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Home , 1992 Los Angeles riots, Attack on Reginald Denny, Chinese massacre of 1871, Daryl Gates, KBLA, LAPD Rampart Division

RACE AND RACE RELATIONS IN DURING THE . THE L.A. TIMES’ NEWS COVERAGE ON THE INCIDENT AND THE ‘L.A. RIOTS’

I N A U G U R A L D I S S E R T A T I O N

zur

Erlangung des Grades einer Doktorin der Philosophie

in der

FAKULTÄT FÜR GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT

der

RUHR UNIVERSITÄT BOCHUM

vorgelegt

von

Kathrin Muschalik

Referent: Prof. Dr. Michael Wala Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Josef Raab Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 08.06.2016 Veröffentlicht mit Genehmigung der Fakultät für Geschichtswissenschaft der Ruhr Universität Bochum Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction ...... 3

2.0 A History of Cultural, Social and Economic Urban Transformation – Black Los Angeles from 1945 until 1991 ...... 14

2.1 Setting the Scene ...... 14

2.2 African American Job and Housing Situation in Postwar Los Angeles ...... 15

2.3 Criss-Crossing Los Angeles – Building Streets for Whites? ...... 18

2.4 Paving the Way to Watts – Unemployment, Poverty, and Brutality ...... 19

2.5 The Aftermath of the Watts ‘Riots’ – Cause Studies and Problem-Solving Approaches ...... 25

2.6 Of Panthers, , and ...... 28

2.7 A Glance of Hope – Los Angeles’ First African American Mayor ...... 30

2.8 Changing Demographics in Los Angeles – How the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 Transformed Urban L.A...... 32

2.9 Reconstructing Economy – Unemployment, Social Despair and Criminality in South ...... 34

2.10 Changing Demographics in South Central ...... 36

2.11 Heading for the Urban Crisis of 1992 ...... 42

3.0 The Rodney King Incident – A Reconstruction ...... 45

4.0 Real Time News – The Rodney King Incident in the ...... 47

4.1 The King Incident Becoming Political ...... 49

4.1.1 Police Chief as the ‘Source of Evil’ ...... 54

4.1.2 Police Chief Daryl Gates vs. Mayor Tom Bradley ...... 59

4.1.3 ‘Bradley’s Inquiry Boards’ – The Police Commission and as the Mayor’s Measures in Fighting Daryl Gates ...... 62

4.1.4 The Power Play Widens: Bradley and the Police Commission vs. Daryl Gates and the City Council ...... 65

4.2 The King Incident, Race and Race Relations...... 73

4.3 The Christopher Commission Report ...... 76

4.4 The Selection of L.A.’s New Police Chief ...... 89 4.5 The ‘Rodney King Trial’ ...... 96

4.5.1 to Simi Valley ...... 97

4.5.2 Los Angeles Facing Its Trial of the Year ...... 101

5.0 The Long Hot Summer of 1991 – The ‘Black-Korean Conflict’ ...... 108

5.1 Latasha Harlins and Arthur Lee Mitchell...... 109

5.2 The L.A. Times’ Reporting on Harlins, Mitchell, and the ‘Black-Korean Conflict’ ...... 110

5.2.1 The Encounter of Latasha Harlins and Soon Ja Du ...... 112

5.2.2 Arthur Lee Mitchell, Tae Sam Park and the Boycott of Chung’s Liquor Market ...... 116

5.2.3 Danny Bakewell and The Brotherhood Crusade ...... 118

5.2.4 Ending the Boycott ...... 121

5.2.5 Soon Ja Du, Joyce Karlin and the ‘Travesty of Justice’ ...... 125

6.0 The 1992 Urban Unrest – A Brief Overview ...... 130

7.0 The 1992 Urban Unrest in the Reportage of the Los Angeles Times ...... 131

7.1 Perceiving the 1992 Los Angeles Unrest ...... 133

7.1.1 The Los Angeles… Riots? ...... 133

7.1.2 Black and White Once Again? ...... 136

7.1.3 Watts revisited? ...... 143

7.1.4 The ‘Black-Korean Conflict’ ...... 147

7.2 Perception and Depiction of the L.A.P.D. During and After the L.A. Unrest ...... 153

7.3 Back to the Future ...... 162

7.3.1 Cleaning up Los Angeles ...... 163

7.3.2 National Politics – The 1992 Unrest and Its Impact on the 1992 Presidential Election Campaigns...... 167

7.3.3 Local Politics – Peter V. Ueberroth and Rebuild L.A...... 180

7.3.4 ‘Back to Business’ – The End of the Los Angeles Times’ News Coverage on the ‘L.A. riots’ ...... 184

8.0 Changes After the 1992 Unrest ...... 185 8.1 Remembering the Civil Unrest...... 186

8.2 The Los Angeles Police Department...... 186

8.3 Economic and Ethnic/Racial Transformation of South (Central) Los Angeles ...... 203

8.4 Race and Race Relations in (South) Los Angeles ...... 206

9.0 Conclusion ...... 213

10.0 Works Cited ...... 220

1.0 Introduction

In 2014 alone, more than three hundred were killed in encounters with the police, one hundred of whom had evidently been unarmed.1 Especially the obscure circumstances of eighteen-year-old Michael Brown’s fatal shooting on August 9th in Ferguson, Missouri, received considerable attention beyond the U.S. and renewed the debate on racially motivated in the country. Not only in Ferguson – where the killing led to violent , which even intensified after a grand jury acquitted the officer who had shot Brown – but all over America, people demanded

systemic cultural and substantive policy changes in police departments […] to ensure black and brown communities are not targeted with overly aggressive, discriminatory ‘broken windows policing’ and ‘stop and frisk’ policies that promote brutality and violence.2 Arguing that improving police-minority relations had to start with holding police officers accountable for abusing civil rights, they called for a nationwide “zero- tolerance policy for .”3

The public outcry aroused by the events in Ferguson, resemble, albeit on a much smaller scale, that following the beating of African American motorist Rodney Glen King by four white Los Angeles police officers on 3rd, 1991. After a high- speed chase, King – in departure from the usual arresting procedure – was beaten and kicked more than fifty times. Unnoticed by those involved, however, the incident had been filmed by a neighbor who handed the videotape over to the local TV-station K.T.L.A., which instantly released an edited version of the tape. Because of the video evidence as well as the huge wave of its publishing led to, the officers were charged with excessive use of force and .4

Despite the horror -wide televised images of the beating caused among Angelenos of all races, large parts of the city’s African American population

1 Sinyangwe, Samuel: “Mapping Police Violence”. URL: http://mappingpoliceviolence.org/unarmed/ [18.08.2015]. 2 Baez, Iris: “Are the police getting away with murder”. CNN, August 12, 2014. URL: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/12/opinion/baez-police-garner-michael-brown-chokehold/ [18.08.2015]. 3 Ibid. 4 Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis – Urban Transformations in the L.A. Times Reporting on the 1992 Los Angeles ‘Riots’”. In: Sattler, Julia: Urban Transformations in the USA: Spaces – Communities – Representations. Transcript, 2016, 325-341, 325. 3 celebrated the existence and publishing of the volatile footage: Having unsuccessfully been complaining about systematic police misconduct against ethnic and racial minorities for years, they considered it being of historically inestimable value as it “finally […] caught the Loch Ness Monster.”5 For them (as well as many others who had ‘witnessed’ the beating on TV), the police officers’ conviction did not only seem a given, it also presented the prospect of justice for Rodney King on behalf of all African Americans.

A year later, however, this enthusiasm vanished instantly with a predominantly white jury acquitting the four policemen. Within hours, Los Angeles was shattered by a violent outbreak that would become known as the ‘L.A. riots’ or ‘Rodney King riots,’ in the course of which 50 people were killed, more than 2,300 injured, and several thousand arrested, making it – together with a total property damage of about $1 billion – one of the most-cataclysmic urban unrests in U.S.-American history.6

Since the beginning of the violent outbreak, scholars of various academic fields have been engaged in researching the reasons for the unrest going far beyond a direct connection with the Rodney King incident and the acquittal of the officers. Here, especially the ‘riot’-analyses by , Edward T. Chang, and Josh Sides are to be emphasized, which in depth examined the social and economic history of Los Angeles before 1991/92. With distance of time and space, they – just like a number of other scholars – identified the beating and the outcome of the trial as the unrest’s ‘trigger events’ rather than as its actual cause. Instead, they stressed a combination of social and economic grievances affecting particularly South Central’s African American population as the underlying reasons for the violent outbreak: Usually starting with the decline of L.A.-based heavy industries during the 1980s, they attributed the 1992 unrest to unemployment, poverty, isolation, physical by the police as well as increasing racial tensions accompanying the area’s demographic change.7 With regard to the latter, one name can be found in a number of analyses of the unrest: Latasha Harlins. Shot by a Korean store owner in South Central only thirteen days after the King incident, the fifteen-year-old African American girl

5 Wilson, Stan (sp.): Race and Rage: The Beating of Rodney King. CNN, 2011. Documentary. 6 Cf. Wallenfeldt, Jeff: “Los Angeles Riots of 1992”. In: Ecyclopaedia Britannica. URL: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/879397/Los-Angeles-Riots-of-1992 [08.07.2013]. 7 Sides, Josh: “20 Years Later: Legacies of the Los Angeles Riots”. In: Places Journal, April 2012. URL: https://placesjournal.org/article/20-years-later-legacies-of-the-los-angeles-riots/ [04.12.2014]. 4 became the symbol of what has been coined the ‘black-Korean conflict,’8 and which is said to have essentially contributed not only to the outbreak but also the course of the ‘L.A. riots’.

The question of whether these results differ from the evaluation of the events at that time forms the basis for this dissertation. Since the different public discourses are almost impossible to reconstruct, this study will examine one of the most important stocks of information and opinion making: mass media.9 At the beginning of the 1990s, there were two kinds of mass media that suggest themselves for such an examination: television and newspaper. Although both had a comparably high number of news recipients (with 110 million American adults reading the newspaper daily and with the same number getting news from TV), there is ample evidence that newspapers had greater effects on their audiences than television news, particularly with regard to people’s political decisions.10

Since all events discussed in this thesis had a considerable impact on local as well as national politics, newspapers are the most obvious choice for a detailed analysis of the reporting on issues connected with the Rodney King beating and the L.A. ‘riots’. Especially one newspaper suggests itself for such an examination, which is the Los Angeles Times. With a circulation of more than 1.2 million copies on weekdays and over 1.5 million on Sundays, the Times was not only the largest local but also the most widely read national metropolitan daily newspaper at the time of the King beating.11 Despite its dominant position on the newspaper market, systematic examinations of the area’s largest paper are basically nonexistent12 as most other scholarly works focus especially on the events’ depiction on television.13 This blank

8 Term used to describe racial tensions between Korean entrepreneurs and their African American customers in South Central Los Angeles, resulting – among others – from cultural misunderstanding and mutual prejudices. Although widely used (especially by the press), the term is highly contested since it does not cover racial tensions in South Central adequately (for more information see chapter 2.8 Changing Demographics). 9 Cf. Jacobs, Ronald, N.: Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society: From Watts to Rodney King, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 3. 10 Cf. Bogart, Leo: Press and Public: Who Reads What, When, Where, and Why in American Newspapers. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London, 1989, 2. 11 Cf. “The Los Angeles Times’ History”. In: Los Angeles Times, September 21, 2012. URL: http://www.latimes.com/la-mediagroup-times-history-htmlstory.html [18.08.2015]. 12 Exceptions are a limited number of essays, analyzing single aspects like, for example, the paper’s depiction of Koreans before and after the 1992 unrest, e.g. Ban, Hyun: “L.A. Times Coverage of Before, After 1992 Riots”. In: Newspaper Research Journal, June 1997 Vol. 18, 64-78. 13 Cf. Vargas, João H. Costa: “The Los Angeles Times’ coverage of the 1992 rebellion: Still Burning Matters of Race and Justice”. In: Ethnicities, June 2004, Vol. 4 No. 2, 209-236, 213. 5 is supposed to be filled with the help of this dissertation, the purpose of which is to contribute to a better understanding of the perception of the King beating and its aftermath. Hence, the following analysis of the Los Angeles Times intends to add another piece to the puzzle and give an insight into how issues related to the March the 3rd beating were interpreted back then, what reasons and effects they were attributed to by this specific paper.

The corpus used for this investigation comprises roughly 1,500 articles published over a period of one year and two months, starting on March 4th, 1991 – the day following the Rodney King beating incident – and ending on May 31st, 1992 – the end of the paper’s intensive reportage on the Los Angeles unrest.14 The methodology underlying the examination is that of discourse analysis, an approach which has regularly been redefined and remodeled. As John E. Richardson wrote in 2007:

The terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discourse analysis’ are vigorously contested concepts whose definition, it often seems, are even beyond the scope of discourse studies itself. Methodologically, theoretically and analytically, the field of DA is extremely diverse […]. [We] come across authors using different – and sometime radically different – accounts of what discourse ‘is’ and the way that the term ought to be used.15 What all approaches have in common, however, is their characterization of language as not being a “neutral of a universal reality or truth” but rather “as the historically and culturally situated means by which we construct reality or truth,”16 defined by the time and space in which it is used. Starting from this observation, scholars such as Justin Johnson describe discourse as the

institutionalized way of speaking that determines not only what we say and how we say it, but also what we do not say. Discourses provide a unified set of words, symbols, and metaphors that allow

14 In the analysis, no distinction will be made between the different types of articles (e.g. editorials, obituaries etc.). It could of course be argued that, for example, letters to the editor could differ from the Times’ overall reportage. As the detailed analysis of the articles published in the period mentioned above has shown, however, this was usually not the case. At least in connection with the topics dealt with here, most reader’s letters were in accordance with what the Times presented as public opinion anyhow. 15 Richardson, John E.: Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis. Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, 21. 16 Cf. DiAngelo, Robin J.: “Why Can’t We All Just Be Individuals?: Countering the Discourse of Individualism in Anti-racist Education”. In: InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies, June 2010, 2. URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5fm4h8wm [10.11.2014]. 6

us to construct and communicate a coherent interpretation of reality.17 This discourse is unavoidable as people are unable to make sense of their “social relations without the meaning-making framework that discourses provide,”18 which means that “whenever people speak or listen or write or read”19 they follow socially determined rules and simultaneously influence them as well.20

Because of this relationship, discourse is not merely a meaning-making framework, but is also “infused with relations of unequal power.”21 According to Norman Fairclough, “[t]he idea of ‘power behind discourse’ is that the whole social order of discourse is put together and held together as a hidden effect of power.”22 Therefore, discourse is not only learned through but also and most importantly “licensed by specific social and historically shaped practices representing the values and interests of specific groups of people.”23 Thus, utterances – be it in written or spoken form, be it perceived or received – carry “an ideological history” that “comprises the ways of thinking and behaving within a given society which make the ways of that society seem ‘natural’ or unquestioned to its members.”24 This ideology can be described as the “‘commonsense’ of the society that functions in various ways to render unequal social relations as natural or inevitable.”25 When discourses become prominent, they often do so because they are in accordance with the interests of those in power – even if, at first glance, they seem to actually challenge authority. As Robin DiAngelo puts it, when discourses “threaten […] dominant interests, they are often co-opted and reinterpreted by and in service of dominant interests […]. Thus, to study discourse is to study power and ideology.”26 Although mass demonstrations against the U.S. government (or government’s decisions) like those during the or the seem to discount DiAngelo’s theory, especially the latter example proves her right: Dwight D. Eisenhower, for instance, had never

17 Johnson, Justin: “What is discourse?” St. Olaf College, Minnesota. URL: http://www.stolaf.edu/depts/cis/wp/johnsoja/works/index.html [10.11.2014]. 18 DiAngelo, Robin J.: “Why Can’t We All Just Be Individuals?”, 3. 19 Fairclough, Norman: Language and Power. Longman, Essex, 1989, 23. 20 Cf. DiAngelo, Robin J.: “Why Can’t We All Just Be Individuals?”, 3. 21 DiAngelo, Robin J.: “Why Can’t We All Just Be Individuals?”, 3. 22 Fairclough, Norman: Language and Power, 55. 23 DiAngelo, Robin J.: “Why Can’t We All Just Be Individuals?”. 3. 24 Billig, Michael: “Discoursive, rhetorical and ideological messages”. In: Taylor, Stephanie [et al.]: Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader. Sage, London, 2001, pp. 210-221, 217. 25 DiAngelo, Robin J.: “Why Can’t We All Just Be Individuals?”, 3. 26Ibid., 3f. 7 shown any particular interest in the Civil Rights Movement, but after the Little Rock Crisis of 1957, he pushed and publicly supported the Civil Rights Act of the same year. It can thus be said that the growing public discourse on civil rights made Eisenhower co-opt this discourse on equality, probably to gain a large number of African American votes and thereby strengthen his own political power.

What does this ‘co-opting and reinterpreting by and in service of dominant interests’ mean for the analysis of the L.A. Times’ discourse on issues related to the King incident? First of all, it has to be made clear that neither does public opinion equal published opinion nor does public discourse equal published discourse although they are interconnect insomuch as the latter reflects the former at least in parts, while the former encompasses the latter. At the time of the beating and the unrest following it, the newspaper was part of the Times Mirror Company, a multibillion-dollar business, owning “other newspapers, cable systems, book publishing houses agricultural land, urban real estate, commercial printing plants, and other nonjournalistic operations.”27 As part of this company and without any serious competitors on the newspaper market, the Times had “considerable influence […] in the city’s politics and economy.”28 Thus, the paper (just like all media conglomerates) offered a “hegemonic perspective that interpret[ed] and shap[ed] reality according to its own interest.”29

Although it is difficult to identify all of the paper’s interests in detail, its political affiliation certainly allows to name a few: As a democratic newspaper, the Times actively supported representatives of this very party on local as well as national levels. In order to do so, it, for example, portrayed the democratic presidential candidate of 1992, , in a much more favorable manner than his non- democratic competitors. Publishing hardly any negative statements on Bill Clinton, the Times created the impression that the then-Governor of Arkansas was favored by a majority of Americans (or at least Angelenos), thereby ‘interpreting and shaping reality’.

Today, as pointed out by J. H. Vargas, one of the papers main interests are “the city’s racial hierarchies, expressed through and maintained as economic, spatial, and

27 Bagdikan, Ben. In: Vargas, João H. Costa: “The Los Angeles Times’ coverage of the 1992 rebellion”, 213. 28 Vargas, João H. Costa: “The Los Angeles Times’ coverage of the 1992 rebellion”, 211. 29 Ibid. 8 alleged moral marginality of non-white communities,”30 a conjuncture closely connected with the Rodney King beating aftermath, in the course of which the concerns of ethnic and racial minorities became the focus of the paper’s attention. Before the incident, race and race relations had most widely been neglected, which had a variety of reasons – ranging from an overall media disinterest in the topic to the Times’ staff and target audience: While some journalists, like Jay Mathews, argue that “racial tension was unfashionable as a media story. Black frustration and the reaction of blacks to the police was a twenty-year-old-story. It was old hat”31, others submit that not noting race was considered advantageous. As a former Los Angeles Times employee puts it:

It seemed somehow wrong to notice race, when we were hoping to create a post-racial society. To say something like that today would sound wrong-headed and ignorant and purposefully blind to tough realities. But at the time there was an unstated idea that maybe not noticing race would be beneficial. Indeed, for white America, and especially for white Southern Californians, the L.A. riots came as a shock. We knew issues surrounding race and race relations weren’t perfect, but we were blind to the depth of animosity and distrust that African Americans harbored toward societal institutions generally, and white America in particular.32 However, it may not only have been the Times’s overall attitude towards race that had made it focus on some and neglect other topics but also the paper’s target audience. Although there are hardly any numbers concerning the ethnic and racial makeup of the paper’s readers, there is some evidence that at the beginning of the 1990s, the Times audience consisted mainly of “Anglo, relatively well-off suburbanites.”33 According to the former Times employee already quoted above,

[…] there is some truth to the idea that a majority of the readers of the Los Angeles Times in the late 1980s/early 1990s were white, suburban and middle class or better, but the paper also had a significant, and growing, number of readers of all demographics. I know that the marketing goal of the paper was to be the paper of everyone in Southern . […]34 As difficult it is to define the Times’ readership as difficult is it to characterize the newspaper’s journalists: In 1997, the L.A. Times started a program to add to the

30 Vargas, João H. Costa: “The Los Angeles Times’ coverage of the 1992 rebellion”, 211. 31 Jay Mathews in an interview with Lou Cannon, 1994. In: Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 14. 32 Interview conducted with former Los Angeles Times employee (anonymous) on May 23rd, 2016. 33 Vargas, João H. Costa: “The Los Angeles Times’ coverage of the 1992 rebellion”, 212. 34 Interview conducted with former Los Angeles Times employee (anonymous) on May 23rd, 2016. 9 newsroom’s diversity “to increase ethnic and racial diversity in the newsroom in a way that more accurately reflects its Los Angeles readership”35, suggesting that at the times of the King beating “principles of ‘diversity’ had [not] been in place.”36 In other words:

“Amongst overall employees, there was a degree of racial/ethnic diversity – although, predictably and unfortunately, there were a disproportionate number of minority employees in the lower- paying jobs, while a disproportionate number of the upper-level management were white men.”37 Based on the theoretical framework of discourse analysis and the background information on the Los Angeles Times, this thesis will examine the newspaper’s reporting on the Rodney King incident, the ‘black-Korean conflict’ and the 1992 L.A. unrest by analyzing which aspects of the respective events were taken up and presented as ‘reality’ by the paper and whether or not this had any impact on local political decision-making in its aftermath. In order to do so, the following key questions – predicated specifically on the works of the discourse analysts Andreas Gardt (Diskursanalyse. Aktueller Theoretischer Ort und Methodische Möglichkeiten, 2007), Willy Viehöver (Handbuch der Sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskursanalyse, 2003), Reiner Keller (Diskursforschung, 2004), and Achim Landwehr (Historische Diskursanalyse, 2008) – will be addressed:

1) When does a respective discourse start/end, by which events is it influenced? 2) What are the key subjects within the respective discourses? 3) Who are the protagonists? 4) Which stylistic devices/terminology is/are used? 5) Who are the addressers/addressees? 6) Where are articles positioned within the paper, how are they structured? 7) Which text strategies are used (narration, description, commentary etc.)? 8) What are the articles’ intentions (information, persuasion etc.)?

This rather open approach was chosen since more detailed questions were likely to have restricted the analysis as well as its results. Statistics on the usage of single

35 Gross, Richard [et al.]: “Diversity Efforts at the Los Angeles Times: Are Journalists and the Community on the Same Page?”. In: Mass Communication & Society, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2002, 263-277, 264. 36 Vargas, João H. Costa: “The Los Angeles Times’ coverage of the 1992 rebellion”, 212. 37 Interview conducted with former Los Angeles Times employee (anonymous) on May 23rd, 2016. 10 words, for instance, would (without embedding them in the respective context) not have led to any knowledge about the discourse examined here.

Although this thesis acknowledges the importance of photographs for newspapers and the discourses they create or to which they contribute, it does not include them into its analysis because in the case of the Times’ reporting of the King incident and the L.A. riots, they mirror what is said in the articles but hardly ever add any further significant information. If an article portrays Rodney King as a victim of police brutality, and if this article shows him sitting in a wheelchair, the message remains the same. Thus, written texts will serve as the only source.

Before turning to the Times’ news coverage, however, there will be a detailed description of the history of African Americans in Los Angeles from 1945 until 1991, closely connected with the area of South Central L.A., which has been identified as the starting point of the unrest. The purpose of this chapter is to show that – contrary to what scholars like Canon, Chang or Sides have indicated – the social and economic grievances black Angelenos held at the beginning of the 1990s, had not just begun during the ‘80, but had been deeply entrenched in the history of the city’s African American community. Starting with the end of World War II, this chapter will point out the considerable influence the Second World War as well as the ensuing Cold War had on L.A.’s demographics and economy, affecting of course also its black neighborhoods: Attracted by job opportunities in its heavy industries, African Americans from all over the U.S. moved to Los Angeles, where – still strictly limited by restrictive covenants in home sales and rent contracts – they settled especially south of the city center. Facing a continuing immigration influx, this ‘black belt’ soon started suffering from overpopulation, poverty, increasing crime rates as well as police misconduct, the dissatisfaction about which for the first time erupted into violence in 1965. Most widely ignored by officials, social grievances that had fostered these so-called ‘’ continued and were accompanied by a number of new problems. Thus, when in the following years the city’s ethnic make- up changed sustainably, leading to African Americans increasingly finding themselves competing for job and housing opportunities with immigrants from Latin America and Asia, racial tensions were inevitable. Apart from illustrating that the reasons for the unrest were not just to be found in the foregone decade, this chapter seeks to provide a basis for the ensuing analysis of the news coverage of the L.A.

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Times. Displaying important landmarks in the history of African Americans in L.A., it will help to evaluate which events or developments were presented by the Times as underlying causes for the King incident and the unrest respectively.

Chapter 3 provides a brief reconstruction of accounts given of the Rodney King beating by the police officers as well as by King himself in order to then trace down how the L.A. Times did or did not include them in its reporting. The paper’s news coverage on the beating is the issue of Chapter 4, demonstrating – among others – how the Times initially shied away from clearly identifying King as a victim of (racist) police misconduct. It furthermore points out how the paper for a short period focused most intensively on police-minority relations to soon turn to reporting on the animosity between Police Chief Daryl Gates and Mayor Tom Bradley, climaxing in the latter calling on the former to resign in the light of the Rodney King crisis.

Chapter 5 examines the paper’s news coverage on another racially heated conflict which would become important in the L.A. Times’ reporting on the violent outbreak of 1992: the ‘black-Korean conflict’ between Korean store owners and their African American customers in South Central Los Angeles, initially finding its peak in the summer of 1991 with the killings of the African Americans Latasha Harlins and Arthur Lee Mitchell leading to a 109-day boycott of Korean-owned stores by a group of black activists. After a brief reconstruction of the two incidents, this chapter will show that the paper at first approached this topic without mentioning the racial background of those involved but later stressed them to a great extent.

After a brief description of the 1992 unrest in Chapter 6, the Times’ reporting on the violent outbreak will be covered in Chapter 7, which seeks to illustrate that the paper presented the unrest as having its roots particularly in the acquittal of the four police officers, classifying this judicial decision as proving that white-on-black had been deeply ingrained in American society. Starting with this perception, the Times initially treated the multiethnic event like a conflict solely between blacks and whites, only slowly expanding its news coverage on race conflicts to Koreans; here, especially the question of whether they had deliberately been targeted by African Americans participating in the unrest was in the center of the paper’s interest. Furthermore, it will be pointed out how, still during the unrest, the Times tried to reason the violent outbreak with the help of foregone historical events that had affected particularly black Angelenos. The question of how to overcome the then- 12 current urban crisis and how to avoid comparable future violent outbreaks was another key topic in the Times’ (post-) unrest reporting, concentrating specifically on how politicians on local as well as national levels were responding to the events taking place in Los Angeles.

Based on the assumption that the intensive news coverage by media of all kind (with the L.A. Times having been just one of them) prompted officials to adopt measures to solve social and economic grievances such as those that had fostered the violent outbreak, Chapter 8 describes changes that have been introduced since the urban unrest of 1992. It illustrates how Daryl Gates’ successors have successfully transformed the L.A.P.D. from a predominantly white institution to one mirroring the city’s population and how new training methods as well as harsh penalties for police misconduct helped reduce use of force incidences drastically. Nevertheless, the chapter will furthermore reveal the still existing grievances affecting particularly the city’s minority groups. In addition, the economic and demographic transformation of South (Central) Los Angeles as well as its impact on race relations in this area are discussed in greater detail. Finally, the last chapter seeks to appraise and evaluate the results of the accomplished analysis to finally answer the question forming the basis of this thesis as well as to suggest possible areas for future research.

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2.0 A History of Cultural, Social and Economic Urban Transformation – Black Los Angeles from 1945 until 1991

2.1 Setting the Scene

World War II constituted a turning point in the history of Los Angeles. In the late 1930s, the city was marked by an economic uptrend that had already begun during the 1920s, when L.A. had been able to establish itself as an indispensable producer of both agricultural as well as industrial goods. Especially armament contracts with France and Great Britain, which both had hired Los Angeles-based companies to build warplanes and aircraft parts, contributed to the city’s industrial growth.

With the beginning of the Second World War and the military buildup by the U.S. government, L.A.’s manufacturing sector expanded further. Receiving more than eleven billion dollars in defense contracts alone, the city became the U.S.’s second largest manufacturing center, specialized in the production of war material.38

The more the city’s industries grew, the more attractive Los Angeles became for people in search of work, leading to an enormous demographic growth. Here, it is particularly noteworthy that despite de jure racial segregation, especially ethnic minorities were attracted to become part of L.A.’s labor supply. This development, however, had rather functional reasons: Because of an increasing demand for workers in the ship and aircraft production and the simultaneously existing labor shortage caused by the Second World War, manufacturers were “forced to look beyond their traditionally white, male and often skilled labor pool.”39 Together with fast and cost-effective manufacturing becoming increasingly important, production processes were simplified, allowing especially ethnic minorities to take up professions they – because of segregation and (institutional) racism which had limited access to both training and experience necessary for such jobs – had not been eligible for in the past.40

As a result of these processes, L.A. soon enjoyed the reputation of being a place where race mattered less than in the rest of the country and where people of all ethnic

38 Cf. Sides, Josh: “A Simple Quest for Dignity. African American Los Angeles Since World War II” In: Schiesel, Martin and Dogde, Mark M. (eds.): City of Promise. Race and Historical Change in Los Angeles, pp. 109-137, 111. 39 Sides, Josh: “A Simple Quest for Dignity”, 114. 40 Cf. ibid. 14 and cultural backgrounds could easily make a living. One ethnic group that joined this wave of immigrants was that of African Americans. Literally fleeing from the racist South of the U.S., many of them started moving North and West, heading for cities that promised a higher degree of racial equality. Besides cities like , Seattle, or San Francisco, Los Angeles became one of their favored destinations.41

Although L.A. and its job opportunities created the impression of a city far less segregated than other major American cities, most black newcomers soon had to discover that the city was not the new Garden of Eden they had hoped for as resentments against African Americans were widespread and largely accepted in the white-dominated city. Especially the work place as well as housing environments were marked by racist practices.

2.2 African American Job and Housing Situation in Postwar Los Angeles

Prior to the Second World War, employment opportunities for blacks in L.A. had been as limited as in any other major U.S.-American city. Apart from “racial preference” for African Americans as domestic staff, e.g. janitors or maids, race – as Josh Sides puts it – had “almost always worked against black economic aspirations.”42 However, World War II, as previously implied, expanded job opportunities for African Americans in Los Angeles. The deskilling of many production processes in L.A.’s heavy industries shortly before and during the war opened various fields of work to African Americans (as well as other ethnic minorities) that had once been limited to whites.

In the 1940s and over the following twenty years, blacks particularly worked in automobile, rubber tire, petroleum refining, chemical, meatpacking and especially steel factories, which ran along Alameda Street, from the old manufacturing district to the Port of L.A. This industrial corridor constituted the center for interethnic/- racial interactions because it was the place where the city’s major ethnic groups – Caucasians, Mexicans and African Americans – met on a daily basis.43 Work-related interactions like that (in consequence of segregation) constituted some of the few occasions in which members of different ethnic groups encountered. The fact that

41 Cf. Sides, Josh: L.A. City Limits. African American Los Angeles from the to the Present. Press, Berkeley, 2006, 2. 42 Sides, Josh: “A Simple Quest for Dignity”, 113. 43 Cf. Sides, Josh: L.A. City Limits, 74f. 15 people of distinct skin color worked together, did not indicate racial equality in the workplace, though. On the contrary, it mirrored segregation and ‘racial hierarchies’: There was preference for Caucasian workers – in white as well as blue-collar positions – and competition between African Americans and Mexicans for blue- collar professions. Even within these professions, race mattered. It was well-known that, for example, in the automobile industry employers very often allocated the dirtiest, most noxious jobs to blacks and saved the easier and cleaner ones for whites (and occasionally for Mexicans).44

Racial segregation could furthermore be found in the city’s housing environment. Prior to WWII, and different from the black populations of e.g. New York or Detroit, African Americans in L.A. had lived in multi- rather than monoethnic neighborhoods (together with, for example, Latinos, Chinese, Japanese, Italians and Jews45), which – because of the city’s comparably low population density – were marked by small houses with yards rather than overcrowded apartment buildings. And although L.A. was a highly segregated city, it can be said that everyday life in these neighborhoods was marked by friendship and mutual support among people of different, non- Caucasian, ethnic backgrounds.46

This situation, however, changed significantly at the end of the 1940s. Because of the ensuing Cold War neither the economic boom nor the immigration influx stopped but continued and even increased further. As housing opportunities for African Americans were still limited, formally mixed communities underwent a noticeable transformation: Neighborhoods like Watts or those along Central Avenue (in between Slauson, Broadway and Alameda, which can be regarded as the nucleus of South Central Los Angeles) became predominately black because Chinese, Japanese and Mexicans used their “closer to white status” and moved to that were refused to African Americans.47 This exodus of non-black minority groups was possible because of the Supreme Court’s decision of 1948 (Shelley vs. Kraemer), declaring restrictive covenants in home sales and rent contracts “unenforceable”. Labeling these covenants unenforceable did not prevent whites from excluding

44 Cf. Sides, Josh: “A Simple Quest for Dignity”, 116. 45 Cf. ibid., 118f. 46 Cf. Bunch III, Lonnie G.: “A Past Not Necessarily a Prologue: The Afro-American in Los Angeles Since 1900”. In: Klein, Norman M. and Schiesl, Martin J (eds.): 20th Century Los Angeles. Power, Promotion, and Social Conflict, pp. 101-131, 126. 47 Sides, Josh: “A Simple Quest for Dignity”, 122. 16 blacks from ‘their’ neighborhoods, though. Caucasian homeowners increasingly tried to circumnavigate the adjudication by entering into covenants themselves and asking their neighbors to follow their example. If those residents had then sold their property to blacks, their neighbors could have sued them for breach of contract. With the help of such clauses, whites tried to maintain the color line in L.A.48

Beside this racist practice, there were other strategies Caucasians used in order to keep a neighborhood white. One was performed by the city’s real estate agents; as Josh Sides puts it:

Until the late 1950s, the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards contained a provision explicitly prohibiting real estate agents from introducing minorities into white neighborhoods. Members of the highly influential Los Angeles Real Estate Board informed the Los Angeles Urban League that they would not sell homes to black families in a white neighborhood or cooperate with black brokers in such transactions unless three or more Negro families already lived on the block. […] In extreme cases, realty agents and neighborhood groups bought available properties themselves, even at a financial loss, to prevent blacks from moving in.49 In addition, numerous Caucasian Angelenos did not shy away from offences like cross burnings and vandalism to frighten off African Americans from white neighborhoods.50

The black community’s expansion, however, was (initially) inexorable. The more African Americans arrived and the more overcrowded their neighborhoods became, the more whites started selling their property in surrounding areas, giving way to African American settlement. Starting from north east South Central, the black community spread southwards along Central Avenue, “connecting to Watts to make an unbroken ‘black belt’ in […];”51 additionally, L.A.’s new African American community moved southward on a parallel track, turning the formally overwhelmingly white South Central into a predominantly black neighborhood. Therefore, by the early 1950s, most of the 170,880 black Angelenos52,

48 Cf. Sides, Josh: L.A. City Limits, 100. 49 Ibid., 106. 50 Cf. Buntin, John: L.A. Noir. The Struggle for the Soul of America's Most Seductive City. Harmony Books, New York, 2009, 268. 51 Sides, Josh: “A Simple Quest for Dignity”, 121. 52 The number of 170,880 black residents is impressive, particularly if you examine the black population’s development in the entire L.A. County: Between 1940 and 1965 more blacks migrated to 17 which means almost 9% of the city’s total population, lived in one of the following areas of Los Angeles:

[…] east of Main Street from 1st Street to Manchester Avenue; between Main Street and Vermont Avenue from Jefferson to Slauson; in Watts and the Jefferson District – from between Adams and Exposition Boulevard with the east-west borders being Vermont to Crenshaw.53 2.3 Criss-Crossing Los Angeles – Building Streets for Whites?

The geographic isolation of the majority of L.A.’s African American population54 was intensified by another factor in the 1950s. As the number of people living in Los Angeles grew steadily, the city was forced to expand in all directions. In order to connect the continuously growing parts of the spreading metropolis (by 1950, L.A. already was one of the major metropolitan areas in the U.S.55), a transport system comprising the whole city became necessary.56 Therefore, the idea of a freeway system – which had already been suggested in the early 1930s57 – was not only revived but also implemented. Thus, “[…] by the 1950s, new freeways were threading through the city like an urban circulatory system.”58

This circulatory system fundamentally altered L.A.’s urban space and thereby drastically changed the life of thousands of (especially non-Anglo) Angelenos. As the freeway system’s main purpose was “linking the Anglo suburban communities with the central business core”59 and as those were separated from each other by neighborhoods predominantly inhabited by ethnic minorities, the latter were those mainly affected by the city’s road building. Thousands of people, especially residents

California than to any other state in the U.S., which in numbers means that Los Angeles County’s African American population increased dramatically from 75,000 in 1940, over 218,000 in 1950, up to 600,000 in 1965 (Cf. Poe, Elizabeth, “Watts,” Frontier (September, 1965), 5-7. In: Caughey, John and Laree: Los Angeles. Biography of a City. Berkley, 1976, pp. 426-431, 426). If one compares the number of blacks living in Los Angeles County in 1950 with that of blacks residing in Los Angeles City itself in the same year, it becomes obvious that more than 78% of L.A. County’s black population lived in the black neighborhoods of L.A. 53 Bunch III, Lonnie G.: “A Past Not Necessarily a Prologue”, 119. 54 As racial segregation in housing had not longer existed de jure, there were always a few blacks who managed to move to areas other than those mentioned. They, however, constituted a minority. 55 Cf. Bozorgmehr, Mehdi and Sabagh, Georges: “Population Change: Immigration and Ethnic Transformation”. In: Waldinger, Roger and Bozorgmehr, Mehdi (edits): Ethnic Los Angeles. New York, 1996. pp. 79-109, 81. 56 This was especially true since public transport systems like the city’s subway had been bought and closed down by the automobile industry. 57 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 188. 58 Ibid., 189. 59 Romo, Ricardo: History of a Barrio. East Los Angeles, 170. 18 of the predominantly Hispanic eastside, were relocated to give way to “[h]igh overpasses and expansive six-lane freeways.”60 While Latin American neighborhoods like Boyle Heights or City Terrace were torn apart61, others areas such as the predominantly black neighborhoods of Watts were literally enclosed by the newly built traffic routes. In both cases, residents became more and more isolated from other parts of the city “as the massive layers of grey concrete and asphalt eliminated the trolley lines and disrupted public transport service.”62

Not having the financial ability to purchase automobiles, many African Americans were dependent on an efficiently working public transportation. The remaining transportation services, however, were all but reliable and convenient. Many bus services (e.g. in Watts, where buses constituted the only public transportation) literally left their passengers out in the rain, “provided no bus shelters, took arbitrary and inconsistent routs, and adhered to no discernable schedule.”63

Limited access to efficient public or private transportation had a huge impact on both African American private as well as professional life. Working outside the industrial area of Alameda was hardly possible or at least coupled with enormous difficulties. Going from Watts to Santa Monica by bus, for example, could take up to two hours; shopping or going to school outside the black neighborhood became virtually impossible. Therefore, the city’s road system, which had been supposed to make people’s lives easier, contributed to the isolation of a huge part of L.A.’s black community, created new and reinforced already existing segregation lines. How important this factor became in the course of the following years will be pointed out in the following chapter.

2.4 Paving the Way to Watts – Unemployment, Poverty, and Police Brutality

Although L.A.’s economy was still prospering during the 1950s and ‘60s, African Americans following this economic uptrend – which means that around 1960, approximately 1,700 black newcomers arrived in L.A. per day64 – had to realize that the city’s prosperity was still a “selective prosperity, reserved largely for the well-

60 Romo, Ricardo: History of a Barrio. East Los Angeles, 170. 61 Cf. ibid. 62 Romo, Ricardo: History of a Barrio. East Los Angeles, 170. 63 Sides, Josh: L.A. City Limits, 114. 64 Buntin, John: L.A. Noir. The Struggle for the Soul of America's Most Seductive City, 268. 19 educated, white Anglo, English-speaking citizen.”65 Still feeding on L.A.’s reputation as a city where the American Dream comes true (also for ethnic/racial minorities), the African American immigration influx did not stop, though.

