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The War in South Africa 1899-1902

General Editor: L. S. Ameiy FeUow of All Souls

Vol. V

Edited by Erskine Childers

Author of 'The Riddle of the Sands,' 'In the Ranks of the C.I.V. rrt With Maps, Plans, and Photogravure Portraits f3>

LONDON Sampson Low, Marston and Company, Ltd.

17A, paternoster row, e.c. 1907 :

330 R5H

LONDON PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, DUKE STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E., AND GREAT WINDMILL STREET, W. GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE

The military aim which the British people and the British Army had set before themselves at the outbreak of the war had been achieved, and more than achieved, by the close of the first year. In his great marches, from Moclder Eiver Camp to the Portuguese frontier, Lord Eoberts had swept away the stubborn resistance of the Boer armies, had triumphantly occupied all the chief towns of the two Eepublics, and had securely established himself upon the great arteries of communication. After Komati Poort there was no longer a single compact, centrally organised and centrally equipped Boer force in the field ; the Boer artillery had almost disappeared; on every side the burghers were coming in to assure the conquerors that the surrender of those who were still in arms was but a matter of a few days or at the outside weeks. Few, indeed, there were who recognised that the British aim had been set too low, or understood the magnitude and character of the task that still lay between Lord Kitchener and the realisation of the national purpose expressed in the formal annexation of the Piepublics. Yet there were abundant precedents to furnish a warning. The defeat of the Sepoy mutiny, the annexation of Burma, the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had each had their aftermath of costly and exhausting guerilla warfare. In the last instance the activities of a few deter- mined bands had occupied 200,000 men for two years. Why, vol. v b ;

vi GENERAL EDITORS PREFACE if any considerable proportion of the Boers were minded to resist, should the effective occupation of the Eepublics call for a lesser effort? The area to be occupied was many times vaster and admirably suited to guerilla tactics. Here were no unorganised, ill -armed subjects of an Oriental despotism, but a free white people, the most obstinate, perhaps, of all the white races, well mounted, equipped with the best modern weapons, and still entirely unconvinced of any tactical inferiority to the invaders. Apart from the comparatively bloodless surrenders of Cronje and Prinsloo, they had suffered no really crushing defeats, they had never been subjected to punishing pursuit. The towns from which they had been driven had never been centres of their national life. What reason, after all, was there for supposing that their stubborn spirit had so lightly been schooled to submission ? That the British arms were bound ultimately to prevail was, indeed, reasonably certain, provided always that the resolution of the British people remained constant. Knowing its own mind clearly for once, the British nation assumed that its settled purpose was no less clearly realised by others, and saw only aimless and mischievous folly in the continued resistance to the formal expression of that purpose. But was it such folly to doubt British resolution ? Twenty years earlier that resolution had been proclaimed in terms no less

definite ; then, too, all the towns had been in British hands then, too, the British arms would undoubtedly have pre- vailed if the resolve behind them had not been shaken by the obstinacy of the Boer resistance. Many, indeed, of the Boers realised at a comparatively early period that the British temper had changed entirely since 1881. Of these, some who had surrendered or were made prisoners at the critical period immediately following the occupation of

Pretoria, when it was almost a matter of chance who sur- rendered or who kept the field, were so impressed by their closer contact with the British that they came to share the British view as to the mischievous futility of continued resistance, and ultimately, finding all their efforts at per- suasion unavailing, even took the field with the British against their old comrades in arms. Others, like Louis GENERAL EDITORS PREFACE vii

Botha nimself, saw that surrender was inevitable, and were anxious to come to terms with the British, but held that honour and interest alike pledged them to continue the war as long as their colleagues were resolved to do so, consoling themselves with the hope that they might at any rate improve the terms which would eventually be granted. Meanwhile the decision rested with those who, with President Steyn, were determined to take nothing for granted, but to fight on while there was still a burgher fit to fight, and to trust in the fortune that so often favours desperate resolution. The event failed to confirm their hopes. Innumerable minor successes could not stay the relentless progress of Kitchener's organisation of conquest; the weary and ruinous prolongation of the war left the British resolve unaffected. When the Boer leaders finally surrendered the terms of peace included not a single con- cession which the British Government would not have been prepared to grant after the fall of Pretoria, nearly two years earlier, or would not have granted if the war had continued to the capture of the last burgher. Are we, then, to say that the prolongation of the war by the Boer leaders was a mere miscalculation, involving a futile destruction of life and property, alike for their own people and for their conquerors ? That, indeed, is the only possible conclusion for those whose conception of war is based on the crude economic materialism which regards it as a mere waste of the general store of commodities, or on the sentimental individualism which shrinks with horror from the suffering and bloodshed which are its immediate con- comitants. But for those who believe that character and will determine the destinies of nations, material as well as moral, who are prepared to maintain that the wasteful struggle of war may even, in the event, increase the material prosperity of both combatants, who realise that the loss of individual life is but a small thing when set in the scale against national welfare, the conclusion may well be different. The decision of the Boer leaders to prolong the war was an assertion of individual and national character over mere calculating reason. In the long, heroic struggle that followed Vlll GENERAL EDITORS PREFACE

