* of

An Anthology

SEVENTH EDITION

MICHAEL REA

LOUIS P. POJMAN Late of the United States Military Academy, West Point

CENGAGE Learning·

Australia • Brazil• Mexico • • • United States • OF THE SOUL 677 364 676 PART VII• AND IMMORTALITY

should remember a lot of what A remembers; fi.1rthermore, B should remember at the c11tire history (!f IVcste111 philosophy is b11t aj(1(1t11orc to Plato. T71c cxm71ts that comprise thcji1llml'- made i11g sclffti!>ll co11re111 Plillo's l'i<'ll's abollf the so11/. Ammlil(I! to Plato, h11111c111 bcil(l!S 11rc composed time. But the is that if B tes mx11cs ll'ith Alcibiades abo11t the !nil' scff 771c scco11d diah\l!llC ({i-0111 the Phacdo) takes place ill bum exists, say, a mere ten seconds later than A, and if B has beliefs, desires, goals, and priso11, ll'hcre Sormtcs mJJairs his e.\W11tio11. J-le is <:OiTcd ,, ll'a)' life afrer death. On his view, the Holy Soc. And the user is not the same as the thing "wratl is like computer software: Just as the same software can be transfctTed to dif- FROM ALCIBIADES I which he uses? well:" ferent hardware, so too a mind can be transfc1,-ed to a different brain (or other sup- daily b. pmting medium). But to say that the mind can be transferred to a different AL. What do you mean? Soc. And is -knowledge an easy thing, and was Im1 medium is just to say that the mind can dza11.l!C bodies; and if it can change bodies, Soc. I \Vill explain: the shoemaker. for example, he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on anthrop he contends, then the mind can survive the death of the body. uses a square tool, and a circular tooL and other for exa1 In our fourth reading, Lynne Rudder Baker examines the for devel- the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a diffi- tools for cutting? oping a satisfying doctrine of . She discusses some of the conceptual thing, which few are able to attain? Sin AL. Yes. problems posed by the doctrine of 1"CSU1Tection, as well as the way in which differ- AL. At , I fancy, , that anybody can JS, But the tool is not the same as the cutter and ent theo1ies about personal over time give rise to different views about know himself; at other times, the task appears to be Soc. she user of the tool? what resu1Tection consists in. She then defends her own favored view: the "consti- very difficult. self tution" view of human persons and their resurrection. On her view, human per- AL. Of course not. sad Soc. But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still sons are mate1ial substances (so, not immaterial souls) that are constituted by but Soc. And in the same way the instrument of eel• there is no other way; knowing what we are, we not identical to human bodies. The relationship between a person and her body is the harper is to be distinguished from the harper CO! shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we the same relation as that between a bronze statue and the piece of bronze that con- are ignorant we shall not know. himself? IS stitutes it. Resu1Tecting a human person is, then, just a of getting a body tht AL. That is true. AL. He is. (though not necessarily the same body) to re-constitute the human person. (Note, to I then, that she apparently rtjects the conceptual distinction between resurrection Soc:. Well, then, let us see in what way the self- Soc. Now the question \vhich asked was whether by and mentioned earlier in this introduction.) existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a you conceive the user to be always different from sp< Finally, we close this section with an essay on view of life, death, chance to discover our own , which with- that which he uses? WI and reincarnation by Prasannatma Das. out that we can never know. AL I do. Ac AL. You say truly. Soc:. Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? w1iters Soc:. Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands? acco1n whom you are conversing?-with whom but with AL. With his hands as well. unders Vll.1 me? 1mpass _ Soc:. He uses his hands too? ply by AL. Yes. AL. Yes. bilist c Soc:. As I am with you? Soc. And does he use his eyes in cutting leather? most r AL. Yes. AL. He does. activit: Immortality of the Soul Soc. That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking? Soc:. And we admit that the user ts not the same numel PLATO AL. Yes. with the things which he uses? i! Soc. And I in talking use words? AL. Yes. c AL. Certainly. Soc:. Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be agent, Soc. And talking and usmg words are, as you distinguished from the hands and feet which they but ai: Plato (c. 427-347 B.C.E.} lived in Athrns, 111as a st11drnt

Gred Reprinted from Alcibimlcs I and thc Plwccfo. translati:d by \Villiam Jowett (Nc..·w York: Charlc:s SnihrH.·r's Som. 1889) . .... 678 PART Vil• DEATH AND IMMORTALITY PLATO• IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 679 364

Soc. And does not a man use the whole body? AL. True. Then when does the soul attain ?-for in disturbing element, hindering the soul from the made attempting to consider anything in company with acquisition of knowledge when in company with pain" AL. Certainly. Soc. But since neither the body, nor the union of the body she is obviously deceived. her-is not this the sort of man who, if ever man LOil, Soc. And that which uses is different from that the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man? Yes. that is true. did, is likely to attain the knowledge of existence? peopl1 which is used? Then must not existence be revealed to her in Thne is admirable truth 111 that, Socrates, bum AL. Just so. AL. True. , if at all? replied Simmias. (Exod Soc. Then a man is not the same as his own body? Soc. Would you have a more precise proof that Yes. And when they consider all this, must not how t the soul is man? And thought is best when the mind is gathered true philosophers make a reflection, of which they Holy AL. That is the inference. AL. No; I think that the proof is sufficient. into herself and none of these things trouble her- will speak to one another in such words as these: "wratl Soc. What is he, then? neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any We have found, they will say, a path of specula- well:'' Soc:. If the although not quite precise, is fair, AL. I cannot say. pleasure,-when she has as little as possible to do tion which seems to bring us and the argument to daily b, that is enough for us; more precise proof will be with the body, and has no bodily or feeling, the conclusion, that while we arc in the body, and Im1 Soc. Nay, you can say that he is the user of the supplied when we have discovered that which we but is aspiring after ? while the soul is mingled with this mass of evil anthrop body. were led to omit, from a fear that the inquiry our desire will not be satisfied, and our desire is of for exar AL. Yes. would be too much protracted. That is true. And in this the philosopher dishonors the the truth. For the body is a source of endless trou- Soc. And the user of the body is the soul? AL. What was that? Sin body; his soul runs away from the body and desires ble to us by of the mere requirement of JS, AL. Yes, the soul. Soc:. What I meant, when I said that absolute exis- to be alone and by herself? food; and also is liable to diseases which overtake sho Soc. And the soul rules? tence must be first considered; but now, instead of That is true. and impede us in the search after truth: and by fill- self absolute existence, we have been considering Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is ing us so full of , and lusts, and fears, and AL. Yes. sad the of individual existence, and that may be there or is there not an absolute justice? fancies, and idols, and every sort of folly, prevents Soc. Let me make an assertion which will, I think, eel· sufficient; for surely there is nothing belonging to us Assuredly there is. our ever having, as people say, so much as a COi be universally admitted. which has more absolute existence than the soul? And an absolute beauty and absolute good? thought. From whence come wars, and fightings, IS AL. What is that? AL. There is nothing. Of course. and factions? whence but from the body and the the Soc. That man is one of three things. Soc. Then we may truly conceive that you and But did you ever behold any of them with lusts of the body? For wars are occasioned by the to of money, and money has to be acquired for AL. What are they? I are conversing with one another, soul to soul? your eyes? by Certainly not. the sake and in the service of the body; and in AL. Ve1y true. Sp( Soc. Soul, body, or the union of the two. Or did you ever reach them with any other consequence of all these things the time which WI AL. Ce1tainly. Soc. And that is just what I was saying-that bodily sense? (and I speak not of these alone, but of ought to be given to philosophy is lost. Moreover, Ac Soc. 13ut did we not say that the actual ruling I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of if there is time and an inclination toward philoso- of Alcibiades, but with Alcibiades; and that writers of the body is man? the or true nature of eve1ything). Has the phy, yet the body introduces a turmoil and confu- is with his soul. sion and fear into the course of speculation, and accom AL. Yes, we did. of them ever been perceived by you through unders AL. True .... the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest hinders us from seeing the truth; and all experi- Soc. And does the body rule over itself? 1mpass, approach to the knowledge of their several ence shows that if we would have pure knowl- ply by AL. Certainly not. made by him who so orders his intellectual vision edge of anything we must be quit of the body, bilist c Soc. It is , as we were saying? as to have the most exact conception of the essence and the soul in herself must behold all things in FROM THE themselves: then I suppose that we shall attain that most r AL. Yes. of that which he considers? activit: Certainly. which we desire, and of which we say that we are SOCRATES: What again shall we say of the actual Soc. Then that is not what we are seeking? And he attains to the knowledge of them in lovers, and that is ; not while we live, but acquirement of knowledge?-is the body, if invited numcJ AL. It would seem not. their highest pu1ity who goes to each of them after death, as the argument shows; for if while in to share in the inquiry, a hinderer or a helper? Codi! Soc. But may we say that the union of the two with the mind alone, not allowing when in the act company with the body, the soul cannot have I mean to say, have sight and hea1ing any truth in c mies over the body, and consequently that this is of thought the intrusion or introduction of sight or pure knowledge, one of two things seems to them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling agent, any other sense in the company of reason, but with follow-either knowledge is not to be attained at man? us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are but at the ve1y light of the mind in her clearness pene- all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till AL. Very likely. inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the bcr c trates into the very light of truth in each; he has got then, the soul will be in herself alone and without other ?-for you will allow that they are Talia£ Soc. The most unlikely of all things: for if one rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of the body. In this present life, I reckon that we the best of them? Gred of the members is subject, the two united cannot the whole body, which he conceives of only as a make the nearest approach to knowledge when we possibly rule. Certainly, he replied . .... • THE FINALITY OF DEATH 681 364 680 PART VII• DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