For many of these newcomers, South Central and its neighborhoods became a port of entry. However, most of them planned to move to other areas as soon as they were able to financially afford it. A survey poll established in 1958, for instance, revealed that 84% of the 438 African Americans sampled would have liked to live in a “nonminority” neighborhood.66 Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, those African Americans who were able to move up in the city’s social hierarchy and to purchase houses in the suburbs (in most cases in those which were not very far from South Central, a phenomenon that was at least in parts based on the fact that African Americans were not welcomed in all neighborhoods) did so immediately. This exodus of the black middle-class led to an increasing class division within the black community;67 while, for instance, the Baldwin Hills or View Park areas68 now mainly consisted of “an upwardly mobile black middle class,”69 South Central Los Angeles itself was primarily inhabited “by lower-income, unemployed, and underemployed blacks […].”70

Because of the high population density in the neighborhoods of South Central and Watts, the quality of living diminished daily. Elizabeth Poe, a contemporary journalist, described the situation as follows:

[In] this ghetto […] problems have multiplied daily for the past ten years [which means from 1955-65], housing is gradually becoming hard to find, and is deteriorating at a rapid rate because of the high population density. Landlords made four-family units out of two- family homes and rented them without limitation on the number of children allowed. New four- to ten-family apartment houses went up completely surrounded with concrete – not a tree or bush inside. City departments responsible for zoning regulations relaxed standards because the residents were apathetic, always hoping they could move into a better neighborhood and therefore not inspired to

65 Fair Employment Practice Commission: “Negroes and in South and East Los Angeles. Changes Between 1960 and 1965 In Population, Employment, Income, and Family Status. An analysis of a U.S. Census Survey of November 1965”, 5. 66 Sides, Josh: L.A. City Limits, 95. 67 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty. From Watts to East L.A., 15. 68 Both neighborhoods are often referred to as ‘golden ghettos’ because although they offered their inhabitants rather comfortable living conditions, they still mirrored segregation. 69 Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 15. 70 Ibid., 15f. 20

improve the one they were in. As the ghetto crept upward, city service declined. Parkways grew up in untrimmed grass; streets were not cleaned; the community drifted downward.71 Beside the housing situation, the job situation worsened noticeably,too. Taking a closer look at Watts, it becomes obvious how disastrous the housing situation in this particular area was: In the early 1960s, 34 percent of all adult males living in Watts were unemployed72 and “[o]ver 40 percent of Watts residents […] lived in families with income below the poverty level.”73 Five years later, the unemployment rate (for both sexes) was more than double the national average.74 Thus, it is not surprising that two-thirds of all residents living in this particular neighborhood received welfare aid.75

Noticed but ignored by officials, the situation in Watts worsened noticeably. Although social agencies repeatedly asked for measures improving the living conditions in the emerging outcast ghetto,76 the city’s public authorities remained inactive.77 Because of the isolation of Watts’ African American population, their problems (or rather the reasons for their problems) stayed largely unnoticed by Los Angeles’s white residents. One circumstance that favored Caucasians not taking notice of the decay of Watts was the city’s road system. The freeways threading not through but around Watts, enabled whites to completely avoid and therefore turn a blind eye on this area. This does not mean that the city’s white population did not know of the social and economic problems of Watts, but instead of showing solidarity many tended to blame African Americans themselves for the decay of this particular neighborhood. That officials did not take notice of the developments in Watts (or social measure preventing the area from deteriorating further), made many Caucasians see their prejudices confirmed, leading to increasing racial tensions. According to the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, “in the

71 Poe, Elizabeth, “Watts”, 427. 72 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 34. 73 Ibid. 74 Cf. Poe, Elizabeth, “Watts”, 427. 75 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 34. 76 The term outcast ghetto introduced by Peter Marcuse in 1997 describes a “ghetto in which ethnicity is combined with class in a spatially separated area with residents who are excluded from the mainstream of economic life of the surrounding society, which does not profit significantly from its existence”. Marcuse, Peter: “The Enclave, the Citadel and the Ghetto. What has changed in the Post- Fordist U.S. City”, 138. 77 Cf. Poe, Elizabeth, “Watts”, 428. 21 second half of 1959 alone, there had been more than sixty ‘incidents,’ from cross burnings to telephone harassment, almost all of them instigated by whites.”78

African Americans, however, did not expect much help from the police as the relationship of the Los Angeles Police Department and minorities in general – and blacks in particular – was very strained. In the African American community, L.A.P.D. officers were known for using their power arbitrarily, which, for example, became apparent in arresting blacks without having reasonable suspicion as well as brutally beating them during the arrest procedure.79

Such racist practices were nothing new in the 1960s, though. Already in the 1940s, the police – in those days primarily consisting of whites who “came from working- class background that had fostered the belief of racial supremacy”80 – had tended to criminalize African Americans, particularly those living in the central section of Los Angeles. This situation was further aggravated with the appointment of William H. Parker as police chief at the beginning of the 1950s, who henceforth

[…] ordered around the clock to discourage criminal activity. […] These ‘preventive’ patrols seldom caused problems with white communities; few of the residents used streets in ways that aroused police suspicion. In black neighborhoods, where teenagers and young adults spent a good deal of their time on the streets, preventive patrols meant continual harassment and intimidation. These practices, however, did not only affect the poor residents of South Central Los Angeles and Watts but all black Angelenos. Outside these areas, especially middle- class male adults were frequently stopped for interrogations because “their prosperous appearance prompted the officers to suspect that they might be involved in bookmaking, narcotics, or prostitution.”81 Such ‘interrogations’ very often resulted in by the officers. After they had beaten the ‘suspect,’ the police pretended apprehended person had either been drunk and/or had resisted arrest.82

78 Buntin, John: L.A. Noir, 268. 79 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 32. 80 Schiesl, Martin: “Behind . Social Discontent and the Los Angeles Police since 1950.” In: Schiesel, Martin and Dogde, Mark M. (eds.): City of Promise. Race and Historical Change in Los Angeles, pp. 137-175, 138. 81 Schiesl, Martin J.: “Behind the Badge: The Police and Social Discontent in Los Angeles Since 1950”. In: Klein, Norman M. and Schiesl, Martin J (eds.): 20th Century Los Angeles. Power, Promotion, and Social Conflict, pp. 153-195, 155. 82 Cf. ibid., 156. 22

During the mayoral race in 1961, knew to use this grievance for his own benefit: Although he had frequently been associated with racists, he was able to win many black votes by promising to end police brutality.83 Shortly before the actual election, an incident in Griffith Park had essentially influenced the outcome of the upcoming election as it had been regarded as a further example of police abuse by many African Americans84: On Tuesday, May 29, 1961, police had tried to arrest two black teenagers in Griffith Park for “horseplay on the park’s merry-go-round” or – more precisely – for “jumping on and off the [merry-go-round’s] platform.”85 Soon, a group of about 200 people (most of them African Americans) had gathered and started attacking the policemen with rocks, bottles and baseball bats.

This confrontation – which all in all lasted about an hour and ended with four policemen injured and three blacks arrested – is symptomatic for many encounters between African Americans and the police at that time. Despite the fact that the police had initially stated that “although most of the participants were Negroes […] there was no inter-racial fighting,”86 Police Chief Parker had to revoke this statement only a little later. However, he did not establish a link between the incident in Griffith Park and policemen’s tendency to use their ‘white supremacy’ (together with their executive power) to persecute blacks but claimed that this “racial riot […] could be attributed to two factors […]. [T]he ‘’ in the South and […] the attention given minority groups in the mayoralty campaign.”87

Because of numerous incidents like the one in Griffith Park and statements by officials like the one presented above, it is not surprising that many African Americans decided to vote for Yorty after he had assured them to end police misconduct. After he had assumed office, however, Yorty soon forgot the promises he had made: Instead of giving Police Chief Parker “‘a lot of schooling’ in police-

83 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 11. 84 Cf. Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 141. 85 “Police Quell Riot in Griffith Park”. In: The Daily Reporter. Spencer, Iowa, Wednesday, May 31, 1961. Vol. 86, No 104, 1. URL: http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2350&dat=19610529&id=Mi4pAAAAIBAJ&sjid=N_4EAA AAIBAJ&pg=6421,2931749 [17.09.2013]. 86Ibid. 87 “Parker Blames Griffith Park Riot on Race Tension”. In: Lodi News-Sentinel. Thursday, June 01, 1961. No. 7622. p. 7. URL: http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2245&dat=19610601&id=TegzAAAAIBAJ&sjid=g- 4HAAAAIBAJ&pg=7304,4286368 [17.09.2013] 23 minority relations,”88 Yorty had a private meeting with Parker, after which he “never made any attempt to control police violence.”89 That in the following years he publicly “defended the openly bigoted police chief” further alienated many blacks.90

This interaction of social neglect, racial discrimination and abuse by the police released one of the most violent and destructive urban unrests Los Angeles was confronted with in the 20th century. On August 11, 1965, at about seven p.m., white California Highway Patrol Officer Lee Minikus stopped Marquette and Ronald Frye, an African American pair of siblings, under suspicion of drunk driving.91 He ordered Marquette Frye to take a sobriety test, which Frye failed. When Minikus tried to arrest him, Frye resisted whereupon a verbal confrontation including the brother’s mother, a nearby resident, started.92 The vociferous argument attracted a fast- growing crowd. When Minikus and an additional officer, who had arrived later, hastily and in a rather rude manner, tried to arrest the two brothers as well as their mother, bystanders started throwing rocks.93 More policemen were called in for backup who soon were involved in a fight with the still growing group of ‘rioters’.

What had originally begun as a traffic check resulted in five days of violence; businesses (many of them owed by whites) were burned and looted. The police was not able to get the situation under control, which made it necessary to call National Guard troops for help.94 When the ‘riot’ was finally put down, 34 people (most of them African Americans) were dead (all but one shot by police officers95), more than 1,000 injured, and several thousands (here, the numbers vary between 4,00096 and 11,00097) arrested. The loss in property was set at more than $30 million.98 Although Watts and its main commercial center, which was located on 103rd Avenue, was hit the hardest, other sections of South Central L.A. were affected by the riots, too.99

88 Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 141. 89 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 32. 90 Cf. ibid., 11. 91 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 31. 92 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 230. 93 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 31. 94 Cf. Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 144. 95 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 231. 96 Cf. ibid. 97 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 31. 98 Cf. ibid. 99 Cf. ibid. 24

2.5 The Aftermath of the Watts ‘Riots’ – Cause Studies and Problem- Solving Approaches

Although experts had cautioned against a violent outbreak already years before the actual uprising,100 the Watts ‘riots’ were a shock for L.A., especially for its Caucasian residents and its predominantly Caucasian leaders.101 In search for answers to the tragedy of Watts, political conservatives and liberals arrived at different conclusions: While conservatives “tended to view the rioters as deviant and disreputable, as hardened criminals, as ungodly drifters, as lazy and chronic troublemakers, as rebellious youths working of their ‘animal spirits,’” liberals rather considered the rioters “as a product of social ills.”102 They stressed unemployment, poverty, lack of education, racism as well as police brutality as the source of social discontent which culminated in the riot.103

As liberals and conservatives used different approaches to explain the uprising, they also arrived at different solutions that were supposed to prevent future outbreaks similar to Watts. If – as conservatives thought – the unrest was a result of socially pathological blacks, they simply needed to be corrected in their behavior; changes in society or politics, however, would not be necessary. If the riots were an expression of social discontent – as alleged by many liberals – social changes such as new social programs, a reduction of racial discrimination and police brutality would be the only solution. This does not mean that political liberals aspired to make changes in the city’s (or even the nation’s) power structure and ethnic inequalities, though.104

While social workers, civil rights leaders etc. soon identified the racial division of Los Angeles as one of the major reasons, (conservative) officials did not only hold blacks themselves responsible for their “predicament,” they even tended to deny problems between whites and minorities in general.105 A year before the unrest, in September 1964, mayor Sam Yorty had stated that the relations of blacks and whites in L.A. had been better than in any other major city in the U.S.106 He simply had not

100 Cf. Poe, Elizabeth, “Watts”, 427. 101 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 323. 102 Cf. Sears, David O. and McConahay, John B.: The Politics of Violence. The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot. Houghton Mifflin Company, , 1973, 18. 103 Cf. ibid. 104 Cf. ibid., 19. 105 Cf. Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 33. 106 Cf. ibid. 25 seen (or had pretended not to see) that racial restrictions in housing, employment etc. would lead to an uprising such as the Watts ‘riots’. Shortly after Watts, he compared the participants’ behavior to that of “monkeys in the zoo” and accused the Black Muslims of actively having kindled the riots to harness them for their purposes.107 Even years after the ‘riots,’ Yorty did not draw a connection between the uprising, racial tension and inequality. When he was asked to identify reasons that had led to the Watts ‘riots,’ he “blamed television coverage of the civil rights movement in the South.”108

City officials, however, were not the only ones (initially) drawing false conclusions; Martin Luther King, for example, who came to L.A. on August 17, 1965, explained the events as

environmental and not racial. The economic deprivation, social isolation, inadequate housing, and general despair of thousands of Negroes teeming in Northern and Western ghettos are the ready seeds which give birth to tragic expressions of violence.109 Although he rightly pointed out “economic deprivation, social isolation [and] inadequate housing” as reasons for the – as he calls it – “tragic expressions of violence,” he did not establish a link between these problems and, for example, restrictive covenants, which drastically limited the possibility for minorities to choose residential areas themselves; he – in short – identified symptoms but not the actual disease. This is probably the reason why during his speech King was booed by the predominantly black audience. Despite this expression of anger, the audience – as Robert Bauman states – “made it clear that the real targets of their vitriol were Yorty and Parker.”110

The Los Angeles Times extensively covered the Watts ‘riots’, changing its perspective from an initially rather conservative to a liberal view on the events. While during the first two month of its reporting, the Times was hardly able to grasp

107 Cf. Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 144. 108 Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 34. 109 King Jr., Martin Luther, 17 August 1965. In: “Watts Rebellion (Los Angeles, 1965)”. The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute, Stanford University. URL: http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_watts_rebellion_los_angeles_19 65/ [13.12.2015]. 110 Bauman, Robert: Race and the War on Poverty, 41. 26

“the complex social currents that ignited and fueled the upheaval”111, it published an article on October 10th, admitting its failure to understand the uprisings underlying causes and asking for an

open and frank communication with the people of Watts, not just its leaders but the people themselves, including the rioters ... to explore the kind of thinking, the kind of passions, the kind of despair and apathy, that led to an explosion of hatred that rocked a great city and shocked the entire world.112 However, nothing essential was being done to improve the situation in Watts in the following years. Initially uncertain about how to react, California’s democratic Governor, Edmund G. ‘Pat’ Brown, decided to appoint a commission the task of which was to investigate the reasons behind the violent outbreak.113 In December 1965, this commission, known as the McCone Commission, released a report, entitled “Violence in the City – An End or a Beginning? A Report by the Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots,” which identified social grievances like those presented above as main reasons for the riots. Although it offered a list of recommendations for addressing the social problems of the ghetto,114 the report failed to identify police brutality as a major problem of South Central’s residents. It regarded peoples’ complaints about police brutality as exaggerated and came to the conclusion that the uneasy relationship between blacks and the L.A.P.D. was based on misunderstanding rather than on arbitrary use of power by the police. Nonetheless, it demanded an independent institution to investigate residents’ complaints; it furthermore asked for the expansion of the L.A.P.D’s police-minority- relations program and called for the employment of more African and Mexican Americans, who – at that point in time – made up less than 8% of the Los Angeles Police Department.115

111 Smith, Doug: “Stunned by the Watts riots, the L.A. Times struggled to make sense of the violence”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 12, 2015. URL: http://graphics.latimes.com/watts- annotations/ [13.11.2016]. 112 Williams, Nick B: “The View From Watts is Worth Thinking”. In: Los Angeles Times, October 10, 1965. URL: http://documents.latimes.com/october-10-1965-view-watts-very-worth-taking/ [13.11.2016]. 113 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 232. 114 The black residents’ demands for bettering their living conditions, were – if at all – only slowly implemented. A new hospital, the Martin Luther King Jr. Hospital, was build to provide medical care to its inhabitants – an action which rather served as an appeasement strategy than a serious approach to solving actual problems like racial discrimination and its after-effects. As soon as publicity receded, officials again turned a blind eye on the ghetto’s problems. 115 Cf. Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 146. 27

Police Chief Parker largely ignored these recommendations. Instead, he (or rather his intelligence division) found out that black activist groups were in contact with members of the Communist party. He suspected these two groups of collaborating and stirring up the negative feelings of South Central’s residents and therefore asked the city council to double the number of policemen working in that area and called for the acquisition of and “antiriot equipment.”116

It was only when Parker died in July 1966 that the newly appointed Police Chief started implementing parts of the McCone Commission’s recommendations. He, among other things, raised the number of people working for the police-community relations unit by 3,000%, from 4 to 120 and hired more African and Mexican Americans.117 In the following years, the percentage of blacks working for the L.A.P.D. became approximately equivalent to the percentage of blacks living in Los Angeles.118

2.6 Of Panthers, Crips, and Bloods

Hiring African Americans and involving officers in race relation training, however, barely improved the relationship between blacks and the police. Between 1967 and 1968 alone, 25 African Americans were killed by the L.A.P.D., three of them having been shot in the back. Trying to prevent the police from using their power arbitrarily, blacks (or rather a group of militant blacks) took matters into their own hands: When African Americans were stopped and checked by the police, armed members of the appeared to prevent them from being harassed by police officers – a situation the police increasingly perceived as a threat to their authority. Therefore, the party’s top-ranking members (Bunchy Carter, John Huggins et al.) were kept under permanent surveillance, their houses and cars were frequently searched. In addition, the police again and again aimed deliberately for open confrontations that repeatedly led to victims on both sides.119

In order to act against the Panthers more effectively and to finally destroy them, F.B.I. director J. Edgar Hoover established the Counter Intelligence Program (short CoIntelPro) in 1968. Federal agents provoked a conflict between the Black Panther

116 Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 146. 117 Cf. ibid., 147. 118 Cf. Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence. How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD. Westview Press, New York, 1997, 18. 119 Cf. Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 147f. 28

Party and the United Slaves, a black nationalist group, by sending slandering letters, flyers etc. to both organizations, pretending they had been written by the respectively other side. This trick led to a bloody conflict and culminated in a gunfight at U.C.L.A. in early 1969, in which Bunchy Carter and John Huggins were killed. The L.A.P.D. knew how to benefit from this weakening: Later that year, they stormed the party’s headquarter and got involved in a lasting several hours. When it was over, the local Black Panther Party was basically wiped out.120

In the 1970s, the problems that had been existing in South Central Los Angeles were accompanied by two more: increasing gang activity and – closely connected with it – organized drug trade. While prior to the Second World War Los Angeles-based gangs were mainly “just groups of rambunctious but harmless city youths,”121 they got a more criminal character during the late 1960s when “drugs, guns, turf-wars, drive-by shootings, and revenge killings”122 took innocence away from the formerly rather guileless gangs.

Mirroring L.A.’s segregated urban space, most gangs consisted of members who all belonged to one particular ethnic group. Although they could be found in almost all ethnicities, the majority of L.A.’s gangs in the 1970s were Mexican or African American.123 Founded in 1969 by a high school student, the Crips (originally the Baby Avenues, then temporarily Cribs) – building on the revolutionary ideas of the Black Panther Party – soon became one of the most influential (black) street gangs in Los Angeles. Not having “the political skills to develop an agenda for social change,”124 however, the Crips continuously drifted into criminality.

Increasingly intimidated by the activities of the Crips, other African American gangs established a federation that became known as the Bloods. In the following years, both gangs laid claim to South Central Los Angeles, Watts and Compton and – “fueled by an increasingly lucrative drug trade”125 – brought deadly turf warfare to this area.

120 Cf. Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 151f. 121 “Gangs”. In: Pitt, Dale and Pitt, Leonard: Los Angeles A-Z. Berkley, 1997, pp. 166-167, 166. 122 Ibid. 123 Cf. ibid. 124 Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 152. 125 Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 257. 29

As both gangs confined their (criminal) activities mainly to South Central L.A., it is not surprising that not only their members but also their victims were in most cases black.126 Nonetheless, they spread fear far beyond the borders of their ‘turfs’ as well as their own ethnic group. Therefore, and because of an increasingly unstable economy, rising cost of living as well as in opposition to the increasing number of racially mixed schools,127 more and more white Angelenos started leaving the city, heading for ‘safer’ places such as Simi Valley or Santa Clarita Valley.128

Despite this phenomenon, known as white flight, the city kept growing.129 By 1970, L.A.’s urban space had spread to such an extent that the former “suburban islands”130 the city had consisted of and which had been isolated from each other by agricultural areas, had vanished almost completely. This removal of, for example, grainfields and citrus groves led to the emergence of the polycentric conurbation which characterizes Los Angeles today.131

Former suburbs and self-governing towns, either officially incorporated into or just enclosed by L.A., developed their own downtowns and industries, with the residents of these communities no longer being obliged to frequent other urban districts to do their work. In some respect, this development resulted in Los Angeles becoming even more segregated132 as people did no longer have to leave their still predominantly racially homogeneous neighborhoods and thus, were not forced to get in contact with other ethnicities.

2.7 A Glance of Hope – Los Angeles’ First African American Mayor

Beside the multitude of problems the black population of Los Angeles had to deal with in the 1970s, there was one event that raised their hope for positive changes: the election of Tom Bradley as mayor. In 1973, Bradley, former police lieutenant,

126 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 258. 127 Cf. ibid. 128 Cf. ibid. 129 As whites left Los Angeles, they were almost immediately replaced by immigrants from Asia, Latin American and the Middle East (Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 257). The changing ethnic make-up of the city will be described later within this very chapter. 130 Laslett, John H. M.: “Historical Perspectives: Immigration and the Rise of a Distinctive Urban Region, 1900-1970”. In: Waldinger, Roger and Bozorgmehr, Mehdi (eds.): Ethnic Los Angeles, pp. 39-75, 60. 131 Cf. ibid. 132 Cf. ibid. 30 councilman and – what made the election so special – an African American, challenged the officiating mayor Sam Yorty a second time.133

Four years earlier, Yorty had won the election against Bradley by linking him to the Black Panther Party and presenting him as a “dangerous left-wing radical”; now, during the mayoral race in 1973, he used similar tactics ‘cautioning’ the residents of L.A. about Bradley, telling them “the police would hesitate to support a black mayor, opening the city to even more violence and crime.”134 This illustrates that the long- existing police-minority problem had not just been a figment of the latter’s imagination and that Yorty indeed must have been aware of the fact that black-white relations in L.A. were not better than in other American metropolises, contrary to what he had claimed in 1964.

In 1973, Sam Yorty did not succeed in using such shibboleths. Bradley won the votes of many African Americans (especially in South Central) as well as Anglo Americans (mostly Westside liberals)135 and thereby became not only the first black but also of a U.S.-American metropolis without a black majority.136 As his victory symbolized a future marked by a convergence of whites and ethnic minorities, it “set off a euphoria among blacks and liberals in Los Angeles and attracted national and international attention.”137

In the following twenty years, Bradley would transform the city’s power structure: He appointed “numerous minorities to his administration, implemented successful Affirmative Action programs in city hiring, and attempted to reform the LAPD by appointing aggressive civil rights advocates to the Police Commission.”138 Furthermore, Bradley ordered the police to no longer use choke holds, “tight grip[s] round a person’s neck, used to restrain them by restricting breathing.”139 Despite these renewals and contrary to what many African Americans had hoped, Bradley’s administration did not offer ‘salvation’ for blacks, though. As the future would show

133 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 243. 134 Ibid. 135 Cf. ibid., 243. 136 Cf. Goldfarb, Lyn and Sotomayor, Alison: Bridging the Divide. Tom Bradley and the Politics of Race. “Tom Bradley Biography”. http://www.mayortombradley.com/biography [22.07.2013]. 137 Cf. ibid. 138 Sides, Josh: “A Simple Quest for Dignity”, 130. 139 “chokehold”. In: Oxford Dictionary. http://oxforddictionaries.com/difinition/american_english/ chokehold [21.09.2013]. 31

– and as will be pointed out in the following chapters – he did not contribute to the improvement of the living conditions in the city’s poorest areas like South Central.

2.8 Changing Demographics in Los Angeles – How the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 Transformed Urban L.A.

Apart from Tom Bradley’s election, further changes significantly altered the life of L.A.’s African American community during the 1970s one of which was certainly the city’s changing ethnic make-up. While in the postwar period blacks as well as Latinos constituted Los Angeles’ major ethnic minorities, another ethnic group gained both size and significance in the ‘70s: Asians, or rather .

Although Asians had been living in the greater area of Los Angeles since the second half of the 19th century,140 it was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 which drastically changed the city’s (Asian) population. Until then, immigration had been regulated by the National Quota System allowing only a restricted number of immigrants to move to the U.S., with this number depending on the immigrants’ respective home country. From 1965 onwards, however, 20,000 people, regardless of nationality, ethnicity or culture were allowed to immigrate into the U.S. on a first- come, first-served basis,141 a concept which implemented a huge immigration wave, especially from Asian countries.142

Although these immigrants initially had to deal with certain difficulties, like e.g. learning a new language, finding a job etc., many newcomers from Asian countries were eager to become part of the American mainstream society. Therefore, they soon – among the white population of Los Angeles – earned the reputation of being a model minority,143 leading to increasing tensions between the city’s respective ethnic

140 Cf. Bozorgmehr, Mehdi and Sabagh, Georges: “Population Change”, 89. 141 Cf. Hata, Donald Teruo and Hata, Nadine Ishitani: “Asian-Pacific Angelenos: Model Minorities and Indispensable Scapegoats”. In: Klein, Norman M. and Schiesl, Martin J (eds.): 20th Century Los Angeles. Power, Promotion, and Social Conflict, pp. 61-101, 62. 142 In 1965, less than 7% of all immigrants coming to the U.S. were of Asian origin. In 1970, their number already ranged at 25% (Cf. Cheng, Lucie and Yang, Philip Q., Asians: “The ‘Model Minority’ Deconstructed”. In: Waldinger, Roger and Bozorgmehr, Mehdi (eds.): Ethnic Los Angeles, pp. 305- 345, 308). 143 Cf. Hata, Donald Teruo and Hata, Nadine Ishitani: “Asian-Pacific Angelenos”, 60. The idea of Asians and Asian Americans as a model minority came into being during the 1960s which were marked by racial upheavals such as the Watts Riots of 1965. Especially the press used the term model minority to portray Japanese and Chinese who tried to integrate into (Anglo) American society by working hard and ‘honorably’. Over time, the term was transferred to Asian Americans as a group. Cf. Cheng, Lucie and Yang, Philip Q., Asians: “The ‘Model Minority’ Deconstructed”, 312. 32 minority communities, especially between African Americans and Koreans144 which would become particularly obvious during the 1980s and ‘90s (see: 2.8 Changing Demographics in South Central Los Angeles).

Korean immigration (in small numbers) had already begun at the beginning of the 20th century and had increased further after the end of the in 1953 as war brides and orphans adopted by U.S. citizens had been brought to both the States and to Los Angeles.145 However, it was not until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 that the number of Korean immigrants increased dramatically. Between 1970 and 1980 alone, the number of Koreans living in the greater area of L.A. grew by about 700% (!), from 8,500 to 60,618.146 One reason for this abrupt rise of Korean immigrants can probably found in the concepts of han and jung:

[Koreans] are motivated by two concepts, han and jung, that have no precise English equivalents. Han relates to accumulated experiences of oppression, like that suffered under Korea’s long occupation by the Japanese, and to rage and frustration. Koreans attempt to release han by working hard to make the American Dream come true. Jung encompasses feelings of love, compassion, sympathy, and sentiment. It drives Koreans to work together and to bring even distant relatives from Korea to live with them in the .147 In connection with Korean immigration, this migration pattern – inevitably leading to a snowball effect – offers an explanation for the increasing number of people that moved to Los Angeles during the 1970s.

The city’s growing Korean community started settling as well as setting up businesses from Wilshire to Olympic Boulevards with the east-west borders being Vermont and Western Avenues. Thereby, newcomers from Korea step-by-step transformed former Latino and white neighborhoods (those which had been left during the white flight) into a newly emerging .148

Koreans, however, were not the only ones who left their home country to move to L.A. At the beginning of the 1980s, the city had replaced New York as the main port of entry for immigrants from all over the world. With a population of 2,996,850 in

144 Cf. Hata, Donald Teruo and Hata, Nadine Ishitani: “Asian-Pacific Angelenos”, 90. 145 Cf. Cheng, Lucie and Yang, Philip Q., Asians: “The ‘Model Minority’ Deconstructed”, 309. 146 Cf. Hata, Donald Teruo and Hata, Nadine Ishitani: “Asian-Pacific Angelenos”, 85. 147 Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 113. 148 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 259. 33 the City of Los Angeles itself and about 10,000,000 in the area, L.A. was not only the first city in the U.S. but also in the world that did not have an ethnic majority. In 1987, 41% of all people living in Los Angeles were non-Hispanic white, 36% Latino, 7% African American and an only insignificantly smaller percentage Asian.149

2.9 Reconstructing Economy – Unemployment, Social Despair and Criminality in South Central Los Angeles

Beside the shifting ethnic make-up, Los Angeles had to deal with further significant changes during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In this period of time, the city’s economy underwent a dramatic restructuring marked by two parallel developments: first, the decline of “traditional, highly unionized, high-wage manufacturing employment” and second, the growth of “employment in high-technology- manufacturing, the craft-specialty, and the advanced-service sectors of economy.”150 As a result of rising production costs and low-cost products from abroad, ten out of twelve non-aerospace factories (like, for example, General Motors’ South Gate Assembly, which had employed numerous skilled and unskilled black manual workers and which shut down in 1982151) had to close down in the greater L.A. area between 1978 and 1982. For South Central – the city’s, even the state’s, former manufacturing center – this development was particularly tragic as 70,000 jobs vanished without substitution, leaving thousands of blacks unemployed.152

Simultaneously, more than two hundred industrialists “seeking for alternative sites for their manufacturing activities”153 started moving to the periphery of L.A.’s metropolitan area, turning places such as , San Gabriel Valley and El Segundo into new high-tech manufacturing centers.154 Furthermore, Mexican cities like Tijuana, Ensenada or Tecate became attractive places for establishing plants, making newly created jobs unobtainable for South Central’s residents. Beside

149 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 271f. 150 Oliver, Melvin L. and Johnson Jr., James H. and Farrell Jr., Walter C.: “Anatomy of a Rebellion. A Political-Economic Analysis”. In: Gooding, Williams (ed.): Reading Rodney King, Reading Urban Uprising, pp. 117-142, 122. 151 Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 8. 152 Cf. ibid., 8f. 153 Oliver, Melvin L. and Johnson Jr., James H. and Farrell Jr., Walter C.: “Anatomy of a Rebellion”, 122. 154 Cf. ibid. 34 this ‘geographical obstacle,’ most of the jobs in the “technopoles”155 – which were often said to bolster the numerous people that had lost their jobs during the extensive plant closure – were design or research positions for which the former factory workers were not qualified.156 Those jobs, however, that emerged in or near South Central and which were available to its residents, could be found only in “competitive sector industries, which rely primarily on undocumented labor and pay, at best, minimum wage.”157 These developments, together with still existing (and newly emerging) prejudices against blacks, led to an unemployment rate among male African Americans that in some black neighborhoods hovered around 50%.158

High unemployment was certainly one reason for the increasing crime rate in Los Angeles in general and South Central in particular during the (late) 1980s.159 Gang activity that had begun in the 1970s on a large scale, continued and even increased further in the ‘80s, very often funded by lucrative drug trade.160 Fighting for the supremacy in the ghetto – and therefore for the leading position in the area’s drug trade – South Central’s gangs “turned streets into armed camps and battled each other ferociously.”161 Between 1981 and 1984, the number of gang-related murders rose from 167 to 512, inducing Police Chief Daryl Gates to

[…] add more personnel to the department’s Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums (CRASH) units [.] […] [H]e instructed them to remind gang members that they […] ‘don’t rule the streets’. CRASH officers stepped up surveillance of places where gangs hung out, randomly stopped and frisked gang members, and often arrested them for minor violations, such as loitering and swearing in public.162 Despite such measures, however, being part of a gang remained popular, as they offered the possibility of ‘easily’ making money. Therefore, especially dealing (and consuming) crack cocaine – here, one sometimes even speaks of a crack epidemic – led to a steady decay of South Central Los Angeles. The cataclysmic interaction of unemployment, poverty, drug abuse, (drug-related) crime, family breakdown etc.

155 Oliver, Melvin L. and Johnson Jr., James H. and Farrell Jr., Walter C.: “Anatomy of a Rebellion”. 156 Cf. Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 8f. 157 Oliver, Melvin L. and Johnson Jr., James H. and Farrell Jr., Walter C.: “Anatomy of a Rebellion”, 122. 158 Cf. ibid. 159 Cf. Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 17. 160 Cf. Wilkman, Jon and Nancy: Picturing Los Angeles, 285. 161 Schiesl, Martin: “Behind the Shield”, 156. 162 Ibid. 35 soon made South Central a rather unattractive neighborhood for most of L.A.’s residents. Therefore, like in the 1960s, more and more African American middle class citizens left South Central as soon as they could afford it, moving to places such as Altadena or the “golden ghettos” of Baldwin Hills or View Park.163 Due to this black flight, the number of African Americans living in South Central decreased significantly between 1980 and 1990, with the percentage varying between 17% and 20%.164

2.10 Changing Demographics in South Central

The exodus of the black middle class made room for ‘new’ residents who – different from the post war years – were not African Americans. First gradually, then rapidly Latinos started moving back to South Central, drastically changing the area’s ethnic makeup once more. The newcomers of the 1980s, however, were not members of the “upwardly mobile Mexican American [middle class] […] [that had] left South Central in the 1960s for neighboring working class suburbs”165 but rather a conglomerate of impoverished people from different Latin American countries. As “the most disadvantaged segments of the African American community remain[ed],”166 and as they were accompanied only by other ‘disadvantaged’ members of society, the social problems mentioned above intensified, leading to an increasing isolation of South Central and its residents from the rest of the city.

Within this now multi-ethnic ghetto/barrio, Latinos and African Americans competed in various fields like, for example, housing job opportunities and political influence, of which employment was certainly of principal importance; especially in the low- skill, low-wage sector Latinos and blacks (particularly young men) vied with each other for the same positions.167

Latinos, however, were not the only ones clashing with African Americans at a progressive rate during the 1980s. Problems between Koreans and African

163 Cf. Bunch III, Lonnie G.: “A Past Not Necessarily a Prologue”, 121. 164 Cf. Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 11 and Chang, Edward T: “New Urban Crisis: Korean- African American Relations”. In: Kim, Kwang Chung [edit]: Koreans in the Hood. Conflict with African Americans, pp. 39-60, 42. 165 Sides, Josh: “A Simple Quest for Dignity”, 125. 166 Kim, Kwang Chung and Kim, Shin: “The Multiracial Nature of Los Angeles Unrest in 1992”. In: Kim, Kwang Chung (ed.): Koreans in the Hood. Conflict with African Americans, pp.17-39, 23. 167 Cf. Ong, Paul and Valenzuela Jr., Abel: “The Labor Market: Immigrant Effects and Racial Disparities”. In: Waldinger, Roger and Bozorgmehr, Mehdi (eds.): Ethnic Los Angeles, pp. 165-193, 165ff. 36

Americans were widely known by the public since the beginning of this decade. To understand where the frictions between these two ethnic minority groups originated, it is necessary to briefly illuminate Koreans’ reasons for coming to the U.S.: Just like many other groups of immigrants, Koreans came to the United States in order to live the American (middle-class) dream.168 Different from many other newcomers, however, Koreans very often “had generally enjoyed a high preimmigration socioeconomic status,”169 holding college degrees and having work experience in “professional and technical occupations or administrative and managerial occupations.”170 When they came to the States, though, most Koreans had to discover that their education was not recognized and that therefore, they did not have access to American mainstream occupations. The jobs available to them were those available to all immigrant workers at that time, which can be subsumed in the categories of low-wage and low-skill service, manual occupations or self-employment in small businesses.171 As running a business of their own was favored by most Koreans (especially by those holding a college degree), they – because of the fact that small business opportunities were limited – had just two options: either opening/taking over “an inner-city retail or service business or an extremely labor intensive business (e.g., laundry and dry cleaning service or fruit and vegetable shops).”172

In connection with Los Angeles, this means that in the 1980s (and 1990s), Korean businesses were located especially in non-Anglo, rather poor neighborhoods like South Central,173 where most residents were too poor to start their own businesses.174 Here, a continuously growing number of Korean merchants purchased their shops from local (African American) owners, who – for various reasons – had to give up their businesses. The more Koreans took over liquor or grocery stores in South Central, however, the more African Americans assumed that Koreans must have been supported by the (white-dominated) government in form of financial assistance

168 Cf. Kim, Kwang Chung and Kim, Shin: “The Multiracial Nature of Los Angeles Unrest in 1992”, 27. 169 Ibid., 28. 170 Ibid. 171 Cf. ibid. 172 Ibid., 29. 173 Cf. Sumi K. Cho, "Korean Americans vs. African Americans: Conflict and Construction" In: Gooding-Williams, Robert (ed.). Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising, pp. 196-211, 200. 174 Cf. Kim, Kwang Chung and Kim, Shin: “The Multiracial Nature of Los Angeles Unrest in 1992”, 32. 37 blacks would never receive.175 Although there had never been any evidence that government agencies assisted Koreans in opening small businesses in South Central,176 this rumor created certain jealousy and resentment on the part of South Central’s black population.

Different from what many African Americans supposed, Koreans hardly used American institutions to finance their businesses. As most of them had been part of the Korean middle-class, they had money of their own to purchase stores in South Central or they used an ancient Korean financial system, which Lou Cannon explains as follows:

Korean immigrants sometimes pool their resources under an ancient system known as kae, in which a group of families and friends contribute to a rotating pool of money that is maintained without written record. Every member of a kae is able to draw upon it in turn, for purposes ranging from pleasure trips to the buying of businesses.177 This intra-Korean way of financing small businesses, however, did not stop many blacks from perceiving Koreans as invaders making money at the expense of the black community. One reason for this view can certainly be found in the fact that most Koreans – although they pursued their business in South Central on a daily basis – did not live in this particular neighborhood but in others such as nearby Koreatown. As they did not reside in South Central Los Angeles, they did not spend their earnings in this community, either – again strengthening the image of Koreans as (foreign) exploiters.178

In addition, the conflict between African Americans and Koreans was fueled by reservations and prejudices Koreans had against blacks, which date back to the end of the Korean War in 1953. When GIs brought Korean war brides to the U.S., these women soon “discovered the social significance of marrying a white versus an African-American GI.”179 Information about American racial (and therefore also social) hierarchies was transferred back to Korea, where the image of blacks as

175 Cf. Chang, Edward T.: “Building Minority Coalitions: A Case Study of Korean and African Americans”. In: Korean Journal of Population and Development. Vol. 21, Nr.1, July 1992, pp.37-56, 45. 176 Cf. Kim, Kwang Chung and Kim, Shin: “The Multiracial Nature of Los Angeles Unrest in 1992”, 30. 177 Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 113. 178 Cf. Kim, Kwang Chung and Kim, Shin: “The Multiracial Nature of Los Angeles Unrest in 1992”, 31ff. 179 Sumi K. Cho, “Korean Americans vs. African Americans: Conflict and Construction”, 189. 38 underprivileged members of American society was consolidated. When Koreans came to the United States after 1965, this idea of African Americans as inferior to other ethnicities was further intensified by the popular media, which often portrayed blacks stereotypically as “criminals, welfare recipients, alcoholics, drug addicts, or simply lazy […].”180

Another reason for the animosity between Koreans and blacks – especially between Korean shop owners and their African American customers – was “interethnic/intercultural miscommunication,”181 based on distinct cultural habits and the frequent low command of English be then-recent Korean immigrants. A survey conducted by Benjamin Bailey in the year 2000, which – if we compare its findings with statements made during the 1980s and 1990s – can also be applied to the decades before, shows that particularly the “face-to-face interaction in service and encounters between African American customers and Korean immigrant retailers often leaves members of each group feeling insulted.”182 While African Americans bewailed especially the Korean shopkeepers’ “lack of interpersonal engagement and involvement,” the latter often complained about “a lack of restraint” on the part of their African American customers.183

Blacks very often criticized many Koreans’ lacking communication skills as well as the fact that they “[do not] greet with a smile, [do not] maintain eye contact, and [do not] make small talk,”184 making African Americans feel “as if they were not recognized as human beings.”185 A considerable problem in this context was that – as Bailey’s survey shows – many blacks did not regard their vis-à-vis’ behavior as a cultural peculiarity but as racism.186 Bailey explains this phenomenon as follows:

The interpretations of storekeepers’ behavior […] are challenged by both the broader historical context of the encounters as well as the immediate history of immigrant Korean retailers and African- Americans in Los Angeles. Racism permeates American society, and it provides a cogent explanation for a variety of historical, social, and economic conditions, including behavior in face-to-face interaction. African-Americans have historically been treated as

180 Chang, Edward T: “New Urban Crisis”, 43. 181 Bailey, Benjamin: “Communicative behavior and conflict between African-American customers and Korean immigrant retailers in Los Angeles”. In: Discourse and Society, pp. 86-108, 87. 182 Ibid., 89. 183 Ibid., 90f. 184 Ibid., 91. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid., 92. 39

less than equal to other Americans, so experiences of racism, e.g. being ignored in stores, are familiar to many provide a readily available explanation for the lack of interpersonal involvement of Korean retailers.187 Korean shop owners, on the other hand, very often criticized the apparent “self- centeredness,” “poor manners” and “lack of education” of their African American customers. To understand what is meant by that from a Korean point of view, it is necessary to take a closer look at Korean culture: Although many Koreans are of Christian belief, Confucianism is a major component of their culture, too. In this philosophical teaching, it is assumed that “proper conduct […] arise[s] in part from the suppression of the seven passions of joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire.”188 If you experience one of these passions, you should carry them off well, which is understood as a sign of higher education and good manners. As a consequence, the behavior of many blacks – which they themselves regard as polite (e.g. making jokes or making small talk) is perceived as “a sign of poor manners by many Koreans.”189

Tensions between African Americans and Koreans, however, did not only find their expression in mutual verbal attacks but also in assaults. Here, especially Korean merchants were affected. In April 1986, four Korean shopkeepers were murdered in South Central and although there was no evidence that these killings were racially motivated,190 African Americans and Koreans clashed with increasing regularity. To respond to the animosity between these two ethnic minority groups, the African American Korean Community Relations Committee (later changed into Black Korean Alliance, short BKA) was founded.191 The purpose of this non-profit organization was “serving the ‘symbolic’ function of bridging the gap between the Korean American and the African American community.”192 While the BKA was supposed to help decrease racial conflicts, its early meetings rather mirrored them instead:

‘The early meetings were a time when two ethnocentric groups were forced to come together,’ said Jai Lee Wong of Los Angeles

187 Bailey, Benjamin: “Communicative behavior and conflict between African-American customers and Korean immigrant retailers in Los Angeles”. In: Discourse and Society, pp. 86-108, 92. 188 Ibid., 93. 189 Ibid. 190 Statistics show that Korean and African American merchants were assailed likewise. The large number of Korean shopkeepers, however, distract from the fact that the raids depend on the place where the stores are located rather than on the shop owner’s ethnicity. 191 Cf. Chang, Edward T.: “Building Minority Coalitions”, 40. 192 Ibid., 39. 40

County Human Relations Commission. For example, several African American members of the BKA expressed a strong negative feeling toward the presence of Korean merchants in their neighborhood. Reverend H.P. Rachel, a co-chair of BKA, advocated the boycott discourteous Korean stores. Other African American members voiced their ethnocentrism accusing Korean merchants of ‘ripping off the African American community.’ African American and Korean members advocated their own issues and defended their people. Some BKA members were more interested in promoting their own agenda than working together to solve problems. In another instance, an African American member angrily raised a question: ‘When are you (Koreans) going to open a bank on Vermont and Manchester (South Central Los Angeles) area?’ [This quotation is supplemented by a footnote saying “During the past few years, several major banks have closed their branches in South Central Los Angeles. In particular, African American merchants have raised concerns that they must drive longer distances since there are no nearby banks to serve them. Against this background, the debate concerning the establishment of a bank by Koreans was raised.”] […] Some Koreans expressed resentment toward the constant demands from African Americans. One Korean member angrily replied that ‘it is not a Korean problem but a problem of South Central Los Angeles. Korean merchants happen to be there. We must learn to live together instead of pushing for more’.193

This quotation shows how gridlocked the situation in Los Angeles in general and South Central in particular was during the 1980s. Ever since then, it became obvious that changes in demographics altered both race relations as well as racism. While in the postwar years it could basically be described as white-on-black racism, this – as it had not vanished – was accompanied by a new one, which can best be described as interminority racism.

