support government needs and restrict sale of remote-sensing data and a position of relative advantage. compete favorably in the global market. products to specific actors of concern. DOD may also require new force The NSP has borne fruit: the U.S. CRS Federal law prohibits some entities, projection capabilities with smaller foot- industry leads the world market in all but such as those on the State Department’s prints. For example, the use of drones has a single niche market (synthetic aperture Denied Party or Treasury’s Office of already rapidly transformed the way we radar), and it is growing rapidly in size, Foreign Assets Control lists, from directly go to war. Drones can be employed in all scope, and complexity. New commercial tasking collection from domestic CRS im- warfighting domains and can be far less entrants are bringing high-resolution agery providers. However, even assuming detectable than conventional forces. They electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, effective enforcement of this prohibi- provide extended surveillance capabilities multispectral and hyperspectral imagery, tion, CRS images are rarely proprietary with a minimal forward logistics footprint and large constellations that provide ex- to an individual customer. Once a CRS and provide real-time data that allow tremely frequent coverage of the Earth. provider loads an image to an archive for commanders to assess the battlespace DOD evaluates each new license commercial sale, it is nearly impossible to and potentially apply combat power, based on sensor capabilities and planned prevent its sale to actors of concern. This dramatically expanding the capabilities operating modes, but it lacks formal is largely due to the prevailing interpreta- of an otherwise small and isolated unit.9 implementing guidance or operational tion of the Berman Amendment, which Incorporation of drones into conven- context to assess the likely national secu- “stipulates that transactions involving tional operations can greatly improve rity impact of new concepts. In concert ‘information and informational materials’ economy of force while maintaining the with the study of operational signatures are generally exempt from the purview element of surprise. described above, the department should of the presidential regulation.”12 The Update Policy. To this point, we develop a set of theoretical minimum amendment was intended to facilitate have discussed ways to mitigate detec- time, space, and spectrum sensor system U.S. sale of entertainment programming, tion by hostile ISR. There are significant parameters that enable an operator to de- participation in academic conferences, cases, however, where the nonfriendly tect militarily sensitive signatures. DOD and other such pursuits overseas during ISR capability is, in fact, within our should then leverage these parameters, the Cold War. However, archived satel- policy influence in various ways. For along with the operational effect deter- lite imagery currently is regarded to fall example, U.S. law grants the Secretary mined by the combatant commands, as it into the broad category of information of Commerce authority to license CRS adjudicates future CRS license requests. and informational materials despite any space systems,10 and the U.S. National In addition, the department should latent national security implications it Security Council CRS policy requires the evaluate the operational effectiveness of may entail. This prevailing interpreta- Secretary of Commerce, prior to grant- limited-duration operational controls tion of the Berman Amendment causes ing any such license, to consult with the such as geographic restrictions or tempo- DOD to be more conservative in licens- Secretary of Defense for national security rary resolution limits. ing CRS operations than it might be if it concerns and with the Secretary of State Our potential adversaries, as well as had recourse to curtail dissemination of for foreign policy and international ob- commercial providers, have also recog- sensitive satellite data to actors of concern ligations.11 Each Secretary can direct the nized the potential applications of drones after collection. inclusion of license conditions, including for ISR. However, unlike space assets, DOD should work within the inter- operational controls such as limits on drones are tactically countered by a vari- agency community and with Congress to spatial and spectral resolution, special ety of means. Combatant commands and develop regulatory and legislative change collection modes, geographic restrictions, military Services should identify sensitive proposals for transactional controls that or latency requirements. These can be locations that should be off limits to could better prevent proliferation of enduring conditions or can be activated drone overflight and should use estab- militarily relevant CRS collection against for a specified duration. The cumbersome lished air traffic management means to friendly forces, while still enabling a interagency process by which this license restrict access by friendly collectors. DOD flourishing CRS market. One potential adjudication occurs is currently under should develop policy regarding the use solution would require CRS operators review by the National Security Council of tactical countermeasures to prevent whose systems reach a threshold ca- in light of a rapid increase in the number collection by hostile or third-party drone pable of detecting critical operational and complexity of CRS license requests in operators, including readily available ki- signatures, as identified in the aforemen- recent years. netic and nonkinetic options. tioned studies, to enroll in the National The U.S. National Space Policy Manage Proliferation. While DOD Industrial Security Program (NISP) as (NSP) states that “a robust and can place some operational controls on a condition of their license. NISP is a
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Lenfestey et al. 89 partnership between government and hostile entities to target friendly military 2016, available at
90 Features / Secrecy and Surprise in an ISR Environment JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 U.S. Air Force survival evasion resistance and escape specialist air advisor, with 818th Mobility Support Advisory Squadron, demonstrates navigation skills for Kenyan Defense Force members, Laikipia Air Base, Kenya, June 23, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Evelyn Chavez)
Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation Overcoming Obstacles to U.S. Africa Command’s Efforts
By Andrus W. Chaney
n 2000, Commander Richard G. has maneuvered through the challenges Catoire, USN, recommended creating of establishing a new unit, the effects of I a new commander in chief for Africa.1 the Arab Spring, and the growing ter- Major Andrus W. Chaney, USA, is a Foreign Area Eight years later, his idea became a rorist threats of al Qaeda in the Islamic Officer specializing in sub-Saharan Africa and is reality with the creation of U.S. Africa Maghreb, al Qaeda in the Arabian currently assigned to U.S. Army Africa. Previously, he was the Office of Security Cooperation Chief at Command (USAFRICOM). In a Peninsula, Boko Haram, the so-called the U.S. Embassy Djibouti. decade since then, the new command Islamic State, and al Shabaab in Somalia.
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Chaney 91 In 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert (GCCMDs) created in the last 45 years, cooperation efforts but highlighted four Gates outlined his vision for the future excluding U.S. Northern Command. significant unaddressed challenges.6 Of of security cooperation: “This strategic Over the last 45 years, other GCCMDs the six combatant commands reviewed, reality demands that the U.S. govern- have had, on average, 15 rotations of USAFRICOM, U.S. Pacific Command, ment get better at what is called ‘building commanders and Active-duty staff (3 and U.S. Southern Command required partner capacity’: helping other countries years each) and 9 rotations of civilian more work in at least 12 of the 20 identi- defend themselves or, if necessary, fight staff assignments (5 years each). USAF- fied deficient subtasks. A few examples alongside U.S. forces by providing them RICOM received four commanders in of the deficiencies were that senior U.S. with equipment, training, or other its first 8 years, recently completed its officials created unrealistic partner coun- forms of security assistance.”2 Following first full rotation of civilian staff, pub- try expectations, the Theater Security this guidance, Defense Secretary Leon lished its third CCCP, and approved the Cooperation Management Information Panetta stated in 2012, “Whenever second edition of its country coopera- System (TSCMIS) provided an insuf- possible, we will develop innovative, low- tion plans. By these measures, USAFRI- ficient common operating picture of cost, and small-footprint approaches to COM is still a young command. all security cooperation activities, and achieve our security objectives, relying on USAFRICOM continues to improve inaccurate cost estimates led to the can- exercises, rotational presence, and advi- itself by conducting necessary analysis and celation of or reductions in the scope of sory capabilities.”3 These two statements developing strategic plans to achieve the a case.7 DOD addressed most of these summarize USAFRICOM’s security endstates outlined in the Nation’s strate- deficiencies in the new policies, directives, cooperation efforts since 2008. Before gic guidance. However, it historically has and doctrine. However, others require 2012, security cooperation professionals received a multitude of recommendations significant changes in the knowledge serving in USAFRICOM used old strate- from the Government Accountability management system, TSCMIS, and gies, policies, directives, publications, and Office (GAO). A GAO report from 2010 more training for security cooperation combatant command campaign plans concerning USAFRICOM’s efforts on personnel. (CCCP) to execute security cooperation the continent identified areas of needed Since 2012, there has been a gradual activities in Africa. USAFRICOM previ- improvement in training, planning, and increase in new and updated strategies, ously planned security cooperation efforts interagency collaboration. These included policies, and regulations issued concern- in stovepipes, without synchronized stra- the lack of overarching strategies such as ing security cooperation. This growth, tegic effects across all staff levels. a CCCP and country cooperation plans, primarily because of security force as- USAFRICOM can better implement the lack of measuring long-term effects sistance (SFA) activities in Afghanistan Department of Defense (DOD) security of activities, and the lack of training on and Iraq, resulted in 15 new publications cooperation guidance by overcoming applying funding sources to activities for combatant commands to execute. four obstacles. This article first reviews by staff members on the patchwork President Barack Obama issued PPD some challenges of establishing a new of security cooperation authorities. It 16, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan combatant command, notes the changes also highlighted that limited resources Africa, in June 2012, and PPD 23, in security cooperation brought about by prevented the desired number of inter- Security Sector Assistance, in 2013. From Secretary Gates, and highlights changes to agency personnel from participating on 2012 to 2017, DOD agencies collectively security cooperation in the recent National the USAFRICOM staff and that limited issued four new policy directives and one Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). cultural knowledge and understanding planner’s handbook, including security The article next illustrates the systems of U.S. Embassy operations caused mis- cooperation as the main subject.8 USAFRICOM has established to opera- steps during engagements.4 GAO also The Joint Staff and Headquarters tionalize its CCCP and identifies areas highlighted that program managers from Department of the Army issued or for further improvement. It then outlines other agencies failed to implement guid- updated seven notes, pamphlets, field specific areas where USAFRICOM and ance from Presidential Policy Directive manuals, publications, or other guidance its components are succeeding in improv- (PPD) 23, Security Sector Assistance. Not during the same period.9 In 2013, the ing their efforts and identifies gaps for fully implementing this guidance has Joint Staff issued Joint Publication Note future improvement. Overall, this article resulted in an inability to accurately track 1-13, “Security Force Assistance,” which highlights areas where USAFRICOM and the distribution of program funding and stated that “despite the importance of its components are struggling with imple- a lack of agencies to coordinate and im- its national mission, SFA does not have a menting the multitude of new guidance plement programs.5 Department of State dedicated JP [joint publication] and exist- for DOD security cooperation efforts. program managers have since improved ing joint doctrine makes only occasional funding assessments and integrated more references to it.” Four years later, JP3-20, Challenges of a New agencies into planning and executing Security Cooperation, was published. The Combatant Command programs. 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy fur- USAFRICOM is the newest of the In another report, GAO highlighted ther defined the security cooperation and six geographic combatant commands ongoing DOD reforms for security security assistance communities.
92 Features / Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 U.S. Marine assigned to Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response–Africa watches as Ugandan soldier uses radio to relay messages, Camp Singo, Uganda, November 17, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Alexander Mitchell)
The release of these 15 documents assistance authorities in the Department staffed,” DSCA director Vice Admiral within the last 6 years is connected to of State and led to charges of a milita- Joseph Rixey remarked of the system. “If Secretary Gates’s vision. This vision, rized foreign policy.”10 This significant you look at the ways sales are going up, if combined with the significant increase shift in security assistance policy and workforce doesn’t correspond with sales in SFA programs since 2006 and the authority undoubtedly laid the founda- going up, or at least stay steady, it’s going consistent findings of the GAO, has led tion for Secretary Gates’s 2010 vision of to have an obvious impact on time be- Congress to implement new strategies the future of DOD SFA activities. cause you’re running everything through ensuring that DOD fully operationalizes This change created numerous is- that particular system.”12 Overall, DOD its security cooperation efforts. sues for DOD staffs that are expected continues to expect war on terror results to execute this vision, especially since from systems designed for Cold War–era Changes in Security “the number of authorities and as- timelines while cutting staffs by 20 Cooperation sociated funding provided to DOD to percent and under the constant stress of The National Defense Authorization conduct security cooperation activities unknown budget allocations. Act of 2006 authorized DOD to use its has expanded significantly since 2001, Title 10 funding source instead of the with DOD security cooperation funding Operationalizing Security Department of State’s Title 22 funding tripling from 2008 to 2015. In contrast, Cooperation to support the Building Partnership the Department of State’s security assis- Congress codified Secretary Gates’s Capacity of foreign militaries. This tance funding has increased by 23 percent vision through the 2016 NDAA. In authorization allows DOD to assist other in the same period.”11 The Defense section 1202, Congress mandated that allied or partner nations in transferring Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) DOD, “in consultation with the Sec- training and equipment so long as they and Security Cooperation Officers (SCO) retary of State, shall develop and issue are in direct support of U.S. efforts to have mainly experienced these effects. to the DOD a strategic framework for counter terrorism. This authorization DOD systems have felt this 23 per- DOD security cooperation to guide pri- was a “departure from vesting security cent increase in demand. “It has to be oritization of resources and activities.”