enemies of the body. and wanting to have the soul infinitely more like the unchangcable.-even the functions is akin to the divine? and which to the made have the least possible concern or interest in the most stupid person \\"ill not deny that. mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be pain" body, and arc not saturated with the bodily nature, alone, and when this is granted to them, to be And the body is more like the changing? that which naturally orders and rules, and the mor- LOR· but remain pure until the hour when God himself is trembling and repining; instead of rejoicing at their Yes. tal that which is subject and servant? pcopl pleased to release us. And then the foolishness of the departing to that place \\·here, when they arrive, Y ct once more consider the matter in this True. burn body will be cleared away and we shall be pure and they to gain that which in life they loved light: When the soul and the body arc united, thrn And which docs the soul resemble? (Exod hold converse with other pure souls, and know of (and this was wisdom). and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the The soul resembles the divine, and the body the how t ourselves the clear light everywhere; and this is body to obey and serve. Now which of these two mortal,-therc can be no doubt of that, Socrates. Holy surely the light of truth. For no impure thing is has been \villing to go to the world below in the "wrat; allowed to approach the pure. These arc the sort of hope of seeing there an earthly love. or \vife, or well:' words, Simmias, which the true lovers of wisdom son, and conversing with them. And will he who is daily b. cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. a true lover of wisdom, and is persuaded in like Im1 You will agree with me in that? manner that only in the world below he can wor- anthroi; Certainly, Socrates. thily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not for cxa1 But if this is true, 0 my friend, then there is depart with joy? Surely, he will, my friend, if he be great hope that, going whither I go, I shall there be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm convic- Vll.2 Sin satisfied with that \vhich has been the chief concern tion that there only, and nowhere else, he can find IS, of you and me in our past . And now that the wisdom in her purity. And if this be true, he would she hour of departure is appointed to me, this is the be ve1y absurd, as I was saying. if he were to fear self hope with \vhich I depart, and not I only, but ev- death. sad c1y man who that he has his mind purified. eel The Finality of Death Certainly, replied Simmias. SOCRATES: And were we not saying long ago COi And what is pu1ification but the separation of that the soul when using the body as an instru- IS BERTRAND RUSSELL the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the ment of , that is to say, when using the the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (for to into herself, out of all the courses of the body; the the meaning of perceiving through the body is by dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, perceiving through the senses),-werc we not sp< 13crtra11d I

The same thing applies to the mind. We think material structure. It will be f(nmcl that exactly sim- As rhc Bishop of Birmingham says, "His mind is a Christians arc immortal, but Hitler and Mussolini made . and feel and act, but there is not, in addition to ilar facts explain our response to language and our far finer instrument than anything that had arc not. or vice versa. The decision will obviously pain" and feelings and actions, a bare entity, the use of it, our mcmmies and the they appeared earlier-he knows right and wrong. He be made on rhe battlefield. not in the study. LOR mind or the soul. which docs or suffers these arouse, our moral or immoral habits of behavior, can build Westminster Abbey. He can make an air- Those who have the best poison gas will have the peopl occurrences. The mental continuity of a person is a and indeed eve1ything that constitutes our mental . He can calculate the distance of the sun .... ethic of the future and will therefore be the bum continuity of habit and memory: there was yester- personality, except the part determined by heredity. Shall. then. man at death perish utterly? Docs that immortal ones. (Exod day one person whose feelings I can remember, The part dctcnnincd by heredity is handed on to incomparable instrument, his mind, vanish when Our feelings and beliefs on the subject of good how t. and that person I regard as myself of yesterday; but, our posterity but cannot, in the individual, survive and evil arc. like everything else about us, natural Holy life ceases?" the disintegration of the body. Thus both the he- facts, developed in the struggle for existence and '\vrat, in fact, myself of yesterday was only certain mental The Bishop proceeds to argue that "the uni- reditary and the acquired parts of a personality are, not having any divine or origin. In well:' occurrences which are now remembered and arc verse has been shaped and is governed by an intelli- so far as our goes, bound up with the one of Aesop's fables, a lion is shown pictures of daily b regarded as part of the person who now recollects gent purpose," and that it would have been charactc1istics of certain bodily structures. We all huntsmen catching lions and remarks that, if he had Im' them. All that constitutes a person is a series of uninrclligcnt, having made man, to let him perish. know that memmy may be obliterated by an injury painted them, they would have shown lions catch- anthrof connected by memory and by certain To this argument there arc many answers. In to the brain, that a virtuous person may be ren- ing huntsmen. Man, says Dr. Barnes, is a fine fellow for cxa1 similarities of the sort we call habit. rhc first place, it has been found, in the scientific If, therefore, we arc to believe that a person dered vicious by encephalitis lethargica, and, that a investigation of nature, that the intrusion of moral because he can make airplanes. A little while ago Sin survives death, we must believe that the memories clever child can be turned into an idiot by lack of or aesthetic values has always been an obstacle to there was a popular song about the cleverness of JS, and habits which constitute the person will con- iodine. In view of such familiar facts, it seems discovery. It used to be thought that the heavenly flies in walking upside down on the ceiling, with she tinue to be exhibited in a new of occurrences. scarcely probable that the mind survives the total bodies must move in circles because the circle is the the chorus: "Could Lloyd George do it? Could self No one can prove that this will not happen. destruction of brain structure which occurs at 111ost perfect curve, that species must be immutable Mr. Baldwin do it? Could Ramsay Mac do it? sad Uut it is easy to see that it is ve1y unlikely. Our death. because Goel would only create what was perfect Why, no." On this basis a ve1y telling argument eel memories and habits are bound up with the struc- It is not rational arguments but emotions that and what therefore stood in no need of improvc- could be constructed by a theologically-minded fly, COi ture of the brain, in much the same way in which a cause in a future life. 111cnt, that it was useless to combat epidemics which no doubt the other flies would find most IS river is connected with the riverbed. The water in The most important of these emotions is fear except by because they were sent as a conv111c111g. tht the river is always changing, but it keeps to the of death, which is instinctive and biologically use- punishment for sin, and so on. It has been found, Moreover, it is only when we think abstractly to same course because previous rains have worn a ful. If we genuinely and wholeheartedly believed however, that, so far as we can discover, nature is that we have such a high opinion of man. Of men by channel. In like manner, previous events have worn in the future life, we should cease completely to indifferent to our values and can only be under- in the concrete, most of us think the vast m;tjority spt a channel in the brain, and our thoughts flow along fear death. The effects would be curious, and prob- stood by ignoring our notions of good and bad. very bad. Civilized states spend more than half their WI this channel. This is the cause of mcmo1y and men- ably such as most of us would deplore. Uut our The Universe may have a purpose, but nothing revenue on killing each other's citizens. Consider Ac tal habits. Uut the brain, as a structure, is dissolved human and subhuman ancestors have fought and that we know suggests that, if so, this purpose has the long hist01y of the activities inspired by writcr5 at death, and mc11101y therefore may be expected cxtern1inated their enemies throughout many geo- any similarity to ours. fervor: human sac1ifices, persecutions of heretics, accom to be also dissolved. There is no more reason to logical ages and have profited by ; it is Nor is there in this anything surprising. Dr. witch-hunts, pogroms leading up to wholesale undcrs think otherwise than to expect a 1iver to persist in therefore an advantage to the victors in the struggle l3arncs tells us that man "knows right and wrong." extermination by poison gases, which one at least of 1111pass _ its old course after an earthquake has raised a for life to be able, on occasion, to overcome the l3ut, in fact, as anthropology shows, men's views Dr. Uarnes's episcopal colleagues must be supposed ply by mountain where a valley used to be. natural fear of death. Among animals and savages, of right and wrong have varied to such an extent to favor, since he holds to be un-Ch1istian. bilist < All memory, and therefore (one may say) all instinctive pugnacity suffices for this purpose; but at thar no single item has been permanent. We can- Are these abominations, and the ethical doct1ines by most 1 , depend upon a which is vc1y no- a certain stage of development, as the Mohamme- not say, therefore, that man knows right and which they are prompted, really evidence of an activit ticeable in certain kinds of matetial structures but dans first proved, belief in has considerable wrong, but only that some men do. Which men? intelligent Creator? And can we really wish that the exists little if at all in other kinds. This is the prop- military value as reinforcing natural pugnacity. We Nietzsche argued in favor of an ethic profoundly men who practiced them should live forever? The nume1 erty of forn1ing habits as a result of frequent similar should therefore admit that milita1ists are wise in different from Christ's, and some powerful gov- world in which we live can be understood as a result God i: occun-ences. For example: a b1ight light makes the encouraging the belief in immortality, always sup- ernments have accepted his teaching. If knowl- of muddle and accident; but if it is the outcome of c pupils of the eyes contract; and if you repeatedly posing that this belief does not become so profound edge of right and wrong is to be an argument for deliberate purpose, the purpose must have been that agent, flash a light in a man's eyes and beat a gong at the as to produce indifference to the affairs of the immortality, we must first settle whether to of a fiend. For my part, I find accident a less painful but ai same time, the gong alone will, in the end, cause world. believe Christ or Nietzsche, and then argue that and more plausible hypothesis. bcr c his pupils to contract. This is a fact about the brain Another which encourages the belief Talia£ and nervous system-that is to say, about a cettain in survival is admiration of the excellence of man. Gred 692 PART VII• DEATH AND IMMORTALITY 364 LYNNE RUDDER BAKER• DEATH AND THE 693

