Implications of the Release of Chibok Girls on Nigeria's War on Terrorism

Covenant University Journal of Politics & Internationall Affairs. Vol. 5, No.1, June, 2017

An Open Access Journal - Available Online

Implications of the Release of Chibok Girls on Nigeria’s War on Terrorism

Olanrewaju Faith Osasumwen1; Olanrewaju Adekunle2, Loromeke Ejiroghene Roland3 & Joshua Segun4

1,2,3,4Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria [email protected]; [email protected] [email protected]; [email protected]

Abstract: The year 2013 marked the emergence of the use of women and girls as hostages by the most dreaded Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria. The successful abduction of about 300 girls from the Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok-Borno State, Nigeria, in the dead of the night boosted the effrontery of the sect to undertake more abduction of hundreds of girls and women even in broad day light in North-Eastern Nigeria. The abduction of the Chibok girls generated both national and international concerns and raised the recognition of the group‟s ruthlessness against women. Various attempts to rescue the Chibok girls by the Nigerian government, humanitarian agencies and the international community failed. Using qualitative descriptive analysis, the paper avows that the controversial release of 21 Chibok girls without battle conditions or reports leaves a lot to speculation. This event represents a symbolism of Boko Haram‟s ability to hold the Nigerian government to ransom at its own terms. It submits that the gradual release of the girls and the sect‟s proposal for the negotiation of 83 more girls raises questions on the terms of the negotiations leading to the release as well as queries the strength of Nigeria‟s anti-terrorism war. The paper recommends that because the release of the 21 hostages may not be the ultimate goal of Boko Haram, the Nigerian state should consciously negotiate on well calculated intelligence and use experts in future negotiation with terror groups in order to construct outcomes that is better than the status quo. Keywords: Boko Haram; Chibok girls; Insurgency; Negotiation; War on Terror; #BringBackOurGirls

Introduction abduction and use of women by the Terrorism is the “propaganda of the terror group is the declaration of the state deed” (Laqueur, 1999:43) and of emergency by Goodluck Jonathan in “propaganda by deed” (Weinberg and May 2013 (Zenn and Pearson, 2014; Eubank, 2006:3). This connotes the Bloom and Matfess, 2016). The publicity of the agenda of terrorist submission of Omego (2015:87) is quite groups by their actions. Actions that different. He argues that the tactics of have serious public impacts tends to kidnapping by the sect began after a raid have critical impact beyond the effects by the federal forces in which close they have on the immediate targets. Such relations of suspected members of the action are expected to provoke other sect were arrested. According to actions from followers through its Barkindo, Gudaku, and Wesley (2013: messages. Of all the strategies of 22) as cited in Zenn and Pearson (2014) insurgency, terrorism has been the and Gilbert (n.d:1-5), during the raid, chosen choice of insurgency obtainable over a hundred women including the to both religious and political insurgents. wives of Abubakar Shekau, the leader of The propaganda effects or impacts of the Boko Haram were arrested. Shekau, after choice of terrorism over other forms of this issued a threat in January 2012 to insurgency such as coup d‟etat and engage in a gender based abduction guerrilla war amongst others make it use centered mainly on the kidnap of women deliberate (Agara, 2015). “enemies” in return (Associated Press,

The relationship between terrorism and January 27, 2012). The Vanguard (2013) gender has been explored by terrorist avows that, Shekau also threatened that organisations. Terror groups have “no one in the country will enjoy his propagated their agenda and impacts via women and children” if the relatives of direct and deliberate attacks on females. Boko Haram members were not released. Nowadays, religious based terror groups Although the second part of the threat are committing violence against women which is to spread the terror against than have been ever witnessed in history. women to all parts of Nigeria has not For various reasons women have become been implemented since then, yet the battlegrounds to be conquered victimisation of women and GBV (Barkindo, Gudaku and Wesley, 2013). became an overt aspect of the activities Terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda, of the Boko Haram in the northeast Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, (Zenn and Pearson, 2014:46-53; Human Hezbollah and Al-Shabaab have adopted Rights Watch, 2014:3-4). Most of the the instrument of gender to expand the abductions have been carried out in intensity of propaganda of their deeds, Borno state, the hottest zone of the ensure the smooth running of their insurgency in North-East Nigeria. Boko organisational activities and as weapon Haram‟s adopted kidnapping tactics is of power (Sharoni, Welland and Steiner, similar to that of Al-Shabaab used in the 2016). Horn of Africa and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Maiangwa Since 2013, Boko Haram has and Amao, 2015). significantly contributed to gendered violence against women (Osita-Njoku Hostages have tactical values. Terrorist and Chikere, 2015). The reasons for the organisations embrace sexual terrorism rise of gender based violence (GBV), against their hostages for various