that character was strengthened, purified and chastened. The corruption, the insolent arrogance, the insatiate ambition which had grown up under the Kruger regime were sloughed off. The Boers, surrendering when they did and as they did, were a greater asset to the British Empire than they would have been if they had surrendered two years earlier. They had gained, not only in self-respect, but also in respect for British purpose and British power, in respect, too, for the principle of racial equality which the war was fought to assert and which it has asserted. Whatever mistakes may have been committed since, the foundations of racial harmony, based on mutual respect, of progress and development to- wards a prosperous and united South Africa, the equal of her sister nations in the Empire, were laid by the war, and laid the more securely because the struggle was so long and so keenly sustained. And not only South Africa but England, too, has much that can be reckoned to the credit of the long duration of the struggle. The South African War was the first serious trial of the national spirit since England had become a democracy. The nation had stood that trial well during the critical and exciting phase of the struggle. Would it stand equally well the trial of patience and resolution involved in the tedious

and costly sequel ? The event proved that it could : from the first day of war to the last British soldiers and statesmen, each in their sphere, were able to act with the strength and certainty that come from the unquestioning support of a united people. The gain to the moral fibre of the nation from that exercise of patience and will-power has not been

lost ; the changes that have since taken place on the surface of politics imply no deep-going or permanent reaction on Imperial issues. Yet for England, as a whole, it may be doubted whether the long conflict had as great an influence on the moral as on the intellectual side. The war was a tremendous intellectual ferment. It shook the national self- complacency. It has made us look with new eyes upon all our existing institutions, upon all our most precious idols, upon all the unchallenged assumptions that stifled and over-

lay our national life. The political development of the next GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE IX generation will be the embodiment of the intellectual awakening which it called forth. As a military operation the new war, for such it really was, will always be of compelling interest. It was no ordinary guerilla campaign carried on by roving bands led by irresponsible persons, devoid of a definite political purpose. It was a guerilla campaign in excelsis, deliberately entered upon by the national authorities, and deliberately adapted to the existing military organisation of the Eepublics. Throughout its continuance the political and military control of the Boer forces, and the organisation of those forces, remained intact. When the end came, the Boers, however reduced in numbers, still surrendered as two nations organised on a military footing. Nothing, indeed, could have illustrated more clearly than this campaign the enormous resisting power of a free democracy organised on a simple and com- prehensive system of national military service. As long as there were burghers at large on the veld the Boer armies and the Boer Eepublics continued to exist. They could only be ended by piecemeal attrition, or by their own collective recognition of the uselessness of continuing the struggle. When we add to these considerations the fact that, from first to last, the Boers retained their tactical superiority in the open field wherever numbers were even approximately equal, when we remember how considerable the Boer numbers were, and how limited and unequal in training the mounted troops on the British side, we begin to realise the enormous difficulty of the task with which Kitchener and his sub- ordinates had to cope and the greatness of their achieve- ment. With the exception of certain portions of the concluding chapter on the peace negotiations, which deals with events with which I was in close personal touch at the time, I have taken no part in the actual writing of the present volume, and have, as in Volume IV., confined myself to the purely editorial duty of criticism and suggestion. As regards the rest of the volume, the responsibility, both for the accuracy of the narrative and for the military judgments and criticisms expressed, rests entirely with Mr. Childers. The difficulty X GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE of the task with which he has had to deal can only be estimated by those who have had experience of similar work.

Of the quality of the result I leave it to the general reader and to the military student to judge. L. S. AMERY.