If we accept the Badger-Everglade sto1y, appro- play chess using almost anything as chess pieces, so mad<: ' is it possible f(ir a person to survive the death of her stories of personal continuity without bodily conti- p1iately explained, as a case of two persons switching can a be unbodied by almost anything, pain" : O\\'n body? nuity, we can say t11L· frillowing. Regardless of what bodies, there seems no reason to deny that Mary has assuming that it is compkx enough. So if there can LOR' The answer to the second question depended happens in our daily lives, our concept of a person continued to live "in" another body, But even if we be nonphysical bodies, there can be nonphysical peopl on the first. If we had concluded that the basis of is a concept of something that does not seem tied are unsure of the 13adger-Everglade case, we can persons. Of course, nothing said so far assures us burn is sa111cness of body. then we to a particular body. Rather, our concept of a per- approach Ma1y Brown's this \Vay, What is it that we that the Christian story-or any other sto1y of lifr (Exoc would have been forced to conclude that life son seems to be tied to a particular stream of con- want to survive after death? Isn't it our memo1ies, after death-is true. That is another mattn.... how 1: afrcr death is impossible. And there did see111 to sciousness. If there is one continuing strca111 of our of self, our perscmalities, our rela- Holy be good reason to come to these conclusions. consciousness over time. then there is one continu- Reincarnation "\vrat tions with others? What does it matter whether How. we asked, could \Ve assure that any 111e111- ing person. Our question, then, was whether we there is some nonphysical substance that survives? If well:' Much of what has been said so far does, however, ory claim is a case of genuine me111ory? Our an- can give a coherent account of continuity of con- that substance has no memo1ies of a prior life:, does daily b rule out the possibility of reincarnation as commonly swcr was this. In the cases likely to confront us in sciousness from om· body to another. not recognize the soul of others who were impor- Inf understood. If human beinsrs are purely physical. our daily lives, we 111ust establish so111c physical The answer was yes. Using the computer anal- tant in that earlier life, what comfort could such a continuity between the person who had the orig- anthror then there is no nonphysical substance that is the per- ogy of the functionalist, we can explain such conti- continuing existence bring? In what sense would it inal experience and the person who clai111s to for exa1 son that can be reincarnated in another ea1thly body. nuity in terms of programming. If it is possible to be the survival of the pemm? How would it be sig- remembcr it. Moreover, even if there were such a substance, it is ''program" another brain to have the same psychol- Sin nificantly diffrrent from the return of the lifeless difl1cult to see how its continued existence in another But the problem with this answer is that it is ogy as the brain I now have, then it is possible for IS, body to the soil? body could count as the reincarnation of a particular too limited. Because we can i111agine cases like 111e to change bodies. And if it is possible for me she If we assume that our sto1y is a genuine case of person, [(there is no other continuity between the the Evergladc-13adger exa111ple, and because our to change bodies, then it is also possible for me to sell personal survival of the death of the body, we may -fiction taks and religious traditions offer old life and the new one. Once again, personal survive the death of my body. sad wonder about another point. Is it compatible with survival requires some continuity of consciousness. It eel Christian belief? According to John Hick, a con- is not sa111eness of sti!O- that constitutes personal iden- co· temporary British philosopher who imagined a sim- tity, but sameness of consciousness. This rcquire111ent IS ilar sto1y, the answer is yes. In I Corinthians 15, is often overlooked by believers in reincarnation. Vll.4 th< Paul w1ites of the resun-ection of the body-not of 13ut suppose that there is some continuity to the physical body, but of some spiritual body. of consciousness in reincarnation. Suppose that by Although one can think of this spiritual body as a 111e111ories and the rest do continue in the next sp• translucent -like body that leaves the physical incarnation, but that they arc not easily accessible. WI body at death, Hick oflers another interpretation. Suppose, that is, that the slate is not wiped co111- Death and the Afterlife The human being, Hick says, becomes extinct A< pletely clean, but that what is written on it is hard at death. It is only through God's intervention to recover. In that case, the passage of the soul into LYNNE RUDDER BAKER accom that the spiritual body comes into existence. 13y a new incarnation would count as personal survival the resurrection of this spi1itual body, we are [f there were such a soul to begin with. 1mpass _ to understand a rcrrcatioll or rerollstit11tioll of the per- Assuming, again, that there is not, what can we ply by son's body in . But that is precisely what say about the possibility of reincarnation? To con- Ly1111e R..11dder Baker (1944- ) is pn?fi·ssor metaphysics alld philosophy r her 1/Jork Oil the 11letaphysics beings is not incompatible with the some mad scientist or whatever. I shall leave it to the prcsellt article, she applies some c?( tliat 111ork to 111akillg sellsc t?f' the Christiall doctrille spirit- this much. There does not seem to be any good l'ic'll'S about 11!/iat it 111(1?ht COllsist ill, she thrn ,\!OCS Oil to her Ol/lll "rollstit11tioll" theory hifc1.'1l/lh)' tf l·ditt..'d hy \\lilli:llll J. \'(lain wright (2005). pp. J(1(1-9 l. © 2004 Gred pendent of any physical description. Just as we can questions: What constitutes personal identity? And hy Oxt(mi Unin·r;ity Inc. By pt:nni.;sion ofOxli.lrd Uni\'cr;ity Pn.·s-;. USA. 694 PART VII• DEATH AND IMMORTALITY 364 LYNNE RUDDER BAKER• DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE 695

