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China: Background Notes Series DOC J'MENT RESUME ED 258 906 SO 016 661 AUTHOR Reams, Joanne Reppert TITLE China:qBackground Notes.Series. INSTITUTION Department of State, Washington, D.C. REPORT NO DOS-7751 PUB DATE Dec 83 NOTE 17p. AVAILABLE FROMSuperintendent of Doduments, U.S. Governmcat Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (Order No. 7751, $2.00). PUB TYPE Reports - Descriptive (141) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS *A.,:ea Studies; Asian History; *Asian Studies; Comparative Education; *Cultural Awareness; Economics; Educational Practices; Foreign Countries; Government (Administrative Body); International Relations; International Trade; Physical Geography; Resource Materials; Travel IDENTIFIERS *China; Taiwan; United States -ABSTRACT Concise background information on the People's Republic of China is provided. The publication begins with a profile of the country, outlining the people, geography, economy, and membership in international organizations. The bulk of the document then discusses in more detail China's. people, geography, history, government, education, economy, and-foreign relations; U.S.-China relations are specifically examined. Taiwan is discussed. A map of China is provided. Charts list the Chinese dynasties, the principal Chinese government and perty officials, China's top 50 trading partners, ana useful China-related addresses, e.g., Chinesc foreign trade contacts, travel contacts, and cultural exchange groups. Statistical information is prcvided concerning the economy, the 1982 commodities composition, Chinese trade by areas and selected countries, and transportation and telecommunications. The Pinyin system of romanization is discussed, and travel notes are provided. A selected bibliograptly concludes the publication. (RM) 010 *********************************************************************** Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. ***************************************************************,******* c. Ti background China a , United States Department of State December 1983 Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION EOUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER IERICI $.Thisciocument hasbeen reproduced U received from the person or organization originating it. Ll Minor changes have been made 14 improve reproduction quality. Points of view oropinionsstated in this docu. ment do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy. Geography Natural resources: Coal, Iron, petroleum, mercury, tin, tungsten, antimony, Area: 9.6 million sq. km. (3.7 million sq. mi.); manganese, molybdenum, vanadium, US is 9.3 million sq. km. Land: Agricul- magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc, uranium, tural;--11%. Forest and woodland-12.7%. world's largest hydroelectric potential. Cities: CapitalBeijing (pop. 5.6 million). Agriculturck: Productsrice, wheat, Other citiesShanghai (6.3 million), Tianjin. other grains, cotton. Arable land-11%. (5.1 million), Guangzhou (3.1 million), Industries: Iron, steel, coal, machinery, Shenyang (4 million), Wuhan (3.2 million), light industrial nroducts, armaments, Chengdu (2.5 million). Terrain; Varied. petroleum. Gross value of industrial output Climate: Varied continental. (1982): $294.2 billion. Heavy/light industry proportion is about equal. Government Trade (1982): Exports $23.5 billion: agricultural goods, textiles, light industrial Type; People's republic. Constitution: 1982 products, nonferrous metals, petroleum, iron, (earlier versions: 1954, 1975, 1978). steel, machine tools, and weapons. Ira- Established: October 1, 1949. Party Con- ports$20.8 billion: grain, chemical fer- gresses: 1956 (8th), 1969 (9th), 197-3 (10th), tilizer, industrial raw materials, machinery 1977 (11th), 1982 (12th). National People's and equipment. Major marketsHong Kong, Congresses: 1954 (1st), 1458 (2d), 1964 (3d), Official Name: Japan, US, Singapore, FRG. Major sup- People's Republic of China 1975 (4th), 1978 (5th), and 1983 (6th). pliersJapan, US, Hong Kong, FRG, Administrative subdivisions: 21 prov- Canada. inces, 5 autonomous regions, 3 special Average exchange rate (1982): 1.895 municipalities. yua.n-US$1 PROF ILE Political parties: Chinese Communist, Party, about 40 million members; 8 minor parties. Suffrage: Universal over age 18. Membership in International People Central government budget (1982): Organizations Revenues$56.8 Expenditures Noun and adjective: Chinese (sing.,and pl.) -UN and its specialized agencies, INMARSAT, -Population (1982): Just over i.008 billion. $58.3 billion. INTELSAT, International Committee of the Defense (1982): 8%-9% of GNP (1982 Annual growth rate (1982): 1.5%. Ethnic Red Cross, and others. groups: Han Chinese, 93.3%; others include est.). Zhuang, Uygur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Man- National