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reasons; sex slaves, subjection of victims Methodology to rape and early marriage; the This paper relies on secondary data manipulation and control of the obtained from journals, conference government and some part of the proceedings, monographs, textbook and audience; and sometimes they are assets internet sources. The data sourced often used as negotiation tools (Osita- through these were analysed through the Njoku and Chikere, 2015; Buba, 2015 employment of qualitative descriptive p.1-12; Yesevi, 2014; Pratt, 2004). The analysis with the backdrop of the spontaneous rise in the use of females Eastonian Systems theory which for the accomplishment of suicide explains the solidity of the political bombing missions at the dawn of the system as a function of the ability of the intensification of female abductions system to convert the inputs (demands explains that the abduction of women and supports) to outputs (authoritative and girls by Boko Haram is for decisions) that please majority of the instrumental purpose such as the people. furtherance of the agenda of the Boko Conceptual Clarification Haram and the weakening of Nigeria‟s The Concept of Terrorism war against terror. Therefore, this paper Although terrorism has become a global seeks to interrogate the politics and phenomenon, the acceptance of a intricacies surrounding the negotiation common definition amongst scholars has between the Nigerian government and been difficult. Attempts to define the Boko Haram for the release of the 21 concepts have instigated arguments Chibok girls as well as discuss it effects amongst scholars (Ifemeje, Ewulum and on Nigeria‟s anti-terror war. It questions Ibekwe, 2015; Agra, 2015; Joshua and why Boko Haram after series of failed Chidozie, 2014). The reason for this negotiations with the Nigerian state could be traced to the various context suddenly agreed on a deal of releasing within which the term has been used. To 21 of the abducted Chibok girls. The arrive at common grounds, attempts to paper is therefore structured into six sub- define terrorism has been grouped into headings. Section one serves as the two: academic definitions and official introduction; the second part addresses definitions. A number of official the methodology and theoretical definitions have been compiled by framework; part three discusses the Schmid and Jongman (2005). The concepts germane to the study; part four United States (US) Vice President‟s provides an overview on the abduction 1986 task force defined terrorism as “the of the Chibok girls and the various unlawful use or threat of violence against reactions that ensued afterwards from the persons or property to further political or national and global contexts; section five social objectives. It is generally intended tackles the implications of the politics to intimidate or coerce a government, surrounding the release of the 21 individuals or groups to modify their Chibok girls on Nigeria‟s anti-terror war behaviour or policies” (Chaliand and while the six sub-heading concludes the Blin, 2007 p.14). US State Department work and provides recommendations for defines it as a premeditated politically more effective anti-terror war in Nigeria. motivated violence perpetuated against

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non-combatant targets by sub-national causes of terrorism, whether they bear groups of clandestine agents, usually economic, political and social symbol. intended to influence as audience (Gadd, Cline and Alexander (1986 p.32) Karstedt and Messner, 2011p.192). The contends that terrorism is the deliberate Department of Homeland Security employment of violence or the use of (DHS) states that terrorism is “any violence by sovereign states as well as activity that involves an act that is some national groups assisted by dangerous to human life or potentially sovereign state in order to attain strategic destructive of critical infrastructure or and political objectives through the key resources; and … must also appear violation of law (cited in Prunckun, 1994 to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce p.22). Ladan (2014) avows that terrorism a civilian population, (ii) to influence the is the calculated use of violence (or policy of a government by intimidation threat of violence) against civilians or or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct non-combatants, in order to attain goals of a government by mass destruction, that are political or religious or assassination or kidnapping” (Gadd, ideological in nature, which is done Karstedt and Messner, 2011 p.192). The through intimidation of a population or definition by the Department of Defence government or an international and the DHS are more detailed than that organization or coercion or instilling fear of the US Vice President. While the to do or abstain from doing any act definitions by the Department of (cited in Ifemeje, Ewulum and Ibekwe, Defence and DHS focuses on threat, the 2015:40). Rourke (2008:316) has actual act of violence, the target of the defined terrorism by attempting to whole society as well as the government. highlight the features common to it thus; The Department of Defence however “terrorism is (1) violence; (2) carried out narrows the cause of terrorism to by individuals, nongovernmental political reasons contrary to what is organisations, or covert government obtainable in some countries of the agents or units; that (3) specifically world. In modern times, reasons such as target civilians; (4) uses clandestine religion have been a serious cause of attack methods, such as car bombs and terrorism. This is exemplified in the case hijacked airliners; and (5) attempts to of the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. influence politics.” From the above, it is The definition did not also distinguish clear that terrorism involves the between attacks on non-combatant perpetrator(s), the victim(s) and the civilians and on military combatant. target(s) of the violence. It is the use of Nevertheless, three commonalities can various means and violence to achieve be discerned from these official whether political, economic and social definitions are the presence of political goals within a political environment. objectives; the use of violence; and the Terrorism as a social menace has had so intention of creating fear in the target much negative effects on human population. freedom, human inalienable rights and