the idea of resutTection of the body. (The New the seed metaphor, just mentioned (I Corinthians made : 1. as a natural property of the soul. The Testament mentions that the- believed in 15). or the metaphor of tents or gannents that we pain'·: idea of is builr iTffff foe 'Chtistian doctrine Death comes to all creatures, but human beings are bodily res1mections, but that the Sadducees did not take on as a coveting in i11com1ption (II Cotinthi- of life after death from the be"inninu. LOIU b t"'I unique in realizing that they will die. Hence, they believe in an afterlife. Jesus endorsed the fonner, ans 5); an-d oi1- the meLlphor peopl' There are many questions to be answered are unique in being able to consider the possibility which was fixed as Ch1istian doct1ine by his own that Augustine preferred. Accordii1g to the seed bum about the doctrine of resuJTection. For example, is of life after death. of an afterlife of one sort or bodily resum:ction.) The second source was Greek metaphor, developed by , the body is (Exoc. there immediate resurrection at the instant of death, ·1-· how·· another have been promulgated by all manner of philosophy, which co11t1ibuted the idea of the dynamic and always in flux. Just as the bodv is or 1s t 1ere a tempora1y mode of existence (an inter- Holy, cultures and . For ancient peoples, the immortality of the soul (Cullman 1973). transformed in life, so too it is transformed in __s_ta!_e) before a general resurrection ·atthe '\vrat afterlife was a realm of vastly existence To the e:irly Church fathers, belief in the The resurrected body will be radically changed, end of time (Cooper 1989)? There is no general well:' populated by shades, counterparts of bodies. immortality of the soul was connected with belief and will not be made of the same matetial as the agreement. 13ut whatever the details of the concep- daily 1J Ancient Egyptians before 2000 postu- in resuJTection of the body. The belief that Jesus premorte111 bod)'(Ilyrliim 1995, 63ff). tion of an afterlife, a particular philosophical question In1 lated a judgment after death. The Greeks had rose from the dead was the belief that his soul sur- by contrast, 111s1sted on the reanimation of the same arises: In vjrtue of what is a pet-son in an afterlife anthroJ ; the Hebrews had Sheol. Far from being a vived death of the body and was "reinvested with b_odily which would Ge i:eiffseiiTl5lec:rrrom pei:Son -Ina p-1:elli0itel11-sfate? for exa: matter of wish fulfillment, an afterlife, as pictured his risen body" (Wolfaon 1956-57, 8). The belief dust anJ ... p.l:Cvious bones (Bynum 1995, 95). A similar question arises for traditions of reincarna- by ancient cultures, was not particularly desirable, in a genet;I resurrection was the belief that surviv- rejected both metaphors for tion: In of what is a person of one generation Sir just inevitable (Hick 1994, 55-60). ': . '/ ! r ing souls, at the end of time, would be "reinvested" understandi'ilg--the nature of the body that is to be the same person as a pe1-so11 who lived previously? IS, There are many conceptions of an afterlife. To with tisen bodies. During the interval between resurrected. His concern was more with the integ- The philosophical issue in any conception of she say that there is an afterlife (of any kind) is to say death and the general resurrection, a soul would rity__ oJ_t:be __Q9cly Jillill::Wirh of an individual afterlite is the question of personal sd that biological death is not the permanent end of a have a life without a body, but a person's final state particles. The resurrected body will C:ont<1in the identity. To have life after death is to have post- sac human being's existence: At least some people con- would be embodied in some sense. In this general same fragments and organs, if not the identical par- mortem experiences linked to each other and to eel tinue to exist and to have experiences after death. picture, belief in resurrection includes belief in ticles (BY!11:1111 ... T995, 265). However, Aquinas premortem experiences in a way that preserves per- co The idea of reincarnation is shared by a number of immortal souls and belief in postmortem bodies (of sometimes suggested that there would be material sonal identity (Price 1964, 369). IS religions, including Hindu, Jaina, and 13uddhist. some sort). body in -tT1e resurrection. the According to the idea of reincarnation, one is born The Ch1istian doctrine of an afterlife is pieced The vatious Christian views of resurrection to over and over, and the circumstances of one's life, together out of hints and metaphors in Scripture. have at least these characteristics in common. First, 1b. The Problem of Personal Identity by even what sort of being one is, depend on one's Jesus' resu1Tection is the case. According to c111bodi111c11t: resurrection requires some kind of bod- There are at least two philosophical problems of sp· actions in the preceding life. Among philosophers, Christian docttine, Jesus was the Son of God, \vl10 death. Postmortem bodies are different pe1-sonal identity. The synchronic problem is solved w: Plato had a view of reincarnation. Plato developed was crucified, died, and was buried. On the third from premortem bodies in that they are said to be by answering this question:Il1\rirtue of what is Ac the idea of the immortality of the soul in the day he rose from the dead and ascended into spi1itual, i11com1ptible, glorified. Even if there is an something a person, at some given time? The dia- Phacdo. According to Plato, a person is an immate- Heaven. Although Jesus' resutTection is the ground "" between death and a general is solved by answering this qties- accom rial soul, temporarily imprisoned by a body. Death of the Christian docttine of resuJTection, many ques- resurrection, in which the soul exists unembodied, tion: In virtue of what is a pet-son at one time is liberation from the ptison of the body, but after tions are left open. Perhaps the most explicit, but still those who live after death will ultimately be identical to a pet-son at another time? The problem 1mpas5. an interval of disembodied existence, the soul is sketchy and metaphorical, account of an afterlife in embodied, according to Christian docttine. Second, of pet-sonal identity as it is raised by the idea of an ply by again imptisoned and is into this world. the New Testament is in I Corinthians 15, with its ijQ!1.i!.r: who exists on earth is afterlife is a diachronic problem: Under what con- bi)ist I On Plato's view, all this occurs in the natural course "seed" metaphor. Our sown in to exist in an afterlife. Individuals exist after death, ditions are pet-sons at ti and at t2 the same person? most 1 of things. com.1ption and in -dis- not in some undiflerentiated state merged with the People change dramatically over time, physically\ activit ra1sea-lff glo1y; sown in weakness, raised in universe, or with an Eternal Mind, or anything else. and mentally. A woman of 50 is very unlike a u-irl \ 1mpas: power; sown a natural body, raised a "spiritual" Not only is there to be individual existence in the b ' 1a. Christian Doctrine of 10 physically, even if the woman of 50 is thv· nu me body. 13ut this passage is not01im;sly open to several Resurrection, but the are to same pet-son who, forty years .earlier, had been the Codi All the great monotheistic religions-] udaism, What is a "spititual body"? Is it made exist both now and after death. "Survival" in some girl of 10. They do not eyep have any matter in c Chtistianity, and -recognize doctrines of an of the same -and-blood pa1tides as the premor- weaker sense of, say, psychological similarity is not common. A girl of 10 has agent. afterlife. I focus on doctrines of resu1Tection of the tem body? Of the same kind of patticles if not enough. The relation between a person here and tudes, pet-sonality from a woman of if but ai dead, which are common to them, and in particular exactly the same ones? Of some entirely difl:erent now and a person in an afterlife must be identity. oT 50 is the same person, considered ber c on Christian doct1ines. kind of stufl:? There is no unanimity. TlJiJ:tl ...-1.Uiradc life after death, according to forty years later, as the girl of 10. In virtue of Taliaf Christian doctrines have two sources. The first There are two kinds of leading metaphors to Christian doctrine, is a gift from God. Cl11istian what is the woman of 50 identical to the girl of Gree! - source is Second-Temple , which contributed guide answers to these questions: on the one hand, docttine thus contrasts with the Greek idea of 10 considered forty years later? 696 PART VII• DEATH AND IMMORTALITY 364 l YNNE RUDDER BAKER• DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE 697

The needed c1ite1ion of personal identity is_ that thinks and wills. The early Ch1istian Church nrious postmortem image-worlds in \\"hich people madl govern what happens to souls after death, there would epistemolo_t,'ical. It docs not say how an observer can considered three theories of soul: (I) souls as communicate telepathically with each other. pain' be no violation of if God were to give to tell tl1-;!t-the woman of 50 is the girl at 10 considered custom-made: God creates especially for each new The image-worlds would be constructed from LOR souls life after death, with or without a new body. forty years later. Rather, the c1itc1ion of personal child ;] new soul at birth (2) souls as a person's -;\nd and telepathic peop Swinburne solves the problem of pem1nal identity for identity is metaphysical. It says what makes it the case rcaay-made: God has a stocl from eternity burn Tfie postmortem worlds arc this world and the next by appeal to immate1ial souls. that the woman .of 50 is the same person as the girl of ;ii1d allocates them as (prcexistentialism); fulfilllnent" worlds, but of one's genuine \Vishes. If (Exo<: Recently, scie11tific philosophers have sug- 10, whether anyone recognizes the idc11tity or not. (3) souls as second-hand: God creai.edo1il)1 c)1_1e -s

There an: at least two ways that this story may be __t:f_ co_n:-;ciousness ov<-:r time-regardless 3a. Sameness of Soul madt the body, at which time the human being is fully recovered. The disembodied soul can neither be filled out, depending on how the idea of "same of identity of substance (192-t, II, xxvii). Locke's pain' There arc familiar arguments in the secular litera- sense nor feeC ifisoi1Tytlie of the person that body" is taken. The(fi,!)t way of understanding idea allows for the possibility that a single con- LOH ture from the sevente_snth ccnturv on about th-Inks While the soul is disembodied, "same body." shared by most of the Church sciousness could unite several substances into a sin- peop the problem of understanding immaterial the soul is 1101_ the person who died. It is merely a fathers, is in terms of same constituent particles. gle person and for the possibility that a single bum minds can interact with material These remi1ant ·c;f the pcrso-n, -reunion with the Suppose that Jane is to be rEc ge;1- could even exist tel_!_1po.r;!! (Exo•'. argtii11e-ili:s ·a-pply ·equ;11Iy to the conception of body. It is only when the soul is reunited cral resurrection, God finds the particles that had Such an approach 1s clearly congenial to the idea of how the soul as an immaterial substance that can exist composed Jane's body. say, and reassembles them resurrection. Holy with the body (the same body) that the person unembodied. resumes life. exactly as they had been before Jane's death, Suppose we say that A and 13 arc the same per- "wrat Another important cnt1c1sm of the idea of a So Aquinas's view of a human person is rather thereby restoring Jane's body. If personal identity is son if and_ only if A can remember what 13 did, or well: disembodied soul, however, concerns the question of a composite of body and soul. He does not bodily identity, then God thereby restores Jane, 13 can-remember what A did. What it to say daily l of individuating souls at a time: the S)_'_'.JChronit; equate personal identity over time with identity of that is, brings her back to life. The same body, in that A can remember what B did is that what B did I ri' problem. In virtue of what is there one - soul. However, Aquinas's conception of the after- both its premortcm and postmortem phases, has the caused, in the right way, A's memory of what 13 anthro· two? If souls are embodied, the bodies individuate. life does require separability of souls from bodies, same particles. did. What secures sameness of persc;n arc causal for exa There _is one soul per body. 13ut if souls are sepa- albeit temporary, and continued existence of souls The way of understanding "same connections of a certain sort among mental states. rated from bodies-existing on their mvn, apart Si1 after death. So, it is reasonable to include Aquinas's body" ap!Jca!s to a natural way to understand iden- It is difficult to spell out just the right kind of causal from bodies-then there is apparently no difference IS, view both with the theories of survival of souls and tity of human bodies over time. Unlike inanimate connection, but "of a certain sort" is supposed to sh• _there so'iilwrtT1· thoughts with the themies of bodily resurrection. objects, human bodies undergo a complete change rule out cases like the one where 13 cuts the grass sel of cells every few years. Not a single one of Sam's and tells C what she had done; then 13 gets amnesia, a:i_9_ tlioughts. If there is no difference between tI-lcrc bel;1g one soul and sac cells today was one of his cells ten years ago; yet and C reports back to 13 that 13 had cut the grass. two, then there arc no souls. So, it seems that the ce 2c. Sameness of Body Sam has not changed bodies. So, perhaps identity C's telling 13 that B had cut the grass causes 'B to co concept of a soul is incoherent. The Christian doctrine of resu1Tcction of the body of body should not consist of identity of constituent have a mental state of thinking that she had cut the IS As we saw in 2b, Aquinas has a response to this ,5Uggcsts that personal identity, at least in part, con- cells, or even of identity of some small percentage grass, and B's apparent memory of cutting the grass th problem of distinguishi1ig 5C..;tween one and t\VO sists of bodily identity. If personal identity consists of constituent cells. The natural thing to say is that is ultimately caused by B's having cut the grass. l3ut to uncmbodied immaterial souls at a single time. Each in bodily identity, even in part, then reincarnation identity of body consists of spatiotemporal continu- l3's apparent memory is not a real memmy, because b) separated soul had an af!!i1_ity _t_o the body with is ruled out, as is Price's ( 1964) conception of an coi1si:ituent cells. VeiT1aps -in B's mental state of thinking that she had cut the sp which it had been united in pre;1ioiien1--lifo.-Even afterlife. Reincarnation requires that the same per- tfil:; God atoms that grass was caused by her cutting the grass, but it was w \vhei1Smith's souT is- disembodied, what makes son have different bodies, and Price's conception of had composed Janc-'sorgaiilcceT!s by not caused in the i:i.ght way. The causal chain Smith's soul S111ith's soul-and not Brown's soul, A an afterlife was of a disembodied consciousness. inc6rruptibk a·na Be-carries oi.1t ·-the bet\veei113's--cut-ting the grass and her apparent say-is that Smith's soul has a tendency and poten- writer For millennia "resu1Tcction of the body" has replacenfrnt in a '\vay that preserves spatiotemporal mem01y went through C. 13 would not have had tial to be reunited with Smith's body, and not with accoJT been taken to mean that the continuity of the body. If that is possible, and if the apparen(;)iemo1y of the grass if C had Brown's body. (l3ut sec 3b.) This reply is not avail- under that died would come back to life. Although I identity of bodies consists in spatiotemporal conti- not told 13 that she had cut the grass. able to proponents of immaterial souls, such as 11npas: _ Corinthians 15 plainly asserts that the resu1Tected nuity, then a premortem body could be the same So, it seems that we have a c1iterion for same- Plato or Descartes, who take a human person to be ply b) body is an incorruptib!e_ "spirit_1,!_.1L (or "glorified") body as a postmortem body even though the pre- ness of resurrected person and earthly person that identical to a soul. bilist · body, the spiritual body was to mortem body is corruptible and the postmortem does not require sameness of body or sameness of Even if we could individuate souls at a time, most from the dust and Q()lles of the 01iginal body is incom1ptible. soul: if a resurrected person has Jones's memmies and thus at a single time distinguish one soul from activil body. undergo radical change, but (i.e., mental states of what Jones did, caused in the two souls, there would still be a problem of indi- tmpas it is to persist in its postmortem state as the same right way), then that resurrected person is Jones. 2d. The Memory Criterion viduating a soul over time: the d_iachronic problem. n ume body. The earliest Cl11istians supposed the body to To see this, consider: either to God i be the person; later Ch1istians (such as Aquinas) The memory c1ite1ion is that sameness of person is 3. change they are not. Suppo\e firss that souls are c took the body to be an essential part of the person, determined by psychological continuity, not by subject to_ cha11ge. In that 'c:t

individual manque. We can say vny little about 3c. Sameness of Body made conversion or amendment of life. Souls must be not the same one that your child built: the manu- this 11l'\V kind of entity except that it fills the bill. It pam subject to change if they are to play their roles in During much of Christian history. the idea of thl' script that God produced is not the same one that rcliuious lifr. would be desirable to make sense of a Christian Augustine produced (van lnwagen 1992). LOI< ," resurrection of the body was of a literal. material "' doctrine of resurrection without appealing to a peop So, suppose that souls are subject to change. resurrection. The resurrected bodv was considned The with respect to God's reassembling new and strange kind of entity, and in section 4, burn · In that case, the same difficulty that arises for the to be the .same body as the car;hly body in the the atoms ot a body that had been totallv destrovcd is tlinc will be an attempt to do so. ' "r · ... "''' ·.'' ·.''· (Exo' identity of a person over time also arises for sense that. It 1s composed of (at least some of) the similar God's reassembling the atoms i;1 Augu;tinc's More important, however, is a problem inter- '· -. how] the identity of a solll over time. Just as \Ve asked, same particles as the earthly body. At thl' rl'surrcc- n!anuscnpt. If a c01vse had not decayed too badlv, nal to Aquinas's thought. Thnc is a t_cmion in Holy. fo llirtuc substantial form that carries our identitv and can because the preceding argument depends on meta- Sa< 111_ part of :aptive's, \Vhich in turn is composed to account for. So, it seems that the identity of a enjoy the beatific vision on its own; body-is physical about bodily identity, perhaps this cc ot the c1vil1an s. The same cells may be parts of person over time cannot be the identity of a soul Ji1st ;fri expression of its glory. So-, the soul alone second argument is not insunnountable either. cc ti.HTC earthly bodies, and there seems to be no prin- over time. seems to have ontological priority. The tension ' There is a \,thirq argument, also from van IS opled .way for Goel to decide which parts belong The materialistic conceptions of the soul arises between whether the human being (the . ( 1992). th:1i: seems to be logically conclu- th to which postmortem bodies. In light of God's body-soul composite, cithn part of which is )' (MacKay J 987; Polkinghorne 19%) do not seem omnipotence and omniscience, howevn, I doubt sive agamst the view that resurrection involves reas- to incomplete without the other) or the sL1bstantial to fare any better. They woL1ld seem to succL1mb to that this objection is insurmountable. sembly of a premortcm person's atoms. Nqne of soLJI has ontological priority. the dL1plication problem that afflicts the me112ory Three further difficulties raise more snious th: atoms that were part of me in 1%0 are part of sp The reason this tension threatens the Thomistic w crite1ion (see 3d). But if the Matthews argument logical concerns. Suppose that Jane's body was rt_1: 11ow. Thcrefr)rc, God could gather up all the view is that Aquinas holds that disembodied souls (see 3d) rehabilitates the memory c1itetion, an ana- utterly destroyed, and the atoms that had composed '.Homs that were part of me in 1960 and put them A are individuated by the bodies that-they logue of that argument could save these materialis- It were spread throughout the universe. Gathering 111 exactly the same relative positions they had· in writer a11a·cresifCITl1i1im1\vith. 13ut if the soul is the tic conceptions of the soul. the atoms an·d· reassembling them in their exact prc- 1%0. He do this without destroying me accon stJi1rfal forln tE;1t accounts for the identity of the now. Then, 1f the reassembly view were correct,· mortem postttons relative to each other would 1 under resurrected person, and if the body is merely mat- 110 bring Jane's body back into existence. To sec this could confront me now with myself as I \Vas 11npas . 3b. Sameness of Soul-Body Composite ter (potency) of which the soul is the form, then consider an analogy. Suppose that one of 111 IWiO. As van lmvagen points out, each of us ply the body of the resurrected human being that conttibution was to give an account of tine: 's manusc1i-ptS-had been enttt·Cly truly say to the other, "I am you." But that, bi list rises-1f!/1c11cucr its matter-will be that human what happens between death and resurrection that later God miraculously reassembled the atoms ts conceptually impossible. Therefore, the reassem../ most being's body, by definition. As 13ynum put it, in terms of the subsistence of the rational soul. in the manuscript. The reassembled atoms would bly view is wrong. I activi1 "God can make the body of Peter out of the dust Aquinas's view has the advantage over the sub- be a perfect duplicate of the manuscript, but they I should point out that these considerations do tmpas that ·\vas once the body of Paul" (1995, 260). stance dualists like Plato and Descartes in that it do not compose the very manuscript that had been not m.akc van lnwagcn a skeptic about bodily res- llllm( If this is the case, souls cannot be individuated at a gives a reason why resurrection should be bodily destroyed. The reassembled atoms have their God could accomplish bodily resurrec- God· time by their yearning for a certain body-because'\, resurrection: the body is _important to make a positions as a result of God's activity, not of tton 111 some other way, for example, by replacinu ( complete substance-. - .. the identity of the body (whose body it is) will \ Augustine's. The duplicate manusc1ipt is related to body_with_a_cluplicate right bcfo1:e agent . On the other hand, Aquinas's account buys depend on the identity of the soul. It is difficult to ,! • 01iginal manusc1ipt as a duplicate tower of blocks or cremation, and the duplicate is what-is--crel11atecl but a these advantages at a cost. His account commits sec how Aquinas can combine the Aristotelian ) j I IS re_Jated to_ your c_hi]d's 0tiginal tower that you acci- or bmied.' This shows that it is logically possible bcr ' him to a new ontological : the view that matter individuates with his view that j that bodily resu1Tection, where the resurrected Talia ?entally knocked over and then ptii:- the blocks back rational soul as a subsisting entity that is not a sub- the soul is a substantial form that can "subsist"-;! body is the same one as the premortcm body, be 111 !heir miginal positiom: The tower that you built is Gree stance. It is not really of and God-apart from a body. I J\ c ;,,I f· .. \• I-'·'·• , '' ... j LYNNE RUDDER BAKER• DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE 364 702 PART VII• DEATH AND IMMORTALITY 703

\ however "in the right way,. is spelled out for the problem, Jones is that person at t2. Thus. Jones can mad l· accomplished by an omnipotent being-even if we c: both memories (caused in the right way) . i causal connections between mental states of Jones be made not to survive by duplication. This sort of pain' lack the conceptual resources to sec hmv. The pres- violates God s essential JUStJCc in judgment. 13ecause Lori ent point, however, is that resurrected bodies arc now and a future person, t\vo fu):_urc persons can move s:ems to many a most unsatisfying way to God is essentially just. if A deserves punishment, it have mental states caused by Joncs's mental states thmk ot personal idrntity. 1s metaphysically impossible for God to brina it peor,! not produced by Cod's reassembling the atoms of There may be another way, at least if we allow bum;; premortcm bodies. no\v in the right way. It is logically possible that ab out that 13 and C both have A's me11101ies. Joncs's memories be transferred to two future per- religious assumptions, to the memorv crite- (Exo; Putting aside van lnwagen's arguments, the If punishment except Christ, rion. A religious philosopher, may respond, to the difficulty for bodily resurrection comes from sons in exactly the same "1ight way" (whatever that tlm ar?umcnt shows that it is metaphysically duplication argument by saying that God would Holy, \'1't:fll:ction on the following question: How can an is). In that case, the memory c1itcrion would hold, 1mposs1ble tor God to transfer A's mcmo1ies to two per impossibile, that two future persons arc Jones. not (or let it be brought about) that ""vra earthly body that is subj_cct to decay or destruction no!1divinc people. It is metaphysically both B and.C have A's memories. Thus, God in wdl: by be the sa111e body as an inco-m1ptibk glori- Whatever causal connections hold between-· the n11poss1ble tor God to transfer Christ's memoiies to His _ would prevent -(Locke daily I fied body? ·I suggested th;{t identity of bodies mental states of Jones now and person 13 in two distinct nondivinc people since Christ is 1924, II, xxvii, 13). 13ut the memoi·y criterion hl consists of spatiotemporal continuity, and if God the future could also hold between the mental divine. The Matthews argument relies on heavv would still be vulnerable to the charge that, even if anthro could replace the organic cells of a body by incor- states of Jones now and a different person C in the theological assumptions, but it docs rescue God would not allow both 13 and to have A's for ex; ruptible and gl01ified cells in a way that preserved future. it is logically impossible that Jones be 'c memo1y criterion from the duplication problem. both 13 and C. - - .. spatiotemporal continuity, then a premortem body _would not be a metaphysically Si sut11c1cnt cntcnon tor personal identity. It would could be the same body as a postmortem body To-pi.it this point another way: there is an IS, still be metaphysically possible for two people, 13 even though the premortcm body is corruptible important constraint on any criterion of personal sh and C, to have all A's memories, that is, for each to 4. and the postmortem body is inc01Tuptible. identity. Identity is a one-one relation, and no per- se have memories continuous with A's. However, I doubt that one and the same body son can be ·1ael1tical with twocltstinct future per- Sa• There is yet another view of human persons, which (or one and the same anything else) can be corrupt- sons. So, any c1itcrion of personal identity that can However, there is an argument using religious ce is compatible with the doctrine of resu1Tection. ible during part of its existence and incom1ptiblc be satisfied both by person A at tl and person B at premises that rehabilitates the mcmmy crite1ion by CC Suppose that huma1_:yersons. are purely material dming another part of its existence. The reason for t2 and by person A at tl and person C at t2 entails showing that it is metaphysically impossible for IS human bodies, but not my doubt is that being corruptible and being incor- that 13 = C. So, if B is a different person from C, a God to bring it about that B and C both have all th criterion that allows that A is identical to both is A's memories. 13ccausc this way was suggested to to the bodies that constitute them (Baker tc ruptible concern the persistence conditions of a 2000). On this view, "the constitution view " thing, and a thing has its persistence conditions logically untenable. However, if sameness of mem- me by Gareth 13. Matthews, call it "the Matthews b· something is a in virtue of. having a ''' c' cssentiaJ!Y. To say thii1g is com1ptible ls-to ories sufficed for sameness of person, one person argument.'' The premises of this argument are ex- Sf and a person is;; !111111<111 person say--tl1at there arc a range of conditions under could become two: A's memories could be trans- plic.itly religious. They appeal to God's necessa1y \\I ferred to B and C, where 13 # C, in such a way attnbutes-namcly, that God is essentially just- 111_ of being by a body. which it would go out of existence; to say that a (I do not distinguish between human organisms and A that B's and C's memo1ics are continuous with A's and to the of a judgment If God thing is incorruptible is to say that there are no such human bodies; the body that constitutes me now is write1 memories in exactly the same way ("the right is essentially just and God judges everyone, and A conditions. It is logically impossible-or at least it identical to a human organism.) The relation accon seems so-that a single thing is such that there are way"). It would follow on the memory c1ite1ion is a_ cJeserves punishment, then it be impossible for 13 and. have between a person and her body is the same relation under conditions at one time under which it could go out that A = 13 and A = C. But since 13 # C, this is a C A's memories. .. __ that a statue bears to the piece of bronze (say) that 1111pas, contradiction. Hence, the memory criterion does of existence, and that there are no such conditions makes it up: constitution. So;-tliei·e are ·rwol:heoi;eti- ply not work (Williams 1973a). . The reason it would be metaphysically impos- , at another time under which it could go out of ex- cafidcas the notion of constitution and the notion bi list \stcnce. This difficulty could be overcome by not The problem of duplication seems insur- sible for 13 and C to have A's memories is this: A most mountable for the memory c1iterion. Philosophers punishment. God is essentially just and of a first-person pcrspectivc--that need explication. requi1ing that the (inc01n1ptible) resutTccted body I'll discuss each of these ideas b1iefly. activi be the very same body as the (corruptible) earthly have responded to the problem of duplication with judges cvc1yone. Suppose that 13 and C both had rather desperate measures; for example, _the A's memories (caused in the tight way). Whom body; see section 4. 4a. The First-Person Perspective -, ..\.r num( same person as a future person, as long as there are dqes Godyunish? If God punished B but not Gr God If there are t\vo Tt!ture persons at t2 C but not B, then God would not be essentially A first-person perspective is the ability to COJ;cei: "' cc; ( 3d. The Memory Criterion related to Jones at tl in the same way, then Jones is JUSt: B and C are related to A in exactly the same oneself. This is not]ust- ;bii.ityto agent Many philosophers find psychological continuity neither.Jo11esjust.__ doe_s not survive until t2; at t2, way! is impossible to be just and to judge B and use the first-person pronoun; rather, it requires that but a an attractive criterion of personal identity, but there there are two replicas ofjories, but Jones herself is C d1t1erently. On the other hand, if God punished one can concci11e

world makes an ontological diffc..Tcncc in that thing" is is determined by y's primary kind. For mad 1 embedded in a clause introduced by a psychological actions derivatively; the body has the property of or linguistic verb in a first-person sentence. For world: a world populated with beings with inner example, if a human body constitutes a person. having toenails nonderivatively. and the person has pain lives is ontologically richn than a world populated then what there is is a perso11-co11stitutcd-bv- LOl I example, "I wish that I were a movie star," or "I the property of being responsible for certain of her with 110 beings with inner lives. But what is onto- a-huma11-body. So you-a person constituted by, a pcor .· said that I would do it" or "I \vondcr how I'll die" actions nondcrivatively. If x constitutes y, then some all illustrate a first-person perspective. If I wonder logically distinctive about being a person-namely, human body-arc most fi.111dame11tally a person. of x's properties have their source (so to speak) in y, the capacity for a first-person perspective-docs Person_is your p6ma1:y kind. If parts of vour bodv (Exol. how I will die, or I promise that I'll stick with you, and some of y's properties have their source in x. not have to be secured by an immaterial substance \;;ere replaced by bion.ic-.parts until yot; were n:) howJ then I am thinking of myself as myself; I am not The unity of the x-constituted-by-y is shown Ho!) .. thinking of myself in any third-person way (e.g., like a soul. longer human, you would still be a person. You by the fact that x and y borrow properties from each arc a pnson as long as you exist. If you ceased to ''""'ra not as Lvnne Baker, nor as the person who is other. The idea of having properties de1ivatively have a first-person perspective, then you would well: thinking, 'nor as her, nor as the only person in the 4b. Constitution accounts for the otherwise strange fact that if x con- daily, room) at all. Even if I had total amnesia and didn't cease to exist-even if your body was still there. stitutes y at t, x and y share so many properties even It• ) know my name or anything at all about my past, I What distinguishes human persons from other logi- Whether we arc talking about rivers, statues, though x ::/=- y anthrc :... could still think of myself as myself. Anything that cally possible persons (God, Martians, perhaps com- human persons, or any other constituted thing, the To summarize the general discussion of the for ex; ,,, ·.can wonder how it will die ipso facto has a first- puters) is that human persons arc constituted by basic idea is this: when certain things of certain idea of constitution: constitution is a vc1y general person perspective and thus is a person. In short, human bodies (i:c., human animals), rather than, kinds (aggregates of water molecules, pieces of mar- relation throughout the natural order. Although it Si any being whatever with the ability to think of say, by Martian green-slime bodies. ble, human organisms) are in certain circumstances is a relation of real unity, it is short of identity. IS, itself as itself-whether a divine being, an artificially Constitution is a very general relation that we (different ones for different kinds of things), then (Identity is necessa1y; constitution is contingent. sh manufactured being (such as a computer), a human arc all familiar with (though probably not under new entities of different kinds come into existence. Idenfif)i is symmetrical; constitution is asvmmctri- SC clone, a Martian, anything that has a first-person that label). A river at any moment is constituted by The circumstances in which a piece of marble cal.) Constitution is a relation that accoun,ts for the sa an agaregate of water molecules. 13ut the river is perspective-is a person. ....b ...., comes to constitute a statue have to do with an :lppearance of genuinely new kinds of things with CC A being may be conscious without having a not identical to the aggregate of water molecules artist's , the conventions of the art world, new kinds of causal powers. If F and G are prima1y C< first-person perspective. Nonhuman and that it at that moment. 13ccausc one and and so 011. The circumstances in which a human kinds and Fs constitute Gs, then an inventory of IS other higher animals are c6'!1sciou<-and they have the same river, call it R, is constituted by different organism comes to constitute a human person have the contents of the world that includes Fs but leaves psychological states such as believing, fearing, and agarea;tes of molecules at different times, the river to do with the development of a (narrowly defined out Gs is incomplete. Gs are not reducible to Fs. tc identical to any of the aggregates of ,; capacity for a) first-person perspective. Jn each case, b· desiring. They have points of view (e.g., "danger in that direction"), but they cannot conceive of th;;t"-make it up. So, assuming here the new things of new kinds, with new sorts of causal Sf classical conception of ;dentity, according to which 4c. Human Persons 1 as the subjects of sudi.. thoughts. They cannot powers, come into being. Because constitution is co1ii:Cii'1· cif themselves from the first person. (We if a = b, then necessarily, a = b, is not the vehi_c,:Je., so to speak, by which tl;ings of new A h1111w11 person at time t is a person (i.e., a being A have eve;y reason to think that they do not wonder identity. kinds come into existence in the natural world, it-is with a first-person perspective) that is constituted write1 how they will die.) So, havi11g psychological states -- A11other way to see that constitution is not obvious that constitution is not identity. Indeed, by a human body at t and was constituted by a accon as and desires and having a point of identity is to notice that even if an aggregate of this conception is relentlessly antireductive. human body at the beginning of her existence. u11de1 view ar: necessa1y but not sufficient conditions for molecules, Al, actually constitutes Rat tl, R might Although not identity, constitt1t{on is a relation (I say "was constituted by a human body at the be- being a person. A sufficient condition for being a have been constituted by a different of of real unity. If x constitutes y at a time, then x and ginning of her existence" to avoid problems raised ply b· person-whether human, divine, ape, or silicon- molecules, A2, at tl. So, constitution is a relation y are l?Ot separate things. A person and her body by the Incarnation. The orthodox Christian view is bi list based-is having a first-person perspective. What that is in some ways similar to identity, but is not have lots of properties in common: the property of that the eternal Second Person of the T1;nity most makes something a person is not the "stuff' it is actually identity. If the relation between a person having toenails and the property of being responsi- was identical with the temporal human Jesus of activi made of. It does not matter whether something is and her body is constitution, then a person is ble for certain of her actions. But notice: the person Nazareth, and that that Being was both fully divine made of organic material or silicon or, in the case not identical to her body. The relation .. is more like has the property of having toenails only because and fully human. How this could be so is ultimately nunH of God, no mate1;a1 stuff at all. If a being has a first- the relation betwe_en a statue and the she is constituted by something that could have had a mystery that requires special treatment far beyond God person perspective, it is a person. bronze that makes 1t up, or between the nver and) toenails even if it had constituted nothing. And her the scope of this chapter.) ( Perso11 is an ontological kind whose defining the aggregates of molecules. body is responsible for her actions only because According to the constitution view, an ordi- agent characteristic is a capacity for a first-person perspec- The answer to the question What most funda- it constitutes something that would have been 11a1y human person is a mate1;a1 object in the same but a tive. A first-person perspective is the basis_ of ;ill mentally is x? is what I call "x's primaty kind." responsible no matter what constituted it. way that a statue or a carburetor is a mate1;a1 ber self-consciousness. It makes possible an inn_e__r_ life, a Each thing has its prima1y-kind property essentially. So, I'll say that of object. A statue is constituted by, say, a piece of Talia life-·ofthot1glits that one realizes are one's own. If x constitutes y, then x and y are of different p1;- and her body has ti1e marble, but it is not identical to the piece of marble Gree - The appearance of first-person perspectives in a ma1y kinds. If x constitutes y, then what "the property of being responsible for -certain of Tter that constitutes it. The piece of marble could exist LYNNE RUDDER BAKER• DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE 364 706 PART VII• DEATH AND IMMORTALITY 707 i The constitution view is compatible with thl' in a world in which it was the only occupant. but conditions of persons-all persons. human or not- possibility of knmvledge here.) Again, \ three tl.'atures of the C:h1istian doctrine of resurrec- no statue could. Nothing that is a statue could exist arc not biological. according to the traditional doctrine of Providence, tion mentioned at the outset: embodiment, iden- pamLOI t· in a world without artists or institutions of art. A the obtaining of any contingent state of atfairs tity, miracle. In the first place. -the- h{1man person is constituted by an organism, a 4d. Resurrection on the Constitution View dei)ends on God's free decre_c. Whether the person vie\v shows why resurrection should be bodily: burrl member of the species Ho1110 si1pims, but is not with resurrected body 1. or body 2, or some other The constitution vie\\" cm solve some outstanding human persons are essentially embodied, and hence (Exel identical to the organism that constitutes her. The body is Smith is a contingent sta;e of affairs. There- conceptual problems about the doctrine of resur- could not exist unembodied. The first-person per- howJ hum:m organism could exist in a world in which fore. which if any of these states of atfairs obtains rection. The two clements of the constitution view spective is an essential property of a person consti- Ho!)• no psychological properties whatever were exem- depends on God's free decree. No immaterial soul needed to show how resurrection is metaphysically tuted by a body of some kind. A nondivinc '\vra plified, but no person could. Nothing that is a per- is needed for there to be a fact of the matter as possible arc these: ( 1) hu_man persons arc essentially first-person perspective cannot exist on its own, well: son could exist in a world without first-person to whether Smith is the person with resurrected cm\)odied, and (2) huma11persons essei1tially have disembodied. So, the question Why is resurrection daily perspectives. A human organism that develops a body I. All that is needed is God's free decree that first-person perspec:tivcs. bodily? cannot arise. On the interpretation of the Ir first-person perspective comes to constitute a new brings about one contingent state of atfairs rather doctrine of resurrection according to which a an th re thing: a person. 1. Essential embodiment: although human per- than another. If God decrc_es ___ that _the person for ex Just as different statues arc constituted by dif- sons cannot exist without some body or other human person exists in some intermediate state with body 1 have first-person between her death and a general the ferent kinds of things (pieces of marble, pieces of (a body that can support a first-person perspec- is the person with body 1 (Davis 1993, Si future, the constitution view would postulate an bronze, etc.), so too different persons are (or may tive), they can exist the bodies that I 19-21). So, tl1ci:e is a fact of the matter as to IS. they ac.ti.ially have. W speak of human (Alternatively, the constitut;t;n which, if any, of the persons in the Resu1Tection is sli be) constituted by different kinds of things (human organisms, pieces of plastic, Martian matter, or, in perso1:isi11 the--1-esu1Tection, where, though still view is compatible with there temporal gap Smith, even if we creatures cannot know it. On se i, the person's existence). Because co!1stitiiti()n the case of God, nothing at all). What makes some- embodied, they do not have human bodies the Christian idea of Providence, it is well within sa view does not require that there be the same body thing a person (no matter what it is "made of') is a with human organs and DNA. The same God's power to bring it about that a certain resur- Ct persons who had been constituted by earthly for the same person, the problems found with the rected person is identical to Smith. cc first-person perspective; what makes something a bodies can come to be constituted by resur- traditional theories of body are avoided. Notice that this use of the doctrine of God's IS piece of sculpture (no matter what it is "made of') In the second place, on the constitution view, Providence provides for the metaphysical impossi- tl- is its relation to an art world. A person could start rected bodies. The bodies on earth and in out as a human person and have organic parts heaven are not the same, but the persons are. it is possible that a future person with a resurrected bility of Smith's being identical to both the person tc body is identical to Smith now, and there is a fact replaced by synthetic parts until she was no longer with body 1 and the person with body 2. For it is b 2. Essential first-person perspectives: if a person's 1 \ )1\) I· of the mattei·--;-Gout which, if any, such future per- p;_11t of Cod's natural knowledcre that it is meta- s1 constituted by a h1111za11 body. If the person whose first-person perspective were extinguished, the ------·------b son is Smith. To see that there is a fact of the mat- physically impossible fo1: one person to be identical organic parts were replaced by synthetic parts person would go out of existence. What makes ter about which resurrected person is Smith, we "' retained her first-person perspective-no matter a person the individual that she is is her first-per- persons. And according to the traditional ;. must proceed to the third feature of the doctrine of notion of God's power, what is metaphysically what was doing the replacing-then she would still son perspective. So, persist in the resur- write1 resurrection. impossible is not within God's power to bring exist and still be even with a synthetic rection is first-person accon In the third place, resmTection is a miracle, a

earth must persist in heaven. The resurrection body Moreover, death would have to be conceived 5. 111ac The constitution view also has advantages, at must be that very organism. In that case. any ani- of in a very unusual way by an animalist who is a pai1: least for Christians, over its major 111atcrialistic com- malist view compatible with Ch1istian resurrection Ch1istian: 011 a Christian animalist view, a person/ The docninc of rcsmTcction has not received as much LOI petitor: animalis111. (Animalism is the view that a will have implausible features about the persistence organism docs not really die. For example, God philosophical attention as some other aspects of Cl11is- peo1 human perso11···is identical to ;\ hu111an organism.) conditions for organisms. snatches the body away immcdiatclv bdt)rc death tia11 thcolot,'Y (e.g .. the and the bun [ On the constitution vic\v, being a person is not just Let me elaborate. If, as on the animalist view, a and replaces it with a simulacrum , that dies (van (Exe t a contingent property of things that arc fundamen- tional arguments fr)r the ), but views person's postmortem body were identical to her prc- lnwagen 1992). God makes on personal identity suggest int1iguing possibilities for howt tally nonpcrsonal (animals). mo1tcm body, then we would have new questions isms disappear at one place (on earth at the place idc11tit)•i11g conditions under which a prcmrntem per- Ho!:/ On the animalist view, our having first-person where the death certificate says that they died) and ''\Vlc. perspectives (or any mental states at all) is ill"elevant about the persistence conditions for bodies. Non- son can be identical to a postmo1tcm person. Onlv if a rc;:_JJ_pcar at some other place (Zimmerman _I lJlJ9). well: to the kind of being that we arc. But the Christian Christian animalists understand our persistence con- prcmo1tem and postmmtcm person can be one the In citl1(.T c1se-;-·chi:istian animalists who believed in daily story cannot get off the ground without presuppo- ditions in terms of continued biological functioning. same individual is resmTcction cvrn a logical possibility. resurrection would have to suppose that organisms Jr sitions about first-person perspectives. On the But Christian animalists who believe in rcsu1Tcction routmely undergo physically impossible changes an th re human side, witl1out first-person perspectives, there construe our persistence conditions biologi- REFERENCES without ceasing to exist. Platonists would say that for ex would be no sinners and no penitents. Because a cally unless they think that rcsu!Tccted persons arc the body dies, but the soul never dies; it lives Aquinas. Thomas. I 9-Ei. S1111111111 "f11colo,!!icll I. Questions person's repentance requires that she realize that maintained by clige_stion, respiration, and so on as Si straight 011 through the body's death. Christian 75-89. Nl'w York: Random Housl'. she herself has offended, nothing lacking a first- earthly persons are. postmo1tem bodies are IS animalists would have to say something even Aristotle. I 94 I. De .rl11i111,1. In "f11e Basic 1-l'orks o(Aristotlc, pcrson perspective could possibly repent. On the incorruptible, it seems unlikely that they arc main- sl· stranger: the body of a resurrected person docs not l'd. Richard McKeon. Nl'w York: Rando;n House. divine side: Christ's atonement required that he tained by biological processes (like digestion, etc.) as SC die either, if by "die" we mean cease functioning suffer, and an important aspect of his suffering ours arc. But if biological processes are irrelevant to l3aker, Lynnl' Rudder. '.WOO. ,111d Bodies: A Co11- sa 1permanently. Death for human persons who will stit11tio11 Viiw. Cambridge, England: Cambridge was his anticipation of his death (e.g., the agony in the persistence conditions of resurrected persons, and be resurrected, on this view, would just be an illu- Univl'rsity Press. the Garden of Gethsemane); and his anticipation of if, as animalism has it, biological processes are essen- sion. I do not think that that conception of death his death would have been impossible without tial to our persistence conditions, then it does not l3ynum, Caroline Walker. I 995. 'J7u· R.cs11rrl"Ctio11 of the comports well with the story of the Crucifixion, Body i11 IVestem Christi,111ity. Nl'w York: a first-person perspective. This part of even seem logically possible for a resurrected person \ which suggests that death is horrendous and not at Univl'rsity Prl'ss. mission specifically required a first-person pcrspec- to be identical to any of us. Something whose per- \all illusory. What is important about us (and Christ) sistence conditions arc biological cannot be identical Cooper, John W. I 989. Body, So11/ 1111il L!fi' E11er/11sti11.!!: So, there are several why a Christian according to the Christian story is that we have to something whose persistence conditions are not Biblical a11d the Mo11is111-D1111lis111 Debate. should prefer the constitution view to animalism. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans. first-person perspectives. Given how impmtant the biological. To make animalism compatible with the doctrine first-person perspective is to the Christian story, To put it another way, a Christian animalist Cullman, Oscar. I 973. "Immortality of the Soul or Res- of resurrection, the Christian animalist would have fl Christians have good reason to take our having who believes in resurrection must hold that UJTection of the Dead?" In ill1111or1<1lity, ed. Terl'llcl' to make two unpalatable moves: she would have to Penelhum, 53-85. Belmont: Wadsworth. write· first-person perspectives to be central to the kind of earthly bodies, which are corruptible, are identical conceive of persistence conditions for organisms as a cc or being that we are. to resurrection bodies, which arc incorruptible. Davis, Stl'phen T. 1993. R.isc11 illdccd: M11ki11!! SC11se o{the R.cs1m-crtio11. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerd.mans. . uncle: The second reason for a Ch1istian to endorse Because I think that biological organisms are at least partly nonbiological, and she would have to rcconceive the death of a human person in a way the constitution view over animalism is that the essentially corruptible, I do not believe that a res- Hick, John. I 994. Death illld Etcmal Lifi'. Louisville. Kv.: ply b. that did not involve demise of the organism to constitution view allows that a person's resurrection urrection body, which is incorruptible, could be Westminster/john Knox. . , which the person is allegedly identical. bi list body may be nonidentical with her earthly biologi- identical to a biological organism. Even if I'm Locke.John. I 924. /111 Essay Co11cc111ii(!! /-/11111a11 U11dcl:\/a11d- most cal body. Acc61:ding to the constitution view, it is wrong about the essential corruptibility of - Perhaps even more important is the fact that, i1(1!, ed. A. S. P1ingle-Pattison. Oxford: Clarendon Press. according to animalism, the property of being a activi logically possible that a person have different bodies isms, however, the fact remains that on Christian MacKay, D. M. 1987. "Brain Science and the Soul." In 11npa at different times; whether anyone ever changes animalism, the persistence conditions for organ- person or of having a first-person perspective is just 'Tlic Oxj(>rd Co111p1111io11 to the Mi11d, ed. Richard L. num1 bodies or not, the logical possibility is built into the isms would be beyond the purview of biology. A a contingent and temporary property of essentially Grego1y, 723-25. Oxford: Oxford University Press. nonpersonal beings: animalism severs what is most God constitution view. By contrast, on the animalist Christian animalist who believed in resurrection Polkinghome, John. 1996. The 1?(a Physicist: ( distinctive about us from what we most fundamen- view, a person just is-is identical to-an organism. would have to allow that organisms can undergo if a Botto111-11p "n1i11kcr. Minneapolis: Fottress Press. agell" tally are. On the animalist view, persons qua per- Whatever happens to the organism happens to the physically impossible changes without ceasing to P1ice, H. H. 1964. "Personal Survival and the Idea of but a sons have no ontological significance. I think that person. On an animalist view, it is logically impos- exist. For example, organisms would disappear at Another World." In Classical 1111d Co11te111porary ber these are all good reasons for a Christian to prefer sible for you to survive the destruction of your one place (on earth at the place where the death Rcadi11gs i11 the Philosophy if Rc/('(io11, ed. John Hick, Talia the constitution view to animalism. body. So, on an animalist view, if Smith, say, is res- certificate says that they died) and reappear at 364-386. Englewood CliffS, NJ.: Prentice-Hall. Gree urrected, then the orgamsm that was Smith on some other place. PRASANNATMA DAS• A HINDU THEORY OF LIFE, DEATH, AND REINCARNATION 711 364 710 PART VII• DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

\ Wil!iJms, lkrnard. 1973. "Bodily Continuity and Swinburne, Richard. 1997. '/11c El'ol11tio11 the So11!. ans\\'er them correctly, you and your brothers shall A sober person is not bewildered by such a mac \ l'ersonal Identity." In l'ro/J/c111s /1ilosophy