The securitisation of climate change A discourse analysis of the NATO and its member states

Master Thesis Political Science | International Relations

Name: Elze van Langen Student ID: 10786201 Supervisor: Dr. L. W. Fransen Second reader: Dr. F. Boussaid Date: 11 August 2016 Word count: 19.371 Abstract

Although the representation of environmental concerns in the security agenda is increasingly recognised, the securitisation of climate change remains a topic of contestation. This thesis elaborates on the question how the visions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its member states correspond regarding the securitisation of climate change. This research draws on the analytical framework of Diez et al. (2016) and presents a comparative analysis of discourses on climate security. The discourses of the US, Germany and the Netherlands are analysed and complemented with the discourse of the NATO, which touches upon the lack of attention that has been given to climate security discourses within international organisations (IOs). This thesis argues that NATO generally constructs climate change as a territorial danger, which corresponds most with the discourse of the US. Although the leadership role of the US within NATO can be a plausible explanation for the similarity, it is argued that NATO’s vision may best be explained by its traditional identity of a military alliance. Despite expressions of fear for the militarisation of climate change, this thesis suggests that the short-term political implications of NATO’s vision are limited, since its mandate and policies concerning climate change are largely vague and undecided.

Cover photo by Isaac Cordal The cement sculpture is created by street artist Isaac Cordal and belongs to a larger installation called ‘Follow the Leaders’. The artwork serves as a metaphor for power-mad businessmen who run our capitalist global order. However, after a picture went viral online, this sculpture was renamed by social media users as ‘Politicians talking about climate change’ (Cordal 2011; Sullivan 2014).

2 Preface

Since several years, I am fascinated by the global issue of climate change. When I started to read more about this topic for my MA thesis project, I discovered an article by George Marshall (2014). In an attempt to explain the difficulties for our global society to find a collective response to climate change, Marshall found the answer in something we all share: our human brain. The exceptionally amorphous problem of climate change provides us with so many uncertainties that our human brain is incapable to fully address the issue. It touches upon our cognitive blind spots, fear of death and perception of threats. This made me realise that climate change is largely socially constructed, and that the way and to what extent it is perceived as a security threat can have great political implications. I decided to write my thesis about the securitisation of climate change, in which I analysed the discourse of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), an IO which traditionally is not involved with climate change. While I was still writing my thesis, I applied for an internship at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within two weeks I was hired as an intern at the ambassador for international organisations. Hence, I will continue to work with the NATO and many other interesting institutions. I am looking forward to the career that lies ahead of me, and I uphold the ambition to work with climate issues in the future.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor dr. Luc Fransen for his valuable guidance and advice, and dr. Farid Boussaid for taking the time to read my thesis as a second reader. I would also like to thank Ariane Berends for her support as a study advisor and involvement throughout the process. Subsequently, I would like to acknowledge the interview respondents, who provided me with new insights and information: Rob de Rave (HCSS), Louise van Schaik (Clingendael Institute), Michel van Winden (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Wilbert van der Zeijden (PAX for Peace). Lastly, I would like to thank the people who are close to me and have been of great support throughout my study.

3 Table of contents

List of tables and figures 6 Abbreviations 7

1. Introduction 8 1.1. Research topic 8 1.2. Researchstructure 9

2. Research design 10 2.1. Research question 10 2.2. Analytical framework: Analysing climate security discourses 11 2.3. Research design: Comparative design 11 2.4. Relevance 14 2.5. Outlook: the argument 14

3. Theoretical framework: The securitisation of climate change 16 3.1. The climate-security nexus 16 3.2. The theory of securitisation (Copenhagen School) 19 3.3. The influx of risk into the field of security 21 3.4. Differentiating securitisation: threat or risk? 24 3.5. Analytical framework of climate security discourses 25 3.6. Normative implications of securitising climate change 27

4. The United States and Germany: Territorial versus individual climate security 30 4.1. United States: Climate change as a territorial danger 30 4.1.1.The US and the NATO 30 4.1.2.The general climate debate 30 4.1.3.The securitisation of climate change 32 4.1.4.Political consequences 34 4.1.5.Conclusion 34 4.2. Germany: Climate change as an individual insecurity 35 4.2.1.Germany and the NATO 35 4.2.2.The general climate debate 35 4.2.3.The securitisation of climate change 37 4.2.4.Political consequences 38 4.2.5.Conclusion 39 4.3. Conclusion: Territorial versus individual climate security 39

5. The Netherlands: Climate change as a planetary insecurity 40 5.1. Introduction 40 5.2. The Netherlands and the NATO 41 5.3. The general climate debate 41 5.4. The securitisation of climate change 44 5.5. Political consequences 49 5.6. Conclusion 50

6. The NATO: Climate change and territorial defence 51 6.1. Introduction 51 6.2. A short history of the NATO 51 6.3. The securitisation of climate change 53

4 6.4. Political consequences 58 6.5. Conclusion 59

7. Conclusions 60 7.1. Research question: a comparative analysis 60 7.2. Normative implications 61 7.3. Limitations and recommendations for further research 62

References 63

Appendix I: Interviews 70

5 List of tables and figures

Figure 1.1: Research structure 9 Figure 2.1: Hierarchical comparative design 13 Table 3.1: Important keywords distinguishing between the danger and risk dimension 26 Figure 3.1: The space of politics and security 26 Table 3.2: A typology of climate security discourses 27

6 Abbreviations

CCMS Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society CCPI Climate Change Performance Index COP Conference of the Parties DOD US Department of Defence DPCR NATO Defence Planning Capability Review EC European Commission EU European Union GHG Greenhouse Gases IO International organisation IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change KNMI Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn NAS Dutch National Adaptation Strategy NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCA US National Climate Assessment NGO Non-governmental organisation NMP Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan PA NATO Parliamentary Assembly PBL Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving RIVM Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu STC NATO Science and Technology Committee UN United Nations UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States VROM Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer

7 1. Introduction

1.1. Research topic The changing climate has already started to reshape our world. Droughts, floods, rising sea levels and water scarcity have made climate change an issue of security policies. The climate- security nexus is part of the larger context of broadening the definition of security, a development that has taken place since the 1980s (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.1)1. The intensification of the environmental debate and the changing strategic environment has even brought the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as an intergovernmental military alliance into the realm of environmental politics (Depledge & Feakin 2012: 80). The most recent Strategic Concept of 2010 revealed NATO’s concern about the future impact of climate change on areas of interest to the alliance (NATO 2010: 13). In the run-up to the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP21) in 2015, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly (PA) urged the allied governments to support an ambitious legally-binding global agreement (NATO PA 2015). While all NATO member countries agree on the likely impacts of climate change on international security, every single state has a different opinion on how much and which impacts it might have, as well as to what extent climate change should be integrated in foreign and security policies (Vitel 2015: 6). There are many possibilities to frame climate change as a security issue. In other words, the way in which the securitisation of climate change develops, can have many different outcomes. The reason for this is because climate security discourses can be important for the legitimisation of certain policies or actions, which normally would not have been approved when there was no recognition of climate change at all (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.2). Hence, the recognition of climate change by a military alliance that traditionally does not focus on environmental issues and which conception of security lies within the traditional state-centric approach, is an interesting but controversial development. The way the NATO as an international organisation (IO) and its individual members construct climate change as a security issue, can have normative implications. It can give climate change more prominence within the political agenda, but it can also expand the military’s policy reach (idem: ch.1, 1.4).

1 References of Diez et al. (2016) will not be showed in page numbers, but in (sub)chapters. This is because the eBook version of the source is used, which does not provide page numbers.

8 A comparative analysis of the climate security discourses within the United States (US), Germany and the Netherlands, as well as within the NATO, can provide a fuller picture on the different visions and interactions concerning the climate-security nexus.

1.2. Research structure Following this introduction on the overall research topic and the second chapter of the thesis’ research design, chapter 3 will explain the theories which are useful for an understanding of the nexus between climate change and security. This part will elaborate on the theory of securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School and the incorporation of the logic of risk in securitisation theory, which ultimately will arrive at the analytical framework on climate security discourses and the normative implications of securitisation. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the climate security discourses of the US and Germany as two members of the NATO. In chapter 5, these cases are complemented with an empirical analysis of the climate security discourse in the Netherlands. The NATO and the way it securitises climate change will be explored in chapter 6. Consequently, conclusions will be drawn from these different cases in chapter 7 (figure 1.1).

Combination Theory •Climate security •US & Germany theory & analysis •Research design •The Netherlands • Securitisation •Conclusions •NATO • Analytical framework of climate security discourses

Introduction Analysis

Figure 1.1: The research structure

9 2. Research design

2.1. Research question In 2010, former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called for the alliance to play a significant role in the global response to climate change (Depledge & Feakin 2012: 80). In NATO’s most recent Strategic Concept of 2010 was recognised that “key environmental and resource constraints”, including climate change, “will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations” (NATO 2010: 13). Although the NATO has received great scholarly attention, research on the alliance and the way it constructs climate change as an emerging security challenge is scarcely represented in the literature. Studies on securitisation have traditionally focused on either a case study concerning a single country or a global overview, with the danger of failing to reconstruct thorough securitisation dynamics. Recently, Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.2) addressed this gap by providing a systematic comparative analysis of discourses on climate change and security in four countries. The authors developed a six-fold matrix which allowed them to trace securitisations in more detail than so far has been done. It also clarifies the connections between security, threat and risk. Furthermore, it makes such securitisations more applicable to empirical analyses and enables the engagement with the normative debate surrounding securitisation. This thesis will further elaborate on the analysis of Diez et al. (2016) by assessing the securitisation of climate change in the Netherlands and comparing it to the discourses in the US and Germany, which are already analysed by the authors. Although they took the state as the main referent object in their research, the literature has not yet offered a comprehensive understanding of climate security discourses within IOs (idem: 726). This research paper aims to address this gap in the literature by analysing the securitisation of climate change within the NATO, and by consolidating these findings with analyses of its NATO members the Netherlands, Germany and the US. This thesis will therefore elaborate on the question:

How do the visions of the NATO and its member states correspond with regard to the securitisation of climate change?

10 2.2. Analytical framework: Analysing climate security discourses This thesis will use the analytical framework on climate security discourses developed by Diez et al. (2016), because it provides a recent and comprehensive method to analyse and compare the securitisation on climate change in different cases. The framework consists of a six-fold matrix of securitisation with two dimensions. On one dimension it distinguishes between ‘threatification’ (the construction of security as an existential threat) and ‘riskification’ (a more diffuse logic of security). On the other dimension it distinguishes between three different levels of referent objects, which climate change is seen to threaten the most: the territorial, individual and planetary level. On the territorial level, states are seen as the main referent objects. However, Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.2) acknowledge that other group entities can also be the referent object, such as the NATO. This means that the NATO as an alliance with 28 member states can produce articulations in terms of territorial danger or territorial risk. This argument is supported by McDonald (2013: 46-47) who argues that IOs play a key role in the provision of security in international contexts. Since climate change poses a threat to both states and individuals as components of international society, IOs in general are powerfully advanced in linking climate change to international security. Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.3) acknowledge that their comparative research of four countries might run the risk of methodological nationalism, which might reinforce the boundaries of states. This is in conflict with the (to a large degree) transnational character of debates on climate change and the importance of transnational actors in these debates, such as international expert panels and NGOs. However, they also argue that climate policies eventually need to be adopted in national contexts in which political debates on climate change largely take place. The approach in this thesis meets this ambivalent issue by highlighting the linkages between the national contexts of the Netherlands, Germany and the US with the international context of the NATO.

2.3. Research design: Comparative design In this thesis a comparative design is applied in relation to a qualitative research strategy, which means the research design takes the form of a multiple-case study (Bryman 2012: 74). A case study can be defined as an intensive examination of a single unit (setting) for the purpose of understanding a larger number of similar units (Gerring 2004: 341). This can be

11 exemplified as the external validity or generalisability (Bryman 2012: 69). Hence, a multiple- case study is a research design in which the number of cases exceeds one. This research design has been chosen because this thesis has the ambition of theory-building instead of theory-testing and uses information-rich cases. The design has the advantage that it allows the researcher to examine the operation of generative causal mechanisms in divergent or similar contexts (idem: 74). This thesis will elaborate on the NATO and three member states, namely the US, Germany and the Netherlands. The US is a relevant case in this study, since it fulfils a role of leadership within the NATO. From a military perspective, the US is most dominant with its high military expenditures (approximately 70 percent of total NATO expenditures) (Elshout & Koelé 2016: 10-11). However, its overall performance on climate change can be measured as poor, concerning its high emission levels and slow adoption of federal climate policies (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.1). Germany is an interesting case as well, since it has long been hesitant towards military involvement through the NATO (Carstensen 2016), as well as in its national debate on climate security. Accordingly, Germany is called an ambivalent forerunner in the field of climate change. While it is a highly industrialised country with a strong economic performance, it is also characterised by progressive climate policies (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4). The climate security discourses within the cases of Germany and the US, mainly obtained from the secondary source of Diez et al. (2016), will be compared with the discourse of the Netherlands, obtained from primary sources. The Netherlands has been chosen as a case because it is seen as a loyal NATO member and is known for its ambition to play a leading role in environmental policies, though its performance on climate change is far behind Germany (WRR 2010: 9; Dutch Ministry of Defence 2013: 8; Germanwatch and CAN 2016). Besides the systematic comparative analysis of the three NATO members, the climate security discourse of the NATO will be analysed as well. A reason for this is, despite the fact that climate policies eventually have to be implemented in national contexts, international and transnational actors are influencing these national debates (Diez et al. 2016: ch1, 1.3). Although the NATO and the Netherlands will receive special attention in this study, it will not be appropriate to compare an international organisation on a one-to-one basis with a nation- state. Therefore, the analysis of the NATO will be positioned above the comparative analysis of the three member countries (figure 2.1).