Agara (2015) avows that the academic human security. definitions are diverse and complex. There are little consensus as to the root

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(a) War on Terror While George Bush‟s war on terror is a strategy to protect the US and its allies The “war on terror” is a response to the globally, the idea received the support of September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on western powers such as Britain and other the United States (US). The concept was countries that envisaged the strategy as a coined by former US President George way of boosting their national security. Bush after the incident. National Through the platform of the United Strategy for Combating Terrorism posits Nations Security Council (UNSC) that war against terror is a long term Counter Terrorism Committee, the US battle against the “underlying conditions provided supports to African countries to that promote the despair and the implement the UNSC Resolution 1373 destructive visions of political change that requires countries to suppress and that lead people to embrace, rather than prevent funding to terror groups, shun terrorism.” The strategies include improve on border security, prevent and four major goals which are to defeat suppress recruitment by terror groups terrorist organisations of global reach; and prevent new and existing safe haven deny further support, sponsorship and of terrorists (Abolurin, 2011:194). safe havens of terror groups; diminish The presence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the underlying conditions that are terrorism in Mali, the existence of al- already stated above and defend the US, Qaeda and the existence of the al- its citizens as well as its interest at home Shabaab amongst others showcase and abroad (National Strategy for evidences that the war on terror has not Combating Terrorism, 2003). The war been globally successful although since on terror conceptualised by George Bush the 9/11terror event, the US has not involves overt and covert military witnessed such massive spate of terror. operations, the blockage of financial However, the existence of terrible terror flows to terrorist groups and new groups around the world as well as the security legislations. It involves attempts socio-economic and psychological to mitigate the impacts of terrorism impacts they cause makes it logical to because ancient and current realities deduce that terrorism still remains an show that terrorism goes beyond issue to the US ministry of defence and identifying with an ideology to the the UN Security Council. The war on impact of the ideology. Therefore, the terror has been very demanding on the war on terror involves engaging various Nigerian government due to the guerrilla avenues and strategies such as military, nature of the Boko Haram activities and legal, political and ideological attempts the loose network of its members. The to globally fight against terror groups declaration of the state of emergency, the themselves, the organisations and emergence of civilian joint task force, individuals supporting them with funds, the deployment of the use of force, arms, technology and logistics advices; negotiations and peace talks are destroying existing terrorist networks strategies that have been employed. and preventing new ones from springing Trillions of naira have been gulped by up. Nigeria‟s war on terror.

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(2) The Chibok Girls: Abduction allowed in my religion, and I and Reactions shall capture people and make (a) The Chibok Girls Abduction them slaves. He added: Discourse Western education is sin, it is forbidden, and women must go In April 2014, Boko Haram adopted a and marry. He said the girls new and notorious tactic of kidnapping should not have been in school female students and women in the north- and instead should have been eastern part of Nigeria. It is also clear married since girls as young as that this tactic is very similar to that of nine are suitable for marriage the Islamic Stata of Iraq (ISIL)‟s attacks (cited in John, 2014). on school girls in the areas it controlled From a video released by Shekau, it is in Iraq. The tragic story of the abduction observed that some of the girls have of the Chibok girls began on the night of been married off and some sold into April 14 and 15, 2014 when Boko slavery. Nevertheless, some accounts Haram laid siege on the Government holds that they were smuggled into Girls Secondary School Chibok (GSSC), Cameroun and Chad through the porous a rural town in Borno State and borders (Peters, 2014:188). The success kidnapped 276 students who were of the abduction of over 200 girls and writing their final Secondary School the attention the sect received expedited Certificate Examination (SSCE) the expansion of its propaganda both (Maiangwa and Amao, 2015). Disguised internationally and domestically. This as security guards, the terrorists ordered encouraged the sect to engage in more of the students out of their rooms for their such sacrilegious act and depend on own safety. The girls were seized from women operatives. It has been observed their dormitory and loaded in the back of that: trucks. While 57 of the girls narrowly The abduction of the Chibok escaped immediately after their girls has become one of the abduction, 219 were still missing and high profile cases illustrating a phenomenon that has attracted under the control of Boko Haram increased attention and (Richmond, 2015). It remains the largest concern in recent years: single occurrence of abduction by Boko violent targeted attacks on Haram (Human Rights Watch, 2014 students, teachers and p.3). education institutions (Richmond, 2015). On May 5, 2014, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in a video took (b) Reactions to the Abduction of the responsibility for the abduction of Chibok girls Chibok girls. He even threatened that The abduction of the Chibok girls stirred more abductions would still occur. a lot of emotional reactions and rescue Shekau added that he would sell them in efforts from both local and international the market as slaves (Martel, 2014). He bodies as the Chibok abduction brought claimed that: attention to the vulnerability of women Allah instructed me to sell and girls in Nigeria (Copeland, 2013). them...I will carry out his The first controversy that the issue instructions. Slavery is ignited was on the weekend of April 19-

