*T Zfyt Vtmrf f^ttftorg of The War in South Africa 1899-1902 General Editor: L. S. Ameiy FeUow of All Souls Vol. V Edited by Erskine Childers Author of 'The Riddle of the Sands,' 'In the Ranks of the C.I.V. rrt With Maps, Plans, and Photogravure Portraits f3> LONDON Sampson Low, Marston and Company, Ltd. 17A, paternoster row, e.c. 1907 : 330 R5H LONDON PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, DUKE STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E., AND GREAT WINDMILL STREET, W. GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE The military aim which the British people and the British Army had set before themselves at the outbreak of the war had been achieved, and more than achieved, by the close of the first year. In his great marches, from Moclder Eiver Camp to the Portuguese frontier, Lord Eoberts had swept away the stubborn resistance of the Boer armies, had triumphantly occupied all the chief towns of the two Eepublics, and had securely established himself upon the great arteries of communication. After Komati Poort there was no longer a single compact, centrally organised and centrally equipped Boer force in the field ; the Boer artillery had almost disappeared; on every side the burghers were coming in to assure the conquerors that the surrender of those who were still in arms was but a matter of a few days or at the outside weeks. Few, indeed, there were who recognised that the British aim had been set too low, or understood the magnitude and character of the task that still lay between Lord Kitchener and the realisation of the national purpose expressed in the formal annexation of the Piepublics. Yet there were abundant precedents to furnish a warning. The defeat of the Sepoy mutiny, the annexation of Burma, the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had each had their aftermath of costly and exhausting guerilla warfare. In the last instance the activities of a few deter- mined bands had occupied 200,000 men for two years. Why, vol. v b ; vi GENERAL EDITORS PREFACE if any considerable proportion of the Boers were minded to resist, should the effective occupation of the Eepublics call for a lesser effort? The area to be occupied was many times vaster and admirably suited to guerilla tactics. Here were no unorganised, ill -armed subjects of an Oriental despotism, but a free white people, the most obstinate, perhaps, of all the white races, well mounted, equipped with the best modern weapons, and still entirely unconvinced of any tactical inferiority to the invaders. Apart from the comparatively bloodless surrenders of Cronje and Prinsloo, they had suffered no really crushing defeats, they had never been subjected to punishing pursuit. The towns from which they had been driven had never been centres of their national life. What reason, after all, was there for supposing that their stubborn spirit had so lightly been schooled to submission ? That the British arms were bound ultimately to prevail was, indeed, reasonably certain, provided always that the resolution of the British people remained constant. Knowing its own mind clearly for once, the British nation assumed that its settled purpose was no less clearly realised by others, and saw only aimless and mischievous folly in the continued resistance to the formal expression of that purpose. But was it such folly to doubt British resolution ? Twenty years earlier that resolution had been proclaimed in terms no less definite ; then, too, all the towns had been in British hands then, too, the British arms would undoubtedly have pre- vailed if the resolve behind them had not been shaken by the obstinacy of the Boer resistance. Many, indeed, of the Boers realised at a comparatively early period that the British temper had changed entirely since 1881. Of these, some who had surrendered or were made prisoners at the critical period immediately following the occupation of Pretoria, when it was almost a matter of chance who sur- rendered or who kept the field, were so impressed by their closer contact with the British that they came to share the British view as to the mischievous futility of continued resistance, and ultimately, finding all their efforts at per- suasion unavailing, even took the field with the British against their old comrades in arms. Others, like Louis GENERAL EDITORS PREFACE vii Botha nimself, saw that surrender was inevitable, and were anxious to come to terms with the British, but held that honour and interest alike pledged them to continue the war as long as their colleagues were resolved to do so, consoling themselves with the hope that they might at any rate improve the terms which would eventually be granted. Meanwhile the decision rested with those who, with President Steyn, were determined to take nothing for granted, but to fight on while there was still a burgher fit to fight, and to trust in the fortune that so often favours desperate resolution. The event failed to confirm their hopes. Innumerable minor successes could not stay the relentless progress of Kitchener's organisation of conquest; the weary and ruinous prolongation of the war left the British resolve unaffected. When the Boer leaders finally surrendered the terms of peace included not a single con- cession which the British Government would not have been prepared to grant after the fall of Pretoria, nearly two years earlier, or would not have granted if the war had continued to the capture of the last burgher. Are we, then, to say that the prolongation of the war by the Boer leaders was a mere miscalculation, involving a futile destruction of life and property, alike for their own people and for their conquerors ? That, indeed, is the only possible conclusion for those whose conception of war is based on the crude economic materialism which regards it as a mere waste of the general store of commodities, or on the sentimental individualism which shrinks with horror from the suffering and bloodshed which are its immediate con- comitants. But for those who believe that character and will determine the destinies of nations, material as well as moral, who are prepared to maintain that the wasteful struggle of war may even, in the event, increase the material prosperity of both combatants, who realise that the loss of individual life is but a small thing when set in the scale against national welfare, the conclusion may well be different. The decision of the Boer leaders to prolong the war was an assertion of individual and national character over mere calculating reason. In the long, heroic struggle that followed Vlll GENERAL EDITORS PREFACE that character was strengthened, purified and chastened. The corruption, the insolent arrogance, the insatiate ambition which had grown up under the Kruger regime were sloughed off. The Boers, surrendering when they did and as they did, were a greater asset to the British Empire than they would have been if they had surrendered two years earlier. They had gained, not only in self-respect, but also in respect for British purpose and British power, in respect, too, for the principle of racial equality which the war was fought to assert and which it has asserted. Whatever mistakes may have been committed since, the foundations of racial harmony, based on mutual respect, of progress and development to- wards a prosperous and united South Africa, the equal of her sister nations in the Empire, were laid by the war, and laid the more securely because the struggle was so long and so keenly sustained. And not only South Africa but England, too, has much that can be reckoned to the credit of the long duration of the struggle. The South African War was the first serious trial of the national spirit since England had become a democracy. The nation had stood that trial well during the critical and exciting phase of the struggle. Would it stand equally well the trial of patience and resolution involved in the tedious and costly sequel ? The event proved that it could : from the first day of war to the last British soldiers and statesmen, each in their sphere, were able to act with the strength and certainty that come from the unquestioning support of a united people. The gain to the moral fibre of the nation from that exercise of patience and will-power has not been lost ; the changes that have since taken place on the surface of politics imply no deep-going or permanent reaction on Imperial issues. Yet for England, as a whole, it may be doubted whether the long conflict had as great an influence on the moral as on the intellectual side. The war was a tremendous intellectual ferment. It shook the national self- complacency. It has made us look with new eyes upon all our existing institutions, upon all our most precious idols, upon all the unchallenged assumptions that stifled and over- lay our national life. The political development of the next GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE IX generation will be the embodiment of the intellectual awakening which it called forth. As a military operation the new war, for such it really was, will always be of compelling interest. It was no ordinary guerilla campaign carried on by roving bands led by irresponsible persons, devoid of a definite political purpose. It was a guerilla campaign in excelsis, deliberately entered upon by the national authorities, and deliberately adapted to the existing military organisation of the Eepublics. Throughout its continuance the political and military control of the Boer forces, and the organisation of those forces, remained intact. When the end came, the Boers, however reduced in numbers, still surrendered as two nations organised on a military footing.