12 NATO

The Germany United States Netherlands (Diez et al. 2016) (Diez et al. 2016)

Figure 2.1: The hierarchical comparative design

The combination of data-collection methods is typical for case studies, which makes the strategy of triangulation appropriate (Eisenhardt 1989: 534). Triangulation in this thesis refers to an approach that uses “multiple methods of investigation and sources of data” (Bryman 2012: 392). In this study, a discourse analysis on 63 relevant documents has been carried out. These include policy papers and government reports and statements from the member states’ ministries in the sectors of defence, foreign affairs and the environment, as well as strategic concepts, treaties and resolutions of the NATO. Reports of research institutes and think tanks have been analysed, most of them can be found in the Dutch case, such as the ‘Advisory Council on International Affairs’ (AIV), ‘Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid’ (WRR) and Clingendael Institute. Also, attention has been given to discursive entrepreneurs through opinion pieces and autobiographies. Consequently, civil society reports, newspaper articles, online news articles, and a radio fragment are used to reflect the broader debate. The choice of the documents is based on their importance, considering the time they were published and the public and/or political attention they received, and the extent to which the document links climate change to security. The documents were published in the time span of 1949 until 2016, but most of them find their origin between 1988 and 2016. The evident explanation for this is that the amount of publications increased due to the increased attention for the environment. Discourses can be defined as ‘selective representations of complex phenomena’ that traverse the conventional boundaries of different disciplines (Fairclough 2013: 3-4). In order to reconstruct the broader debate, discover linkages between actors and find certain motivations behind securitising moves, semi-structured interviews

13 have been conducted with several policy-makers and experts within the field of climate change and security.

2.4. Relevance This thesis wishes to make an empirical as well as a theoretical contribution. Empirically this thesis aims to provide a better understanding of how the NATO frames the emerging security challenge of climate change and to what extent this corresponds to the securitisation of climate change of its members, considering the Netherlands, Germany and the US. Theoretically this thesis aims to contribute to the debate about securitisation and elaborate on the underexposed aspects of the literature by using the analytical framework of Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.2). The aim is to develop a better understanding of the logic of risk and its relationship with security, and of the effects of the related languages on political decision- making (idem: ch.2, 2.1). There are many possibilities to frame climate change as a security issue and these different discourses are of importance for the legitimisation of certain policies, such as military security policies. Therefore, it is relevant to analyse discourses on climate security and to assess its normative implications. Whether these discourses can be perceived as a good or a bad thing, “depends on the exact ways in which the securitisation of climate change unfolds” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.2). When such a discourse brings climate change on the political agenda and thus facilitates political decision-making, it can be a good thing. But when such a discourse helps to expand the military’s policy reach and neglects climate policy, it can be a bad thing as well. How this takes place is in turn a consequence of several structural factors, such as the influence of discursive entrepreneurs or the historical evolution of a political institution (ibid.). The way the NATO and the Netherlands as a NATO member construct climate change as a security issue, can thus matter in the legitimisation of policies. In this sense, the question of whether the linkage of climate change and security is a good or a bad thing depends on how the securitisation of climate change in these cases unfolds. In comparatively analysing the NATO as an international alliance and three of its member states, it is possible to assess to what extent the climate security discourse of the NATO corresponds to the discourses of its members and what further conclusions can be drawn.

14 2.5. Outlook: the argument This thesis shows that the vision of the NATO with regard to the securitisation of climate change corresponds most to the climate security discourse of the US. Both actors generally frame climate change in terms of a territorial danger, while Germany primarily constructs the issue as an individual risk and the Netherlands generally frames climate change as a planetary risk. Although the reason for the similar discourses of the NATO and the US touches upon the leadership role of the US within the alliance, this thesis argues that NATO’s vision is largely influenced by its traditional identity of a military alliance which is built on the principle of collective territorial defence.

15 3. Theoretical framework: The securitisation of climate change

This chapter will elaborate on the theories concerning climate change and security. After the development of the climate-security nexus is discussed, the theory on securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School is explained. This theory on the narrow conceptualisation of security forms the basis for the rest of the chapter, in which the incorporation of risk as a broadening of the securitisation theory is described. Subsequently, attention is given to the analytical framework on climate security discourses developed by Diez et al. (2016). The chapter concludes with the normative implications of the securitisation on climate change.

3.1. The climate-security nexus The growing appeal of ‘climate security’ in international politics represents a recent and sufficiently successful introduction of concerns about the environment into the security agenda. Despite this increased recognition, the nexus between environmental change and security continues to be a topic of contestation (Trombetta 2008: 585). First, Trombetta (2008: 585) argues that environmental problems are often overruled by ‘more urgent threats’. This can actually be understood as the perceived urgency of threats, since the human brain tends to recognise visible and recent threats, such as terrorist violence, as more urgent. Widely shared by cognitive psychologists, climate change is an exceptionally amorphous problem. “It provides us with no defining qualities that would give it a clear identity: no deadlines, no geographic location, no single cause or solution and, critically, no obvious enemy” (Marshall 2014). Second, the contestation remains whether the environment can be considered as a security issue (Trombetta 2008: 585). This refers to the debate on security studies between the ‘traditionalists’ and the ‘non-traditionalists’. The traditional conception of security is supported by political realists, who argue that security is centred around the military threat and the use of force. They take the state as the referent power-exercising object (Biswas 2011: 2). The increasing attention for the international economic and environmental dimensions from the 1970s and the rising concerns on identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s contributed to the dissatisfaction about the military and nuclear focus of

16 security imposed by the Cold War. This generated the debate about the conceptualisation of security, in which the traditional notion of security was increasingly criticised by its insufficiency to explain emerging threats (Buzan et al. 1998: 2; Biswas 2011: 2). Political scientists including Ullman (1983); Jahn, Lemaitre and Waever (1987); Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988); Brown (1989); Matthews (1989); Nye (1989); Haftendorn (1991); Crawford (1991) and Tickner (1992) explicitly argued for a widening of the concept of security (Buzan et al. 1998: 2). The incorporation of the environment into the realm of security initially appeared to be a reasonable idea, since it could increase the political relevance of environmental problems (Trombetta 2008: 586). According to Buzan (1991: 433) “environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.” Others welcomed the concept since it emphasises different values like ecology, ‘globality’, and governance over values like identity, territoriality and sovereignty, traditionally associated with the nation-state. Yet others mentioned that environmental security could analytically contribute to a better understanding of new typologies of vulnerability and the associated potential for conflict (Trombetta 2008: 586). Traditional security analysts opposed this development by arguing that the progressive widening of security endangered its intellectual coherence, incorporating so many issues that its essential meaning became void (Buzan et al. 1998: 2). This argument implied concerns about the possible evocation of “confrontational practices associated with the state and the military which should be kept apart from the environmental debate” (Trombetta 2008: 586). These concerns encompassed the possibilities of generating new competencies for the military -the militarisation of the environment rather than the greening of security- or the rise of nationalistic attitudes to protect the national environment. Moreover, security could undermine the cooperative efforts in order to deal with environmental problems, introducing a zero-sum rationality in which winners and losers could be created. Similar objections centred around the southern perception of environmental security as a security discourse of northern countries (ibid.). As the debate between the traditionalists and the non-traditionalists went on, the concept of environmental security slowly gained popularity. In April of 2007 the issue of climate change was discussed for the first time in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although state representatives remained divided over whether climate change and, more

17 generally, environmental degradation could be considered as a security issue (Trombetta 2008: 586), narratives about environmentally induced conflicts entered decisively onto the world stage. In that same year, the violence in Darfur was attributed to a combination of resource scarcities, demographic pressures, and climate change by influential actors such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon. Well-known security pundits like Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jeffrey Sachs shaped the academic and even popular discussion by emphasising the connection between environmental degradation and violent conflict. Along with these climate conflict narratives came other predictions about the threat of so-called ‘climate refugees’ (Trombetta 2008: 592; Hartmann; 2013; 47). Research on environmental conflict and the corresponding narratives created an intense academic debate in which not only the empirical validity of claims and methodologies were addressed, but also the normative implications. Critics argued that the debate eliminated the responsibility of developed countries, represented people in the Third World as villains, and attempting to frame environmental problems in terms of national security (Trombetta 2008: 593; Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). Trombetta (2008: 593) argues that the climate security debate has shown two tendencies which can be translated into two discourses. The first one is influenced by a national security discourse with an emphasis on conflicts and population displacement, in which the threat to global order and stability has gained prominence. While this discourse is largely informed by reactive and defensive measures, the second discourse challenges these security practices by outlining the inadequacy of military responses and preparation in dealing with environmental issues. Instead, it shifts the attention to the concept of vulnerability and suggests the promotion of both mitigation and adaptation to environmental change. It argues that preventive measures to ensure safety and resilience provide the best results. These two aspects – one inspired by reactive measures, and the other by preventive measures - are both present in climate security discourses of western countries (idem: 594). These aspects can be connected to two important concepts within the securitisation of climate change: the concept of threat and the concept of risk. These terms will receive more attention in the next paragraphs, in which theories on the social construction of security will be explained.

18 3.2. The theory of securitisation (Copenhagen School) The narrow definition of security finds its traces in realism, which can be identified as the mainstream approach in security studies. Realists tend to see environmental degradation as an issue of ‘low’ politics rather than a matter of ‘high’ politics, such as security. Constructivists and poststructuralists deliberately received more support by challenging this narrow perspective. They argue instead for a non-traditionalist approach of security, suggesting that threats are socially constructed (Trombetta 2008: 587). The theory of securitisation, developed by the Copenhagen School and mainly associated with the research of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, is considered as “[t]he most innovative and thoughtful attempt to conceptualise the social construction of security issues” (ibid.). From a social-constructivist perspective it examines how problems are transformed into issues of security by differentiating security and the securitisation process from its purely political stance (Buzan et al. 1998: 4-5; Biswas 2011: 3). The theory is relevant in this debate because it investigates the implications of widening the security agenda and gives specific attention to environmental problems. Furthermore, it has been influential in the academic and political debate, since it warned for the risk of framing environmental issues in security terms (Trombetta 2008: 587-588). The Copenhagen School argues that in the securitisation theory objective threats do not exist. Instead, any issue can go through a process of securitisation, in which it is transformed into a security issue. This happens through a speech act, a discursive process in which an issue is constructed by a political community as an existential threat. An issue only becomes securitised when it is accepted as a threat by the audience in wider society. As such, this transformation does not necessarily mean that a real threat prevails, but that the issue is framed in such a way that the perception of a security threat is created. As a consequence, the method of dealing with the issue will be transformed (Trombetta 2008: 588; Biswas 2011: 4). As such, securitisation can be perceived as a more extreme form of politicisation. According to Buzan et al. (1998: 23-24) a public issue can be placed on a spectrum ranging from non-politicised, through politicised, to securitised. In other words, an issue can be completely absent in public debate and decision, through being part of public policy, to being presented as an existential threat. The latter phase of securitisation gives rise to emergency measures and justifies actions that are outside the normal boundaries of political procedure.

