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Law of Governorates Not Organised Into a Region No. 21 of 2008

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Law of Governorates Not Organised Into a Region No. 21 of 2008 UNOFFICIAL UNAMI TRANSLATION In the Name of People The Presidency Council Based on what has been rectified by the Council of Representatives under the provisions of Article (61) of the Constitution, and based on Articles (110), (114), (115) and (122) of the Constitution, The Presidency Council decided in its session held on / / 2008 to issue the following law: Law No. ( ) of 2008 Governorates not organized into a region Preface Article 1 For the purpose of this Law, the following terms shall have the meanings assigned to them hereunder: The law: Law of Governorates not organized into a Region Council of Representatives: the Iraqi Council of Representatives Governorate: An administrative unit within its geographic borders; it shall be composed of districts, sub-districts and villages. Council: Governorate Council. Local Council: District Council and Sub-district Council. Councils: Governorate Council, District Council and Sub-district Council. Administrative Unit: Governorate, District and Sub-district. Head of an Administrative Unit: Governor, Qa’im-maqam (District Director) and Sub- district Director Senior Positions: Director Generals in the governorate and the heads of the security apparatus in the governorates except university presidents, judges and army commanders. Absolute Majority: realized by half of the members + 1. Simple Majority: realized by half of the present members + 1 only after the required quorum had been achieved. Part One Councils and Formation Procedures Article 2 1. A Governorate Council shall be the highest legislative and supervisory authority within the administrative borders of the Governorate. It shall have the right to UNOFFICIAL UNAMI TRANSLATION adopt local legislations within the borders of the Governorate in a manner that enables it to run its affairs according to the administrative decentralization principle and in a way that does not contradict the Constitution and the federal laws. 2. The Governorate Council and local councils shall be subject to the monitoring of the Council of Representatives. Article 3 First 1- Governorate Council shall be made up of (25) seats with the addition of one seat for every (200,000) people for more than (500,000) people. 2- A District Council shall consist of (10) seats, with the addition of one seat for every (50000) people. 3- A Sub-District Council shall consist of (7) seats, with the addition of one seat for every 25000 people. 4- Council members shall be elected through direct secret ballots according to the Councils election law. Second The latest official statistics should be adopted to determine the number of seats to be added according to the provisions of Clause 1 of this Article. Article 4 The electoral cycle of the Council shall be for four calendar years commencing with its first session Chapter One Conditions and Expiry of Membership Section One Conditions for Membership Article 5 A candidate for membership of the Councils must; 1. Be an Iraqi citizen, fully eligible and not less than thirty years of age at the time of his candidacy; 2. Hold a secondary school certificate or its equivalent, at a minimum; UNOFFICIAL UNAMI TRANSLATION 3. Be of good conduct and repute and have not been convicted of an offence prejudicial to honor; 4. Be from the people of the governorate or a permanent resident for a period not less than ten years, and that his residency would not be attributable to reasons of changing the demography 5. Not be a member of the armed forces or the security agencies at the time of his candidacy; 6. Not be included in the provisions and procedures of the De-Baathification Law or any other alternative law; 7. Not have illegally gained wealth at the expense of the country and the public money pursuant to a court verdict. Section Two Expiry of Membership Article 6 First Membership shall expire by the expiry of the electoral cycle or in the following cases: 1- The death of a member or his infliction by a permanent handicap, disability or a dangerous disease that prevents him from pursuing his job pursuant to a decision by a specialized medical committee. 2- A. A member of a Council or Local Council may submit his resignation in writing to the Head of the Council; the latter should present it at the first following session so as to take a decision about it; B. The resignation shall be deemed accepted upon the approval of the Council by absolute majority or by the insistence of the resigning member, even if the Council rejects it by an absolute majority. - A member shall be deemed dismissed when he fails to attend four successive sessions or (1/4) the sessions of the Council during the period of four months without a lawful excuse. The Council shall invite the member so as to hear his statements in a session to be held at least 7 days after notification of the date of the session. A member shall be deemed resigned by a decision with the absolute majority of the Council; 4. In the event that one of the causes stipulated in Article7 paragraph 8 of this Law applies, the Council may terminate the membership by an absolute majority of its members. 5- When a member does not meet one of the conditions of membership. Second UNOFFICIAL UNAMI TRANSLATION Replacement shall be due once the membership is expired and when one of the conditions stipulated in this Article is met, from the same list, provided that the elections were carried out under the list system or with the person who scored the highest number of votes pursuant to the electoral system applied. Third A Council member may appeal the decision of removal to the Administrative Judiciary Court during thirty (30) days of notification of the decision. Fourth: The provisions of termination of membership of this Article shall be applied on the local councils. Chapter Two Competencies of Governorate and Local Councils Section One Competencies of Governorate Councils Article 7 A Governorate Council shall assume the following functions: First Election of the Council’s Chairperson and his Deputy by the absolute majority of the Council members at the Council’s first session upon the Governor invitation and within 15 days from the date of ratification of election results. The session shall be presiding by the oldest member. Second The removal of the Council’s Chairperson or his deputy from office by absolute majority of the Council members in case that one of the causes stated in Clause 8 of this Article applies and upon the request of one third of the Council’s members. Third To issue local legislations, regulations and instructions to regulate the administrative and financial affairs in a way that enables it to run its affairs according to the administrative decentralization principle in a manner that does not contradict with the provisions of the Constitution and federal laws. Fourth Outline the Governorate general policies in coordination with the competent ministries within the context of developing the plans of the governorate. UNOFFICIAL UNAMI TRANSLATION Fifth 1. Prepare the budget of the Council to include it in the general budget of the Governorate 2. Ratify the general budget of the Governorate submitted by the Governor and transfer funds between its chapters with the approval of the absolute majority of the members, with the consideration of Constitutional standards in distribution for the Center of the Governorate, the Districts and Sub-districts, and refer it to the Federal Ministry of Finance to unify it with the Federal budget. Sixth Monitor all activities of the local executive bodies, except for courts, military units, colleges and institutions, in order to ensure good performance of all except the departments with Federal competencies. Seventh 1. Election of the Governor and his deputies by the absolute majority of its members during a maximum period of thirty days of convening its first session; 2. In the event that no candidate gets absolute majority of the Council members, candidates who get highest number of votes shall contest in a second round of elections. The member who gets the highest number of votes of the second ballot shall be elected. Eighth 1. Questioning the Governor and his Deputies shall be at the request of one third of the Council members. In case that the simple majority of members are not convinced, they shall vote to remove him in a second session. He shall be deemed resigned by the acceptance of the absolute majority of the Council members. The request or recommendation of removal should be based on one of the following exclusive reasons: a. Lack of integrity or exploitation of rank. b. Cause a waste of public property. c. Loss of one of the membership conditions. d. Intentional dereliction or negligence of duty and responsibilities. 2. The Council of Representatives may remove the Governor by an (absolute-simple) majority of its members based on a proposal by the Prime Minister for the same reasons above. 3. A Governor shall be deemed removed for lack of one of the conditions stated in Article 5 of this Law; 4. A Governor may appeal the decision of removal to the Supreme Federal Court within fifteen days from the date of notification of the decision. The Court must adjudicate the challenge within one month from the date of its registration. The Governor shall continue assuming the governorates daily duties until a decision by the Court is taken. 5. After the deadline for appeal stipulated in Clause (4) above or ratification of the removal decision by the High Federal Court, in case of appeal, the Governorate Council UNOFFICIAL UNAMI TRANSLATION shall elect a new Governor in accordance with the provisions of Clause 7 of this Article, within a period not to exceed 30 days of ratification or deadline for appeal.
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