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Chaney 93 U.S. Army instructor with soldier from Senegalese army’s 1st Paratrooper Battalion, as part of Africa Readiness Training 2016, Thies, Senegal, July 13, 2016 (U.S. Army Africa/Craig Philbrick)
It also directed that DOD discuss stra- With the 2017 NDAA, these direc- of attention and efficiency as other tegic goals of security cooperation pro- tives and instructions have become integral DOD activities.”15 However, grams; identify the primary objectives, law. For USAFRICOM staff members, operations tend to receive the full atten- priorities, and desired endstates of pro- these new directives and changes in the tion of the staff because officers are grams; identify challenges to achieving NDAA 2017 resulted in new require- more familiar with them. Operations the objectives, priorities, and endstates; ments without the systems or trained have a clear and defined task, purpose, and develop a methodology for assess- staff to accomplish these tasks. With these and timeline. Security cooperation is ing the effectiveness of the programs.13 challenges, how does USAFRICOM about building relationships, sometimes In response to these requirements, implement new DOD policies and laws with “difficult” partners who have a say DOD developed policies and processes and improve our security cooperation in what we do. To fully operationalize to improve security cooperation com- efforts? security cooperation, USAFRICOM munities. These new changes became must overcome four obstacles: institu- law in the 2017 NDAA. Four areas Obstacles to Operationalizing tionalize new processes, institutionalize that the new legislation would focus the CCCP all programs in the CCCP, reduce the on include streamlining security coop- Security cooperation efforts require number of events, and increase training eration authorities, coordinating more detailed plans that are synchronized for its staff. between DOD and the State Depart- with congressional funding cycles and Institutionalize New Staff Processes. ment on security cooperation activities, that are capable of being executed over USAFRICOM has begun establishing improving monitoring and evaluation multiple years and through various CCCP line-of-effort boards to syn- of security cooperation activities, and program managers. It is DOD policy chronize all combatant command and increasing the professionalism of the that security cooperation activities “shall component staffs’ security cooperation security cooperation workforce.14 be planned, programmed, budgeted, efforts and programs into five defined and executed with the same high degree areas. This allows the boards to prioritize
94 Features / Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 USAFRICOM efforts, resulting in State Department’s Foreign Military USAFRICOM should code each billet synchronizing efforts through the is- Financing (FMF) and International properly to ensure its staff is properly suance of operation orders for security Military Education and Training (IMET) trained through DISCS. As well, DISCS cooperation events. U.S. Army Africa programs. To synchronize these efforts, should absorb the U.S. Army and Marine (USARAF), which is USAFRICOM’s the CCCP should become the sole direc- Corps Planner’s courses to include Army component command, has further tive for all security cooperation efforts Service-specific processes. operationalized this by initially establish- in the combatant command’s area of Overcoming these four obstacles to ing an 18-step system to achieve full operations, including the National Guard operationalizing the CCCP will not be staff integration and support the CCCP. Bureau’s State Partnership Programs. accomplished easily or quickly. They may Neither of these new staff processes has Likewise, the CCCP should become not be realized for several years because achieved a full execution of their cycles, the tool through which USAFRICOM significant coordination and buy-in from nor are they fully integrated into a writ- directs FMF and IMET funding by show- within DOD and the State Department ten and published standard operating ing the desired long-term effect of State are required. However, without over- procedure. Department security assistance. coming these issues first, none of the USAFRICOM’s orders are not syn- Reduce the Number of Military- following three recommendations will be chronized with the requirements of its to-Military Events. The impact of achieved. components’ timelines and requirements. military-to-military events is rarely mea- USARAF regularly receives the order to sured and accessed due to their small size Improve Coordination execute security cooperation programs (two to three personnel), small effect (3 Efforts with Allies just weeks before the new fiscal year, and to 4 days), and sheer numbers (more than Synchronizing security cooperation not within the 180-day requirement by 100). Instead of trying to do something efforts with our strategic partners in U.S. Army Forces Command to task in every country in Africa, USAFRICOM Africa is ongoing at the highest and regionally aligned forces. USAFRICOM should make its staff and components do lowest levels. These efforts sometimes should challenge its line-of-effort boards fewer events with more synchronization end in meeting notes, but without to produce operation orders that include and more effects afterward. These events any credible action taken. As military all security cooperation events and send should be longer, with more personnel, budgets decrease, our militaries are these orders to its components 270 days more expected outcomes, and more forced to look for ways to synchronize before the start of the new fiscal year. synchronization of efforts with allied our efforts. North Atlantic Treaty With any new staff procedure, time partners. If these efforts were synchro- Organization (NATO) doctrine is is required to synchronize efforts fully. nized with other programs over several designed to enhance interoperability as Over the upcoming years, USAFRICOM years, these small touch points could be the primary defense against aggression. and USARAF should continue to refine included in the larger assessment of an In addition to operationalizing interop- their staff processes and integrate them overall effort. erability, we need to operationalize into a codified system that outlasts staff Increase the Professionalism of the our security cooperation efforts. This changeovers. In doing so, USAFRICOM Security Cooperation Workforce. To en- concept is directly in line with all DOD will reduce its staff’s learning curve, pro- sure security cooperation funds are spent policies and directives recently released. vide the time required to task allocated properly, USAFRICOM must ensure USAFRICOM participates in mul- forces correctly, and comply with the its personnel are properly trained and tiple initiatives that help synchronize its new requirements from the 2017 NDAA staffed. DSCA is primarily responsible efforts with allied nations. Specifically, by fully accessing every security coopera- for the professional development of the USAFRICOM participates in the Sahel tion event. security cooperation workforce, and does Multilateral Planning Group, which Institutionalize All Programs in this through resident and online train- synchronizes allied activities in the Sahel the CCCP. USAFRICOM must include ing courses by its Defense Institute of Maghreb region, the Multinational Joint in the CCCP all State Department Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS). Task Force to synchronize efforts in programs and DOD units that oper- Security cooperation professionals need the Lake Chad Basin to counter Boko ate in its area of operation but are not more than a few weeklong courses to Haram, and the East Africa Multilateral directly assigned. For example, DSCA is understand the complexities of their Planning Group to synchronize ef- responsible for the Defense Institutional jobs. The fact that the Service branches forts in East Africa. These efforts have Reform Initiative, Africa Center for conduct their own security cooperation shown some progress. However, these Strategic Studies (ACSS), and Ministry courses highlights the previous lack of efforts were previously restricted by the of Defense Advisor (MoDA) programs. training opportunities from DISCS. lack of headquarters staff synchroniza- These programs and center execute Both the Army and Marine Corps have tion. USAFRICOM is attempting to activities in the USAFRICOM area of separate security cooperation planner expand staff synchronization through operations, yet none are captured or courses. Since DISCS recently expanded the Defense Systems Information directed in the CCCP. Neither are the and updated its training curriculum, Agency’s All Partners Access Network,
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Chaney 95 that aligning units to regions of the world is a smart approach, especially when downsizing an army. The chief of general staff for the British army commented on this in a report in 2014, stating that the “U.S. Regionally Aligned Forces programme is the most advanced of these and one that we are very conscious we need to work alongside, comple- ment, and collaborate with such that our activities are reinforcing rather than interfering.”19 A recent example of collaboration is the peacekeeping training for Malawi Defence Forces that were trained by British and U.S. soldiers for deploy- ment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in support of a United Nations mission. Our efforts can go further with the British by synchronizing more with the four British regionally aligned brigades. Recent staff talks between the Republic of Mali airman trains with U.S. Soldiers, Airmen, and partner nations during aerial logistics U.S. and British armies show potential to and resupply Exercise Atlas Accord 2012, Mopti Airfield, Sevare, Mali, February 6, 2012 (U.S. Army/ synchronize our efforts in some nations. Callie West) However, it will take more than yearly but even this system has its limitations of France’s security cooperation efforts in staff talks to synchronize efforts in Africa. to synchronizing with other knowledge Africa are with its former colonial nations. To further expand our efforts, USARAF management systems. For example, In 2008, France released its first recently hosted a British army delegation USAFRICOM’s component planners defense white paper since 1994. In it, to increase interoperability and collabora- selectively participate in these groups, and France explained that its security coopera- tion by establishing routine staff-level when they do, few overarching action tion mission was to develop the capacity discussions. Agreements were made to agreements are operationalized due to a of its partner nations to respond to crises provide each other common operating lack of understanding of their capabili- and support peacekeeping operations pictures and to invite British army partici- ties, operations, and security cooperation led by regional or subregional organiza- pants into USARAF’s annual order and systems. USAFRICOM could overcome tions.16 France further defined its goals multiyear planning cycles. Establishing these shortcomings by focusing its under- for security cooperation efforts in Africa operational planning teams that focus on standing on France and Great Britain’s in its 2013 white paper: “Support for specific aspects of planning will achieve efforts and by identifying ways that we establishment of a collective security ar- the required collaboration to synchronize can further synchronize our efforts. chitecture in Africa is a priority of France’s efforts. Additionally, by including the France’s security cooperation efforts cooperation and development policy.”17 British army’s regional brigade repre- fall into two broad categories: structural Collaboration between the United States sentatives, USARAF will enable effective and operational. The structural category and France in operational efforts is in- planning for several different engage- has a long-term planning horizon of 5 to creasing in Africa, particularly in West and ments across multiple regions and achieve 10 years. This category includes activi- Central Africa; however, security coop- DOD guidance. ties such as building a military academy eration efforts are minimally integrated, Senior ranking members of our allied or a demining unit (building partnership and mainly at the Embassy level, among nations are members of USAFRICOM’s capacity) and is executed by embedded security cooperation officers. Multinational Coordination Center. trainers and advisors. These advisors live The British army is currently un- This center is the channel through which full time in the country for 2 years and dergoing a significant shift in its forces USAFRICOM continues to improve wear the rank and uniform of the partner called “Army 2020.” Part of this change its synchronization efforts. This center nation, something DOD normally does is identifying priority regions for defense should be more than liaison officers. not do. The operational category includes engagement (security cooperation), and The USAFRICOM commander must activities such as peacekeeping pre-deploy- another important change is the creation empower them, and so should their ment training, and short-term police and of regionally aligning brigades.18 Great commands, to coordinate throughout border security training events. A majority Britain, like the United States, recognized the breadth and depth of USAFRICOM
96 Features / Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 security cooperation efforts. Additionally, President Bill Clinton envisioned the Table. Africa Military Education USAFRICOM can improve our efforts Africa Center to “be a regional center Program by Country with the British and French by including modeled after the George C. Marshall Country Program them in our annual security cooperation Center in Germany designed in consulta- Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) conferences, reducing the classification tion with African nations and intended School of certain documents, and coordinating to promote the exchange of ideas and Staff College Botswana staff talks between the British, French, information tailored specifically for Center for Military Intelligence and USAFRICOM’s other component African concerns.”21 The Africa Center is Special Operations or Combat Life Savers commands. These efforts will move away currently achieving President Clinton’s Military Academy from security cooperation officers and vision, but it is not as successful as the Burkina Faso NCO Academy components trying to accomplish the Marshall Center. The center limits itself Staff College interoperability of efforts between two to primarily being a strategic institution Burundi Military Academy nations and toward full staff synchroniza- significantly contributing to the academic Staff College tion of all our efforts. It will also allow community and reports to congres- Cameroon Air Operations School our African partners to benefit from a sional leaders when required; however, Officer’s School coordinated and cohesive security coop- most of its information is duplicative Chad NCO Academy eration strategy. of other think tanks that cover Africa. Military Academy The center seemingly is unaffiliated with Djibouti NCO Academy Create a New CCCP USAFRICOM based on an analysis of its Line of Effort activities compared with other regional Gabon Staff College Air Force NCO Academy Defense institution-building (DIB) by centers and collaboration with their Ghana USAFRICOM has been minimal and respective combatant commands. The Staff College focused on the individual instead of the Africa Center currently executes one of Kenya Military Academy Staff College institution. In Africa, the primary pro- eight components of DIB for DOD with Madagascar grams through which DIB is executed its Africa Miltary Education Program Military Academy are through the ACSS, Counterterrorism (AMEP). This program is directed by the Armed Forces Sergeant Major of the Malawi Army Fellowship Program, and Defense Insti- State Department and mandated by the Mozambique Institute for Defense Studies tutional Reform Initiative, which primar- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense ily are only seminars and conferences. for Policy for ACSS to serve as the execu- Niger Military Academy Additionally, professional military educa- tive agent. Under the AMEP mandate, Defense College Staff College tion through the IMET program has ACSS partners with 19 nations for 32 Nigeria been provided on a limited scale in com- programs. The USAFRICOM com- Defense Academy (Senior NCO) Warrant Officer Academy parison to other combatant commands. mander should refocus this organization Medical Simulation Center DOD guidance outlines what planners to concentrate more on synchronizing Rwanda Staff College should take into account when deciding and leading its DIB efforts in Africa at the whether to support an event: “Security executive direction and generating forces Military Academy South Africa College for Educational Technology cooperation planners shall consider the levels. The Africa Center could become War College economic capabilities of the foreign the bridge between DSCA DIB programs Air Force NCO Academy country concerned. Except in cases of and USAFRICOM’s effects. Tanzania Air Force Junior Officer Course the primary military considerations, an USAFRICOM should request the ex- Uganda NCO Academy improvement of military capabilities that pansion of the DSCA MoDA and AMEP the partner country cannot or will not programs. Currently, there are dozens of Zambia Staff College support, safeguard, or sustain shall be dis- MoDAs in Afghanistan, but only one in all couraged.”20 Planners in USAFRICOM of Africa. The AMEP program is poorly Approved for Fiscal Year 2016 and USARAF face a complicated decision funded at only $3 million a year—less than Angola War College when including these economic con- the amount spent on one of the dozens NCO Academy siderations into security force assistance of tactical-level counterterrorism events. Benin Cadet School proposals because most African nations USAFRICOM could employ up to 20 Staff College struggle to sustain the equipment avail- new MoDAs in Africa and expand its DIB Côte d’Ivoire School of Armed Services able through the DSCA Foreign Military efforts into every military institution in Sierra Leone NCO Academy Sales system. Providing less sophisticated Africa for the price of one of these events. equipment and focusing more on improv- USAFRICOM encounters three ing their defense institutions could go programmatic obstacles to executing DIB Previously, 1-year programs, other- further in improving the capabilities of in Africa, one of which was solved by wise noted as “1-year money,” limited our partner nations. the recent changes in the 2017 NDAA. too many DOD security cooperation
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Chaney 97 Cameroonian soldiers, along with U.S. and Spanish marine advisors assigned to Africa Partnership Station 13, simulate amphibious assault in jungle as part of final exercise, Limbe, Cameroon, October 2013 (U.S. Marines/Tatum Vayavananda) programs. This resulted in limited returns by DSCA, through the Defense Institute By establishing a new CCCP line of because many programs required long Reform Initiative. Because of this, some effort, USAFRICOM can focus its DIB horizons with long-term growth returns. staff members regularly refer to generat- efforts. This will drive guidance given Therefore, the 1-year money cycle was in- ing or operation force activities incorrectly to the Africa Center, assign DIB efforts effective for DIB in Africa because it takes as DIB activities. This causes confusion of to the appropriate executor, and expand more than 1 year to implement changes the intent of the event and the program ministry-level effects with our partner in defense institutions. through which it should be executed. The nations. Lastly, it will synchronize DIB Thanks to Chapter 16, Section 333, new requirement under Section 333 also efforts across all security cooperation of the new NDAA, events can now span creates the expectation that USARAF, programs, including the new mandated multiple years. This solves the 1-year which is USAFRICOM’s primary execu- NDAA requirements. money issue. However, the new section tor of security cooperation in Africa, can requires each event to have a supporting plan these DIB requirements. USARAF’s One System for Security institutional capacity-building require- primary executor of security cooperation Cooperation Efforts ment, which is often confused with DIB. is the Regionally Aligned Brigade, which DOD Directive 5132.03, DOD Policy This new requirement further highlights is not capable of performing DIB as de- and Responsibilities Relating to Security the second and third programmatic fined by DOD Directive 5205.82, Defense Cooperation, mandates the use of the obstacles: defining DIB and available Institution Building. The potential effects Global Theater Security Cooperation forces to execute DIB. Few SCOs or of these issues are SFA proposals not Management Information System component staff officers are trained to meeting the requirements under the new (G-TSCMIS) as the system for security access and develop DIB proposals at the NDAA, poorly developed and executed cooperation activities. DOD recently ministerial level, which is currently done events, and missteps with partner nations. published another new instruction fully
98 Features / Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 updating and outlining its assessments, USAFRICOM should work with the holistic assessment to USAFRICOM’s se- monitoring, and evaluation policy; it Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense curity cooperation efforts, and will reduce directed USAFRICOM to “ensure secu- (DASD) for Security Cooperation to learning curves by new staff members rity cooperation initiatives are appropri- merge the many security cooperation through providing a common knowledge ately assessed and monitored, including knowledge management systems into management system. JFQ by ensuring that appropriate data [are] G-TSCMIS to achieve the full intent of entered into G-TSCMIS.”22 The 2017 the new DOD instruction. DASD Security NDAA also directs implementing new Cooperation should work with the State Notes monitoring and evaluation systems. Department’s Bureau of Political-Military 1 USAFRICOM security cooperation Affairs and Bureau of African Affairs to Richard G. Catoire, “A CINC for Sub- Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Com- officers work primarily through three learn from their new monitoring and mand Plan,” Parameters (Winter 2000/2001), knowledge management systems: evaluation systems, which would provide available at
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Chaney 99 Army Security Cooperation Policy (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, March 21, 2013); Pamphlet 12-1, Security Assistance Procedures and Operations (Wash- ington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, March 31, 2016); Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 29, 2013). 10 Nina M. Serafino,Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, RS22855 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 8, 2014), available at
100 Features / Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 call for entries for the 2018 Secretary of Defense and 2018 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions
Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners.
Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows.
What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college.
When? Anytime during the 2017–2018 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 17–18, 2018, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: www.ndu.edu/press/SECDEF-essay-competition.html www.ndu.edu/press/CJCS-essay-competition.html The Battle Between Scipio and Hannibal at Zama, Cornelis Cort, after Giulio Romano, engraving ca. 1550–1578, Elisha Whittelsey Collection (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art)
Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War Joint Lessons for Center of Gravity Analysis
By Kenneth T. Klima, Peter Mazzella, and Patrick B. McLaughlin
Bellum parate, quoniam pacem pati non potuistis. [Prepare for war, since you have been unable to endure the peace.]