19 In a security analysis three types of units are involved, in which a distinction is made between referent objects (things which are seen as threatened from existence with a legitimate claim to survival), securitising actors (actors who securitise issues by indicating a referent object as existentially threatened), and functional actors (actors who neither are the referent object nor the securitising actor, but who are affecting the decisions in a certain sector) (idem 1998: 35-36). However, according to Trombetta (2008: 588) the Copenhagen School’s theory on securitisation has problematic consequences. Although a political community has the decision whether or not to securitise an issue, “[o]nce an issue is securitised the logic of security necessarily follows”. This logic brings with it a set of practices which are associated with the traditional logic of security, suggesting a zero-sum understanding of security and an ultimate form of antagonism (ibid.; Trombetta 2014: 136). It allows for emergency measures that go beyond otherwise binding rules (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). The broadening of the security agenda can therefore have dangerous consequences, since this rationality of security will spread to other contexts from which it previously had been excluded (Trombetta 2008: 589). Alongside the problematic consequences in the theory of securitisation, the process of securitisation does not seem analytically accurate when applied to environmental issues (ibid.). The most notable peculiarities that the Copenhagen School identified in the environmental sector can ironically be associated with the amorphous problem of climate change. The theory of securitisation is associated with the inscription of enemies and issues governed by decrees rather than democratic procedures (Trombetta 2014: 136). However, the Copenhagen School argues that environmental securitisation has not been successful (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4), since “few appeals to environmental security have mobilised exceptional measures or inscribed enemies in any context” (Trombetta 2008: 589). Yet other authors such as Trombetta (2008), Brauch (2009), Brzoska (2009) and Parsons (2010) criticise this argument and clearly recognise securitisation processes, especially in the field of climate change (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). Bourbeau (2015: 384) criticises the securitisation theory for underdeveloping and undertheorising the scale or variation of securitisation. Although a large amount of research has been done on the absolute distinction between securitised and un-securitised issues, no further differentiation is made when an issue has entered the security realm. As such, he argues that security is mainly perceived as a one-size-fits-all concept. Consequently, previously mentioned authors

20 say we need to contextualise securitisation: “that what the Copenhagen School considers the inherent ‘grammar’ of securitising moves is merely one form of securitisation prevalent in military sectors and western contexts” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). According to these authors Buzan et al. have a too narrow definition of securitisation, hence they look at climate change discourses through a lens that keeps them from seeing securitisation. In the climate security debate, such a contextualisation of climate change has led to the explanation of a diversity of versions of securitisation. Although these theories have contributed to our understanding of securitisation mainly by differentiating between various referent objects of security, they are still relatively close to the Copenhagen School formulation and remain largely theoretical in nature (ibid.). Diez et al. (2016) recently developed an analytical framework which proposes a more deductive way of distinguishing climate security discourses by creating two dimensions. The first dimension includes different levels of referent objects, while the other addresses the conceptualisation of risk in the climate security literature. The scholars argue that the literature largely ignores or does not draw systematically on the notion of risk (idem: 431). In order to distinguish climate security discourses in a systematic way, this thesis will use their framework, which will be discussed later in this chapter. First will be elaborated on the concept of risk.

3.3. The influx of risk into the field of security One of the long-established criticisms of the Copenhagen School by authors belonging to the so-called Paris School, comes from a presumed ‘sociological’ approach of securitisation. This has led to a flourishing literature on the growing relevance of risk in security practices. The criticism pointed to the failure of Buzan et al. to “see the emergence of security framing through day-to-day bureaucratic practices and routines, as well as diffuse forms of power in decentralised networks, including private actors such as the insurance industry” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). In light of the growing awareness surrounding the uncertainty and complexity of contemporary threats, scholars, bureaucratic planners and insurance brokers are increasingly using the concept of risk in order to conceptualise current security dynamics, as well as ‘resilience’ as a strategy of societies and individuals to prepare for endogenous or exogenous shocks as situations of risk (ibid.; Trombetta 2008: 590; Bourbeau 2015: 375; Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4).

21 Although the risk-security literature often uses the term ‘securitisation’, it effectively implies that the logic of the security field has already been transformed. Corry (2012: 241- 243) distinguishes two groups of risk theorists who share assumptions about the logic of security, but reach different conclusions with regard to the generation of risk and the way it is dealt with. The first group draws upon the theory of world risk society developed by sociologist Ulrich Beck. Risk society can be defined as a social scenario, a scenario which describes the transformation process of late modern society into its probable result: a risk society (Rasmussen 2001: 289; Beck & Holzer 2007: 3). This (western) society is increasingly confronted with the unwelcomed side effects of successful modernisation, which nobody completely understands and which results in a diversity of possible futures (Giddens 1999: 3; Beck & Holzer 2007: 3). As such, it is a society that is increasingly concerned with the future (and with security), which generates the conception of risk. The idea of risk is associated with the will to control, and particularly with the aspiration to control the future (Giddens 1999: 3). In a risk society external risks are transformed into manufactured risks, since they are created by the progression of human development (idem: 4). According to Beck this happened through the process of ‘reflexive modernisation’, in which risks have become the consequences of modernisation itself instead of the consequences of a lack of modernity, as was the case in the industrial society (Bulkely 2001: 432-433). Since most situations of manufactured risk are inherently ambiguous and reflexive, responsibility can neither easily be assumed nor attributed. This applies both to circumstances where risk is an energising principle (financial markets), and where risk needs to be limited (health risks, or ecological risks) (Giddens 1999: 7-8). As such, the ecological risk of climate change is perceived as a paradigmatic example in Beck’s theory of risk society, since environmental problems can hardly be assigned to one particular source or actor and its sources as well as its experiences transcend temporal, spatial and social limits (Bulkely 2001: 432; Matten 2004: 378). The second group of risk theorists is inspired by French philosophers such as Foucault and Bourdieu. For them, “risk is neither a modernist tool for calculating insurance premiums nor a vain pretence at being in control of the uncontrollable global age, but is itself a particular rationality of government that works to legitimate certain technologies of power” (Corry 2012: 242). They show how logics of risk facilitate increasing securitisation of populations by focusing on the institutions and practitioners of security, bringing new domains of human life under governmental control. In this way risk is not an inevitable

22 feature of a macro-sociological transformation. Rather, risk is used purposively as a strategy by institutions as a mode of ‘governmentality’ in order to secure their role as providers of security and protection and to mask some of their failures (Bigo 2002: 65). Foucault developed the concept of governmentality in 1977 which summarises the concerns about the working of the government. The neologism consisting of ‘govern’ and ‘mentality’ points to the processes of governing and the mentality of a government as the way of thinking about how the governing happens. It is thus a rationality (a practice) and an art of (a way of thinking about) government (Foucault et al. 1991: 2-3). Theorists on risk and governmentality are pessimistic about the situation of populations and discuss the normative implications of securitisation (Corry 2012: 243). One example is the securitisation of climate change in the US in 2009, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched its Center on Climate Change and National Security. Hartmann (2013: 46) argues that the linkages between climate change, conflict, and natural disasters produced by the defence interests of the US, do not only threaten a distortion of climate policy, but also further militarise development and humanitarian assistance. Despite the different assumptions, both groups of risk theorists argue that security is not an objective ‘good’ as it is for realists. Instead, they follow the Copenhagen School in considering security issues as socially constructed and changeable. They both argue that security is increasingly being thought of in terms of risks rather than threats. Although for different reasons, both groups are concerned about the ever-expanding security agenda which they see as partly driven through the concept of risk. Therefore, they ask primarily the question of ‘what does security do?’ rather than ‘what should security do?’ (Corry 2012: 243). This thesis will follow these arguments and will draw primarily on the perspective of the second group, who’s assumptions correspond to what Eckersley (2004: 9) categorises as critical constructivism: a combination of critical theory and constructivism. Critical constructivism critically questions the internal, rather than the external, norms and values existent in understandings and practices in modern society. For the analytical ambition of this thesis the approach can be used as a method to unmask contradictions, tensions and hidden forms of powers within and between ideas and practices in climate security discourses. Furthermore, critical constructivism can help to explore changes in thought and practice which may help to identify the normative implications of securitisation (idem: 8).

23 3.4. Differentiating securitisation: threat or risk? Although in the literature there is no single definition of risk, several features are common to most conceptualisations. Risk presents a relatively long-term potential threat that is typified by a radical uncertainty and leads to a more diffuse sense of anxiety. Risks are often perceived as manageable, and “invite the calculation of the incalculable” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). In contrast, security threats are direct, existential and urgent, for example the drowning of islands or violent resource conflicts. Security threats are inclined to be identifiable or even personifiable (such as certain practices, a specific country or group of people), whereas risks are often more diffuse and lead to more diffuse referent objects (potentially risky behaviour, risk-areas or risk-groups) (ibid.). Hence, risk policies are focused on precaution, and programmes on risk-reduction intent to increase the resilience of a referent object (Corry 2012: 245). Where threats are uninsurable because they lead to devastation, risk is typically the object of insurance (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). When a risk is invoked as an existential threat and insurance is no longer possible, a security logic sets in. Such a logic demands emergency measures in order to prevent the threat from occurring under any circumstances. In contrast, a risk-based approach constitutes of mitigation to the possible consequences of climate change (ibid.) and adaptation to changing conditions and new risks (O’Brien 2012: 667). Considering the features of the conceptualisation of risk, it appears to be an appropriate way of framing the threats caused by climate change. Corry (2012) made a contribution to the identification of threats by distinguishing between ‘securitisation’ and ‘riskification’ as two opposing logics of security. The scholar links securitisation to the direct defence of a referent object against an existential threat, while he refers riskification to the governance of a referent object in order to control ‘conditions of possibility’ for damage against it. Thus, riskification focuses on the probable harm and requires a different mentality of governing than securitisation (Corry 2012: 256). Although Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.4) largely agree with this characterisation of security and risk, they argue that risk is “a variation of security rather than a category separate from it”. According to these scholars, this argument is not only supported by the fact that risk is generally classified under security considerations, but is also backed by the historical development of the security-risk debate. Therefore, their analytical framework distinguishes between riskification and ‘threatification’ which they see both as variations of securitisation. In this way securitisation forms a continuum on which risk and danger as two poles can

24 intersect. This supports the argumentation that in climate security discourses arguments on risk can include references to existential threats for the purpose to bolster argumentative force (ibid.). The inclusion of risk results in an enlargement of the scope of security, whereas the original formulation of the Copenhagen School relies on a strict distinction between normal politics and securitisation. While literature on climate change policy has provided essential insights into different logics of securitisation, the problem that this widening runs counter to the dichotomous theory of Buzan et al. is largely ignored. The analytical framework posed by Diez et al. (2016) therefore comprises politicisation as a third process next to the two possibilities of securitisation: threatification and riskification. In this way it is possible to conceptualise the area between politics and security as another continuum. As a consequence, political arguments can have both a securitising and a politicising effect (idem: 494).

3.5. The analytical framework of climate security discourses Central to the analytical framework of Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.1) is a two-dimensional conceptual matrix, which on one dimension distinguishes between threatification and riskification as two versions of securitisation. On the other dimension, the matrix consists of three different levels of referent objects. Consequently, the matrix covers six categories of climate security discourses which are all able to change the nature of politics (idem: ch.2, 2.2). By adding the logic of risk to the field of security, Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.1) ask how this will change the security realm, what the relationship is between risk and security and if the related languages differ in their effects on political decision-making. Although these questions are not necessarily new, the authors argue they have not been answered in a fully comprehensive and consistent manner. This paragraph will elaborate on the theoretical considerations of the framework. Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.1) argue for a re-conceptualisation of politics, security and risk, in which risk is seen as a sub-category of security and in which the concept of securitisation (Copenhagen School) is re-labelled as ‘threatification’. While the scholars recognise that risk also calls upon threats, threatification increases the urgency of those threats. It therefore refers to the extreme threats of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation process, summarised under the label ‘danger’ (table 3.1). Subsequently, Politics, Risk and

25 Danger are developed as poles of a triangle in which political debates stretch out. Dependent on its articulation, an issue can be ‘threatified’, ‘riskified’ or ‘politicised’ (figure 3.1). In the latter form the political relevance of the issue is increased without referring to a threat. An issue can also be ‘de-securitised’ and thus ‘re-politicised’ when its invocation of security is weakened in either form (ibid.).

Table 3.1: Important keywords distinguishing between the danger and risk dimension (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.1)

Figure 3.1: The space of politics and security (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.1)

Besides the distinction between the two types of securitisation, there is the second dimension consisting of three levels of referent objects which are based on existing literature on climate security: the territorial, individual and planetary level. The territorial level is based on the environmental conflict discourse with the conceptualisation of the state as the main referent

26 object. However, territorial articulations may also be assigned to other group entities. Central in this level is the defence of a specific territorial order. In contrast, the individual level comes from the environmental security discourse which is closely linked to human security. In this case the referent object is the individual or a global society of individuals. Consequently, the planetary level comes from the ecological security discourse with its holistic and cosmological outlook. Here it is the planetary ecosystem that is threatened, or the biosphere as a whole (idem: ch.2, 2.2). These three levels of referent objects combined with the two logics of securitisation form a typology of six categories of climate security discourses. These are summarised in table 3.2, in which illustrations of typical speech acts are provided as an example.