In the context of Los Angeles and its African American population, this kind of racism was something completely new. Historically, blacks had been accepting the ethnic diversity of the city as well as the region, which is documented by, for example, the area’s oral history. These stories include anecdotes of friendship and mutual support of Mexicans and blacks or Asians and blacks.194 In the 1980s, little of this positive attitude towards each other remained. Blacks very often reacted “with

193 Chang, Edward T.: “Building Minority Coalitions”, 43f. 194 Cf. Bunch III, Lonnie G.: “A Past Not Necessarily a Prologue”, 126. 41 envy, distrust, and, […] anger to the growing economic and political clout of the ‘new immigration’” because they suspected (white) America to “embrace and encourage the new migrants [especially Hispanics and Koreans] to reach heights that are unobtainable to most blacks.”195

Therefore, it would be wrong to look at the growing interethnic tensions in South Central from a black-Korean perspective only as the relationship of all three major ethnic/racial groups that frequented this particular neighborhood (African Americans, Latinos and Koreans) was strained. While – as pointed out above – African Americans were competing with both Koreans and Latinos (yet for different reasons), Latinos and Koreans were in conflict, too. Latinos, for instance, accused Koreans of exploiting them because – although relying on Latino immigrant workers – “Latino employees in Korean-owned businesses [were] paid less than the Korean immigrant employees who [held] higher-level jobs”.196 Therefore, it can be said that with regard to South Central, there was a triangle of interminority tensions and that the term ‘black-Korean conflict’ is insufficient to cover it adequately.

2.11 Heading for the Urban Crisis of 1992

As briefly mentioned in 2.9 Reconstructing Economy, both the City of Los Angeles as well as Los Angeles County had to deal with a continuously increasing rate of violent crimes during the 1980s. Between 1984 and 1989 alone, the number of violent felonies rose from 1,179 to 1,601 incidents per 100,000 residents. Unsettled by this development, the public asked Southern California law enforcement agencies to take actions that would curtail crime.197 Therefore, (white) Police Chief Daryl Gates initiated , “a massive antigang police sweep launched initially in the south central section of Los Angeles.”198 On an April weekend in 1988, more than one thousand officers plowed through South Central, “picking up everyone available on already existing warrants, issued new traffic citations, arrested others for gang-related behaviors (flashing signs, wearing ‘colors’ etc.), and arrested more for observed criminal activities (including violations).”199 Altogether,

195 Bunch III, Lonnie G.: “A Past Not Necessarily a Prologue”, 126. 196 Min, Pyong Gap: “Korean-Latino Relations in Los Angeles And New York”. In: Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race, Vol. 4, No. 2 , October 2007, pp. 395-411, 400. 197 Cf. Klein, Malcolm M.: The American Street Gang. Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control. Oxford University Press USA, New York, 1995, 162. 198 Ibid. 199 Ibid. 42

1,453 people were arrested, yet 1,350 of them were released without charges. Although Operation Hammer had been directed particularly against gang members, only about half of those arrested were actually part of any gang. Furthermore, there were only sixty arrests due to violent crimes, of which only thirty-two led to actual convictions.200

Although already this first sweep had been rather inefficient, it was repeated several times.201 These round-ups, admittedly, intimidated drug dealers and small-time criminals (at least temporarily), but they were not able to stem gang-killings and other felonies. This, however, is not all: During the same period of time, there were two gang-related murders and three injured people within the area of South Central,202 calling the efficiency of the operation even more into question.

Operation Hammer, like many other police actions of that time, did not contribute to positive police-minority relations as police officers very often violated citizens’ rights during such operations. A good example of such an infringement is an incident that took place on August 1st, 1988: Acting on a tip, 88 officers stormed four apartments in South Central (near 39th Street and Dalton Avenue) believing they were crushing crack cocaine houses. In departure from the usual procedure, they “smashed toilets, destroyed furniture, broke windows, and wrote pro-police graffiti on an outside wall.”203 Furthermore, some of the thirty-three blacks that had been arrested during that operation later testified that they had been slapped by the officers. As it turned out later, the tip had been wrong: Instead of a crack den, the police found less than an ounce of cocaine and six ounces of marijuana. Because of their misconduct during the sweep, numerous officers were disciplined and the city of Los Angeles had to pay 3.7 million dollars in damages.204

Despite both the moral condemnation and the criminal conviction of the officers involved this incident, it is a typical example of encounters between ethnic minorities and the L.A.P.D., making blacks (especially young men) increasingly complain that “they were stopped by the police and […] [were] made to lie face down with legs

200 Cf. Klein, Malcolm M.: The American Street Gang. Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control. Oxford University Press USA, New York, 1995, 162. 201 Further sweeps were typically conducted by far less than 1,000 officers; usually 100 – 200 policemen were involved in the operations. 202 Cf. Klein, Malcolm M.: The American Street Gang, 162. 203 Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 17. 204 Cf. ibid. 43 and arms spread and palms up […] for minor traffic violations or for no reasons at all.”205 As the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.) put it, “[y]oung black men have come to experience police stops, questioning, and harassment as their American way of life.”206 Although numerous policemen were punished for their racist behavior towards blacks and although the City of Los Angeles had to pay millions of dollars in compensation for police misconduct,207 several incidents of verbal abuse and harassment stayed unreported as many victims were too scared to bring charges against the police officers.208

Furthermore, several encounters between the L.A.P.D and African Americans did not turn out well for the latter: In the 1980s alone, eighteen Angelenos died because of choke holds, sixteen of whom were black,209 contributing to relationship between African Americans and the police being at the lowest ebb during the 1980s and early ‘90s. Similar to the times before the Watts ‘riots,’ police-minority relations were marked by mutual distrust and animosity, a situation Police Chief Daryl Gates and Mayor Tom Bradley did hardly take notice of: Similar to the times before Watts, the chief downplayed problems between minorities and the L.A.P.D. by – according to Lou Cannon – arguing “that he was greeted in a friendly fashion whenever he visited South Central.”210 Bradley, for his part, was more concerned with making Los Angeles a “World Class City” (e.g. by successfully hosting the 1984 Olympic Games) and “diverted recourses toward downtown redevelopment and away from projects aimed at expanding the affordable housing stock in the city or in improving infrastructure in blight neighborhoods”211 like South Central.

The dramatic loss of jobs Los Angeles had been dealing with since the late 1970s intensified once more in the late 1980s. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, $3 billion in defense contracts were cancelled, leading to another wave of plant closing. Again, thousands of people lost their jobs, not only those who had worked in one of the ship or airplane factories but also those that had been

205 Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 18. 206 Ogletree Jr., Charles J. [et al.]: Beyond the Rodney King Story. An Investigation of Police Conduct in Minority Communities. Northeastern, Boston, 1995, 28. 207 Cf. Oliver, Melvin L. and Johnson Jr., James H. and Farrell Jr., Walter C.: “Anatomy of a Rebellion”, 120f. 208 Cf. Ogletree Jr., Charles J. [et al.]: Beyond the Rodney King Story, 40. 209 Cf. Oliver, Melvin L. and Johnson Jr., James H. and Farrell Jr., Walter C.: “Anatomy of a Rebellion”, 121. 210 Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 19. 211 Sides, Josh: “A Simple Quest for Dignity”, 130. 44 employed in one of the businesses near the plants (shops, gas stations etc.). As a result of the extensive plant closing, the state was no longer able to financially support local governments the way it had done in the past; local governments in turn had to cut services, forcing public institutions like medical trauma centers or libraries to close down.212

This interplay of disappearing jobs and reduced public services again hit South Central the hardest. In 1991, 230,000 of South Central’s 630,000 residents lived below the poverty line, 40,000 black teenagers neither went to school nor had a job213 and those who had one found themselves in competition with other ethnic minorities, especially Latinos and Koreans, for housing and (badly paid) jobs.

3.0 The Rodney King Incident – A Reconstruction

The event which later should gain a doubtful reputation as the Rodney King incident started on March 3rd, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m. Tim and Melanie Singer, members of the California Highway Patrol (C.H.P.), were patrolling on Interstate 210 north of Los Angeles when – near the Sunland Boulevard off-ramp – they realized a car approaching them at high speed. The Singers immediately took up the pursuit, which was the beginning of a 7.8-mile chase during which, according to the police, the car they were following reached a speed of 110 to 115 mph on the freeway, and 85 mph within residential areas.214

The driver of the car they were chasing was Rodney Glen King, a 25-year-old African American construction worker, who was accompanied by two friends, Bryant Alland and Freddie Helms. Together they “had just watched a basketball game on TV, and it was still pretty early so [they] decided to go for a drive.”215 Although during the chase, King had repeatedly been given the order to stop the car,

212 Cf. Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 10. 213 Cf. ibid., 11. 214 Cf. ibid., 25. Already shortly after the incident, this speed measurement led to a controversy because according to different experts and Rodney King himself, the 1988 Hyundai Excel he was driving that night was not capable of reaching that speed at all. King, however, did not deny that he was driving too fast. A few days after the incident, he said in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that he “[…] may have been speeding just a little bit”. Eleven years later, he commented on the accusation of speeding in a more detailed way. In his autobiography, The Riot Within, King states “[a]fter ten, eleven p.m. in L.A., the highways are usually more open, and the flow of traffic easily gets into the high seventies to eighties. Trouble is, after a few miles at that speed, ninety starts to feel like eighty, and I must have been in the passing lane where cars can hit those speeds pretty easily. Cf. King, Rodney and Spagnola, Lawrence J.: The Riots Within: My Journey From Rebellion to Redemption. Harper One, New York, 2012, 41f. 215 King, Rodney and Spagnola Lawrence J.: The Riot Within, 41. 45 he – later testifying he had been afraid he would be arrested for violating his – did not do so but instead sped up, ignored red lights and nearly caused an accident.

Meanwhile, it was no longer the C.H.P. that was involved in the pursuit only: Cars from the Los Angeles Unified School District (L.A.U.S.D.) and the L.A.P.D. as well as an L.A.P.D. helicopter were following Rodney King in his car, too. Near the intersection of Osborne Street and Foothill Boulevard, King was finally forced to stop, as a pickup truck whose driver had tried to pull over after hearing the police sirens, was blocking the street.216 Here, in Lake View Terrace, “a racially mixed middle-class neighborhood in north East LA,”217 the units involved in the chase were accompanied by another three L.A.P.D. cars. Their passengers were the future defendants Officers Laurence Powell and Timothy Wind, Officers Theodore Briseno and Rolando Solano (the latter was not charged) as well as Sergeant , who – as the highest ranking officer present at the scene – assumed command.218

In view of the participants’ different statements, what happened next is hardly reconstructable: Tim Singer ordered Rodney King and his two passengers to exit the car and to lay face down on the ground. While his companions followed Singer’s instructions immediately, King’s actions and motivations were depicted and interpreted differently: Contrary to King, who later said he had followed the officers’ orders,219 Powell, Wind, Briseno, and Koon reported King had been acting like someone intoxicated. According to them, he – presumably under the influence of P.C.P. – had repeatedly tried to attack the officers, making them fear for their lives.220 Thus, in order to make him comply, they – in departure from the usual arresting procedure – tased King twice as well as kicked and beat him more than 50 times;221 none of the other officers present at the scene intervened.

Unnoticed by the police as well as King and his companions, Lake View Terrace- resident George Holliday filmed a large part of the incident. Based on this evidence, Briseno, Powell, and Wind, most heavily involved in the beating, were charged with

216 Cf. Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 25. 217 Schlund-Vials, Cathy J.: “‘Near-White’ or ‘Just like Blacks’: Comparative Cartographies and Asian American Critique”. In: American Literary History, Vol. 24, Nr. 2, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 390-403, 391. 218 Cf. Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 26. 219 King, Rodney and Spagnola Lawrence J.: The Riot Within, 44ff. 220 Cf. Koon, Stacey C. and Deitz, Robert: Presumed Guilty: The Tragedy of the Rodney King Affair. Regnery Publishing Inc., Washington D.C., 1992, 32ff. 221 Cf. Wallenfeldt, Jeff: “Los Angeles Riots of 1992”. 46 use of excessive force on March 14th, 1991; Koon as the highest officers present, not having actively taken part in the beating and ‘only’ having used his taser, was accused of “willfully permitting and failing to take action to stop the unlawful assault.”222 Several of the by-standing officers were temporarily suspended.

Before the officers had been charged, however, several other events took place. Here, especially the video’s way before it was finally published by the local TV-station K.T.L.A. and the public attention it aroused are of importance as they reveal a contrary evaluation of the King beating. While, as the following chapter will show, neither the police nor the media were initially interested in the video footage, it – after it had finally been published – immediately evoked great public and media interest. Without these background information, the ensuing analysis of the King incident’s representation in the Los Angeles Times, which will be the next chapters’ object of examination, would hardly be possibly.

4.0 Real Time News – The Rodney King Incident in the Los Angeles Times

The L.A. Times’ did not report on the Rodney King beating until March 5th. Although this – at first glance – is not a long period of time, the reason for this delay is quite remarkable: Despite being shocked by what he had witnessed in front of his window, George Holliday initially did not publicize the videotape, but plied his trade. Yet, still bothered by the beating, he decided to inform the police about the incident on May 4th, but to Holliday’s amazement, the police officer (his identity remains unknown since none of the officers ever acknowledged taking Holliday’s call) he told about the beating as well as the video tape was not interested in either of those. Therefore, after having tried to contact C.N.N.’s Los Angeles bureau, which did not take his call, Holliday took the tape to the local TV-station K.T.L.A., where “it made a strong and immediate impact.”223 The same day, they published an edited version of the tape and took a copy of the full version to the L.A.P.D. headquarters.224

Having become aware of Holliday’s video released by K.T.L.A., the Times also published an article about the beating on May 5th. Positioned on page A26 (in-

222 Guerrero, Georgen: “King, Rodney (1965-)”. In: Greene, Helen T. and Gabbidon, Shawn L.: Encyclopedia of Race and Crime. SAGE Publ. Inc., Thousand Oaks, 2009. 223 Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 22. 224 Ibid. 47 between obituaries, death notes, funeral announcements, advertisements, and an article dealing with the killing of five in ), however, the paper treated the incident like a side note in the city’s daily business, offering not more than a synopsis of the videotape and short statements by George Holliday as well as by an L.A.P.D. press spokesman. The reason for the Times initially neglecting the beating can only be guessed: Generally, it can be said that during the 1980s and at the beginning of the ‘90s, mainstream media tended to largely bracket out African American concerns as well as racial tensions. As Jay Mathews, then bureau chief of in L.A., stated in retrospect:

Latinos and diversity were the new media fashion in the eighties. Blacks were the old minority, on the way out. Racial tension was unfashionable as a media story. Black frustration and the reaction of blacks to the police was a twenty-year-old-story. It was old hat.225 Therefore, it can be assumed that at first, also the L.A. Times considered the actually volatile video footage not ‘fashionable’ enough to report about it in greater detail.

Another reason could be found in the widespread confidence in the police, particularly among the city’s non-minorities and non-poor. Not believing that the police would gratuitously act that forcefully, people might have doubted that the victim had provoked the violent treatment by the officers in one way or another. In the Times’ reporting, this became apparent in the paper initially refraining from clearly identifying King as a victim of police brutality, referring to him repeatedly as a “prone and apparently [highlighted by author, K.M.] defenseless man,”226 or reporting that “at no time does the man appear [highlighted by author, K.M.] to offer any resistance. […] He appears [highlighted by author, K.M.] to cry out.”227 Stating this, the L.A. Times provides the opportunity to interpret the officers’ behavior as appropriate to the situation. The notion that King could have posed a threat to the officers, was supported by the Times repetitively mentioning his size (calling him, for instance, “heavy-set”228) as well as his criminal record, also leaving room for the opportunity that the police had acted forcefully but adequately. This would also

225 Jay Mathews in an interview with Lou Cannon, 1994. In: Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 14. 226 Berger, Leslie and Tobar, Hector: “Tape of L.A. Police Beating Suspect Stirs Public Furor: Law enforcement: Mayor says he’s ‘outraged.’ The department, FBI and district attorney are investigating”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 06, 1991, A1/21, 1. 227 Fiore, Faye and Gollner, Philipp: “Video Showing Beating by L.A. Officers Investigated“.In: Los Angeles Times, March 05, 1991, A26. 228 Ibid. 48 explain why the paper initially neglected the incident; from the Times’ point of view, nothing noteworthy had happened.

Only with the “public outcry” and “public furor”229 the video had reportedly aroused, the Times’ interest in the incident increased, too. This can particularly be seen in the paper relocating the story to the front page as well as a sudden increase in articles dealing with the topic: While – as mentioned above – on March 5th, there was only one article on page A26, the one about the beating published on March 6th was located on A1, albeit at the bottom of the page. From March 7th onwards, the L.A. Times addressed the beating in three to four individual articles on average per day; each day, one of these articles was printed on the front page.

Furthermore, there was a development with regard to subject matter as well as language. It is striking that initially, the Times did not establish a link between the beating and the race of those involved. In the paper’s first article, King (whose name was unknown at that time) was simply referred to as “man” six times; it was mentioned only once that he was black, serving to describe the video as detailed as possible rather than labeling the incident a racist one.230 As already pointed out above this might have its reason in the paper’s employees attitude towards race, saying that “[i]t seemed somehow wrong to notice race, when we were hoping to create a post-racial society.”231 This not-noticing race, however, changed slowly with increasing details about the beating coming to light, especially on TV. In order to reveal this development, it is essential to analyze politicians’, institutions’ and citizens’ responses to the King incident at first.

4.1 The King Incident Becoming Political

Examining Angelenos’ responses to the King incident, it soon becomes obvious that reportedly, the vast majority of Americans perceived it as a deep wrong. On March 6th, the Times stated that the “violent images produced an immediate public outcry”232 and presented different public figures, like Mayor Tom Bradley or Police Chief Daryl Gates, characterizing the beating as “shocking.”233

229 Berger, Leslie and Tobar, Hector: “Tape of L.A. Police Beating Suspect Stirs Public Furor”, A1. 230Cf. Fiore, Faye and Gollner, Philipp: “Video Showing Beating by L.A. Officers Investigated”, A26. 231 Interview conducted with former Los Angeles Times employee (anonymous) on May 23rd, 2016. 232 Berger, Leslie and Tobar, Hector: “Tape of L.A. Police Beating Suspect Stirs Public Furor”, A1. 233 Ibid., A21. 49

What applicably differed from one account to other, however, was the evaluation of what had led to the incident: Although the Los Angeles Times itself – as already indicated above – initially shied away from identifying the event as race-related, it nonetheless stressed that people from different quarters (particularly left-wing politicians and civil rights activists) immediately conceived suspicion that the beating had been a racially-motivated attack of white police officers on a black motorist. Especially civil rights groups, members of ethnic minorities, but also L.A.P.D. internals (of different races) were quoted, according to whom the King beating had by no means been an “aberration caused by total human failure”234 – as Gates put it – but rather a small piece in a larger pattern of police misconduct against ethnic minorities. Reportedly, the only difference of the actual and the many other “Rodney King incidents”235 was that now the beating had been caught on tape.

The more voices characterizing the King incident as just one of many attacks of police officers on ethnic/racial minorities were raised, the more the Times’ interest in this very topic increased. However, instead of clearly identifying the beating as racist, the paper rather characterized it as “carr[ying] racial overtones” because of the races of those involved. On March 8th, the Times for the first time – albeit still cautiously – reported that the video showed “white officers savagely pummeling a prone black man,”236 implying two things, which is that King was indeed the victim (a term used on March 7th for the first time) and not the perpetrator in this incident and that the encounter might have rooted in King being African American. The reason for the Times suggesting rather than speaking bluntly could be found in a statement by King’s lawyer, who – after Gates had announced an investigation of the incident – declared that the

case would not be about racism. They [King and his family] are not looking to turn this into a racial crusade […] His rights were totally

234 Stolberg, Sheryl and Tobar, Hector: “Gates Wants Officers Prosecuted In Beating: Police: Chief calls incident an aberration caused by ‘total human failure’. Bradley also presses investigation”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 08, 1991, A1/28, 1. 235 Carroll Jr., Richard L.: “Outcry Over Police Beating”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 24, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-24/opinion/op-1221_1_police-officers-rodney-king-king- incident [23.07.2015]. 236 Stolberg, Sheryl and Tobar, Hector: “Gates Wants Officers Prosecuted In Beating”, A1. 50

violated [but] it’s his rights, not the rights of a race or creed or religion that’s at issue here. It’s the rights of a human being.237 The idea that the incident might have rooted in racism on the part of the officers was also rejected by King himself, saying in one of his first statements to the press that the incident had “not [been] a racial thing.”238 Since both the police as well as the victim agreed upon the beating not having been racially motivated, the Times initially refrained from clearly identifying it as such, too.

Nonetheless, the L.A. Times increasingly reported about similar incidents in which the police had proceeded against ethnic/racial minorities with undue force. For example, the paper repeatedly informed its readers about baseball player Joe Morgan and basketball star Jamaal Wilkes, both African American, who had been awarded several hundred thousand dollars after violent encounters with the L.A.P.D.239 Furthermore, it quoted Angelenos (particularly blacks) stating that police brutality was an inherent part of their everyday life. Also scholars and (civil rights) attorneys were being heard, telling not only about racially motivated police misconduct but also explaining why the public – despite the fact that incidents like the King beating were quite common – had not been aware of this widely present phenomenon: Reportedly, those mostly affected belonged to the city’s impoverished parts of the populations, whose concerns remained largely unknown to L.A.’s wealthier society. To convey this message as authentically as possible, the Times made use of ‘personalized,’ appealing articles, providing its readers with ‘first hand’ information. One example is an article by Gregory J. Boyle, pastor of Dolores Mission Church in Boyle Heights, stating that

[m]ost citizens viewing the tape of Rodney G. King being beaten by police officers were stunned and uncomprehending. Most citizens that is, but the urban poor. […] [T]he inner-city poor know that the only thing isolated about this incident was the chance the way in which it was captured on tape. Most people of color can recall such an incident happening to them or to a family member or a neighbor. We are less than honest and commit a grave error if we

237 Fiore, Faye and Wood, Tracy: “Beating Victim Says He Obeyed Police: Law enforcement: He is freed from jail. D.A. files no charges against him”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 07, 1991, A1/20/21/22, 22. 238 Serrano, Richard A.: “Police Documents Disclose Beating Was Downplayed: Investigation: Highway Patrol officers say they were ‘shocked’ at the level of violence used by the police: Reports studied by grand jury add detail to King incident”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1991, A1/12, 1. 239 Cf. Ferrell, David: “Grim Gates Faces Heated Questions: Media: The chief seems to know that the news conference on police beating might be the most significant of his stormy tenure”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 08, 1991, B1/4, 4. 51

insist that what happened to Rodney G. King was isolated and an exceptional case. The poor know better. We need not to wait for further, well placed video cameras to see that low-intensity warfare is being waged against low-income minorities. We need only listen to the voices of the poor; they can testify that they are dehumanized, disparaged and despised by the police. […] To characterize the King incident as atypical and an aberration is to further insult and discredit the experience of minorities and the urban poor.240 As this quote shows, the Times particularly established a link between race and class, indicating that police harassment also affected middle and upper class members of ethnic/racial minorities but was far more likely to occur in the poor areas of the city, mostly inhabited by non-whites. He (and so did the Times through him) furthermore characterized these incidents as ‘warfare,’ which means as attacks aimed at on the city’s weakest and calls for the (white) middle class readership to no longer ignore the L.A.P.D.’s frequent ill-treatment of the inner-city poor.

According to the Times, another reason for many Angelenos not knowing about incidents similar to the King beating could reportedly be found in sophisticated cover-up tactics by the police. It was reported that citizens – in case they tried to lodge a complaint against police officers – had to expect further harassments. In the Times’ news coverage, this subject was addressed in emotional and very personal articles, too. Antonio H. Rodriguez, attorney and a volunteer with the East Los Angeles Police Malpractice Complaint Center, for instance, found vivid expressions, elucidating that if you want to report police abuse, you

[f]irst, […] must discard your gut-level instinct that it is a waste of time; that nothing comes from filling a complaint against an officer. This is the solid ghetto and barrio wisdom. It is based on the knowledge that police officers, who are sometimes even friends of the culprit, will investigate, and that the percentage of sustained complaints is woefully low. If you discard your cynicism, you must then consider your fears that you will run into the same officer in the streets of your neighborhood, where he or she patrols. […] This too, is based on the popular knowledge that, if they think they can get away with it, police officers will retaliate against those who dare report them for brutality or verbal abuse. These officers have been known to threaten people, roust people, arrest them for nothing and sometimes even harm them physically. If you overcome those fears for yourself, you must then deal with your

240 Boyle, Gregory J.: “Defenseless, the Poor Are Also Voiceless: Inner-city residents know all about abusive police behavior. Reusing to hear their complaints adds to the injury”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 11, 1991, B5. 52

family, who will fear police retaliation against you or them, especially if they live with you. Witnesses will be a problem. Police officers do not roust or beat up people in front of witnesses […]. But if there are any, most usually will refuse to get involved, even your friends. They share your skepticism and fears. […]. [If you decide to file a complaint] […] you have to step into the unknown world of the police […] station. Coming from the ghetto or barrio, you will step into a sea of mostly white faces. And you must walk up to the desk officer and tell him or her that you want to file a complaint against an officer – someone she or he surely knows – for mistreating you. In most instances, the officer will interrogate you right there or refer you to a sergeant, who will ask you, usually in an unfriendly manner, why you want to file a complaint. He or she may try to discourage you by telling you that the officer is married, has children and that your filing will put the officer’s job in jeopardy. You may even be told that what the officer did was legal. Or he will tell you that they have no complaint forms. If you are not discouraged and you do file your complaint, you will be called and interviewed by an investigating officer, usually from the same station. You won’t be telling your story to a sympathetic or even neutral ear. The officer will grill you, cross-examine you and try to tear apart your story, often in a hostile manner. Usually that will end your participation in the story. You will not be informed of the outcome of the investigation. It is a privileged and confidential information. You are, therefore, left with the empty feeling with which you started. That it is a waste of time. That nothing ever comes from filing a complaint against an officer. Think about this the next time you hear someone argue that the number of citizen complaints about police misconduct filed represent only a portion of the actual incidents that occur in our community.241 Written in a narrating style, articles like that tried to make their readers imagine life as an (impoverished) African American or Latino in L.A. and thereby evoke a greater understanding for the concerns of the city’s minorities. In articles like the one presented above, African American and Latino neighborhoods were presented as worlds of their own becoming particularly apparent by using terms like ‘barrio’ and ‘ghetto,’ clearly distinguishing them from the rest of the city. According to the Times, in these microcosms (and only there), it was well known that police officers regularly abused people’s rights, characterizing it as ‘ghetto and barrio wisdom’ or ‘popular knowledge’. This world was contrasted to the ‘unknown world of the police station’ marked by aggressive behavior towards people of color as terms like ‘roust,’ ‘beat,’ ‘grill,’ ‘cross-examine,’ ‘tear apart’ and ‘hostile’ suggest.

241 Rodriguez, Antonio H.: “So, You Have A Complaint: Police: Citizens who want to report being mistreated must run a gauntlet of obstacles, hostility and fear”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 14, 1991, B7. 53

Having been largely unnoticed and uncommented for decades, this discrimination of inner-city residents by the city’s police department temporarily became the focus of the paper’s attention. As the next chapters will show, however, the topic of race and race relations was soon abandoned in favor of another thematic focal point.

4.1.1 Police Chief Daryl Gates as the ‘Source of Evil’

It is remarkable that although in the aftermath of the King beating, the L.A.P.D. as a whole had been criticized by a large part of society, it was particularly Daryl Gates who was constantly under fire in the Times’ reporting. Besides current accusations considering his management style and responses to the King incident, the paper repeatedly mentioned racist remarks he had uttered in the past and for which he had already been sharply criticized back then. It was stressed that in 1978, for example, he had stated that there were hardly any Latinos in higher positions within the L.A.P.D. since they were “lazy” or that in 1982, Gates had declared that particularly African Americans died of (forbidden) chokeholds because they had a different anatomy than “normal people.”242 Thus, what the L.A. Times did was presenting a ‘chronology of racism’ concerning the head of the Los Angeles police department, illustrating that the racism that was by now alleged to have led to the King beating was neither a new phenomenon, nor one affecting street officers only, but could also be found in the L.A.P.D.’s highest ranks.

By establishing and mentioning this chronology time and again, the Times implied that after the King beating, Gates was trying to conceal this characteristic of the L.AP.D. by continuously claiming that the incident had not been rooted in racist police behavior. Believing that a fish rots from the head down, many (including civil rights organizations, politicians, and people of all ethnic backgrounds) reportedly demanded Gates’ resignation after the King affair had become known. According to the Times, this demand for the first time found expression on March 9th, when “several hundreds [predominately black] protestors converged on the Police Department’s downtown headquarters,”243 calling for “Gates to step down, but also

242 Cf. Clifford, Frank and Mitchell, John L.: “Bradley’s Opinions Limited by System: City Government: Civil Service bureaucracy denies the mayor power to take charge of a department during a crisis: Calls continue for Gates to resign”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 08, 1991, B1/4, 4. 243 Stolberg, Sheryl: “Hundreds of Protestors Demand That Gates Resign: Police: Angered at the beating of a black motorist, demonstrators at vow to rally each weekend until the head of LAPD steps down”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 10, 1991, B1. 54 for the dismissal of all 15 police officers [sic!] who were at the scene of the beating and for changes in the way the department handles brutality cases.”244

In the L.A. Times, the call for Gates to resign was offered an exceptional platform: On March 12th, the paper published a full-page advertisement by The American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (A.C.L.U.), demanding Gates’ resignation. Entitled WHO DO YOU CALL WHEN THE GANG WEARS BLUE UNIFORMS?, the advertisement informed readers that

[v]ictims of police abuse call the ACLU each and every day! The brutal beating [of Rodney King] which shocked the nation, did not, unfortunately, surprise the ACLU. Because this is not an isolated incident. The difference this time is that we have the proof…on tape. But no matter how many victories are won in court, the abuse continues. In 1990, 8 million taxpayer dollars were paid to victims of LAPD violence. In the interest of the City and the Police Department, the time has come for Police Chief Daryl Gates to resign.245 Furthermore, it asked the Times’ readers to “join in demanding the resignation of Police Chief Daryl Gates. We need your help to convince him.”246 Attached there was a coupon for citizens to fill in and return to the A.C.L.U., saying

Dear Chief Gates, I am horrified at the outrageous behavior of your police officers towards a defenseless suspect on Sunday, March 3, by your lack of moral leadership and your history of offensive remarks concerning minorities. Because of this incident and the hundreds of other examples of police abuse perpetrated by the LAPD, and because you have clearly failed in your responsibility to set a tone of humane and professional conduct for your officers, I call on you to resign immediately.247 Although it might be argued that this powerful advertisement was launched by the A.C.L.U. and not by the Times itself, it can be said that the latter certainly would not have published it in case it had not agreed with its overall attitude towards the King beating and Gates’ role in it. Regarding a paper with a circulation of over one million copies a day, it cannot be contended that the L.A. Times published this advertisement for financial reasons only, either. Rather, as will be shown later in this thesis, it can

244 Stolberg, Sheryl: “Hundreds of Protestors Demand That Gates Resign: Police: Angered at the beating of a black motorist, demonstrators at Parker Center vow to rally each weekend until the head of LAPD steps down”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 10, 1991, B1. 245 “WHO DO YOU CALL WHEN THE GANG WEARS BLUE UNIFORMS?” In: Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1991, A21. 246 Ibid. 247 Ibid. 55 be read as the Times positioning itself in the emerging dispute over whether Gates’ resignation would help reforming the Los Angeles Police Department, as the paper contributed to portraying the police chief negatively. In the advertisement presented above, this negative image was created with the help of phrasings like ‘lack of moral leadership,’ ‘history of offensive remarks’ and alleging Gates of having ‘clearly failed in [his] responsibility to set a tone of humane and professional conduct for [his] officers’.

The newspaper’s critical reporting on Gates even intensified with the release of Powell’s and Wind’s, Briseno’s and Solano’s as well as Koon’s police car logs on March 19th. In several articles, the paper provided its readers with excerpts from the first in particular, using them to prove that the King beating had been racially motivated. This, however, was not based on statements by the officers regarding the King incident but an earlier incident. As the Times put it:

Another message, sent from Powell’s and Wind’s car just before the King incident, described a domestic dispute involving African- Americans that the officers had handled as being ‘right out of Gorillas in the Mist’. A squad car that received the message responded: ‘HaHaHaHa. Let me guess who be the parties.’ A Los Angeles Police official investigating the King affair said the reference to ‘Gorillas in the Mist,’ the title of a movie about ape research in Africa, and the usage of the black dialect by white officers apparently had racial connotations.248 In the weeks following the release, the Times would repeatedly use this characterization of African Americans as ‘Gorillas in the mist’ to prove that the King beating had been racially motivated as the excerpt on the King beating itself did not contain any racist remarks.

Additionally, the paper provided its readers with a detailed transcript of the log on the King incident, displaying not only how alarmingly relaxed the police officers had dealt with King’s ill-treatment but that they even had made fun of it. Here, it were again messages by Laurence M. Powell sent to another officer and friend that were in the center of the paper’s interest:

In a later exchange, the foot patrol officers in Sunland-Tijunga were told in a message from Powell’s and Wind’s car about the

248 Stolberg, Sheryl and Wood, Tracy: “Patrol Car Log in Beating Released: Police: The officers’ massages include racial slurs about an earlier case. ‘A big time use of force’ against Rodney King is referred to in the transcript.” In: Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1991, A1/20, 1. 56

beating. ‘Oops,’ was the initial message from the car of Powell and Wind. ‘Oops what?’ was the response. ‘I haven’t beaten anyone this bad in a long time’. The foot beat officer responded: ‘Oh not again. Why for do that… [sic!] I thought you agreed to chill out for a while…What did he do…’. ‘I think he was dusted… many broken bones later… after the pursuit,’ was the message that came back.249 Reportedly, with the release of the police car log, more and more voices were demanding Gates’ immediate resignation. As his critics pointed out, in order to help the L.A.P.D out of the crisis and make it recover, it would be essential to remove its leader form office, a demand that Gates reportedly continued to reject vehemently. From mid-March onwards, this debate on whether Gates should resign started upstaging reports about the actual beating. From then on, the beating was almost solely mentioned in passing, serving as a justification of the current debate and as the most prominent example of racially motivated police brutality.

Concomitant with this shift in perspective, the Times published all King-related articles under the overall headline “Crisis in the LAPD: The Rodney King Beating” (from March 19th until April 9th). Here, the terminology used by the Times is remarkable: According to the Oxford Dictionaries, a ‘crisis’ is either “[a] time when a difficult or important decision must be made,” or “[t]he turning point of a disease when an important change takes place, indicating either recovery or death”.250 With regard to the Times’ reporting, especially the second definition is of interest because it corresponds to the overall discourse in the King aftermath: Repeatedly, the paper quoted officials using what Dana Cloud coined rhetoric of therapy, describing a tendency of politicians and economists in the 1980s and particularly ‘90s to use medical terms to refer to socio-economic grievances.251 “‘I want to heal the wounds that have opened up,’ [Councilman] Woo said”252 or “‘Our city must also begin to heal its wounds’ [, declared Tom Bradley]. ‘My duty as mayor is to all. I simply will not stand by as our city is split apart. […] We must heal’”253 are examples of this widely used rhetoric of officials commenting on the King beating or rather on the question of whether or not Gates should resign following the incident. Although the

249 Stolberg, Sheryl and Wood, Tracy: “Patrol Car Log in Beating Released”, A20. 250 “crisis”. In: Oxford English Dictionaries. URL: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ crisis[28.11.2015]. 251 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 331. 252 Mitchell, John L. “Woo Takes Call for Gates to Quit to Black Churches, Ministers”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 02, 1991, B1/8, 1. 253 “Text of Mayor’s Statement”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 03, 1991, A10. 57

Times quoted officials using medical terms to refer to the current events, rather than using them itself,254 the paper – by describing the King beating as engulfing the L.A.P.D in a crisis – nonetheless adapted itself to the political discourse since both therapeutic terms as well as the term ‘crisis’ imply a hazardous but solvable situation.

The more racism was identified as a daily routine in the L.A.P.D., the more the Times sided against Gates, too. Although the paper mentioned that beside the increasing public criticism leveled against Gates, there were others who continued supporting him, saying that the chief could not be called to account for his officers’ deeds, the Times repeatedly reported that the vast majority of Angelenos called for Gates to resign. Simultaneously – and contradictorily – it informed its readers that the city was quarreling about the question of Gates future, giving account of, for instance, an “increasing[ly] intense tug-of-war over whether Police Chief Daryl F. Gates should resign.”255 This statement already implies that there had not been a clear trend, but rather two similarly large oppositional parties. Although the Times mentioned both and gave Gates’ supporters as well as his proponents a chance to speak, it nonetheless depicts the majority of Angelenos as declaring themselves against the chief. This discrepancy between what the newspaper reported and ‘reality,’ becomes particularly obvious in a poll taken by the Times itself. Reporting that “31% of Angelenos say Gates should quit now. Almost one out of three Los Angeles residents believe that Police Chief Daryl Gates should resign immediately over the police beating of a black Altadena man and a majority say he bears substantial blame for the incident […],”256 the Times created the impression that disproportionally many Angelenos were opposing the chief. This, however, was not the case because if 31% of all interviewees sided against Gates, this simultaneously means that 69% did not. Initially, the Times did not mention whether these 69% had refused to answer the question forming the base of this poll or whether they had even answered it in favor of Gates. Only in the course of the article the paper explained that 32% of those sampled did not want the chief to resign. This – as already implied

254 As will be pointed out in the course of this thesis, this changed in the course of the 1991 unrest, when the Times itself would use medical terms to refer to the ongoing events, see 7.3.1 Cleaning up Los Angeles. 255 Bunting, Glenn F.: “Focus on Gates Seen as Blurring Police Issues: Law enforcement: Public attention is being diverted from the need to overhaul department, officials say”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 23, 1991, A1/25, 1. 256 Stolberg, Sheryl: “31% of Angelenos Say Gates Should Quit Now”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1991, A1/41, 1.

58 above – does not only show that there were two comparably large parties (as well as a third group of the same size which had either refused to answer or had doubts whether Gates should resign or not), it furthermore suggests the assumption that the Times actively tried to draw a picture of opposition, maybe in order to contribute to Gates vacating his position as soon as possible.

4.1.2 Police Chief Daryl Gates vs. Mayor Tom Bradley

The question of how to induce Gates to resign had reportedly been occupying his opponents since the King incident had been made public. While many Angelenos built their hope on various civil rights groups, organizing protests or signature campaigns to make Gates step down, others relied on Mayor Tom Bradley. Not only was he known for having a strained relationship with Gates, he also – as an African American ex-police officer – seemed to be the perfect ‘insider’ to put a stop to the chief’s activities and to convince him to step down.

At the beginning of the 1990s, however, protected by the civil service system, L.A.’s police chief had an open-end tenure, was virtually accountable to no one, and could thus hardly be removed from office. It was well-known that already before the King incident, Bradley had been working on changing the civil system not allowing the mayor to take charge of the L.A.P.D. in case of crisis. Not having been successful in doing so, however, the mayor could not do anything but voice his opinion on Gates remaining in office. Different from what many Angelenos had expected, Bradley initially suspended judgment, stating only that the problems of the L.A.P.D. were closely connected with Daryl Gates and that it was important to identify and resolve those. As the Times put it:

While Gates called it [the beating] an aberration, Bradley said it points to a breakdown in leadership that begins with the chief himself. ‘The supervision does, in fact, flow from the top of the department down – through his orders and instructions, through his training,’ the mayor said. ‘All of that is connected. […]’257 According to Bradley, the task of finding out what the specific problems were, however, was not his but should be delegated to the internal investigations announced by Gates as well as the Police Commission (see also 4.1.3 ‘Bradley’s Inquiry Boards’ – The Police Commission And Christopher Commission as the

257 Fiore, Faye and Wood, Tracy: “Beating Victim Says He Obeyed Police”, A22. 59

Mayor’s Measures Fighting Daryl Gates). As Bradley reportedly put it, “every appropriate action will be taken by the Police Department and the Police Commission.”258 Repeatedly, he was presented saying that the question of whether Gates should resign because of the current events could only be answered by the chief himself. He, however, would not comment on that issue: “Bradley said he would not attempt to remove Gates, as some civil rights groups have demanded. But the mayor stopped short of declaring support for the chief, saying that it is not up to him to decide whether Gates should resign or retire.”259

Already here, it becomes clear what would increase even further during the Times’ news coverage on the King aftermath, which was a (partly) artificially created opposition between Daryl Gates and Tom Bradley. Reasons for the Los Angele Times presenting the police chief and the mayor as opponents, however, can only be guessed: Beside their enduring animosity, their respective positions within L.A.’s society might have contributed to the paper contrasting them: While Bradley as the head of the city represented the interests of all citizens, Gates’ task as head of the L.A.P.D. was to serve and protect these citizens. Since the police had – as the King incident had shown – failed fulfilling this task, Tom Bradley was perceived and depicted as responsible for solving the problems inherent to the L.A.P.D.

