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Kurdistan Region of Iraq Erbil, Duhok & Sulaymaniyah

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Kurdistan Region of Iraq Erbil, Duhok & Sulaymaniyah at a glance THE USE OF PROFILING IN THE KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ ERBIL, DUHOK & SULAYMANIYAH 2016 www.jips.org Why a profiling ? While a significant amount of information was available on IDPs and refugees residing in camps in the Kurdistan This Region of Iraq (KRI), less was known about those resid- profiling ing outside of camps, particularly in urban areas. entailed a col- Furthermore, most of the existing strategies to mitigate the effects of displacement focused on addressing the laborative approach, needs of either the IDP or refugee populations, while the capacity sharing, and devel- needs of the host communities living alongside these oping long-term responses to displaced groups received much less attention. the displacement concerns in Erbil However, the local communities and authorities Governorate. We did not know a lot about were deeply affected by the waves of displacement resulting from the conflicts in Syria and the rest of Iraq. IDPs and refugees residing out of camps, we By 2016 the urban population in Erbil Governorate had did not know the impact of the crisis on increased by 25 %, in Duhok Governorate by 31 % and in Sulaymaniyah Governorate by 15 % due to the displace- the host community. This profiling ment crises. This combined with the pervasive financial enlightened us about these crisis greatly exacerbated the strains already placed on issues. local communities. In this context, the Governorate authorities in Erbil, Diyar Lateef Omar Duhok and Sulaymaniyah together with UN partners National Humanitarian Advisor Erbil Refugee Council, decided to conduct studies comparing population Erbil Governorate groups (IDPs, refugees, and host communities) in differ- ent urban areas to inform longer term planning for the Kurdistan Regional Government authorities as well as the humanitarian and development community. DART Do your own analysis of the data from Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah on dart.jips.org ! Or download the full datasets from the Humanitarian Data Exchange (data.humdata.org). 1 2 What difference did the profiling make ? more targeted The profiling results responses provided an evidence- base necessary to improve The collaborative The targeting of cash-based a locally character of the pro- profiling interventions as well as owned filing exercise enabled urban planning projected by process local ownership of the helped focus UN and NGO partners. process. This ensured the cash assistance that the profiling approach programmes on the most was adequately tailored to the specific context of vulnerable IDP and refugee com- improved each Governorate and that munities, e.g. due to lack of employ- The profiling understand- the results were useful to all ing and ment or very critical housing situations. We results helped to shared data partners. better understand also learned that we should include the the impact of displacement host community in our program- on different population groups in various urban ming, as they had also been areas in KRI. In addition, The Kurdistan Region through very difficult local authorities as well two-way Statistics Office and local times. as the humanitarian and capacity Statistics Offices had a development community building central role in carrying out all agreed upon and wel- Jozef Merkx the profiling process (e.g. UNHCR Iraq comed the profiling results. pertaining to mapping, data collec- This enabled each actor to tion and preliminary analysis). This improve their interventions combined with the collaborative and led to a shared under- nature of the profiling exercise led standing of the urban to significant technical capacity dimension of displace- sharing between the Governorate ment as well as its impact authorities, including the Statistics on the host communities. Offices, and the humanitarian and development agencies involved. 3 4 How was the process shaped ? A collaborative approach was In addition to this, each exer- taken in designing and imple- cise established a Technical menting each profiling exer- Working Group made up cise, with a Profiling Steering of representatives from the This Committee comprising all respective Governorate bodies, study shows relevant partners jointly over- Statistics Offices, and UNHCR seeing the process and con- to lead the technical work, with the importance tributing at different stages. support from JIPS throughout of joining efforts Partners included : the process. between Government, Government and The Statistics Offices admin- including Statistics Offices, and Governorate bodies : Joint istered the household surveys humanitarian organisations to avoid Crisis Coordination Centre while the Governorate author- (JCCC), Kurdistan Region ities and UNHCR organised multiple data collection with Statistics