The Temple, 5, 1907. PREFACE

My task in this volume is to describe the guerilla war. Mainly, I am concerned with Lord Kitchener's period of command, dating from the end of to the conclusion of peace. To a certain extent, however, I have to traverse ground already covered, but only by way of fore- cast, in the preceding volume. For the guerilla war, so far from being coincident with Lord Kitchener's term of com- mand, may be truly said to have originated at the end of , three months before Lord Eoberts ceased to be Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. The first two chapters of this volume narrate the birth and growth of the guerilla war in the months of September, October and November 1900. While they record many instructive and a few stirring events, they must be regarded to some extent as preparatory to the rest of the volume. Although "regular war" and "guerilla war" are con- venient terms to denote two widely different forms of military activity, it would be a profound mistake to assume that they have nothing in common. Both pursue the same end and both are governed by the same fundamental principles. Whether the enemy be based on rich and populous towns, linked by a network of railways, or on nomadic knots of wagons filled from half-ravaged mealie fields, whether he draws ammunition from well-equipped arsenals or gleans it from deserted camping-grounds, whether he manoeuvres in armies 100,000 strong or in commandos 500 strong, the problem of grappling with that enemy and forcing him to admit defeat is, in essentials, the same. Moreover, it is Xll PREFACE the peculiar interest of guerilla war that it illuminates much that is obscure and difficult in regular war. Just as the Kontgen rays obliterate fleshy tissues and reveal the bony structure, so in the incidents of guerilla war there may be seen,, stripped of a mass of secondary detail, the few dominant factors which sway the issue of great battles and great cam- paigns. Subjected to close analysis, one of Kitchener's combinations may be perceived to have succeeded or failed from the same causes which dictated the success or failure of Marlborough's combinations. It is equally true that in many of the short and sharp actions described in this volume there may be distinguished, following one another with kine- matographic rapidity and vividness, the same phases through which long struggles on historic battlefields have passed. It is in this spirit that the guerilla war should be studied. It will be found that the qualities which made for success in it are qualities which make for success in operations of the grandest scope, and which, recognised more clearly and striven for more ardently in the early stages of the South African War, would have shortened the campaign. In so far as these qualities are found to have been developed during the last year and a half of the war, so far should the methods evolved in that period become permanent models for future military effort. Conversely, whenever those methods contravene broad military principles, they should be acknowledged as makeshifts and frankly discarded. The touchstone by which all should be criticised is their applic- ability to the most varied contingencies. Two examples will suffice. If mobility, physical and mental, strategical, tactical and individual, seemed to be supremely requisite in the effort to close with and overcome the will-o'-the-wisp partisans who continued for so long to challenge the might of their great adversary, let us not overlook the fact that the same mobility was equally requisite on the first day of the war, and will be equally valuable in any campaign of whatever sort that the future may have in store for us. If, with every day the guerilla war lasted, the rifle, in contradistinction to the gun and the arme blanche, stood out more and more clearly as the weapon of decisive efficacy, let us throw the light of that fact PREFACE Xlll not only upon the regular war in South Africa but upon wars in general and see if it does not suggest some broad conclusions as to the proper function of artillery, and as to the utility, if any, of the arme blanche, in the conflicts of the future. And when, to combine both illustrations, we seek to obtain in his perfection the mobile rifleman, let that ideal figure have an universal quality, transcending even the most elementary classifications. Let us draw no impassable line between horsemen and infantry, but rather set both arms, each according to its own capacity and each instructed by lessons derived from the other, to pursue the same end. Above all, when the inquiry is narrowed to the special functions of mounted men, let us shake off the fetters of verbal definition, dismiss for a moment the time-honoured terminology of cavalry and mounted infantry, and, piercing to the heart of the matter, find what it is we really want, and construct, if necessary, a single definition to meet a single need. Thus, and thus only, can we reap the full harvest of military wisdom from the finest school for mounted troops that Britain has ever obtained or is ever likely to ob tain. When I began work in the summer of 1904, drafts for the early part of the narrative, the period now covered by the first five chapters, had already been written by Colonel C. a Court Eepington, C.M.G., the military correspondent of The Times. I need scarcely say what great advantage I derived from building on a groundwork prepared by that able and distinguished writer. The only other part of the volume which needs any special reference is the concluding chapter, entitled " Peace." Mr. Amery, in his capacity of General Editor, has largely remodelled my draft of this chapter and, as it now stands,

he is solely responsible for it. For all the preceding chapters I take full responsibility. Having made this explanation, I hasten to express my deep sense of obligation to Mr. Amery, both for the collection of the original material on which the volume was based, and for invaluable criticism and advice. Mr. Basil Williams, the editor of the fourth volume, besides setting me a high example, has given me many xiv PREFACE

excellent suggestions. To Mr. G. 1*. Tallboy's accurate and eflicient work in the preparation of maps and appendices and in the general revision of the volume, I owe more than I can easily estimate. In proof correction, I have received valuable help from my father-in-law, Mr. Hamilton Osgood. In regard to maps, I have to thank Lieutenant J. A. G. Elliot, of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, for those of Frederikstad

and Bakenlaagte ; and Lieutenant P. 0. G. Usborne, R.E., for those of Springhaan's Nek, Dewetsdorp, Itala, French's operations in the Eastern Transvaal, and Botha's attempt to invade Natal. The map of Bothaville is taken from a sketch kindly supplied by Major H. de B. Hovell, D.S.O., of the