Furthermore, in this racially charged situation, the importance of their respective race is not to be underestimated, allowing it to reduce the multi-layered conflict of two racial groups to two representatives of these groups.260 Additionally, Gates’ as well as Bradley’s behavior might have contributed to the Times’ opposing the two: Initially, Bradley refused to ask Gates to resign because – according to the paper – instead of publicly “lynch[ing]” him (a racially charged term, suggesting that race might have played an essential role in the paper contrasting Gates and Bradley), he wanted the legal system to do justice. He was thus presented as remaining within his means, meeting the requirements of a thoughtful mayor. Gates, instead of acknowledging possible mistakes on his part and bearing the consequences, was depicted as letting roll heads other than his own, suspending the four officers

258 Fiore, Faye and Wood, Tracy: “Beating Victim Says He Obeyed Police”, A20. 259 Stolberg, Sheryl and Tobar, Hector: “Gates Wants Officers Prosecuted In Beating”, A28. 260 Another reason for the paper presenting Gates and Bradley as opponents could also be found in their political affiliation. While Bradley was a member of the Democratic Party, Gates was a conservative republican. However, since their party affiliation was not made a subject of discussion by the Times in the aftermath of the King beating, it will be neglected in this thesis, too. 60 involved in the beating as well as almost all by-standers. Although this was portrayed as a proper response to the officers’ deeds, it, from the Times’ point of view, did not go far enough. For them, the chief’s adequate reaction would have been his imminent resignation. However, since he shifted responsibility upon his officers only, he was perceived as not fulfilling the expectations directed at a police chief by many Angelenos as well as the Times.

Whatever the exact reasons for the paper’s motivation to position Bradley and Gates as opponents, it could repeatedly be found in the Times’ news coverage and was thus most likely to have influenced the readers’ perception of both, the mayor as well as the police chief. In the reporting, this opposition was mainly held up by contrasting their respective statements. Despite expressions of opinion by many other public figures – also represented in the reporting – it was particularly statements by Gates and Bradley that were contrasted, with the latter being ascribed a far more positive role than the former. Thus, it can be said that in the news coverage of the L.A. Times, Bradley was portrayed as a ‘hero’ while Gates was depicted as the ‘villain’.261

The image of Bradley as the hero was moreover furthered by the Times increasingly portraying him as working behind the scenes.262 From March 15th, the paper time and again reported that the mayor – because his hands were tied by the civil system – was operating against Gates in silence, trying to find ways to remove him without coming into the picture himself. As the Times put it:

While Mayor Tom Bradley has refrained from calling for the ouster of Police Chief Daryl F. Gates, his chief of staff has been busy orchestrating moves to ‘turn up the heat’ on Gates and force him to resign over last week’s police beating […]. The behind-the-scenes campaign, directed by Deputy Mayor Mark Fabiani, is designed to exert so much political and public pressure on Gates that he eventually will give up his $168,000-a-year post for the good of the Police Department and the community, said City Hall sources familiar with the effort.263 Reporting that the mayor’s staff was ‘busy orchestrating’ moves to make Gates resign, the Times’ did not only present Bradley’s working ‘behind-the-scenes

261 In his work Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society, Ronald N. Jacobs identifies Bradley and Gates as hero and villain respectively, but does not elaborate on this any further. Cf. Jacobs, Ronald N.: Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society, 98. 262 Ronald N. Jacobs mentions this too, but, again, he does not analyze it in greater detail. Cf. ibid. 263 Bunting, Glenn F.: “Mayor’s Office Seen Directing Ouster Effort”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 15, 1991, A1/30, 1. 61 campaign’ as given but also as well-organized (also implied by the term ‘campaign’) and thus particularly promising. This was supported by terms like ‘eventually,’ suggesting that Gates would very soon wilt under Bradley’s pressure. However, as the quote presented above shows, the Times did not depict the mayor’s acting behind-the-scenes as a personal vendetta but as an act for the city’s greater good. The assumption that Bradley was using Fabiani to put pressure on Gates was – according to the newspaper – suggesting itself because he had already used this strategy before: “The same approach was employed […] recently in soliciting the resignation of three city department heads […].”264 Although Bradley reportedly rejected this notion, the paper nonetheless used it to further the mayor’s positive, heroic image: Operating behind the scenes, Bradley was working for the city’s benefit without wanting any reward – the action of a ‘true hero’.

4.1.3 ‘Bradley’s Inquiry Boards’ – The Police Commission and Christopher Commission as the Mayor’s Measures in Fighting Daryl Gates

After the King beating had become known to the public, different already existing and newly formed commissions and panels were engaged to investigate the circumstances that had led to the incident as well as to find out whether the L.A.P.D. showed racist tendencies and if so, how these could be eliminated. One of the first inquiry boards that started investigating on March 7th was the Police Commission, a civilian oversight panel whose members had been appointed by Mayor Tom Bradley. It was followed by the Los Angeles County grand jury, a citizen panel that began hearing testimonies on March 11th as well as by the F.B.I. that started questioning police officers on March 25th. Three days later, Daryl Gates ordered an internal police investigation chaired by retired state Supreme Court Justice John A. Arguelles. This so-called Arguelles Panel was closely followed by the Christopher Commission which – named after its chair, former Deputy Secretary of State, Warren M. Christopher – was launched by Tom Bradley on April 1st.

Focusing on the presentation of Gates and Bradley as opponents or rather Bradley’s ‘heroic role’ in this dispute, the Times paid particular attention to the actions and findings of the two boards of inquiry whose members were appointed by the mayor. Before the formation of the Christopher Commission, it was the Police Commission

264 Bunting, Glenn F.: “Mayor’s Office Seen Directing Ouster Effort”, A30. 62 that was in the center of the paper’s interest, depicting it as providing the opportunity to expose grievances in the L.A.P.D. and Gates as its ‘unqualified’ leader. As the Times put it: “Mayor Tom Bradley has rightly [highlighted by author, K.M.] asked his appointees on the commission to determine if ‘inherent defects [highlighted by author, K.M.] in the department’s power structure’ permit such incidents [like the King beating].”265

Other than with regard to the general question of whether or not Gates should resign, when the Times had presented different opinions, it is striking that considering the Police Commission, the paper quoted its proponents only. On a content level, their statements were all very similar, depicting the Police Commission as a powerful weapon fighting Daryl Gates. The following statement by Geoffrey Taylor Gibb is representative of this way of reporting: “The Police Commission does have the power and the grounds to discipline Gates. All it really needs is the will.”266

This notion of a board of inquiry as a tool to exert leverage on Gates became even more apparent with the formation of the Christopher Commission, certainly because it – as opposed to the Police Commission – was a newly established panel, whose only task was examining the King beating. Since it had been established by Bradley at the peak of his dispute with Gates (and after he himself had appointed the Arguelles Panel), the Times repeatedly depicted it as “the latest in a series of political moves engineered by the mayor’s office to bring pressure on Police Chief Daryl F. Gates to resign […].”267 Furthermore, although never openly critical of Gates’ internal investigation, the paper presented the Christopher Commission as being a truly independent and thus the most promising board capable of finding out the ‘truth’ about (racist) L.A.P.D. politics and police brutality closely connected with it. It was praised as “[a] new commission, free of the usual strings,”268 which, as a “totally independent and comprehensive probe” 269 (like an official in the mayor’s office reportedly called it) could “assure that the final report has credibility.”270

265 “Questions for the Police Commission”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 09, 1991, B5. 266 Gibb, Geoffrey Taylor: “Who Says They Can’t Fire the Chief?” In: Los Angeles Times, March 15, 1991, B7. 267 Bunting, Glenn F.: “Ex-U.S. Official to Head Mayor’s Probe of LAPD”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 01, 1991, A1/16, A1. 268 “Prescription for LAPD: An Independent Panel.” In: Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1991, B4. 269 Ibid. 270 Bunting, Glenn F.: “Ex-U.S. Official to Head Mayor’s Probe of LAPD”, A16. 63

This positive image was furthered by the Times presenting even Daryl Gates as “embracing” the Christopher Commission, saying “We welcome an examination by any group that acts in good faith with fairness and objectivity. […] I believe the Christopher Commission is made up of people of high quality…I am sure the work of this group will complement the Arguelles panel and vice versa.”271 Although it could be argued that presenting statements like this served to portray Gates positively, this was not the case. The purpose of quoting Gates speaking affirmatively about the Christopher Commission rather served to valorize the latter even more: If even Gates publicly demonstrates respect for his opponent’s inquiry board, it must be outstanding.

Despite characterizing the Christopher Commission as a cure to the ills of the L.A.P.D. even before it had started its investigations, the Times did not depict it as an easily manageable task. As the paper put it:

The Christopher Commission, the impressive independent citizens panel selected to examine the structure and operation of the Los Angeles Police Department, has a tough mission. It must investigate a virtually closed department and come up with recommendations that discourage police brutality as well as restore confidence in the LAPD and it must do this against the backdrop of another commission put together by LAPD Chief Daryl Gates […].272 Contrasting the Christopher Commission and the L.A.P.D. by characterizing the former positively as ‘impressively independent’ and the latter negatively as ‘virtually closed,’ the paper took the image of ‘good’ versus ‘evil,’ of ‘hero’ versus ‘villain’ up again. Calling the commission’s task a ‘tough mission’ supported this image even more as the term itself suggests a military-like task273 against the city’s police force sealing itself off from any reforms. Militarizing the panel’s assignment verbally did not only stress the severity of the situation but also the difficulty of the task. Thus, it can be said that stressing the obstacles the Christopher Commission was facing also contributed to its positive image created by the Times. Not only was it an

271 Berger, Leslie and Bunting, Glenn F.: “Police Inquiry Panes May Join Forces”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 2, 1991, A1/20, 20. 272 “A Police Panel With Promise: Mayor Tom Bradley puts together the new Christopher Commission”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 02, 1991, B6. 273 Cf. “mission”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/mission [28.11.2015]. 64 independent but also an indomitable panel, which would spare no effort to put the L.A.P.D. back on track.

The paper’s depiction of the inquiry board did not even change after the Christopher Commission and the Arguelles Panel had announced on April 4th that they – chaired by – would join forces. Other than it might be assumed, the Times did not report about the fact that the new panel now included investigators that had initially indirectly been accused of not being independent by the newspaper itself. Instead, it was continuously characterized as ‘Bradley’s independent commission’.

4.1.4 The Power Play Widens: Bradley and the Police Commission vs. Daryl Gates and the City Council

After the two boards of inquiry had joined forces, the L.A. Times largely abandoned the Christopher Commission, turning its attention back to the Police Commission. This changed focus was provoked by the latter’s decision to place Daryl Gates on a 60-day paid leave on April 4th, a decision that seems to have been greatly welcomed by the newspaper: Commenting on Gates’ intention to challenge the Police Commission’s order in court, it said he was “claiming [highlighted by author, K.M.] that he ha[d] been disciplined without first having been accused of wrongdoing,”274 implying that the board’s decision had been right since Gates had been publicly ‘accused of wrongdoing’ for weeks. This interpretation sees itself confirmed by the paper also saying that “the commission was responding to the public outcries following the beating of King […].”275

As can be seen in the following passage, the Times – based on Gates’ responses to the King beating – moreover openly questioned his decision to challenge the Police Commission in court, although he had the legal ground to do so:

The commission’s action, whose legality will be tested in courts, is understandable. Gates has not been forced to leave. He is being asked to step aside for a decent interval while the commission’s probe proceeds. Gates is within his rights to challenge the police

274 Clifford, Frank and Rohrlich, Ted: “Gates to Challenge Commission Decision in Court: Leave: He says he has not been accused of wrongdoing. Panel's ruling is similar to the treatment the chief dealt officers charged in King beating”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 05, 1991, A22. 275 Serrano, Richard A.: “Gates Put on Leave, Pledges to Appeal Commission Action: King beating: Police chief says he has been disgraced. His lawyers will ask court on Monday to overturn decision”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 05, A1/23, 23. 65

commission in court, but under the circumstances, is that the wisest course? Given the polarizing crisis and the increasingly ugly tone of the debate, would it not have been better for Gates to accept the decision? Even if the chief prevails in the courts, he must understand this issue is now larger than any one man. No doubt Gates feels he did nothing wrong. But did his management style or controversial remarks foster a climate that permitted the beating? Lead to the failure of the sergeant at the scene? Set a tone that allowed other officers to watch the beating without intervening, and then fail to report to their superiors? Encourage a belief that officers could transmit personal messages – including racially offensive remarks and jocular sentiments about use of force – over police computer without penalty?276 Other than before, when the Times had depicted the majority of Angelenos as wanting Gates to resign (despite its own poll belying this assertion), it now characterized the question of whether or not the chief should leave office as ‘polarizing,’ which suggests that there were two opposing leagues arguing over Gates future in the L.A.P.D. However, the paper continued reporting critically about Gates as can be seen in the very same quote: With the help of six rhetorical questions, the Times tried to persuade its readers that Gates and his management style – although not legally attackable – were morally questionable. Here, especially the paper’s usage of the terms ‘failure’ (and ‘fail,’ respectively) is striking: Asking critically whether Gates had led to the officers’ ‘failure,’ an omission of performance,277 and not denying it, the Times ascribed the responsibility for the King beating directly to the chief. As implied by the paper, it was his behavior and his management style that had made incidents like the March the 3rd beating possible in the first place.

As could be assumed because of the Times presenting the Police Commission as Bradley’s tool making for Gates resign, the paper ascribed the board of inquiry’s decision to the mayor, particularly by offering quotes saying exactly this: Daryl Gates’ statement, according to which “I must admit, I cannot believe him [Bradley saying that he had not been secretly working against Gates] any longer. I think this has all been well-orchestrated”278 or Danny Bakewell’s comment that “the action he [Bradley] took showed that he is the mayor of all the people […]. He gave Daryl Gates enough rope to either distinguish himself or hang himself, and I think Daryl

276 “What Next in the Police Furor?”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 5, B6. 277 Cf. “failure”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/failure [28.11.2015]. 278 Serrano, Richard A: “Gates Put on Leave, Pledges to Appeal Commission Action”, A23. 66

Gates chose the latter”279 are examples of how the Times used to portray the Police Commission’s decision as originating from Bradley’s office.

This notion could also be found in the Times’ reporting when – before Gates appeared in court – City Council intervened and reversed the Police Commission’s decision only one day after it had been made, entailing a huge controversy regarding the responsibility and power of the respective institutions. In the news coverage, the City Council’s decision was labeled “a major setback for the mayor,”280 or “a stinging political defeat,”281 also portraying (albeit indirectly) the Police Commission as Bradley’s tool rather than an independent oversight panel. Bradley, himself, however, reportedly regarded the City Council’s intervention as having “threatened the independence of the Police Commission,”282 a statement the Times did not comment on since the paper itself had been depicting the board as siding with Bradley from the very beginning of its reportage on the King beating.

In the following days, the newspaper focused particularly on Bradley and his “aids regroup[ing] to asses Gates’ future.”283 Different from before, however, the paper reported increasingly critically about Bradley’s politics: It did not only repeatedly inform its readers about “many city leaders say[ing] the drive to remove went ‘out of control’ with Bradley’s call for Gates to resign […],”284 it also asked bluntly “is Bradley right?,”285 without answering this question affirmatively. This was accompanied by the paper’s allegation that the mayor’s and the police chief’s dispute was increasingly dividing Los Angeles.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the Times conveyed a feeling of release when, on April 9th, Tom Bradley and Daryl Gates rather surprisingly announced that for the sake of the city they were compounding their conflict. As the newspaper put it:

279 Serrano, Richard A: “Gates Put on Leave, Pledges to Appeal Commission Action”, A23. 280 Feldman, Paul and Fritsch, Jane: “City Council Acts to Reinstate Gates Despite Plea by Bradley”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 06, A1/27, 1. 281 Bunting, Glenn F. and Connell, Rich and Fritsch, Jane: “Bradley Aides Regroup to Assess Gates' Future: Police: Options to block chief's return are studied. Mayor seeks to distance himself from the dispute”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 07, A1/30/33, 1. 282 Feldman, Paul and Fritsch, Jane: “City Council Acts to Reinstate Gates Despite Plea by Bradley”, A27. 283 Bunting, Glenn F. and Connell, Rich and Fritsch, Jane: “Bradley Aides Regroup to Assess Gates' Future”, A1. 284 Ibid., A30. 285 Ibid. 67

Seeking to reunite a city deeply divided […], the city’ top three public officials agreed […] to put an end to their feuding […]. […] Mayor Bradley, Police Chief Daryl F. Gates and City Council President – standing shoulder to shoulder at a late afternoon City Hall press conference – made it clear that they still have major differences over who should control the LAPD and whether Gates should step aside. ‘It’s true, we do not agree on everything,’ Gates said, ‘but we do agree that we need to get this city in shape. We need to get it back in order’.286 Characterizing the mayor’s, the police chief’s and the city council president’s agreement as the end of their ‘feuding’ is quite remarkable. Describing a bitter dispute, characterized by murderous assaults,287 the term suggests that the three parties had been trying to eliminate each other politically. As a feuding is usually long-lasting and not easily compounded, the term furthermore implies that – although Bradley, Gates and Farraro were seeking to convey a certain degree of unity – it was rather unlikely for the quarrel not to flare up again. This was supported by Gates’ statement presented above, according to which the three parties did not agree on every aspect of the agreement.

However, with this agreement, the news coverage by the L.A. Times changed significantly: Apart from short notes saying that the truce and especially Bradley’s trade trip to Asia on April 12th helped “quiet[ing] Gates furor,”288 the paper almost instantly neglected the conflict of the two. Turning back to the Rodney King incident, it seems as if in the following two weeks, the Times tried to perpetuate the discourse on the beating yet without developing a clear canon of topics. Instead, without arriving at any new results, it published articles describing, for instance, the beating from different perspectives or dealing with what the Christopher Commission was currently doing. Especially the latter or rather the upcoming publication of its report may explain the Times’ keeping up of the topic: Expecting a survey of great public interest, the paper tried to bridge the time between the end of Bradley’s, Gates’ and Farraro’s dispute and the sensation the Christopher Commission report was holding out in prospect.

286 Serrano, Richard A. and Stolberg, Sheryl: “Gates, Bradley Declare a Truce: Police: Mayor and chief join City Council President in agreeing to stop public feuding. Ten rookie officers say they have immunity in beating case”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 10, 1991, A1/18, 1. 287 Cf. “feuding”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/feuding [28.11.2015]. 288 Bunting, Glenn F.: “With Mayor Abroad, Gates Furor Quiets: King beating: Some black leader question timing of Bradley’s trip to the Far East: Police Chief defends events aimed at raising his popularity”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 28, 1991, B1/3, 1. 68

However, it did not take the report’s publication for the Times to develop a clear focus again, when at the end of April, the already existing conflict of the Police Commission and the City Council on the question of which institution was in charge of the L.A.P.D. flared up again. In the following weeks, albeit with lesser intensity than with regard to Bradley and Gates, the paper focused particularly on the newly emerging binary opposition of the Police Commission and City Council, resulting from the King beating rather than on the beating itself. Like before, the King incident (in most cases) only served as an explanation for the current conflict: “Los Angeles Police Commissioners, refusing to back down in an extraordinary power struggle, rejected […] a City Council offer to end a […] dispute over the status of Police Chief Daryl Gates in the wake of the Rodney King affair.”289 Here, the term ‘affair’ is of particular importance because – characterizing a matter of public interest and importance290 – it offers an explanation why the Times had kept up its discourse on the King beating (aftermath), even without any then-current developments: It regarded the topic as being of great societal importance, which was not supposed to sink into obscurity. Furthermore, as the newspaper idealized the Christopher Commission and its task of investigating the L.A.P.D., it is most likely that the Times regarded keeping up the topic and laying the ground for the publication of the Christopher Commission report as – to use the terminology of the paper itself – its own ‘mission’.

Until then, however, the Times’ interest in the opposition of the Police Commission and City Council increased when both parties failed to resolve their dispute, saying that

Los Angeles officials Tuesday failed to settle their legal dispute arising from a Police Commission attempt to replace temporarily Chief Daryl F. Gates […]. Under the settlement, proposed […] by Police Commission President Dan Garcia, the commission would have abandoned its attempt to place Gates on a 60-day paid leave. In return, the council was to appropriate $150,000 to the Police Commission to pay for its investigation of the chief. The talks

289 Ford, Andrea and Fritsch, Jane: “Police Commissioners Reject Council’s Offer: Beating: Proposal would have ended dispute over Gates. It provided nothing new, a panel member says”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1991, A1/22, 1. 290 Cf. “affair”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/affair [28.11.2015]. 69

broke down as some City Council members held fast to a demand that the commission drop its investigation.291 Here it is significant how the Times referred to the respective parties: While the paper called the first by his name and title (Police Commission President Dan Garcia), it referred to the latter just as ‘some City Council Members,’ making the former seem more important and graspable, while the latter appeared like a rather unimportant and indistinguishable group. This certainly influenced the readers’ perception of the two, with Dan Garcia (and thus also the Police Commission) coming off more positively.

The assumption that with regard to the conflict of the City Council and the Police Commission, the Times tried to influence its readers actively, is supported by the fact that in its news coverage about the continuing dispute, the paper predominantly reported from the Police Commission’s perspective, presenting commissioners commenting on their respective motivation for not agreeing with the council’s propositions. Furthermore, as could be expected since the L.A. Times had been presenting the Police Commission as ‘the mayor’s board of inquiry,’ it provided its readers with statements from the mayor’s office, e.g. deputy mayor Fabiani, fully supporting the board of inquiry in its decision.292

This way of reporting continued when, in the following days, the tag-of-war between Police Commission and the City Council proceeded. This can be read as the Times promoting the commission’s political bearing, having its reason not only in the paper’s general support of Tom Bradley, but also in its attitude towards the council’s decision to reinstate Gates. Stating that City Council “does not have the authority to overrule Police Commission decisions,”293 the Times openly criticized the council’s procedure.

When on May 13th, Superior Court Judge Ronald Sohigian decided that the council’s reinstatement of Gates had been legal, the L.A. Times characterized this as a “decisive victory for City Council […] and Gates” and a “crushing defeat for the

291 Berger, Leslie and Fritsch, Jane: “Proposed Settlement Over Gates’ Status Unravels: Politics: Police Commission and City Council fail to resolve legal dispute. Matter is now up to a judge“. In: Los Angeles Times, April 24, 1991, A1/22, 1. 292 Cf. ibid., A22. 293 Fritsch, Jane and Ford, Andrea: “Police Commissioners Reject Council’s Offer: Beating: Proposal would have ended dispute over Gates. It provided nothing new, a panel member says”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1991, A1/22, 1. 70

Police Commission appointed by Mayor Tom Bradley.”294 As it had done before, the newspaper personalized the actually political conflict, presenting first of all – after a short explanation of the judge’s decision – Bradley and Gates commenting on the verdict. Not only did it do so in that direct order (first the mayor, then the chief), it also offered Bradley more space in its reporting:

Bradley said that he was ‘shocked and dismayed’ by the ruling and that it undermines the city’s traditional commission form of government. ‘I think the decision cannot be permitted to stand,’ Bradley told a City Hall press conference. ‘It has to be challenged’. The mayor added that ‘no action, no decision of these commissions is ever going to be authoritative of if the City Council, in each and every case, can simply arbitrarily say, We reject your action and we will step in and settle the matter. That’s why the integrity of the civilian commission system of government in this city is on the line’.295 As this quote shows, Bradley was presented as evaluating the verdict as a loss for democracy since it ‘undermines the city’s traditional commission form of government’ as well as cautioning against the making decisions ‘arbitrarily,’ which means “without concern for what is fair or right.”296 He was thus depicted as questioning the ruling since it was threatening the civil commission’s integrity, i.e. its honest and moral principles.297

This passage was directly followed by a distinctly shorter presentation of Gates’ reaction, reporting that

[m]eanwhile, at Park Center, Gates told reporters that he ‘didn’t pop any champagne’ after learning of Sohigian’s ruling. He also said that he had no animosity toward the commissioners and stressed that it was important that everyone involved in the controversy ‘get back on track’.298 In addition to the length of the two passages, it is striking that while Bradley was quoted, Gates’ reaction to the ruling was only presented in indirect speech. This is important because the “effect of indirect speech can easily be perceived as somewhat

294 McGraw, Carol: “Judge Upholds City Council’s Reinstatement of Chief Gates: Government: The ruling is a crushing defeat for the Police Commission. It could have ramifications for other agencies overseen by appointed panels”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1991, A1/21, 1. 295 Ibid., A21. 296 “arbitrary”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/arbitrary [28.11.2015]. 297 Cf. “integrity”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary /integrity [28.11.2015]. 298 McGraw, Carol: “Judge Upholds City Council’s Reinstatement of Chief Gates”, A21. 71 monotonous and certainly it creates a distance between the utterance and the reader’s perception of it.”299 Thus, by citing Bradley but not Gates, the paper clearly depicted the former as more active, which certainly contributed to the positive image the Times had been creating of him for weeks.

Bradley’s evaluation of the ruling as infecting democracy was taken up in the Times’ discourse on the King beating aftermath: It repeatedly quoted politicians (including Councilman , who initially was the only council member openly criticizing the chief) saying that they “[felt] the rights of the Police Commission have been abrogated”300 by the verdict which “[threw] civilian oversight ‘out of the window’.”301 This, together with the paper’s previous notion that City Council did not have the authority to overthrow the Police Commission’s decision, shows the Times’ position in the dispute.

Other than it might be assumed considering this saber-rattling by Bradley as well as the Police Commission (reportedly saying they would not accept the ruling), the L.A. Times’ news coverage on the opposition of Gates/City Council and Bradley/Police Commission vanished almost instantly, and without any recognizable reason, after the rendition of the verdict. What followed was a rather diffuse news coverage on the King incident, in which – from the end of May and all through June – the paper reported on various beating-related subjects like the influence the King beating might have on the 1993 mayoral race302 or Gates suggesting a training program for citizens teaching them how to behave towards officers.303 Simultaneously, the number of articles addressing the topic decreased significantly: Other than before, when the Times had approached the King aftermath on a daily basis and in numerous articles per day, it – if at all – reported about this topic in one article per day in May and June.

299 “Narrative Modes”. University of Freiburg. URL: http://www2.anglistik.uni-freiburg.de/intranet/ englishbasics/NarrativeModes01.htm [28.11.2015]. 300 McGraw, Carol: “Judge Upholds City Council’s Reinstatement of Chief Gates”, A21. 301 Ibid. 302 Cf. Fritsch, Jane: “King Case Sparks Start of Mayoral Race”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1991, B1/3. 303 Cf. Sahagun, Louis: “Gates Urges Education on Arrest: Police: The chief endorses the idea of a video program on how to be taken into custody. He tells a council panel it would make encounters with the police less frightening”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1991, B1/4. 72

4.2 The King Incident, Race and Race Relations

Although after the beating had become known to the public, Rodney King and his family had instantly announced that the incident had not been racially motivated, many others – particularly ethnic/racial minorities – perceived it as exactly this. As the previous chapters have shown, this had been elaborated on by the Times in detail: It was reported that particularly African Americans (civil rights activists as well as ‘ordinary’ citizens) regarded the King beating as just one of a vast number of race- related confrontations of blacks and the L.A.P.D. and that for them, the only ‘aberration’ was George Holliday’s video tape showing the incident. This discourse dominating the Times’ reporting from March 7th until March 19th, however, had changed in favor of the binary opposition of Tom Bradley and Daryl Gates, determining the paper’s news coverage until Bradley’s trip to Asia on April 12th.

This conflict of the police chief and the mayor upstaged the discourse about race and race relations as well as the attempt of Angelenos (particularly ethnic minorities) to make Gates resign, independently from Bradley’s attempts. Although the Times mentioned these activities, it did so almost solely in passing and hardly ever in articles of their own. This – as already suggested – might have its reason in the newspaper trying to simplify the conflict of two racial groups, or rather one racial group and an institution dominated by another. Since most African Americans (as well as other ethnic/racial minorities) were demanding Gates’ immediate resignation, they could seemingly easy be integrated in the discourse as Bradley’s supporters. In favor of this focus on Bradley and Gates, however, race and race-relations were largely neglected in the Times’ news coverage on the King beating (with the paper also neglecting the mayor’s and the chief’s racial backgrounds). From time to time, however, these topics flared up and will thus be examined in the following.

With regard to race relations, it is striking that in the Times’ reporting the discourse on racism following the King beating was confined to the relationship between the L.A.P.D. and ethnic/racial minorities but was not transferred to L.A’s society in general. What was stressed repeatedly, however, was that because of Holliday’s video whites had almost instantly been confronted with the problems particularly African Americans and Latinos had have with the police and that now they were no longer able to ignore those. This implies that although African Americans (representing all ethnic minorities) and Caucasians had been sharing Los Angeles as 73 a living space, their lived-in worlds had significantly differed from each other. This, however, would not be commented on in the newspaper’s reporting until the L.A. unrest, when the paper would, at least to some extent, discuss both inter-racial racism as well as the spatial separation of the city’s different ethnic racial groups.

In the King aftermath, however, the Times identified – albeit only in sidelines – a contrary development, which was a moving closer together of the city’s different ethnic/racial groups. Although it can be assumed that it was especially (white) democrats expressing sympathy for the concerns of black Angelenos, the paper did not identify the political affiliation of those closing ranks. Instead, it focused on reporting that – unified in their horror about the King beating – members of diverse races demonstrated together against police brutality and for the dismissal of Daryl Gates. According to , President of the Los Angeles Urban League, an L.A.-based Civil Rights group, the King incident “has brought people together in a way that nothing else has in several years.”304 These multi-ethnic protests, in most cases organized by Civil Rights organizations, did not only accompany official meetings involving the mayor, the Police Commission etc. discussing Gates’ future; instead, they became a weekly event taking place every Saturday in front of the Parker Center police head quarters in since March 9th. Reportedly, with 150-200 participants on average, they were one of the lengthiest demonstrations in the history of Los Angeles, in which “protest rarely lasted more than a single week.”305 Although the number of protesters was relatively small, the Times reported that civil rights groups had be “deluged with phone calls from outraged Angelenos”306 and that “[s]cores of people have turned out at community forums,”307 creating the impression of masses publicly expressing their anger over police brutality and Daryl Gates.

Although the Times itself identified citizens of different races/ethnicities closing ranks, it nonetheless stated that there had been a clear ‘racial line’ regarding the question of whether Gates should resign or not. After having taken a poll, the paper explained that “the numbers are sharply divided along racial lines, with blacks and

304 Ford, Andrea: “King Beating Reunites Civil Rights Groups”. In: Los Angeles Times, , 1991, B1/6, 1. 305 Ibid., 1f. 306 Ibid., 1. 307 Ibid., 6. 74

Latinos more often siding with Bradley and Anglos more often supporting Gates.”308 Answering the question if they rather “believe Bradley, who says Gates must leave in order to restore confidence in the Police Department, or if they believed Gates, who says he must stay to provide leadership to his officers,”309 32% of Anglos, 65% blacks, and 61% Latinos spoke out in favor of Bradley. Reportedly, they were opposed by 57% Anglos, 11% blacks and 31% Latinos who agreed with Gates. This survey indeed portrayed blacks, Latinos and whites perceiving Bradley and Gates differently, but it excluded rapprochements like the one mentioned above completely, thereby reinforcing the impression of “stark racial differences”310 dividing the city. It is particularly striking that while people of different ethnic/racial backgrounds demonstrating together were almost solely mentioned in passing in the Times’ news coverage, the paper focused on ‘racial differences’ in individual articles, thereby drawing the reader’s attention to this topic in particular.

Here, it becomes obvious that the Times used the rigid categorization of people commonly used in census forms. Until the year 2000, these invited individuals to identify themselves as belonging to one of the following five races/ethnicities: Caucasian, Asian American, African American, Hispanic and Indigenous Peoples.311 However, as race theorist David Hollinger criticized in 1995, this “ethno-racial pentagon”312 did not allow any other affiliations than these. This rigid distinction did neither fully portray the United States’ ‘ethnic/racial landscape’ nor did it leave room for personal affiliations (i.e. for people of mixed heritage). Therefore, the paper – although it stressed the importance of race/ethnicity in the King beating aftermath – depicted Angelenos in a very simplified manner. It did not question the ethno-racial pentagon and showed no attempt to portray the complexity of L.A.’s inhabitants. Additionally, the Times again focused only on the race of those questioned (and not on other factors like sex or political affiliation), depicting race as the main basis of decision-making.

308 Stolberg, Sheryl: “Divided City Sees Politics in Mayor’s Move”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 06, 1991, A1/25, 25. 309 Ibid. 310 Ibid. 311 Cf. Hollinger, David A: Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism. Basic Books, New York, 1995, 23. 312 Ibid.

75

In its reporting on the King incident, the paper paid particular attention to black officers and their perception of the King incident. Reportedly, while there was a large number of African American police officers who had experienced racism in the L.A.P.D. themselves and thus did not consider it an aberration, there were others who initially could not imagine the incident to have been racially motivated but who – because of the evidence – could not arrive at another conclusion. What they reportedly had in common, however, was their dismay about the King beating as well as the increasing public pressure they were facing. According to the Times, already before the incident, many black officers had to vindicate their occupational choice to family and friends since the image of the L.A.P.D. as a gang in blue had been pervasive in the black community. Now, after the King beating, this pressure from their social environment had intensified; on duty, they – like non-black officers – were increasingly accused of bigotry as well as abandoning their community and being part of a racist organization. This idea of racially determined in- and outsiders can also be found in the Times’ reporting, describing black officers as finding themselves “caught in the middle”313 between the predominately white L.A.P.D. and their (racially determined) community. By stressing their ‘in-between’ position, the paper emphasized the opposition of African Americans and the police and contributed to maintaining it.

Again, it is striking that the L.A. Times did not include factors other than race in its reporting. Hence, the in-between position of black police officers was not traced back to their social status and/or their community: It was not examined whether or not it made any difference if they came from typically black or multiethnic, poor or wealthy neighborhoods. Furthermore, the discussion was limited to black officers in the predominantly white L.A.P.D. – other ethnicities or people with mixed cultural backgrounds were left out completely.

4.3 The Christopher Commission Report

With the release of the Christopher Commission report on July 9th, 1991, the Times’ news coverage on the King aftermath got a clear focus again, dedicating three articles on average per day on the panel’s findings as well as the consequences they

313 Jones, Charisse: “Black Cops Caught in the Middle: In the aftermath of the King beating, many must suffer taunts of fellow African-Americans. The LAPD officers struggle to sort through conflicting emotions”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 15, 1991, A1/21, 1. 76 had. In the discourse following the publication, the King incident was initially revisited, reasoning the necessity of the inquiry in the first place. Different from its very first articles, in which the paper had cautiously described the video-taped beating as ‘powerful’ but without linking it to a larger pattern of police misconduct against ethnic minorities, it now immediately characterized the incident as “dramatic and disturbing”314 and explained it with racist tendencies within the L.A.P.D. Furthermore, based on the analysis of the police car log (focusing particularly on those statements referring to an African American couple as “Gorillas in the mist”315 shortly before the King beating) as well as other recorded messages by police officers, the Times reported that it was most likely that the King incident was all but an aberration.

The results of the Christopher Commission’s inquiry seemed to confirm this assumption. In a number of articles (each of them comprising several pages), the Times presented excerpts from the commission’s “sweeping and disturbing”316 report concentrating especially on passages that revealed harassment of women, homosexuals, and ethnic minorities by members of the L.A.P.D. According to the panel, however, these assaults did not only confine themselves to encounters of Angelenos and the police, but could also be found among the officers themselves.

The L.A. Times furthermore informed its readers that according to the commission’s report,

[…] there is a significant number of officers who repetitively misuse force and persistently ignore the written policies and guidelines of the department regarding force. By their misconduct, this group of officers tarnishes the reputations of the vast majority of LAPD officers who do their increasingly difficult job of policing the city with courage, skill and judgment.317

314 “The Christopher Commission on Tuesday issued a 228-page report on the activities of the Los Angeles Police Department. Here are excerpts:” In: Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-10/news/mn-1962_1_lapd-officers-excessive-force-officers- laurence-m-powell [01.06.2015]. 315 Ibid. 316 Ford, Andrea and Wilkinson, Tracy and Wood, Tracy: “Panel Urges Gates to Retire: Report on Police Cites Racism, Excess Force: Investigation: The Christopher Commission blames a failure of leadership. It calls for the formation of a new and stronger Police Commission”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-10/news/mn-1889_1_police- commission [23.07.2015]. 317 “The Christopher Commission on Tuesday issued a 228-page report on the activities of the Los Angeles Police Department”. 77

Saying that a large number of L.A.P.D. officers ‘repetitively misuse force and persistently ignore’ the department’s guidelines, the Times stressed once more that the King beating was not an isolated case, but just one of many comparable incidents. However, the paper nonetheless conveyed the idea that the city’s department mainly consisted of virtuous officers, whose reputation was ‘tarnished’ by those who misused force. By describing the many righteous officers’ reputation as ‘tarnished’, i.e. becoming less valuable and respected,318 but not as damaged or destroyed, the Times implied that there was still hope for the city’s police force to shine in new splendor. This was furthermore done by characterizing the ‘vast majority’ of L.A.P.D. officers as policing Los Angeles ‘with courage, skill and judgment.’ These terms were not only used to define those officers who were working in accordance with the department’s guidelines but they simultaneously show what the paper considered a ‘good’ police officer.

In the following weeks, certainly based on the Christopher Commission’s findings, identifying the problems of the L.A.P.D. as having been fostered by “fundamental problems of supervision management and leadership”319 as well as a tendency of officers in higher ranks to tolerate racism and use of force, the Times concentrated particularly on Daryl Gates as the department’s chief. The paper re-established its discourse on Gates’ possible resignation, while this time it conveyed a clear message: Gates has to go and he has to go now. It is striking that when reporting on the Christopher Commission’s recommendations on how to reform the L.A.P.D., it particularly stressed that the “panel urges Gates to retire.”320 The paper used the report’s findings as well as its recommendation regarding Gates’ resignation as a legitimization for its own position within the debate on the embattled police chief: Different from before the release, when the Times had reported about Gates’ opponents as well as his supporters, the latter were almost completely neglected in the newspaper’s discourse following the assessment’s publication. If Daryl Gates’ supporters were mentioned at all, they – in many cases – were harshly criticized by the Times, even accusing them of hoping to profit from backing the chief.321

318 Cf. “tarnish”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/tarnish [29.11.2015]. 319 “The Christopher Commission on Tuesday issued a 228-page report on the activities of the Los Angeles Police Department”. 320 Ford, Andrea and Wilkinson, Tracy and Wood, Tracy: “Panel Urges Gates to Retire”. 321 Cf. Serrano, Richard A.: “Police Union Head in Line for New LAPD Job: Labor: George Aliano says there is no connection between the expected promotion and his uncharacteristically strong 78

Obviously, for the paper, it was not rationality but voracity for money and power that made people support Gates.

This notion went hand in hand with the newspaper publishing a number of articles which were openly critical of the head of the police, reporting, for instance, that

[…] he has failed as chief, causing great harm not only to his department but also to the entire police service. Gates weakens the LAPD and unfairly burdens thousands of chiefs and officers across the country by remaining on the job. The perception of excessively powerful chiefs and brutal, racist officers is an injustice that Gates perpetuates by his defiant arrogance.322 It is particularly striking that by using negative terms, the L.A. Times depicted Gates as the exact opposite of what it considered a good police officer or chief, respectively: Reportedly, Gates caused ‘great harm’ instead of protecting his officers as well as his citizens, ‘weakened,’ ‘harmed’ and ‘burdened’ chiefs and officers not only in L.A. but in the country instead of strengthening them morally and supporting them by resigning. He acted ‘unfairly,’ did ‘injustice’ and was ‘excessively powerful’ instead of serving and protecting Los Angeles. And he fostered the image of ‘brutal’ and ‘racist’ officers instead of thoughtful and especially colorblind policemen and -women doing justice for all. Therefore, it can be said that the Times ascribed all ills of the L.A.P.D. to Daryl Gates and his management style alone. The paper implied once more that police officers were not essentially bad but that Gates had facilitated police misconduct and had contributed to the reputation of the many virtuous officers’ being tarnished.

Now that Gates had ‘officially’ been identified as having essentially contributed to the ethic and moral degeneracy of the Los Angeles Police Department by the Christopher Commission report, the paper increasingly concentrated on how the city’s police force could be reformed. According to the Times, the task of implementing the panel’s recommendations would be difficult and needed more than just a new police chief. Instead, as the paper put it, “solving problems requires action by the mayor, the City Council, the Police Commission, Police Department and ultimately [and that was new in the Times’ reporting on the King aftermath] the

support of Chief Gates after the Rodney G. King beating”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-16/local/me-2365_1_police-union [01.06.2015]. 322 Murphy, Patrick V.: “PLATFORM: ‘Defiant Arrogance’”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-16/local/me-2260_1_chief-gates [01.06.2015]. 79 voters.”323 Taking up the commission’s suggestion to let Angelenos vote if Gates should resign and if his successor’s tenure should be limited to five years, the Times – for the first time in the discourse on L.A.P.D. reforms – ascribed citizens an essential role in curing the ills in the city’s police force. It published articles saying that “Gates has long acted questionably. […] Now is the time for the people to correct it”324 or that the “tragedy of the King incident gives Angelenos an opportunity to support the Christopher Commission’s findings by either casting their vote on the side of the angels or… [sic!],”325 suggesting that supporting Gates would equal supporting the devil who had been working against Los Angeles for far too long.

