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To Begin a Conversation on Judicial Independence Patience Drake Roggensack

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To Begin a Conversation on Judicial Independence Patience Drake Roggensack Marquette Law Review Volume 91 Article 5 Issue 2 Winter 2007 To Begin a Conversation on Judicial Independence Patience Drake Roggensack Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Patience Drake Roggensack, To Begin a Conversation on Judicial Independence, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 535 (2007). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol91/iss2/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TO BEGIN A CONVERSATION ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE* THE HONORABLE PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK** When I was in private practice and won a case, I had little concern with anything other than the bottom line of the decision. I always thought the judge or justices were brilliant in those cases. Of course when I lost, my view of the scholarship of the members of the court was not so enthusiastic. I did not study trends of the court's decision making unless I was writing a brief and exploring the edges of a given legal issue. I imagine that many practicing lawyers are much the same now as I was then. However, today I am asking you to look beyond the bottom line of court decisions so that we may begin a conversation on judicial independence. It is an important consideration to all citizens of Wisconsin, but it is particularly important to those of us who work in the judicial branch, on both sides of the bench. Judicial independence is a highly prized quality, at least according to the judiciary. The public also values judicial independence, but often as a more abstract principle. It has been said that most of the respect the public accords to judicial decisions emanates from public perception that a court's decision is an independent determination of what the rule of law requires. Judicial accountability is also a quality that is widely valued, but it is most often addressed by those outside of judicial circles. There is a natural tension between judicial independence and judicial accountability. I shall attempt a limited exploration of both concepts as we begin what I hope will be an ongoing conversation. I. HISTORIC PERCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE Judicial independence is a concept that has been around for a long time. In discussing the principles of our tripartite system of government, the founding fathers focused on the need for judicial independence. It was critical to their structuring of the federal government and the * This speech was presented to the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, Milwaukee Chapter, on January 25, 2007. ** Patience Drake Roggensack is a justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [91:535 establishment of the United States Constitution. During the debates preceding the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the judicial branch of government was seen as a bulwark against "encroachments and oppressions of the representative body [Congress]" and as "the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws."' The judiciary was often referred to as the "least dangerous" branch because it had neither the purse of the legislative branch nor the sword of the executive branch.2 Those involved with the debate and creation of the Federal Constitution were very concerned that an independent judiciary be part of the structure of the federal government. The separation of powers of the three branches of government was thought to be central to the preservation of liberty for the people. As Alexander Hamilton explained, "'there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.' . [L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments .... ,,3 The founding fathers' concept of an independent judiciary also expected that the judges would not "substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature."4 Rather, the courts were expected to interpret the law and not to "exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT." 5 The independent quality of the judiciary and the trust in the courts to exercise "judgment" about what the rule of law requires and not the "will" of those who serve in the courts remain foundational principles of judicial independence. The historic acceptance of Marbury v. Madison,6 where the United States Supreme Court established its constitutional right to set aside laws that it concluded were unconstitutional, is grounded in part in the public's trust in an independent judiciary. For many, myself among them, a judge's decision counts because he or she is trusted to operate with restraint in interpreting constitutions and statutes, while employing process that is even-handedly applied to all who come before the courts. 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 2. Id. 3. Id. at 491. 4. Id. at 493. 5. Id. 6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 2007] CONVERSATION ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 537 II. DEFINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE TODAY Much of the debate on judicial independence is confused by how various discussants define the term "judicial independence."7 However, most agree that as a general concept, judicial independence has two components: institutional independence and decisional independence.8 When discussing institutional independence, the focus of the discussion is the judiciary's ability to stand up to other branches of government.9 Institutional independence is sometimes referred to as "external" independence." When discussing the decisional component of judicial independence, the focus is on the individual decision making of each judge or of each collegial court." The ability of each judge or court to make independent legal determinations also may be referred to as "internal" judicial independence.1 2 Both broad concepts are significant to the legitimacy of the judicial branch of government, and both concepts of judicial independence are applicable to state as well as federal courts. The component of institutional independence is essential to our tripartite system of government. It requires the courts' independence from the legislative and executive branches. Institutional independence is most often associated with the separation of powers doctrine, though in reality both decisional and institutional independence have separation of powers qualities. Institutional independence cannot be accorded the judicial branch without the respect of the executive and legislative branches for judicial decisions. At least one writer has noted, "[A]n independent judiciary requires also that [its] decisions, once given, would not be altered or ignored by the government [responsible for enforcing them]."'3 However, as part of the system of checks and balances created in our tripartite system of government, there are occasions when it may be appropriate for the legislature to regulate a matter in an area of 7. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 317 (1999). 8. A.B.A. COMM'N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS & JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 11-12 (1997). 9. Id. at 12. 10. Id. at 11-12. 11. Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 351-52 (1993). 12. Id. at 351. 13. Id. at 352. MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [91:535 constitutionally shared powers or to overrule the courts in an area of exclusive legislative authority. For example, the legislature may enact a statute that affects the functioning of the courts as an institution, as it did with the statute reviewed in State v. Holmes.14 In Holmes, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed whether Wisconsin Statutes section 971.20, which established the peremptory right of substitution of judges, was constitutionally permissible."5 Or, the legislature may enact a statute that effectively overrules prior Supreme Court statutory interpretation, as it did in regard to the court's interpretation of conditions relating to recreational immunity. 16 The component of decisional independence is adherence to the rule of law in individual cases, such that decisions of a court or an individual judge are not affected by the demands of another branch of government or by other personal pressures exerted upon judges. 7 Decisional independence requires impartial decision making, where the rule of law is applied even-handedly and the court does not respond to external pressures such as court funding, special interest groups, political agendas, the press, campaign contributors, or an upcoming election or hoped-for appointment. 8 In recent years, there have been overt attempts to politicize the judiciary through questioning in the federal appointment process and through questioning in state judicial elections. The questioning has become so detailed in the federal process that at times it appears that the power of the executive to appoint a justice or judge and the Senate's power to consent to appointments have become the power-in-fact to decide significant constitutional issues. In my view, the executive and legislative attempts to decide constitutional issues through the appointment process are inconsistent with judicial independence, which requires both independent decisions and the appearance that the decisions have been independently made. However, it is when one begins to examine judicial accountability that one recognizes some actions of the courts may not have been judicially independent. For example, when a court disregards long- 14. 106 Wis. 2d 31,41-47, 315 N.W.2d 703,708-11 (1982). 15. Id. at 41, 315 N.W.2d at 708.
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