Table 3.2: A typology of climate security discourses (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.2)

3.6. Normative implications of securitising climate change The Copenhagen School considers the closures to the political debate and hence the constraints to deliberation as the most important normative concern of securitisation. There may also be other less formal normative implications, such as the purposive closure to the debate by discursive entrepreneurs. Although several authors raised their concerns about the normative consequences of securitisation, not all types and stages of securitisation are necessarily ‘bad’. Securitisation in for instance its first stage leads to an opening up of the

27 political agenda, which is clearly not harmful. In order to estimate whether the other stages are ‘bad’ depends on a consideration of various normative concerns and an assessment of the kind of measures that are taken by taking into account the specific context (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5). In light of the debates about the morality of securitisation, the differentiation of the various climate security discourses of Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.5) gives rise to the question of “whether some forms of securitisation may be normatively preferable to others.” This is particularly the case when comparing the articulations of risk and danger and considering the different levels of referent objects in the analytical framework. Some theorists argue that a risk-based approach may be less problematic than a securitisation based on danger, since it does not necessarily imply emergency measures as anticipated by the Copenhagen School (Corry 2012: 255). However, others say that exceptional precautionary measures can be legitimised in a risk-based articulation, in the case of uncertain and incalculable risks. A third argument, coming from the Paris School, even highlights the idea of hidden securitisations in riskifications which also have their dangers. Despite these somewhat ambiguous propositions, at the diagnostic and prognostic level there are significant differences between risk- and danger-centred discourses. Yet, it is important to recognise that “the goal of risk-based measures is not to eradicate the risk completely but to manage and govern it, and to contain it at a tolerable level” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5). The normative question that arises here is: ‘tolerable for whom?’ This has mainly to do with the difference between industrialised countries (dominant in climate security debates and connected to mitigation and adaptation) and developing countries (mostly seen as endangered but very much neglected from a western perspective in terms of mitigation). When assessing the different levels of referent objects, some remarks can be made by questioning if some are normatively more preferable. On the territorial level, climate securitisation in terms of national security conceptions and conflicts between states or groups can be highly problematic. In a positive way, the discourse helps to bring climate change on the agenda of coalitions that would normally not have taken climate change seriously, such as the UN Security Council or the NATO. However, it can also distract the attention from efforts of climate change mitigation to rather adaptation measures and interferences in countries at risk, which can ultimately take the form of military intervention (ibid.; Hartmann 2010: 241).

28 But in the end, it depends on the time and the context whether a territorial securitisation can have positive or negative consequences (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5). The individual level seems to be more suitable for climate security discourses, since the pitfalls of the territorial level can be avoided (Detraz & Betsill 2009: 307). In a positive way, the individual discourse focuses on the people who are most vulnerable to climate change and stays away from national security conceptions based on the traditional state- centred security logic. Nevertheless, individual securitisation has the danger that the ones seen as vulnerable are becoming the ones who are dangerous themselves. For instance, when climate change threatens poor populations in developing unstable countries in their human security, it becomes easy for securitising actors to make a dangerous territorial argument. This argument can focus on failing states, terrorism and large-scale migration movements, which in turn can lead to concerns of national security for industrialised countries (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5). The discourse of the planetary level can be perceived as the least problematic, because it underlines the interdependency of the whole international community and its surrounding ecosystem. It calls for the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) and for sustainable measures in economic activity. However, the planetary approach might be too weak to produce a policy output that can be considered as successful, and has difficulties in producing the same degree of attention compared to arguments with a clearer referent object. Moreover, the discourse has a thin line with the ambiguous framing of climate change in the past and can therefore be dismissed as unworldly and naïve. The Kyoto Protocol which aims at a reduction of GHG emissions and its doubtful success is an example of this discourse (ibid.).

29 4. The United States and Germany: Territorial versus individual climate security

This chapter will elaborate on the dominant climate security discourses within the US and Germany. While the US constructs climate change as a territorial danger, in Germany are individual framings dominant. In both cases, the relationship between the member country and the NATO is briefly explained, followed by an elaboration on the general climate debate, the securitisation of climate change and the main actors in the debate, the political consequences and a short conclusion. This chapter is based on secondary sources, in which the book of Diez et al. (2016) is used as the main source and guide for further research of the cases of the Netherlands and the NATO.

4.1. The United States: Climate change as a territorial danger

4.1.1. The United States and the NATO Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the US has been a leading country of the NATO. The current US defence expenditures are twice as much as European expenditures and count for 70 percent of the total NATO expenditures (Elshout & Koelé 2016: 10-11). From a purely military perspective, one can say the US is capable of independent military action and therefore does not need its European allies (Erdmann 2013). However, the need and value of the NATO has been firmly established within the national strategy and army doctrine of the US for years (Schmidt 1994). The NATO serves not only as an important source of stability and economic prosperity, but NATO allies also contribute in a fundamental way to the legitimacy of American foreign policy. Furthermore, in a world which is increasingly dominated by different power blocks such as Russia and China, the alliance forms a powerful basis of mutual democratic values and economic interests (Erdmann 2013; De Rave 2016).

4.1.2. The general climate debate The US is usually seen as a stumbling block to an international treaty in which the reduction of GHG emissions is presented. The country is by far the largest contributor of emissions in history with 339,174 metric tons or 28 percent between 1850 and 2007 (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.1). Although China has now surpassed the rate of US emissions, the US can still be

30 seen as one of the largest emitters per capita (World Bank 2013). “The high emissions output and the slow adoption of meaningful federal climate legislation or international commitments have led to the US ranking in the lower regions of most international climate policy tables” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.1). Although the overall climate performance of the US can be seen as poor, from the late 1960s the environment became a great policy concern in the country. Due to a vigorous environmental and scientific advocacy community and the implementation of progressive laws, the US evolved into an environmental forerunner (idem: ch.3, 3.2). After years of political and public awareness of climate change, in the late 1990s support for firm environmental regulation increasingly disappeared and more sceptical attitudes towards climate change took over the domestic political landscape (Grundmann & Scott 2014: 222). This trend consolidated during the presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009). Increasing opposition against environmental and climate policies came from both Congress with anti- environmental Republicans and an effective non-governmental lobby in which the business community was particularly showing its stance (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.2). After Democrat Barack Obama was elected as President in 2009, climate issues made their entry again in the top of America’s political agenda (Vig 2013: 98-102). Obama argued for ‘a new era of global cooperation on climate change’ and his statements were backed by a Democratic majority in Congress and more support from the public and even the business community. However, this optimistic picture was short-lived due to “the failed UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen in late 2009 and the Democrat’s defeat in the Senate in the mid- term elections of 2010, and later in the House of Representatives” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.2). In the following years Obama’s attempts to push for climate legislation and invest in renewable energies did not succeed. Nevertheless, climate change remained on the agenda, due to the contribution of domestic advocacy efforts, international pressure, greater media coverage and climate friendly policies set by individual states such as California. In 2014, reports from the National Climate Assessment (NCA) and think tank CNA highlighted the seriousness of climate change and its consequences for US security (ibid.). Although on emission levels the US still performs poorly, the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) has recently discovered positive signals. Where in 2015 the CCPI ranked the US on place 46, this changed in 2016 to place 34. This mainly comes from the CCPI policy ranking, in which the US climbed from place 35 to 12

31 partly due to its efforts towards international climate negotiations (Germanwatch & CAN 2016).

4.1.3. The securitisation of climate change Diez et al. (2016: ch.3, 3.3) distinguish the debate on climate security in the US in two phases: the first phase in the 1980s and 1990s centred around environmental security on a planetary and individual level, while the second phase from the mid-2000s focused solely on climate change as a territorial danger. Early arguments in the 1970s on climate security mainly focused on issues such as food security and sea level rise, which can be categorised in the planetary and individual level. Although these arguments were overshadowed by the Soviet threat, after the Cold War non-traditional security issues gained more attention. The lack of a clear enemy gave room to ‘new discourses of danger’, in which climate change slowly became one of the most serious environmental security concerns. Until the 1990s, the general focus on climate change was more international and framed as a planetary or individual danger in order to claim the need for an international climate regime. While statements of climate change as a planetary or individual danger were often conflated with the destruction of the ozone layer and later with global warming, these articulations gradually became more cautious and were rather described in long-term risks. This representation led to difficulties in the mobilisation of more support in public and political circles. Together with the increasing impact of climate sceptics and their campaigns against binding agreements to combat climate change, the general climate debate as well as the climate security debate lost prominence in the late 1990s. After Bush was elected as President in 2001 and the ‘war on terror’ started ensuing from the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the so called ‘soft’ climate issues were almost excluded from the US security sector. While funding was cut, executive orders were reversed, institutions were renamed and important personnel replaced, opposition and dissatisfaction with Bush’s moves eventually helped the second phase of the climate security debate to emerge. The appearance of a study in 2003 commissioned by Andrew Marshall, an influential defence adviser of the US Department of Defence (DOD), marked the beginning of the territorial danger discourse in the US (ibid.). The report stated in an alarming way that climate change “should be elevated beyond a scientific debate to a US national security concern” (Schwartz & Randall 2003: 3).

32 Because this report was in variance with the official stance of the Bush administration on climate change, it had limited political impact. However, it paved the way for a broad range of climate security studies which significantly reduced the amount of planetary references. Climate change increasingly became a topic of US national security and its image from being an abstract, distant and global environmental concern transformed into an issue with immediate consequences for US security. Hence, the Bush administration was put under pressure by the opposition to give climate change considerable political attention. Together with the fourth assessment report of the ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ (IPCC), this created awareness of climate change and its security implications among the general public and within military and political circles (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.3). When Diez et al. (2016: ch.3, 3.4) took a closer look to the climate security discourses within Congressional debates and think tank reports in the US, they saw 2007 as the year in which the territorial danger discourse gained prominence. “The most common articulation presents US national security as threatened by the direct physical and the indirect socio- economic and political effects of climate change” (ibid.). The installations and training procedures of the US military were mentioned as mainly threatened by the direct dangers of climate change. An important CNA report in 2007 depicted climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ that could exacerbate instability and conflict in states which were already fragile. Within this discourse, climate change could not only further destabilise certain regions, but could also lead to the spread of terrorist ideologies and even nuclear war. In this way, the connections between climate change and military interventions were easily made (ibid.). Among influential actors in the US, Diez et al. (2016: ch.3, 3.5) discovered that environmental NGOs are since the turn of the millennium relatively absent in climate security discourses. Instead, security think tanks largely influence the debate. This is because in the US experienced politicians and high-ranked military officers are often employed in these think tanks. Also, think tanks facilitate the heavy workload of active politicians by providing policy concepts and talking points. Besides this thin line with the government, think tanks maintain good connections with the media and with other non-governmental actors. Hence, they are able to provide cover for government actors who wish to go public with a new and perhaps provocative view. Not only institutions, but also individual actors can be discursive entrepreneurs in such a debate. Actors such as Kurt Campbell, Sherri Goodman, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko actively

33 engaged in reframing climate change as a national security issue. The engagement of the military in the climate security debate was an important part of their strategy, since the military enjoys an extremely good reputation in politics and among a large amount of the US public. Environmental NGOs kept away from the climate security debate, partly because of their lack of expertise in the security field and partly because they did not want to damage their environmental and liberal image. Another unusual feature in the second debate in the US was the lesser involvement of research institutions or scientists, especially in comparison with Germany. The catchy and policy-oriented language of think tanks received much more attention, since they construed the complex scientific argumentation into political language and received great prestige as security experts (ibid.).

4.1.4. Political consequences According to a think tank expert, “the climate security debate has not scored a goal but has moved the ball a bit across the field” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.6). Three important political consequences underlie this debate. First, the climate security discourse enabled politicians, regardless of their political stance, to speak about climate change without having the fear to be labelled, and thus bridged the gap between the liberals and the conservatives. Second, climate change received increased attention and caused the issue to enter the realm of high politics, which contributed to more initiatives on climate legislation. Furthermore, the debate had a strong effect on the American defence, security and intelligence sector and its focus changed from mitigation to adaptation measures (ibid.).

4.1.5. Conclusion The securitisation of climate change in the US underwent a transformation from an emphasis on planetary and individual risk in the 1980s and 1990s to a focus on arguments of territorial danger from the mid-2000s. The security think tanks were highlighted as the most important actors in the second debate, since their national security conceptions gained incredible attention within policy circles and among the wider public and because of the strong reputation of the military. The predominant territorial danger discourse particularly affected the security and defence sector and tended to a political approach of adaptation.

34 4.2. Germany: Climate change as an individual insecurity

4.2.1. Germany and the NATO West Germany became a member of the NATO in 1955, when its status as an occupied country came to an end. With Germany’s reunification in 1990, the “former German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany in its membership of NATO” (NATO 2016c). Germany’s membership played an important role in NATO’s enlargement with the inclusion of Central and Eastern European democracies (NATO 2016d). In line with its foreign policy consensus as a ‘civilian power’ after the Second World War, Germany has long maintained a restrained approach towards military involvement. In the alliance it depended on US leadership in the fields of military policy and ‘hard power’ (Overhaus 2004: 551; Carstensen 2016). Germany spent in 2015 1,18 percent of its GDP on the military, which is under the 2 percent norm of the NATO and even less than its expenditures in 2014 (NATO 2016e). However, Germany recently committed to enhance its military role in the NATO, partly as a consequence of the unease about Russian assertiveness (Carstensen 2016).