According to the Times, however, it would not only require determined voters to introduce reforms, but also the working together of the Police Commission, Tom Bradley as well as City Council, a necessary cooperation which – in case it could not be achieved – would constitute the greatest threat to the implementation of the commission’s recommendations. As the newspaper reported, “recommendations contained in the Christopher Commission’s report cannot be implemented without at least six City Charter amendments and approval from the City Council, which in the past has backed Gates.”326 Therefore, it is not surprising that there was a sign of relief in the Times’ news coverage, when already shortly after the survey’s publication the paper announced that

[c]rucial City Council support broadened and solidified Wednesday behind the full package of reforms proposed by the Christopher Commission to stem racism and brutality in the Los Angeles Police Department—including the panel’s recommendation that Chief Daryl F. Gates leave office.327

323 “The Christopher Commission on Tuesday issued a 228-page report on the activities of the Los Angeles Police Department”. 324 McNamara, Joseph D.: “Police Story: Report Just Underlined the Obvious: Gates Has Long Acted Questionably: Leadership: The chief set the tone for an aberrant style of policing that condoned a brutal, racist and sexist subculture on the LAPD. Now it's time for the people to correct it.” In: Los Angeles Times, July 14, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-14/opinion/op- 3131_1_police-chief-talks-assistant-chief-gates-christopher-commission [01.06.2015]. 325 Ibid. 326 Ford, Andrea and Wilkinson, Tracy and Wood, Tracy: “Panel Urges Gates to Retire”. 327 Fritsch, Jane and Muir, Frederick M.: “Council Majority Backs Police Panel Reform Package: Commission: They seek full implementation of the Christopher report, including its call for a new chief. Former Chief Davis also urges Gates to step aside”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-11/news/mn-2872_1_council-members [01.06.2015]. 80

Surprisingly, the paper (with regard to the Los Angeles City Council approving the reform package suggested by the Christopher Commission) concentrated particularly on the problems of racism and police brutality. Although the panel’s investigations had revealed a number of other grievances, and although the paper had included those in its reportage too, it now made racism and police brutality its key topics. This probably had its reason in the survey having been initiated as a consequence of the King beating, which – according to the paper – had been made possible by these exact two ills.

The City Council’s changed attitude towards the chief, however, was not accepted silently in the Times’ reporting. Instead, the paper accused council members of having turned a blind eye to the L.A.P.D.’s racist and brutal policies that had made the King incident possible as well as Gates’ role in it for too long. The following excerpt is a vivid expression of this critical reporting:

Councilman , in fact, attacked critics of the chief, saying that he was waiting for the evidence to come in. Now that the report of the Christopher Commission is out, Gates’ defenders – the Alatorres, the Joy Picuses, the Nate Holdens and the Richard Ferraros, along with the rest of the gaggle, are acting as if they were as pure as the driven snow – and that they didn't know how bad it was. Pure hypocrisy. The tensions between the police and minority communities are nothing new. Alatorre […] lived through the 1968 East Los Angeles walkouts and the 1970 Moratorium. Throughout the 1970s he was an advocate for prisoner rights and he condemned police abuse. Why the change? Why did he cavalierly dismiss Gates’ racist remarks about his own people?328 Here, the Times openly attacked City Council members, with Councilman Richard Altorre leading the way, for having ignored the grievances in the L.A.P.D. and having supported Police Chief Daryl Gates until the pressure put on them by the results of and the public reaction to the Christopher Commission report had become unbearable. Calling the Councilmen ‘gaggle,’ which by definition describes a group lacking organization,329 shows the Times’ evaluation of the City Council as not qualified for dealing situations like the given. However, the paper did not reason this

328 Acuna, Rudolfo: “COLUMN LEFT: Blind Before, How Can They Lead Us Now?: The City Council backed Gates until the day the Christopher Commission report came out.”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 17, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-17/local/me-2161_1_city-council- member [01.06.2015]. 329 Cf. “gaggle”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/gaggle [29.11.2015]. 81 with inability on the part of the Council members but with their ‘hypocrisy’: Using Richard Altorre as its prime example, the Times pointed out that it was not the Councilmen’s lack of knowledge that had made them backing the chief to the last; instead, as the paper indicates, they had just been concerned about their own advantage, which had made them turn a blind eye on the problems of the L.A.P.D. fostered by Daryl Gates. And even more: Not only did the L.A. Times report that Gates and his management style had made racism possible, it also – as it had already done before – pointed to racist remarks Gates himself had made in the past. Thereby, the paper did not only show how deeply racism was rooted in the L.A.P.D., but it stressed the ignorance by many Council members once more as they themselves had experienced racism in the past.

Despite the open criticism of City Council’s ‘delayed’ shift of opinion with respect to Daryl Gates, it was – as already mentioned above – nonetheless depicted as essential for successfully implementing the panel’s recommendations and was thus welcomed by the Times. Now that the city’s highest officials had joined forces, the paper repeatedly stressed the necessity of acting fast, making sure that the Christopher Commission’s investigation would not remain an “empty ritual”330 but would indeed bring change, revealing an altered characterization of the Christopher Commission and its final report: While directly after its appointment, it had been praised as a harbinger of truth, it was now upgraded to a harbinger of change, the potential of which had to be exploited by any means possible.

With the release of the Christopher Commission report, which reportedly led to growing public pressure on Daryl Gates, the L.A. Times repeatedly (which means three times within the first two weeks of July331) published false rumors according to which the police chief was on the verge of resigning. Basing its reports on alleged insiders, the paper – intentionally or not – certainly made its readers expect Gates’ demission any time soon. It can be assumed that these expectations, furthered by the Times constantly quoting officials urging Gates to resign, amplified the already

330 “Was Police Investigation an Empty Ritual, or Will It Bring Change?: The Times asked a diverse group of people, most of them Los Angeles residents, to comment on the report of the Christopher Commission. The following commentaries are taken from the interviews: Right Man, Wrong Job”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 12, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-12/local/me- 1874_1_black-humor-mr-gates-clarence-thomas [01.06.2015]. 331 While on July 12th and 13th, the Times declared that Gates would “resign at the end of the years,” it, on July 14th, reported that he would “wait for the vote to retire” which was assumed to take place in 1993. 82 negative attitude of many readers towards Gates. Doubtlessly, it contributed to Gates’ image of an old man remaining in office out of stubbornness and maybe even greed for money. The latter suggests itself because the Times mentioned his – and only his – yearly salary more than once when reporting about him not stepping down: “Gates, who has been under pressure to quit amid charges of police brutality and racism in the Los Angeles Police Department, said that he did not intend to leave his $168,793-a-year post […]”332 is only one example of this way of reporting.

Furthermore, Gates’ image as a stubborn and undiscerning chief was intensified by presenting him as making fun of those who demanded his retirement. According to the paper, he publicly announced that “I will retire either way, I can’t hang around here forever” or “If you don’t stop the rhetoric, […] I may just stay here until I die,”333 not only characterizing Gates as acting questionably in his capacity as a chief but also on a personal level.

When on July 23rd, the Times reported that Gates had finally decided to actually retire in April 1992, it presented this decision as a victory for the city. By quoting particularly his critics – among them Mayor Tom Bradley and members of ‘his’ commissions as well as of the City Council – the paper created the impression of an overall enthusiasm concerning the chief’s resignation. As the Times put it:

Mayor Tom Bradley, obviously pleased with the day’s events, called a news conference […] to express his delight. The mayor had first called on Gates to resign April 2. ‘We have gone through 4 1/2 months of agony, of trauma, in this city,’ Bradley said. ‘I am pleased that at long last we have a date to which we can now look forward to the replacement of Chief Gates.’ He added that ‘there has been a growing consensus’ in the city for Gates to step aside. ‘I think that that volume of evidence became so clear that he has finally decided that he will hang ‘em up,’ the mayor said. […] Councilman , long a Gates critic, said the chief’s decision to leave would begin to help mend the divisiveness in Los Angeles that began with the King beating. ‘I think it’s a good result for the city,’ he said. ‘He had to be out of the picture . . . in order for the city to come together again.’ […] Michael Woo, the first

332 Muir, Frederick M. and Stumbo, Bella: “Gates Says He Might Not Retire Until 1993: Police: Chief wants to wait until a vote is taken on recommended reforms. Council allies who announced his departure still expect him to leave this year.” In: Los Angeles Times, July 14, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-14/news/mn-3488_1_police-reform [01.06.2015]. 333 Ibid. 83

councilman to call for Gates’ immediate resignation, said: ‘It’s wonderful that the chief has finally seen the light.’334 Referring to the chief’s resignation as mending the ‘divisiveness’ of L.A. that had started with the King beating, shows the impact the incident had on the city according to the Times – especially with regard to the question of whether or not Gates should resign. As this thesis has shown by now, the paper developed a (race- based) discourse of division in the aftermath of the March the 3rd beating, applying it to different aspects of the affair: Not only did the Times report that Angelenos were divided over the chief remaining in office, but also that they were divided along stark racial lines. Furthermore, it was pointed out that minorities and non-minorities, poor and non-poor had been experiencing police-citizen contacts very differently, which also fits into the paper’s discourse of division. In the quote presented above, however, the L.A. Times presented the city’s divisiveness resulting from the King beating only, which – to a certain degree – contradicts its foregone news coverage.

Reporting about Councilman Woo evaluating Gates’ decision as an act of ‘seeing the light,’ once again reveals that the Times considered the chief mainly responsible for the then-current divisiveness of the city. Only now that he had taken what the paper considered appropriate steps, Los Angeles could grow back together.

Expressions of relief as those presented in the quote above were accompanied by a number of statements raising the question of whether Gates’ promise to retire could finally be taken at face value. This also seems to have been the Times’ core issue: Beside quotes according to which “Daryl Gates has proven time and time again that his words cannot be blindly trusted. […] Therefore, we cannot blindly trust his so- called timetable for resignation or retirement,”335 the paper presented a list enumerating fourteen occasions in a time period of almost twenty years in which the chief had announced his imminent retirement. Thus, by publishing this list, the newspaper questioned not only Gates’ current intentions but his reliability in general.

While initially, the L.A. Times had concentrated on the Christopher Commission report as the last nail in Gates’ coffin, it – after the police chief had promised to

334 Serrano, Richard A.: “Gates Announces April Date for Retirement as Police Chief: Law enforcement: Embattled leader tells of his decision in letters to city officials and in message to officers. He says he will stay longer if successor is not chosen”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-23/news/mn-98_1_police-department [01.06.2015]. 335 Ibid. 84 resign – used the survey as the starter for a number of new yet related topics: From August onwards, the paper’s reporting on the L.A.P.D. was marked by three key subjects, all of them predicated on the findings of the Christopher panel. First of all, the paper published a significantly higher number of articles dealing with police misconduct than before the report’s release, informing its readers especially about use of force incidents of the past and the present as well as drug use among officers. With regard to the former, it is particularly striking that the Times almost solely reported on incidents involving African Americans, conveying the impression that after the release of the Christopher Commission report, the paper tried to prove that it was indeed particularly black Angelenos that were targeted by the police and that the King incident had not bee an aberration. Therefore, it can be argued that – initiated by the investigations by the Christopher panel – the Times developed a ‘watchdog mentality’ publicizing illegal police practices of all kind, but with a clear focus on arbitrary, racially motivated use of force.

The newspaper’s watchdog mentality also becomes clear with regard to the second key subject, which was the discrimination of homosexuals by and within the city’s police department. Especially in August and September 1991, the Times focused on the standing of homosexual officers within the L.A.P.D., triggered by Gates prohibiting “gay or lesbian officers to appear in uniform to recruit police officers at a community festival […], and […] dismiss[ing] such recruitment drives as ‘a total waste of our time’.”336 In the following weeks, the paper continuously informed its readers about officials publicly criticizing Gates for his homophobic remarks, finally resulting in the Police Commission overruling his decision.337 Although there had been a number of critical voices, too338, the Times first and foremost presented quotes

336 Serrano Richard A.: “Gates Bars Uniforms at Festival: Police: Gay and lesbian officers can wear only civilian clothes at Sunset Junction fair. Chief also dismisses gay recruitment as a waste of time”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 07, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-07/local/me- 264_1_gay-recruitment [06.07.2015]. 337 Cf. Wilkinson, Tracy: “Uniformed Gay Officers to Staff Recruit Booth”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 10, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-10/news/mn-104_1_recruitment-booth [06.07.2015]. 338 While the paper itself reported positively about this equal treatment of homosexual officers, it nonetheless published a number of letters to the editor harshly criticizing the Police Commission’s decision as, for instance, “stupidity”. This was one of the very few topics the paper’s and the public discourse did not coincide. Cf. “Recruiting Gay Officers”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-21/local/me-683_1_police-commission-lapd-uniform- officers [06.06.2015]. 85 by people greeting the revision as, for example, “a historic moment,”339 thereby stressing its own position.

The third key subject the Times concentrated on was that of implementing the Christopher Commission’s reform proposals for L.A.P.D. Since the paper continued praising the report as such as “impressing” and balanced, stating that it “focuses on weaknesses but not without acknowledging strength,”340 it is not surprising that it also paid particular attention to the realization of the police reform. Here, especially the adoption of community-based policing programs was at the center of the Times’ interest. This focus on building strong police-community relations can be explained by the former news coverage of the L.A. Times, in which the paper had identified the L.A.P.D. as a gang doing terrible harm to those they were actually supposed to ‘serve and protect’. The police’s attempt to meet their actual motto thus aroused the paper’s particular attention: Although the Times also mentioned other reform-oriented approaches (e.g. culture classes for L.A.P.D. officers341 or an improved use-of-force- training342), it reported about those in a limited number of articles only; instead, the newspaper’s focus was clearly on community-based policing. It, for instance, informed its readers about other cities which had already successfully implemented this strategy of policing such as Houston, Texas. Although the paper reported that in the case of Houston, community-based policing did not help reducing crime, it nonetheless stressed the positive effects it had on police-resident relations, saying that “[t]oday, in Link Valley [a community in southwestern Houston], much of the area is still run-down, but residents and police remain upbeat; they believe their partnership is working.”343

339 Wilkinson, Tracy: “Uniformed Gay Officers to Staff Recruit Booth”. 340 “Learning From the Mistakes of Others: Sheriff Block studies Christopher Commission report for applicable lessons”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 04, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991- 08-04/opinion/op-472_1_christopher-commission-report [07.07.2015]. 341 Cf. Meyer, Josh: “Seminar Aims at Making Police Culturally Aware: Community relations: Improving trust between police and public is goal of sensitivity class for officers on the Westside”. October 14, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-14/local/me-419_1_police-department [08.07.2015]. 342 Cf. Rohrlich, Ted: “LAPD Seeking to Improve Rookies’ Training: Police: The common advice from field officers to 'forget everything you learned at the academy' is subverting teaching on restraint in the use of force, administrators say”. In: Los Angeles Times, September 17, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-17/local/me-2874_1_field-training-officers [08.07.2015]. 343 Murphy, Dean E.: “When Cops Go Back on the Beat: Houston has pioneered community-based policing, a practice now urged for Los Angeles. While some see benefits, many officers are skeptical. And crime there keeps rising”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 27, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-27/news/mn-1690_1_houston-police-department/3 [07.07.2015]. 86

That the Times was positive about establishing community-based policing in Los Angeles, can be seen particularly in the large number of articles dealing with City Council, Police Commission, and the L.A.P.D. preparing the implementation of the program. Between September 1991 and January 1992, the paper regularly informed its readers about the progress that had already been made, e.g. employing new patrol officers or selecting volunteer citizens willing to coordinate different anti-crime activities.344 Although it is striking that – different from other topics – the Times hardly ever used terms or phrasing clearly approving the initiated reforms, this does not mean that the paper deplored them: Since the Times had depicted community- based policing in other cities positively and since it portrayed the realization of the program in L.A. as closely connected to the City Council and the Police Commission (which already had been ascribed a positive role before, e.g. with regard to convincing Gates to resign), it is unequivocal that the paper welcomed this project before it had actually started.

This approval, at the latest, became clear with the beginning of community-based policing programs in five L.A.P.D. divisions. On January 24th, the paper reported that “a new period in Los Angeles police history arrived”345 and that – despite only a few critical voices arguing that changing the name of police work would not change the actual proceeding – this reform approach won common assent. This was supported by a number of quotes estimating this way of policing not only as the beginning of a new era but also as the foundation of a newly emerging bond of trust between Angelenos and the L.A.P.D. One of those was that by David J. Gascon, Captain of the Southeast Division station, who stated that “We’re going to put a new shine on that badge, a new brilliance. […] We’re going to spend more time cultivating relationships. We really want to form a partnership with the community we serve.”346

With the beginning of community-based policing programs in five L.A.P.D. divisions, the Times’ news coverage on the Christopher Commission and on the

344 Cf. Rotella, Sebastian: “Community Policing to Be Expanded: Law enforcement: The pilot program sends veteran officers to work full time with neighborhood groups. Civilian volunteers will join the effort”. In: Los Angeles Times, September 04, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991- 09-04/local/me-1517_1_police-officers [08.07.2015]. 345 Tobar, Hector: “Community-Based Policing Begins in 5 LAPD Divisions: Law enforcement: Officers are told to form partnership with citizens to decide best ways to fight crime”. In: Los Angeles Times, January 27, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-27/news/mn-609_1_police- officers [08.07.2015]. 346 Ibid. 87 implementation of its recommendations faded almost instantly. The only other related topic which kept attracting the paper’s interest well into March 1992 was the question of whether the City Council would allow Angelenos to vote for the City Charter to be changed, giving City Hall greater authority over the police. Before the ballot had been resolved, the paper stressed that in

“[l]ess than a year [highlighted by author, K.M.] after the videotaped police beating of Rodney King traumatized the city, the leaders of a drive to reform the Los Angeles Police Department are searching for a compelling message to rally voters and help turn a campaign into a cause,”347 lauding the comparatively short period of time it had taken city officials to start reforms.

Furthermore, the Times commended that by letting people decide on changing the City Charter, officials would be meeting “widespread demands for a shake-up of the department,”348 stressing that politics and the public were acting in concert. When on February 27th, the Times reported that City Council had approved the ballot (having set the referendum for June 2nd), it celebrated this decision by saying “police power to the people,”349 indirectly identifying (by altering the original slogan of the 1960s) the police as oppressors from which Los Angeles needed to be freed. Here, it is striking that the Times stressed the essential role Angelenos would play in reforming the L.A.P.D.: While directly after the King incident, the paper had concentrated on authorities as ‘problem solvers’ only, it now called on L.A.’s citizens to make reforms possible, stating that “[v]oters who care about public safety, a healthy economic future and the image of Los Angeles should approve the charter amendment on the June 2 ballot.”350

With the decree by City Council, the Times’ news coverage on the Christopher Commission report and its recommendations ended. Instead, as will be shown in the

347 Clifford, Frank: “NEWS ANALYSIS: Leaders for Police Reform Seek Rallying Cry: City government: Despite widespread demands for a shake-up of the department after the Rodney King beating, the task will not be easy. There already is organized opposition to changing the charter”. In: Los Angeles Times, January 24, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-24/local/me- 584_1_city-charter-charter-reform-charter-change [09.07.2015]. 348 Ibid. 349 “Police Power to the People: City Council approves measure for June ballot on needed LAPD reform”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02- 27/local/me-3945_1_police-commission [09.07.2016]. 350 Ibid. 88 following chapters, it simultaneously concentrated on the selection of the new police chief and the ‘Rodney King trial’.

4.4 The Selection of L.A.’s New Police Chief

After the intensive news coverage on Daryl Gates’ resignation, it is not surprising that also the selection of a new chief attracted the Times’ attention. From August onwards, the paper – first sporadically, then most intensively – informed its readers about the process of choosing a chief itself as well as the candidates applying for the appointment, focusing particularly on the circumstance that Gates’ successor was most likely to come from outside the L.A.P.D. Here, the Times again concentrated especially on city officials welcoming this decision,351 reporting, for instance, that

[f]or the first time in decades, city officials say, there is a significant possibility that a police official from another city will be brought in to head the 8,300-member Los Angeles Police Department. A police administrator with no ties to past LAPD practices may be in the best position, some say, to orchestrate the reforms needed to restore public confidence in a department that has been badly tarnished by the police beating of Rodney G. King and by the Christopher Commission report that followed. ‘It may very well be time to break with tradition,’ said Councilman Mark Ridley-Thomas, a vocal police critic. ‘There are people throughout the country who would take it as a rare opportunity and a very attractive challenge to lead the department in this city. I think people welcome the opportunity to get the LAPD in shape.’352 Using the term ‘orchestrate,’ the Times again indicated that the task of reforming the L.A.P.D was not going to be an easy one. Instead, each action would need to be adjusted to the next to reach the best result possible, which would require a great deal of thoughtful organization and planning. As this quote shows, the paper presented this task as being in best hands with a new chief from outside the L.A.P.D., who would not only get the ‘opportunity’ to become the city’s police chief, but would also constitute an ‘opportunity’ for the department to get back on track.

However, besides quoting a number of officials supporting the idea of an external successor, the paper also cautioned against the problems that might come along with

351 Angelenos’ opinion considering the new police chief only played a secondary role in the newspaper’s reporting, probably because they did not have any influence on the election anyway. 352 Fritsch, Jane: “Unanticipated Contenders for Gates' Job--Outsiders: Police: For the first time in decades, there is a chance that the next chief will not come from within the LAPD”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 07, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-07/news/mn-102_1_job-of-police- chief [10.07.2015]. 89 choosing an outsider as the new head of police. It reported that in other cities’ departments this had failed miserably because officers had not been willing to take orders from an external. As the paper put it:

Local police officers can make life difficult for an outside chief, as was demonstrated in San Francisco a decade ago when Charles Gain, formerly the police chief in Oakland, was brought in with a mandate to reform the San Francisco Police Department. […] Eighteen months ago, hired its first outside chief in 25 years, Lee P. Brown, who had been the police chief in Houston and, before that, public safety director in Atlanta. It may be premature to assess his performance in New York, but he left Houston after nearly eight years, never having won the support of the rank-and-file officers.353 Critical remarks like this, however, remained a rarity in the Times’ reporting, which rather focused on presenting voices welcoming a chief from outside the L.A.P.D.

This focus on external applicants was kept up in the following weeks, reporting, for example, that the new chief would be chosen secretly. Although – according to the Times – there had been a number of critical voices about this way of proceeding, the paper supported a secret vote, stating that “[t]he feeling is that many chiefs from around the country work at the pleasure of their mayors or city managers and would not appreciate these officials unnecessarily learning that they had applied for the Los Angeles job.”354 By concentrating on externals, the Times did not only create the impression that city officials were most likely to choose a chief from outside the L.A.P.D., it also suggests the assumption that the newspaper itself was advocating external candidates.

After city officials had yield to “pressure from candidates for chief from inside the Los Angeles Police Department” not to make the finding of the new chief a secret (September 27th, 1991) and after the committee to select the new police chief had been chosen (February 20th, 1992), the Times’ focus changed from one on in- and outsiders to one on race/ethnicity.355 In February and March, the paper reported

353 Fritsch, Jane: “Unanticipated Contenders for Gates’ Job – Outsiders”. 354 Rohrlich, Ted: “Key Work in Picking Police Chief to Be Secret: LAPD: Civic leaders will cut list of candidates to about 15 in private sessions. Even names of panel members will be confidential”. In: Los Angeles Times, September 06, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-06/local/me- 1897_1_police-commission [10.07.2015]. 355 Between September 1991 and February 1992, the Times’ news coverage on selecting the new chief tailed off almost completely. Apart from very few articles dealing with naming the committee to choose Gates’ successor or ruled out candidates, there were hardly any reports about the city’s future police chief. 90 repeatedly that seven of the twelve semifinalists were ethnic minorities and that this “[l]ist with 4 blacks and 3 Latinos underscores [the] emphasis on candidates reflecting minority population.”356 Stressing that the choice of candidates was meeting the Christopher Commission’s demand for a department mirroring the city’s ethnic make-up, it can be assumed that the paper welcomed this decision as well.

It is striking that in its reporting about the appointment of Gates’ successor, the Times promoted one candidate, who was African American Willie L. Williams, then- Police Commissioner of . In articles mentioning the pool of the twelve semifinalists and later the six finalists, he – as the following example shows – was separated from his competitors and portrayed in greater detail:

Williams, 48, and a 29-year veteran of the Philadelphia Police Department, is known for encouraging community-based policing, for his easygoing approach and for promoting minorities and women. He is a Philadelphia native who rose through the ranks of that department to become the city's first black police commissioner in 1988, heading a 6,300-officer force.357 This short but informative passage on Williams was followed by the one listed below introducing the other five semifinalists:

The other semifinalists are Los Angeles Assistant Police Chiefs David Dotson and Robert Vernon, Deputy Chiefs Glenn Levant, Matthew Hunt, Bernard Parks and Commanders Robert Gil and Ron Banks. From outside the department are Lee Baca, a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department division chief [and Ray Johnson, head of the state Office of Criminal Justice Planning].358 This quote does not only show that the Times paid greater attention to Willie Williams than to his competitors, it also illustrates why the paper focused on him in particular. Although it was not explicitly mentioned in the news coverage, he incorporated everything the Christopher Commission report had recommended and what the paper thus had already depicted as necessity for reforming the police on a long term basis: community-based policing as well as hiring more ethnic minorities and women.

356 Connell, Rich and Meyer, Rich: “12 Semifinalists for LAPD Chief Include 7 Minorities: Police: List with 4 blacks and 3 Latinos underscores emphasis on candidates reflecting minority population”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 25, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-25/news/mn- 2627_1_police-chief [10.07.2015]. 357 Ibid. 358 Ibid. 91

Williams was moreover promoted by the Times publishing individual articles on him portraying him as a hands-on reformist:

The first time he saw the Rodney G. King beating videotape last March, Willie Williams stared, horrified and fascinated, at the figures flickering before him. […] As Philadelphia’s police commissioner, Willie L. Williams saw lessons in the violent encounter. Within two weeks, he had ordered his commanders to use copies of the tape in officer training sessions. It was a quintessential move for Williams, an earnest police reformer who preaches the gospel of community harmony and officer accountability. In Philadelphia, where cops once swaggered in black leather jackets and tough-guy Commissioner Frank Rizzo attended soirees with a nightstick in his tuxedo, Williams has brought change to a 6,300-officer force that has bucked even the most glacial progress.359 In this narration-like article, the Times, although not stating it explicitly, depicted Williams as Gates’ perfect successor. Not only was he depicted as having been shocked by the videotaped King beating, he was also characterized as willing to learn from the officers’ mistakes beyond city borders to make the police a better organization: Reporting that Williams had been ‘horrified’ by the images of the King incident, the Times did not only stress the severity of the beating, which had shocked even seasoned policemen like Williams, but it also helped depicting the latter as humane. This, however, was not the only positive characteristic the paper attributed to the then-Police Commissioner of Philadelphia: Calling him ‘earnest’ also contributed to his positive image as it suggested the self-assertion needed to orchestrate the reforms, which were supposed to restore public confidence in the L.A.P.D. Also, the paper’s depiction of Williams as ‘preaching the gospel of community harmony’ was used to depict him favorably: Not only did it serve to show that Williams regarded police-community relations as well as morally and lawfully right police work as sacred, the term ‘preaches’ also suggests a certain continuity and especially earnestness360 needed for this job.

Mid-March, when the selection of the chief was in danger of slowing down because Councilman Richard Alatorre reportedly wanted to put the selection on hold after the

359 Braun, Stephen: “Philadelphia’s Top Cop Offers a Reformist Style: Outsider: Willie Williams expects resistance if chosen as L.A. police chief. But he is accustomed to tough battles.” In: Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-22/news/mn- 7324_1_willie-williams [12.07.2015]. 360 Cf. “preach”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/preach [29.11.2015]. 92

Latino candidate had been eliminated,361 the Times called on officials to adhere to their original plan to name the new head of department until April. In articles under the headlines “Don’t Delay Naming a Successor to Gates: A new police chief must be named next month”362 or “What’s Best for Los Angeles: A new chief should be selected by April, and the chief should leave in April,”363 the paper cautioned against letting the selection get out of hand, stating, for example, that “[t]he search for, and selection of, a new L.A. police chief threatens to degenerate into a royal mess.”364 Here, again, the Times’ self-imposed role as a watchdog became apparent: Since it had contributed to revealing the L.A.P.D. as having a massive misconduct problem and after having exposed Gates (or rather his management style) as having fostered and tolerated this development, the paper now tried to make sure that reforms would be implemented regardless of the personal interests of those involved.

When on April 16th, the Times reported that Willie Williams had actually been appointed as the new head of the city’s police force, the paper dedicated six articles to this decision praising it as, for example, a “new era in local law enforcement,”365 or “a historic step designed to propel the Los Angeles Police Department on a course of sweeping reforms,”366 embedding Williams in a discourse of recommencement. This positive portrayal of the new police chief was additionally fostered by the paper presenting numerous quotes by officials from Los Angeles as well as Philadelphia lauding particularly Williams’ community-oriented policing, reporting, for example:

‘It’s [Williams’ appointment] good for L.A. and bad for Philly,’ said Capt. Marshall Smith, commander of Philadelphia's crime- ridden 22nd District. ‘His greatest strength is dealing with people

361 Cf. Duff, Joseph H. and Romero, Gloria J. and Westreich, Meir J.: “PERSPECTIVE ON THE LAPD: Don’t Delay Naming a Successor to Gates: A new police chief must be named next month. The department’s reform can be adjusted to the City Charter vote in June”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 13, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-13/local/me-3636_1_police-chief [10.07.2015]. 362 Ibid. 363“What’s Best for Los Angeles: A new chief should be selected by April, and the chief should leave in April”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03- 16/local/me-2706_1_l-a-police-chief [10.07.2015]. 364 Ibid. 365 Murphy, Dean E.: “Gates Bitterly Steps Out of Spotlight: Retirement: Outgoing head spends the day fighting with council, predicting a tough time for Williams and scourging department ‘traitors’”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-16/news/mn- 919_1_tough-time [13.07.2015]. 366 Braun Stephen and Connell, Rich: “Philadelphia Chief to Head LAPD: Police: Willie L. Williams will be first black to head department and first outsider since 1949. ‘He’s the best,’ Police Commission President says”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-16/news/mn-878_1_police-commission [13.07.2015]. 93

outside the department, not being afraid to open up the department to criticism from outsiders. He'll do what has to be done to get things back to where the community can feel some confidence in the people who are supposed to be out there protecting them.’ Others lauded Williams for putting more officers on the street even as overall staffing levels were declining and for dealing with critics in a civil and constructive manner. He was described as an ardent proponent of the concept known as community-based policing, which includes closer cooperation between neighborhood groups and the police, more foot patrols and greater civilian oversight of police activities.367 Quoting people speaking in favor of Williams contributed to his positive image once more. In this context, especially the terms ‘strength’ and ‘confidence’ are of particular interest: With the help of the first, the newspaper stressed that Williams would be able to deal with the problems inherent to the L.A.P.D. in a determined and effective way,368 while the latter indicates what the Times considered good police- community relations, namely a strong reliance by Angelenos on a police force, acting morally and lawfully right. By solely presenting positive statements like this, the Times created the impression that Williams’ appointment obtained approval only – at least at official levels; Angelenos’ opinion did not play a role in the paper’s reporting on the new police chief.

It is remarkable that although ‘race’ had played an important role in the L.A. Times’ reporting on the Rodney King incident, the new police chief’s race was of minor interest in the paper’s coverage. Admittedly, it was reported that Williams was “the Police Department’s first black chief and the first outsider to assume command of the insular force in more than 40 years,”369 but it did not comment on his ‘blackness’ any further. Nonetheless, it can be assumed that it was this characteristic which, for the Times, made him – besides reform-oriented policing – a good choice for the assignment as the Christopher Commission report had recommended a more racially diverse department reflecting the city’s multi-racial/-ethnic population. Furthermore, it had repeatedly been reported that minorities hardly ever achieved higher positions within the L.AP.D. Willie Williams as African American head of police thus embodied one of the Christopher Commission’s most important pieces of advice; that

367 Broder, John M. and Bunting, Glenn: “Philadelphia Supporters Laud Williams as Reformist”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-16/news/mn- 920_1_police-officers [13.07.2015]. 368 Cf. “strength”. In: Merriam Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/strength [29.11.2015]. 369 Braun Stephen and Connell, Rich: “Philadelphia Chief to Head LAPD”. 94 in Philadelphia he had implemented other reforms the Christopher panel had now recommended for the L.A.P.D. too, certainly made him even more attractive for the L.A. Times.

Therefore, it is not surprising that also his first steps as chief-designate were watched narrowly by the paper: It focused especially on Williams’ attitude towards the up- coming change of the City Charter (which by then had been given the name Proposition or Amendment F), which would make it possible to limit the police chief’s tenure to five years. Reporting that Williams was supporting Proposition F, the Times lauded “his willingness to speak out”370 in favor of and thereby probably boosting the planned reform. However, readers were also informed that by doing so, Williams “has already become a controversial player in the campaign”371 because according to critics of Proposition F, he was creating the impression that “his loyalty was to the politicians who had appointed him and not to the department he will be heading.”372

Critical remarks like that, however, remained only marginal notes in the Times’ news coverage on Willie Williams. Instead, as it had done already before Williams had officially been appointed, the paper continued concentrating on presenting him as the harbinger of positive change. In biographical sketches, it was stressed that from the very beginning of his career, Williams had “complained openly of overt racial prejudice in the department [of Philadelphia]”373 and that as the chief of the Philadelphian police, he had essentially contributed to improving police-community relations. As the Times put it:

Williams made community harmony a top priority within the 6,300-officer department. His greatest successes came in Philadelphia’s black neighborhoods, where police had a longstanding reputation for brutality and corruption. […] Determined to crack down on police brutality, Williams dismissed 19 officers and disciplined or transferred 100 others. The city’s police union, the Fraternal Order of Police, has frequently sued him for his disciplinary actions. […]Smooth, open and easygoing, he

370 Clifford, Frank: “Williams Throws Support Behind Charter Changes: Reform: His willingness to speak out is seen by some as a boost to the campaign. But it puts the new chief at odds with Gates and officers’ union.” In: Los Angeles Times, April 17, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04- 17/news/mn-736_1_charter-amendment [14.07.2015]. 371 Ibid. 372 Ibid. 373 “Profile: Willie L. Williams”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 17, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-17/news/mn-734_1_willie-williams [14.07.2015]. 95

won increased confidence from community groups and younger, front-line officers he tries to call by name.374 Here, just like in other quotes presented above, the Times portrayed Williams as holding out the prospect of ‘community harmony,’ which constituted the exact opposite to the divisiveness that had reportedly been caused by Daryl Gates. And like the paper had done before, it assigned a number of positively connoted terms to the newly appointed chief: Pointing out his ‘success’ in Philadelphia, the L.A. Times stressed the quality of his foregone work as Police Commissioner, indicating that he would also be able to reform the L.A.P.D. This was furthermore supported by the paper reporting that Williams was ‘determined to crack down police brutality,’ which means that he as well as the disciplinary actions he would introduce, were – in advance – considered resolute but not obstinate. This becomes particularly clear by the Times also characterizing him as ‘smooth, open and easygoing,’ suggesting foresight, open-mindedness and serenity. Therefore, it can be said that he was not only presented as holding out the prospect of community harmony but also as incorporating harmony and balance himself.

Informing its readers that Williams ‘tries to call front-line officers by name’ certainly contributed his positive image as well because it did not only portray him as community-oriented but also as being concerned about his officers. In summary, it can therefore be said that although Williams had not yet started working as the new head of the city’s police force, the newspaper praised his qualities as police chief as well as his character traits, thereby presenting him as the complete opposite of Daryl Gates. While the latter had repeatedly been identified as a stubborn old man who had not been able to keep up with the times, Williams was presented as youthful, fresh and reform-oriented. Thus, for the paper examined here, he was the perfect cure for the ills that had infected the L.A.P.D. under Gates.

4.5 The ‘Rodney King Trial’

In American media, ‘cases’ and ‘trials’ are usually named after the respective defendants as, for example, L.A.’s famous O.J. Simpson or Charles Manson trials show. In the case of Rodney King, however, mainstream media – including the Los Angeles Times – tended to refer to the court proceeding of the four officers as ‘Rodney King trial,’ a conjuncture that had often been bewailed by African

374 “Profile: Willie L. Williams”. 96

Americans arguing that it was presenting King as the perpetrator rather the victim of the March 3rd beating. As the foregone analysis of the Times’ reporting on the King incident and its aftermath has shown, however, the paper clearly portrayed King as the victim, belying the allegation that it used the phrasing ‘King trial/case’ to characterize him as the actual offender. Thus, it is most likely that the newspaper used the term ‘Rodney King trial’ conveniently as there were four defendants and not just one. An alternative the Times applied occasionally was the ‘Rodney King beating trial,’ also showing that the paper considered King as the officers’ victim.

4.5.1 Change of Venue to Simi Valley

Labeled a ‘misdetermination’ by some and a ‘racist decision’ by others, the relocation of the ‘King trial’ to Simi Valley, a predominantly white middle-class city in Ventura County, has – since the violent outbreak of 1992 – repeatedly been identified as essentially having contributed to the acquittal of the four police officers involved in the beating. Scholars of various fields have pointed out that because of the political and especially the racial composition of the area’s residents, the trial’s outcome could have been guessed before it had already started.

It is remarkable, however, that in the Times’ reporting on the King aftermath, the change of venue was not of any particular interest. It was hardly mentioned (the number of articles dealing with this specific topic did not exceed ten) and if so, it was barely connected to race and much less to the question of whether or not race could become a determining factor in the proceeding. Instead, as will be pointed out in this chapter, it was rather depicted as a way to guarantee all participants a fair trial.

On May 15th, the paper for the first time informed its readers in a sideline that Theodore Briseno’s, Timothy Wind’s, Laurence Powell’s, and Stacey Koon’s respective defense attorneys requested a change of venue, arguing that – as the Times reported – “the Los Angeles area is saturated daily with publicity about the beating – accompanied by repeated playings of a videotape of the incident, and submitted a poll showing that a majority of prospective jurors think the officers are guilty.”375 Two days later, on May 17th, the Times – in a comparably short note – reported that Superior Court Judge Bernard Kamins “turn[ed] down [the] request to move King

375 Ingram, Carl and Timnick, Lois: “Judge Rejects Separate Trials for 4 in King Beating”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-05-15/news/mn- 1728_1_separate-trials [05.07.2016]. 97 beating trial,” characterizing this decision as a “major blow to the defense.” Reportedly, Kamins did “not have any doubt that a fair jury can be selected in Los Angeles County,” not least because – according to him – “[m]ost people are really proud of the Los Angeles Police Department.”376

It is striking that considering a possible change of venue, the L.A. Times’ reporting focused particularly on the question of how to ensure the four officers a ‘fair trial,’ a phrasing used repeatedly. Other than after the outbreak of the unrest, when the Times itself would establish a link between the change of venue and the verdicts (see 8.1.2 Black and White Once Again?), it – at that point in time – did not yet take into account that the trial’s adjournment to another city could affect Rodney King’s interests negatively, certainly having its reason in the widely spread opinion that the Holliday video would be enough evidence to convict the officers. According to the Times,

[t]he four Los Angeles police officers charged in the Rodney G. King beating will face a rugged challenge when they stand trial next month – how to blunt the damage from a shocking, widely aired videotape that shows the black motorist being ferociously kicked and clubbed.377 As this very quote shows, the Times did not change its depicting of the King incident but continued using strong, negative terms to describe the officers’ actions. Reporting that the beating was ‘shocking’ as the officers ‘kicked and clubbed’ King ‘ferociously’ as well as using the term ‘blunt’ – which carries the notion of reducing, not resolving – indicates that the paper regarded the officers’ conviction as a given. Thus, the apprehension that the officers would be facing an ‘unfair trial’ if it was held in L.A. County most likely concerned the degree of penalty, but not the question of whether the officers would be convicted at all. Rodney King – to whom justice would be done anyhow – was largely ignored in this discourse.

This focus on Briseno, Wind, Powell, and Koon could also be found in articles published after the decision of moving the trial out of L.A. County had – after some

376 Timnick, Lois: “Judge Turns Down Request to Move King Beating Trial: Courts: The four officers charged wanted a change of venue. Jurist says he is confident an impartial panel can be found in L.A. County”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 17, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-05- 17/local/me-1791_1_king-beating [04.12.2015]. 377 Serrano, Richard A.: “Attempt to Blunt Effect of Video Seen as Key to Trial: Defense: Court documents indicate officers' strategy”. In: Los Angeles Times, January 16, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-16/news/mn-293_1_court-documents [05.08.2015]. 98 considerable toing and froing – finally been made. On July 24th, the Times informed its readers that

[a] state appeals court […] [had] ordered the criminal trial of [the] four Los Angeles police officers accused in the beating of Rodney G. King to be moved out of Los Angeles County because of ‘extensive and pervasive’ media coverage and ‘intense’ political fallout that shows no sign of abating.378 It furthermore quoted from the appellate court’s decision, according to which

[t]here is a substantial probability Los Angeles County is so saturated with knowledge of the incident, so influenced by the political controversy surrounding the matter and so permeated with preconceived opinions that potential jurors cannot try the case solely upon the evidence presented in the courtroom.379 In the judge’s report as well as the Times’ news coverage on it, it was again the police officers’ fate that was at the center of interest. Like in previous articles dealing with the change of venue, it was not discussed in how far it could result in (to use the Times’ terminology) an ‘unfair’ trial for Rodney King.

Furthermore, it is striking that – although the Times itself had repeatedly identified racism as an underlying course for the beating – race and race relations at first did not play a role in the paper’s reporting on the change of venue. Not until November 26th, when Superior Court Judge Stanley M. Weisberg (Kamins had been suspended from the case after having expressed solidarity with King) decided to move the trial to Simi Valley, Ventura County, it was indicated that this could change the potential jury’s ethnic (and political) make-up, which in turn could have a certain impact on the trial’s outcome. This, however, remained a marginal note in the Times’ reporting, saying only that Weisberg “rejected the prosecution’s argument that the trial be moved from Los Angeles to the more racially diverse, less conservative Alameda County in the .”380 The prosecution’s demand for a more racially diverse area implies that a juror pool consisting of predominately white Simi

378 Boyer, Edward J. and Serrano, Richard A.: “Trial of LAPD Officers Ordered Out of County: King case: State appeals court cites media coverage and political fallout in calling for a change of venue.” In: Los Angeles Times, July 24, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-24/news/mn- 305_1_los-angeles-county [05.07.2015]. 379 Ibid. 380 Ford, Andrea and Kelly, Darryl: “King Case to Be Tried in Ventura County: Courts: Proceedings for four LAPD officers charged with brutality will get under way Feb. 3.”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 27, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-27/news/mn-220_1_ventura-county-s- population [05.07.2015]. 99

Valley residents would come to a different verdict (most likely one in favor of the accused police officers) than a more ethnically diverse one. This leads to the conclusion that – at least in the judicial branch – it was well known that judicial decisions relied heavily on the race (and class) of those ruling and those to be ruled, a circumstance that remained uncommented in the Times’ news coverage, though. One reason for the paper neglecting the question of whether the change of venue to white, predominantly conservative Simi Valley could result in a mild verdict for the officers can be found in the paper’s remark that “in the end, both the prosecution and defense agreed that a fair trial can be held in Ventura County.”381 Since both were satisfied with Simi Valley as the location for the proceeding, the Times probably did not see any need to discuss possible side-effects, either. This, however, does not mean that the newspaper neglected this topic completely: It indeed continued mentioning that different organizations like the N.A.A.C.P. were afraid that a predominantly white jury was most likely to rule in favor of the police officers but it did so in side notes only.