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20, 2014, when the Defence #BringBackOurGirls hash tag. Put Headquarters falsified a report that over differently, the frustration ignited by the 100 of the 129 figure that the ministry initial determined and energetic response said was abducted were released. This from the parents, Nigerian authorities was debunked by the GSSC Principal. and local advocates began the “Bring The military was forced to retract this Back Our Girls” campaign. This statement on April 21, 2014. Hope was popularised the #BringBackOurGirls dimmed at the inability of Goodluck movement and publicised the hashtag on Jonathan, Nigeria‟s immediate past social media. It demanded that Goodluck president to rescue the girls. Then First Jonathan mounts concerted strength to Lady Patience Jonathan, although rescue the girls. The #Bringbackourgirls breaking protocol decided to intervene twitter phenomenon (campaign) had over by summoning the GSSC principal, 3.3 million tweets from all over the Chibok community leaders and some globe (Buba, 2015). It boosted the key figures in Borno State government conspicuousness of the girls‟ abduction to seek clarifications and amicable and gained international support of well- solution to the missing girls‟ conundrum. known figures such as Malala Yousafzai Her call was heeded only by the a Nobel Prize-winner and Michelle principal and a few others. This Obama amongst others (Stein, 2016). necessitated the tearful outburst: “Na While human rights activists got support only you waka come…” that popularised through public awareness campaigns and the issue. It also changed the dynamics NGOs, Nigeria‟s international partners, and raised the tone of the agitation for such as France, US, Canada, China, UK, their release. Israel and United States also volunteered The prolonged case was heightened with to rescue the girls. They provided somewhat confusion on the part of supplementary military support to government on what rescue mechanisms augment Nigeria‟s weak counter should be adopted. A vehement military terrorism prowess. They provided spy engagement with Boko Haram terrorism planes, technical experts and also sent created a vacuum for several Special Forces to assist Nigeria‟s efforts stakeholders to volunteer intervention. (Khan and Hamidu, 2015: 25). The US This birthed the Bring Back Our Girls supported Nigeria in getting intelligence (BBOG) movement that began as a “One by providing drones and unmanned Million Match for the Release of surveillance aircraft (Bloom and Abducted Chibok Girls”. The march was Matfess, 2016). The internationalisation led by Ms. Hadiza Bala Usman, the and external dynamics of the activities of present Director-general of Nigerian the sect also gave rise to an African-led Ports Authority. The movement International Support Mission in Mali transformed to the BBOG with the (AFISMA) under the auspices of which appearance of Mrs. Oby Ezekwisili, Nigeria have had military involvement in former Minister of Education and World the Sahel. The reasons for the increased Bank Vice President, Africa, which gave international responses is because the the campaigning an international acts of the abduction contradicted moral prominence, especially with the values and humanitarian principles. It

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was a crime against humanity. For Mrs. against the militants. The military was Michelle Obama, the immediate past underfunded and was not adequately First Lady of the United States, the act equipped with the suitable weaponry for was “unconscionable” (The Hindu, that kind of warfare. Nigeria‟s former 2014). Unfortunately, the collaborative Chief of Defence Staff, General Martin counter terrorism efforts did not yield Luther Agwai astutely observed that: positive results especially in the rescue “Our military is properly equipped to of the abducted Chibok girls as over 200 fight yesterday‟s war” (Siollun, 2015). of them are still in captivity. President Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria‟s

(c) Responses of the Nigerian incumbent president have achieved much Government success in the war against Boko Haram Two major approaches have been because the challenges the military faced employed by the Nigeria state in its war were addressed. against terror. Human Rights Watch - Declaration of the State of (2012) describes them as the stick and Emergency carrot approaches. The declaration of a state of emergency

(i) Stick approaches was necessitated by the constitutional obligation to restore a portion of  Military Engagement Nigeria‟s territory taken over by Boko According to Udounwa (2013), Nigeria Haram. It involves the suspension of has engaged “kinetic strategy‟ in its war constitutional provisions relating to civic against Boko Haram. This strategy rights. According to section 305 (3 (c) entails the use of hard military power. (d) (f) of the Nigerian Constitution as The strategies and tactics in kinetic amended, the President shall have power operations are similar to how state actors to issue a state of emergency only when, conduct themselves in conventional “there is actual breakdown of public warfare. This involves massed order and public safety, there is a clear movement of infantry, the use of and present danger of an actual manoeuvres and the adherence to rules breakdown of public order and safety in of engagement in war. Pruitt (2006:374) the federation or any part to require avers that most government prefer the extraordinary measure to restore peace use of core military force because it and security or to avert such danger” “requires no concessions, grants no (Nkwocha, 2012:368). In December legitimacy, and is consistent with the 2011, former President Jonathan norm of punishing illegal violence.” Full declared a state of emergency in 15 local military response is also used because of government areas of six northern states the need to protect the sovereignty of the as an attempt to restore order and regain state as no government will allow a control of the territories taken over by group to usurp part of its territorial the sect. On May 13th, 2013 the state of sovereignty. emergency was also declared in