4.2.2. The general climate debate While the US is depicted as the fallen forerunner in climate policies, Germany is a significantly different case and rather seen as a forerunner, though an ambivalent one. “Germany has been a consistent advocate of binding international climate agreements, passed various rounds of legislation to curb CO2 emissions and reduced emissions to a considerably higher extent than many other countries” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.1). The country managed to decrease its emissions by 26 percent between 1990 and 2012, and thus performed better than its original reduction aims of 21 percent set in Kyoto. In this way Germany helped to accomplish the reduction targets of the European Union (EU) (Werland 2012: 55). Accordingly, with a 22nd place, Germany takes a high position in the CCPI (Germanwatch & CAN 2016). However, during the 1950s and 1960s Germany’s rapidly growing economy led to perceptible environmental pollution and the country lagged far behind on environmental protection. In this time, the US introduced new environmental policies. Together with the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 held in Stockholm, this provided an important drive for German environmentalism. Reports such as the ‘Limits to Growth’

35 developed by the Club of Rome and the UN Brundtland report strongly influenced the German environmental debate (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.2). Such political occurrences resulted in growing environmental awareness among the German public, which subsequently demanded appropriate government response (Feindt 2002; Roth & Rucht 2008). In the 1970s and 1980s various movements contributed to the formation of actors such as as the Green Party and Greenpeace Germany, which led to more changes in policy and government institutions (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.2). Scholars have recognised, with the ambivalences of Germany’s policies in mind, that its position toward climate protection can best be characterised by extremes. Krück et al. (1998: 2) argue that from the late 1970s the country transformed from a laggard to a leader ‘almost overnight’. Core concepts such as ‘sustainable development’ and ‘ecological modernisation’ began to prevail over the ‘limits to growth’ model and materialised in policies. After Germany’s reunification in 1990, environmental issues became inferior to other political issues, such as social and economic concerns. However, with its reputation as a civilian power, Germany carried on in supporting international efforts to tackle climate change. In 1998, a new coalition government between Greens and Social Democrats overcame the relative stagnation in climate policymaking. The coalition initiated a program of ecological modernisation, which led to a big progression in Germany’s energy and environmental policies (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.2). After a new coalition government (CDU/CSU-SPD) was elected in 2005 with Angela Merkel as chancellor, Merkel decisively continued to support Germany’s role of international leadership in climate policies (ibid.). However, the ambivalence of its policies is still present. Despite the significant cuts in emissions and investments in renewable energy, it is unlikely that Germany will meet its own CO2 reduction target in 2020. The decrease in emissions has slowed down remarkably since 2000, and between 2011 and 2013 carbon emissions even rose (Clean Energy Wire 2015; Burck et al. 2012: 5). Also, some contradictory developments played a role, such as the withdrawal from the production of nuclear energy which actually led to an increase in the importance of coal (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.1). However, a few days before the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris of the UNFCCC, environmental minister Hendricks started to advocate for the phase out of coal until 2035/2040. It is expected that this will influence the environmental future of Germany (Germanwatch & CAN 2016).

36 4.2.3. The securitisation of climate change Since the emergence of the first debates on environmental security in the 1970s, discourses of individual danger and risk together with planetary framings of security have been dominant. Because of its Nazi past, the German military has suffered from a bad reputation and has been a topic of contestation among the general public. Together with a long- established environmental concern, an influential Green Party, a strong scientific community as well as an active civil society sector, this has resulted in a context in which, in contrast to the US, the discourse on territorial danger has not flourished (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.1). Diez et al. (2016: ch.4, 4.3) separate the climate security discourse in Germany in two periods. The first phase of climate security discourses started from the 1970s and lasted until the mid-1990s. These discourses were characterised by “the depletion of the ozone layer, the ‘Limits to Growth’ debate, and the invocation of a ‘climate catastrophe’” (ibid.). Particularly, the debate called for the need of behavioural change in order to save human society from environmental dangers. From the 1980s, the securitisation of climate change functioned as an agenda-setter and resulted in advanced policies to decrease carbon emissions. Although these policies were equivocal, such a trajectory in a firmly industrialised country with a powerful car industry showed the success of securitisation. In the course of the climate security debate, parliamentarians and scientists increasingly used the narrative of ‘climate catastrophe’. Although not everybody believed in these dramatic framings, the call from scientists to create governmental research groups was immediately heard. In 1987, the ‘Enquete Commission for Preparation for the Protection of the Atmosphere’ was established in order to investigate the status of the atmosphere and to propose protection measures in national or international contexts (ibid.). The commission, which consisted of nine parliamentarians and nine scientific experts, indicated the strong influence of science in the German debate on climate change (Altenhof 2002). Largely due to the commission’s work, political attention for climate change increased and reached its peak with the first COP of the UNFCCC in 1995 in Berlin. Although the second phase was still characterised by framings of individual danger which were occasionally combined with planetary articulations, the narrative of global warming came much more into focus. In the early 2000s new discursive entrepreneurs appeared. The security think tank Adelphi emerged as one of the most import actors. “The securitisation of climate change in Germany is a consequence of the voices of a multitude of

37 actors and coalitions from different sectors such as science, civil society, bureaucracy, government and the media” (Diez et al. 2016: ch4, 4.4). The German debate is much more predicated upon scientific findings and the international climate debate with references to for instance the IPCC and the World Bank, when compared to the US. Due to its broad basis in society, individual entrepreneurs such as in the US case were not that visible (idem: ch.4, 4.3). After the discouraging Copenhagen Summit in 2009, a change in discourses occurred when most actors in science and civil society stopped in articulating ‘horror scenarios’ in order to achieve policy change. Instead, various discursive entrepreneurs started to aspire the promotion of a certain ‘good global citizen’ stance (ibid.). This attitude actually fitted “into a broader discourse of guilt in German political culture after the Second World War” (Berger 2012). This is in line with Germany as a ‘civilian power’ whose foreign and security policy is often depicted as peaceful and restrained. Individual and planetary risk articulations are most appropriate in this context, which leave no room for emergency measures and the inclusion of the armed forces in climate policy (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.3).

4.2.4. Political consequences The Federal Foreign Office is seen as the main authority to address climate change in Germany, whereby development policy and preventive security are regarded as most important in avoiding an increase of the dangers and risks connected to climate change. Securitisation in Germany achieved great political attention for climate change, combined with framings of the ‘climate catastrophe’ Germany continued to set high emission reduction targets. The German debate has not only influenced the domestic energy politics (retraction of nuclear energy and great investments in renewable energy), but also affected foreign and development policy. In contrast, the effects on military planning were limited since the German Federal Armed Forces have only published two reports on the security threat of climate change until now. The increased framings in terms of individual and planetary risk led the German government to involve the insurance industry into the climate security debate, by supporting the creation of certain finance mechanisms that cover “the increased risks of 500 million individuals through climate change by 2020” (Diez et al. 2016: ch4, 4.5).

38 4.2.5. Conclusion The German climate security discourse consisted of individual, and to a lesser extent, planetary articulations. From the mid-1990s, individual risk has been specifically dominant, but articulations often mixed risk and danger together. A multitude of discursive entrepreneurs played a role in the securitisation process, in which scientific organisations and NGOs have been incredibly influential compared to the US. Furthermore, the historically tarnished status of the military resulted in the relative absence of territorial discourses and thus a very limited role for the military in the climate security debate. Instead, Germany focused on developmental policies by helping developing countries with sustainable development and climate adaptation, as well as the economic opportunities that come from a reorientation towards climate adaptation and mitigation policies.

4.3. Conclusion: The United States and Germany: Territorial versus individual climate security

The climate security discourse in Germany opposes the securitisation of climate change in the US. While the US mainly draws on the territorial danger discourse in especially the second phase, in Germany individual security, with a focus on risk, prevailed. In Germany, a great diversity of discursive entrepreneurs was involved in the climate security debate. After the Second World War, Germany’s image as a civilian power resulted in a strong influence of NGOs and scientific organisations. Its military suffered from a bad reputation, which prevented the emergence of a territorial discourse. In contrast, the powerful reputation of the US army and the dominance of security think tanks (represented by politicians and military officers) in the US climate security debate, created the perception of climate change as a danger to national security. When comparing the performance on combating climate change, the US is running far behind Germany. The countries differ strongly on the output of GHG emissions as well as the implementation of climate policies and the commitment to international agreements.

39 5. The Netherlands: Climate change as a planetary insecurity

5.1. Introduction The Netherlands is connected to climate change in a unique way. A few facts about this country, where 26 percent of its land surface is below sea level and 59 percent is prone to river flooding, reveal that an expected sea level rise critically threatens the nation (PBL 2008). The Netherlands perceives itself as part of a global whole where all humans are interdependent and must share solutions. This social identity strongly influences the country’s actions (Pettenger 2007: 68). Although the domestic unrest in the early 2000s negatively affected the Dutch climate agenda and the struggle with reducing its GHG emissions continues (idem: 63), the Netherlands currently seems to strive again for global leadership in climate policies (idem: 51). The Dutch climate security discourse connects to its identity; climate change is mainly framed as a planetary or individual risk. The country recently committed to the EU’s request to develop a comprehensive climate change adaptation strategy, which will be announced in 2016. Together with plans to integrate climate change into security policy, the Netherlands has a chance to better its position on the CCPI. Due to the limited success in the reduction of emissions, the country is ranked at place 35 (compared to place 40 in 2015), which is just behind the US (place 34) and far behind Germany (place 22) (Germanwatch & CAN 2016). In this chapter, the relationship between the Netherlands and the NATO is briefly described, followed by an elaboration on the general climate debate, the securitisation of climate change, the political consequences and a short conclusion. The analysis of the Dutch climate debate is largely based on the work of Pettenger (2007). In this book, called ‘The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses’, she dedicates a chapter to the formation of climate change policy in the Netherlands from the 1980s (idem: 13). This source is used in order to explain the general development of the Dutch climate debate, and because it provides a good structure for a discourse analysis of securitisation. For this analysis, publications of relevant actors in the climate debate are used, ranging from Dutch ministries, (government) research institutions, think tanks and discursive entrepreneurs.

40 5.2. The Netherlands and the NATO The Netherlands is one of the founders of the NATO and considers the alliance as the keystone of its security policies. The small country acknowledges that it is not able to guarantee its own safety. Therefore, it strives for intensive military cooperation with similar states and a strong European Union (WRR 2010: 9; Dutch Ministry of Defence 2013: 8). Recently, the NATO criticised the Dutch armed forces for their insufficient capabilities and contribution to NATO forces. Through the ‘NATO Defence Planning Capability Review’ (DPCR), the NATO expressed its concerns about the Dutch defence budget and the readiness of the armed forces. European NATO members spend on average 1,43 percent of their GDP on defence. The Netherlands is with 1,14 percent far below average (De Volkskrant 2016). Minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert stated that until now, the defence budget is increased with half a billion euros and that improvements are being made, although it will take multiple years to make the Dutch armed forces sufficiently capable again (Radio Een Vandaag 2016).

5.3. The general climate debate A culmination of several processes contributed in the late 1960s to a growing environmental concern among the Dutch public. Although the rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s had led to higher material living standards than before, it also started to raise doubts among an increasing number of people about the immaterial quality of life (Cramer 1989: 103). In the early 1970s, as in Germany, public concern in the Netherlands was further evoked through the report of the ‘Limits to Growth’ issued by the Club of Rome and the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm (ibid.; Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.2). Most Dutch political parties started to recognise environmental issues such as pollution and environmental degradation. This resulted in the legislation of various environmental laws and regulations and the establishment of a special department in 1971, which is currently called the ‘National Institute of Public Health and the Environment’ (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu - RIVM) (Cramer 1989: 103). In 1972, the Dutch government provided for the first time a proper overview of Dutch environmental policy in the ‘Urgence Memorandum on the Environment’ (‘Urgentienota Milieuhygiëne’) (VROM 2001). In this period, a large amount of environmental action groups was created in order to influence government policy or mobilise the public, such as the ‘Dutch

41 Society for the Preservation of the Waddensea’ (Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee) in 1965 and the ‘Environmental Defence League’ (Vereniging Milieudefensie) in 1972 (Cramer 1989: 103-105). However, the socio-economic stagnation that set in after the oil crisis in 1973 had a clear impact on Dutch society. A growing unemployment rate combined with a government confronted with a shrinking income from taxes and increasing social welfare expenditures, led to a further economic slowdown. This changed the idealistic mentality of people towards the environment, and political concern and response decreased (idem: 107-108; Dijkink & Van der Wusten 1992: 7). In the late 1980s the publication of two documents had a significant impact on environmental consciousness and policymaking in the Netherlands. The first document was the Brundtland Report published by the UN in 1987, which introduced the concept of ‘sustainable development’. In 1988, the second document was produced by the RIVM called the ‘Concern for Tormorrow’ (‘Zorgen voor Morgen’) (Pettenger 2007: 55). This report provided the first national outlook in which an alarming prediction was made about future environmental problems. Furthermore, the publication marked the beginning of nature and environmental planning which was first executed by the RIVM and is currently done by the ‘Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency’ (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving – PBL). The impact of the two reports, together with severe weather events in the late 1980s, led to the formation of the first ‘National Environmental Policy Plan’ in 1989 (Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan – NMP1) (ibid.; RIVM 2013). The NMP1 serves as an ambitious and comprehensive plan which is created to guide policymaking in the future. The plan did not only show the leading role of the Dutch government in defining and addressing environmental degradation (top-down perspective), but was also in itself a global pioneering expression of environmental policy and even served as a source of inspiration for other states and organisations, such as the EU. Since its adoption, “the national plans have served as guides for all subsequent governmental policies and laws, and precipitated five major changes2 in political perspective” (Pettenger 2007: 56-58). Scientific information plays an important role in the rise of Dutch environmental consciousness and self-awareness of the country’s own contribution to climate change (idem: 60). The reports of the IPCC are seen as the most fundamental sources of knowledge about

2 Due to the length of this chapter, these changes will only partly be discussed. Many of the principles initiated in NMP1 were maintained and strengthened through subsequent versions of the NMP (Pettenger 2007: 58).