The Times itself rather concentrated on pointing out that Simi Valley was facing a media attention it had not known before and thus raised the question if such a small town had the capacity to accommodate the huge number of people involved in the trial as well as the reporters covering it. Furthermore, the paper implied that the choice of venue had not been appropriate because of the sparsely-furnished facility of the Simi Valley Courtroom, saying, for example, “4 Officers to Be Tried in Spartan Conditions: Rodney King case: The courthouse in Simi Valley has been virtually empty and unused since opening in March. There are no amenities”.382 Therefore, by emphasizing the trials ‘extraordinary character’ (it was mentioned more than once that the ‘King trial’ was the third to be relocated in L.A. history383) and the high media interest as well as by repeatedly mentioning that Simi Valley had actually been a hick town the name of which scarcely anyone had ever heard of

381 Ford, Andrea and Kelly, Darryl: “King Case to Be Tried in Ventura County: Courts: Proceedings for four LAPD officers charged with brutality will get under way Feb. 3.”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 27, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-27/news/mn-220_1_ventura-county-s- population [05.07.2015]. 382 Lozano, Carlos V: “4 Officers to Be Tried in Spartan Conditions: Rodney King case: The courthouse in Simi Valley has been virtually empty and unused since opening in March. There are no amenities”. In: Los Angeles Times, January 27, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01- 27/local/me-670_1_simi-valley [04.07.2015]. 383 Cf. Boyer, Edward J. and Serrano, Richard A.: “Trial of LAPD Officers Ordered Out of County”. 100 before,384 the paper stressed the event character of the trial rather than examining in how far the change of venue could influence the verdicts.

The little the Times had reported on the change of venue to Simi Valley before the actual trial, the more it concentrated on it during and after the Los Angeles unrest a year later. How the paper integrated this particular topic in their discourse on the violent outbreak of 1992 will be examined in chapter 8.1.2 Black and White Once Again?.

4.5.2 Los Angeles Facing Its Trial of the Year

Long before the actual beginning of the “landmark Rodney King beating trial”385 on March 5th, 1992, the Times regularly informed its readers about the proceeding’s ongoing preparations (e.g. the change of venue or the defense attorneys’ defense strategies). From February 20th onwards, however, the paper focused especially on the selection of the jury as well as exclusion criteria leading to the dismissal of a number of potential jurors. Other than with regard to the foregone change of venue to Simi Valley, however, when the paper had particularly concentrated on the question of how to guarantee the officers a ‘fair trial,’ the Times’ interest now applied to both parties alike. It reported that different people were excluded from the pool of potential jurors after they had spoken out in favor of Rodney King and the defendants, respectively.386

Stressing that officials were trying to ensure that the jury was not biased, however, does not mean that the Times’ did not have an unequivocal attitude towards the respective parties. During the proceeding, the paper (like in its previous news coverage, in which the L.A.P.D. had been identified as, for example, a ‘gang in blue’) kept publishing articles harshly criticizing not only the four defendants but the

384 Lozano, Carlos V: “Simi Valley Coping Smoothly With King Case: Courts: Opinions in the community still differ about playing host to one of the state's most publicized trials. But attorneys' fears that office space and food would be lacking have proved unfounded”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 10, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-10/local/me-1156_1_simi-valley [04.07.2015]. 385 McDougal, Dennis: “No O.C. Outlets for Live King Trial”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 26, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-26/entertainment/ca-2858_1_king-trial [16.07.2015]. 386 Cf. Deutsch, Linda: “Selection of Jury Begins in King Case: Jurisprudence: The four officers watch solemnly as the first batch of prospects are quizzed. Some strong opinions are expressed”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 20, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-20/local/me- 3676_1_strong-opinion [15.07.2015] or Galloway, Laura A. and Serrano, Richard A.: “Prospective Jurors in King Case Express Sympathy for Police: Trial: Of five potential members of panel with strong law enforcement leanings, only one is excused”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 20, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-25/local/me-2883_1_police-officers [15.07.2015]. 101 city’s police force in general. Calling the trial, for instance, a “modern day war crimes trial,”387 the Times stressed once more that the King beating was not an aberration but just one incident of many in the L.A.P.D.’s self-declared ‘war’ against those they considered particularly dangerous ‘enemies,’ namely African American men. According to the Times, in this per se questionable war, police officers, like in the King incident, had regularly been acting beyond any legal framework. As the paper summarizes:

Consider this case a war crimes trial. The cops are foot soldiers, sent out to battle crime, to contain it in certain sectors of the city written off by everyone but those who must live in them. Like all war crimes trials, this one could make many people uncomfortable before it is over. You never know when a defendant will break the code of silence and tell all. Also, hypocrisy is inherent in these affairs. Carpet bombings are permitted, but cutting off corpses’ ears cannot go unpunished. Operation Hammer and battering rams are fine, but don’t get too rough with the bad guys – or, at least, don’t get caught at it. More than anyone else, Sgt. Koon and the others are in a good position to answer – if they want to take things that far – the most important question raised by the King beating. Despite a year of politics, commissions, litigation and journalism, no one yet can say with any real confidence how many times incidents like this occur outside the range of a bystander’s video camera.388 It is remarkable that – although the Times kept implying that police targeted black men in particular and despite civil rights organization cautioning against a white and conservative jury that was likely to rule in favor of the officers – the paper refrained from making race a subject of discussion regarding the selection of the Simi Valley jury. Different from after the outbreak of the 1992 urban unrest, when the Times would immediately draw a connection between the acquittal of the four police officers and the jury’s racial make-up, the prospective jurors’ racial background was not of any interest to the paper before the beginning of the trial. At that point in time, it rather concentrated on how individuals had perceived and interpreted the beating video and how that could possibly influence the verdict; the question of whether

387 King, Peter: “The King Case as a Modern-Day War Crimes Trial”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 06, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-06/news/mn-3326_1_crimes-trial [16.07.2015]. 388 Ibid. 102 these peoples’ race or political bent could affect the proceeding in any way was initially left out almost completely.389

Since the Times’ news coverage on the Rodney King incident and its aftermath was most intense, it is not surprising that the trial itself was of special interest to the newspaper, too. Between the beginning of the court proceeding on March the 5th and the announcement of the verdicts on April 29th, the paper concentrated on publishing courtroom reports, informing its readers about the four police officers’ statements, witness reports as well as the prosecution’s and the respective defense attorneys’ arguments.390 Here, the emphasis was particularly on the defendants and their lawyers, the reasons of which, however, can only be guessed: One can certainly be found in Rodney King not testifying in court – a circumstance the Times seemed surprised at, reporting that the “[a]ttorneys prosecuting four Los Angeles police officers accused in the Rodney G. King beating are scheduled to complete their case this morning without calling the man almost everyone assumed would be their star witness: King himself.”391 The other – even more likely – reason can be found in the Times’ news coverage on the Rodney King incident and its aftermath in the course of which the paper had repeatedly reported on his, but not the defendants’ perception of the beating, having its reason in the latter refusing to comment publicly on the incident. Since now, one year after the beating, the officers testified on what had happened on March 3rd, 1991, for the first time, their statements were of particular interest to the newspaper.

Reporting on the officers’ as well as their respective lawyers’ perception and depiction of the King incident in greater detail, however, does not mean that the Times’ tried to justify the policemen’s action. Instead, it unmistakably distanced itself from every attempt by the defense to exonerate their clients. One ‘method’ the paper used to disassociate itself from statements in favor of the defendants was

389 Previous to the trial’s beginning, the Times, in very few side notes, reported was that civil rights organizations like the N.A.A.C.P. had approached potential black jurors, showing that race remained an important factor in the public discourse on the King beating and the ‘King trial’. However, since the Times did not comment on this any further, it will also be neglected in this thesis. 390 While in March the Times published two articles on the court proceeding per day at the average, the number of reports decreased significantly in April (here, the paper published only one articles every other day), having its reason the chief’s appointment. 391 Serrano, Richard A.: “Prosecution to Rest Without Calling King: Trial: It remains uncertain whether attorneys for the LAPD officers will call the beating victim to the witness stand”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-17/local/me- 3896_1_witness-stand [20.07.2015]. 103 making those clearly recognizable as such. Referring to a witness report by another officer present at the scene, the Times wrote, for instance, that “[h]e testifies that it was like a ‘monster movie’ when the motorist ‘kept on coming’ despite being struck,”392 making it possible to immediately distinguish the witness’ testimony from the Times’ own choice of words. As the following example shows, statements like that were furthermore repeatedly answered with irony: Reporting that “[t]wice belted over the head with a police baton and jolted with a stun gun, Rodney G. King conjured up ‘a scene from a monster movie’ as he staggered, on his feet, his face convulsing […],”393 the Times made clear that from its point of view it was the injuries inflicted by the officers that had influenced King’s postural control and not the other way round.

In addition, the newspaper criticized the defense’s attempt to make the beating appear like a minor incident, reporting that “[l]awyer for Officer Powell downplays [highlighted by author, K.M.] […] the severity [of King’s injuries] despite testimony from doctor [highlighted by author, K.M.] who treated motorist hours after beating.”394 Together with continuously reminding its readers of the “shocking nature of the videotape,”395 the Times’ critical attitude towards the police officers was clearly recognizable at any time. Simultaneously, terms like those presented in the quotes above conveyed (albeit only indirectly) the idea that the conviction of the four officers was a given.

However, it was not only the Times’ choice of words that made its stance on the police officers discernible, but also the thematic priority of its court room reports. Here, especially the contradictory nature of the policemen’s statements was in the center of the paper’s interest: It did not only work out that King’s and the defendants’

392 Deutsch, Linda: “King’s Actions Scared Him, Officer Says: LAPD: He testifies that it was like a ‘monster movie’ when the motorist 'kept on coming' despite being struck”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 11, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-11/local/me-3336_1_monster-movie [21.07.2015]. 393 Serrano, Richard A.: “Staggering King Scared Him, Officer Says: LAPD: Witness likens scene to 'a monster movie.' His description of baton blows differs from earlier testimony”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 11, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-11/local/me-3602_1_monster- movie [21.07.2015]. 394 Deutsch, Linda: “King’s Injuries at Issue: Trial: Lawyer for Officer Powell downplays their severity despite testimony from doctor who treated motorist hours after beating”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 13, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-13/local/me-3623_1_defense- lawyers [21.07.2015]. 395 Deutsch, Linda: “King’s Actions Scared Him, Officer Says”. 104 depiction of the beating differed completely from each other,396 it also stressed that the officers’ statements themselves were contradictory, too.397 Stating that these reports furthermore differed recognizably from those by other officers present at the scene and that even those were incoherent, the Times did not only attack the reliability of the four defendants but of L.A.P.D. officers in general.

Conclusively, it can be said that this way of reporting (continuing until shortly before the day of the verdicts’ announcement) certainly promoted expectations on the part of the reader. Although the Times never called the officers ‘guilty,’ the paper’s consequent rejection of the statements by the defendants, lawyers and witnesses testifying in favor of the policemen as well as the omitted attempts to look at the incident in a more differentiated manner, contributed to the readers expecting the trial resulting in the conviction of the officers.

Since March 26th, three days before the rendition of judgment, however, the Times published articles showing that the conviction of the officers was not as certain as it had presented them to be. Readers were informed that the “[j]urors [had] deliberated 3 1/2 hours without reaching any verdicts”398 since they had not been able to find a coherent definition of the term ‘beat,’ a conjuncture the Times did not comment on, though.

On March 27th, the paper reported furthermore that black community leaders were “impassionate[ly]”399 calling for calm after the King verdict, showing that the Times’ and the public discourse of the foregone months must have different clearly from each other. While – as mentioned above – the paper had presented the officers’ conviction as a given, there must have been deep concerns among many, particularly black, Angelenos. Those, however, as it was becoming clear just prior to the jury’s

396 Cf. Serrano, Richard A.: “2 Views of King Drawn by Lawyers: Trial: In a dramatic statement, the attorney for Officer Briseno says his client was trying to stop the beating by others who, he says, were ‘out of control’”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 06, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03- 06/news/mn-3324_1_rodney-king [27.07.2015]. 397 Weinstein, Henry: “Attorneys for 2 Officers Clash at Trial in King Case: Courts: Lawyers for Officers Powell and Briseno try to make each other's clients look bad over the way they behaved during the beating of the motorist”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 03, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-03/local/me-89_1_police-officers [27.07.2015]. 398 “Update: The Rodney G. King Beating Trial”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 26, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-26/local/me-1462_1_police-officers [05.08.2015]. 399 Stolberg, Sheryl: “Leaders Appeal for Calm After King Verdict: Trial: Impassioned pleas are made to stay cool no matter what happens in the case involving four LAPD officers. Church plans a solidarity rally”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04- 27/local/me-613_1_king-verdict [05.08.2015]. 105 decision, had not been mirrored in the L.A. Times’ reporting, which had rather concentrated on the mayor’s and the police chief’s ‘power play’. Yet, now readers were informed that there had been

highly organized campaign[s] […] waged by city officials and community leaders to ensure that tranquillity [sic!] will reign in the City of Angels no matter what happens in the Simi Valley courtroom where Sgt. Stacey C. Koon and Officers Laurence M. Powell, Timothy E. Wind and Theodore J. Briseno have been on trial for the past three months.400 Furthermore, by quoting angry Angelenos, the paper – for the first time in its reporting on the ‘King trial’ – informed its readers about how passionately and particularly skeptically blacks had been tracking the ongoing court proceeding. Referring to a speech by African America Rev. Cecil L. Murray the Times reported in a narrating manner that

It is not unlike Murray to use his pulpit to talk about such issues [like the ‘King trial’]. With their spirited atmosphere and joyous, foot-stomping gospel music, Sundays at the church routinely offer a blend of religion and politics. Murray, adorned in his black robe and multicolored African shawl, is wont to talk about education, gang violence, teen-age pregnancy and other matters of importance to his community. As usual, Sunday’s sermon was laced with these themes. But its most powerful moment came as the pastor tapped into his congregation’s lingering anger over last year’s videotaped beating of King. ‘The defense attorneys,’ he roared, ‘are trying to convince us that we didn’t see what we thought we saw on that video. I don’t know what you saw, but I saw a man being brutalized! I saw an unarmed man being brutalized! I saw an unarmed, prostrate man being brutalized! […] And I didn’t just see Rodney King being brutalized. I saw the King of Kings being brutalized! I saw truth being brutalized! I saw decency and justice being brutalized! I saw you and me being brutalized! The same thing could happen – the same thing has happened – to you and me!’ Much of his talk was directed to the young men and women in his audience. The pastor’s words were not lost on them […].401 In this quote, the terms ‘slingering anger’ used by the Times itself as well as the paper’s presentation of Cecil Murray’s usage of the term ‘brutalize’ are of particular importance: The first suggests that the reverent – who reportedly had been well known for passionately discussing social ills – was exceptionally furious about the King beating as well as the police officers’ attorneys’ defense strategy. Although in

400 Stolberg, Sheryl: “Leaders Appeal for Calm After King Verdict”. 401 Ibid. 106 this case, the Times applied the term ‘slingering anger’ to a single individual only, it – from today’s point of view – hints at the anger felt by a large part of African Americans and thereby also to the events of the forthcoming 1992 unrest. Reporting that the pastor’s sermon had a certain impact on his audience prompts this assumption. The paper itself, however, did not comment on the potential of violence inherent to people’s fury, indicating that it misjudged the situation completely (see also: 5.2.5. Soon Ja Du, Joyce Karlin and the Travesty of Justice).

Furthermore, not only did Cecil Murray state that the Holliday video showed a ‘man being brutalized,’ describing violence going far beyond any human behavior, he also says that he ‘saw the King of Kings being brutalized’. This religious connotation presented in the paper is not just a paronomasia with Rodney King’s name and an expression used to refer to Jesus Christ, but it carries a far deeper meaning: Saying that he saw Jesus Christ being violated when he was watching the videotaped King beating, Murray depicts the incident as an attack on God himself, who – according to Christian belief – revealed himself to humanity through his Son. Thus, it can be said that by citing Murray, the Times presented the King incident as an act of blasphemy as well as an atrocity on mankind since – as the Bible teaches it – God lives in every person. This is supported by the reverend’s statement that he ‘saw you and me being brutalized’. Therefore, the paper condemned the beating on both, secular as well as religious levels.

Reporting that African American community leaders had been preparing rallies in case the officers were to be acquitted also shows that at least the city’s black population was not certain about the defendants’ conviction. Thus, it can be said that the Times’ later characterization of the acquittal as unexpected, is elusive. It also means that the potential for unrest inherent in the trial’s outcome had not been unexpected, either. And even more: As the following chapter will show, Los Angeles at the beginning of the 1990s was marked by further tensions that had most widely been neglected by city officials as well as main stream media.

107

Chart 1. Number of articles published in the Los Angeles Times on the King beating and its aftermath between March 05, 1991 and April 28, 1992.

5.0 The Long Hot Summer of 1991 – The ‘Black-Korean Conflict’

Between March 16th and June 17th, 1991, five people died in quarrels between Korean entrepreneurs and their African Americans customers in South Central alone. Today, the killing of the fifteen-year-old African American girl Latasha Harlins by Korean grocer Soon Ja Du is a crucial part of each and every ‘riot analysis,’ describing it as having essentially contributed to the outbreak and the course of the 1992 ‘L.A. riots’. Neglected, but at least equally important, however, was the shooting of black Arthur Lee Mitchell, likewise killed in an encounter with a Korean shop owner, Tae Sam Park, three month after the Harlins incident, leading to a 109- day-boycott of his and other Korean-owned stores in South Central Los Angeles by a group of African American activists. Depicting the respective events as proving the existence of a black-Korean conflict in L.A.’s inner-city, mainstream media of all kind addressed them from different perspectives and with a different intensity. Since 108 this is also true for the L.A. Times, the following chapters, after giving a brief description of both cases, will examine the paper’s news coverage on both incidents as well as the events following them.

5.1 Latasha Harlins and Arthur Lee Mitchell

On March 16th, 1991, thirteen days after the Rodney King incident, Latasha Harlins (15) entered Empire Liquor Market Deli on Figueroa Street in South Central to buy orange juice. After she had accessed the store, she took a $1.79 container of juice out of the refrigerator, put it half-way into her backpack and walked straight up to the counter, holding $2 in her hand. Soon Ja Du, the 49-year-old owner of the store, however, did not expect Harlins to pay for the juice but instead accused her of trying to steal it. With the aim of showing the container in her bag to Du, Harlins turned – a movement the former probably misinterpreted as the attempt of leaving without paying. Soon Ja Du therefore reached for Harlins’ sweater to make her stay, which was followed by a heated debate during which both called each other “bitch.”402 While they were scuffling, Harlins’ backpack fell onto the counter and Du pulled it away. Enraged, Latasha Harlins struck Du in the face three times, making her fall to the ground. When she got up again, she threw a stool that had been standing nearby at the African American girl, who dodged.403 Du then drew a revolver from under the counter. Harlins picked up the container of orange juice that had fallen out of the backpack during the fight and put it back on the counter. When Du knocked it behind the counter and pointed the weapon at Harlins, the girl started walking away. While she was turning, the shop owner shot Harlins in the back of her head, killing her instantly. Alarmed by the shot, Du’s husband who had been sleeping in a van outside the store entered the shop and found his wife bending over the counter, looking at Harlins’ body.404 He immediately called the police and told them that they had been robbed and that his wife had shot “the robber lady.”405 When the police arrived, Soon Ja Du, who pretended to be unconscious (the reaction of her pupils proved her

402 Cf. Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 109. 403 Cf. Stevenson, Brenda E.: “Latasha Harlins, Soon Ja Du, and Joyce Karlin: A Case Study of Multicultural Female Violence and Justice on the Urban Frontier” In: The Journal of African American History, Vol. 89, No. 2. Association for the Study of African American Life and History Inc., 2004, pp. 152-176, 159. URL: http://jstor.org/stable/4134098 [14.05.2014]. 404 Ibid. 405 Ford, Andrea: “911, TV Tapes Tell Different Tales in Killing of Teen-Ager: Murder trial: The Korean store owner told a police operator that the black girl had tried to take money. But the security recording conflicts with that version”. In: Los Angeles Times, October 02, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-02/local/me-3102_1_black-girl [21.07.2015]. 109 faking), was brought to hospital and the officers started interviewing two children who had witnessed the incident. Because of their statements and the fact that the incident was captured on tape, Soon Ja Du was charged with first degree murder.406

On June 4th, about three months after Latasha Harlins was shot by Soon Ja Du, Arthur Lee Mitchell (42) walked into Chung’s Liquor Market owned by Tae Sam Park, a 46-year-old Korean American.407 Mitchell, who was unarmed, tried to buy a wine cooler “but was turned away when he offered to pay less than the cost of the item.”408 Although Mitchell carried enough money with him, “he offered a piece of jewelry to make up a 25-cent difference.”409 As Park’s wife (who was working together with her husband in their store that day) rejected Mitchell’s offer, the latter reached into his pocket pretending he was holding a weapon. Then he walked behind the counter and tried to steal money from the cash register. Park and Mitchell started struggling and while they were doing so, Park reached underneath the counter, pulled out a pistol and shot Mitchell five times. Since, according to the police, Park, who sustained three broken ribs, shot Mitchell in an act of self-defense, he was not charged.

5.2 The L.A. Times’ Reporting on Harlins, Mitchell, and the ‘Black- Korean Conflict’

Compared with the Times’ news coverage on the King beating and the events following it, the number of articles addressing the Harlins and Mitchell incidents as well as the ‘black-Korean conflict’ was rather marginal. Although reports including notions about the respective topics were published only sporadically, they nonetheless found entrance in the paper’s reporting until long after the outbreak of the urban unrest of 1992; on average, eight short or medium-length articles per month (with upward and downward deviations410) were published by the L.A. Times.

406 Cf. Stevenson, Brenda E.: “Latasha Harlins, Soon Ja Du, and Joyce Karlin”, 108ff. 407 “Merchant Kills Robber During Hold-Up Attempt”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 06, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-06/local/me-295_1_south-los-angeles [16.06.2015]. 408 Holguin, Rick and Lee, John H.: “Boycott of Store Where Man Was Killed Is Urged: Racial tensions: The African-American was slain while allegedly trying to rob the market owned by a Korean-American”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06- 18/local/me-837_1_african-american-man [15.06.2015]. 409 Ibid. 410The maximum of articles on the respective topics was seventeen (October 1991), the minimum comprised only two (July 1991). 110

Reasons for the Times neglecting what was happening in South Central Los Angeles, however, can only be guessed: One suitable explanation can certainly be found in Jay Mathews’ statement already mentioned earlier, according to which “blacks were the old minority, on the way out [and] [r]acial tension was unfashionable as a media story.”411 Since both obviously pertained to tensions between Korean merchants and their African American customers, it can be assumed that the Times – already ‘covering the concerns of blacks’ by reporting intensively about the King beating aftermath – did not find it necessary to add the ongoing tensions in South Central to its agenda. This becomes particularly clear when comparing the number of articles published about the respective topics: Focusing heavily on the ‘Rodney King crisis,’ the paper neglected the on-going tensions in South Central and vice versa (see Chart 2).

All in all, however, the Times’ news coverage about the frictions between Korean merchants and their African American customers remained significantly behind that about the impact of the King beating, which can be explained by the importance the Times attached to the respective topics concerning their impact on the city as a whole. Furthermore, it can be argued that the L.A. Times did not treat South Central as part of Los Angeles but as an isolated, foreign element, the concerns of which were only of minor interest to the city’s remaining population. This assumption suggests itself since the paper hardly ever drew a connection between South Central and L.A. as a whole. While in the King aftermath, the paper repeatedly reported that the ‘L.A.P.D. crisis’ was dividing the city, thereby endangering its peace, it did not portray the increasing tensions of blacks and Koreans as posing a potential threat to Los Angeles.

The assumption that in its reporting on the Harlins and Mitchell incidents, the L.A. Times treated South Central as a foreign element furthermore sees itself confirmed by the paper almost solely using an external approach to the respective topics, looking at the ongoing tensions with the help of binary oppositions only: Other than with regard to the King incident, when officials and ‘experts’ from various fields and with different ethnic backgrounds were cited commenting on the event, the paper examined the ‘black-Korean conflict’ almost solely from African American and Korean perspectives. Here, however, it should not be forgotten that at the beginning

411 Jay Mathews in an interview with Lou Cannon, 1994. In: Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 14. 111 of the 1990s, South Central’s black population was simultaneously competing with the growing number of Latinos for low-wage jobs and housing opportunities, which furthered animosities between the two groups. These, however, were not brought up in the Times’ reporting. Neither was it mentioned that Latinos perceived Korean merchants in a similar way as blacks did. By not mentioning this, the paper presented the conflict of local store owners and their customers as one relating to African Americans and Koreans only. In addition, and different from its news coverage on the L.A.P.D. crisis, the Times – apart from a few exceptions – hardly ever commented on the events taking place in South Central itself, fostering the reader’s perception that what was happening in South Central was of black and Korean interest only and would not have any effect on Los Angeles as a whole.

5.2.1 The Encounter of Latasha Harlins and Soon Ja Du

Examining the Times’ news coverage on the killing of Latasha Harlins, it soon becomes obvious that the paper treated the incident similar to the King beating: Published on March 17th, one day after the incident, the first short article about the killing of Harlins was positioned in a less prominent section of the paper; located on page B5, in between articles on Rodney King, Columbian drug dealers and a number of advertisements, the Times presented it as a minor event in the city’s daily affairs.

Another striking parallel can be found in the paper initially refraining from mentioning the racial background of those involved, referring to Latasha Harlins and Soon Ja Du as “girl” and “woman” or “owner of the liquor stores” respectively.412 In the following articles, however, reporting that parts of South Central’s African American population perceived the incident as stemming from racism of Koreans against blacks, the Times started mentioning Harlins’ and Du’s race (as well as that of any others mentioned), too, saying, for instance, “[a] Korean grocer pleaded innocent Thursday to murder charges in the death of a black teen-age girl shot in a South-Central Los Angeles market over a bottle of orange juice.” By repeatedly referring to Du’s and Harlins’ respective racial backgrounds, the Times did not only mirror the view widely held particularly among African Americans that Du shot Harlins because she was black, it also perpetuated and fostered this idea among its

412 “Girl, 15, Shot to Death Over Orange Juice”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-17/local/me-888_1_orange-juice [10.06.2015]. 112 readers. Thereby, the killing of Latasha Harlins fit in seamlessly in the public discourse of the ‘black-Korean conflict’.

Since the Times identified the personal clash of Du and Harlins as part of the larger ‘black-Korean conflict,’ it can be said that the paper approached the topic on two levels: On the one hand, it examined the Harlins incident on a micro-level (as the encounter of two people, a ‘girl’ and a ‘grocer’) and on the other hand on a macro- level (with the two being representatives of Koreans and blacks, respectively). Depending on which level the paper reported about the event, Harlins’ and Du’s roles changed noticeably, which will be of importance later in this chapter.

Until today, several ‘riots surveys’ have argued that mainstream press (including the L.A. Times) used Koreans as scapegoats in explaining both the Harlins incident as well as the events following it.413 With regard to the paper examined here, however, this assertion is ill-founded; instead, it was the Du family that was massively attacked in the Times’ reporting. Stating “Slain Girl Was Not Stealing Juice, Police Say”414 or “Latasha Harlins, a 15-year-old African-American school girl, is dead from a gunshot wound to the head after trying to buy orange juice in a South-Central convenience store,”415 and hardly ever reporting about Harlins’ violent actions against Du, the paper clearly identified the former as the innocent victim while the latter was ascribed the role of the perpetrator in this violent encounter. Together with repeatedly mentioning the respective women’s racial background, the paper furthered the idea that the killing had been racially motivated. This characterization of Soon Ja Du as racist was cultivated by the Times with the help of statements by African Americans living near Du’s Empire Liquor Deli, stating that they had stopped frequenting the store because of its owner’s ‘disrespectful’ behavior particularly against blacks:

413 Cf., for example, Chang, Edward, T. and Diaz-Veizades, Jeanette: Ethnic Peace in the American City: Building Community in Los Angeles and Beyond. New York University Press, New York, 1999, 72. 414 Ford, Andrea and Lee, John H.: “Slain Girl Was Not Stealing Juice, Police Say : Shooting: The incident in which the 15-year-old was killed by a market owner was captured on a security system videotape.” In: Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03- 19/local/me-456_1_dead-girl [11.06.2015]. 415 Fairchild, Halford H.: “A Sad Tale of Persecuted Minorities: Racism: Slaying of a South-Central teen-ager underscores the disturbing economics of being Koreans and African-Americans”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 24, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-24/opinion/op- 1211_1_korean-american-families [11.06.2015]. 113

Many black people who live and work near the Empire Liquor Market Deli on South Figueroa Street had stopped patronizing the store because the owners often shouted insults at customers and frequently accused them of shoplifting, those interviewed said. “One day I came up to the counter to pay for a bottle of wine and the guy says to me, ‘Oh, you didn't steal anything today,’” said a 38-year-old man who lives around the corner of the market. “I stopped going in there right then.” All interviewed had similar complaints about the Du family.416 However, there is no hint that Koreans as a group were scapegoated by the Times. It could of course be argued that the paper tended to depict the conflict particularly from an African American perspective, presenting more statements by blacks and reporting on their actions more frequently; this, however, can be explained by African Americans simply having played a more active role in the events following the Harlins incident. It does not mean that the Times laid blame for the conflict on one of the opposing parties. Instead, it published a number of problem-oriented articles stressing that both groups were victims one way or another:

On the one hand, there exists a community in desperate need of basic local services and resources. On the other, there exists a community in equally desperate need for a way to survive in a newly adopted homeland – a place believed to be the land of opportunity, equality and freedom.417 The notion that both groups were victims could also be found on a language level: One term characteristic of the Times’ discourse on the Harlins incident is that of ‘tragedy’. In its reporting, the paper repeatedly identified the shooting as the “tragic consequence of long-simmering tension and violence between the Korean market owners and their African-American neighbors” 418 or explained that

Latasha Harlins and Soon Ja Du – though separated by language, culture and years – shared a common struggle even before a bullet bound their fates in a liquor store. Each has

416Ford, Andrea and Lee, John H.: “Racial Tensions Blamed in Girl’s Death: Shooting: Prolonged distrust, insults and violence between the Korean store owners and their black neighbors are cited by both sides”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03- 20/local/me-455_1_black-neighbors [11.06.2015]. 417 Kim, Bong H. and Oh, Angela E.: “PERSPECTIVE ON BLACK/KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: Don’t Fall for ‘Divide and Conquer’: Blaming one store-owner is easier than correcting problems that affect both our struggling communities”. In: Los Angeles Times, September 04, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-04/local/me-1389_1_american-community [11.06.2015]. 418 Ford, Andrea and Lee, John H.: “Racial Tensions Blamed in Girl's Death”. 114

come to embody, in a tragic way, the hardships of everyday life in the city’s most impoverished neighborhoods.419 This is not only one of the very rare occasions in which the Times drew a connection between South Central L.A. and the larger city, it also shows that on a macro-level (and different from the micro-level on which Latasha Harlins was Soon Ja Du’s victim), both Harlins and Du – as representatives of the two equally victimized groups – were characterized as victims of their circumstances. Furthermore, this ‘rhetoric of tragedy’ potentiated the incident in comparison to previous deadly encounters of Korean shop-owners and their black customers, having its reason certainly in Harlins’ age as well as her and Du’s sex. While until then only adult males had clashed violently, they were among the first female victims of the conflict, adding a completely new dimension to it.

The Times, however, did not only point out problems, it also offered solutions, emphasizing that to solve the conflict of blacks and Koreans

[c]learly, racism must be eliminated, equal opportunity implemented and upheld, sensitivity to different peoples and cultures stressed. We need to translate these broad initiatives, however, into individual practices that reduce prejudice, intolerance and the potential for violent conflict. At some point, we need to resocialize ourselves in a way that views the use of lethal force as a method of no resort. […] [What we need is] the increased sensitivity that we are forced to develop toward one another, the need to grapple with differences in cultures, the incentive for non- violent means to resolve conflicts and recognition that basic features of our society set the stage for inter-ethnic conflict and violence.420 Conciliation, however, was nowhere near. Instead, as the following chapters will show, the ‘black-Korean conflict’ intensified once more with the killing of Arthur Lee Mitchell on June 4th, 1991, and the boycott of Tae Sam Park’s liquor store by a group of Africans Americans lead by Danny Bakewell (for more information on the latter and his representation in the L.A. Times, see 5.2.3. Danny Bakewell and the Brotherhood Crusade).

419 Lee, John H. and Katz, Jesse: “Conflict Brings Tragic End to Similar Dreams of Life: Shooting: An immigrant grocer is accused of murdering a girl, 15. Both sought to overcome adversity.” In: Los Angeles Times, April 08, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-08/news/mn-121_1_ja-du [15.06.2015]. 420 Fairchild, Halford H.: “A Sad Tale of Persecuted Minorities”. 115

5.2.2 Arthur Lee Mitchell, Tae Sam Park and the Boycott of Chung’s Liquor Market

With the killing of Arthur Lee Mitchell, Latasha Harlins disappeared almost instantly (yet only temporarily) out of the L.A. Times’ news coverage, making room for Mitchell as the new representative of the ‘black-Korean conflict’ in South Central L.A.. However, it is remarkable that in its first article, the Times – as it had done with Rodney King as well as Latasha Harlins – did not mention Mitchell’s or Park’s racial background but referred to them as “robber”/“neighborhood resident” and “merchant.”421 In this case, it might be the Times’ identification of Mitchell as a ‘robber’ that had motivated the paper to neglect the men’s race because (although the incident occurred at the then-peak of the ‘black-Korean conflict’) there seemed to be an explanation for the killing beyond the ongoing racial tensions.

However, when the paper reported that for a number of South Central’s African Americans Mitchell’s death was nothing but another sign of Korean ‘disrespect,’ the Times – as it had done earlier – changed its view of the incident, too. It did not only report on a “coalition of African-American religious and civic groups”422 calling for a 90-day boycott of Park’s business as well as demonstrators protesting outside Chung’s Liquor Store, demanding its immediate closure; it also published a list of victims of the ‘black-Korean conflict,’ thereby conveying the idea that Mitchell’s and Park’s violent encounter might indeed have had its reason in their respective racial background:

The June 4 incident was one of four shootings since March 16 involving African- and Korean-Americans in Los Angeles – incidents that have resulted in five deaths and have further strained relations between the two groups. […] Other recent incidents [besides the killing of Latasha Harlins] include the May 25 shooting of two employees in a liquor store near 35th Street and Central Avenue. The victims, both recent emigrants from Korea, were killed after complying with robbery demands made by an assailant described by police as an African-American. Last Thursday, an African-American man suspected of committing a robbery in an auto parts store on Manchester Avenue was fatally wounded by his accomplice, who accidently fired a round during a struggle with the shop's Korean-American owner.423

421 “Merchant Kills Robber During Hold-Up Attempt”. 422 Holguin, Rick and Lee, John H.: “Boycott of Store Where Man Was Killed Is Urged”. 423 Ibid. 116

Despite increasing tensions, the Times largely neglected the ‘black-Korean conflict’ in the following weeks: Readers were informed only in short notes (the majority of which was published in the B-section of the paper) that on June 18th, Chung’s Liquor Store was attacked with Molotov Cocktails424 or that on June 20th, “[…] a number of firebombs were tossed onto the roof of Chung’s Market; two unused Molotov cocktails were found nearby.”425 Neglecting the ongoing events to such a degree suggests that the Times indeed did not perceive South Central as a part of L.A. the concerns of which were of any special interest to the rest of the city. Telling its readers that Park’s store had been boycotted and “picketed daily”426 by African American demonstrators indicates the severity of the events. However, informing its readers about these events only sporadically makes them appear like trivialities. This inconsistency was furthered by the Times’ way of referring to the violent encounters of residents and merchants: While they were labeled a “war” in some articles (here it could be argued that this ‘war’ was taking place on foreign ground as South Central was not depicted as a part of L.A.), they were characterized as “ugly confrontation[s],” in others, not capturing their actual fierceness.

This way of reporting continued well into August. On August 13th, the Times reported that it was not longer just Park’s store that was targeted by African Americans but also two others, saying that “[t]hree Korean-owned stores [one of which was Park’s shop] in South-Central Los Angeles […] were firebombed overnight.”427 Focusing particularly on Chung’s Liquor Market, the paper explained that

[t]he store has been boycotted and picketed by a group of black religious and civic activists since the Korean-born owner shot and killed a black customer in a struggle during an alleged attempted robbery June 4. The district attorney’s office found that the killing was justified and did not file criminal charges against the owner.428

424 “ Tossed Onto Boycotted Store”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-19/local/me-817_1_molotov-cocktail [15.06.2015]. 425 Rutten, Tim: “Unity Also A Victim of Shooting”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-21/news/vw-935_1_korean-people [15.06.2015]. 426 Lee, John H.: “Diary of a War of Attrition in Volatile Urban Dispute: Boycott: Business has plummeted in a store whose Korean-American owner killed a black man.” In: Los Angeles Times, July 02, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-02/news/mn-1591_1_african-american-man [15.06.2015]. 427 “Korean Stores Firebombed; 2 of 3 Hit Have Seen Black Boycotts”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 18, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-18/local/me-1554_1_black-girl [15.06.2015]. 428 Ibid. 117

In this context the Times’ usage of the terms ‘customer’ and ‘alleged attempted robbery’ are of particular importance because they could be read as an attempt to call the district attorney’s decision to clear Tae Sam Park into question. This, however, as will be pointed out in 5.2.4 Ending the Boycott, is rather unlikely.

In October 1991, the Times stopped approaching the ‘black-Korean conflict’ with the help of the deadly encounter of Tae Sam Park and Arthur Lee Mitchell. Instead, it turned back to Latasha Harlins and Soon Ja Du, whose upcoming trial was of particular interest to the paper. Before examining the Times’ reporting on Du’s trial, however, the representation of another protagonist in the ‘black-Korean conflict,’ Danny Bakewell, as well as the end of the boycott will be analyzed.

5.2.3 Danny Bakewell and The Brotherhood Crusade

One figure the Times heavily focused on in its reporting on Latasha Harlins, Arthur Lee Mitchell, and the ‘black-Korean conflict’ was Danny Bakewell, then-president of the civil rights organization The Brotherhood Crusade and leader of the boycott of Korean-owned businesses in South Central following the killing of Mitchell. Already massively involved in events following the Harlins incident, he was mentioned and quoted in a large number of articles published by the Times. By offering him a platform and mentioning repeatedly that Bakewell was supported by a majority of South Central’s black community, the paper contributed to his image as a new and influential African American leader.429

This became particularly apparent in articles dealing with the beginning of the boycott of the Empire Liquor Deli, where Latasha Harlins had been killed. Here, despite shortly noting that there were several African Americans speaking, the paper focused especially on him and his statements, reporting that

‘We are declaring here today that this store will never reopen,’ said Danny Bakewell, president of the community group Brotherhood Crusade, as he stood with the crowd outside the market at Figueroa Street and 91st Place. ‘We . . . are closing their store because of murder and disrespect on the part of these people toward us and our community,’ he said. Outside the market […], Bakewell said African-Americans are tired of Korean shop owners and others

429 In Ethnic Peace in the American City, Edward T. Chang and Jeanette Diaz-Veizades state that the L.A. Times presented Bakewell as ‘new voice’ in the African American community, but do not explain it any further. Cf. Chang, Edward, T. and Diaz-Veizades, Jeanette: Ethnic Peace in the American City, 72. 118

who take ‘money out of our community, but who don’t live here or hire blacks.’ […] The comments were met with thunderous applause and screams of support from onlookers. After Bakewell and several others finished speaking, a sign on butcher paper was taped across the market’s front entrance. It said: ‘Closed for Murder & Disrespect of Black People.’430 The reason for the Times focusing particularly on Bakewell can certainly be found in his aggressive yet charismatic behavior, whose “controversial statements ma[de] good sound bites, which boost ratings and sales.”431 This, however, can be regarded as rather dangerous because remarks like the one presented above already alluded to what would become even more apparent in the course of the conflict, which was Korean-bashing. Although Bakewell time and again claimed that he was not targeting Koreans as an ethnic group but all merchants who treated blacks with ‘disrespect,’ he repeatedly made remarks that proved otherwise:

‘The African-American community will no longer sit back and accept disrespect, racism and murder and write it off as cultural differences, Danny Bakewell, president of the Brotherhood Crusade, […]. ‘Beginning with the Empire Liquor Market Deli, this organization will send a clear signal to merchants who attempt to rape our community of profits and pride,’ Bakewell said. ‘We’re taking our community back.’432 Alleging Koreans of ‘raping’ the African American community, Bakewell accused Korean shop owners of despoiling South Central’s black populations of ‘pride and profit,’ mirroring what had been pointed out in the historical overview in Chapter 2.0, namely that Koreans were perceived as foreign exploiters – an image Bakewell tried to benefit from: Stating that ‘we’re taking our community back,’ Bakewell revealed his actual goal, which was the re-establishment of a predominantly African American neighborhood with stores operated and frequented by blacks. Indirectly, he spoke out against multiethnic neighborhoods and it can be assumed that this ‘alienating’ of Koreans certainly intensified the conflict. Furthermore, Bakewell reportedly rejected various demands by Korean organizations as well as Mayor Tom

430 Lee, John H. and Ramos, Georges: “Demonstrators Demand That Korean Market Never Reopen: Shooting: A crowd of 150 at the store reflect growing tensions over the slaying of a 15-year-old girl by a grocer.” In: Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03- 22/local/me-656_1_korean-community [10.06.2015]. 431 Chang, Edward, T. and Diaz-Veizades, Jeanette: Ethnic Peace in the American City, 73. 432 Malnic, Eric: “Blacks Vow to Buy Korean Market: Race relations: Girl was shot to death in store, sparking charges of racism and economic exploitation. Activists hope to purchase other stores as well.” In: Los Angeles Times, March 28, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-28/local/me- 1139_1_black-people [10.06.2015]. 119

Bradley to enter into a dialogue with Korean community leaders and merchants to find a way out of the existing crisis, thereby not only contributing to escalating but also to perpetuating the conflict. These circumstances, however, remained largely uncommented in the L.A. Times’ reporting; it neither commented on Bakewell’s conduct itself nor hardly ever presented others doing so. In the time-period examined here, the paper published only two articles openly critical of the president of The Brotherhood Crusade, one of which reported that

[t]he involvement of the nonprofit Brotherhood Crusade in the boycott of a store in South-Central Los Angeles has drawn criticism from a county official who warns that the organization's leader may be increasing tension and divisiveness. Mimi Lopez Baffo, president of the county Commission on Human Relations, said the county ‘appears to be working against itself in supporting both the reduction of the tension and the Brotherhood Crusade.’ She said the organization’s president, Danny Bakewell, ‘appears to be increasing tension.’ Although this article cautions against Bakewell increasing ‘tension and divisiveness,’ this choice of words is quite remarkable: Referring to attacks with Molotov Cocktails as ‘tensions,’ the Times did not fully cover the gravity of the situation. Here, it could of course be argued that the term ‘divisiveness’ was used to point out the actual fierceness of the conflict, but it remained clearly behind the Times’ later evaluation of the events in South Central (see 5.2.4 Ending the Boycott).

