20180810134844495 17-1584 Brief in Opposition.Pdf
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
No. 17-1584 In the Supreme Court of the United States DANIEL J. H. BARTELT, PETITIONER, v. WISCONSIN ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN BRIEF IN OPPOSITION BRAD D. SCHIMEL MISHA TSEYTLIN Attorney General Solicitor General Counsel of Record State of Wisconsin Department of Justice AMY C. MILLER 17 West Main Street Assistant Solicitor Madison, WI 53703 General [email protected] (608) 267-9323 Attorneys for the State of Wisconsin QUESTION PRESENTED Whether a suspect automatically places himself into “custody” under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), by confessing. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i INTRODUCTION .......................................................1 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............................................................3 STATEMENT ..............................................................3 REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION.......... 11 I. The Vast Majority Of Courts To Have Addressed The Question Presented Agree With The Wisconsin Supreme Court That A Suspect Does Not Automatically Place Himself Into Custody By Confessing ............. 11 II. The Wisconsin Supreme Court Correctly Determined That Petitioner Did Not Place Himself Into Custody By Confessing ............. 17 III. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For Addressing The Question Presented ................................. 24 CONCLUSION ..........................................................26 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) ............................................. 18 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) ...................................... passim Connecticut v. Edwards, 11 A.3d 116 (Conn. 2011) ................................... 12 Connecticut v. Lapointe, 678 A.2d 942 (Conn. 1996) ........................... 11, 12 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) ....................................... 18, 25 Dowthitt v. Texas, 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1996) ....... 17 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) ...................................... i, 1, 18 Graham v. United States, 950 A.2d 717 (D.C. 2008) .................................... 12 Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012) ............................19, 20, 22, 23 Jackson v. Georgia, 528 S.E.2d 232 (Ga. 2000) .................................. 16 iv Kansas v. Vandervort, 72 P.3d 925 (Kan. 2003) ............................... 12, 13 Kolb v. Wyoming, 930 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1996) ................................. 16 Locke v. Cattell, 476 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2007) ................................. 16 Louisiana v. Redic, 392 So. 2d 451 (La. 1980) ................................... 13 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ............................................. 3, 17 Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010) ......................................... 20, 23 Massachusetts v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383 (Mass. 2005) .................. 13, 14, 16 Massachusetts v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. 1997) .............................. 16 Minnesota v. Champion, 533 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 1995) .............................. 14 Minnesota v. Heden, 719 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 2006)............................. 14 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) ............................18, 19, 20, 23 v Minnesota v. Staats, 658 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 2003)............................. 14 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ...................................... passim New Hampshire v. Locke, 813 A.2d 1182 (N.H. 2002) ................................. 14 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) ............................19, 20, 21, 22 Roman v. Florida, 475 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1985) ................................ 17 Ruth v. Texas, 645 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1979) ....... 17 Thomas v. Maryland, 55 A.3d 680 (Md. 2012) ....................................... 13 United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2008) ........................... 11 Vermont v. Muntean, 12 A.3d 518 (Vt. 2010) ........................................ 15 Vermont v. Oney, 989 A.2d 995 (Vt. 2009) ................................ 14, 15 West Virginia v. Farley, 797 S.E.2d 573 (W. Va. 2017) ............................. 15 vi Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) ....................................... 19, 20 Constitutional Provisions U.S. Const. amend. V ............................................... 17 U.S. Const. amend. XIV ....................................... 3, 17 Rules Sup. Ct. R. 10 ........................................................... 16 INTRODUCTION Three days after assaulting a woman with a knife in a local park, Petitioner went to another woman’s home and strangled her to death. The next day, police had identified Petitioner as a person of interest in the knife attack and asked Petitioner to speak with them at the police station. Petitioner agreed and met two detectives to participate in a concededly non-custodial interview. During the course of the interview, Petitioner made admissions implicating himself in the knife attack and eventually admitted to having been the attacker. Petitioner then made two brief comments about whether he should speak to a lawyer. Shortly thereafter, the detectives arrested Petitioner for the knife attack. The next day, two different detectives interviewed Petitioner about the murder. After waiving his Miranda rights, Petitioner told the detectives that he had been in another park on the day of the strangulation-murder. One of the detectives then went to that park, where he found evidence linking Petitioner to the murder. Petitioner argued to the Wisconsin courts that, although he went to the police station willingly and was not in custody when he made his initial admissions, by admitting to the knife attack he placed himself into “custody” under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (Miranda-Edwards), and therefore the evidence that the police obtained based upon the statements he made after his confession was 2 inadmissible. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s argument, explaining that only law enforcement can place a suspect into custody. Because the detectives took no action to place Petitioner in custody at the relevant time, Petitioner was not entitled to the protections of Miranda- Edwards. Petitioner argues that this Court should grant the Petition to settle a division of authority over whether a suspect who confesses places himself into custody, but the overwhelming majority of state courts of last resort and the only federal Court of Appeals to have opined on the issue agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that law enforcement must take action in response to a confession to create custody. Indeed, only two courts of last resort—in outlier decisions from 18 and 22 years ago—have taken Petitioner’s approach. And this overwhelming majority of jurisdictions is correct because, under this Court’s caselaw, only law enforcement can place an individual into custody. In any event, this case is a poor vehicle because resolving the Question Presented will not entitle Petitioner to any relief and will simply cause the victims and their families here to suffer unnecessary harm. This Court should deny the Petition. 3 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, reproduced in the Petition, Pet. 1, applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: [a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. STATEMENT A. Petitioner attacked a woman in a park while wielding a knife. App. 2a–3a, 10a. The woman, M.R., was walking her dog in Richfield Historical Park when Petitioner attacked her. App. 2a, 10a. Petitioner tackled her to the ground, but M.R. wrestled the knife away from Petitioner, receiving “several knife wounds” in the process. App. 2a, 10a. 4 After M.R. disarmed him, Petitioner fled. App. 2a, 10a. Three days later, Petitioner strangled Jessie Blodgett to death in her home. App. 2a–3a, 10a. Petitioner tied Ms. Blodgett’s wrists and ankles and strangled her with a rope. App. 9a–10a. With M.R.’s help, police identified Petitioner as a person of interest in the knife attack in the park. M.R. provided police with, among other things, Petitioner’s physical description and a description of the vehicle he was driving. App. 41a. A police officer recognized the vehicle as having been in the same park before, and the officer had previously run a report on its license plate. App. 3a. The report indicated that the vehicle was registered to Petitioner’s parents, and, using information from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, police discovered that their son, Petitioner, matched M.R.’s description of her attacker. App. 3a. Police then interviewed Petitioner in a concededly non-custodial environment. Petitioner agreed to meet with detectives at the Slinger Police Department to discuss “an incident.” App. 3a. The Slinger Police Department is located in