—sCipio afriCanus To HanniBal, prior To THE BaTTlE of Zama, in 202 BCE
102 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 ublius Cornelius Scipio (236–183 the Mediterranean for nearly 6 centuries. desperation, the Roman Senate eventu- BCE), known more widely by the However, before we can use Scipio’s ally turned to an unproven 24-year-old P nom de guerre Scipio Africanus, campaign history to support our claims of Scipio—son of Publius Scipio, the general was a Roman statesman and general COG analysis, we must first understand defeated and slain by Carthaginian forces whose actions during the Second Punic the history and operational conditions in 211 BCE—to remove the threat of War (218–201 BCE) demonstrate the present during the Second Punic War. Hannibal’s forces from Rome’s doorstep. eternal qualities embodied by modern However, Scipio did not move to directly concepts of joint warfare. Scipio The Operational Environment challenge Hannibal in battle, as was employed said concepts at all levels of As the name suggests, the Second Punic expected by most Roman leaders, but in- war and showed an atypical ability to War was not the first skirmish between stead chose to take an indirect approach, integrate military and political objec- Rome and Carthage. The First Punic deploying forces to Spain to conduct a tives into a single system. Although the War (264–241 BCE) was a conflict multiyear campaign against Carthaginian period of antiquity was a time when over the control of Sicily that ended forces and allies.5 In Spain, Scipio isolated the concepts of strategy were only inconclusively. In the interregnum and defeated four armies (including two nascent, the study of Scipio highlights between the first and second conflict, led by Hannibal’s brothers, Hasdrubal practically every aspect of modern joint an unsteady peace existed as each side and Mago), destroyed lines of commu- planning and operations. In analyzing maneuvered for advantage. nication supporting Hannibal in Italy, Scipio, Basil H. Liddell Hart proposed Circa 218 BCE, Carthaginian and rebalanced Carthaginian allies back that his “[m]ilitary work has a greater general Hannibal Barca prepared for, to Rome. Furthermore, Scipio showed a value to modern students of war than and then renewed, Carthage’s efforts unique ability to conduct joint warfare, that of any other great captain of to subjugate its rival. Reportedly, he leveraging the unique attributes as- the past.”1 In fact, despite warfare’s inherited his father’s hatred of Rome sociated with the different units of the advancements in technology and indus- and, through a cult of personality, led his Roman army, navy, and marine forces. try, Hart’s observation of Scipio is as army from the deserts of Africa, across Scipio’s demonstrated ability to leverage applicable to today’s joint planner as it the Mediterranean, over the Alps, and strategic, operational, and tactical flexibil- was nearly a century ago. into the Italian peninsula, embarking on a ity yielded extraordinary success. Scipio Africanus’s European and bloody campaign to defeat Rome.2 In vic- Consequently, the victory in Spain African campaigns during the Second tory after victory, using the “mental and solidified the efficacy of Scipio’s unortho- Punic War serve as timeless lessons for material means for a stroke at the heart of dox approach, the Senate expanded his joint force planners on how to conduct the Roman power,” Hannibal’s tactical commission, and he moved his armies center of gravity (COG) analysis in sup- and operational genius crushed Rome’s toward Africa to threaten the city of port of theater and national military armies and established him as one of his- Carthage directly. The confluence of planning. The campaigns are a superb tory’s greatest commanders.3 Following these events compelled Hannibal to vehicle with which to examine five key Hannibal’s decisive defeat of the Roman abandon Italy and return to Africa, where lessons associated with today’s concept of forces at Cannae (216 BCE), Carthage his army was met and routed by Scipio’s COG analysis: gained control of the Italian coast of forces at the Battle of Zama (202 BCE). Magna Graecia, which resulted in mul- Hannibal’s defeat finalized Carthage’s de- achieving the desired endstate •• tiple Roman allies and economic vassals feat, securing for Rome a Mediterranean COGs as part of a system •• switching allegiances to Hannibal.4 Post- empire that would last nearly 600 years. the indirect approach to attacking •• Cannae, Hannibal was unable to lay siege COGs to Rome to force its surrender. Instead, Lesson One: COG Analysis how to move between direct and •• he launched a decades-long campaign Enables Desired Endstates indirect approaches throughout Italy during which, despite The failure to understand the desired the result of poor COG analysis. •• unending tactical success, he remained political endstate—what comes after the Despite the use of 2,200-year-old unable to achieve his military or political transition to civil authorities—invariably evidence, all five lessons demonstrate endstates: the subjugation of Rome. leads to challenges in war termination how the basic dictums of modern Hannibal’s tactical success did result and the establishment of legitimate gov- doctrine proved pivotal in determining in a shortage of qualified Roman generals ernments, institutions, and authorities whether Rome or Carthage would rule willing to march out and meet him. In in postconflict states.6 This challenge of overcoming the split between military and political planning is not a phenom- enon of the present age. Even a cursory Commander Kenneth T. “Max” Klima, USN, is Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff J2. study of Scipio expresses how the Lieutenant Colonel Peter Mazzella, USA, is the Joint Training System and Lessons Learned Branch Chief for North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command soldier-statesman must conduct a range (USNORTHCOM) J7. Major Patrick B. McLaughlin, USAF, is the Lead Joint Planner for the Aerospace of military operations within a spectrum and Homeland Defense Plans Branch, NORAD and USNORTHCOM J5.
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 103 Scipio Africanus Storming New Carthage, ca. 1470, tempera on fabric, mounted on cassone panel, gift of Mr. and Mrs. Theodore W. Bennett (Courtesy Minneapolis Institute of Art) that simultaneously integrates all three successes to set the political conditions loyalty from Carthage to Rome—ir- levels of war while still supporting the for Carthage to comply with Roman revocably destroying Carthage’s supply desired political endstate (often referred will in its affairs. of personnel and financial support for to as “national strategic endstate” in Another example of Scipio’s political Hannibal’s Italian operations. joint doctrine). For example, during the foresight in the use of military means By remaining focused on the desired Second Punic War, the political end- was demonstrated after his successful political endstate, Scipio adroitly avoided state was not solely the destruction of seizure of the Carthaginian Spanish expected military practices that were the adversary’s military, but rather the colony of Cartagena (209 BCE). Rather counter to the postwar peace. Spain, a military means to achieve the political than destroy Spain’s Celtic-Iberian tribes hotbed of insurgents and untrustworthy aim of securing unrivaled control of the who supported Carthage—the very allies, was also the source of Carthaginian Mediterranean world.7 Throughout the same tribes whose revolt from Rome led troop levies, food supplies, and war war, Scipio’s military actions and opera- to the death of Scipio’s father—Scipio economics essential to Hannibal’s Italian tional approach demonstrated an ability broke with tradition and built close ties campaign. In addition to his military to directly link singular and multiple with former enemies. The day after his victories, Scipio’s benevolent treatment military actions toward the achievement triumph in Cartagena, Scipio showed of former foes had a compounding ef- of both the desired military conditions clemency and even mercy toward the fect in that other tribes and nations loyal as well as the desired political endstate. indigenous tribes both publicly and to Carthage surrendered to Roman Scipio’s every action, both on and off through policy. The Roman historian forces rather than battle Scipio or remain the battlefield, focused on achieving a Livy claims these acts actually endeared Carthaginian vassals.8 Consequently, in a lasting postwar peace in which Rome Scipio to the people throughout Spain few masterful strokes, Scipio won a regu- directed the course of a subdued but and were major causes toward undercut- lar war, ended an irregular war, destroyed integrated Carthage. This emphasis ting Carthage’s political control in the Hannibal’s supply chain, and integrated ignored the traditional military focus on region. Scipio’s actions may have gone the Spanish tribes into the greater Roman destruction of armies, industry, and eco- against the common military practice political and economic system in the nomic means and instead used military of the age, but his mercy shifted Spain’s Mediterranean. Scipio remarked to the
104 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Roman Senate that in Spain he had faced as those agreed upon prior to Hannibal’s Planning, echoes Scipio’s approach, down four enemy commanders and four return. Livy’s record shows this move identifying the need for “a clear un- armies, with the outcome being not a was not popular in Rome, as some leaders derstanding of the end state and the single Punic soldier remaining in Spain.9 wanted Carthage to suffer in defeat— conditions that must exist to end military Focusing on both military and political much like Germany would be made to operations. Knowing when to terminate endstates, Scipio’s actions effectively suffer by the victors after World War I. military operations and how to preserve neutralized the troublesome tribes of Scipio’s leniency toward his defeated achieved advantages is key to achieving Spain from supporting Carthage for the enemy indicates he believed a weakened the national strategic end state.”13 remainder of the Punic Wars.10 Carthage with a destroyed army and frag- Scipio’s success teaches joint plan- Scipio followed the same formula after ile institutions would have created a peace ners that a critical component of COG his initial victories following the invasion no different from that following the First analysis involves a greater understanding of Africa (206–204 BCE). Hannibal Punic War—sowing the seeds for yet an- of the desired political endstate. A clearer remained in Italy, but Carthaginian politi- other war between the two empires.11 understanding of the political condi- cal elites, fearing Scipio’s invasion force, Scipio’s ability to identify the desired tions informs the COG discussion and felt defenseless and sued for peace. The political endstate allowed each tactical furthers identification of the means for resulting peace terms were lenient for the and operational movement to advance destroying or disabling adversary COGs. age and indicate Scipio’s preference to in- toward achieving “a more perfect peace.” Current doctrine focuses on military tegrate Carthage and its colonies into the The result was that every action, small or termination and phase-transition criteria Roman system as contributing partners. large, was integrated into the overall op- and directs political endstates to be the The peace lasted until Hannibal returned erational objective of removing Hannibal province of political decisionmakers. JP to Africa to challenge Scipio directly. from Italy and subjugating Carthage. In 5-0 describes the process and products Nevertheless, after Hannibal’s defeat at doing so, Scipio successfully subjugated that the National Command Authority Zama and in spite of the Carthaginian the enemy while sustaining the smallest uses to develop national strategy, but Senate’s deceit, Scipio’s demands for a possible cost of life and resources.12 Joint does not discuss how the government final peace remained principally the same Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation develops desired political endstates for
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 105 specific conflicts. Political entities and in- politics. This lesson may be the most pro- forces in Italy were not the strategic stitutions do not necessarily have clear (in found for modern military planners who COG—the level most interconnected Department of Defense terms) mecha- train to create a specific military endstate with the desired political endstate—but nisms to create identifiable endstates to and then speak of transition. more likely an operational COG.17 serve military planning objectives. JP 5-0 Current doctrine teaches today’s Moreover, this analysis indicates the does identify the commander’s need to planners that military planning cannot defeat of Hannibal at the operational work with interagency mechanisms, but be effective without a clear understand- level of war would not have led to a these efforts are varied and reliant on the ing of the military endstate and that the strategic defeat of Carthage. Conversely, individuals in command and do not lead termination of military operations is key improper or incorrect analysis limits the to clear integration of government insti- to achieving the “national strategic end ability to target or influence the whole, tutions and the military. state.”16 No single government institution and effects are isolated rather than In contrast to Scipio, Hannibal exem- is responsible for defining an individual systemic—hence Scipio’s decision to plifies the pitfalls of not integrating desired strategic endstate, particularly for major ignore the Senate’s orders to confront military and political endstates. According theater contingency plans, whereas Hannibal directly and instead seek an to the Roman record, Hannibal’s cavalry the military receives guidance directly indirect way of threatening the true leader Maharbal remarked to his com- from the National Command Authority strategic COG of Carthage itself. mander that Hannibal “knew how to through a byzantine process of strategic Hannibal’s reliance on Spain as a gain a victory” but did “not know how guidance and the labyrinthine Joint critical force enabler supporting his to use it.”14 Hannibal’s approach is akin Strategic Planning System. Unfortunately, operational COG—Carthage’s fielded to Mark Cancian’s 1998 discourse on the joint planner does not have a role in forces in Italy—made it the logical target the fallacy of COG analysis, as they both developing responsibilities in the interna- for Scipio’s indirect strategy. In sacking incorrectly identify the goal of all military tional system of states, and the crafters of the Spanish city of Cartagena, Scipio operations as attaining a battlefield advan- national strategy are not members of joint cut off Hannibal’s lifeline and crippled tage.15 Hannibal’s emphasis on battlefield planning groups, resulting in a natural fis- his operational capability without ever advantage resulted in a series of tactical sure between military and political ends. having faced the dreaded general on the and operational successes that never led to Modern planners therefore must learn battlefield. Livy records Scipio instructing strategic victory. Scipio’s approach stands from Scipio’s example and create a work- his forces, “You will in actuality attack the in stark contrast and serves as a reminder ing understanding of the political endstate walls of a single city, but in that single city to military planners that the transition rather than remain preoccupied solely on you will have made yourselves masters to a better peace does not occur simply the defeat or destruction of the opposing of Spain.”18 Liddell Hart further identi- because one has achieved the desired mili- militaries. Only with this understanding fied that the Spanish campaign was not tary endstate. can military success effectively translate to merely about Spain, as military actions at Other conflicts more recent than the lasting stability and peace after hostilities the operational level had systemic effects Second Punic War have demonstrated have ceased. influencing the strategic: both the difficulty today’s joint planners face in outlining war termination criteria Lesson Two: COG and Its Scipio, in whom the idea of strategic exploi- and the effective transition from military Elements Are Part of an tation was as inborn as the tactical, was to civil authorities and the importance Interconnected System not content to rest on his laurels. Already he in doing so. This is more likely a result Scipio’s second lesson is to view COGs was looking to the future, directing his view of military planners focusing principally as part of an interconnected system to Africa. As he had seen that Cartagena on military approaches to the transition in order to find which pressure points was the key to Spain, that Spain was the from peace to war rather than integrating yield the maximum effect. There remain key to the situation in Italy, so he saw that whole-of-government efforts focused deep, integral relationships between the Africa was the key to the whole struggle. on achieving the smooth transition from COGs at the varying levels of war that Strike at Africa, and he would not only war back to peace. Carl von Clausewitz create an interconnected system identi- relieve Italy of Hannibal’s ever menacing identified the ties between national poli- fied through COG analysis. Therefore, presence—a menace which he had already tics and the aims of conflict, but it was the ability exists to use analytical results reduced by paralyzing Hannibal’s source of General William T. Sherman who clari- to focus military operations to create reinforcement—but would undermine the fied that “[w]ar’s legitimate object is a system-wide impacts. Understanding foundations of Carthaginian power, until more perfect peace.” Historical examples COGs as a system means that even tacti- the edifice itself collapsed in ruin.19 provide evidence that responsibility falls cal actions can support strategic ends. to the rare soldier-statesman to have the Applying the modern rubrics of COG Scipio’s indirect approach into Spain greatest understanding of the national analysis to the Second Punic War, it provides planners a lesson in the ef- strategic ends: the transition between becomes clear that the integrated COG fectiveness of thorough COG analysis. politics-to-war-to-peace and then again to analysis of Scipio indicated Hannibal’s The military planner must not only
106 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 understand the fact that COGs exist approach were three sequential battles, was too small and inexperienced to at multiple levels but also endeavor to each characterized by innovative tactics have any hope of victory. These orders understand how the connection between and massive battlefield successes that ignored the years of defeat suffered by those COGs and their elements (critical remain instructive for modern tacti- Roman generals who could do little capabilities [CCs], critical requirements cal planners and commanders. More more than check Hannibal’s advance [CRs], and critical vulnerabilities [CVs]) important, Scipio’s true mastery of through small skirmishes and delaying interact with one another.20 While attack- warfare is evident in how each individual tactics. With Hannibal’s army being ing a single vulnerability, one may create a action was part of a grand strategy to larger, more experienced, better armed, cascading effect that paralyzes or destroys defeat Hannibal (operational COG) better resourced, and better prepared, the enemy’s system from within—setting and Carthage (strategic COG). While Scipio had no prospect of victory using conditions for the desired endstate. Hannibal’s tactical successes never a direct approach. It was clear to him Several examples from Scipio’s placed pressure on Rome’s COGs, that Spain was the fundamental source of Spanish campaign emphasize the im- Scipio’s actions attacked all levels of the Hannibal’s power to organize for war—a portance of understanding systemic Carthaginian system. Scipio’s example conversion point for levies and material relationships of COGs. The lenient demonstrates the value of understanding and economic support.24 Liddell Hart treatment of the Spanish tribes—an the systemic nature of COG, CCs, CRs, comments, “By swiftness of movement, operational CR for Hannibal’s man- and CVs and approaching each step with superior tactics, and skillful diplomacy he power needs, and those of Carthage at calculated forethought, considering the converted this defensive object into an the strategic level—eventually led Spain systemic impacts associated with the in- offensive, if indirect, thrust at Carthage to switch sides and support Rome’s terconnected nature of war.23 and at Hannibal.”25 Victory validated this future operations in Africa. Then there approach; Scipio won Spain for Rome is Scipio’s leniency following his victory Lesson Three: Using the without facing Hannibal’s main force, at Cartagena, which led to the defec- Indirect Approach and by taking Spain he struck at the tion of the Numidian leader and cavalry Scipio’s indirect strategy of defeating COG—Hannibal’s army. commander Masinissa from Hannibal Hannibal and Carthage offers joint Scipio would continue an indirect to Scipio. Specifically, after learning planners a third lesson—how to use approach throughout the Second Punic one of the prisoners was the nephew of an indirect approach to attack COGs. War. Following victory in Spain, he Masinissa, Scipio provided care for the Regardless of the interpretation of prepared to invade Africa with an army youth and ensured his safe return home. Clausewitz, the application of COG built on the Roman legions defeated This single act attacked Carthage’s sys- analysis theory often devolves into by Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae. tem by affecting multiple CRs and CVs planning to attack an enemy where it is The Senate again ordered him to at- of Carthage and Hannibal, resulting in the strongest and falsely believing that tack Hannibal in Italy. Roman Senator a systemic ripple effect that shaped the when the identified strength is defeated, Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus execution and outcome of the Second the enemy’s will to resist will crumble. (surnamed Cunctator), who had previ- Punic War. Through sparing the life of a The direct approach maintains that ously conducted a campaign to delay small boy, an oddity of restraint in that meeting enemy strength with friendly Hannibal’s army, criticized Scipio’s age, a key Carthaginian ally in Africa strength is the best use of force and indirect approach: “Why do you not became sympathetic to Rome, helping leads to the greatest possible massing apply yourself to this, and carry the war nullify Carthage’s powerbase.21 of armies. The interpretation continues in a straight forward manner to the place As a final example from the campaign that COG is therefore the recipe for where Hannibal is, rather than pursue in Spain, following Scipio’s victory at rapid and decisive victory. Those who that roundabout course, according to Cartagena, the Carthaginians split into decry COG analysis often lean on this which you expect that when you have three armies-in-being, with two com- misunderstanding as the major point of crossed into Africa Hannibal will follow manded by Hannibal’s brothers. Rather their assertions of the uselessness of the you tither.”26 than staying on the defensive and en- concept. The review of Scipio not only Scipio countered his political oppo- abling the Carthaginian armies to mass, counters the fallacy of misunderstand- nents and again sought to fight Hannibal Scipio moved from the siege warfare ing COG analysis but also emphasizes indirectly by taking the war to Africa: of Cartagena to operational maneuver how the application of proper analysis “Provided no impediment is caused here and eliminated each of the Carthaginian can avoid resource-intensive, force-on- [in the Senate], you will hear at once that armies in succession without allowing force battles that exhaust militaries and I have landed and that Africa is blazing them to combine. Adept at using his national will but do not result in the with war; that Hannibal is preparing new allies as intelligence networks, Scipio culmination of strategic aims. to depart from this country. . . . I shall was able to maneuver his smaller force Although Scipio’s senatorial com- . . . have the opponent you assign me, to bring larger enemies to battle where mission specifically directed him to Hannibal, but I shall rather draw him and when he chose.22 The results of his attack Hannibal in Italy, his initial force after me than be kept here by him.”27