However, ascribing Denny Bakewell the ability as well as the will to worsen the situation shows the paper’s critical attitude towards the then-president of the Brotherhood Crusade. The other article was even more critical of Bakewell: Referring to a speech Bakewell had delivered during a gathering at the Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church on November 16th, 1991, L.A. Times reporter Bill Boyarski wrote that

[…] I was troubled by the way he said ‘Korean’. He stretched it out, so that by the time he got to the middle syllable, it had turned into a sneere ‘Kor-EE-an’. I’ve heard people use the same technique to turn other proper nouns into terms of derision. Jew. Mexican. Black. It reminded me of the way old Southern Sheriffs sneered when they said the word ‘Negro,’ taking so long that you could time it with the second hand of your watch.433

433 Boyarski, Bill: “When Protest Edges Up to Racism”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 20, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-20/local/me-270_1_koreans [10.06.2015]. 120

This was the only article published by the Times in which Bakewell’s language was identified as that of a racist successfully alleging parts of South Central’s black population against Koreans. According to Boyarski, this agitation fell on fruitful ground since for many Bakewell seemed to provide a remedy for the ills South Central’s African Americans had been suffering from for years:

Bakewell is a dominating, powerful figure […]. Anger and resentment simmer close to the surface […]. […] I could see how this anger works for Bakewell, how it connects him to the anger felt by many African-American residents of South LA neighborhoods. He is a complete departure from previous black leaders, who carefully built coalitions […].434 Reporting that Bakewell was full of ‘anger and resentment,’ the Times indicated that there was no diplomacy recognizable and that Bakewell was all but a patient and thoughtful leader. However, since these were the only statements critical of Bakewell, the paper – by simply presenting his controversial remarks – evoked the impression that these were hard, universal facts. Other than with regard to the paper’s news coverage on Daryl Gates, in which it had ‘guided’ the reader by commenting on Gates and (subliminally) criticizing him, it now left the interpretation of Bakewell’s actions and statements to its readers.

5.2.4 Ending the Boycott

While Danny Bakewell was not ascribed a clear role in the Times’ reporting, Koreans were: Different from the assertion presented before saying that Koreans were scapegoated in the L.A. Times, the paper rather portrayed them as being anxious for conciliation, going even beyond the current dispute. This impression was not only created by the Times repeatedly reporting that – despite a number of attempts by Korean community leaders to open negotiations as well as attempts by Mayor Tom Bradley to mediate between the two groups – African Americans kept up the boycott; it was also supported by a variety of statements by Koreans stressing cultural similarities of blacks and Koreans rather than their differences. One of those Koreans quoted by the Times was Kenny Kang, a Korean entrepreneur in South Central, according to whom

434 Boyarski, Bill: “When Protest Edges Up to Racism”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 20, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-20/local/me-270_1_koreans [10.06.2015]. 121

[…] Koreans are a minority. Black people are a minority, too. So I think they should know each other’s situation. Korean people have to love black people; black people have to love the Korean people. They have to help each other. Martin Luther King said, . Well, I have a dream too: that one day black people and Korean people will help each other. I respect Dr. King. Even when things happen, like this accident, I think black people and Korean people should love each other.435 This quote illustrates once more that in the L.A. Times’ news coverage Koreans were not scapegoated. On the contrary, as this example shows, they were portrayed as having great respect for African Americans. Quoting a Korean saying that he ‘respected Dr. King’ (a phrasing which shows respect per se) helped characterizing Koreans as acknowledging the achievements of the Civil Rights Movement. Furthermore, reporting that this man ‘loved’ African Americans and wanted both racial groups to ‘love each other’ certainly contributed to a positive image of Koreans. Although the Times itself characterized statements like this as naive, saying that “[i]t was hard not to be touched by sentiment so directly expressed – harder still not to wonder about its seeming naivete [sic!],” they nonetheless contributed to the public perception of Asian Americans as a ‘model minority’ turning the other cheek.

According to the Times, however, Koreans were not the only ones that were eager to end the boycott. Also Mayor Tom Bradley was ascribed an essential role in easing the tensions between Koreans and blacks. Already during the protest, the Times repeatedly reported about him trying to bring the two opposing groups together. When on August 30th, for instance, the newspaper informed its readers that Bradley scheduled a meeting to bring the investigators in the Mitchell case and boycotters together to let the former explain why – from their point of view – the shooing had been justified, it described this as an “extraordinary effort”436 by the mayor. When on October 4th, the paper reported that after lengthy and difficult negotiations, the two groups had finally declared truce after 109 days of boycott, it praised Bradley as a skillful and persistent mediator; stating that “Blacks and Koreans, With Bradley's

435 Rutten, Tim: “Unity also a Victim of Shootings”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-21/news/vw-935_1_korean-people/2 436 Sahagun, Louis: “Bradley Tries to Calm Racial Animosities: Neighborhoods: Mayor sets up a meeting between detectives and organizers of a boycott of a Korean-owned store in South-Central. Blacks are upset over treatment by shopkeepers”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1991. http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-30/local/me-1372_1_korean-community [19.06.2015]. 122

Aid, Make Truce”437 or that “Bradley, […] had vigorously opposed the boycott and had long been pressing for it to end,”438 the newspaper stressed the effort he had made to bring representatives of the respective groups together. That this had not been an easy task was pointed out by describing the truce as “the product of frantic behind-the-scenes negotiations this week by the mayor’s office with both black and Korean-American leaders”439 or as resulting from “a series of delicate behind-the- scenes talks.”440 Thus, the Times – as it had already done in its reportage on Gates’ resignation – depicted Bradley as a (commonly accepted) savior figure.

Furthermore, it is remarkable that in the Times’ news coverage, the rapprochement of blacks and Koreans was repeatedly described as “truce,” stating, for instance, “a truce between black activists and Korean merchants” has been negotiated. This is particularly striking because it clearly characterized the ‘black-Korean conflict’ as a war-like situation in retrospect. While – as already mentioned above – the Times had initially been inconsistent in labeling the conflict, the term ‘truce’ stressed its intensity as well as the potential threat originating from it. Characterizing the rapprochement a ‘truce’ moreover alluded to the possibility that it might just be a temporary cessation, a notion that was supported by the paper informing its readers that “a lasting truce may be difficult to achieve and that the accord is, at best, a fragile one.”441

That the L.A. Times described the rapprochement as “fragile” and “uneasy”442 can be reasoned by the paper also reporting that it was perceived very differently by African American and Korean community leaders. Here, the focus was particularly on the compromises Koreans had to make to end the conflict; according to the Times:

‘This is not the best deal,’ said Duk H. Kang, president of the city’s Korean Chamber of Commerce. ‘But what can be done? We have

437 Clifford, Frank and Stolberg, Sheryl: “Blacks and Koreans, With Bradley’s Aid, Make Truce”. In: Los Angeles Times, October 04, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-04/news/mn- 3340_1_korean-community [17.06.2015]. 438 Ibid. 439 Ibid. 440 Clifford, Frank and Stolberg, Sheryl: “Black-Korean Truce Termed ‘Very Fragile’: Ethnic relations: The two sides offer differing interpretations of pact to end boycott. City officials say there is more work to be done.” In: Los Angeles Times, October 05, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-05/local/me-3230_1_city-officials [17.06.2015]. 441 Ibid. 442 Oh, Angela E.: “Talk Is Fine; What the City Needs Is Leadership: Race relations: The pact between Korean-Americans and African-Americans is a fragile first step, not a ‘victory.’” In: Los Angeles Times, October 09, 1991. http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-09/local/me-17_1_african- american-business [17.06.2015]. 123

no choice. We have to stop it, this boycott, right now. We don’t want it to go to another store and another store and another store.’ For Korean-Americans, the truce means that they must come to terms with the fact that store owner Tae Sam Park – who was cleared by police in the fatal shooting of Lee Arthur Mitchell – will lose his business in the interests of ethnic peace. ‘Some Koreans are thinking, he’s given up his store even though he hasn’t done anything wrong, so what’s to stop other black groups from boycotting other stores?’ said Jerry Yu, executive director of the Korean-American Coalition, a civil rights group. ‘It sort of sets a precedent.’443 Informing its readers that Tae Sam Park had been ‘cleared’ shows that the paper considered him lawfully innocent.444 This was supported by saying that Park would lose his shop in the ‘interest of ethnic peace,’ pointing out that the paper regarded the decision to dispossess his property as morally wrong. As the Time indicated, Park had fallen victim to larger interests, which was actually inacceptable.

The idea that the truce was ‘fragile’ was furthered by the paper mentioning that instead of holding a joint news conference and thereby suggesting unity, African American and Korean community leaders announced the end of the boycott individually.445 However, it was not only reactions by African Americans and Koreans that made the newspaper estimate their rapprochement as endangered, it was also the settlement itself, the details of which were published by the Times:

*Chung’s Liquor Store will be closed and the boycott suspended for a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 120 days, during which time the Korean Grocers Assn. will negotiate sale terms with the African American Honor Committee, a group of black activists led by Bakewell. If the committee does not find a buyer, the store may be sold to someone else.*The sale of the store will not include the liquor license. *The black coalition and the grocers group will work to establish a “dispute resolution center” that will negotiate disagreements before boycotts occur. According to Bakewell, the Brotherhood Crusade will donate $25,000 to help get the center under way. *The two sides will draft a code of ethics for merchants. They will also work together to establish a jobs program in which Korean business owners will hire black youths and bank officers will train merchants in “customer sensitivity” before loaning them money to open new stores.446

443 Clifford, Frank and Stolberg, Sheryl: “Black-Korean Truce Termed ‘Very Fragile’”. 444 It is striking that – different from its discourse on the King beating – the L.A. Times did not call the police officers’ judgment or actions into question. 445 Clifford, Frank and Stolberg, Sheryl: “Black-Korean Truce Termed ‘Very Fragile’”. 446 Clifford, Frank and Stolberg, Sheryl: “Blacks and Koreans, With Bradley's Aid, Make Truce”. 124

The fact that the L.A. Times printed the basis of the truce without commenting on it any further may idicate that that the paper indirectly tried to distance itself from its content. This suggests itself because in the following days, the paper published articles harshly criticizing the settlement, one of which asking whether or not African Americans really thought “that Korean immigrants are so stupid that they must take ‘classes’ on how to treat their customers with respect.”447 Thus, in the Times’ discourse on the end of the boycott, Koreans were depicted as disadvantaged by the settlement, also showing that in the reporting of this particular newspaper, Koreans were not scapegoated but rather depicted as having been victimized by African Americans.

5.2.5 Soon Ja Du, Joyce Karlin and the ‘Travesty of Justice’

Since the killing of Latasha Harlins, developments in the Du lawsuit had been well documented by the Times. Telling its readers in short notes about Du pleading innocent and being released on a $250,000 bail or informing them about her lawyers obtaining a change of venue because of the racially charged atmosphere in Compton, where the trial was to be held,448 the paper gradually prepared its readers for the up- coming trial. When it finally opened on September 30th, 1991, in Downtown Los Angeles, the Times almost solely focused on the events taking place in the court room as well as the public responses it evoked. During the ongoing lawsuit, the number of articles was significantly above average, with sixteen reports in October alone. This sudden increase can be explained by the surveillance video showing the shooting of Latasha Harlins being ‘publicly’ shown for the first time. Although until then, the L.A. Times had repeatedly referred to the tape, stating that it proved that Du had shot Harlins in the back of the head, it was the first time the press actually had access to the video; no longer relying on statements by the police, the paper described the killing in detail. According to the Times,

[t]he graphic images of the killing of 15-year-old Harlins, captured by a security camera inside the Empire Liquor Market in South- Central Los Angeles, drew gasps in the packed Superior Court

447 Oh, Angela E.: “Talk Is Fine”. 448 Here, again, the Times’ news coverage was marked by restraint. It informed its readers that by arguing it was impossible to find an impartial jury in predominantly black Compton, Du’s lawyers achieved a change of venue. Although it furthermore reported that this decision was harshly criticized by many blacks, the paper did not comment on it itself. Cf. Hubler, Shawn: “New Site Okd for Grocer’s murder trial”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 28, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-28/local/me-1299_1_los-angeles-county [16.05.2015]. 125

courtroom where grocer Soon Ja Du is being tried for murder. […] The videotape of the incident lasted less than a minute, but showed Harlins and Du grappling at the store counter in a dispute over a bottle of orange juice. It also shows Du pointing a handgun and Harlins dropping to the floor, mortally wounded.449 In this quote, especially the image of the two-parted courtroom – created by the usage of the term ‘gap’ – is of interest as it mirrored the growing divisiveness of blacks and Koreans in the city, the paper had reported about before. Therefore, it can be said that here, the Times took up the discourse of division again, with the microcosm of the courtroom reflecting the societal processes in South Central L.A.

By furthermore referring to witness statements, the paper – for the first time in its news coverage on the Harlins incident – also reported that the teenager had behaved violently, too, stating that “Harlins, after telling Du she intended to pay for the juice, hit the grocer twice in the face as Du held onto her clothing.”450 This, however, does not mean that the Times tried to justify Du’s actions, it rather served to describe the incident as detailed as possible; by repeatedly mentioning Harlins’ young age, the paper maintained the image of Harlins as the innocent victim in this encounter.

This became particularly obvious when on October 3rd, Judge Joyce Karlin declared that Soon Ja Du was facing a second-degree penalty: Reporting that “Judge says Korean-American woman should face no more [highlighted by author, K.M.] than a second-degree penalty,”451 the Times subliminally questioned the court’s decision. This – despite reporting that the “decision that drew both praise and anger”452 – was supported by the newspaper quoting especially people criticizing it. Although this could of course have originated in critical voices being the ones increasing sales, it (because of the forgone depiction of Du and Harlins) is more likely that the Times used them to stress its own stance on this decision. Furthermore, since the vast majority of critics quoted were of African American descent, the Times held up the idea that the Harlins case was part of a larger ‘black-Korean conflict’.

449 Ford, Andrea: “Videotape Shows Teen Being Shot After Fight: Killing: Trial opens for Korean grocer who is accused in the slaying of a 15-year-old black girl at a South-Central store”. In: Los Angeles Times, October 01, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-01/local/me- 3692_1_black-girl [15.06.2015]. 450 Ibid. 451 Ibid. 452 Ford, Andrea: “1st-Degree Murder Ruled Out in Grocer Trial: Courts: Judge says Korean- American woman should face no more than a second-degree penalty in shooting of black teen-ager.” In: Los Angeles Times, October 04, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-04/local/me- 3260_1_1st-degree-murder [16.06.2015]. 126

This tactic was also employed when on October 11th, a jury found Du guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Here, however, the paper stressed that both African American as well as Korean community leaders perceived the verdict as

[…] probably the least inflammatory choice of the four charges the jury weighed. A lesser verdict, such as involuntary manslaughter or acquittal, might have created an explosive situation in the black community, they said; a second-degree murder conviction might have left Koreans feeling unfairly persecuted. ‘In my view, justice has been done by the verdict,’ said Joseph Duff, president of the Los Angeles chapter of the National Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People. ‘A person has been found criminally guilty of killing and I think that’s pretty damn important.’ Jerry Yu, executive director of the Korean-American Coalition, agreed, adding that not all in the community offered unconditional support for Du. ‘We can relate to her as a Korean and we can pray for her that she not suffer,’ Yu said. ‘But, on the other hand, just because we are Korean, that doesn’t mean we wanted her to get off. There has to be justice.’453 This shift in perspective – focusing not longer on the two groups’ friction but meeting points – can certainly be explained by the fact that, as mentioned above, on October the 4th African American community leaders had declared a truce. By focusing on positive reactions to the ruling, the Times – despite mentioning that there was still some “fiery rhetoric”454 – stressed the convergence of blacks and Koreans. After having done so, the actual conflict of Korean merchants and their African American customers in South Central Los Angeles faded appreciably into the background. This, however, does not mean that the Times gave up on the topic. Instead, it reported about a number of incidents involving Koreans and African Americans outside L.A., thereby perpetuating its discourse on the ‘black-Korean conflict’ in general; additionally, concentrating on the question of whether African Americans were disadvantaged by the criminal justice system emerging from the controversial verdict in the Du trial analyzed below, notions about the ‘black-Korean conflict’ in South Central served as background information, explaining how the current discussion had evolved.

453 Katz, Jesse and Clifford, Frank: “Many Find Verdict Fair, But There Is Still Outrage: Killing: Leaders in African-American and Korean-American communities think the Du jury picked the least inflammatory verdict.” In: Los Angeles Times, October 12, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-12/news/mn-195_1_korean-american-community [16.06.2015]. 454 Ibid. 127

When on November 15th, Joyce Karlin sentenced Soon Ja Du to five years on probation, four hundred hours of community service, and a $500 fine, this reportedly caused an immediate outcry among the city’s African Americans. The following excerpt is just an example of the vivid expressions the Times found reporting on the verdict:

The sentence […] immediately drew angry cries of protest from friends and relatives of Latasha Harlins, the 15-year-old girl killed in a dispute over a bottle of orange juice at a grocery store owned by the family of Soon Ja Du. Several community leaders also expressed shock at the sentence. […] [A]s the judge spoke of healing, angry spectators spilled into the hallway outside the courtroom. While some of Latasha’s friends and relatives sobbed, others shouted, ‘Murderer!’ and, ‘We’ll take this to the streets!’ There were several shoving matches between spectators and television photographers as more than a dozen sheriff's deputies escorted participants in the trial to elevators. […] Danny Bakewell, who heads the Brotherhood Crusade and led a boycott of Korean- owned grocery stores, labeled the sentence an ‘outlandish injustice.’ He said he could not predict how the community would express its anger but vowed to ‘make our voices heard in a way that is forceful and meaningful.’ […] State Sen. (D-Los Angeles), a recently announced candidate for the county Board of Supervisors, warned that the ‘incredible’ sentence could have serious repercussions. ‘This might be the time bomb that explodes,’ she said. ‘It could really create havoc in the community.’455 Besides presenting quotes mirroring the anger of many African Americans, the Times in the following days also published a number of articles harshly criticizing the verdict as well reporting, for example, that

Judge Karlin knew the entire city was watching the case, and she knew her sentence would send a message. This message is clear: Black life is worthless. Unlike 1950s’ Mississippi, however, in 1991 Los Angeles such a message does not come without a price. […] Is there one political or community leader who can credibly tell African-American residents of Los Angeles that they should trust the court system to treat them fairly?456 Both quotes presented above – besides mirroring a clearly recognizable distrust in and an allegation of racism against the city’s judicial system – point to an imminent

455 Clifford, Frank and Wilkinson, Tracy: “Korean Grocer Who Killed Black Teen Gets Probation”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-16/news/mn- 1402_1_straight-probation [16.06.2015]. 456 Gibbs, Geoffrey Taylor: “Can African-Americans Now Truly Believe in Judicial Fairness?: Race relations: Soon Ja Du’s sentence sends a message that black life is worthless. Such a message, however, doesn’t come without a price”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 24, 1991. 128 occurrence that would deeply influence L.A.’s residents: Stating that African Americans were most likely to ‘make [their] voices heard in a way that is forceful and meaningful,’ or defining the verdict as a ‘time bomb’ which was most likely to create a ‘havoc’ or – in other words – would ‘not come without a price,’ equals a warning against a (black) revolt similar to the 1965 Watts ‘riots’. By offering a number of similar statements, the Times conveyed the message that this was not the perception of a single individual but a rather widespread opinion among (African American) Angelenos. The probably most explicit statement by a city resident was published on November 25th, according to which

[f]rom the days of slavery, to the emancipation from slavery, to the promise of 40 acres and a mule, to institutionalized racism, from those days until now, we have waited and hoped for healing. But we see not even a gesture in sight. With this background of such travesties of justice, the revolution that will take place in America will make the French Revolution look like a Sunday School picnic.457 Although the Times’ discourse on Soon Ja Du’s acquittal was significantly marked by statements like this, they made up just a nominal part in the paper’s overall reporting. Nonetheless, they reveal that at least the potential for violence resulting from the verdict in the Du trial had been known, showing that the Times’ statements made during and after the 1992 unrest, according to which the violent outbreak had been unpredictable, is implausible. Taking the period between the Rodney King incident and the Rodney King trial alone, the paper’s reporting was marked by different crisis analyses, revealing that L.A.’s different ethnic groups were heading for what would later be called ‘L.A. riots’. This potential for conflict going far beyond that finding its expression in the 109-day boycott of Korean markets by African American activists, however, was – apart from the very few occasions presented here – most widely neglected by the L.A. Times.

Instead, it focused on the political power play resulting from the acquittal: From the end of November 1991 until the outbreak of the civil unrest at the end of April 1992, the majority of articles mentioning the Harlins incident and the racial tensions it had provoked, actually dealt with Joyce Karlin as well as officials trying to use the outcome of the Du trial in their own interest.

457 King, Peter: “Judge’s Sentence Draws Fire”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 25, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-25/local/me-214_1_fountain-valley [16.06.2015]. 129

Chart 2. Number of articles published by the Los Angeles Times on the ‘black-Korean conflict’ in comparison with the King beating and its aftermath between March 05, 1991 and April 28, 1992.

6.0 The 1992 Urban Unrest – A Brief Overview

On April 29th, 1991, only minutes after the Simi Valley jury – consisting of six white men, four white women, a Hispanic and an Asian woman but no African Americans458 – had announced the acquittal of Stacey Koon, Timothy Wind, and Theodore Briseno (it had been deadlocked on one charge of excessive force against Laurence Powell and thus declared a mistrial459), protest erupted in Los Angeles. Hundreds of angry demonstrators gathered outside the court house as well as police headquarters in Los Angeles, demanding justice for Rodney King on behalf of all African Americans.460 Within the next two hours, however, protest turned into violence, changing parts of the city – especially South Central, Pico-Union and

458 Abu-Lughod, Janet L.: Race, Space, and Riots in , New York and Los Angeles. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 229. 459 Cf. Race and Rage: The Beating of Rodney King. 460 Cf. Wallenfeldt, Jeff: “Los Angeles Riots of 1992”. 130

Koreatown – into what the Los Angeles Times called a “warzone.”461 Therefore, by the late evening, Tom Bradley asked California Governor to send the National Guard to support the city’s police forces which was unable to cope with the ‘rioters’ propensity towards violence. However, they

remained in their armories for most of Thursday, April 30, awaiting supplies of riot gear and ammunition and waiting for squabbles to be settled over how they were to be deployed. It was not until Thursday night, more than 24 hours later, that the first contingent arrived […]462 in Los Angeles.

As the violent outbreak did not recede, Governor Wilson declared a in the early hours of May 1st and the mayor enforced a city-wide nighttime curfew.463 Since the L.A.P.D. and National Guard were not able to stem the destruction and violence, they were furthermore bolstered by 3,000–4,000 army troops and marines as well as 1,000 riot-trained officers sent by then-President George H.W. Bush on May 1st, who – as the violence continued – declared L.A. a disaster area only one day later. On May 4th, with unrest finally receding and the curfew being ended, Los Angeles’ residents were facing the debris of one of the most devastating urban unrest in U.S.-American history: In the foregone six days, property worth $1 billion had been damaged, more than 50 people had been killed, more than 2,300 had been injured, and several thousand had been arrested.464

7.0 The 1992 Urban Unrest in the Reportage of the Los Angeles Times

Most remarkable about the L.A. Times’ news coverage on the 1992 unrest was certainly its intensity. From the second day of its reportage (April 30th, 1991), the paper – for nearly a month – focused almost solely on a huge variety of unrest- related topics, leading to the chaotic and occasionally fragmented character typical of real-time reporting in times of crisis. As Jill Edy puts it:

Yet, reporters’ uncertainty emerges everywhere. Their reports are unfailingly professional, but it is clear that normal news routines

461 Race and Rage: The Beating of Rodney King. 462 Abu-Lughod, Janet L.: Race, Space, and Riots in Chicago, 232. 463 Cf. ibid and Wallenfeldt, Jeff: “Los Angeles Riots of 1992”. 464 Cf. Wallenfeldt, Jeff: “Los Angeles Riots of 1992”. 131

have broken down. It might be argued that of course news coverage [appears] chaotic. Reporters [are] working under hazardous conditions as well as under deadline.465 In the reporting examined here, this impression of uncertainty and chaos was furthermore owed to the paper’s attempt to not only cover as many simultaneously happening events as possible, but to explain them at the same time. Different from its news coverage on the King beating and its aftermath, the Times did no longer report on one topic at a time, but – as already mentioned above – focused on different subjects simultaneously, thereby losing its linear character. Besides, it did no longer exclusively focus on the responses by city officials, community leaders as well as ‘experts’ form various scholarly fields but supplemented those with statements by Angelenos. Especially South Central residents mostly affected by the violence were presented, commenting on the respective specifics of the outbreak. Since both, the perception as well as the analysis of the 1992 civil unrest, varied extremely depending on who was asked, the paper – different from its reporting following the King beating – frequently did not present a clearly identifiable consensus, which contributed to the impression of chaotic reporting, too.

Despite the manifold topics dealt with in the L.A. Times’ news coverage on the unrest, it is nonetheless possible to identify a number of key subjects constantly recurring. These key subjects – either addressed in individual articles or appearing as marginal notes in other contexts – will be worked out and examined in more detail in the following chapters, which represent the nodal points keeping the net of reportage together. Nevertheless, as will be pointed out in the respective chapters, these centers were by no means static, but were liable to steady changes of perspective.

465 Edy, Jill: Troubled Pasts: News and the Collective Memory of Social Unrest. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2006, 26. 132

Chart 3. Number of articles published by the Los Angeles Times on the 1992 urban unrest between April 29th, 1992 and May 31st, 1992.

7.1 Perceiving the 1992 Los Angeles Unrest

7.1.1 The Los Angeles… Riots?

Examining the events following the acquittal of the four L.A.P.D. officers involved in the King beating, it soon becomes obvious that today there is a variety of names used to describe them. There seems to be no consensus concerning the question if labeling them ‘riots,’ ‘uprising,’ ‘upheaval,’ ‘rebellion,’ ‘revolt,’ ‘civil unrest,’ or ‘civil disturbance’ is the most suitable way to characterize what was happening in Los Angeles from April 29th until May 4th 1992. In the news coverage by the L.A. Times, however, this seemed to be beyond debate. From the first day of its reporting, the paper almost solely referred to the events as ‘riots,’ saying “Rioting mobs ignited

133 fires, beat motorists and looted stores […],”466 “The Press under Fire: Riot targets Journalists”467 or “World Reacts With Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots.”468

This inevitably leads to the question of what a ‘riot’ actually is. According to three renowned dictionaries of English, the Longman: Dictionary of Contemporary English, the Oxford Dictionaries and the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the term riot refers to “a situation in which a large crowd of people are behaving in a violent and uncontrolled way, especially when they are protesting about something,”469 “a violent disturbance of the peace by a crowd,”470 or “a situation in which a large group of people behave in a violent and uncontrolled way.”471 Focusing on the ‘uncontrolled’ action itself and neglecting both its reasons as well as purposes, the term riot creates the impression of an arbitrary behavior by a group of people the only purpose of which is disturb ‘peaceful’ society.472

This, however, does not correspond to the Times’ overall news coverage on the 1992 urban unrest. Although it did not openly support those participating in the violent outbreak, the paper nonetheless indicated a certain degree of sympathy for those taking their anger to the streets. In numerous problem-oriented articles, grievances going far beyond the racism exposed by the King beating or the verdicts following it were identified as the underlying cause for the unrest. Either by pointing at those themselves or by quoting residents as well as “experts” (in most cases community leaders, politicians and scholars) doing so, the Times concentrated particularly on the social and economic problems of South Central L.A., which had been neglected by the city’s officials for decades. “Life had been hard on the neglected area for

466Huber, Shawn and Lacey, Marc: “Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores; 4 Reported Dead”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 29th, 1992, A1/31, 1. 467 Morrison: Patt: “The Press under Fire: Riots targets Journalists”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1992, A4. 468 “World Reacts With Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 2, 1992, A8. 469 “riot”. In: Longman: Dictionary of Contemporary English.URL: http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/riot_1 [03.11.2014]. 470 “riot”. In: Oxford Dictionaries. URL: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/riot [03.11.2014]. 471 “riot”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/riot [03.11.2014]. 472 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 328. 134 years”473 is only one of the paper’s vivid expressions referring to the living conditions in L.A.’s South Central. Stating furthermore that

[l]ong before [….] [the unrest], daily life in parts of South Los Angeles was grueling in ways much different from elsewhere in the city. In ordinary, mundane ways – from a shortage of grocery stores and credit at normal interest rates to a scarcity of jobs and the more publicized ills of crime and drug – it was often hard to get through a typical day [,]474 the Times legitimized the motives that made people participate in the unrest. While in the L.A. Times’ reporting before the 1992 unrest, the living conditions in South Central were hardly ever made a subject of discussion,475 they were now brought into focus. Reporting that life in this area was ‘grueling,’ i.e. very exhausting, and ‘much different from elsewhere’ in Los Angeles, the paper stressed South Central’s special position once more. Like in its news coverage on the ‘black-Korean conflict,’ the Times – by contrasting the area with the rest of the city – depicted South Central as some kind of strange and foreign element, marked by the absence of grocery stores, job opportunities as well as the ‘ills of crime and drug,’ a phrasing that is particularly important in this context: Referring to the area’s drug and crime problems as ‘ills’ does not only characterize them as causing suffering and distress, but it also – and more importantly – implies that South Central’s residents were victims of their circumstances rather than active contributors to the problem. Instead, crime and drug abuse had infected them like a disease. Showing this degree of sympathy, however, contradicts the newspaper’s usage of the term ‘riots,’ describing a violent action without reason and purpose rather than an expression of despair, a contradiction which (as will be shown later in this study) was only one of many in the Times’ reporting of the 1992 unrest. Reasons for the paper calling the unrest ‘riots’ can most likely be found in the first hours of the outbreak in which “its course, scale and manifold reasons might have been obscured. Once the newspaper had labeled the

473 Peterson, Jonathan and Tobar, Hector: “South L.A. Burns and Grieves”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A1/24, 1. 474 Ibid., A1. 475 They were broached in the aftermath of the King beating, with the paper informing its readers that minorities and non-minorities, poor and non-poor were experiencing police-community contacts quite differently. The paper, however, did not dwell on the social and economic grievances large parts of South Central’s residents were facing daily. 135 events ‘riots,’ it might have simply adhered to it even though it was not suitable to the Times’ characterization of the reasons for what was happening.”476

As already pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the terms used to refer to the violent outbreak of 1992, are manifold. In this thesis, as should have become clear by now, it is solely be referred to as ‘unrest,’ describing “a political situation in which people protest or behave violently,”477 “a state of dissatisfaction, disturbance, and agitation, typically involving public demonstrations or disorder,”478 and “a situation in which many of the people in a country are angry and hold protests or act violently.”479 Noting that people are angry and therefore protesting at least indicates that they have a reason for doing so; it applies logic to peoples’ actions and legitimizes them. An adjective emphasizing this notion and which will thus be used in this thesis as well is ‘civil,’ stressing that those protesting were not just any ‘hoodlums’ creating disorder for fun but citizens reacting to the ills of society. Another term creating a suitable alternative to ‘civil unrest,’ is that of ‘urban unrest,’ indicating that those taking part in the 1992 events were responding to problems typically of (U.S.-American) cities. Therefore, in the following, the terms civil and urban unrest will both be used to refer to the violent outbreak that took place after the acquittal of the four LA.P.D. officers involved in the King beating.

7.1.2 Black and White Once Again?

Race mattered. This – although not explicitly mentioned – was one of the Times’ most prominent observations concerning the 1992 unrest. In a number of articles, readers were informed that since the beginning of the violent outbreak, “the relationship between different ethnicities was not only marked by suspicion but increasingly by fear.”480 Reporting that “fear knows color”481 and that “even people who normally pride themselves in the acceptance of other cultures have found

476 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 328. 477 “unrest”. In: Longman. Dictionary of Contemporary English. URL: http://www.ldoceonline.com/ dictionary/unrest [12.12.2015]. 478 “unrest”. In: Oxford Dictionaries. URL: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/de/ definition/englisch/unrest [12.12.2015]. 479 “unrest”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unrest [12.12.2015.] 480 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 329. 481 Woo, Elaine: “Fissure of Race Tear Fabric of L.A.: A third-generation Chinese-American comes to a haunting realization about multiracial L.A. For the first time, she feels prejudice – and fear”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A1/12, 1. 136 themselves noticing other peoples’ skin colors and feeling afraid,”482 the paper presented race and ethnicity as one of the most important identity markers. This distinction of Angelinos based on their (visible) ethnic/racial background could also be found in the L.A. Times’ reporting. In the first 48 hours of the paper’s news coverage on the unrest, it mentioned the ethnicity/race of the majority of individuals it referred to. Statements like “[w]hite photographer Al Seib and reporter Ashley Dunn, who is Chinese-American […],”483 “Times reporter Greg Braxton, who is black […],”484 or “Highland Park resident Marianne Hooper, 30, who is white watched the verdicts at home […]”485 are only some of the many examples in which the Times mentioned this feature. Furthermore, the lists of fatalities published by the paper are particularly noticeable:

While reports from the second day of the unrest (Thursday, April 30th) the respective victims’ name, age, cause and place of death as well as their ethnic/racial background are mentioned, the last information cannot be found on the list published directly after the unrest (Tuesday, May 5th), [a development that] can very nicely be tracked since the Times used its ‘old’ fatality lists and simply added the unrest’s new victims.486 In the racially heated situation of the civil unrest, the Times did what race theorist Arthur M. Schlesinger denounced as “cult of ethnicity,”487 saying that stressing everyone’s ethnic/racial background would lead to the disuniting of American society. By reporting on people’s race in great detail and simultaneously stating that ‘fear knows color’ the Times fostered an image of L.A. that resembles Schlesinger’s idea of a multiethnic but disunited America (or, in this case, city).

Despite the fact that the L.A. Times immediately identified the unrest as a multiethnic event, saying that “[a]lthough young black men constituted many of the rioters and

482 Kowsky, Kim and Ashi, Bernice Hirabayashi: “Tension Add Awkwardness to Everyday Encounters: Race Relations: Mistrust is pervasive. Even small talk and forced politeness point to a heightened unease”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A1/18, 18. 483 Morrison, Patt: “The Press Under Fire: Riot Targets Journalists”, A4. 484 Ibid. 485 Ferrell, David and Wallace, Amy: “Verdicts Greeted With Outrage and Disbelief: Reaction: Many cite videotape of beating and ask how jury could acquit officers. A few voice satisfaction”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1992, A1/24, 24. 486 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 329. 487 Schlesinger, Arthur M.: “The Disuniting of America: A Second Look”. Interamerican University of Puerto Rico, 1998. URL: http://revistahomines.com/articulos/thedisunitingofamerica.pdf [12.12.2015]. 137 looters, Latinos, Anglos and Asians also took part,”488 it is striking that it initially focused almost solely on how African Americans and Caucasians perceived the verdicts as well as the unrest. This can be explained by the fact that within the first two days of its reporting, the L.A. Times regarded the Rodney King incident or rather the acquittal of the four officers involved in the beating, as the main reason for the violent outbreak: “Rioting mobs ignited fires, beat motorists and looted stores and offices Wednesday night throughout Los Angeles [...] after the acquittal of four Los Angeles police officers in the beating of Rodney G. King”489 or “Outrage and indignation swept the city Wednesday as citizens [...] struggling to reconcile the acquittals of four Los Angeles Police Department officers with the alarming, violent images captured on a late-night videotape.”490

Therefore, the newspaper presented itself as the mouthpiece of L.A.’s population, quoting – beside scholars, community leaders, and politicians – particularly citizens commenting on the verdicts as well as circumstanced that, from their point of view, had contributed to the trial’s outcome. Reportedly, the King incident, but also the change of venue to Simi Valley which (according to a majority of Angelenos) had made the acquittal of the L.A. police officers possible in the first place, were perceived as a proof that racism was an integral part of American society:

‘The jury apparently didn’t see and hear the same trial I heard,’ said Inglewood resident Terry Coleman 49, a former police officer […]. ‘The verdict was as racist as what happened that night. I’m ashamed to be from Los Angeles. I’m happy I don’t have a uniform anymore’.491 This statement is not only representative for those the Times used to show that most Angelenos dissociated themselves from the verdicts, but it – like many others – also demonstrates that the King incident and verdict were not regarded as an aberration but as part of a larger problem. While in this quote racism is exposed as a city-wide problem, others extended the problem even to a national level, while L.A. was repeatedly characterized as the “the capital” of the U.S. dominated by racism:

488 Merina, Victor and Mitchell, John: “Opportunists, Criminals Get Blame for Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A1/12, 1f. 489 Huber, Shawn and Lacey, Marc: “Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores”, A1. 490 Ferrel, David and Wallace, Amy: “Verdicts Greeted With Outrage and Disbelief”, A1. 491 Serrano, Richard A. and Wilkinson, Tracy: “All 4 in King Beating Acquitted: Violence Follows Verdicts; Guard Called Out”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1992, A1/22, 22. 138

[t]he dismaying decision by an all-white [sic!] jury to find four police officers not guilty of beating King suggest that it just isn’t possible for blacks to receive justice in the courts. And it confirms what many of us, black and white, have known since we first saw that videotape: Racism is alive and well and living in America, with L.A. as its capital.492 This quote is representative for the L.A. Times’ news coverage during the unrest because it includes three terms (or phrasings, respectively) that were used repeatedly by the paper: ‘justice,’ ‘racism’ and the image of ‘L.A. as the capital of the racist U.S.’

With regard to the latter, it can be said that this extension, this transfer of white-on- black racism revealed by the beating and the trial to a national level, was furthermore achieved with the help of different national and international historical references, particularly pointing to Apartheid in South Africa on the one hand, and the history of slavery in North America on the other. The Times repeatedly quoted Angelenos stating that “[e]ven in Johannesburg, South Africa, they have begun to punish white officers who assault black people”493 or “[…] racism blinds people. It did in South Africa. It did in the U.S. South.”494 Statements like these did not only serve to show that racism was not a part of the past but of the present, they were furthermore used as a parameter showing how strained the relationship between African Americans and whites in 1992 Los Angeles actually was. This is not only true for references to international but also for national historical situations, like, “[…] [I] tell my children stories […] of their ancestors who fought for survival under the authority of cruel plantation owners who beat them for sport and I’ll realize that nothing has changed.”495 By using historical examples of white-on-black racism, it was emphasized that this kind of racism was not only a part of the past but also of L.A.’s and even the nation’s presence.

This directly leads to the second term, the Times used over and over again, which is that of ‘racism’. From the first day of its reporting on the verdicts and the unrest, the Times labeled the judicial decision a racist one. Instead of calling the verdicts, for

492 Dennis, Gregory: “Outrage over King Verdict”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-01/local/me-1167_1_blacks-outrage-over-king-verdict-racism [03.08.2015]. 493 Serrano, Richard A. and Wilkinson, Tracy: “All 4 in King Beating Acquitted”, A22. 494 Murray, Cecil in: Scheer, Robert: “Cecil Murray: A Voice of Reason in a Time if Troubles”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, M3. 495 Franenberg, Estellaleigh: “Outrage over King verdict”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B6. 139 instance, a ‘judicial error,’ the paper characterized them as an intentional decision based on the racist ideas of the jurors. Therefore, it is not surprising that beside statements identifying the beating and the verdicts as representing racism on both local as well as national levels, there are others in the Times reporting, according to which racism in the U.S. had been given a completely new dimension by the ‘King trial’. While previously it had existed only subliminally in the country’s judicial system, it openly came to light in the Simi Valley verdicts. Reportedly, particularly African American Angelenos feared that now racism would become publicly accepted. “‘This shows you can’t trust the justice system,’ said Anthony Ellis, a black man who talked bitterly about the message the verdicts have sent. ‘They just got a new license – any nigger you see, you can beat’”496 or “‘The verdict is very wrong,’ said Russell Baldwin, who is black. ‘They had it on tape. It showed that the cops were wrong…The verdict makes us open targets for the police […]”497 are vivid expressions of that fear represented in the paper’s reporting.