Thousands of soldiers were deployed to Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states. It the region for direct military offensive was extended until November 2014 in an against Boko Haram. The military has attempt to crush the Boko Haram not had an easy feat in winning the war

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militants. However the security crisis of the SMJTF was to join forces, efforts continued to worsen. and intelligence in winning the war - Joint Task Force Initiatives against Boko Haram.

At the regional level, the Multinational (ii) The Carrot Approach: Joint Task Force (MJTF) was formed in Negotiation and the Release of the 21 March 2015 by the Federal government Chibok Girls of Nigeria along Niger, Chad and The carrot approach include the use of Cameroon her immediate neighbouring peace talks and negotiations. countries under regional framework of Engagement in peace talks and Lake Chad Basin Commission. It had negotiations with terror group is a over 8,000 soldiers. common trend amongst the governments The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a of the terrorism infested states. The citizen-led initiative was created on the federal government have engaged in rationale that strong knowledge of the private, public, direct and indirect local environment would allow the local interactions with Boko Haram over the population to arrest Boko Haram release of the 21 Chibok girls and in members (Okeowo, 2014). The CJTF ending the insurgency in general. At the mostly made up of vigilante groups, state level, the carrot approach has hunters, farmers and youths in the areas involved proposals and reconciliations to also complement the efforts of the Boko Haram insurgents. For instance, in military in degrading Boko Haram (US 2009 Ali Modu Sheriff former governor Homeland, 2013). This has been a of Borno State paid N100 million naira crucial advantage to the MJTF that were to pacify the anger of the sect when their not familiar with the local context or leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed. even local languages. The collaboration At the national level, the government between the MJTF and the CJTF have have tried to bring the sect to the been effective in capturing and negotiation table as well as offer neutralising hundreds of terrorists on repentant ones amnesty. Late President many occasions. However, it is argued Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua‟s establishment that CJTF worsened the distance of a committee of inquiry led by between the State and the people. Ambassador Usman Galtimari to The accession of Shekau after the death ascertain the complaints of the sect and of Mohammed Yusuf led the group to a make likely commendations on how to more violent phase. Boko Haram began improve security in the north-east to employ new tactics and methods, (Onuoha 2012). In 2013, President including suicide-bombings which Goodluck Jonathan set up the Committee prompted the Nigerian government to on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of establish the Special Military Joint Task Security Challenges in the North to Force (SMJTF) in 2011. It consists of identify and constructively engage key personnel from the Nigeria Police Force leaders of Boko Haram and to develop a (NPF), the Nigerian Immigration Service workable framework for amnesty and (NIS), the Department of State Security disarmament of members of the group (DSS) and the Defence Intelligence (Amaliya and Nwankpa, 2014). As Agencies (DIA) (Falode, 2016). The role

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recommended by one of the panels, the consultation of Goodluck Jonathan efforts by the government to engage the with United States, Israeli, British and group in talks have failed mostly due to French governments in Paris where it difficulties in identifying Boko Haram‟s was agreed that force be used instead of demands (Thurston, 2015). prisoner exchange (Iroegbu, 2016).

At the assumption of President Buhari to Thirdly, former Nigerian president office, there has been much silence over Olusegun Obasanjo also attempted to the rescue of the girls. During his media negotiate between the sect and the chat on December 2015, he disclosed Nigerian state. At the end of the that there were no concrete intelligence negotiation, the demands by the sect about the Chibok girls. Following the were the prosecution of policemen media chat, in April 2016 the sect responsible for the death of Yusuf released a video taken in December Mohammed; demands for a ceasefire showing “about 15 chubby looking and which included an end to arrests and relaxed Chibok girls” (Thisday, 2016). killings of their member; and payments The government responded to this video of compensation to families of sect with Operation Crackdown and members killed by security personnel bombardment of Boko Haram enclaves (Uchehara, 2014). Fourthly, attempts in Sambisa forest to free the girls. This was also made by Datti Ahmad, ended with no success recorded. president of the National Supreme