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 107 defense of Carthage with Scipio’s army in Africa. The Carthaginian Senate ordered Hannibal to end his Italian campaign and return to Carthage’s defense. A masterstroke of strategic craftsmanship, Scipio’s COG analysis drove Hannibal from Roman lands even though he had not lost a major battle. The lesson from antiquity is clear to joint military planners—the adversary’s army should not be the focus of military strategy. The use of the indirect approach provides means to neutralize or defeat an enemy or enemy force without necessar- ily attacking strengths or, at times, even forces. There are no unlimited resources in war, and the force that can better meet military and political ends through the ef- ficient use of force has the advantage. The indirect approach also offers the ability to create better postwar political conditions by controlling force and thus minimiz- ing its collateral effects. Scipio’s indirect approach is an example of how the ad- versary’s integrated political and military system can be analyzed to most effectively apply force in pursuit of statecraft. As the system becomes clearer, the means to collapse that system also become clearer. Notably, the use of COG analysis toward an indirect approach aligns with modern maneuver doctrines among the land components, the evolution of airpower doctrine, and distributed lethality con- cepts in the maritime domain. It stands to reason that if proper analysis could help avoid costly military overextension in conventional war, it would also assist in identifying better ways of applying military force in our current irregular wars. To plan for the future of combat, it appears the joint force must return to antiquity: Scipio’s indirect approach to the use of force within adversarial COGs could and should inform the develop- Bronze bust of Scipio Africanus in Naples National Archaeological Museum, dated mid-1st century ment and execution of modern doctrine. BCE, from Villa of Papyri in Herculaneum, modern Ercolano, Italy (Courtesy Miguel Hermoso Cuesta) In the invasion of Africa, Scipio will of the political elites of Carthage to Lesson Four: Moving Between moves firmly from the operational to continue the war. With the main body of Indirect and Direct Approaches the strategic in his approach to imple- the Carthaginian army abroad, Scipio’s Scipio’s use of the indirect approach menting his COG analysis. His words combined/joint amphibious assault into to attack COGs comes with a caveat. and actions indicate an understanding Africa threatened “regime change” in Should direct military action offer an of how the indirect approach provided Carthage proper. Whereas Hannibal’s opportunity for a debilitating blow, so the greatest systemic effects by threaten- army in Italy was necessary to defeat long as it supports the COG analysis ing a strategic COG—in this case, the Rome, it was wholly irrelevant in the and the risk to one’s own force is lower,
108 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 one should take the opportunity and taking no direct action until drawing Senate appeared to understand to some strike. In 205 BCE, while preparing Hannibal away from his lines of com- extent its own COG in that it weighed to invade Africa, intelligence indicated munication and ensuring he was located each of Hannibal’s military moves in the leaders of Locri favored Rome in territory advantageous to the Roman relation to his ability to take Rome. This over Hannibal, their occupier. Scipio force. Only at Zama did Scipio return to Roman view is similar to Clausewitz’s departed from his plan and launched the direct approach, attacking the opera- instruction to consider “the dominant a swift seaborne raid, the shock of tional COG: Hannibal’s forces. characteristics of both belligerents,”32 which caused the rapid evacuation of all Scipio’s excellence in generalship as well as Sun Tzu’s duality that victory Carthaginian forces at Locri. Hannibal was not only in the use of the indirect requires understanding the adversary and quickly moved to counter but found approach over the direct but also in his self.33 Hannibal would threaten the city of himself exposed to a trap laid by Scipio, ability to switch and know when to switch Rome—the source of political will and the who had combined operational decep- between the two. A deep understand- Roman Empire’s strategic COG—only tion with an expeditionary assault ing of the environment and the enemy once. Following his triumphant victory behind Hannibal’s lines. Hannibal with- must exist to have this level of battlefield at Cannae, Hannibal moved to attack drew. The result of the movement from cognizance, and such understanding is the heavy defense of Rome but was un- the indirect to direct approach was the an element of planning developed during able to secure victory due to a lack of addition of another Italian ally to Rome, COG analysis. Current doctrine, such as siege machines and enablers for urban the reduction of a Carthaginian ally, a JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation combat. Hannibal’s lack of COG analysis moral victory for Scipio’s legions, and a of the Operational Environment, discusses and its resulting impact on operations moral defeat for Hannibal’s army.28 how one should conduct COG analysis amplified his failure to alter or change his Scipio’s caveat to the indirect ap- but does not cover the flexible use of the operational approach.34 Despite years of proach appears similar to Admiral Chester theory and how COG analysis can pro- campaigning, Hannibal never built the Nimitz’s calculated risk order to his vide a level of understanding that allows siege weapons or combat arms necessary operational commander prior to the commanders to seize the initiative and to strike at the heart of his enemy—Rome Battle of Midway: “In carrying out the convert from the indirect to the direct itself. Consequently, despite his invincibil- task assigned in Operation Plan 29-42 approach.30 Expansion of our current ity on the battlefield, Hannibal could not you will be governed by the principle of doctrine can provide commanders a far win the war. calculated risk, which you shall interpret greater level of understanding through A second example of poor COG to mean the avoidance of exposure of which force maybe applied. analysis comes from Carthage’s failure your force to attack by superior enemy to check Scipio’s ability to maneuver forces without good prospect of inflicting, Lesson Five: The Result throughout the Mediterranean, par- as a result of such exposure, greater damage of Poor COG Analysis ticularly using sealift. In the First Punic to the enemy.”29 In the cases of Locri and Lessons from the Second Punic War War, Carthage held a numerical and Midway, the victory weakened a compo- include the effect of negligent or non- technological edge in maritime warfare, nent of an identified COG. For Hannibal, existent COG analysis of the enemy. forcing Rome to execute a massive ship- it was the perception of the invincibility Polybius, the Hellenistic historian who building program. Rome used innovative of the commander, whereas at Midway, it is the closest primary source of the techniques and new technology to turn was the loss of four Japanese aircraft carri- Punic Wars, noted, “Those who have the Mediterranean into a contested ers. Scipio’s and Nimitiz’s approaches to won victories are far more numerous maritime environment, winning six of transition from the indirect to the direct than those who have used them to their seven major naval battles and setting the approach show the power of measured advantage.”31 In the Second Punic War, conditions for an unsteady peace. Both boldness and of how the operational im- the absence of the elements of COG states maintained a sizable naval capability pact of switching to the direct approach analysis by Hannibal was at minimum a through the Second Punic War, with each at a time and place of their choosing was contributing factor to Carthage’s ulti- heavily relying on sealift for the move- fundamentally supported by the previous mate defeat. ment of forces. Scipio, for instance, used use of the indirect approach. Each had Hannibal’s strategy against Rome a fleet of 50 warships and 400 transports at his disposal all the personnel and re- focused on defeating armies and subjugat- to transfer his forces to Spain. Carthage sources to take advantage of the situation. ing allies. Historical hindsight indicates maintained a large maritime force in Nimitz had three carriers and critical in- this was an incorrect analysis because the war and was able to move whole telligence, whereas Scipio had trained and Rome’s power came from the institutions armies—first the army of Hannibal’s experienced legions, significant sealift, that bound its Senate and its people. This brother, Mago, from Gaul to Africa, and intelligence from disaffected allies. analysis of Rome’s COG is strengthened and then Hannibal himself from Italy After Locri, Scipio principally re- by the fact that repeated military defeats to Carthage—during its course. Proper turned to the indirect approach. He were never able to sway Rome from its COG analysis would have indicated sealift maneuvered once Hannibal was in Africa, strategic goals. Furthermore, the Roman as a CR of Scipio’s force, and Carthage
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 109 would have had the ability to attack it provides for thinking about war. In other violence is employed in the pursuit of with good prospects of contesting the sea words, the process of determining centers national security interests. Perhaps more lines. In this endeavor, Carthage would of gravity may be as important as the than those of any other historic figure, not have needed to defeat Roman navies, product.”38 Moreover, poor analysis that Scipio’s exploits provide the modern which they appeared to lack the aptitude reinforces biases or prejudices and fails to joint force anecdotal excellence in the to do, only to challenge Rome’s ability implement a thorough approach almost application of modern military theory— to use the sea lines and in so doing com- certainly leads to defeat. The example particularly in the realm of COG analysis plicate or disrupt the ability of Scipio’s of Scipio shows how understanding the and its use in supporting combat forces. forces to move by sea. operational environment enables the In studying the victories and defeats of Yet the Carthaginian strategic failure commander to make sense from chaos history’s great captains, modern joint to appreciate the nature of contesting when complex military challenges are planners should use joint doctrine as a the maritime domain is evident in one analyzed and viewed systemically. prism to view and distill the genius and of the most referenced elements of the folly that resulted in victories and defeats. Second Punic War: Hannibal’s overland Conclusion They should look upon the battles of an- movement of his army from Spain to The campaigns of Scipio Africanus tiquity as laboratories for honing doctrinal Italy. The feat is often heralded as master- provide an ancient example of the appli- principles and crucial lessons in military ful, but Hannibal in fact lost half of his cation of the modern doctrine of center acumen prior to employing them in the elephants and half of his army along the of gravity. COG analysis is not a new field. The lessons identified only scratch route. Alfred Thayer Mahan pondered concept, and the universality exposed the surface of the practical application that Carthage’s refusal to check Rome’s navy in an example from 2,200 years ago exists within the study of Scipio. There by considering “how different things underscores the vital linkages between still exists a wealth of intellectual treasure might have been could Hannibal have today’s modern doctrine and the wars from generals and battles that have been invaded Italy by sea, as the Romans of antiquity. While COG analysis is a “lost” due to a lack of familiarity among often had Africa.”35 Rome, conversely, doctrinal process, its value in application modern readers. Such is the case with remained concerned with Carthage’s is directly proportional to the skill of Scipio Africanus, arguably history’s great- ability to use sea power throughout the its use. Using this analysis to entrench est general, wherein many studies have war. Following Scipio’s Spanish victories preconceived notions about force-on- focused not on his victories, but on the (207 BCE), he was ordered to yield a force battle or to support an individual’s failures of the general he defeated. JFQ large element of his navy to the military views related to the dictums of strategic governor of Sicily because intelligence science, is a misapplication that is as indicated the threat of Carthaginian detrimental to the desired military and Notes maritime forces blockading the Italian political endstates as battlefield defeat. 1 coast.36 Throughout the course of the Proper COG analysis through all levels Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Scipio Africa- nus: Greater Than Napoleon (Boston: Little, war, Rome kept multiple fleets to protect of war, including the pursuit of “a Brown, 1927), vi. its territorial waters from Punic raids, more perfect peace,” assists the military 2 Ibid., 20–21. Hart provides commentary secure vital sea lines of communication, planner in constructing military means on the emotional and moral aspects of Hanni- and stave off a second-front war engi- of supporting an integrated approach bal’s Italian campaign: “During the long interval neered by Carthage with Macedon—all to the culmination of the desired politi- of outward peace this Carthaginian Bismarck prepared the mental and material means for indicating that Rome continued to view cal endstate. COG analysis enables the a stroke at the heart of the Roman power, Carthaginian maritime forces as a key planner to better think about what educating his sons and followers to conceive the threat. Minimal Carthaginian efforts to goal is trying to be achieved (ends) and conquest of Rome as their goal, and using Spain interdict or destroy communications, how it is to be achieved (means).39 A as the training ground for the Barcinse school envoys, or supplies would have cre- well-executed COG analysis allows one of war, as well as the base of their forthcoming military effort. In 218 B.C., Hannibal, crossing ated detrimental systemic effects across to anticipate which parts of one’s own the Alps, began his invasion of Italy to reap the Scipio’s force, at a minimum delaying system the adversary may attempt to harvest for which his father had sown the seeds.” his timelines and possibly preventing his directly or indirectly target, giving the 3 Ibid., 21. ultimate invasion of Africa. Carthage had thoughtful planner greater insight into 4 Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, vol. 1, the forces to do so, as became apparent in the opponent’s intent.40 trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh from the text of F. Hultsch (London: Macmillan, 1889), book 3, the final treaty of the war wherein Scipio To find examples of the effective ap- chapter 118. ordered the entire navy of Carthage de- plication of COG analysis, joint force 5 For the purposes of this article, modern stroyed save for 10 ships to allow the city planners can return to antiquity. During geographical boundaries will be used except to defend its commerce from piracy.37 the Second Punic War, Scipio Africanus where doing so would complicate the narrative. Whereas COG is not necessarily demonstrates multiple historical models Spain refers not to the political entity but to the Iberian Peninsula, and Italy to the Italian the pathway to victory, its “true value that show timeless and universal themes Peninsula. . . . may be the framework the concept of war that exist whenever sanctioned
110 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 6 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Opera- available at
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 111 2016) loom especially large. Still, there the population was asserted in late has been no comprehensive history, 2008. Farrell assesses, “By 2010, British especially for Americans less interested in forces had achieved significant results in British political debates than an explana- Helmand, creating the security for gov- tion of what happened and why. Theo ernance and development to flourish in Farrell’s Unwinnable: Britain’s War in many parts of the province.” Afghanistan, 2001–2014 is just that. A great strength of Unwinnable is the Farrell is the former head of the author’s detailed coverage of the British renowned Department of War Studies effort in Nad Ali, a critical district next to at King’s College London, and is now Helmand’s provincial capital. This front an executive dean at the University of has gone woefully understudied. It is Wollongong in Australia. Farrell traveled perhaps Britain’s greatest tactical success to Afghanistan repeatedly throughout in Afghanistan. While the U.S. Marines the course of the war. He was able to cleared southern Helmand and Marjah, review military plans and post-operational the British were clearing Nad Ali and the reports and interview over 200 British adjacent sector of Babaji. Americans can- officers and officials. He also collected a not understand the outcome of its effort small sample of Taliban opinion. All serve in Helmand without understanding Nad as rich sources for the book. Ali. Indeed, U.S. Marines are helping Farrell shows that the British ex- Afghan soldiers and police fight there perience was not one of unremitting today. Farrell’s is the first account to blunders. Certainly, the beginning was explain the full history of what happened Unwinnable: Britain’s War in tough. After engaging in a variety of in Nad Ali across 7 years and the deploy- Afghanistan, 2001–2014 counterterrorism operations and devel- ment of multiple British battalions. opment activities from 2001 to 2005, While fair to British tactical and op- By Theo Farrell the largest British troop commitment erational successes, Farrell contends the Bodley Head, 2017 started in 2006 in Helmand Province. overall strategy was misguided, as his title $34.58 576 pp. The British went in overly optimistic and implies. The main reason is “political ab- ISBN: 978-1847923462 neglectful of Afghan memories of their senteeism and military hubris.” His text Reviewed by Carter Malkasian empire. They compounded the problem makes clear that a large part of this was by removing the drug lord provincial poor knowledge of Afghanistan and a re- governor, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, sistance to learn. British policymakers and or years, the British enjoyed a repu- turning part of his tribe against them. generals had the scantest of knowledge tation of counterinsurgency excel- Tactically, the British settled on an overly on Afghanistan yet insisted on moving F lence. Their campaigns—Malaya, militarized approach and failed to focus forward without regard for facts that Kenya, Oman, Northern Ireland—were on protecting the population. By the challenged their preconceptions. They hailed as successes in this difficult end of the year, the situation had gone disregarded reports of Taliban strength form of war. Afghanistan, however, so badly that the British withdrew from and studies that called for caution and turned out to be painful for the British. three districts—Musa Qala, Sangin, and taking time to deepen their knowledge They committed a peak of over 9,500 Nowzad—in three controversial ceasefire and did not recognize the popular antipa- troops, eventually drawing down to a agreements. thy toward Britain. They even neglected few hundred by the end of 2014. They Over time, the British adapted. They future President Nad Ali’s warning that faced numerous battlefield reverses. introduced new equipment, deployed if they “go in fighting . . . there will be a Eventual successes were overshadowed more helicopters, and developed new bloodbath.” by the arrival of 20,000 U.S. Marines. counter–improvised explosive device Farrell describes how British officers Britain’s counterinsurgency reputation techniques. Counterinsurgency tactics made key tactical errors because they came out of the campaign tarnished. improved. Battalions were assigned to did not understand Helmand. In 2006, Many books and articles have been districts for their entire tours in order British commanders infamously diverted written criticizing British government to develop “an intimate knowledge of from a plan to defend the population in and military decisions. Mike Martin’s the ground, the local nationals, and central Helmand that had been written An Intimate War (Oxford University the pattern of life” rather than rotated by a team of officers and civilian officials Press, 2014), Frank Ledwidge’s Losing through positions throughout the who had studied the province. Instead, Small Wars (Yale University Press, 2017), province. Firepower was restrained in the commanders scattered British and Emile Simpson’s War from the order to minimize counterproductive forces into rural districts to fight the Ground Up (Oxford University Press, civilian casualties. A focus on protecting Taliban. British forces became besieged