Worcestershire Regiment ; that of Groen Kop is by Lieu- tenant W. Hyde Kelly, R.E., and that of Langverwacht by Captain G. Hartley Watson, of the 3rd Dragoon Guards. Captain P. C. Faff was good enough to provide the materials for the map illustrating the labyrinthine wanderings of the Transvaal Government. In respect to general informa- tion, I should like to take this opportunity of thanking Lieut. -Colonel R. M. Holden, of the Cameronians, for notes concerning the Cuban blockhouse system, and the Marquis and Marchioness of Tullibardine for information about the Scottish Horse.

It is scarcely necessary to say that, in addition to all the sources I have named, use has been made of a vast quantity of information from officers in the army and others connected with the events described, and I have to acknowledge the unfailing courtesy and generosity with which this information has been placed at my disposal. Two remarks may be added. One relates to a point of terminology. Throughout this volume, the countries which we were engaged in conquering are called the Trans- vaal and the Orange Free State, or, for brevity, the Free State. In the latter case, the appellation is technically incorrect; for both countries had been annexed to the British dominions at a date prior to the period covered by this volume. I found, however, that to use the new name " Orange River Colony " while describing warlike operations lasting for a year and a half, involved much awkwardness PREFACE XV and confusion, mainly due to the unsuitability of the term in describing Boer plans and points of view. This circum- stance alone should excuse the technical inaccuracy. The other remark has reference to one of the many short- comings of the volume. From the nature of the operations described therein, it is inevitable that a great number of small episodes, highly honourable to those who took part in them and well worth recording, must, owing to limitations of space, go unrecorded. I can only crave indulgence for these omissions and plead the necessity for maintaining, as far as possible, a just historical perspective. EESKINE CHILDEES.

April 5, 1907. CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE AWAKENING IN THE FREE STATE

(August-) PAGE I. British miscalculations at the end of Sept. 1900. The source of the guerilla war, Aug. De Wet stirs the Free State to revolt, Aug.-Sept. 1900. Siege of Ladybrand, Sept. 2-5. Helplessness of the British

columns. Scarcity of mounted troops . . . 1-7 II. De Wet takes the field and besieges Frederikstad, Sept. 20-Oct. 25 7-13 III. Knox pursues de Wet and defeats him at Bothaville, Oct. 23-Nov. 6 13-21 IV. De Wet prepares to invade Cape Colony, mid-Novem- ber. Conditions in the Free State at that time. British operations in October and November. Attacks on garrison towns in the south, Oct. 16-26. De Wet's prospects 21-28 V. De Wet's attempt to invade Cape Colony, Nov. 13- Dec. 14. Capture of Dewetsdorp, Nov. 22. The second de Wet hunt, Nov. 27-Dec. 14. Action of Springhaan's Nek, Dec. 14 28-43

CHAPTER II

THE AWAKENING IN THE TRANSVAAL

(September-November 1900)

Collapse of the Boer arms, Sept. 1900. Escape of the leaders. Rallying-point in the far north. The guerilla

spirit. British system of warfare obsolete . . . 44-46 xviii CONTENTS

PAGE British operations, Sept.-Nov. The march of French's cavalry division, Oct. 12-26. Actions of Van Wyk'e Vlei and Kornati Eiver, Nov. 2-8. Hildyard's com- mand in Natal. Methuen and other leaders in the West. French in the Johannesburg district. Paget in the North 46-60 First symptoms of an organised Boer revival in the Trans- vaal, mid-November. Plans of the leaders. Viljoen takes the field. Action of Ehenoster Kop. The old era and the new ...... 60-64

CHAPTER III THE PROBLEM BEFORE KITCHENER

(December 1900)

I. Historical aspect of the problem. Unprecedented character of the struggle ..... 65-67 Relative numbers. The British Army. Dissemina-

tion on passive duties. Stragglers. Leadership . 67, 68 Dearth of mounted men. The cavalry. The mounted infantry. The Colonials and the irregulars. The Yeomanry. Existing strain on the mounted arm. The mounted army dissolving. .... 69-73 Infantry. Artillery. Remounts .... 73, 74 The rebellion in Cape Colony. Civil administration. Treatment of the civil population. Devastation 74--77 Attitude of the Home Government .... 77, 78 II. Kitchener's appeal for mounted troops. Reinforce- ments from England and Australasia. Troops raised in South Africa ...... 78-85 Evacuation of needless garrisons. Railway protection 85 86 The new policy of deportation arid concentration 86-88 The military crisis. Future problems outlined. Control 88--91 Kitchener's attitude in regard to peace. Failure of the Burgher Peace Committee ..... 91-93