42 climate change. Both the ‘Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute’ (Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut – KNMI) and the PBL use IPCC reports (PBL & KNMI 2015). While the Dutch recognise their responsibility in this debate, this acknowledgement is challenged by the material realities of its GHG emissions and its energy-intensive developed society. Compared with other European states, the Netherlands produces a significant amount of GHG emissions per capita and even saw this level increasing in the period between 1990 and 2000. Consequently, the country reconsidered its goals and policies around the reduction of emissions to set a more realistic timetable (Pettenger 2007: 60-61). In 1998, the Netherlands joined the EU to sign the Kyoto Protocol. In 1999 and 2000 it produced documents considering domestic and international climate measures: Part I and respectively Part II of the ‘Climate Policy Implementation Plan’. The Dutch government encouraged these measures globally by hosting the COP6 in The Hague in 2000. However, the optimism of the government and the Dutch citizens “about a multilateral approach to climate change was severely wounded when the meeting failed to come to agreement on measures to meet the Kyoto Protocol Goals” (idem: 61). The subsequent meeting in Bonn also failed because of the withdrawal of the US and its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. Although the newly published NMP4 in 2001 showed the Dutch conviction to progressively reduce its emissions in an international and EU-based response, this optimism quickly faded when Dutch politics and society started to experience a transition (ibid.; VROM 2001: 33). The elections in 2002 combined with several disturbing events disrupted the generally stable flow of politics in the country and reduced the citizen’s trust in the democratic government (Pettenger 2007: 63; Hendriks et al. 2012: 133). Ten days before the elections on 6 May 2002, Pim Fortuyn, popular leader of the extreme right party ‘Lijst Pim Fortuyn’ (LPF), was murdered by a white man who was supposed to be a green activist (Pennings & Keman 2002: 4). A week after the assassination, LPF Chairman Peter Langendam stated: “the bullet came from Left” (Halsema 2016: 102). He blamed the leftist parties - Fortuyn’s political opponents - for the incitement of hatred and specifically proclaimed environmental party ‘Green Left’ (‘GroenLinks’) as responsible for the violence. Gradually, murderer Volkert van der Graaf was identified by Fortuyn’s heirs and the public as someone who belonged to GroenLinks. While in fact he did not have any ties with the party, GroenLinks’ reputation transformed from “a welcome opposition party to an undesirable political player” (idem: 114).

43 The hatred against GroenLinks and leftist parties in general caused the Dutch population to lose interest in the issue of climate change. In 2004, the already nervous Dutch were again startled by the assassination of film director Theo van Gogh, carried out by an Islamic extremist. Since Van Gogh was a good friend of Fortuyn and had similar populist ideas, his murder drew the focus of the national debate to issues of migration and terrorism (Pettenger 2007: 63; Halsema 2016: 107). Concurrently, progressive environmental policy decreased with the election of a more conservative government. “As the State Secretary for the Environment, Pieter van Geel said: ‘It is nostalgia to profile the Netherlands as the leader it might once have been in the area of environmental issues’” (Pettenger 2007: 64). However, from 2004 the Netherlands started to reinvent its climate policies and attempted to retake its role as European environmental leader. It placed great importance on the EU to promote its climate policies. With the ‘Climate Policy Evaluation Memorandum 2005: On the way to Kyoto’ (‘Evaluatienota Klimaatbeleid 2005: Onderweg naar Kyoto’), climate change officially returned on the Dutch policy agenda (idem: 64-67). In 2007, the Dutch government established the ‘Second State Delta Committee’ with the impetuous storm surge of 1953 in mind. The committee provided advice on the protection of the Netherlands against the expected effects of climate change, such as more rainfall and sea level rise (Verduijn et al. 2012: 469). The suggestions had several policy results, such as the ‘Delta Program’ in which important steps were being taken to make the country more climate proof. Following the request from the European Commission (EC) to all member states to propose a comprehensive climate adaptation strategy by 2017, the Dutch government announced the ‘National Adaptation Strategy’ (NAS) for 2016. Where the Delta Program focuses on water-related themes, the NAS focuses on all sectors that will feel the impact of climate change, such as agriculture, energy and infrastructure. Furthermore, the consequences of global climatic effects for the Netherlands will be described (Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie 2016). This global view is further reflected in the ‘Planetary Security Conference’, which was hosted by the Netherlands in The Hague in November 2015. The initiative of Bert Koenders, Minister of Foreign Affairs, provides an international platform for the discussion of the impacts of climate change on security (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015: 5).

44 5.4. The securitisation of climate change The development of the Dutch environmental policies in general can be typified by a shift in focus from direct and subsequent action to prevention and planning (VROM 2001: 20). The environmentalist movement which rapidly expanded from the late 1960s carried out a cosmological worldview in which “they opposed developments that visibly attacked the ‘organic foundations of the life-world’” (Cramer 1989: 101-102). In this period, a planetary danger discourse prevailed and led, through the publication of documents such as the ‘Limits to Growth’ report, to further public and political concern (idem: 103). After a period of socio- economic stagnation in the Netherlands and decreasing attention for the environment, the Brundtland Report (1987) and the Dutch RIVM document ‘Zorgen voor Morgen’ (1988) raised new environmental awareness (Pettenger 2007: 55). Since the Brundtland Report introduced the concept of sustainable development, it has become one of the primary norms in climate change policy in the Netherlands. The Dutch define this norm as “economic development that places equal emphasis on the economy and the environment, and as requiring economic, political, and social processes to be changed today to avoid passing pollution problems to future generations” (idem: 52). The norms of ‘Stewardship’, ‘Equity’, the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ and the ‘Precautionary Principle’ embody the Dutch definition of sustainable development (ibid.). These principles can be found in the RIVM report, which was produced in order to explore the long-term environmental consequences for the Netherlands in a global context (RIVM 1988: 8). It signifies the growing need for a risk-based approach, while framing climate change as a planetary issue:

“As environmental issues are becoming more widespread, a global and structural preventive approach is urgently necessary. Climate change and ozone depletion can cause globally significant risks for the environment and public health and can have extensive damaging consequences. This means that the current generation is expected to let the long-term benefits of measures outweigh the costs that will be incurred in the coming decades” (idem: 28).

The year of 1989 is seen as the year that environmental consciousness reached its highest point, in which the Dutch government emerged as the leading actor in addressing environmental degradation (Pettenger 2007: 57). The emergence of green parties and pressure groups and the general greening of politics occurred more or less at the same time

45 (Dijkink & Van der Wusten 1992: 10). In her Christmas message, Queen Beatrix called for a Dutch response in terms of a planetary danger:

“The earth is slowly dying… We human beings ourselves have become a threat to the planet. Those who no longer wish to disregard the insidious pollution and depredation of the environment are driven to despair” (Pettenger 2007: 57).

The publication of the NMP1 in that same year, urgently titled ‘Choose or Lose’ (‘Kiezen of Verliezen’), marked the beginning of a significant transformation in Dutch environmental policy (ibid.). The report resulted from joint policymaking between the former ‘Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environmental management’ (‘Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer’ – VROM) and four other ministries, which showed the need for coordination of environmental planning in overlapping policy fields (idem: 56). The publication focused on the so-called ‘approach to risk’, in which a remarkable attempt was made in making risks quantifiable and which laid the groundwork for environmental effect- oriented policies (VROM 1989).

“The approach to risk should help to ensure that risks regarding its nature and scope become clearer and better comparable, also for the population. Too often, only the undesirable effects are taken into account, while the chance of the occurrence of these effects is neglected” (idem: 12).

In this period, climate change was variously depicted as a planetary danger or risk, though the NMP1 showed the increasing dominance of the planetary risk discourse (VROM 2001: 20):

“The international acceptance of the Dutch strategy will further be promoted. Agreement on policies and policy principles at the international level reinforces the Dutch policy and promotes the control of transboundary risks. This strategy represents a new challenge for a renewed effort to promote the safety and thus to harmonize human activity and the environment, the ecological suitability” (VROM 1989: 27).

In 2001, the fourth version of the NMP, the NMP4 titled ‘One World and One Will: Working on Sustainable Development’ (‘Een Wereld en een Wil: Werken aan Duurzaamheid’) came out (VROM 2001). The publication presented a broader and more future-oriented vision, in which seven environmental problems were discussed that international society faces over the

46 period to 2030. The report shows the continuation of the planetary discourse in the Netherlands, combined with articulations on the individual level:

“Climate change threatens the security and health of people in many different ways, as well as the stability, diversity and survival of natural ecosystems” (VROM 2001: 49).

While this quotation tends towards the threatification of climate change, the overall document fits more in a discourse of risk, referring to scenario planning and the credible establishment of the Precautionary Principle (VROM 2001; Pettenger 2007: 62). However, the Dutch environmental conviction was still very much in tension with the well-established norm of Economic Efficiency and its merchant identity. Moreover, the NMP4 was published during a time of Dutch political transition and economic recession, which eventually did not prove very successful. The country was incapable to meet its goal of a 3 percent reduction in GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 and the Dutch mind was quite damaged after the failures of the COP6 and the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. These developments led to a loss of interest in climate change among the Dutch public (Pettenger 2007: 63-64). A few years later, the Climate Policy Evaluation Memorandum 2005 was published and marked a return of climate change on the Dutch policy agenda (idem: 67). The report showed the increased attention for climate adaptation next to mitigation, and argued that more attention needed to be drawn to risks of flooding and other effects of climate change in future spatial policy (VROM 2005: 31-32):

“In the Netherlands, adaptation has recently been given a higher place on the political agenda. The Netherlands is most vulnerable to climate change impacts on water and adaptation in this area is obviously the most developed” (idem 31).

Subsequently, in 2008, the Second State Delta Committee announced suggestions on how to defend the country against the water-related impacts of climate change. Although no real crisis occurred, “the committee managed to create awareness and set the agenda for climate adaptation policy and the issue of safety in Dutch water management” (Verduijn et al. 2012: 469). It succeeded by using several framing strategies, in which it used the story of the Dutch delta identity, generated a sense of collectiveness and urgency, and created a crisis narrative (ibid.).

47 “Our Committee’s mandate is therefore unusual: we have been asked to come up with recommendations, not because a disaster has occurred, but rather to avoid one” (Veerman 2008: 7).

This quotation marks the riskification of climate change, because the committee acknowledges the undeniable and uncertain consequences of climate change and stresses the need for flood risk management (Verduijn et al. 2012: 476). Although the report unites the Netherlands as a (territorial) risk area, the articulations of risk refer to human security and place the Netherlands within the global community. Hence the speech acts are individual and planetary. In July 2008, former Dutch Minister of Defence Eimert van Middelkoop requested advice at the AIV on the “likely implications of climate change for the international security situation over the next twenty years”, as well as the implications for the international role of the Dutch armed forces. This report, called ‘Climate Change and Security’, was one of over forty research requests from the Ministry of Defence, which would all be used for drawing a future plan for the Dutch military (AIV 2009: 3). This highlights the growing awareness that also the military was no longer able to neglect the possible impacts of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’. The AIV report refers to reports from the IPCC, KNMI and the EU, as well as papers that consider the need for climate mitigation and adaptation (AIV 2008) and the proposition of a proactive approach to risks (WRR 2008). The identification of climate change as a potential security threat is in Dutch public documents largely limited to the inclusion of climate change in analyses concerning the changing security environment. However, increasing consideration has been given to anticipation on climate risks, such as disaster risk reduction (Van Schaik et al. 2015: 35). The ‘International Security Strategy’ of 2013 acknowledges climate change as a ‘new’ issue that increasingly dictates the international security agenda (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). In 2010, climate change has been included in the Defence report ‘Explorations: Guidance for the Armed Forces of the Future’ (‘Verkenningen: Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de Toekomst’). It identifies climate change as one of the eight driving forces of possible insecurity for the Netherlands and discusses the future role of the Dutch armed forces (Dutch Ministry of Defence 2010). The report addresses the need for climate proof defence materials and versatility of the military in for instance natural disasters, abroad but also inland:

48 “Sea level rise may threaten towns in the coastal regions of the Netherlands, as well as the supporting infrastructure of port facilities and oil refineries. Reliance on the armed forces for assistance can arise in case of flooding” (Dutch Ministry of Defence 2010: 82).