112 Book Reviews JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 in far-flung “platoon houses” and suf- editor of the Special Operations Journal fered heavy casualties. Farrell debunks and professor at the U.S. Army School a decades-old argument that pleas from of Advanced Military Studies, opens the President Hamid Karzai and Provincial book by discussing the modern (post– Governor Mohammed Daoud had World War II) proliferation of SOF and forced the British commanders to move claims that many countries “seek to gain off the original plan. He tells how the the status and capabilities” that come British commanders never even read the from possessing such specialized units. plan and decided on their own to get He then briefly describes the intent of into a fight in the hinterlands. Brigadier the book—to fill the gap between “a vast Edward Butler, the British commander in body of literature that focuses on single Helmand at the time, dismissed the origi- cases of heroism, or at best, histories of nal plan as “pretty light on the military single units” during a select period. Line of Operation . . . drawn up by peo- To help fill the gap, Elite Warriors ple who did not properly understand the provides descriptive chapters on the SOF Brigade’s skill sets and capabilities.” Years forces of 14 countries in the following later, of course, Butler’s successors fell order: Russia, Ukraine, France, Germany, back on defending central Helmand, just Italy, Poland, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, as the original plan had advised. Farrell’s China, Singapore, Columbia, and case will surely draw great controversy. Algeria. The book claims a format com- What should we take from this? The monly used by the Center for Analysis United Kingdom was caught in the same of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), dilemma that the United States has faced Elite Warriors: Special the Russian think tank co-founded and again and again in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operations Forces from directed by Pukhov. CAST regularly For the outsider, intervening in an Around the World employs a team of highly capable research insurgency or a civil war is a learning analysts to provide summaries on a variety Edited by Ruslan Pukhov experience. The imperative to work with of topics—usually focused on Russia’s and Christopher Marsh the people demands knowledge of so- defense industry and national arms pro- East View Press, 2017 ciety, culture, politics, and history, in all curement program. Elite Warriors claims $79.95 263 pp. their complexity. Yet learning takes time. that each of the chapters provides a “brief ISBN: 978-1879944992 Outsiders face an unavoidable dilemma historical background to that country’s of making decisions with incomplete Reviewed by Bruce McClintock special operations forces, then quickly knowledge or making no decisions at all. moves to the present time, offering the Every decision stands a reasonable chance reader a very comprehensive overview of being a misstep. Friction is inevitable. pecial operations forces (SOF) of the many units that exist, the mis- What Farrell reminds us is that at any have existed in some form and sions which they are designed to address, decision point we should listen to the S played roles in warfare since the and examples of some of the missions knowledge that does exist and not dismiss advent of conventional military opera- they have conducted.” Marsh states, it because it complicates what we want tions. For example, in biblical times, “Encyclopedic in nature, it is filled with a to do. King David had a special forces platoon. wealth of information on the special op- With its broad scope and detail, World War II brought growth, greater erations forces of the countries included.” Unwinnable is akin to an official history recognition, and prestige for special Most chapters do include some form in the finest of British historical tradition. forces like the British Commandos, of historical discussion, a detailed organi- In fact, whenever the official history does Special Air Service, and the American zational listing for known units, and some come out, it will find itself in stiff compe- Office of Strategic Services. The last information on equipment used, as well tition with Farrell’s work. JFQ two decades have witnessed explosive as training and education. However, the growth in various forms of unconven- diversity of contributors creates inconsis- tional or SOF. tency in the format as well as the style of Dr. Carter Malkasian spent 2 years as a civilian In Elite Warriors, Ruslan Pukhov and the different chapters. If read cover-to- political officer in Helmand Province and is the author of War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Christopher Marsh aim to provide acces- cover, the inconsistency in the chapter Conflict on the Afghan Frontier (Oxford University sible, high-quality comparative research organization is readily apparent, as is the Press, 2016). on the elite SOF of 14 countries. They level of detail available for various coun- achieve some of their lofty objectives tries. The chapter on Iran, for example, and add value to the important field of provides good detail on the weapons literature on special operations. Marsh, used by Iranian SOF and provides basic
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 113 information on recent operations in Syria This gap has, arguably, reduced the with substantive footnotes of the sources military’s effectiveness in operations for the information. Other chapters like Iraq and Afghanistan because think include substantially less detail, often tanks and professional military educa- citing the lack of available information. tion have not replicated the academic The chapters are generally short with depth of understanding in local cultural the shortest being only eight pages and dynamics. Critics like author and co- containing no information on equipment editor Montgomery McFate, herself an or training. accomplished anthropologist, attorney, The strength of Elite Warriors is the and longtime professor at the Naval War variety of authors and their use of native- College, argue this is because military language sources, often from mass media culture is task-oriented, reductionist, and and generally current, as well as other problem-solving by nature as opposed authoritative material. The generous use to the more open-ended, expansive, of footnotes makes the book a worth- and puzzle-solving individual nature of while resource for those who want a academic inquiry that is necessary to guide to other useful material. The book, produce depth of qualitative knowledge however, fails to explain its rationale for of social complexity. This becomes a the relevance or importance of the 14 se- problem when the military is tasked, as lected countries. Readers will find value in it has been many times since 1989, with the China and Iran chapters but wonder operations other than war where under- where they might find information on standing the complexities of the local key allies including Japan, South Korea, Social Science Goes to War: culture can mean the difference between Denmark, the Netherlands, and the The Human Terrain System success and failure, reduced casualties, United Kingdom. Furthermore, the in- in Iraq and Afghanistan and escalation. consistent format and level of detail may In the polarized literature surround- Edited by Montgomery McFate and frustrate some readers. Readers looking ing the U.S. Army’s controversial Human Janice H. Laurence for more specifics on U.S. forces should Terrain System (HTS), few publications Oxford University Press, 2015 examine Linda Robinson’s Masters of are likely to have the impact that this vol- $39.95 320 pp. Chaos (PublicAffairs, 2009) and the ume promises on the debate surrounding ISBN: 978-0190216726 more recent historical evaluation by Mark the inclusion of social science expertise Moyers titled Oppose Any Foe (Ingram, Reviewed by Brian R. Price within the American military/security 2017). Nevertheless, the material in Elite establishment. McFate introduces a Warriors is valuable and the book is an concept of the military-academic divide, ideal primer for someone without a back- he gap between academia and the noting how the HTS was often successful ground in special operations who wants military has existed at least since in bridging the sociocultural gap between to learn the basics about foreign military T the early 1960s, when Project not only the Afghan/Iraqi societies and elites and have a guide to other useful Camelot crystallized political opposi- expeditionary military units but also the sources. JFQ tion to the American military/security social scientists’ own academic world and apparatus by activist academicians. As that of the military. This out-of-the-box a result, the military/security com- perspective, McFate and co-editor Janice Brigadier General Bruce McClintock, USAF (Ret.), munity established its own think tanks, Laurence conclude, proved valuable is the Chief Executive Officer of Zenith Advisors Group, a full-spectrum startup and government designed to replicate social and hard in widening the perspective of military consulting company. science capabilities, reducing the politi- teams in an effort to represent the local cal noise and fallout inherent in the population in the military decisionmaking engagement with a potentially hostile process. academic community. On the other McFate was the anthropologist who, side of the divide, many academics together with Colonel Steve Fondacaro, reacted with anger to social scientists USA, led HTS in its formative period. engaged in military activity, political McFate and Laurence gathered first- beliefs fusing with concerns of academic person data by social scientists who freedom and fanned with the flames of worked in Iraq and Afghanistan. They opposition to the Vietnam War in what offer the best summary to date of the they saw as colonialism and rampant program’s establishment and mission in militarization of American society. “Mind the Gap.” McFate’s contribution
114 Book Reviews JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 in particular is valuable given the U.S it continues with limited knowledge of addressing the administrative and team military’s retrenchment following seques- potential areas for American military dynamic/recruiting challenges, and tration and the myriad points around the intervention, with humanitarian missions discussing the critical debate that swirled globe where the U.S. military is likely to and more limited engagements, even around the program. But this debate be again engaged, albeit at a much lower if the United States remains weary of hardly touched those riding in the hot, level of intensity. Laurence provides the nation-building or large-scale interven- cramped vehicles, risking dismemberment concluding chapter, assessing HTS’s tions. This book captures the perspectives by improvised explosive devices or bullet successes and failures with an insightful from within the program, noting suc- wounds, and living day to day with the piece, “The Human Terrain System.” She cesses and responding to critics. While it mission of trying to bring understanding and the whole group of authors assert will not silence challenges from academia to the military’s decisionmaking process. that, in keeping with the military’s own or from segments of the military (where Social Science Goes to War does a master- assessments, sociocultural knowledge and criticism of HTS was part of the larger ful job of representing their perspective understanding directly contributed to op- counterinsurgency-versus-conventional and will become a critical piece of litera- erational success at the brigade level and operations debate), this volume stands to ture in the ongoing debate on the use of below at the least. become a key source in future evaluations social science in the conduct of military Social Science Goes to War offers a of the HTS program, representing both operations. JFQ number of valuable and well-written a primary source and analysis that reflects contributions that range from memoir- well on the skills of the HTS social sci- type lessons learned pieces, such as Ted entists who staked their lives and their Dr. Brian R. Price is an Associate Professor of History in the Department of History and Callahan’s “An Anthropologist at War in careers in order to serve downrange. International Studies at Hawaii Pacific University. Afghanistan,” Katherine Blue Carroll’s Countering politically charged com- “What Do You Bring to the Fight?” mentary against the program, McFate, and Jennifer Clark’s “Playing Spades Laurence, and their contributors offer in Al Anbar.” Other pieces are more a balanced perspective between that of analytical, offering advice on integration the military/security establishment and of civilians in military units, including the academic community. Military critics Katherine Reedy’s “The Four Pillars of tended to oppose the program as part Integration,” James Dorough-Lewis’s of the larger counterinsurgency/major “Investing in Uncertainty,” and Leslie combat operations debate. This is an old Adrienne Payne’s “Allied Civilian debate within the military, one that this Enablers and the Helmand Surge.” The volume will hardly dent, but there is a ethical dimension that has been heavily growing consensus that, regardless of criticized is ably addressed, though likely whether the military’s focus should be on without a resonating conclusion, in a major combat operations or operations useful debate piece in Carolyn Fleuhr- other than war, sociocultural knowledge Lobban and George Lucas’s, “Assessing will be of great importance. the Human Terrain Teams,” and in Brian To this reviewer, having served as a Brereton’s “Tangi Valley.” social scientist within the HTS program Each of these contributors presents in 2011–2012, Social Science Goes to War thoughtful, well-heeled commentary that is the most balanced and thorough rep- speaks volumes of the program’s potential resentation of the program yet produced for injecting insight and understanding from the perspective of those who actu- into stability operations or a counterin- ally did the work, but there are, however, surgency campaign. They also highlight a few weaknesses. Most of those writing the difficulties: political division at home, served during 2008–2009, but the posi- ideology, physical danger, lack of consis- tions of those who served later—from late tent access to local persons, administrative 2010 to 2013—are not well represented. complexity, and most of all, cultural gaps This phase represents a new period dur- between the military and civilian academ- ing which HTS was directly managed by ics working with the mission-oriented an Army officer, changing the program’s military units. tone, policies, and direction. Nor does While HTS was closed in September it include the several critics who served of 2014, the need for sociocultural within the program. To be sure, the book knowledge in the military/security es- achieves its intended purpose, showcasing tablishment has not ebbed. If anything, the program’s successes and potential,
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 115 Seabee, assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5, yells out enemy locations in simulated attack during field training exercise, Fort Hunter Liggett, California, April 27, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Stephen Sisler)
the concepts of strategic will and ability COGs to strengthen the concept’s use- A COG Concept for fulness at the strategic level;3 provides a clear and simple method for identifying and validating COGs;4 exemplifies the Winning More Than concept’s usefulness in counterinsur- gencies and peacekeeping missions;5 and provides a method for using the Just Battles concept to not only link actions, effects, and objectives but also link national- strategic objectives to operational ones. By Jacob Barfoed In essence, the article presents a COG concept that will help commanders and staffs focus on not just winning battles he center of gravity (COG) is practitioners and scholars alike. The but also winning wars and the subse- a central concept in U.S. and purpose of this article is not to discuss quent peace.6 T North Atlantic Treaty Orga- the alleged problems with the concept nization planning doctrines, yet the in current doctrine—plenty of other What and Why current U.S. center of gravity concept articles have already done that.1 Rather, For this article, center of gravity is is the target of much criticism from the purpose is to propose a solution in defined as an entity that is the primary the shape of a revised COG concept. component of physical or moral More specifically, the article connects strength, power, and/or will to fight the COG concept to compellence and at a given level of command.7 At the Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Barfoed, Ph.D., is Chief of the Capability Branch, Development Division, coercion theory to strengthen the con- national strategic level, moral strength Danish Air Staff. cept’s theoretical foundation;2 presents (will) as well as physical strength
116 Joint Doctrine / A COG Concept for Winning More Than Just Battles JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 (ability) COGs exist. Both types are cohesion can be the coalition’s strategic Strategic Ability COGs physical entities but vary in purpose. will COG. Likewise, elements such as and Lower Level Physical At lower levels of command, only ethnic nationalism or ideology cannot Strength COGs physical strength COGs normally exist. be COGs, but they can be a critical COGs representing a physical strength By affecting an actor’s strategic will requirement for the political leadership exist in principle at each level of COG, one aims to influence his will (the real strategic will COG) to inspire command. Thus, it is the entity repre- by persuasion or coercion, whereas by and provide moral cohesion and the senting the primary physical strength affecting the strategic ability COG, one will to fight. Since the will to fight ulti- that an actor depends on to carry influences the actor’s ability to carry mately dictates the beginning and end out his intent and achieve his objec- out his overall strategy.8 By affecting of a conflict, determining desired as well tives at a given level of command. At an actor’s operational COG, one influ- as undesired conditions of the primary the national strategic level, these are ences his ability to achieve operational actors’ strategic will COGs and affect- called strategic ability COGs. Examples objectives with the current course of ing them accordingly are central for include a coalition military task force, a action (COA). achieving national/coalition strategic particularly strong element of national COGs have critical capabilities (what objectives. military power, a national security force, the COG can do in context of the actor’s a political group’s military arm, or even mission); critical requirements (means, Identifying and Validating a strong nonmilitary entity in case the resources, and conditions essential for a Strategic Will COGs main strategic effort is not a military COG to perform its critical capabilities); Using information derived from the one. and critical vulnerabilities (deficient, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational COGs are found at missing, or vulnerable critical require- Operational Environment, the following the joint force command (JFC) level. ments). A key element of operational art factors should be considered in deter- Examples include an armored corps, an is to derive ways to affect the primary mining an actor’s strategic will COG: air component command force, a mari- actors’ COGs sufficiently to achieve Does the actor have a political leader time task force, a national police force, national/coalition objectives, whether by who possesses all the critical capabilities or a regional network of insurgent cells. strengthening, protecting, weakening, listed above in the strategic will COG Operational COGs are normally central or destroying their COGs. This can be definition? If yes, then this leader is the elements or constituent parts of strategic done by affecting their critical vulner- strategic will COG. If some of the criti- ability COG. As an example, the national abilities, which are always contextual cal capabilities listed above are weak or police force (operational COG) is a con- and therefore subject to change at any missing for the actor’s political leader, stituent part of the national security force time during the campaign or operation. one of the following situations exists: (strategic ability COG). The strategic Consequently, COG analysis is an itera- One, the leader is clearly the entity who ability COG is not necessarily nested tive, continuous process. possesses most of the critical capabili- within the strategic will COG, but it is ties and is therefore the strategic will chosen and controlled by it as part of the Strategic Will COGs COG, but support from the primary actor’s practice of strategy. COGs representing moral strength exist entity that possesses the weak or missing Normally, objectives can be achieved at the national strategic level; they are capabilities becomes a critical require- in various ways that potentially use dif- called strategic will COGs. An actor’s ment for the strategic will COG. Two, ferent primary physical strengths (that is, strategic will COG is the primary entity the identified leader is a marionette who physical strength COGs); consequently, that inherently possesses the most of possesses few or none of the critical identifying the various ways an actor can the following critical capabilities: deter- capabilities for the strategic will COG. achieve his objectives is a critical step in mines—and can alter—policy and strat- Instead, the real strategic will COG identifying an actor’s potential physical egy, commands the resources and means will be the entity that actually possesses strength COGs. Defeating an actor’s required to achieve strategic objectives, most of the critical capabilities. Three, physical strength COG at a given level de- and inspires and provides moral cohe- the leader shares the critical capabilities feats the actor’s current strategy/COA at sion and the will to fight. In short, it is listed above with one or more people that level. This forces the actor to change the actor’s political strategic decision- who then, as a group, is the strategic to another strategy/COA that depends making entity. Examples of strategic will COG. Four, the strength of will of on another COG (if one exists), and it will COGs include a strong political an actor’s population is such that it does also might force the actor to change his leader, a ruling elite, and a strong-willed not matter who the leader is. If a large objectives at that level. Accordingly, an population (or a segment of it) deter- part of a population feels so strongly actor’s COG changes when the actor mined to prevail. It follows that coali- about a policy that leadership cannot changes the primary physical strength he tion cohesion cannot be a strategic will thwart, deflect, or dilute its will, then uses to achieve his objectives. As such, COG, as it is not an entity. Instead, the the population itself is the actor’s strate- operational COGs might change from primary entity that provides coalition gic will COG. phase to phase of an operation. Several