CHAPTER IV

NOOITGEDACHT AND THE TRANSVAAL OUTBREAK

(December 1900-)

I. The Boers take the field in the Western Transvaal.

Convoy disaster at Buffelspoort, Dec. 3 . . . 94-96 Action of Nooitgedacht, Dec. 13 ... 96-109 CONTENTS XIX

PAGE Retaliatory operations against De la Rey and Beyers, Dec. 16-Jan. 2. Action of Cyferfontein, Jan. 2. Beyers breaks across the main line—actions of Kaal- fontein and Zuurfontein, Jan. 10-12. Action of Middelfontein, Jan. 23-25 109-113 Smuts captures Modderfontein and repels Cunningham, Jan. 29-Feb. 4 113-116 II. Boer outbreak in the Eastern Transvaal. Attack on Vryheid, Dec. 11-12. Action of South Rand Mine, Dec. 26 116-120 Ben Viljoen captures Helvetia ..... 121, 122 Simultaneous attacks on Belfast and other garrisons, night of Jan. 7 122-125 The situation in the Transvaal, Jan. 1901. Kitchener's plan of offence. The Boer scheme for concerted

action against Natal and Cape Colony . . . 126

CHAPTER V

THE INVASION OF CAPE COLONY AND THE GREAT DE WET HUNT

(December 1900-)

I. The preparatory invasion of Hertzog and Kritzinger, Dec.-Feb 127-131 II. De Wet prepares his invasion. He marches south, under pursuit, and crosses the Orange, Jan. 27- Feb. 10 131-187

Plumer's pursuit ; action of Wolvekuil ; de Wet crosses

the railway and loses his convoy, Feb. 14 . . 137-139 Kitchener's strategy to prevent the junction of de Wet and Hertzog 139-141 Plumer's further pursuit, Feb. 15-19. Knox takes up the pursuit, Feb. 19. De Wet abandons his invasion ;

he is penned between two swollen rivers ; he circles along the Orange. Knox loses the scent. Fresh

pursuit by Plumer. De Wet breaks through 's

cordon and re-crosses railway, Feb. 20-24 . . 141-145 Brand and Hertzog evade Bruce Hamilton and also cross the railway, Feb. 16-25. Fourie does likewise. 146-148 Penultimate phase of the hunt. All the Boers unite at

Sand Drift. They are surrounded ; but ford the Orange and escape, Feb. 24-28 .... 148-152 Plumer's final pursuit ; de Wet escapes, Feb. 28- March 11 152-157 --

XX CONTENTS

CHAPTER VI

FRENCH IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL

(January-) PAQK Description of the Eastern Transvaal. Kitchener's design. The British force. The double aim—devastation and pursuit 158-163 First phase—the converging movement on Ermelo, Jan. 28-

Feb. 6. Action of Lake Chrissie, Feb. 6 . 163-170 Second phase—the advance to the Swazi border, Feb. 7-18. 170-174

Third phase—rain and floods ; collapse of the British supply

arrangements ; French reduced to immobility for a

month ; then prepares for the fourth phase, Feb. 18- end of March 174-179 Fourth phase—the advance east from Vryheid. Smith

Dorrien's cordon on the north. March 27- . 179, 182

CHAPTEB VII THE MIDDELBURG CONFERENCE

(February-March 1901)

The overtures to Botha, Feb. 13. The meeting at Middel- burg, Feb. 28. The draft terms of settlement. Amendments made by the Home Government. Botha

breaks off the negotiations, March 16 . . . . 183-193

CHAPTER VIII

THE NORTHERN ADVANCE AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VILJ0EN

(March-)

I. The lull in mid-March. Reasons for the advance to Pietersburg and for the operations in the North Eastern Transvaal. The Transvaal Government.