holidays: Spring Festival (Chinese New Year)late January/early Published by the United States Department chu, Mongol, Buyi, Korean. Religions: Of- of StateBureau of Public AffairsOffice ficially atheist, but there are Muslims, Bud- February, 4 days; May 1International of Public CommanicationEditorial DM- dhists, Lamaists, Christians, and adherents to Socialist Workers' Day; October 1National sionWashington, D.C.December 1983 Chinese folk religions (varying amalgams of Day. Editor: Joanne Reppert Reams Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, and Flag: Five yellow stars, one large and Department of State PP' lication 7751 ancestor worship). Language: Standard ,four small, in the upper left corner of a red Background Notes SeriesThis material is field. 41 the public domain and may be reproduced Chinese (Putonghua) or Mandarin (based on without permission; citation of this source the Beijing dialect). Education: l'ParN row- would be appreciated. puLiory-5; 1990 goal is universal elemen- Economy tary school education. First grade Prtr011 For sale by the Superintendent of Docu- GNP (1981): $301 billion. Annual growth ment~, U.S. Government Printing Office, 171P7li93%. Literaryover 75%. Life ex- Washington, D.C. 20402 pectancy-68. Work force (447.1 million): rate (1980-82): 7.4%. Per capita GNP (1982): A gr-ulture-7 4.4%. Industry and rom- $298. Avg. inflation rate (1982 Chinese, merce-15.1%, Otiwr estimate): 2,2%. BEST COPY2 J..: ) A H A .11E11. ONGJIANG ur in rb Ph. Chongehulf JII IN Urumqi MONO( Ihryl (iN NC, 44k0,1, , -).-- 1..1 41(101 /1 rliph121. s X /NJ/lig N p \ ..... Ara --w- FGH 1 GANSU NO r ,') C ,. .,.,),,,J4 I- /I ,......1,3, I i qiiitiut.g. I En' , A ./ ...., ...'....N....,\...s .... , 741....k3 rifroh an i -/-"" ,ii4roi -r-L,./' ., x,..9. ..N./ ..'... ...........e.' -.A. Golmud iQ-Jinin IC 1., .\AjNinalnoN .., t {1.'1: ' -.4.-?i..*.t.i.0-.:,y, _,r--\, r,11,;t.k.,:,11:421:-k..,,z1s,..i- ' f h 14 SP h 5 _s_,,./ ,,,, OINGI-4A1 i. us-..r ' !..... A...... ( ,. , i i rj . .-"t LIN -,vst',-- -54(i'An r4i Y.,-. r.., r A Wtho;c i it) ANA VICNAN k.44-.' L.... - 1 "APe "6* A4\,-- ,......- \..i .,.%S.c ip-ort4"'......440 XIZANG - 1. Hu\BIN W-luhnA81:11," ,....,, SICHUAN ow 9., h .Art- 1: __Chongdirpf .....44-.- ../riIt. DAN }4citi,, .---,-11$1 _ ."--vg. \: ,ry w.-.N. BH...,,,,,aPi ,t:A$Alt C 11 8 n III 11 8 9 pe ...411141111P' 1 .:4;4';,V140-1''.- _Jr : .--11.10,,;/' J : \ ' _r r" . , , , .,1, 1. A.; ' 4AI,NAN N k '' ,,&,--4''- C4 !yang*, % j-,,,AN 1.01 .:,. :, '11:, l ----erd A x. 1 m o ' kul, (JAN(,x, (1 , 4 `44q uyuNnAme 4,,,,,,..4 t China , , ._A ( 11.02.0mawrAjt V .Wil 9 It".°''' '' '' International boundary j.., 'limnrut '!. lc , 1' 1,I.V.7t..A qq.1.1--,'' Province-level boundary * National capital ® Province-level capital Railroad Road 0 500 Kilometers ' 0 500 Moos 3 2 BEST COPY o foe PEOPLE The Pinyin System of Rominizatlop China's population is just over 1 billion; on a census conducted in 1982. On January 1, 1979, the Chinese Government officially adopted the "pinyin" systerrefor spell- abasedGovernment, authorities endorsed birth ing Chinese names and places in Roman letters. A system of romanization invented by the control in the 1950s, played it down in Chinese, pinyin has long been widely us41 in China on street and commercial signs as well as 1958, and began to promote it again in in eleryentary Chinese textbooks as an aid in learning Chinese characters. Variations of pinyin 1962. The present family planning pro- de also used as the written forms of several minority languages. t, gram began in the early 1970s and has Pinyin hb, now replaced the familiar conventional spellings in China's English-language publications. The US Government has also adopted the pinyin system for all PRC names and . become more fully mobilized, with places. For example, the capital of China is now spelled "Beijing' rather than "Peking." 'stricter guidelines. since 1979. Today, In the pinyin system, letters are pronounced much as they would be in AmericaftEnglisb with family planning vigorously pursued, with the following exceptions. the target population growth rate of 1% may already have been attained in major Complex initial sounds Final sounds cities but not in rural areas. Overall clike the is in it's elike the oo in book population growth dropped from 2.3% in qlike the ch in cheap englike the ung in lung 1973 to 1.5% in 1978. The Chinese Gov- xbetween the s in see and the shin she aias in aisle ernment is calling for a target family zlike the ds in lids ui--like the ay in way size of three and has introduced incen- zhlike the j in just uailike the wi in wide 0 tives to limit the number of children per ilike the i in skin* , , family to one or two. The one-child fami- ' When zh, ch, sh, are followed by an i, the
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