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Jahresbericht 1999 Annual Report 1999 IMPRESSUM Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH Jahresbericht 1999 Annual Report 1999 IMPRESSUM Herausgeber / Published by: Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH Abt. Kommunikation Ltg.: Dr. Heinz-Peter Butz Redaktion / Technical Editors: Dr. Heinz-Peter Butz, Ilka Monheimius, Gabriele Berberich (Köln) Satz / Layout: Gabriele Berberich (Köln), Regina Knoll Übersetzung / Translation: Frank Janowski-Hansen M.A., Erika Schild, Klaudia Böhlefeld (Alt-Mölln) Druck / Printed by: Moeker Merkur Druck GmbH (Köln) Nachdruck, auch auszugsweise, nur mit Genehmigung der Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 50667 Köln Reproduction in whole or in part only with prior permission of Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 50667 Köln Internet: www.grs.de Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH Jahresbericht 1999 Annual Report 1999 Inhalt Contents Einführung 4 1 Introduction 4 Organisation 10 2 Organisation 10 Analysen und Bewertungen zur Reaktorsicherheit 14 3 Analyses and Assessments of Reactor Safety 21 3.1 Betriebserfahrung mit sicherheitstechnisch wichtigen Wärmetauschern und Kühlern in deutschen Druckwasserreaktoren 29 Operating Experience with Safety-relevant Heat Exchangers and Coolers in German Pressurised Water Reactors 31 3.2 Validierung einer Störfallprozedur für ein kleines Leck im WWER-1000 mit ATHLET 33 Validation of an SBLOCA Procedure of WWER-1000 with ATHLET 33 3.3 Simulation thermo-hydraulischer Belastungen und struktur-mechanischer Beanspruchungen von Reaktordruckbehältern 37 3.3 Simulation of Thermal-hydraulic and Structure-mechanical Loads on Reactor Pressure Vessels 42 Forschung und Entwicklung für eine fundierte Sicherheitsbewertung von Kernkraftwerken 44 4 Research and Development for a Sound Safety Assessment of Nuclear Power Plants 50 4.1 Berechnungen zum OECD PWR Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Benchmark mit dem gekoppelten Codesystem ATHLET–QUABOX/CUBBOX 55 Calculations on the OECD PWR Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Benchmark with the Coupled Code System ATHLET–QUABOX/CUBBOX 57 4.2 Analysesimulator für den WWER-1000 59 Analysis Simulator for the VVER-1000 63 Brennstoffkreislauf, Strahlen- und Umweltschutz 66 5 Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Radiological and Environmental Protection 72 5.1 Sanierung im Uranbergbau 78 Redevelopment in Uranium Mining 80 5.2 Deutsch-Französische Initiative für Tschernobyl 83 Franco-German Initiative for Chernobyl 85 Endlagersysteme aus geochemischer Sicht 88 6 Repository Systems from a Geochemical Perspective 91 6.1 Modellierung von Zwei-Phasen-Strömungen in Granit 95 Modelling of Two-phase Flows in Granite 97 6.2 Geoelektrische Überwachung von Tonstein-Formationen 99 Geoelectrical Monitoring of Clay Stone Formations 100 6.3 Entsorgung abgebrannter Brennelemente in Granit – Erkenntnisse aus dem europäischen Projekt SPA 103 Lessons Learned from the European Project SPA – Performance Assessment for Spent Fuel Disposal in Granite 105 Internationale Zusammenarbeit 108 7 International Co-operation 109 7.1 Das slowakische Kernkraftwerk Mochovce im Licht westlicher Sicherheitsanforderungen 111 The Slovak Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant in the Light of Western Safety Requirements 113 Forschungsbetreuung 115 8 Research Management 117 Geschäftsstelle SFK/TAA 120 9 SFK/TAA General Secretariat 121 RISKAUDIT IPSN/GRS International (EWIV) 124 10 RISKAUDIT IPSN/GRS International (EEIG) 127 Institut für Sicherheitstechnologie (ISTec) GmbH 132 11 Institute for Safety Technology (ISTec) GmbH 137 11.1 Nachrüstung osteuropäischer Kernkraftwerke mit digitaler Sicherheitsleittechnik 142 Upgrading East-European Nuclear Power Plants with Digital Safety Instrumentation and Control Systems 144 11.2 Auswirkungen zweiphasiger Strömungsvorgänge auf die Auslegung eines salinaren Endlagers 148 Effects of Two-Phase Flow Processes on the Design of a Repository in Salt 150 1 Kommunikation 153 2 Communication 157 Anhang / Annex Veröffentlichungen und Vorträge Publications and Lectures 162 Kooperationsverträge der GRS mit ausländischen Organisationen Co-operation Agreements between GRS and Foreign Organisations 167 Einführung 1Introduction Mit der Umorientierung der deutschen Hauptaufgaben der GRS bleiben Sicher- Kernenergiepolitik hat das vergangene heitsanalysen und -bewertungen auf den Jahr neue Herausforderungen für die GRS Gebieten Reaktorsicherheit, Brennstoff- gebracht. Dabei bleibt unser technisch- versorgung, Brennstoffentsorgung und wissenschaftliches Engagement für die Endlagerung sowie die Reaktorsicher- Sicherheit kerntechnischer Anlagen auch heits- und die Endlagersicherheitsfor- beim schrittweisen Kernenergieausstieg schung. Wir wollen jedoch das