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Barfoed 117 operational COGs might exist for an op- COG concept is not only useful in a defeating the insurgent network, protect- eration, but normally not simultaneously. classic bipolar interstate military conflict ing the population, and protecting the Still, if an actor pursues two or more but also in intrastate conflicts—such government and governmental services. strategies simultaneously using different as counterinsurgencies—or in missions The COG’s operational national army physical strengths and capable of achiev- with no adversary. and national police force as well as U.S. ing the actor’s objectives by themselves, COGs in Counterinsurgencies. funding and training could be the criti- then multiple COGs can in principle exist Counterinsurgencies normally present cal requirements. Operational COGs for simultaneously. a complex and dynamic operating envi- the ally would then be the national army ronment that reflects on COG analyses. and/or national police force nested in Identifying and Validating The local population is often referred the strategic ability COG. Some of their Physical Strength COGs to as the COG in counterinsurgencies; critical vulnerabilities could be corrup- Identifying and validating physical however, it can only be the strategic will tion and nepotism, a high desertion rate, strength COGs at a given level of COG for an actor if it makes the strategic and poor training. The JFC’s mission command require that one identifies decisions for the actor. As an example, would then be to address these critical the actor’s objectives at that level and a part of the population, such as a large vulnerabilities. the actor’s strategy/COA for achieving ethnic group, might be the strategic will Non-Opposing COGs. In situations those objectives. Then the follow- COG for an insurgency that has the char- where there is no particular adversary, ing questions—all of which must be acteristics of a popular uprising of that such as peacekeeping missions, the COGs answered in the affirmative—can be ethnic group. This is not a leader-driven of the key actors should still be identi- used to identify and validate physical COG. However, support from the local fied and analyzed. While an actor might strength COG candidates: population is often a critical requirement not be an adversary, his intent might still for the COGs of all actors involved in present an unacceptable condition for the Is the candidate the primary entity •• this type of conflict. In a different ex- national/coalition strategic objectives to used by the actor to achieve his ample, a key actor might be a relatively be achieved. Knowing the critical capabil- objectives at the analyzed level of small political grouping. Here it might ities, requirements, and vulnerabilities of command? If it is an important or not make sense to talk about strategic- as the actor’s COGs can aid the commander even essential entity but not the well as operational-level physical strength in influencing the actor. primary entity used by the actor to COGs for the actor, in which case the achieve his objectives, then it is a two levels merge. The COG Analysis Model critical requirement for the physical An actor, like an insurgent group, To assist in finding ways to achieve the strength COG. If it is not an entity might not have a single, integrated required condition of a specific COG, but rather an important condition strategy but rather a large number of commanders and their staff should that must be present for the actor parallel yet uncoordinated efforts. Such analyze the COG within a framework to achieve his objectives, then it is a situation raises the question of whether of three critical factors: capabilities, likewise a critical requirement for the to identify physical strength COGs for requirements, and vulnerabilities. physical strength COG. each effort or a single physical strength Critical capabilities are defined as Does the candidate possess the •• COG representing the combined but what the COG can do—its primary most critical capabilities required to physically scattered entities. An example abilities—in relation to achieving the ac- achieve the actor’s objectives at the could be a political group’s military arm tor’s objectives at the given level in the analyzed level of command? If some that operates through a large number of context of a given situation. The critical critical capabilities are missing, then decentralized, largely autonomous cells, capability concept is useful to identify and support from the entities possessing each with its own independent effort. validate COGs, as it expresses how an them becomes a critical requirement Strengthening the local allied govern- actor could use a particular strength (the for the physical strength COG. ment’s strategic and operational COGs COG candidate) to achieve the actor’s If the candidate is defeated, does this •• by addressing their critical vulnerabilities objectives at the analyzed level of com- defeat the actor’s COA at that level are often key U.S. strategic objectives. mand. If, for example, a specific military of command? If not, the candidate Thus, the ally’s strategic will COG task force is identified as a COG, its might be a physical strength COG for could most likely have weak or missing critical capabilities could be the ability to another possible COA for the actor. critical capabilities, such as a weak ability defend area A against coalition forces and to inspire and provide moral cohesion counterattack and cut off coalition forces. COGs in Complex Operating for all ethnic groups in the population, However, if the actor’s mission changes, Environments along with related critical vulnerabilities. the same military task force could still be One of the most severe criticisms of the Likewise, the local ally’s strategic abil- the COG but possess different critical COG concept is that it is ill-suited for ity COG could be the national security capabilities. As such, critical capabilities the conflicts of today.9 Yet the proposed forces, with critical capabilities such as are always contextual, as is the COG
118 Joint Doctrine / A COG Concept for Winning More Than Just Battles JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 U.S. Soldiers assigned to B Company, 1-502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), set up AN/PRC-155 (Manpack) radios at Fort Bliss, Texas, as part of annual Exercise NIE 17.2, July 13, 2017 (U.S. Army/Jordan Buck)
itself. In some cases, one or more of the counterattack. Each of the COG’s critical its critical capabilities, and an effective C2 critical capabilities required to achieve capabilities must be considered in relation system is identified as one of the critical the actor’s objectives might be a weak to what the critical requirements are for requirements. If the C2 system (or com- ability for a particular COG candidate; in the COG. There will normally be an over- ponents of it) is vulnerable to jamming, this case, it would have associated critical lap of requirements to perform the various cyber attack, or physical destruction, it vulnerabilities. In other cases, a COG critical capabilities, but it is useful to note could be a critical vulnerability. If such a might be missing an ability deemed criti- which critical capability each requirement critical vulnerability is exploited, the COG cal for achieving the actor’s objectives. relates to. Critical requirements at one will be weakened or cease to function In this case, support from an entity that level may be COGs or closely related either in general or at a specific time and/ possesses the missing ability becomes a to COGs at the next lower level; that or space. Consequently, critical vulner- critical requirement for the COG. is, lower level COGs are nested within abilities represent risks associated with the Critical requirements are specific a COG at the next higher level. For ex- analyzed actor’s course of action, whether conditions, resources, and/or means es- ample, the armored land forces mentioned obvious to the actor or not. sential for a COG to perform its critical above as a critical requirement might be a Each critical requirement must be capabilities. If a military task force has COG at the next lower level of command. analyzed for vulnerabilities. While some critical capabilities, as in the example Critical vulnerabilities are require- requirements might be deficient or miss- above, examples of means that could be ments, or components thereof, that are ing already, others need to be affected to critical requirements are a command and deficient, missing, or vulnerable and become so. For these to be actual critical control (C2) system, armored land forces, might contribute to a COG failure to vulnerabilities, other actors must have the and offensive air forces. Examples of con- perform one or more of its critical capa- ability to influence them sufficiently to ditions are air superiority, good weather, bilities—the lesser the risk and cost, the weaken one or more of the critical capa- high tide, secure lines of communication, better. For example, a military task force bilities. Some critical requirements might local popular support, and terrain and is identified as the COG. The ability to only be vulnerable at a specific time infrastructure that favor defense as well as defend a certain area is identified as one of and/or space. Similarly, there might be
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Barfoed 119 ous, iterative process that must continue Table. Using the COG Analysis Model throughout planning and execution of Center of Gravity Analysis Model the operation as collaborative planning Assessed objectives and potential COAs (note actor and level of command) by multiple levels of command. The The actor’s (assumed) main objectives and potential COAs for achieving them, at the analyzed following steps describe how to use the command level. For an adversary, assess as a minimum most likely and most dangerous COAs. COG concept to link actions, effects, Center of Gravity Critical Capabilities and objectives, and how to link the JFC Identify the COG for each COA (validate as Identifying the COG’s critical capabilities serves described earlier); analyze according to this as a validation of the COG—does it possess level of command with the national table. the primary abilities required to achieve the strategic level of command. For simpli- Determine the condition of the COG that must objectives for the actor? fication purposes, only two actors are exist as well as conditions that must be avoided, Some abilities might be weak, in which case included: the United States and a single in order to achieve U.S./coalition objectives at associated critical vulnerabilities must be the analyzed command level. Example: entity identified. adversary (ADV). The text is worded as destroyed vs. entity isolated (post-war combat A critical capability deemed essential to achieve if the analysis takes place at the theater- effective entity needed for stabilization). the actor’s objectives could also be missing, strategic or JFC level, although strategic The required condition should be reflected in in which case support from an entity that COG analysis should be started at the own objectives; if not, revise as required. possesses the missing ability becomes a critical requirement for the COG. national strategic level of planning (that Conditions to be avoided must be reflected is, the National Security Council). in rules of engagement (ROEs) and other restraints. Critical Vulnerabilities Critical Requirements Applying Strategic-Level COG For every critical vulnerability (CV) identified, Each of the COG’s critical capabilities must Analysis in the Planning Process assess the impact on each capability and relate be considered in regard to what the critical If strategic-level COGs are not already to the required condition of the COG. requirements (conditions, resources, and/or means) are for the COG to perform it. identified by higher command, the JFC For opposing COGs: For each CV, determine should start by identifying and analyz- the potential effect(s) that expresses how the There will normally be an overlap of CV can be exploited in order to achieve each requirements to perform the various critical ing them, including both strategic will potential effect—with what combination(s) of capabilities, but it is useful to note which critical and ability COGs. Previously identified actions? What are the risks associated? Are capability each requirement relates to. COGs should still be validated and the there undesired effects? What combination(s) of effects can achieve the required condition analyses refined since COGs and their of the COG? Those effects deemed decisive for critical capabilities, requirements, and achieving the required condition are designated vulnerabilities may change as the situa- decisive conditions (DC). Different COAs might select different combinations of effects and tion evolves. thus DCs. 1. Identify the U.S. strategic will COG For friendly COGs: (How) can an opponent cause and exploit a vulnerability (effects and actions)? (the strategic decisionmaking entity Which effect(s) achieved by the U.S./coalition in the current strategic context) and could protect/prevent the vulnerability in order analyze it using the COG analysis to satisfy the critical requirement (to achieve the required condition of the COG)—with what model. combination of actions? 2. Identify the ADV strategic will Conclusions (key deductions) COG. Identify likely successors and The key deductions should be formulated as elements for further planning, that is, desired and assess the potential influence on undesired condition(s) of the COG, DCs, effects, actions, ROEs, commander’s critical information the U.S. objectives for each one to requirements, etc. replace the current leadership. 3. Analyze the ADV strategic will COG using the COG analysis critical requirements that are potentially Using the COG Concept model. Missing information must be vulnerable, but the available or allocated for Planning provided through the Commander’s means might not be sufficient to exploit COG identification and analysis focuses Critical Information Requirements the weakness or the political will to do the planning effort because it helps process (valid for all steps). so might be lacking. Such potential vul- identify how an actor’s will and primary 4. Identify the ADV objectives and nerabilities should be noted, along with ability might be influenced in order motives driving them. potential events that could alter their to achieve U.S./coalition objectives. 5. Determine the ADV policy degree of vulnerability. Commanders and staffs should analyze change(s) required to attain the The table provides a method for using all actors with central interests in the U.S. national strategic endstate the COG analysis model to analyze an ac- conflict and establish the conditions of and objectives, such as “no longer tor’s physical strength COG at a generic each actor’s COGs (strategic and opera- supports insurgents financially” or level of command. Strategic will COGs tional) that must exist to achieve these are analyzed in a similar way. objectives. COG analysis is a continu-
120 Joint Doctrine / A COG Concept for Winning More Than Just Battles JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 U.S. Marines assigned to Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, conduct amphibious landing during Blue Chromite 18 aboard Kin Blue Beach, Okinawa, Japan, November 2, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Aaron S. Patterson)
“withdraws its forces and accepts 7. Determine what possible combi- COGs should be identified, at a U.S. peace terms.” nations of strategic effects in the minimum, for the ADV’s most 6. Determine the required condition COG’s critical vulnerabilities could likely as well as most dangerous of the ADV strategic will COG and lead to the required condition of strategic COA; the COGs could its critical capabilities. The condi- the ADV strategic will COG, as well be the same for several COAs. The tion must support the desired policy as what central undesired effects ADV strategic COAs should aim at change and should be reflected in could lead to the conditions to be affecting U.S. strategic COGs and the U.S. national strategic objec- avoided (ROE and other restraints). their critical vulnerabilities, which tives. If the U.S. objectives do not Those strategic effects that are means this step must be revisited reflect such considerations, they deemed decisive for achieving the once U.S. strategic COGs are should be revised. An example required condition of the related identified and every time they are could be “Country X has a stable, COG are designated strategic deci- refined or changed. representative government.” Con- sive conditions (DCs). 10. Establish the required condition of ditions to be avoided should be 8. Determine what possible strategic the identified ADV strategic ability determined as well; these must be actions of the DIME IOPs could COGs and their critical capabilities reflected in rules of engagement lead to each identified strategic (related to each adversary strategic (ROEs) and other restraints for all effect. One action could in principle COA); each condition must directly diplomacy, information, military, support several effects and/or DCs. support the U.S. national strategic and economic (DIME) instruments 9. Identify the various ways the ADV objectives. If the U.S. objectives of power (IOPs). A condition to can achieve its strategic objectives do not reflect such considerations, be avoided could be a leadership using its available means. The they should be revised. An example change instituting a leader not primary entity used to achieve the could be “the weapons of mass desired by the United States. objectives in each potential strategy destruction are destroyed.” Con- is the strategic ability COG. Ability ditions to be avoided should be
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Barfoed 121 determined as well; these must candidates) will contribute to strate- tives for the most likely and most be reflected in ROEs and other gic COA development and selection dangerous ADV strategic COA. restraints. An example could be “the by highlighting critical vulnerabili- 18. Identify the various ways the ADV Army’s armored and artillery units ties and thus central risks associated can achieve its operational objec- must not be reduced by more than with each COA candidate. tives using its available operational 50 percent (for postconflict regional 15. From the DCs in the selected U.S. means. The primary entity used to stability purposes).” strategic COA, objectives for the achieve the objectives in each poten- 11. Determine what possible strate- DIME IOP are developed, includ- tial adversary operational COA is gic effects in each COG’s critical ing the theater military-strategic the ADV operational COG. COGs vulnerabilities could lead to the objectives. should be identified, at a minimum, required conditions of the ADV 16. From the theater military-strategic for the ADV’s most likely as well as strategic ability COG, as well as objectives, JFC’s operational objec- most dangerous operational COA; undesired effects that could lead to tives are developed; normally, the the COG could be the same for the conditions to be avoided. military-strategic effects form the several COAs. An ADV operational 12. Determine what possible combi- basis of the operational objectives. If COG should either be a critical nation of strategic actions of the the only means available to the mil- requirement (a means) for the ADV DIME IOP could lead to each iden- itary-strategic command is a single strategic ability COG or be able tified strategic effect. operational-level command, the to achieve a critical requirement (a 13. The different combinations of operational objectives should closely condition). If it is not, the strategic strategic effects and actions deter- reflect the military-strategic objec- COG analysis must be refined to mined above are core elements of tives deduced in step 15. If more ensure the operational COG is the U.S. strategic design. Different means are available (more than nested in the strategic COG. The combinations form the core ingre- one subordinate command), the ADV operational COAs should be dients of different potential stra- same method described below can assumed to exploit critical vulner- tegic COAs (along with strategic be used for military-strategic level abilities of U.S. operational COGs, DCs, effects, and actions identified planning to ensure a logical linkage which means this step must be elsewhere in the planning process); between military-strategic objectives revisited every time U.S. operational those strategic effects in ADV and operational objectives. COGs are refined or changed. This critical vulnerabilities, which are step (first performed in mission anal- selected for a specific COA and are Applying COG Analysis for ysis) initially uses an interim U.S. deemed decisive for achieving the Operational-Level Planning operational COG based on com- required condition of the related Overall, the logic is the same as mander’s initial planning guidance. COG, are designated strategic DCs the political strategic-level method 19. Establish JFC’s required condition in that COA. Each strategic COA described above. For simplicity, the of each ADV operational COA’s must be able to attain the national following assumes that the operational COG and its critical capabili- strategic endstate and the required objectives closely reflect the military- ties; each condition must directly DIME means to carry out the strategic objectives deduced in step 15. support JFC’s operational objec- COA must be available. This might tives. If the operational objectives 17. Identify the ADV operational lead to a requirement for revising do not reflect such considerations, objectives. For simplicity, the fol- the national strategic endstate and they should be revised. Conditions lowing assumes the adversary’s objectives. to be avoided should be determined operational objectives are the same 14. For each U.S. strategic COA, iden- as well; these must be reflected in as its military-strategic objectives tify the strategic ability COG (the ROEs and other restraints. (the adversary’s military-strategic primary entity used in the COA) 20. Determine which possible effects and operational level merged); these and analyze it using the COG in each COG’s critical vulner- can be deduced from the adversary’s analysis model. Determine strate- abilities could lead to the required strategic COAs (see step 9). Quite gic effects and associated actions conditions of the ADV operational possibly, each identified ADV strate- required to protect the critical vul- COGs, as well as which undesired gic COA with associated adversary nerabilities. Do this as well for the effects could lead to the condi- DCs, effects, and actions leads to a U.S. strategic will COG analyzed in tions to be avoided (to be reflected different, but likely overlapping set step 1. Incorporate this in the U.S. in ROEs and other restraints). of ADV operational objectives. For strategic COAs and use it to update Those effects deemed decisive for simplicity, the following assumes the step 9 (ADV COAs). The COG achieving the required condition same set of ADV operational objec- analyses of the U.S. strategic ability of the related COG are designated COGs (related to different COAs DCs. Sometimes a DC might also