The government of Nigeria has had Council on Sharia to broker a deal some failed attempted negotiation with between the Nigerian state and the sect in 2012 to no avail. Boko Haram. Shehu Sani, a civil right activist in northern Nigeria, was the first Around August 2016, there was a ray of to help broker peace deal between the hope that came with Islamic State (ISIS) government and the sect. Secondly, by announcement of Abu Musab Al- May 2, 2014, the then President, Banarwi as the new Boko Haram Goodluck Jonathan announced that his leadership. Abu Musab Al-Banarwi was government was making uptight efforts said to be more inclined to negotiate the to rescue the girls. The hopeful freedom of the Chibok girls in exchange assurances issued by the Jonathan for some of their commanders (Iroegbu, administration was countered by the 2016). After the negotiations brokered statement issued by the sect in a video by the officials of the Swiss government on May 12, 2014 in which the leader of and in which the international Boko Haram Abubakar Shekau, was Committee of Red Cross played a shown cladded by over 130 of the girls neutral intermediary role, a date and with a long Islamic chador and hijab, location was agreed for the release of the and called for a prisoner exchange. It girls (Ukpong, 2016). On October 13, was against the backdrop of this that 2016 the nation, international Ahmad Salkida, a journalist, brokered a community, concerned citizens and the pact to ensure the release of the girls in families of the abducted girls exchange for 100 Boko Haram prisoners experienced a happy moment that all detained in various prisons in Nigeria. have been eagerly waiting for. 21 of the However, this plan was abandoned after Chibok girls abducted in 2014 were

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released to freedom at Kumshe some negotiations. While the issue of states kilometres away from Banki close to negotiating with terrorists is a complex Nigeria‟s border with Cameroon one, various reasons have been attributed (Ogundipe, 2016). It is one of the to the why democratic states must never greatest achievements of the government do such. In the actual fact, states detest since the beginning of the Boko Haram negotiations with terrorists because ordeal. terrorism is an overt disrespect for state

(3) Implications of the Politics of sovereignty. Negotiation with terrorists the Release of the 21 Chibok Girls is unacceptable and illegal because of on Nigeria’s Anti-Terror War their affection for violence, disrespect States negotiate with terrorists for both for the principle of the rule of law and strategic and tactical reason. However, other legal framework (Hoxha, 2015). state-versus-terrorists negotiations has By 2001 president George Bush stated raised so much debates because it that the only way to deal with terrorists opposes the standard doctrine which whose only goal is deaths is to bring holds that “one should not negotiate with them to justice which definitely is not by terrorists”. The traditional perception talking to or negotiating with them but about the relationship between the state punishing them (Bush, 2003). In 2004, and terrorists has been to launch a Vladimir Putin, a former president of the military attack on terror groups Russian Federation, stated that “the (Zartman, 1990 p.165). Eland (1998) universally recognized method of avers that “most attention has been fighting terrorism is denying any focused on combating terrorism by negotiations with terrorists because any deterring and disrupting it beforehand as contact with them encourages well as retaliating against it after any committing new, bloodier crimes” attack on the state.” Less attention has (Putin, 2004). Similar perception was been paid to what motivates terrorists to also held by Nigeria‟s former President launch attacks against innocent citizens Goodluck Jonathan, who saw the and the state. In line with this traditional violence and hostage taking of women view on state-terror groups negotiation is and children as the declaration of war the concept of the war on terror and against Nigeria and the undermining of Ronald Reagan‟s debates on negotiating the authority of the state. In response to with terrorists. The Regan debate is that: this, Goodluck Jonathan vowed to take America will never make all necessary action to putting an end to concessions to terrorists. To do the impunity of terrorists in Nigeria.

so would only invite more Other arguments includes that arriving at terrorism, once we head down a middle ground is a support of violence that path there would be no as well as an avenue of rewarding end to it, no end to the suffering of innocent people, terrorists. Democracies must never give no end to the bloody ransom in to violence, and terrorists must never all civilized nations must be rewarded for using it. It is also argued pay (Cambanis, 2010). that negotiating with terrorists tends to

The Regan debate summaries the legitimise or justify the terror group and traditional position on state-terrorists undermine the actors that pursue