Tätigkeits- eine wesentliche Aufgabe. Die Bedingun- spektrum in den kommenden Jahren ge- gen der Kernenergienutzung in der Bun- zielt erweitern, indem wir unser Know- desrepublik Deutschland haben sich how zunehmend auch für die Sicherheit grundsätzlich geändert, naturgemäß in anderer technischer Systeme mit beson- einer Reihe von Bereichen neue Akzente deren Risiken für Mensch und Umwelt gesetzt und Verschiebungen von Prioritä- nutzen. ten und Perspektiven bewirkt. Wesentliche Maßgabe für die Tätigkeit der GRS im Jah- Was die Analysen und Bewertungen auf re 1999 war damit, die Kontinuität in der dem Gebiet der Reaktorsicherheit betrifft, Lösung bleibender Aufgaben zu wahren so steht der sichere Betrieb der beste- und gleichzeitig die notwendige Anpas- henden Kernkraftwerke jetzt im Vorder- sung des Unternehmens einzuleiten. grund. Wichtig ist hier u. a. die Frage, wie Sicherheitsmerkmale unterschiedlicher Wir haben dies zum Anlass genommen, Anlagen nach einheitlichen Maßstäben Prof. Dr. Dr.-Ing. E.h. Adolf Birkhofer, Ausrichtung und Umfang unserer Tätig- bewertet werden können. Die GRS hat Wissenschaftlicher Geschäftsführer keit unter den neuen Bedingungen zu im vergangenen Jahr die Entwicklung Scientific Director überdenken und – in Abstimmung mit un- einer Methode zu einer solchen Bewer- seren Aufsichtsgremien – ein Konzept für tung auf der Grundlage des gestaffelten eine Neuausrichtung der GRS zu entwi- Sicherheitskonzepts abgeschlossen, ckeln. Ziel ist, die GRS in die Lage zu ver- welche weitgehend unabhängig von spe- setzen, sich an den Wandel der nuklea- zifischen technischen Ausführungen an- ren Aufgaben anzupassen, in allen we- gewandt werden kann. Die Kriterien sind sentlichen Fragestellungen der nuklea- grundsätzlich deterministisch, beinhalten ren Sicherheit aussagefähig zu bleiben aber auch probabilistische Elemente, die und trotz der extrem schwierigen Nach- das sicherheitstechnische Niveau der wuchssituation in der Kerntechnik eine Anlagen kennzeichnen. Ein weiterer wich- qualifizierte Belegschaft zu erhalten. tiger Teil unserer Tätigkeit bezog sich wie- Wichtige Elemente des Konzepts sind der auf die Verfolgung und Auswertung von Betriebserfahrungen. Beispielsweise l eine Anpassung an den mittelfristig er- hat die GRS hier – im Rahmen einer lang- warteten Rückgang der nuklearen Auf- fristig angelegten Auswertung der Erfah- gaben durch sozial verträglichen Perso- rung mit druckführenden Komponenten nalabbau über die nächsten 5 Jahre, in Druck- und Siedewasserreaktoren – eine Trend- und Ursachenanalyse von l eine Konzentration eigener Kompeten- Schäden an sicherheitstechnisch wichti- zen, gen Wärmetauschern und Kühlern durch- geführt. l Partnerschaften mit anderen leistungs- fähigen Organisationen im In- und Auf dem Gebiet der Brennstoffversorgung Ausland. und -entsorgung hat die GRS 1999 eben- Last year’s re-orientation of the German ments in the fields of reactor safety, fuel policy on nuclear power has presented supply, spent fuel management and dis- GRS with new challenges. Nevertheless, posal as well as to carry out nuclear and our scientific and technical commitment final repository safety research. Howev- concerning the safety of nuclear facilities er, we intend to broaden our spectrum of will continue to be a major task also un- activities in specific areas by applying der the circumstances of a step-wise nu- our know-how increasingly also to en- clear phase-out. The conditions of the uti- hance the safety of other technical sys- lisation of nuclear power in the Federal tems that represent special risks to man Republic of Germany have undergone and the environment. fundamental change, which has quite naturally resulted in a shift of stress in a As for the analyses and assessments in range of different areas and has also ef- the field of reactor safety, the major fo- fected a shift of priorities and perspec- cus is on the safe operation of the exist- tives. Thus the major aim of GRS in 1999 ing nuclear power plants. Here, an im- was to maintain continuity in finding solu- portant question is i. a. how the safety tions to still existing problems and at the features of different plants can be as- same time to start initiating the necessary sessed according to consistent stand- adjustments to the company. ards. In the year gone by, GRS conclud- ed the development of a methodology Dr. jur. Walter Leder, We have taken the opportunity to recon- for such an assessment on the basis of Kaufmännischer Geschäftsführer sider the orientation and scope of our the defence-in-depth concept. This meth- Managing Director activities under the new conditions and – odology can be applied largely inde- in agreement with our supervisory com- pendent of specific technical designs. mittees – to develop a concept for a new The criteria are chosen deterministically
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