Office (KRSO), the qualitative data collection. different methodologies Governorate Statistics All members were involved in and objectives. Offices (Erbil Statistics data analysis, and the findings Directorate, Duhok Statistics were shared and validated with Office and Sulaymaniyah each Governorate as well as Serwan Mohamed, Statistics Office), the Erbil humanitarian and develop- Kurdistan Region Statistics Refugee Council (ERC), ment stakeholders in a one-day Office the Board of Relief and workshop. This multi-stake- Humanitarian Affairs holder collaboration resulted (BRHA) in Duhok and the in significant knowledge and Sulaymaniyah Governorate ; capacity sharing including the introduction of new data col- Humanitarian and devel- lection and analysis methods. opment actors : UNHCR, UN-HABITAT, OCHA, UNFPA and IOM. 5 6 How was data collected ? The urban profiling exercises in Erbil, An area-based methodology DUHOK GOVERNORATE Duhok and Sulaymaniyah combined was developed for the exer- quantitative and qualitative meth- cises, which allowed for a Distribution of the households interviewed in ods to explore i. the diversity within comparative analysis not only the coverage area by geographical stratum StratificationStratification MethodMethod forfor the the each target group by different types between population groups DuhokDuhok GovernorateGovernorate ProfillingProfiling of urban areas, and ii. the differences but also between certain types Stratification method, each point representing one sampled household per strata : as well as similarities between groups of urban areas/geographic by location. Methods used included : strata with the highest concen- 1st1stStrata strata Strata 1 : -high Duhok-HighHigh density Density DensityDistrict areas centerAreas Areas 2nd2ndStrata Strata Strata 2 : medium- Duhok- Medium Districtdensity Density Periphery areas Areas tration of displaced populations. Medium Density Areas Darkar Batifa A sample-based household These comprised the followingStratification Method for the !(!( Stratification Method for the !( 3rd3rdStrata Strata Strata 3 : low- -TownsLow density Density areas Areas !( !(!( Low Density Areas !( !(!(!( !(!( !( !(!(!( !(!( !(!( !(!(!(!(!(!( !(!(!(!(!( Duhok Governorate Profilling !(!( !(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!( !(!( !( !( !(!( !(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!( !( !(!(!( survey of approximately 1,200 areas : Duhok Governorate Profiling !(!(!( Zakho!(!( !(!( !(!(!(!(center!( !(!( StratificationStratification MethodSubMethodSubdistricts district forfor the the Sheladaza !(!(!( !(!(!(!( households in each Governorate !(!(!( Razgari !( !(!( Deralok DuhokDuhok GovernorateEachGovernorate point point represents represents ProfillingProfiling one one !(!( Amedi center !( targeting IDPs, refugees and In Erbil : Erbil District !(!(!( !( sampled household per strata !( 1st strata - Duhok District center !(!(!(!(!(!(!( 1st Strata -HighHigh DensityDensity Areas Areas household interviewed. Sarsank !(!( host communities. The profiling Centre, Erbil District 2nd2nd Strata Strata - Duhok- Medium District Density Periphery Areas !(!( Medium Density Areas1st1st strata Strata - Duhok-HighHighDarkar Density DensityDistrict centerAreas Areas produced a basic demographic Periphery and selected !( Batifa !( !(!( Zawita!(!(!( !( !(!( 3rd3rd Strata Strata - -TownsLow Density Areas !(!( !( Low Density Areas !( !(!(!( !(!(!( !(!(!( profile of the groups disaggre- towns. !( !( !( !( !(!( !( !( !(!( 2nd2nd Strata Strata !(-!(!( !(!(Duhok- Medium!(!( District Density Periphery Areas Semel center!( !( !( !(!(!( !(!( !(!(!(!(!(!( Medium Density Areas !(!(!( !( !( !(!(!( !(!(!(!(!(!( !(!(!(!(!( !(!(!(!( !(!(!(!(!( !(!(!( !(!( !(!( !( !( !(!( !(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!( !(!( !( !(!(!(!(!(!( !( !( !(!(!(!( !(!(!(!( !(!(!(!( !(!( !(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!( !(!(!(!( Darkar !(!( !(!( !( Zakho!(!( !(!( !(center !(!( !(!( !( !( !(!( !(!( !(!(!(!(!( !(!(!( gated by sex, age, location and BatifaDuhok center!(!( !(!( !( Sheladaza Sub district !(!( !( !( !( !(!( 3rd3rd Strata Strata - -TownsLow Density Areas !(!( !( !( In Duhok : high-density !( !(!(!( !(!(!(!( !(!(!( !(!( Low Density Areas !(!( !( !( !(!( !( !(!( !(!( Razgari !(!(!( !(!( !(!( !(!(!( !( !(!(!(!(!(!(!(!( !(!(!(!(!(!( !( !(!( Deralok!(!(!( !(!(!( !(!( !(!(!(!(!(!( !(!( !(!(!( diversity focusing on livelihoods, !(!( !(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!(!( !(!( !(!( !( !( !(!( !( !( !( !(!( !(!(!( Each point represents one !(!(!( Zakho!(!( !(!( !(!(!(!(center!( !(!( Fayda Each point represents one !(!( Amedi center !(!(!( !( districts, medium-density Sheladaza !( !(!(!( Akre center!(!( sampled household per strata Sub district !(!( !(!(!( !(!(!(!(!(!(!( !( !(!( !( community cohesion, education household interviewed. !(!( !(!( !( !(!(!(!( Sarsank !(!(!( !( !(!(!(!( !(!(!(!( Razgari !(!(!( !(!(!( !(!( !( Baadre !(!(
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