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political change through peaceful means mixed reactions from Nigerians. (Toros, 2008: 408; Neumann, 2007). According to Agbiboa and Maiangwa Martha Crenshaw (1983: 25) argues that (2014), a survey conducted by CLEEN “the power of terrorism is through Foundation in August 2012 projected the political legitimacy, winning acceptance public opinions of Nigerians on whether in the eyes of a significant population the government should dialogue with and discrediting the government‟s Boko Haram or not. The northern and legitimacy.” As such Toros (2008: 408) southern parts of Nigeria were divided opines that such a course of action would over the acceptance of negotiation. legitimize the terrorists and set a bad Opinions from southern Nigeria averred precedence. In practice, there are cases that there should be no negotiation with of democratic governments that the sect, rather force should would be negotiated with terrorists. The British more effective in dealing with the government maintained a secret back terrorist organisation. Opinions from channel to the Irish Republican Army Northern Nigeria asked for negotiation even after the IRA had launched a contending that a coercive strategy mortar attack on 10 Downing Street that would be ineffective in resolving the nearly eliminated the entire British insurgency. Definitely, the reasons for cabinet in 1991. In 1988, the Spanish the varying opinions between the north government dialogued and negotiated and the south is not far-fetched. Support with the separatist group Basque for negotiation in the north could be Homeland and Freedom only six months because of the intensity of the attacks in after the group had killed 21 shoppers in the region, the high rate of deaths, a supermarket bombing. In 1993, the maiming, displacement, general violence Israeli government secretly negotiated and terror experienced by the civilians in the Oslo accords even though the the region. On the other hand, the south Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) could afford to reject negotiation continued to launch its terrorist because the north has been the terrain of campaign and refused to recognize the violence and therefore has not Israel‟s right to exist. The US negotiated experienced the terror the North with the Taliban for the release of Bowe experienced from the insurgency.

Bergdahl (Neumann, 2007). The failure of warfare led the Nigerian

Hayes (2002) avows that state-terror government to ensure a successful group negotiation mostly occurs in negotiation with the sect. Finally, after hostage situations like that of the Chibok intense dialogue and compromises 21 of girls. Prisoners are used as instruments the Chibok girls have been freed during to achieve strategic gains. Put the current administration of President differently, hostages have strategic Mohammadu Buhari. With no clues values as assets that are often used as from the partners in the talks, Nigerians negotiation tools. The use of hostages as amidst the jubilation with the families of a point of strength in negotiations is a the girls only speculated what the deal common trend in terror groups. Whether would have involved. In the light of the the Nigerian government should above, a public opinion on Premium negotiation with Boko Haram generated Times News (2016) discussion forum

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argues that President Buhari sees the Banki in North-East Nigeria. This also release of the girls as a medium for the brings to the fore a statement issued by release of Sunni terrorists. A Nigerian the sect months before the release of the who mediated previous failed girls that the girls would only be released negotiation attempts between the as exchanges for Boko Haram Nigerian government and Boko Haram commanders (Al Jazeera, 2016). stated that the Swiss government paid Premium Times News (2016) discussion some “handsome ransom” to the tune of forum contends that there is a millions of dollars on behalf of the relationship between Boko Haram and Nigerian authorities for the release of the President Buhari. Nigel (2016) argued girls. The minister of information that the release of the girls is a political Mohammad Lai, representing the strategy for the retention of political Nigeria government claimed that no power and office (cited in Premium ransom was paid for the girls and Boko Times News, 2016). The argument also Haram commanders were not released in follows that the gradual release of the exchange for the girls (Okakwu, 2016). girls by Boko Haram is to make The Minister credited the release of the Nigerians believe that the president and 21 Chibok girls to “painstaking his party are effective and should be negotiation and trust on both sides” voted for in the forthcoming general (Campbell, 2016). elections in 2019. Nonetheless, the

The fact remains that negotiation #BringBackOurGirls campaigners avers involves compromise. Negotiation is a that the release of the 21 girls confirms direct process of dialogue and discussion the development of the capacity of the taking place at least between two parties government in the anti-terror war. Karen who are faced with a conflict situation or Bass, a member of the House Foreign dispute. The goal of the parties involved Affairs Sub-committee on Africa and a in the negotiation is to arrive at an member of the United States Congress agreement on the causes of the conflict avers that: between them (Best, 2007:105 cited in The release of 21 Chibok Obiajulu, 2011). Self-interest of the young women from the grips parties underpins the negotiation process of the terrorist group Boko but it often ends in the show of empathy Haram into the custody of the to the other party. The continuation of state services department is bittersweet news. The warfare between the state security forces negotiations – brokered by the and the Boko Haram as well as the International Red Cross and release of another 82 hostages by the the Swiss government – have sect buttresses the speculations that the resulted in the greatest Nigerian government paid some forms of breakthrough since the due to Boko Haram. Iroegbu (2016) beginning of this ordeal. opines that “it is an arranged prisoner However, I join the rest of my exchange programme.” Supporting this colleagues in wanting to see stance, Okakwu (2016) avers that there the release of the remaining are signs to prove that four Boko Haram 197 girls who remain in captivity and are still enduring prisoners were exchanged for the girls in