B«n Viljoen. Kitchener's strategical scheme . . 194-201 Plumer's advance to Pietersburg .... 201-204

II. Plumer blocks the drifts on the Olifant's . . . 204

Character, strength and objects of Blood's force . 204-208 Blood's operations, -19. Action of Palmiet- fontein. Viljoen's difficulties. His escape across the Olifant's, -24. Clearing operations, -May 5. Results 208-210 CONTENTS XX]

CHAPTER IX

CLOSE OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN

Western Transvaal, Free State, Cape Colony

(February-May 1901) PAGE I. Western Transvaal. — The situation in February. Operations against Smuts and Kemp. Action of Hartebeestfontein, Feb. 18. Attack on Lichtenburg,

March 2-3. Actions of Geduld, March 22 ; Wildfon-

tein, March 24 ; Goedvooruitzicht, ; and Platberg, 217-229

Combined movement against De la Rey, May 3-11 . 230-233 II. Orange Free State.—Operations at the close of the de Wet hunt, March 234 De Wet's district re-organisation. Kitchener's four-

fold division of districts, end of March . . . 234-237 Operations of Elliot, Knox, Bruce Hamilton and Bundle, April-May 237-241 III. Cape Colony.—Kitchener's policy. The unequal con-

ditions. Sporadic operations in March and April . 241-245

CHAPTER X

KITCHENER AND THE GUERILLA WAR

(May 1901)

The situation in May 1901. The new mounted army. Horses. Total strength of the army. Use made of Boers and natives ...... 246-251 Boer strength. Depopulation. Concentration camps. De- vastation. Condition of the commandos in regard to

food, clothes, rifles, guns and ammunition . . . 251-256

Blockhouses on the railways ; initial and secondary objects. The cordon of Constabulary posts .... 256-262 The current of events—the double objective, the drive,

centralisation ; greed for aggressive impulse. Causes of the current—national temperament, composition of the

army, deficient mobility and intelligence . . . 262-269 Kitchener's personal bent. Merits and defects of his military policy. The column-commanders. The Head- quarters Staff. Kitchener's isolation. The main trend of military development ...... 270-276 Hopeful feeling in May 1901. Proposed reduction of force. The eve of winter. Boer depression. The Transvaal VOL. V c .

XX 11 CONTENTS

hints at submission, May 10. Indignation of Steyn. A joint council of war is planned. Situation at the beginning of winter ...... 276-278

CHAPTER XI

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN OF 1901 (May-September)

I. Western Transvaal. Action of Vlakfontein, May 28 279-285 II. De la Rey's journey to the Free State. Operations in the Free State, May and June. Action of Graspan, June 6. De la Rey and the Free State leaders enter the Eastern Transvaal ...... 285-290 III. Operations in the Eastern Transvaal, May. Action of Mooifontein, May 25. Action of Wimiansrust, June 12. The Boer Governments meet, June 20. Result of the council of war. Boer plans 290-298 IV. Viljoen's return to the north-east. His adventures, June 21-July 11 298-300 V. Raid on the_Free State Government, July 11 300-302 VI. The ride of Smuts from the Western Transvaal to the Cape Colony border. He finds himself entangled in the great Free State drive ..... 302-309 VII. The winter campaign in Cape Colony. Kritzinger's fresh invasion. French placed in command. Ac-

tions of Jackalsfontein, July 21 ; Zuurvlaakte, July 14. The first drive in the Colony, July 18-24. The second drive, July 29-Aug. 15. Kritzinger joins Smuts at Zastron...... 309-317 VIII. Smuts invades Cape Colony, Sept. 3. Capture of Lotter, Sept. 4. The Colony once more aflame, mid- September ...... 318-320 IX. The Proclamation of August 7. Its effect. Special mobile columns. Raids. Operations in the Free State, Aug.-Sept...... 321-324 Initiation of the cross-country blockhouse system. The protected area in the Transvaal 324-326 The Western Transvaal, July-Sept. Action of

Marico River, Sept. 5 . 326, 327 The Eastern, North-Eastern and far Northern Trans- vaal, Aug.-Sept...... 327-330 Benson's night raids, Aug.-Sept. Ominous situation in the Eastern Transvaal. Failure of the proclama- tion. Relative progress on Boer and British side. The prospect at the end of winter .... 330-332 CONTENTS XX111

CHAPTER XII

botha's attempt to invade natal

(September-) PAGE

I. The Boer spring revival, Sept. 1901. Boer plans . 333, 334 II. Botha's march upon Natal, Sept. 7-17. Action of Blood River Poort, Sept. 17 334-341 III. Botha's further advance. Actions of Itala and Pro- spect. Sept. 17-29 341-349 IV. Botha's retreat, Sept. 29-Oct. 2. He is surrounded at Boschhoek, Oct. 2-5. But escapes and makes good his retreat, Oct. 5-12. Subsequent British - tions, October 349-35?