122 Joint Doctrine / A COG Concept for Winning More Than Just Battles JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 describe the required condition of 24. From the DCs and effects in the cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/COG.pdf>. 3 Vandersteen argues that the COG concept a COG. selected operational COA, objec- “fails to provide convincing evidence for its 21. Determine what possible combina- tives for the components are use at the strategic level of war.” See Kurt P. tion of actions across the joint func- defined (that is, the subordinate Vandersteen, “Center of Gravity: A Quest for tions could lead to each identified commands). This happens through Certainty or Tilting at Windmills,” in Address- effect. One action could in principle collaborative planning with the ing the Fog of COG, 40. 4 This addresses a critique such as “the support several effects. The effects components to ensure the related JOPP [joint operation planning process] . . . and associated combinations of actions are realistic and the objec- lacks a definitive COG qualifying procedure.” actions must be developed through tives are achievable. Component- See Daniel J. Smith, Kelley Jeter, and Odin collaborative planning with the level planning will refine and revise Westgaard, “Three Approaches to Center of components to ensure they are as required, just as described here Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” Joint Force Quarterly 78 (3rd creatable. for operational-level planning. Quarter 2015). Rueschhoff and Dunne raise 22. The different combinations of 25. For each branch and sequel devel- a similar critique. See Jan L. Rueschhoff and effects and related combinations of oped, each step must be revisited. Jonathan P. Dunne, “Centers of Gravity from actions determined above are core the ‘Inside Out,’” Joint Force Quarterly 60 elements of the operations design. Winning Wars and the (4th Quarter 2011), 121–122. In relation, Alex Ryan argues that “COG concept is so abstract Different combinations form the Subsequent Peace to be meaningless.” See also Eikmeier. core ingredients of various poten- While current U.S. doctrine makes the 5 That the COG is a dead metaphor related tial JFC operational COAs (along COG concept the centerpiece in opera- to Prussian military challenges in the early with operational DCs, effects, and tional planning, there is a broad call for 19th century is also a typical argument from actions identified elsewhere in the either revising or killing the concept.10 critics. See, for instance, Paparone and Davis; and Robert Dixon, “Clausewitz, Center of planning process). Those effects in However, if the COG concept is to Gravity, and the Confusion of a Generation of ADV critical vulnerabilities, which remain the centerpiece in military plan- Planners,” Small Wars Journal, October 20, are selected for a specific COA and ning, it must not only help link actions, 2015, available at JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Barfoed 123 Engineman completes written damage control test aboard USS Rushmore, operating in 7th Fleet area of responsibility, June 4, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Chelsea Troy Milburn) Department of Defense Terminology Program By George E. Katsos he Department of Defense departments and agencies, and between (DOD) Terminology Program the United States and international T was formalized in 2009 by the partners. It includes U.S. participation Office of the Secretary of Defense in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (OSD) and falls under the responsi- (NATO) terminology development as bility of the Chairman of the Joint well as other terminology forums. Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).1 The program is Colonel George E. Katsos, USAR, is the DOD overseen by the director of Joint Force Policies Terminologist on the Joint Staff with duties as Head of Delegation to the NATO Military Development (DJ7) to improve com- The standardization of military ter- Committee Terminology Board and Senior munications and mutual understanding minology is established under two Editor for the U.S. Government Compendium through the standardization of military policies: DOD Instruction (DODI) of Interagency and Associated Terms. He also serves as a Deputy Director of Civil-Military and associated terminology within 5025.12, Standardization of Military Training for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. DOD, with other U.S. Government and Associated Terminology, and CJCS 124 Joint Doctrine / Department of Defense Terminology Program JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Instruction (CJCSI) 5705.01, Stan- ment community who make it their job introduced during JP development dardization of Military and Associated that words matter. This terminology and DOD terminologist administrative Terminology. Since the Eisenhower community consists of the DOD changes that reflect results of revalidation and Kennedy administrations, both terminologist, Service and National proposals or directed action by senior documents continue to mature and Guard Bureau joint doctrine planners leadership. guide the department on terminology and organizational terminologists, and standardization at all workforce levels.2 points of contact from OSD and other Principles DODI 5025.12 is the Defense Secre- DOD components. Additionally, Joint The Chairman’s Instruction includes tary’s overarching policy for the DOD Staff doctrine planners individually three fundamental principles as the basis Terminology Program. Revised in April maintain joint publication (JP) glos- for appropriate DOD Dictionary term 2017, it applies to all DOD components saries and represent DOD organiza- and definition development: clarity, con- including OSD, military departments, tional terminology positions to NATO. ciseness, and completeness. To propose the Office of the CJCS, Joint Staff, and Regardless of these occupations, indi- a successful term and definition, the combatant commands.3 Issued by the viduals from the joint force can propose submission first must be clear, focusing deputy chief management officer in new terms and definitions through their on articulating what the term means. OSD, this instruction directs the Chair- own organization processes for consid- It should not contain doctrinal or pro- man to manage the DOD Terminology eration in any forum. cedural information on how or why a Program, develop and maintain the Proposed terms and definitions for term is used or address the term itself. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associ- the DOD Dictionary are introduced Next, the definition must be concise, ated Terms (DOD Dictionary), and under five processes. The first is DOD being brief as possible and including resolve terminology issues. An initial set terminology proposed from joint doctrine only information that makes the term of terminology criteria is provided that JP glossaries. Under this process, a group unique. The definition should be limited is further built upon by the Chairman’s of organizational representatives and to one sentence whenever possible. The Instruction. CJCSI 5705.01F (revised in subject matter experts that comprises the last principle is that the definition should September 2017) establishes the Chair- joint doctrine development community be complete by including all information man’s policy and implementation pro- conducts its own maintenance of glossary required to distinguish the term from cedures for the joint force.4 The CJCSI terms and definitions that are reflected those that are similar. This includes supports and is in compliance with the in the DOD Dictionary. Its community- addressing an associated parent term if DODI. The DJ7 provides general/ based consensus—governed under CJCSI applicable. Whenever possible, defini- flag officer oversight for the Chairman 5120.02, Joint Doctrine Development tions should use the two-part definition to coordinate, standardize, and dis- System, and CJCS Manual 5120.01, Joint form. For example, “theater of opera- seminate DOD military and associated Doctrine Development Process—continues tions: an operational area defined by terminology. In support, the director to be the sole driver for clear, concise, and the geographic combatant commander delegates development and management complete DOD Dictionary joint doctrine for the conduct of support of specific responsibilities to the deputy director terms and definitions. military operations.” In this case, the for Joint Education and Doctrine, who Next is DOD terminology directed first part (operational area) specifies the appoints and supervises the DOD termi- by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy relevant general type and the second part nologist to facilitate the program. The Secretary of Defense, or CJCS via specific (defined by the geographic combatant Chairman’s Instruction not only refines memoranda. These are policy terms command) specifies the instance of the procedures on how to introduce term directed for placement into the DOD type that is being defined. and definition additions, modifications, Dictionary to fill a void in joint doctrine Common errors plague term and or deletions to the DOD Dictionary with the caveat that they may be adopted definition proposals and the following but also introduces a new procedure to into or modified by JP revisions, thus examples should be avoided: multiple def- revalidate existing terms and definitions becoming joint doctrine terms. initions that include a series of numbered from nondoctrinal sources. The instruc- Third is DOD terminology proposed definitions for different meanings, in- tion also includes more clarity on the from DOD (OSD/Joint Staff) issuance complete definitions that are not detailed differences between joint doctrine and glossaries. After being socialized with the enough to include all items necessary, policy terms as well as the process to DOD terminologist and correctly staffed, overly restrictive definitions that are too maintain a database where policy terms these terms of policy origin are proposed detailed and exclude items that should be reside outside the DOD Dictionary. to fill gaps and start conversations in covered, circular definitions that repeat joint doctrine until it catches up with and the term being defined as part of the defi- Processes adopts or modifies the terms in JP glossa- nition or used as a characteristic, negative Processes are managed by organiza- ries, also becoming joint doctrine terms. definitions that state what is not covered tional personnel. There are terminolo- The two remaining steps are pro- rather than what is covered, and hidden gists within the joint doctrine develop- posals of NATO terminology that are definitions that embed definitions of one JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Katsos 125 Table. Nineteen Criteria for Inclusion in the DOD Dictionary nondoctrinal policy glossaries. Updated 1. Merriam-Webster dictionary term is inadequate for DOD use quarterly, the Terminology Repository 2. Not a Merriam-Webster dictionary definition with non-definitional added text (fluff) was established in 2016 to provide awareness of specific and technical policy 3. Not self-defining (bomber aircraft: an aircraft that delivers bombs) terms and definitions that are sourced 4. Not a policy term that competes/overrides a doctrinal term in the DOD Dictionary or reside outside of joint doctrine.7 Now 5. Follows established procedures (pre-signature DOD Terminologist coordination, otherwise in one location, over 22,000 entries term referred to Terminology Repository) of terms and definitions can be viewed 6. Reflects extant DOD capabilities and practices and tracked from over 1,200 OSD and 7. General military or associated significance (technical terms may be included if defined in easily 400 CJCS issuance glossaries. Duplicate understood language and of general military or associated significance) term entries from multiple individual 8. Weaponry terms are limited to generic weapon systems issuances are included by design to track 9. Not to consist of/contain shortened word forms (abbreviations, acronyms, or initialisms) differences in organizational definitions 10. Must be UNCLASSIFIED (including shortened word forms) and marked as such and approaches in understanding terms. 11. No prowords, code words, brevity words, or NATO-only terms When developing glossaries, it is recom- mended to review the Terminology 12. Not Service- or functionality-specific unless commonly employed in U.S. joint force operations Repository after reviewing the DOD 13. Approved joint term with similar definition does not exist Dictionary in order to develop a full un- 14. Consistent with U.S. law, treaties, international agreements, and executive orders derstanding of DOD’s usage of the term 15. Noun terms should be in singular form and potential derivatives. It is also rec- 16. No proper names ommended that future issuance glossaries 17. No separate cross-reference entries (“Universal Time” is also called “ZULU time,” no separate follow CJCSI criteria for developing entry for “ZULU time”) organizational policy terms to refine and 18. Must appear and be used in the content of the document (not just in its glossary) improve overall DOD terminology. The 19. Should be written as a definition (what it is) and not as a description (how/why it works) process for updating the Terminology Repository can be found in the CJCSI as well as OSD and Joint Staff workforce term inside another. These principles memoranda and DOD policy issuances.6 polices and checklists. and lessons learned from common errors This document supplements common The U.S. Government Compendium inform boundaries for the 19 criteria in English-language dictionary terms and of Interagency and Associated Terms was the Chairman’s Instruction to determine definitions in a military context clearly developed to provide visibility on stan- the quality and acceptability of terms distinguished from other terms. Military dard terminology used in department and definitions for inclusion in the DOD terms with more descriptive or narrative dictionaries, U.S. Code, and cooperation Dictionary (see table). text constrained by CJCSI definition activities of the executive branch.8 DOD criteria are not reflected in the DOD Dictionary terms and definitions are Products Dictionary but can exist as content within reflected in this document to increase Terminology products are the tools JP chapter text. Those interested in devel- efficiencies among and between work- employed to provide transparency of oping new term and definition proposals forces. Generated by the Joint Doctrine DOD terminology usage within the should access this official resource first Interorganizational Cooperation joint force and for interagency partners. prior to precoordination to determine Terminology Working Group and cre- For the purpose of this review, the fol- if the term(s) exist, then cross-reference ated by action officers from all executive lowing products managed by the DOD terms and their derivatives that are re- branch departments and many agen- terminologist are examined: the DOD flected in the OSD and Joint Staff policy cies, this inaugural release of more than Dictionary, the Terminology Repository database—known as the Terminology 12,000 entries will be annually revised. As of DOD (OSD/JS) Issuances, and the Repository—for situational awareness. practiced in the Terminology Repository, U.S. Government Compendium of Inter- Additionally, a basic but non-exhaustive the appearance of duplicative term entries agency and Associated Terms. list of shortened word forms (abbrevia- with different definitions is by design The DOD Dictionary was first tions, acronyms, and initialisms) criteria is to show differences in organizational published by the Joint Staff in 1948.5 provided as an appendix for general guid- approaches, usage, and understanding. Now issued monthly, it reflects over ance. Shortened word forms included The document also contains foreign and 2,400 general and universal terms and in the DOD Dictionary appendix only domestic thematic lists for reference to definitions in JP glossaries (98 percent), reflect those used in individual JPs. enhance workforce interoperability in known as joint doctrine terms, as well as The Terminology Repository of DOD steady state activities, disaster relief, or policy terms that fill joint doctrine gaps (OSD/JS) Issuances is a database that other missions. This unofficial document (2 percent) addressed by senior leader tracks OSD and Joint Staff terms in is nonbinding, socialized, used to break 126 Joint Doctrine / Department of Defense Terminology Program JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Dictionary’s purpose where clear, con- cise, and complete terms and definitions reside.10 JFQ Notes 1 Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5025.12, Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology (Washington, DC: DOD, August 14, 2009), 3. 2 Memorandum of Policy No. 109, Stan- dardization of Military Terminology, June 1, 1959; DODI 5000.9, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (Washing- ton, DC: DOD, September 23, 1961). 3 DODI 5025.12, April 11, 2017, change 1. 4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5705.01F, Standardization of Mili- tary and Associated Terminology (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 15, 2017). 5 Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 1948). 6 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associ- C-5 Galaxy aircraft crew chief assigned to 167th Maintenance Squadron, West Virginia Air National ated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Guard, performs engine check after C-5 lands at Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina, July 22, 2013 September 2017). (U.S. Air Force/Dennis Sloan) 7 Terminology Repository of DOD (OSD/JS) Issuances (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, down organizational stovepipes, and is the need to reinforce cooperation July 2017). published with the understanding that with non-DOD organizations through 8 U.S. Government Compendium of Inter- it not be definitive of a mission or func- terminology transparency in pursuit of agency and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 9 The Joint Staff, July 2017). tion of any organization. The process for maximum interoperability. The last 9 James C. McArthur et al., “Interorgani- updates is generated through an annual is the need to continue tracking the zational Cooperation I of III: The Interagency staffing to the organizations under a call terminology that informs these prod- Perspective,” Joint Force Quarterly 79 (4th for information. ucts to push the DOD Terminology Quarter 2015), 106–112; James C. McArthur Program and the joint force further et al., “Interorganizational Cooperation II of st III: The Humanitarian Perspective,” Joint Force The Way Ahead into the 21 century. These steps are Quarterly 80 (1st Quarter 2016), 145–152; and The program’s continued socializa- guaranteed to empower workforce staff James C. McArthur et al., “Interorganizational tion to the personnel that make up the and action officers in solving problems Cooperation III of III: The Joint Force Per- joint force is paramount to the growth that involve language before they reach spective,” Joint Force Quarterly 81 (2nd Quarter of DOD terminology management. senior leadership. 2016), 129–139. 10 For more information regarding DOD To build on its momentum, informal As the joint doctrine develop- terminology, see the DOD Terminology rollouts continue at all levels of the ment community continues its own Program, available at JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Katsos 127 USS Ashland patrols waters off coast of Australia during biennial U.S.