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systematic abuse, rape, and encourages terrorism and the reuse of forced labor at the hands of terror tactics by terror groups but the these militants (Okakwu and degree to which terrorist groups is able Ukpong, 2016). to achieve their demands via negotiation. This paper takes a position that it is The negotiation may strengthen the wrong to view negotiation, mediation, faction in the insurgent group that is in and dialogue with terrorist groups like favour of non-violent and political Boko Haram as a sign of weakness or solution or engagement. Negotiation compromise for the acceptance of could draw insurgent groups down a violence. This is because it was wise for path of change, moderation or the option of negotiation and other transformation towards non-violence. methods of conflict resolutions to be Weiss (2003) argues that the acceptance embrace when over the years the use of and willingness for terrorists to negotiate force have failed. As terror groups are occurs after a realisation that its goals founded on imagined or real demands, are unachievable. Therefore agreeing to dialogue helps state to understand the negotiate portrays that the organisation is demands and grievances as well as weak; connotes the possibility of conveys a message of the understanding changing their ideological position and of their plights by the state. However, strategy as well. Hence, Weiss argues the release of the Boko Haram that rather than dwelling on the negative commanders poses security risk to the effects as perceived by the traditional Nigerian state as the act is an school of thought, negotiation could be a empowerment of the sect for more platform for states‟ victory over violence. Since the released commanders insurgent groups- to bring terrorists to are not repentant or ex-members of the positive change. On this note, while the sect they remain enemies of the state and swap of the girls represents an would act against the peaceful existence achievement for the BBOG campaign, it of the state as they did before their shows that negotiating with moderate arrest. elements within the Boko Haram could This paper aligns with one of the be explored by the Nigerian government arguments of the traditional state- to win the war on terror in Nigeria. The terrorist negotiation thoughts that the Nigerian government need to engage the release of hostages does not mean the moderate group of Boko Haram in victory of the state over the terrorist discussing the sources of their group. The release of the 21 Chibok girls grievances which will be addressed via is not equal to the victory over the effective policies. insurgency. However, the Nigerian state Negotiation theory states that negotiation has attached the release of the girls to should be carried out by experts from part of the criteria for measuring its various but relevant segments of the victory over terrorism. Contrary to the society. On the contrary, the negotiation state-centric analysis of the implications between the government and Boko of the state-versus-terror group Haram was conducted by politicians. negotiation, the paper contends that it is The National Security Agency (NSA) not the actual act of negotiation that assured that the government engeged the

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right set of people which does not this study, the following include the military. As such the recommendations are put forward: negotiation was a political decision and The fight against insurgency and anti- the military continued military combat insurgency policies should be against Boko Haram (Saharareporters, implemented by experts. Prior to the 2016). This position is a deviation from release of the girls most of the anti- the traditional model of state-versus- insurgency efforts involved the use of terrorists negotiation. Modern perception force. On the other hand, the negotiation on state-terror group negotiation states deals have been strictly political. Both opines that sole dependent on military approaches although crucial to defeating action is an inadequate strategy for the insurgency have their weaknesses winning the war on terror. Military and effects on the fight against terror in solution can never solve the problems. Nigeria. This paper proposes that there The establishment of the amnesty should be a firm relationship between Committee reflects President Goodluck the military anti-insurgency strategies Jonathan‟s acknowledgment that purely and political negotiation. For effective military means cannot resolve the counter-terrorism operations, the current impasse (Thurston, 2013). obviously existing politico-military Military actions are inadequate because institutional divisions should be most of the wars is usually caused by addressed in further negotiations with political, social, economic reasons. The terror groups. paper argues that the success of the The Nigerian government should military in the theatre of war was of understand that negotiation cannot bring great help to the success of the the Boko Haram insurgency to an end as negotiation. it is not an all effective instrument in curbing terrorism. Certainly, buying the Conclusion entirety or part of the group off does not Many modern-day governments have epitomize a long-term solution. There is insisted time after time that they will not no absolute guarantee that the hard core negotiate with terrorists which in of fighters would be bought off via practice have not been so. Over the negotiations. Rather, a long lasting years, calls from the Nigerian solution to the insurgency should address government, individuals, international the causes of their grievances which are agencies and the global communities for fundamental political, economic, and negotiations with Boko Haram for the social problems rooted in society. release of the girls have failed. The Lastly, while negotiation should not be sudden willingness of the sect to completely ignored as an approach to negotiate with the government for the resolving contending issues, the release of the girls in batches is quite government needs to understand that the surprising and calls for caution. It brings release of hostages is not the ultimate Nigeria to a decisive point or juncture of goal of the terrorists but is a symbolism whether it will win the war on terror or or an avenue for the establishment of not. Subsequent upon the conclusion of their influence. The government

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however need to understand that the well drafted strategy of engagement that negotiation also offers it the opportunity will be used for future negotiation. The to exert influence. It should therefore try strategies should ensure that the to construct an outcome that is better sovereignty of the state and other rights than the current status quo. In the light of the state enjoys within international laws the above, Nigeria needs to develop a are not compromised.

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