Van Schaik (2016) argues that the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs seem to consider climate change as a security threat, but that thus far it has not been specifically operationalised in security policies. However, the Dutch integrated approach of defence, development and diplomacy offers potential for the integration of climate change into security policy. A first attempt of this was made in an update of the Dutch international security strategy, in which framings of planetary risk were dominant (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; Van Schaik et al. 2015: 35-36):

“Problems regarding climate, water and raw materials can cause or exacerbate conflict and should therefore be part of early warning systems. Building a resilient population in rural and densely populated areas against the effects of climate change is the challenge for the coming decades and fits within a forward-looking foreign policy. The Netherlands can take responsibility for a liveable and sustainable world by using its knowledge and expertise in order to help prevent instability elsewhere” (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014: 17).

Subsequently, the Planetary Security Conference was organised by the Dutch government to create political awareness and involvement for the implementation of an integrated climate agenda (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). It showed the willingness of the Dutch to play a leading role (Van Winden 2016). The danger dimension of climate change and the presence of the military at the conference demonstrated a tendency towards threatification (Van Schaik 2016). However, the risk dimension seems to become more dominant in Dutch climate security discourses, which is supported by the supporting reports of the forthcoming NAS (PBL 2015a; PBL 2015b):

“The National Adaptation Strategy could be perceived as a national business case: a project plan with the objectives of the adaptation strategy, the required investments, the consequences of the possible implementation, the risk analysis, and a long-term planning” (PBL 2015a: 109).

5.5. Political consequences The Dutch government can be seen as the leading actor in the climate security discourse, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to become increasingly important. Individual

49 discursive entrepreneurs hardly played a role in the climate security debate. A growing number of reports on climate security describe the global effects of climate change on the country, which shows the planetary level of the Dutch discourse. According to the Dutch, climate change transcends national boundaries and therefore calls for an international and integrated approach (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The Dutch approach of defence, development and diplomacy, for which the country is known internationally, presents a way to integrate climate change in development and security policies (Van Schaik 2014: 36; Van Schaik 2016). In normative terms, the planetary security discourse can be perceived as the least problematic of the different levels, because it underlines the interdependency of the international community and its surrounding ecosystem. At the same time, the planetary approach has difficulties in producing an adequate degree of attention and does often lead to weak and unsuccessful policy outputs (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5). This refers to the integration of climate change in Dutch security policies that thus far has not been specifically developed (Van Schaik 2016). However, in recent years more sectors have become involved in climate policy, including the military. The Netherlands took an important step with the organisation of the Planetary Security Conference, which reflects the Dutch global view and tradition to maintain the international legal system (Van Winden 2016). Although the climate security discourse consisted of articulations in terms of danger, the overall development in the Netherlands can be seen as a move towards a planetary riskification of climate change.

5.6. Conclusion The climate security discourse in the Netherlands resembles more with the German discourse on the individual and planetary level than with the dominant territorial security discourse in the US. In the Netherlands, planetary framings prevail, combined with articulations on the individual level. This relates to the Dutch recognition that the Netherlands forms part of a global whole and is largely dependent on other countries in for example trade and the military. The Dutch discourse from the 1960s until now can generally be typified by a development in which climate change is increasingly perceived as a risk, in which precaution, scenario planning and risk reduction are of growing importance. These measures, together with initiatives such as the Planetary Security Conference, show the growing Dutch commitment and ambition to play a global leading role on the issue of climate change.

50 6. The NATO: Climate change and territorial defence

6.1. Introduction Since the NATO first recognised the environment as a security issue in 1969, the alliance has an ambivalent vision on climate change (Risso 2016: 3). Especially since the end of the Cold War, the alliance has continuously confirmed its broadened approach to security. Although NATO has increasingly announced its commitment to address climate change, its mandate and policies concerning the issue remain vague and largely undecided (Korteweg & Podkolinkski 2009: 59). This can be explained by the fact that NATO is a community of many different states in which a common ground for climate change is hard to reach. Another explanation is the traditional military identity of the alliance, which is struggling with its own commitment to a broader non-traditional approach to security (Van der Zeijden 2016). Hence, the dominant climate security discourse is strongly connected to NATO’s original mission: the collective defence of its own territory. Although the alliance recognises climate change as a threat-multiplier, articulations about the connection between climate change and security are often centred on clear threats to its security environment such as instability, conflict and migration (NATO/CCMS 1995: 38). It therefore largely constructs climate change as a territorial danger. Despite this expressed urgency, climate change has since Russia’s annexation of Crimea been largely overshadowed by the immediate military threat of Russia (NATO 2014; De Rave 2016; Van der Zeijden 2016). As shown in this chapter, this recent reorientation of NATO and its members does not mean that its attention for climate change has disappeared, but it indicates NATO’s struggle with this amorphous problem. In this chapter, NATO’s history is briefly described, followed by an elaboration on the alliance’s securitisation of climate change, the political consequences and a short conclusion. This chapter is based on the analysis of internal documents published by NATO, such as Strategic Concepts, research reports, speeches and press statements, as well as documents about NATO from external actors.

6.2. A short history of the NATO The NATO was created as part of a broader attempt to serve three purposes: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a

51 strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration” (NATO 2015a). On 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by twelve states from North-America and Europe; Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Canada and the US. The members agreed on the united efforts for collective military defence and the maintenance of peace and security. Article 5 is considered as the most important part of the treaty, in which the NATO members agreed on the mutual defence in case of an armed attack by any external party against one or more of the members (NATO 1949). Given the accomplishment of NATO’s primary mission with the collapse of the Soviet Union, fundamental questions about whether the alliance is still necessary or relevant have emerged (Weinrod 2012: 1). Furthermore, in the fields of International Relations and Security Studies, the politico-strategic identity and actions of the NATO are among the topics which received the most controversy. NATO’s evolution in the past decennia, concerning the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 attest to the ongoing demand for a comprehensive and clear understanding of NATO’s role. After 1989 the NATO started a process of reorientation which had approximately two consequences (Ciut 2002: 35; De Rave 2016). Alongside NATO’s traditional role concerning the territorial defence of its members, the alliance started to conduct so-called ‘out-of-area’ operations in order to create security at a distance. These operations were often connected to new security-related issues such as cyber defence, counterpiracy, counterterrorism, missile defence, energy security and climate change. This development runs parallel with the reorientation of several national armed forces, including the Dutch and German armed forces. Cuts in military expenditures (referred to as the ‘peace dividend’) and the creation of mobility were important factors in this development, whereby the heavy military means were partly or completely replaced by lighter versions that were more suitable for out-of-area operations in for instance Afghanistan (Weinrod 2012: 1; De Rave 2016). Since its establishment, membership of the NATO has increased from 12 to 28 countries. Currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Georgia as partner countries have declared the ambition to NATO membership (NATO 2015b). In recent years the alliance also developed security and politically based partnerships with a significant amount of nations in Europe, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, as well as with

52 international organisations such as the African Union, the UN, and the World Bank (Weinrod 2012: 1). The NATO also established bilateral structured relationships with Russia and Ukraine, but since the Russia-Ukraine conflict, cooperation with Russia has been suspended while cooperation with Ukraine has been intensified (idem; NATO 2016a; NATO 2016b). Furthermore, Russia’s annexation in Ukraine in 2013, the first annexation since the Second World War, can be seen as a wake-up call for the NATO. It caused the member countries to realise that the security environment on the East and the South had changed and that this required a change in NATO’s strategy. Particularly, the downing of the passenger flight MH17 of Malaysia Airlines caused by the violence in eastern Ukraine, brought the conflict closer to the allies (NATO 2016a; De Rave 2016). These developments have recently led to a shift which focuses on the largest reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence since the Cold War. Currently, sixteen European member countries have agreed to increase their defence expenditures. The changing security environment on NATO’s borders was the central theme of the NATO summit on 8 and 9 July 2016 in Warsaw. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg presented the alliance’s attitude towards Russia in the words ‘defence’, ‘deterrence’ and ‘dialogue’. He announced that NATO’s focus will be on the collective defence of its territory: “We have to adapt to a world which has by all means become more dangerous” (Elshout & Koelé 2016).

6.3. The securitisation of climate change The NATO recognised security challenges related to the natural environment for the first time in 1969, when it initiated the ‘Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society’ (CCMS). Together with the Science Committee, the CCMS was launched in order to become a key component of NATO’s ‘third dimension’, in addition to its military and political dimensions. The swift pace of industrialisation and economic transformations resulted in the fact that all NATO-countries had to face air and water pollution, industrial waste problems and urbanisation. In this time, criticism increased among wide sectors of the public about the damaging economic effects on the environment. The CCMS provided a forum where NATO- members and partner countries could cooperate and share knowledge on health, social and environmental issues. It was meant to bring new life to the alliance, both in the engagement with themes far outside its traditional scope and in the media attention it received to regain public support (NATO/CCMS 1995: 34; Risso 2016: 3-9).

53 The launch of the CCMS was therefore an attempt to respond to the public’s concerns, as in the US, Germany and the Netherlands. But it also marked a crucial step towards a new strategic concept of the NATO, in which the label ‘environment’ introduced subjects such as crisis management and disaster relief. The work of the CCMS could be seen as “an attempt to redefine the security concept of the alliance and the idea of what constituted a threat. It was a first tangible sign that the alliance was moving towards a different kind of defence, which was not only military defence but defence of their populations and their wellbeing.” (Risso 2016: 11). In the end of the 1970s, experts recognised the success of the CCMS in the past years, in which the general focus seemed to have moved from territorial to individual security with more focus on risk. Hence, NATO’s redefined discourse on security became more similar to especially German and Dutch discourses, because of more recognition for an individual and risk-based approach. But with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 by the Soviet Union, NATO’s attention quickly shifted back to military defence and the CCMS began to suffer from a lack of political support (idem: 28-29). After the Cold War with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, NATO’s state representatives recognised the need for a strategic transformation. The alliance increasingly identified non-traditional security threats in an enlarged regional and global context, similar to planetary articulations in the US, German and Dutch discourses, and exemplified in the new Strategic Concept of 1991 (NATO/CCMS 1995: 38):

“But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension” (NATO 1991).

This security concept broadened NATO’s mission to cooperation with Eastern countries, promotion of political stability and democracy, and mitigation of environmental problems. Following the US DOD, the NATO recognised the link between environmental issues, stability and conflict (Butts 1993: 6-7). In occasion of the Plenary Meeting of the NATO in Washington D.C. in 1995, the CCMS launched a pilot study called ‘Environment and Security in an International Context’. The pilot study, co-chaired by the US and Germany, presented “the relationship between environmental change and security at the regional, international, and global levels”

54 (NATO/CCMS 1995: 34). It demonstrated that the NATO was seeking for a solution on how to combine the environment with security, which tended to a riskification of climate change:

“Its main goal is to elaborate conclusions and recommendations to integrate environmental considerations in security deliberations and to integrate security considerations in national and international environmental policies and instruments. These conclusions and recommendations are guided by the principles of sustainable development and a precautionary approach, emphasizing preventive measures and strategies” (ibid.).

However, the CCMS report actually revealed many articulations which fit into a territorial danger discourse. The assessment of the links between the environment and security showed a strong emphasis on conflict and violence. Furthermore, the report indicated the linkage between the original treaty and the non-traditional threat of the environment, and therefore demonstrated that the NATO is still connected to the traditional (military) conception of security:

“With reference to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, any issue can be brought before the Alliance for the purpose of consultation with other Member States when one Member State perceives the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Member States is threatened. This could conceivably include an environmental issue (NATO/CCMS 1995: 38)”.

In order to anticipate on the further security and political developments since the Strategic Concept in 1991, NATO state representatives agreed on a new strategy in Washington D.C. on NATO’s 50th anniversary in 1999. The alliance again highlighted its broad approach to security, and put more emphasis on taking account of the global context and the importance of developing an effective cooperation with regional and international institutions, such as the UN and European institutions. This resulted in a shift of NATO’s discourse from a territorial to a planetary focus on climate security (NATO 1999). In that time, the main security challenge of the alliance was located outside its territory, albeit in its direct neighbourhood; the Balkans. It therefore adopted a policy for the execution of ‘out of area’ operations, which led the NATO-countries to slowly transform their armed forces into so called ‘expeditionary’ forces. From the 2000s, the US climate security discourse slightly started to transform in a territorial danger discourse with the US as driving force of the global expansion of NATO’s operations, with “ISAF in Afghanistan, the counter-

55 piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and the Iraq training mission” (Korteweg & Podkolinkski 2009: 6). The expansion of these ‘out of area’ operations has been the subject of notable friction between NATO’s members. When considering the role of NATO in responding to climate change, this is a significant issue “because it is precisely these kinds of operation that are most likely to expand if NATO is called to intervene in climate-related disaster and conflict zones in the coming decades” (Depledge & Feakin 2012: 81). The Strategic Concept of 2010 is the first concept in which the NATO explicitly mentions climate change as affecting areas of NATO’s concern. These areas could belong either to its territory or to its global operations. Thus, the alliance’s climate security discourse was largely centred on the territorial danger discourse:

“Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations (NATO 2010).”