CHAPTER XIII

BAKENLAAGTE, MOEDWIL, AND OTHER INCIDENTS OF THE BOER SPRING REVIVAL

(September-October 1901)

I. Botha's return to the high veld of the Eastern Trans- vaal, Oct. 8. Benson's raids and subsequent move- ments, Sept. 10-Oct. 20. The raid on Botha at Schimmelhoek, Oct. 25. Benson in the Bethal

district. Action of Bakenlaagte, Oct. 30 . . . 360-376 II. The Western Transvaal in September. Action of Moedwil, Sept. 30. Action of Kleinfontein, Oct. 24. 376-385 III. The Free State in September. Actions of Slangfontein and Quaggafontein, Sept. 19-20. Cape Colony in September. Action of Modderfontein, Sept. 17. Combat of Visserkraal, Sept. 16 ... 385-390 IV. Attrition in September and October. Summary of the actions of the spring revival. Tactical value of artillery. The R.A.M.R 390-392

V. Miscellaneous operations in September and October . 392-395

CHAPTER XIV THE BLOCKHOUSE SYSTEM

I.- Its previous history recapitulated. Details of construc- tion. Further history of construction, Sept. 1901- . The Cuban parallel. Kitchener's use of the blockhouse system 396-403 .

XXIV CONTENTS

II. Civil and administrative reconstruction in the last year of the war. Deportation of families stopped, Dec. 1901. Reinforcements to the army in the last year of the war. The National Scouts. The appointment of Sir Ian Hamilton as Chief of the Staff, Dec. 1901 404-412

CHAPTER XV DB WET'S LAST CAMPAIGN

( -)

I. The situation in November 1901. The three centres of resistance ...... 413, 414 II. Operations in the North-Eastern Free State. The great Paardehoek drive, Nov. 6-12. De Wot concen- trates, end of November. The Council of War, Nov. 28. Rimington's march against de Wet,

Nov. 27-29. Another drive, Dec. 8-12 . . . 414-423 III. Action of Tafel Kop, Dec. 20 423-427

IV. Action of Tigerkloof Spruit, Dec. 18 . . . . 427-431 V. Action of Tweefontein, Dec. 25. Action of Armstrong Drift, Dec. 28. De Wet disperses his force, Jan. 1. The end of an era 431-446

CHAPTER XVI

NIGHT RAIDS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL

(November 1901-)

I. The British forces in the Eastern Transvaal, Nov. 1901. Bruce Hamilton's eastward sweeping movement, Nov. 16 -Dec. 3. Adventures of the Transvaal Government. Botha breaks back .... 447-451 The night-raid system described. The first of Bruce Hamilton's raids, Dec. 4. Further raids, Dec. 10- Jan. 4. Operations of Plumer and other leaders. Action of Holland, Dec. 19. Action of Bankkop, Jan. 4, 1902. Further night raids, January 1902. Botha deserts the high veld ..... 451-460 II. Piet Viljoen invades the "protected" area, Jan. 24, 1902. Operations in the protected area, Dec. 1901-

Feb. 1902. Action of Klippan, Feb. 18 . . 460-462 Ben Viljoen and Muller in the north-east. The settle- ment at Pilgrim's Rest. The capture of Ben Viljoen, Jan. 25, 1902. The pursuit of the Transvaal Govern- ment, Feb.-March 462 !<"-'• CONTENTS XXV

CHAPTER XVII THE NEW MODEL DRIVE

(North-Eastern Free State, January-March 1902) PAGB

I. Origin and character of the new driving system . 467-473 II. Preparations for the first drive. Commands re- organised, January. Action of Roodekraal, Feb. 3. The first drive, Feb. 5-8. De Wet's escape, Feb. 7-8. The final night ...... 473-481 III. The second drive. First phase, Feb. 13-16. Second phase, Feb. 16-27. The Boers within the trap. De Wet breaks out, action of Langverwacht, Feb. 23. Capture of Harrismith commando, Feb. 27 481-491 IV. Preparations for the third drive. Flight of Steyn and de Wet, March 5-17. They meet De la Rey,

March 17. The third drive, March 4-11 . 491-494

CHAPTER XVIII

YZER SPRUIT AND TWEEBOSCH

(Western Transvaal, February-March 1902)

Review of operations in the Western Transvaal, Oct. 1901- Feb. 1902 495-497

Action of Yzer Spruit, Feb. 25 . 497-501

Methuen's defeat at Tweebosch, March 7 . 501-509

CHAPTER XIX

THE FINAL STRUGGLE WITH DE LA REY

(Western Transvaal, March-April 1902)