-Australia bilateral Exercise Talisman Saber 17, Coral Sea, July 21, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Jonathan Clay) Born Multinational Capability Solutions for Joint, Multinational, and Coalition Operations By Charles W. Robinson .S. military operations are team offers the benefits of both inher- conducted in a multinational ent interoperability and a broad set of U environment. This is true today perspectives, insights, and knowledge and for the foreseeable future. Given sources. The pooling of resources this fact and the Chairman of the Joint also enables cost savings for each par- Charles W. Robinson is the Knowledge Manager, Joint Staff Deputy Director J7 Chiefs of Staff’s emphasis on working ticipant. The Multinational Capability Enterprise Architecture Division, and detailed with allies and other international Development Campaign (MCDC) pro- to the Multinational Capability Development partners, there are many advantages to vides a quick, affordable way to conduct Campaign as Federated Mission Networking and Mission Partner Environment Civilian-Military certain capabilities being born multi- projects designed to develop concepts Information-Sharing Project Lead. national. A multinational development and capabilities in collaboration with a 128 Joint Doctrine / Born Multinational JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 broad set of international mission part- into solution paths that others might not Nations desiring to become members ners. MCDC capability development see. MCDC takes the approach that a of the MCDC community do so by projects offer a model of effectiveness broader set of perspectives makes for a requesting membership to the MCDC and efficiency. better solution to a multinational prob- Executive Steering Group (ESG) via lem. Projects undertaken as partnered the MCDC secretariat. Information on What Exactly Is MCDC? efforts from the start are, in effect, born membership as well as program details MCDC is a Joint Staff program led by multinational. can be obtained from the secretariat the director of Joint Force Develop- The Joint Staff J7 established the in the Joint Staff J7. Generally, indi- ment (J7). The program consists of MCDC program in 2013 in order to vidual nations or intergovernmental 24 partner nations and international build and expand from the Multinational organizations (IGOs)—for example, organizations focused on developing Experimentation (MNE) program. The the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nonmateriel solutions to fill capabil- legacy MNE series focused on concept (NATO) and Economic Development ity gaps for joint, multinational, and development and experimentation Administration—apply to the ESG chair coalition operations. These capabilities (CD&E), with an emphasis on the latter. in writing and indicate their desired are intended to meet the present and MCDC maintains the foundational build- category of participation. There are two future needs of the United States and ing blocks that made the MNE series categories of participation to which a its potential mission partners. MCDC successful but moves into the realm of member of the MCDC community may provides a mechanism for pooling and delivering solutions. MCDC builds on belong: contributor or observer. The sharing resources in multinational col- and goes beyond the MNE foundation, ESG chair will distribute such applications laborative development efforts directed incorporating key changes in scope and to the current ESG members for approval at solving or mitigating common mission necessary to meet the capability under silence. If no one has broken si- problems. The focus is on providing development requirements of the United lence at the end of the suspense—usually interoperable solutions at the best value. States and its partners. In other words, 30 days—then the application is accepted Economics is not, however, the sole MCDC is translating concepts into usable and a nation or IGO becomes a member driver of the MCDC approach. multinational capability. of the MCDC community. Some may wonder why the United For multinational force development States supports the MCDC program purposes, it was important that MCDC How a Capability Development given the other possible pathways for not be constrained to CD&E method- Campaign Works capability development. The National ologies but instead be able to define, MCDC uses a 24-month lifecycle for Military Strategy and our Joint Concepts produce, and transition relevant solutions each program of work. This begins envision multinational operations as and capabilities that could be used now with a 6-month requirements analysis the primary mechanism for mobilizing and in the foreseeable future. While some and planning phase, followed by a collective action from the international MCDC projects still use basic CD&E 16-month execution and production community. The United States works methodologies to develop operational phase and a 2-month approval phase. daily with multinational partners to ad- concepts, others elect to apply system The process starts with member nations dress global risks and share the burdens design and engineering, Business Process and organizations proposing gaps, of maintaining global security. Looking Engineering, Six Sigma, Lean, and other problems, or issues for consideration across U.S. strategy, threats, commit- methodologies and frameworks. All ef- by the MCDC partners. The member ments, and recent experience, it is clear forts examine the specific operational nations use a blend of informal and that current and future operations of gaps and develop solutions to fill these formal processes to identify and down- most types will be multinational by using the doctrine, organization, train- select the set of common problems to be nature. This view is clearly reflected ing, materiel, leadership and education, addressed in a campaign cycle, which is and reinforced in the strategy, doctrine, people, facilities, and policy and interop- in effect the MCDC program of work. concepts, and priorities of the many erability framework to ensure results are The basic selection method is for multinational partners with whom we comprehensive enough to have an opera- those proposing projects to recruit mem- will team. tional impact. bers into a multinational project team Every nation, the United States MCDC continues to evolve and to conduct the necessary work. Each included, brings cultural perspectives to improve over time. As it begins its third MCDC contributing member has the capability development. When capabili- iteration with the 2017–2018 program ability to invite representatives from its ties are developed by U.S. mechanisms of work, significant improvements have national networks of public, private, and and then transitioned to a multinational been incorporated into the project pro- academic institutions as well as functional environment, a lot of time and effort posal process, product quality control and expertise from other centers of excellence may be required to address others’ per- consistency, documentation of internal and communities of practice to become spectives. Similarly, partner nations and processes, and transition of products to project team members. This reachback organizations may have unique insights end users. feature of the program is instrumental in JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Robinson 129 producing innovative and nontraditional needed to engage future customers approach works. FMCM2 is the second solutions. Those projects that are able to and users of the prototype. scenario of the FMCM information- draw interest and resources sufficient to •• Multinational Defensive Cyber Oper- sharing project. This project, which sees meet requirements are included in the ations (MDCO), led by the United a continuation and expansion of the program of work. States, created a MDCO planning 2016 implementation, serves as a good Past campaigns have resulted in guide for use by a multinational force example of how MCDC works and the several useful capabilities being imple- commander. It provides repeatable results that can be achieved. mented. Some examples include: processes for quickly and effectively FMCM2 is a multinational project de- integrating multinational forces to veloping a capability for mission partners Countering Hybrid Warfare, led by •• conduct defensive cyber operations. to share information with nonmission Norway, developed a common con- Federated Mission Network/Mission partners—especially international and ceptual lexicon and framework for •• Partner Environment Civil-Military multinational organizations—when op- multinational efforts and determined Enhancement, co-led by the United erating in a common environment. This conceptual linkages between policy, States and NATO, provided an capability is important where: strategy, and operational implemen- improved ability to rapidly and effec- tation when countering hybrid chal- Nations’ military forces are partici- tively respond to international crises •• lenges. The outcome was a better pating in either Federated Mission through enhanced collaboration understanding of hybrid warfare and Networking (FMN) or Mission and cooperation between military an operational framework for how Partner Environment (MPE), or and civilian organizations. The nations and coalitions can deter, frequently operate alongside nations capability development focused on mitigate, and counter these threats. that do so. standardizing processes for identify- Counter Unmanned Autonomous These military forces have opera- •• ing information, data exchanges, •• Systems [C](UAxS), led by NATO tional requirements to share infor- and service requirements; facilitating Allied Command Transformation, mation with nonmilitary entities timely mission-specific information developed an overarching concept such as governmental agencies of exchange; and developing a means of to explore the potential threats other nations, international civilian validating interoperable and compat- to military and civilian personnel, organizations, or the humanitarian ible information systems and support leadership, and facilities and imple- community. tools. ment protection and countermeasure The FMCM2 project addresses solutions; conduct a study exploring The current MCDC campaign in- both FMN/MPE capability develop- the evolving technology and future cludes projects that enable the challenges ment requirements for civilian-military operation implications of UAxS in our multinational team is facing. These information-sharing and the need for four domains (ground; air; sea; and include: an operational concept and guidebook command, control, communica- • Countering Hybrid Warfare 2 to support implementation by member tion, intelligence, and surveillance); • Globally Integrated Logistics for nations choosing to apply the concepts, explore policy recommendations on Rapid Aggregation practices, and standards. FMCM is a priority areas for both future capabil- • International Cyberspace Operations military-led effort performed by a team ity implementation and integration Planning Curricula made up of MCDC members. The team with existing assets; and develop • Integrated Coalition Personnel is actively sharing information with key policy recommendations on prior- Recovery Capability organizations including the Department ity areas for both future capability • Integration of Lethal and Nonlethal of State, U.S. Agency for International implementation and integration with Actions Development, United Nations (UN) existing assets. • Information Age Command and Civil-Military Coordination Section, Integrated Communication Demon- •• Control Concepts International Committee of the Red stration (ICD), co-led by Germany • Military Strategic Communication Cross, and International Federation of and Sweden, developed a validated Implementation Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. prototype set of solutions to address • Medical Modular Approaches When implemented, FMCM will provide processes, organizational structures, • Federated Mission Networking/ architectures, standards, techniques, and and tools for integrated communica- Mission Partner Environment procedures for information-sharing using tion and communication manage- Civilian-Military Information-Sharing the public Internet environment, com- ment, including practical recommen- patible with those used by nonmilitary dations for policy, doctrine, standard Project (FMCM, second scenario). entities such as governmental agencies operating procedures, and training The MCDC project to improve of other nations, international organiza- concepts. ICD deployed a capability FMCM information-sharing provides tions, and the humanitarian community. for designing demonstration events an excellent example of how well this 130 Joint Doctrine / Born Multinational JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 U.S. Soldier deployed in support of CJTF–Operation Inherent Resolve discusses operations with 9th Iraqi army division leaders during offensive to liberate West Mosul from Islamic State, near Al Tarab, Iraq, March 19, 2017 (U.S. Army/Jason Hull) Background Other studies, such as the one conducted the FMN/MPE environment does by the Stockholm International Peace not exist outside those produced by As with any project, the first step was Research Institute, identified problems FMCM. problem identification and definition. with civilian-military information-sharing This problem was analyzed during the as fundamental to issues that occurred Current Project 2015–2016 MCDC cycle within the during humanitarian and disaster re- FMCM is anticipated to have a big FMN/MPE civilian-military 15/16 sponse operations. The UN Office for the payoff in terms of information-sharing project to address technical, process, Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has with civilians in the mission space. It and standards-based challenges related recognized this as a problem area. This will provide military forces using FMN/ to civilian-military information-sharing. finding was reinforced by surveys of and MPE the capability to conduct civilian- The major indicator that this problem focus sessions and interviews with ex- military information-sharing between existed was found through research. perts from both the military and civilian members of a federated network and A review of FMN/MPE and other in- communities. entities operating external to the ternational resources indicated that there Specific statements collected by the network utilizing a public Internet was no extant joining, membership, or FMCM 15/16 solution development environment to leverage common core exiting instruction templates for civilian- team related to these problems included: services. The FMCM approach will military information-sharing as described allow information-sharing to be estab- above. Also, no similar protocols were The problem affects all MCDC par- •• lished in a coordinated process early in identified under any other international ticipating nations who are also users the operations rather than ad hoc over standardization effort. A survey of after of the FMN/MPE approach to mul- a much longer period. This will result action reviews and lessons learned drawn tinational network federation. in improved unity of effort by respond- from multiple nations’ experiences in- A set of architectures and instruc- •• ing military forces to coordinate, col- dicated chronic problems in this area. tions for information-sharing outside laborate, and cooperate with civilian JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Robinson 131 entities within both the affected state and humanitarian organizations. Better information-sharing will support the Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision development of a common awareness of (to be signed within 6 months) the operational environment and devel- JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations opment of a common operating picture JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations among all participants. Additionally, information shared by non-FMN/ JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations MPE entities directly with the FMN/ JP 3-11, Operations in CBRN Environments MPE network would be available to all JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations FMN/MPE member participants as part of the military-military common JP 3-15.1, Counter–Improvised Explosive Device Operations operating picture. Information-sharing JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations among stakeholders is foundational to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency a comprehensive approach for multi- dimensional crisis response and peace JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Information-sharing via the public JP 3-32, C2 for Joint Maritime Operations Internet is critical for FMCM. Military- military information-sharing developed JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations by FMN/MPE will be incomplete if JP 4-0, Joint Logistics it does not also include the ability for JP 4-04, Joint Contingency Basing multinational forces to share information external to the network in an unclassified JP 4-09, Distribution Operations environment using the public Internet. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support Inability to do this would necessitate that each FMN/MPE nation establish a separate information-sharing approach to JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) the non-FMN/MPE entities. This would JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces create an unmanageable burden for the JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense limited capabilities of these nonmilitary JP 3-27, Homeland Defense entities to handle information exchanges. That in turn reduces the availability of JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters information to develop and share a com- JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations mon operational picture. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting Success will result in more timely, reliable, and clearer civilian-military JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations information-sharing between a FMN/ JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System MPE federation network and non-FMN/ JP 4-02, Joint Health Services MPE entities. The FMN/MPE federated network will serve as a single point of contact for humanitarian organizations and affected states to exchange informa- following payoffs and benefits that capa- nonmateriel solutions. These solutions tion with FMN military forces instead bility developers should consider: are born multinational. Multinational of the current requirement to have solutions are more readily adopted by our individual information exchange paths born multinational capabilities •• allies and other partners because of the between responding military commands lower cost •• consensus-building inherent in MCDC. and non-FMN/MPE entities. Enhanced broader perspective •• Any U.S. command or organization with information-sharing will support im- early consensus •• a capability requirement can leverage proved overall situational awareness, speed of delivery. •• the MCDC as an opportunity to exploit deconfliction of operations, and better MCDC offers the United States these benefits. JFQ coordination for both military and civil- and its mission partners an opportunity ian participants. to collaboratively, rapidly, and afford- The MCDC path is proving successful ably define operational capabilities and for FMCM because MCDC offers the 132 Joint Doctrine / Born Multinational JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 From NDU Press Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration 2016 • 396 pp. The Trump administration takes office in a time of great complexity. The President faces a national security environment shaped by strong currents: globalization; the proliferation of new, poor, and weak states, as well as nonstate ac- tors; a persistent landscape of violent extremist organizations; slow economic growth; the rise of China and a revanchist Russia; a collapsing Middle East; and domestic policies wracked by division and mistrust. While in absolute terms the Nation and the world are safer than in the last century, today the United States finds itself almost on a permanent war footing, engaged in military operations around the world. This book, written by experts at the Defense Department’s National Defense University, offers valuable policy advice and grand strat- egy recommendations to those senior leaders who will staff and lead this administration in national security affairs. The President and his staff, Members of Congress, and the many leaders throughout government concerned with the Nation’s security interests should find this book valuable. Their task is not an easy one, and this volume’s insights and reflections are offered with an ample dose of humility. There are no silver bullets, no elegant solutions to the complex problems confronting America and its leaders. This volume provides context and un- derstanding about the current national security environment to those in the Administration as they prepare to lead the Nation during challenging times. To those senior leaders who bear the heavi- est responsibilities, these policy insights may chart a course forward. The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior officers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them. Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/charting-a-course/ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-EIGHT, 1ST QUARTER 2018 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm You can also find us on: You Visit us online at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit JFQ is available online at the Joint Electronic Library: articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, The Armed Forces Officer“This new edition of The Armed Forces articulates the ethical and moral underpin- nings at the core of our profession. The special trust in us by the Nation and confidence placed we protect is built upon this foundation. I commend members of our officer corps to embrace the principles of this important book and practice them daily in the performance of your du- I expect you to imbue these values in the next generation of leaders.” ties. More importantly, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1159223/the-armed-forces-officer/ New from NDU Press New from Officer The Armed Forces 2017 • 212 pp. ChairmanStaff: of the Joint Chiefs of Dunford, Jr., From the Foreword by General Joseph F. C. Marshall, then serving George “In 1950, the great Soldier-Statesman Secretary as the of Officer page for a new book titled The ArmedDefense, signed a cover Forces . That original Marshall, who later explained that was written by none other than S.L.A. version of this book Secretary Marshall had ‘inspired the undertakingpersonal conviction that American due to his military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground morally.’ ethically and it addressed an of the Cold War, emergence at the dawn of the nuclear age and the Written officer a strategy of nuclear deterrence, corps tasked with developing facing unprecedented deployments, and adapting to the creation of the Department- of Defense and other new orga nizations necessary to manage the threats of a new global order. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked