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Military and Strategic Affairs Military and Strategic Affairs Military and Strategic Military and Strategic Affairs Volume 6 | No. 1 | March 2014 In Retrospect: The Second Lebanon War Ehud Olmert Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects Stephen J. Cimbala Commercial and Industrial Cyber Espionage in Israel Shahar Argaman and Gabi Siboni Blood and Treasure: On Military and Economic Thinking Saul Bronfeld Iron Dome’s Impact on the Military and Political Arena: Moral Justications for Israel to Launch a Military Operation against Terrorist and Guerrilla Organizations Liram Stenzler-Koblentz Russia’s Security Intentions in a Melting Arctic Lincoln Edson Flake המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITYc STUDIES INCORPORATING THE JAFFEE bd CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES ISSN 2307-193X (print) • E-ISSN 2307-8634 (online) Military and Strategic Affairs Volume 6 | No. 1 | March 2014 CONTENTS In Retrospect: The Second Lebanon War | 3 Ehud Olmert Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects | 19 Stephen J. Cimbala Commercial and Industrial Cyber Espionage in Israel | 43 Shahar Argaman and Gabi Siboni Blood and Treasure: On Military and Economic Thinking | 59 Saul Bronfeld Iron Dome’s Impact on the Military and Political Arena: Moral Justifications for Israel to Launch a Military Operation against Terrorist and Guerrilla Organizations | 79 Liram Stenzler-Koblentz Russia’s Security Intentions in a Melting Arctic | 99 Lincoln Edson Flake The purpose of Military and Strategic Affairs is to stimulate Military and and enrich the public debate on military issues relating to Strategic Affairs Israel’s national security. Military and Strategic Affairs is a refereed journal published three times a year within the framework of the Military and Strategic Affairs Program at the Institute for National Security Studies. Articles are written by INSS researchers and guest contributors. The views presented here are those of the authors alone. The Institute for National Security Studies is a public benefit company. Editor in Chief: Amos Yadlin Editor: Gabi Siboni Editorial Board: Udi Dekel, Oded Eran, Zaki Shalom Journal Coordinator: Daniel Cohen Editorial Advisory Board • Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Swiss Federal • Jeffrey A. Larsen, Science Applications Institute of Technology Zurich, Switzerland International Corporation, US • Frank J. Cilluffo, George Washington • James Lewis, Center for Strategic and University, US International Studies, US • Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State University, • Theo Neethling, University of the Free US State, South Africa • Rut Diamint, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, • John Nomikos, Research Institute for Argentina European and American Studies, • Maria Raquel Freire, University of Coimbra, Greece Portugal • T.V. Paul, McGill University, Canada • Metin Heper, Bilkent University, Turkey • Glen Segell, Securitatem Vigilate, Ireland • Peter Viggo Jakobson, Royal Danish • Bruno Tertrais, Fondation pour la Defence College, Denmark Recherché Strategique, France • Sunjoy Joshi, Observer Research • James J. Wirtz, Naval Postgraduate School, Foundation, India US • Efraim Karsh, King’s College London, • Ricardo Israel Zipper, Universidad United Kingdom Autónoma de Chile, Chile • Kai Michael Kenkel, Pontifical Catholic • Daniel Zirker, University of Waikato, University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil New Zealand Graphic Design: Michal Semo-Kovetz, Yael Bieber, Tel Aviv University Graphic Design Studio Printing: Elinir The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 40 Haim Levanon • POB 39950 • Tel Aviv 6997556 • Israel Tel: +972-3-640-0400 • Fax: +972-3-744-7590 • E-mail: [email protected] Military and Strategic Affairs is published in English and Hebrew. The full text is available on the Institute’s website: www.inss.org.il © 2014. All rights reserved. ISSN 2307-193X (print) • E-ISSN 2307-8634 (online) In Retrospect: The Second Lebanon War Ehud Olmert The processes that led to the Second Lebanon War and the events that took place during the war are analyzed six years after the war. The starting point for the analysis is the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, which, according to the analysis, was justified. However, from a broad perspective, it is evident that the overall processes since the withdrawal led to strategic choices that resulted in the IDF’s reduced operational preparedness. The article examines the decision making processes near the start of and during the course of the war through a review of the IDF’s main operational activity during the war. In addition, it describes the political moves during the fighting and at its conclusion. Finally, there is an analysis of the campaign’s achievements and the main lessons derived from it. Keywords: Second Lebanon War, Lebanon, IDF, strategy, Hizbollah It is an overstatement to call the military effort undertaken by Israel in Lebanon during the summer of 2006 a “war.” The events known today as the Second Lebanon War did not actually begin on July 12, 2006; they began on the day the State of Israel decided to adopt a policy of containment in response to the kidnapping and killing of its three soldiers in 2000 – when it threatened to make the ground shake in Lebanon but then did nothing. In fact, the Second Lebanon War began when Israel lost its deterrent capability; when it failed to act, explicitly contradicting its commitment to do so; when it decided to accept a situation in which the other side chose the timing, the scope, and the manner in which to drag Israel into a situation where it was forced to react rather than dictate. This was the state of affairs for six years after October 2000. Ehud Olmert was the Prime Minister of Israel during the Second Lebanon War. This essay is based on his lecture “The Second Lebanon War: The Test of Time,” delivered at the INSS conference “The Lebanon Wars and Israel’s Security Concept,” July 12, 2012. Military and Strategic Affairs | Volume 6 | No. 1 | March 2014 3 EHUD Olmert | IN Retrospect: THE Second LEBANON WAR 4 This article will address only the military aspect of the campaign in Lebanon in 2006, from a six-year perspective. Firstly, it should be emphasized that the withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 was justified. I differ on this matter with my friend Effi Eitam – a great soldier, but one who is happy with our presence in territories that are not part of the State of Israel and do not contribute to its international legitimacy, although this legitimacy is necessary and essential in order to realize Israel’s strategic interests. This happiness is not part of my worldview and was not part | Volume 6 | No. 1 | March 2014 1 | March 6 | No. Volume | of it when I was Prime Minister. Thus, the decision to withdraw from Lebanon was correct and justified, and although the manner in which we departed may be questioned, it is beyond the scope of this discussion. After withdrawing from Lebanon, for six years Israel closed its eyes to Strategic Affairs the situation forced upon it on the northern border. Not only did it refrain and from responding to events and act, or fail to act, in direct contradiction to threats issued by officials who set Israel’s policy goals; it also diverted the Military vast majority of security operations and military preparations to combat in another arena, with other tools and other methods, regardless of the clearly predictable security and military needs that would ultimately be imposed on us on the northern border. The lack of operational preparedness as reflected in certain events during the Second Lebanon War resulted from a deliberate strategic preference – and it no longer matters who made this decision, nor will I engage in accusations or assign responsibility. This strategic preference was manifested by the IDF’s failure to prepare as necessary, in terms of training and capabilities, to provide effective responses at the right time and in the right context during the Second Lebanon War. Even before January 2006, I was a member of the security cabinet and, in that capacity, of the small team of ministers addressing the issue and arena of Lebanon. Beginning in January 2006, the question of Lebanon became an integral part of my agenda. To the best of my understanding and knowledge, having also examined the archives, no measure taken during the six years prior to 2006 compares to the measures taken during the six months after January 8, 2006 – in terms of focused assessment of the situation in Lebanon, the feasibility of operating there, and the need to address the emerging situation. On that date, I held my first meeting with a team of senior advisors, including then-Chief of Staff Lieut. Gen. Dan Haloutz, in order to discuss what we could and should do, given the EHUD Olmert | IN Retrospect: THE Second LEBANON WAR 5 assessment that there was very little time before we would be challenged in the north. According to the situation assessment, we were progressing toward a conflict on the northern border, and the question was whether, under the circumstances, we should continue the policy of containment that had been in place for six years, or whether we should change this policy, taking into account that doing so would drag us into a violent conflict and state of friction with the opposing forces. Without exception, the position of all those in the military leadership – from the Chief of Staff, to the head of Military Intelligence, to the head of Military Intelligence’s 2014 1 | March 6 | No. Volume | Research Division, and all other officials – was that we could not maintain the policy of containment. This was also the view of the General Security Services (GSS), the Mossad, and all the other advisors. The salient position, including of the Chief of Staff, was that if we were attacked in the north Strategic Affairs in accordance with Hizbollah’s regular pattern – that is, kidnapping of and soldiers and firing of rockets against towns on the northern border – and we failed to respond, then Israel would suffer strategically very much, Military worse even than if the regime in Syria changed unexpectedly.
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