I. The first steps toward peace. The Dutch offer of

mediation, Jan. 25 ; refused, Jan. 29. The official correspondence sent to the Transvaal Government, March 7. The Government enters the British lines, March 22 509-512 II. Troops massed in the Western Transvaal. The one- day drive, March 23-24 512-517 The problem of field-control. The columns advance

en echelon. Action of Boschbult, March 31 . 517-525 Sir Ian Hamilton takes command .... 525, 526 III. Meeting at Klerksdorp of the two Boer Governments. They decide to negotiate, and travel to Pretoria, April 9-11 526,527 IV. Action of Roodewal, . 527-537 xxvi CONTENTS

CHAPTER XX

THE GENERAL SITUATION IN APRIL 1902 PAOB I. The campaign in Cape Colony, Nov. 1901-May 1902. Capture of Kritzinger, Dec. 16. Disaster to a convoy, Jan. 30-Feb. 5. Smuts in the West, March-May.

Siege of Ookiep, April 4-May 3. Summary . . 538-554 II. The campaign in the Free State, March-April 1902. The fourth drive in the North-East, March 20-April 5. Other operations. Summary ..... 554-557 III. The campaign in the Transvaal, March-April 1902. Action of Boschman's Kop, April 1. The last drives in the East, -20. General military situation in South Africa 557-563

CHAPTER XXI

PEACE

(April 12-May 31, 1902)

I. The first phase of the negotiations for peace, April 12-18 564-567 II. Significance of the first phase ..... 567-577 III. Peace and war. The last drives in the Free State and

Transvaal, April 12-May 11. The armistice . . 577-582

IV. The Vereeniging Conference, May 15-17 . . . 582-590 V. Second phase of the peace negotiations at Pretoria, May 19-28. The final terms 590-600

VI. Last scenes at Vereeniging, May 30-31. Peace . . 600-606

APPENDICES ..,,.«.. 607-614 .

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Rembrandt Photogravure Plates

To face jpage Major-General Sir C. E. Knox 14 General C. F. Beyers 98

General Kritzinger ; General J. B. M. Hertzog . 130

Brigadier-General H. C. 0. Plumer . . . . 200

Major-General Bruce Hamilton ; Major-General Walter Kitchener ...... 286 General J. C. Smuts 302

Lieut.-Colonel A. Woolls-Sampson ; Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Benson ...... 364 Major-General E. Locke Elliot; Lieut.-Colonel Sir H. S.

Rawlinson ; Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. J. H. G. Byng ; Lieut.-Colonel M. F. Eimington 474 General J. H. De la Rey ...... 496

LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS To face page

Frederikstad To accompany Chaphap. I. . 12

Bothaville . . . „ I. . 20

Dewetsdorp I. 32 ,

Springhaan's Nek ,, I. 40 The Second de Wet Hunt » I- 42 Nooitgedacht „ IV. 106

Vryheid .. IV. 118

Helvetia and Belfast. „ IV. 126 The Third or Great de Wet Hunt „ v. 156 j

XXV1U LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

To face page French in the Eastern) Transvaal, Lak To accompany Chap. VI. 182 J Chrissie Plumer and Blood in THE North-Eastern Trans VIII. 216 VAAL

LlCHTENBURG IX. . . 222

Vlakfontein XI. . . 284

Itala and Prospect XII. . 350 Botha's Attempt to Invad XII. . 858 Natal .

Bakenlaagte XIII. . :J74

MoEDWIL XIII. . 382

The Blockhouse System XIV. . 412

TWEEFONTEIN AND GROEN IvOP XV. . 442

De Wet's Last Campaign XV. . 446 Summer Campaign in the

Eastern and North XVI. . 464 Eastern Transvaal

Langverwacht XVII. . 490 Drives in the North-Eastern XVII. . 494 Free State

Boschbult . XIX. . 524

Roodewal XIX. . 536 The Western Transvaal. For reference through-

out the volume, with special applicability to \ End of Chap. XX.

Chaps. XIX. and XX j Wanderings op the Transvaal Government,) Sept. 1900 -March 1902. For reference End of Chap. XX. J throughout the volume )

General Map of the Transvaal. For j In pocket at the beginning reference throughout the volume j of the volume. General Map of Cape Colony. For reference throughout the volume In pocket at the end of the General Map of the Orange Free volume. State. For reference throughout the volume ....

A GENERAL MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA

IS ENCLOSED IN THE COVER OF VOLUME I., OR CAN BE PURCHASED SEPARATELY. PRICE 2.9. 6d.

The Medallion on this Volume in from the " King' a Medal" given to the troops who took part in the South African campaign 1901- 1902.