In that same year, former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen stated that the NATO could function as an important forum for international dialogue on the security-related challenges of climate change. Although he says the alliance’s policy on climate change has not been entirely developed, NATO could be involved on the basis of “three words: consultation, adaptation, and operation” (Rasmussen 2010). Consultation refers to the intensification of international dialogue with other institutions, the scientific community and NGOs. Adaptation means that the alliance must seek to reduce its carbon footprint of its forces in order to adapt to security challenges of climate change. Operation means the recognition that NATO’s forces can be the ‘first responder’ to the consequences of climate change, thus addressing its impacts directly (ibid.). Again, NATO’s traditional role in terms of military operation was linked to the non-traditional phenomenon of climate adaptation. In 2014, NATO state representatives gathered in Wales for one of the most important summits after the Cold War. One year after the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Russian threat was the first topic on the summit’s agenda. The increased attention on Russia’s aggression led to criticism about the lack of attention that was given to climate change. Although the alliance continued to acknowledge the security threat of climate change in the Wales Summit Declaration, it did not offer revisions by using the exact same statement as in NATO’s last Strategic Concept (NATO 2010; NATO 2014; Yeo 2014).

56 While Russia demanded most of NATO’s attention, climate change lingered in the background and seemed to receive more attention in the run to the UN COP21 in Paris. On 20 March 2015 a Special Report called ‘Climate Change, International Security, and the way to Paris 2015’ was published by the NATO PA’s Science and Technology Committee (STC)’. The NATO PA, which is institutionally segregate from NATO, stressed the need for more attention for climate change on NATO’s agenda:

“No matter the outcome [of the Paris COP21], the Assembly, and this Committee in particular, should continue to serve as a forum for climate change discussions among legislators of the Euro-Atlantic community. This is essential to mobilise public support and political impetus. The Committee and Assembly should also continue to push that climate change is included more visibly on the political agenda at NATO (Vitel 2015: 11).”

While the previous citation is full of good intentions, it shows how difficult it is for an alliance consisting of a diversity of states to present it as one influential actor in climate change policies. Another quote supports this finding:

“While all NATO member states agree that climate change can impact international security, individual states' opinions vary on how much and what kind of impact it might have, or how integrated climate change goals should be in their foreign and security policies” (idem: 6).

On 12 October 2015 the NATO PA adopted resolution 427 on ‘Climate Change and International Security’, in which it urged the member governments in seven points to negotiate on a successful agreement at the COP21 in Paris, and to recognise risks related to climate change in their security and foreign policies. It further called upon the support of the ‘Green Defence Framework’ which NATO adopted in 2013 in order to contribute to climate change mitigation (NATO PA 2015). Similar statements were made by Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges Jamie Shea, who represented the NATO during a speech at the Planetary Security Conference in The Hague in November 2015:

“My sense is that when it comes to involving a security community like NATO, the debate has started, but it is still in an embryonic stage. I will do my best from inside the organisation to push things ahead, but I need your support and your pressure from outside the organisation to convince us that this is something that is fundamental for our future security” (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015: 26).

57 His argument confirms the vagueness and indecisiveness of NATO’s mandate and policies concerning climate change. It shows the complexity of the issue for a coalition which consists of 28 different states which all have different visions. In this sense, the dominant territorial danger discourse of the NATO can be explained by the great influence of the US, which also frames climate change as a territorial danger. However, the territorial danger discourse is firmly connected to NATO’s original mission, which is the collective defence of its own territory. The amorphous problem of climate change, that provides the alliance with no obvious enemy, is a complicated phenomenon for a traditionally military alliance. Korteweg and Podkolinkski (2009: 59) argue that NATO links the main concerns identified with climate change to specific crises, such as state failure, as well as the melting Arctic as a geopolitical space. “In this sense, climate change is considered to be a catalyst for other threats and NATO focuses on the threat rather than the catalyst” (ibid.). It is therefore not a surprise that NATO frames climate change primarily as a territorial danger. The NATO will always look through a ‘military lens’ to security threats and will naturally use the capabilities it has (Van der Zeijden 2016). Hence, NATO’s vague and largely undecided mandate regarding climate change reveals the struggle with the perceived urgency of the climate threat and with its own identity. This is exemplified in the following statement, especially through the ambiguous word ‘fight’:

“We face many challenges. Some can be solved. Some must be fought. But if we want a more secure world, there is one fight we must avoid. Fighting the planet. Climate change will pose security challenges for us all. Together, we can meet them. Fight the planet, and we all lose. Peace and Security, that’s our mission (NATO 2009)”.

Obviously, climate change is currently overshadowed by the military threat of Russia, the ‘enemy’ that was ironically an important reason for NATO’s establishment.

6.4. Political consequences NATO officials Shea and Rasmussen can be considered as important norm entrepreneurs, next to certain NATO departments such as the ‘Science for Peace and Security Programme’ (merger between the CCMS and the Science Committee) who stress the need for more involvement of NATO in the climate debate (Risso 2016: 30). On the other hand, The NATO

58 strongly tends to perceive immediate threats that require emergency measures as more urgent. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its recent military assertiveness is such an example that clearly overrules an amorphous threat-multiplier like climate change. Although in the past decennia the NATO has increasingly voiced the security threat of climate change, its mandate and policies concerning the issue remain largely undetermined (Korteweg & Podkolinkski 2009: 59). When considering the general territorial danger discourse of the NATO, some argue that this is a positive development, since it helps to bring climate change as a serious policy concern on NATO’s agenda (Van Schaik 2016; Van Winden 2016). However, such a discourse can also be problematic, because it is closely linked to national security conceptions and conflict. Expressions from NATO related to climate change have led to criticism from actors such as ‘PAX for Peace’, that charge the alliance with broadening its remit. They argue that the alliance will use the accessible capabilities for any security issue, hence they fear the militarisation of climate change (Rasmussen 2010; Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5; Van der Zeijden 2016). However, since Russia is at the moment NATO’s greatest concern and its policies on climate change appear to be vague, it is expected that the short-term political consequences of NATO’s territorial danger discourse remain limited.

6.5. Conclusion The overall climate security discourse of the NATO comes closest to the discourse of the US, in which climate change as a territorial danger prevails. This is not a great surprise, since the US has been the leading country of the alliance since its establishment. While the NATO in the past decennia increasingly voiced the need to address the security threat of climate change and has tried to put more emphasis on the risk dimension in terms of crisis management and disaster relief, its dominant discourse remains based on the threatification of climate change. This is in line with NATO’s military identity and main purpose of collective defence, in which a focus on immediate threats to its territorial environment is the common denominator.

59 7. Conclusions

7.1. Research question: a comparative analysis This thesis has elaborated on the question:

How do the visions of the NATO and its member states correspond with regard to the securitisation of climate change?

By employing the analytical framework on climate security discourses of Diez et al. (2016), this thesis argued that NATO’s vision on climate change can generally be described as a climate security discourse of territorial danger. Besides NATO’s vision, the visions of its member states with regard to the securitisation of climate change vary among each other. Primarily based on the research of Diez et al. (2016), the dominant climate security discourse of the US can be specified as a territorial danger, while in Germany the discourse is generally based on individual security with a focus on risk. Based on primary sources, the discourse in the Netherlands appears to relate to planetary security, also with an emphasis on risk. Consequently, the vision of the NATO corresponds most closely with the vision in the US, both actors experience climate change as a territorial danger. The climate security discourses of Germany and the Netherlands are more different from NATO’s vision. Two explanations underlie this conclusion. First, the US has a considerably greater influence on the policies of the NATO than the European countries. An important example is that US defence expenditures count for 70 percent of the total NATO expenditures and are twice as much as the expenditures of all European members together. Second, the territorial danger discourse of the NATO corresponds with its traditional role as provider of peace and security for its members, based on the principle of collective military defence. In the case of a non- traditional security issue such as climate change, the alliance will look from its own (military) perspective and will use the accessible capabilities to react. Drawing on these results, this thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of climate security discourses within IOs, which is identified as a gap in the literature. With regard to the first explanation considering the great influence of the US in the NATO, a climate security discourse can be the result of one or more powerful actors within such an IO. However, this

60 thesis argued that NATO’s climate security discourse of territorial danger can best be explained by its traditional identity of a military alliance. Although NATO has during the years increasingly announced its commitment to address climate change, its mandate and policies concerning the issue remain vague and largely undecided. This shows the struggle of the traditionally oriented NATO with its commitment to a broader non-traditional approach to security. Hence, according to this research a discourse within an IO can largely depend on factors such as its traditional mandate, historical evolution and political identity.

7.2. Normative implications This thesis has provided a comparative analysis of the climate security discourses of the NATO and its member states, which enables the engagement with the normative debate surrounding securitisation. By linking theory and analysis, NATO’s territorial danger discourse may be perceived as problematic. The alliance is built on the traditional notion of (military) security. Therefore, the principle of collective defence is automatically linked to any security issue. As such, climate change can be a legitimisation for NATO to interfere in countries at risk, which can ultimately take the form of military intervention. While some express the fear of militarisation, others rather see NATO’s involvement in climate change as a positive development. It is positive in the sense that a large coalition takes climate change seriously, and that NATO’s military strength can be of great help in for instance natural disasters. The territorial danger discourse in the US has also resulted in positive consequences; it brought climate change into the realm of high politics and bridged the gap between liberal and conservative politicians. However, scholars such as Hartmann also criticise the US discourse, since it links climate change, conflict and natural disasters, which in turn threatens the distortion of climate policy and militarises development and humanitarian assistance. The fear of policy distortion and militarisation is of less importance in the climate security discourses of Germany and the Netherlands. The general German discourse of individual risk stayed away from national security conceptions. The historically tarnished status of the German military resulted in a very limited role in the climate security debate. Instead, the debate positively influenced domestic energy politics and focused on the people who are most vulnerable to climate change through foreign and development policy. The Dutch planetary discourse with a growing influence of risk is also less problematic than the

61 territorial articulations of the NATO and the US. It emphasises the interdependency of the international community and its surrounding ecosystem. However, this discourse provides difficulties for the Dutch to maintain the political attention for climate change, and to not end up in ambiguous and ineffective policy outputs. Consequently, the short-term normative implications of NATO’s territorial danger discourse may be perceived as limited, considering its undetermined mandate and policies on climate change and the military threat of Russia.

7.3. Limitations and recommendations for further research Although this research has been carefully conducted, given the limited time frame it is inevitable to identify research limitations. Firstly, the number of NATO member states which have been examined could have been increased. This would have made the comparative analysis more complete and the results more credible. Secondly, in order to keep within the time limit and required length of the research paper, a selection of the most important and diverse documents has been made. However, it is possible that not all types of relevant publications have been equally included. In future research, more attention can be given to actors that are less influential in direct terms, such as civil society actors. The same argument can be made for the number of participants that have been interviewed. Although these were four persons originating from different backgrounds and working in different sectors of society, a larger number would have probably given more information about the evolving climate security discourses. Furthermore, the style of interviewing might have influenced the integrity of the answers of the interviewees and the interpretation of their responses, since several interviews have been conducted via Skype or over the phone. In order to further address the identified gap in the literature concerning climate security discourses within IOs, future research could be conducted with other global institutions than the NATO, such as the EU. By using a similar method of comparative analysis between an IO and its member countries, more insights could be drawn from the origin and characteristics of climate security discourses within IOs. Furthermore, it can also provide a better understanding of an institution in general. However, the question remains to what extent discourses of IOs can be generalised, since such organisations may differ considerably in their origin, structure and mandate.

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69 Appendix I: Interviews

Interviewee: Rob de Rave Organisation: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) Profession: Colonel and strategic analyst Type of interview: Personal Date: 8 June 2016

Interviewee: Louise van Schaik Organisation: Clingendael Institute Profession: Coordinator EU in the World/ Senior Research Fellow Type of interview: Phone Date: 10 June 2016

Interviewee: Michel van Winden Organisation: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Inclusive Green Growth Department Profession: Strategic Policy Advisor, organiser of the Planetary Security Conference Type of interview: Phone Date: 9 June 2016

Interviewee: Wilbert van der Zeijden Organisation: PAX for Peace Profession: Program manager Defence and Security Policy Type of interview: Skype Date: 8 June 2016

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