In the Times’ news coverage, this ‘black-and-white-conflict’ was constructed further by the paper focusing on Reginald Denny, a Caucasian who was pulled out of his truck and severely beaten by a group of five African Americans shortly after the violent outbreak. One reason for the Times concentrating particularly on him could certainly be found in the fact that – similar to the King beating – there was a video tape of the attack. This, however, cannot have been the only reason because only minutes after Denny had been brought to hospital, another man, Latino Fidel Lopez, entered the intersection of Florence and Normandie and suffered a similar fate: He too was pulled from his truck and almost beaten to death and like the Denny incident, the vicious beating was filmed. Despite the resemblance of the two attacks, however, Fidel Lopez’s name did not enter the Times’ news coverage until the year 2012, when the paper brought him to mind as “the forgotten victim from Florence and Normandie.”498

This inevitably prompts the question why during and after the unrest, the Times focused on one and completely neglected the other incident. It stands to reason that race was an important factor leading to the paper’s selection: While the video of the

496 Ferrel, David and Wallace, Amy: “Verdicts Greeted With Outrage and Disbelief”, A24. 497 Serrano, Richard A. and Wilkinson, Tracy: “All 4 in King Beating Acquitted”, A22. 498 Lopez, Steve: “The forgotten victim from Florence and Normandie”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06, 2012. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/06/local/la-me-0506-lopez-riot-20120506 [04.08.2015]. 140

King beating showed four white men abusing a black man, this new video displayed five African American males hitting and kicking a Caucasian. It was virtually a negative image of the King incident. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Times used an almost identical terminology reporting on the respective events: While – as the newspaper put it – George Holliday’s video showed “white officers savagely pummeling a prone black man,”499 it now referred to Reginald Denny as “the white truck driver who was savagely beaten by rioters […],”500 fostering the impression of a reflection of the two incidents, which – as the term ‘savagely’ implies – were marked by violence lacking the restraint of a human being.501

However, while the Times used the King beating particularly as a proof of racist police behavior, the paper’s reporting on the Danny beating seems to have two contradictory purposes. By focusing on this new, mirrored event, the Times seems to have tried to take blacks out of their victimhood. While after the King beating the newspaper’s focus had been especially on white-on-black discrimination, it seems as if the Times had soughed to show that blacks could also be perpetrators and were by no means color-blind. As the newspaper itself put it: “Now white gravel truck driver beaten nearly into oblivion in South Los Angeles has become the face on the flip side of the Rodney King coin, the unofficial black-on-white response to the official white- on-black beating.”502

Another aspect that was in the center of the Times reporting on Reginald Denny was his rescue, stressing that those who drove Denny to hospital were – just like his attackers – African Americans: “[…] in one of the most widely reported acts of heroism four African Americans saved a white truck driver, Reginald Denny.”503 Statements like these served to show that not only hatred and animosity were interracial but also sympathy and cooperativeness. Although obviously this contradicts the Times’ depiction of the beating, it also represents a characteristic

499 Stolberg, Sheryl and Tobar, Hector: “Gates Wants Officers Prosecuted In Beating”, A1. 500 Chavez, Stephanie: “Trucker Beaten by Rioters Improves”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, B3. 501 Cf. “savage”. In: Merriam Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary /savage [02.12.2015]. 502 Becklund, Laurie and Chavez, Stephanie: “Beaten Driver a Searing Image of Mob Cruelty”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A1/14, 1. 503 “The Open Wound That Los Angeles Must Now Work to Heal”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, B9. 141 typical of the newspaper’s coverage on the unrest, which is a non-coherent account of one and the same event.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one reason for the L.A. Times’ initial focus on African Americans and Caucasians can certainly be found in the newspaper identifying the unrest as having its cause in the King beating and the verdicts following it. However, although not specifically mentioned by the Times, there might have been other reasons for this focus on blacks and whites: One can certainly be found in L.A.’s ‘riot history,’ deeply rooted in the city population’s collective memory: starting with the Chinese Massacre of 1871, via the 1943 Suit Zoot riots to the 1965 Watts riots, all important unrests of the city’s past involved two racial groups, of which one always was white. Now, in 1992, however, Los Angeles was confronted with its first multiethnic unrest, “a ‘concept’ both unknown and hard to grasp, especially in the early hours of the events.”504 Therefore, the newspaper resorted to “the stereotypical and historically accepted racial conflict in the U.S.,”505 which was that of African Americans and Caucasians. This also corresponds with the Times repeatedly attempting to draw parallels between the 1992 unrest and the Watts riots that had shattered South Central almost thirty years earlier (see: 7.1.3 Watts revisited?).

The third term that was characteristic of the Times’ news coverage on the verdicts as well as the unrest was that of ‘(in)justice’. As the quote presented above shows, the jury’s decision was depicted as proving “that it just isn’t possible for blacks to receive justice,” an evaluation which could be found in a number of similar statements in and by the newspaper: “‘This shows you can’t trust the justice system,’ said Anthony Ellis, another protester. ‘What’s justice? What kind of example do we have to show our kids?”506 and “[…] Tonia Smith [a local resident] […] stood screaming about the verdicts, ‘It was wrong! Suspended without pay, that’s no justice’”507 are only two of the many expressions published by the Times, showing the public’s anger over the acquittal of the four officers.

As these examples illustrate, the highly abstract term of ‘justice’ (and injustice, respectively) served to illustrate that Rodney King had been treated unfairly and that

504 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 328. 505 Ibid. 506 Serrano, Richard A. and Wilkinson, Tracy: “All 4 in King Beating Acquitted”, A22. 507 Ferrel, David and Wallace, Amy: “Verdicts Greeted With Outrage and Disbelief”, A24. 142 his rights had been ignored by a predominately white jury in favor of the four police officers. Therefore, if King’s rights had been violated by a racist jury and if L.A. was the ‘capital’ of the ‘racist United States,’ the Times portrayed him as representing the injustice all African Americans were facing daily in the country’s court rooms.

7.1.3 Watts revisited?

Particularly in the first two weeks after the outbreak of the unrests, the Watts and L.A. ‘riots’ were repeatedly compared to each by the Times itself as well as by residents and ‘experts’ quoted by the paper. The – up to that point – most violent urban outbreak in L.A.’s history at first glance seemed to show striking parallels: An encounter of an African American motorist and white L.A.P.D. officers as the unrest’s trigger event and South Central as the starting point of the unrest reportedly made many Angelenos say that “[i]t doesn’t take a rocket scientist to see the parallels between the Watts riots of 27 years ago and the post-Rodney King verdict incidents.”508

However, it soon became obvious that the current events were not a “Watts II”509 but a distinct event, which (despite having similar reasons) had far more complex developments and a different constellation of participants. Instead of neglecting the Watts ‘riots,’ however, Times rather adduced them as a benchmark to emphasize the severity of the current events, saying, for instance, that “[i]t [the current violent outbreak] was the largest rioting to erupt in Los Angeles since the Watts riots of 1965,”510 “[…] early signs indicate that the destruction of the past few days may rival that caused by the Watts riots of 1965”511 or “[d]eaths placed at 40, eclipsing the Watts riots. […] During the five days of the Watts riots, 34 died.”512

Furthermore, the Times used Watts to point out the uniqueness of the 1992 civil unrest in terms of its geographic spread as well as the social and ethnic/racial constellation of those participating. Concerning the first, the paper reported that “[u]nlike the Watts riots of 1965, the violence this time has not been confined to an

508 Cantos, Steve: “Rioting in Los Angeles”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, B6. 509 Jackson, Jesse in Scheer, Robert: “Interview: ”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1992, C8. 510 Serrano, Richard A. and Wilkinson, Tracy: “All 4 in King Beating Acquitted”, A1. 511 Mulligan, Thomas S.: “Adjusters Fan Out as Insurers Brace for $1 Billion in Claims”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, B3. 512 Lieberman, Paul and Murphy Dean E.: “Bush Ordering Troops to L.A.” In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A1/13, 1. 143 isolated area”513 or, more cynically, that “[t]he netherworld never moved north of Pico [Boulevard]. But last week, the two worlds suddenly came face to face,”514 indicating that in 1965, the impoverished black ‘rioters’ did not move beyond the borders of ‘their’ neighborhoods; now in 1992, however, participants in the urban unrest did not confine themselves to South Central but infringed on other neighborhood and thereby affected members of almost all ethnic groups.

In addition, besides emphasizing the diverging severity and the extended geographic spread, the Times especially stressed the two events’ different ‘agents’ to underline the singularity of the 1992 unrest. It repeatedly mentioned that in both cases, ‘rioters’ were members of the impoverished population of South Central, cut off from the city’s economy, simultaneously emphasizing that now – because of the area’s altered ethnic/racial make-up – the participants were no longer black only but ethnically/racially diverse: According to the Times, 1992 South Central, similar to prior to Watts, suffered particularly from “[…] joblessness, hopelessness and a crippling lack of skills and education.”515 The Times notion of ‘hopelessness’ reminds strongly of Cornel West’s idea of ‘black nihilism’ that – according to him – had been affecting the African American population of the U.S. for centuries and was one of the main problems of blacks in the 1990s. As West postulates, it was not only racism, economic deprivation and political powerlessness but particularly the “nihilistic threat – that is, loss of hope of absence and meaning,” which was “the major enemy of black survival in America.”516 Hence, the paper did not only stress economic reasons as having contributed to the violent outbreak but also “that without hope there can be no future”517 in South Central Los Angeles. This, however, was one of the rare occasions in which the L.A Times (as a liberal newspaper) mentioned reasons other than economic ones.518

513 Braxton, Greg and Newton, Jim: “Looting and Fires Ravage L.A.: 25 Dead, 572 Injured; 1,000 Blazes Reported: Unrest: Troops begin deployment and a dusk-to-dawn curfew is clamped into place in the second day of violence”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A1/10” In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A1/10, 1. 514 Jones, Robert A.: “City’s Two Worlds Collide as the Riots Reach Out and Grab White Los Angeles: A Few Hours When Our Town Hung in the Balance”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, A4. 515 Hubler, Shawn: “South L.A.’s Poverty Rate Worse Than ‘65”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1992, A1/22, 1. 516 West, Cornel: Race Matters. Beakon Press, Boston, 1993, 15. 517 Ibid. 518 West furthermore criticized the common liberal approach, which was also supported by the Times (see 7.3.2 National Politics), saying that “[t]he liberal notion that more government programs can 144

Different from 1965, however, it was no longer the black population of South Central that had been suffering from joblessness, hopelessness as well as a lack of skills and education. As the paper reported “the faces have changed: In 1965, the area was 81% black. By 1990, with more than double the population, half the people in South Central were Latino and the black community comprised 44.8%.”519 As the paper reported, this urban transformation of South Central led to a changed make-up of those participating in the unrest: “[…] of those arrested 51% were Hispanics, 37% black and 12% white.”520 This altered constellation was one of the main reasons making the Times (as well as many Angelenos) perceive the current event as having a “different profile than Watts.”521

Another aspect closely related to the Watts ‘riots’ that was mentioned in the Times news coverage on the 1992 unrest was the ’s final report examining the causes of the unrests in L.A. (Watts, 1965), Chicago (1966) and Newark (1967). Here, the newspaper focused particularly on the extract according to which the U.S. was becoming “two societies, one black and one white, separate and unequal.”522 Although the conflict of 1992 was no longer one on a black-and-white level only but comprised multiple ethnicities, the old binary scheme of two unequal societies was revisited in the Times reporting. In some cases, it was veritably attempted to force the city’s different groups into this system:

In 1992, the L.A. riots again point toward a great and growing divide in a city moving towards two societies, one rich and predominantly white, one poor and predominately Latino and African-American – still separate and unequal. Asians, depending on their income and ethnicity, are caught somewhere in the middle.523 Beside those approaching the current developments with the help of the actually outdated binary scheme, there were others who reportedly regarded particularly the statement’s second part as a prophecy that has become true: In the discourse about the 1992 events, the city’s impoverished multi-ethnic population was repeatedly

solve racial problems is simplistic – precisely because it focuses solely on the economic dimension.” This, however, does not mean that West rejected government initiatives but different from most liberals (as well as the Times), he regarded these as insufficient. West, Cornel: Race Matters, 2. 519 Hubler, Shawn: “South L.A.’s Poverty Rate Worse Than ‘65”, A1. 520 Jackson, Jesse in Scheer, Robert: “Interview: Jesse Jackson”, C8. 521 Ibid. 522 Jackson, Jesse: “A ‘Terrible Rainbow of Protest’”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, B7. 523 “Tales of Two Cities: Rich and Poor, Separate and Unequal”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06, 1992, B8. 145 juxtaposed in opposition to the more affluent, also multi-ethnic residents of Los Angeles. They were perceived as two societies of their own also becoming apparent by, for example, the image of “two worlds collid[ing]”524 during the riots or the one used by Bill Clinton, who referred to the inner-city as “the other America.”525

Furthermore, the Kerner Commission’s prediction was used by the L.A. Times as an indicator showing that the current crisis could have been prevented if national politics had responded to the urban problems already existing back then. Therefore, the events of 1965 and 1992 were not considered local phenomena but part of a larger national urban problem, relying on national initiatives improving the living conditions in the U.S.’ inner-cities. Hence, Watts did not only serve as a benchmark pointing out the degree and spread of violence but also as a historical example the present generation (of politicians) could learn from. According to the Times, various politicians and community leaders thought it necessary not only to introduce ‘urban initiatives’ but also to adhere to as well as to enhance them. Reportedly, politicians had admittedly driven forth such initiatives but had given them up in favor of other political decisions. In connection with this, e.g. Civil Rights activist Jesse Jackson was quoted, saying that “[The Kerner Commission] called for a national offensive against poverty and racism. But urban initiatives were among the first casualties of the war in Vietnam.”526 According to him as well as many others, it was officials focusing on foreign affairs that had made them miss “revitalize[ing]”527 America’s cities. Thus, in the news coverage examined here, the 1992 civil unrest was not only portrayed as directly related to the aftermath of the Watts ‘riots’ of 1965 but also as a warning not to again neglect L.A.’s urban problems in the unrest’s aftermath.

Taking into consideration all the evidence given above, it can be said that in the discourse on the 1992 events, Watts was mentioned for different reasons: By comparing these two events, the Times did not only stress the importance Watts had for Los Angeles but also attributed a similar importance to the new events. It did not only serve as a benchmark depicting the severity of the current crisis but also as a

524 Jones, Robert A.: “City’s Two Worlds Collide as the Riots Reach Out and Grab White Los Angeles”, A4. 525 Brownstein, Ronald: “Clinton: Parties Fail to Attack Race Divisions”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, A8. 526 Jackson, Jesse: “A ‘Terrible Rainbow of Protest’”, B7. 527 Clifford, Frank and Schwada, John: “Ueberroth Will Direct City Rebuilding Effort”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, A1/13, 1. 146 textbook example of what would happen if politics failed to adequately respond to the country’s urban problems, offering the possibility to do it better this time.

7.1.4 The ‘Black-Korean Conflict’

Besides the black and white conflict dominating the first few days of the L.A. Times’ reporting, there was another – already familiar – racial opposition the newspaper focused on, which was that of African Americans and Koreans. From May 1st, the discourse on the conflict between Korean shop-owners and their African American customers, the Times had already reported after the shootings of Latasha Harlins and Arthur Lee Mitchell in the summer of 1991, was renewed. Although these racial tensions were discussed less intensively than that between blacks and whites, they nonetheless constituted a relatively large part of the paper’s reportage on the unrest. Especially, the question of whether African American ‘rioters’ had deliberately been targeting Korean-owned businesses during the unrest was posed and doffed repeatedly.

Again and similar to the reportage on animosities between blacks and whites, the Times almost solely presented statements by Koreans and African Americans speculating if the looting and torching of Korean-owned stores were deliberate actions by black ‘rioters’ or accidental occasions, having their reason in the shops’ location rather than their owners’ ethnic background. Reportedly, answers to this central question were manifold, ranging from a decisive ‘yes,’ to a definite ‘no,’ to a doubting ‘maybe’.

And neither did the Times itself adopt a clear position with regard to this topic, but commented on it in a rather contradictory manner. The following examples are vivid expressions of this ambiguous depiction: Stating that “[s]ome Korean merchants, who have clashed with black customers in the past, saw their businesses burned. But many black-owned businesses – despite some efforts to identify themselves that way – were not spared,”528 the Times depicted the events as economically and socially motivated rather than racially; it stressed that Korean and African American entrepreneurs alike were victims of the looting and .529

528 Braxton, Greg and Newton, Jim: “Looting and Fires Ravage L.A.”, A10. 529 It furthermore illustrates that both the Times as well as many African American shop-owners perceived the violent outbreak as a black dominated one since they – just like during the 1965 Watts 147

Beside the shop owners’ diverse racial background, it was particularly the multi- ethnic composition of the ‘rioters’ the Times used as an indicator showing that the attacks on Korean-owned stores were not the result of tensions between African and Korean Americans. The hypothesis uttered by Korean entrepreneur Eddie Rho that black ‘rioters’ could have deliberately attacked his store because of its owner’s race was contested by the Times, stating that “his assumption that the looters were African Americans belied the multiracial composition of rioters that swept through many parts of the city.”530 On the one hand, this statement indicates that ‘the looters’ were perceived as a homogenous group driven by one motivation and not as individuals having their distinct reasons; on the other hand, it shows that because of the ‘multiracial composition of rioters’ in many places, it – at least for this reporter – was virtually out of the question that African Americans had deliberately targeted Korean-owned stores.

In contrast, however, there were numerous articles in the Times creating the impression that Korean-owned stores were intentionally looted and torched by African Americans. As the paper put it, “some Korean-owned businesses were singled out for looting and arson, apparently because of tensions between African Americans and Korean Americans.”531 Here, it is striking that the arguments the Times used to show that Korean merchants were deliberately attacked were very often similar to those that were supposed to prove the opposite. While – as presented above – the Times used shops owned by African Americans being burned as evidence that Koreans had not been deliberately targeted, it used the same kind of argument to prove the opposite. It, for instance, was mentioned several times that Korean shops burned out while African American businesses close by were spared:

A strung of Asian-American-owned liquor stores and markets were set afire and looted. On Compton Boulevard, a Korean-

riots – tried to prevent their stores from being attacked by putting signs into their windows, saying ‘black-owned’. 530 Braun, Stephen and Dunn, Ashley: “View of Model Multiethnic City Vanishes in Smoke”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A1/28, 28. 531 “Methodist Leadership Holds Special Session on Racism, L.A. Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 09, 1992, B 6. 148

owned liquor store was burned to the ground while a black-owned store just yards away stood unscathed and open for business.532

These conspicuities seemed to be supported by statements by black ‘rioters,’ quoted by the Times, according to which “we’re [blacks] the ones who made them [Koreans] rich”533 and thus “we are taking our community back.”534

It is striking that despite the notion that the participants in the unrest were multiethnic, the Times almost solely interviewed and quoted members of that ethnic group it already regarded as the ‘protagonist’ anyhow (in this case African American ‘rioters’) and resorted to already known conflicts (or rather potential for conflicts) as can be seen in the following example:

Disrespect. A woman I talked to last week used that as a reason why she, a normally law-abiding citizen walked into the rubble of a torched liquor store on Western Avenue and picked up a box of cigars. She said she couldn’t stand the Korean-American owner. I asked her why. “Because the first time I walked into the store he didn’t say ‘Hi’ or ‘Good morning’. He said ‘Hey Mama’ – trying to talk as if he thought that’s how black people talk. How dare he! He thought so little of me, thought so little of my community that he didn’t even bother to find out the most basic things about us.”535 This anecdote again (just like in the discourse following the killings of Harlins and Mitchell) indicates that cultural miscommunication was one essential reason for the tensions between African and Korean Americans. Unrecognized as such by Koreans as well as blacks, many of those African Americans taking part in the looting of Korean-owned stores reportedly used the seemingly ‘disrespectful’ behavior of Korean merchants as a justification for their own actions. And so did the Times: As already implied above, it focused on the potential motivation of blacks participating in the unrest only, instead of taking into consideration that more than one ethnic group showed aversions to another one – that, for example, Latinos and African Americans both and for similar reasons had torched and looted Korean-owned stores. On the contrary, it focused on binary oppositions in a conflict the paper itself had

532 Griego, Tina: “2 Cities – Under Siege and Under Threat”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B 1/8, 1. 533 Dunn, Ashley: “Will South L.A. Liquor Stores Be Rebuild?” In: Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1992 A1/34/35, 34. 534 Dunn, Ashley: “Years of ‘2-Cent’ Insults Added Up to Rampage”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 07, 1992, A1/14, 1 535 Clayton, Janet: “When Loving L.A. Turns to Heartache”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A1/22, 22. 149 already identified as multi-oppositional and multi-layered. Additionally, in articles in which the Times identified attacks on Koreans as deliberate actions, it hardly ever regarded a combination of factors as possible reasons for these occurrences. Either they were portrayed as a display of racial tensions or as geographical accidents or as having economic reasons.

Beside the debate about attacks on Korean-owned businesses, especially the recourse to the Latasha Harlins incident as well as the suspended sentence for Soon Ja Du following it, is striking in the Times’ news coverage on the 1992 unrest. While in the summer of boycott, the paper had presented black activists referring to Latasha Harlins and Arthur Lee Mitchell as ‘proof’ for the ‘disrespectful’ behavior of Korean American merchants towards their African American customers, the latter was hardly mentioned in the newly inflamed debate about the relationship of the two racial groups. As already mentioned in chapter 5.2.1 The Encounter of Latasha Harlins and Latasha Harlins, the reason for that can certainly be found in Harlins (because of her age and sex) occupying a special position in the conflict. While previously, particularly men were involved in violent encounters between Korean American entrepreneurs and their black customers (just like in the Mitchell incident), the fatal occurrence between Harlins and Du was one between two women. The fact that in this particular case, the victim, the culprit as well as the judge in charge were female might have led to an altered perception of the incident.

Now, in the reappearing debate about the conflict between Koreans and African Americans, Harlins’ death became a symbol of these long-existing tensions. In the news coverage examined here, it served as a time marker, showing for how long tensions had been particularly high: “Relations worsened last spring when a Korean- American merchant shot an unarmed, 15-year-old black girl to death […]”536 or “[…] tension flared again when a Korean-born grocer was sentenced to probation for the fatal shooting of a 15-year-old black girl.”537 Furthermore, it emphasized the intensity of the conflict by stressing that a young and unarmed girl had fallen victim to it. Therefore, it is not surprising that reportedly many (black) Angelenos perceived the current violent outbreak as a delayed reaction to Soon Ja Du getting probation,

536 Chang, Irene and Krikorian, Greg: “30,000 Show Support in Koreatown March”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A3/23, 3. 537 Risen, James and Tumulty, Karen: “Numbers Show Most Blacks Remain Mired in Poverty”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A10. 150 which becomes apparent in statements like “[a]fter Latasha was killed and they announced the [sentence], I thought that what’s going on now would have gone on then.”538

Although not explicitly mentioned by the Times, another reason for incorporating Latasha Harlins in the discourse about the L.A. civil unrest can certainly be found in the similarity of this and the Rodney King incident. In both cases there had been a long simmering conflict between respectively two parties – one between the L.A.P.D. and blacks, especially young black men, and one between Korean American entrepreneurs and their black customers. Additionally, in both cases there had been video footage of the incidents making many (particularly African American) Angelenos assume that the taped evidence would lead to severe sentences for the respective defendants – which, however, was not the case. Therefore, in the L.A. Times’ news coverage, Harlins did not only become a symbol of the black- Korean conflict but also, together with Rodney King, one showing that blacks were treated unfairly by the American justice system, that both had fallen victim to the city’s white-dominated power structures. As L.A. Times columnist Al Martinez reported:

I heard over and over again that it wasn’t just the Rodney King verdict that . The name of Latasha Harlins was mentioned often. She was the 15-year-old black girl shot in the back by Korean grocer Soon Ja Du, who was fined $500 and put on probation by a white judge, Joyce Karlin. Anger over the mild verdict has never subsided. ‘It proves my point,’ Terry Adams [a black resident of South Central] said […] ‘Justice wasn’t created for black people’.539 Reporting that Harlins had been ‘shot in the back,’ the paper again portrayed her as Du’s defenseless victim, which – together with the notion that Du was sentenced ‘mildly’ – shows that the Times characterized the verdict as an injustice. Although not mentioned explicitly, the terminology used by the paper furthermore indicates that it considered race having constituted an important factor in finding the verdict: Mentioning Latasha Harlins’, Soon Ja Du’s as well as Joyce Karlin’s racial backgrounds suggests that it was the latter’s ‘whiteness’ that had made her rule in favor of the member of the Korean ‘model minority’ and to the detriment of the actual victim. That the verdict was criticized by the Times can furthermore be seen

538 Morrison, Patt: “Symbol of Pain Survives Flames”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 07, 1992, B3. 539 Martinez, Al: “Scenes from the Battlefield”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B2. 151 by the paper not mentioning Joyce Karlin’s name but simply calling her ‘white judge,’ which can be read as another attempt to fully distance itself from Karlin and her decision in the Du case.

At another point of the reporting, the verdict was even more obviously called into question, reporting that “[t]he Simi Valley verdict – and the woefully inadequate [highlighted by author, K.M.] sentence meted out to the killer [highlighted by author, K.M.] of 15-year-old Latasha Harlins shot by a Korean grocer – just added to the growing sense that African Americas do not get a fair shake in the American criminal justice system.”540 Both statements presented above display that the Times regarded the King as well as the Harlins incident as symptoms of a long simmering racism against African Americans regularly leading to an abuse of power by those representing the country’s legal system. Despite evidence suggesting that the defendants were facing severe penalties, Caucasians in both cases had judged in favor of whites and a member of a ‘model minority,’ respectively. Therefore, the ‘riots’ were characterized as a logical consequence of the unequal distribution of power as well as abuse of power against blacks that became manifested in the Rodney King and Latasha Harlins incidents. Repeatedly, the newspaper quoted African American Angelenos, saying, for instance, “[i]t is sad, but it had to happen […]. We turned the other cheek with Latasha Harlins. Justice wasn’t done there. We waited for the justice system to work in the King case.”541

Despite the tensions between Koreans and African Americans, identified by the newspaper examined here, there were counter movements comprising citizens of various ethnic/racial backgrounds, who aimed at mitigating the conflict. On May 3rd, i.e. five days after the outbreak of the ‘riots,’ the L.A. Times reported about “30,000 show[ing] support in Koreatown march.”542 Despite the fact that it was a gathering of “various ethnic groups,”543 the paper’s focus was again particularly on the reactions of blacks and Korean Americans. It, for example, was described how

[s]everal elderly Korean men left the parade route to shake the hands of Latinos and African-Americans who were watching. […] A black youth waved a South Korean flag from a curb and thrust a

540 “Stop the Violence, Start the Renewal”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B6. 541 Boyer, Edward J.: “The View at the Crenshaw Café: ‘It’s Sad, But It Had to Happen’”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, B1/4, 4. 542 Chang, Irene and Krikorian, Greg: “30,000 Show Support in Koreatown March”, A3. 543 Ibid. 152

fist into the air in a gesture of solidarity. The marchers, most of whom were Korean-American, cheered.544 Reportedly, members of both ethnic groups perceived this event as an important first step towards interethnic understanding, stating that “this was an ideal opportunity to have some kind of rapprochement between the black and the Korean communities.”545 It is noticeable that despite numerous Angelenos of various ethnicities trying to act as a counterbalance to the omnipresent violence and distrust (see 7.3.1 Cleaning up Los Angeles), the newspaper examined here tended to focus on the points on frictions only; statements like “Koreans are victims [of the system] but blacks are victims, too,”546 affirming solidarity and sympathy could only scarcely be found.

7.2 Perception and Depiction of the L.A.P.D. During and After the L.A. Unrest

After the outbreak of the unrest on April 29th, the perception and depiction of the Los Angeles Police Department in the L.A. Times probably underwent one of the most significant changes. While after the Rodney King incident it had been identified as a racist, violent and bigoted institution by a large part of L.A.’s society as well as the L.A. Times, it now had to contend against another accusation, which was that of passivity and self-imposed inability. In the Times news coverage, this was particularly linked to an occurrence which took place directly after the verdict had become known to the public and which during the first days of the unrest was regarded as their flash-point: the and other motorists near the intersection of Florence and Normandie Avenues, where “at least 20 Los Angeles Police Officers backed down in a tense confrontation with South LA gang members and other residents furious over the verdicts.”547 As the L.A. Times explains further, the officers “fled when the encounter turned into a shoving match […]. One officer told his colleagues repeatedly: ‘It’s not worth it! Let’s go!’ They did not return for hours and have refused to fully explain why.”548 Already here, the criticism the Times leveled against the police becomes noticeable: the verb ‘to flee’ implies fear

544 Chang, Irene and Krikorian, Greg: “30,000 Show Support in Koreatown March”, A3. 545 Ibid. 546 Kwon, Soon Chang: “’This riot is the ugly other side of America’”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 13, 1992, T10. 547 Connell, Rich and Rohrlich, Ted: “Police Pullout, Riot’s Outbreak Reconstructed”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A1/4, 1. 548 Ibid. 153 and weakness on the part of the policemen – a fear that was characterized as highly questionable, indicated by the term ‘shoving match,’ suggesting a minor quarrel rather than a violent encounter. Stating that the officers ‘did not return for hours’ moreover implied that the police abandoned the residents – an impression that was reinforced by the following descriptions: “Police cars [were] barreling through the intersection [of Florence and Normandie] during the riot, sirens blaring, without stopping”549 or “police left without trying to block traffic, seal off area or warn anyone,”550 also suggesting a certain forsaking of this particular area as well as its resident by the L.A.P.D. By informing its readers about the police’s retreat from Florence and Normandie Avenues and furthermore telling them that after the police had left, “members of the crowd [of ‘rioters’] stoned Anglo and Latino motorists, pulled them out of cars and looted and torched stores,” 551 the Times suggested that the police had made the unrest possible in the first place.

This quote, however, is also noticeably for a number of other reasons: Reporting that the participants in the unrest ‘stoned’ motorists, ‘looted’ and ‘torched’ stores, the paper stressed the criminal character of those involved in the ‘riots’ as they intended to kill,552 robbed shops on grand scale553 and deliberately set them on fire,554 showing that here (different from other passages in the paper’s news coverage in which it showed sympathy for those taking their anger to the streets), the paper condemned the ‘rioters’’ deeds.

Stressing the participants’ propensity towards violence could of course be read as the paper’s attempt to explain the police officers’ retreat, which (taking the following excerpts into account) is rather unlikely, though. Instead, the delayed and unorganized intervention by the police during the first hours of the unrest drastically changed the population’s perception as well as the Times’ portrayal of the Los Angeles Police Department: While previous to the unrest, it had been characterized not only as being powerful but also as using their power arbitrarily (which had made

549 Connell, Rich and Rohrlich, Ted: “Police Pullout, Riot’s Outbreak Reconstructed”, A4. 550 McMillan, Penelope: “Video Captures Police Retreat at Outbreak of Violence”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A4. 551 Connell, Rich and Rohrlich, Ted: “Police Pullout, Riot’s Outbreak Reconstructed, A1. 552 “stone”. In: Merriam Wester Online. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stone [04.12.2015]. 553 “loot”. In: Merriam Wester Online. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/loot [04.12.2015]. 554 “torch”. In: Merriam Wester Online. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/torch [04.12.2015]. 154 parts of society – especially ethnic minorities – fear this institution), it was now discerned as “impotent”555 and “paralyzed,”556 ergo as powerless; reportedly, this, in turn, induced fear on the part of many Angelenos. Now, however, they were not afraid of the police themselves but of those the L.A.P.D. could obviously not protect them from: criminals, gang members or generally speaking ‘rioters’. Therefore, at least temporarily, there was a shift of power making scared citizens ask if the police “will […] react aggressively [enough] to crime”557 – a question that in an altered manner can repeatedly be found in the L.A. Times news coverage. Supreme Court Justice Armand Arabia, for example, was quoted asking cynically: “Where was the protection and the service? Any slower response and we would have seen photos of policemen pasted on milk containers and listed as missing.”558 Other examples presenting as how significant many people regarded the police’s inability to react can be seen in utterances by Angelenos identifying the “night’s chaotic events [as] the LAPD’s Vietnam.”559 Alluding to what many U.S.-Americans still consider one of the greatest disasters in their country’s (military) history, the paper characterized the L.A.P.D.’s procedure during the unrest as a strategic nightmare, contributing to the Times’ image of the city’s police force as impotent.

Besides Florence and Normandie, the Times soon concentrated on another hotspot to identify police failure: attacks on Korean-owned businesses in South Central and Koreatown. Reportedly, it was “lacking confidence in the police”560 that had made numbers of entrepreneurs arm themselves to protect their properties from being looted and torched. Quoting Koreans asking “Where are the police?,” or stating that “The police cannot help us now,”561 the Times created the impression that the L.A.P.D. had abandoned Korean shop-owners and thereby forced them to “become vigilantes, embracing a new brutal code of order.”562 This was even furthered by

555 McNemara, Joseph D.: “When the Police Create Disorder”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, M1. 556 Ibid. 557 Hager, Philip: “LAPD Losing Public Support, Judge Says”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 08, 1992, A1/6, 1. 558 Ibid. 559 Connell, Rich and Rohrlich, Ted and Serrano, Richard A. and: “Riot Found Police in Disarray”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06, 1992, A1/16, 16. 560 Dunn, Ashley: “Looters, Merchants Put Koreatown Under the Gun: Violence: Lacking confidence in the police, employees and others armed themselves to protect mini-mall”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A1/10, 1. 561 Ibid., A10. 562 Ibid. 155 descriptions like the following, portraying the police as unorganized and incompetent:

At 10:30 p.m. the calm is shattered as several police cars pull up and a group of officers barrels out, leveling weapons at the Koreans. ‘Get your hands up,’ an officer yelled. ‘Hands up! Stand up! Hands up!’ The Korean stood frozen for a moment, uncertain what the officer wanted. ‘Hands up!’ the officer yelled again as a floodlight from a police car scanned the group. For a moment, the two groups stood motionless before each other. ‘Wait,’ an officer finally said. ‘This isn’t it. They are all Koreans.’ The officers turned to their cars and sped off. The Korean chuckled in relief. A few minutes later a single squad car pulled up next to the parking lot and stopped. Richard Rhee [a Korean merchant] stared at the black Los Angeles police officer at the wheel. ‘William, is that you?’ Rhee asked. The officer nodded and smiled back. ‘Stay here with us,’ Rhee said. The officer smiled and shook his head. ‘I wish I could’, he said before he drove off into the night.563 As already implied above, this anecdote contributed to the negative image of the L.A.P.D. It was not only portrayed as incapable of differentiating between ‘rioters’ and merchants defending their property but also as abandoning them when recognizing their mistake. This was not only done by describing the police officers ‘speeding off,’ but also and especially by saying that – despite the Koreans’ request to stay – the officers ‘drove off into the night,’ literally leaving behind those who needed protection. In the final analysis, this also means that the Times implied that the L.A.P.D. at least partially was to blame for the escalation of violence in Koreatown: If the police had responded to the Korean shop-owners’ calls for help, there would certainly have been fewer victims and less property damages.

Seeking for explanations why the police ‘abandoned’ Koreatown as well as Florence and Normandie and did not meet “thousands of pleas for help by LA residents,”564 an ‘old acquaintance’ was soon identified: Police Chief Daryl Gates. Although the Times itself stated that there was “plenty of blame to spread around – from the Police Department to the mayor’s office to some community leaders,”565 it is striking that the newspaper particularly presented statements by Gates’ critics. It reports that he was not only accused of having been at a political fundraiser instead of the police headquarters at the beginning of the riots but also of not having adopted sufficient

563 Dunn, Ashley: “Looters, Merchants Put Koreatown Under the Gun”, A10. 564 Connell, Rich and Rohrlich, Ted and Serrano, Richard A.: “Riot Found Police in Disarray”, A1. 565 Connell, Rich and Rohrlich, Ted: “Gates’ Defense of LAPD Faces Searching Inquiry”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1992, A1/29, 29. 156 measures to prevent them (or at least to deal with them adequately), notwithstanding that the potential for unrest inherent to the ‘King trail’ had been well-known. As the L.A. Times puts it: “Questions […] have arisen over whether there was inadequate planning by Gates and others in the days and weeks before the beating verdicts, which may have slowed the department’s response to the unrest;”566 reportedly, questions like these were not only posed by civilians or the city’s fire fighters of many of whom complained about the police not having protected them during their operations but also by police officers themselves. The Times published numerous articles quoting policemen, according to whom there was “a picture of chaos and indecision by police commanders, who felt overmatched and seemed unprepared to deal with the crisis.”567 Furthermore, they told of “‘a complete breakdown’ of the command leadership. […] [There was] no contingency plan. There was nothing… [but] paralysis,”568 portraying the highest L.A.P.D. ranks, first of all Daryl Gates, as the ones to blame for the officers’ unorganized and slow response to the emerging ‘riots’. In the discourse of the L.A. Times, statements like these contributed to the reinforcement of Gates’ negative image that had already been created in the aftermath of the King beating.

This, however, does not mean that Daryl Gates was not heard in the L.A. Times reporting. He, for example, was quoted insisting that the unrest getting out of control was neither his fault nor that of the police as such but could be attributed to the wrongdoing of only a few (an argument he had also put forth after the King beating). While, at first, he stated that “we [the LAPD] wanted to be ready for any eventuality and we were … I am proud of my police officers. I am proud of my leaders. We had some glitches and I am not unwilling to admit those glitches,”569 he later blamed his “high-ranking officers [who] made factional errors and failed to implement longstanding plans for dealing with unrest.”570 According to Gates, the ‘riots’ were particularly the fault of field lieutenant Michael Moulin who withdrew his officers from Florence and Normandie. Gates himself only acknowledged that his departure from the L.A.P.D. headquarters in the early hours of the unrest was wrong, but he did

566 Connell, Rich and Rohrlich, Ted: “Gates’ Defense of LAPD Faces Searching Inquiry”, A29. 567 Connell, Rich and Rohrlich, Ted and Serrano, Richard A.: “Riot Found Police in Disarray”, A1. 568 Ibid., A16. 569 Connell, Rich and Serrano, Richard A. and Rohrlich, Ted: “Gates Defends Riot Planning of LAPD, Concedes Mistakes”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 09, 1992, A1/4, 4. 570 Rohrlich, Ted and Serrano, Richard A.: “Criticism Over Use of Force Inhibited by Police, Gates Says”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 07, 1992, A1. 157 not admit any further mistakes on his part.571 Reporting about Gates defending the L.A.P.D. and particularly himself, the Times used phrasings like “angry and weary, Gates continues to parry criticism,”572 portraying the chief not only as increasingly suffering under the accusations but also, and most importantly, unwilling to publicly admit any possible mistakes. This impression was furthered by the newspaper saying that Gates “fended off – or evaded – reporters’ questions,”573 or that he “swagger[ed] into the fray”574 with a reporter.

Besides this rather open criticism, the Times also resorted to more indirect ways of criticizing the police chief. According to the paper, for Gates, the Rodney King incident and the investigation following it could be regarded as another reason for the police officers’ hesitation. According to him, the media’s interest in the occurrence and the public condemnation of the use of force by L.A.P.D. officers now kept policemen from taking action since they were afraid of being (pre-) judged:

I know police officers on the streets are scared to death to use any kind of force because they think they’re going to be second- guessed. […] They [critics] have pushed us and pushed and pushed. So, we have turned into a community-oriented policing…That’s the watchword. Don’t use force.575 It is remarkable that the Times itself did not comment on statements like this, which can be read as an attack on the media, including the Los Angeles Times itself that had openly criticized the L.A.P.D. (or rather its racist tendencies) after the King beating. Nevertheless, instead of addressing him and his position with criticism, the newspaper presented numerous others doing so: “Gates’ remarks drew sharp criticism from community and political leaders. ‘It sounds to me as if Chief Gates was living on another planet,’ City Councilman Michael Woo said,”576 is only one of the many critical remarks presented by the Times.

571 Connel, Rich and Serrano, Richard A. and Rohrlich, Ted: “Gates Defends Riot Planning of LAPD, Concedes Mistakes”, A1. 572 Sipchen, Bob: “Angry and Weary, Gates Continues to Parry Criticism”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 09, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-09/news/mn-1587_1_daryl-gates [01.01.2015]. 573 Ibid. 574 Ibid. 575 Rohrlich, Ted and Serrano, Richard A.: “Criticism Over Use of Force Inhibited by Police, Gates Says”, A1. 576 Connell, Rich and Serrano, Richard A. and Rohrlich, Ted: “Gates Defends Riot Planning of LAPD, Concedes Mistakes”, A4. 158

However, the paper did not identify Daryl Gates alone as responsible for the (spread of the) unrest. Also Mayor Tom Bradley – or rather his relationship to Gates – was assumed to have contributed to the chaos at the beginning of the ‘riots’. While in the debate about Gates’ resignation following the Rodney King incident, he had played an important role and had even been constructed as his opponent, this was now prejudicial to him. As the Times put it:

[…] Mayor Tom Bradley had not spoken personally to Gates for about a year. […] The mayor’s information on the department’s preparation came […] through other police officials. Some City Hall observers and Police Department insiders contend that the poisoned relationship and atmosphere in the city family may have hurt efforts to plan a comprehensive strategy for combating possible violence in the wake of the verdicts.577 And the Times itself added that this, together with the widely spread opinion that the four defendants would certainly be sentenced, might explain some of the disorder at the beginning of the unrest.

Despite a few statements like this, indicating that the unrests were not only the L.A.P.D.’s fault (and even fewer according to which the police acted right by retreating since using too much force would have made the ‘rioters’ even more aggressive578), a large part of L.A.’s society reportedly believed that before and during the outbreak, the police department had simply acted inadequately. Here, it is striking that in the news coverage by the L.A. Times, this ‘wrongdoing’ was not depicted as an isolated incident; instead, it was directly linked to the Rodney King beating and the debate following it since this had already shown that the L.A.P.D. had been suffering from a lack of credibility. Beside the “documented racism and misconduct exposed by the Christopher Commission,”579 the police’s ‘failure’ during the unrests was considered their “ultimate disgrace.”580 Therefore, it can be said that in the discourse following the unrest, the L.A.P.D was regarded as being responsible for the violent outbreak in two ways: first, as a racist institution with four of members having been filmed abusing a black citizen and because of which there had been the potential for unrest in the first place, and second, because of the police’s delayed intervention in the first hours after the verdicts had been announced.

577 Connell, Rich and Rohrlich, Ted: “Gates’ Defense of LAPD Faces Searching Inquiry”, A1f. 578 Baker, Henry G.: “LAPD’s response to the Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1992, B4. 579 McNemara, Joseph D.: “When the Police Create Disorder”, M1. 580 Ibid. 159

In the L.A. Times reporting, Willie Williams, Daryl Gates’ successor who had been appointed already before the unrest and who was expected to take office in June 1992, was presented a as remedy for this deficit in the Los Angeles Police Department. According to the newspaper, Williams was perceived as a savior figure by many, stressing that he himself was not happy about this image: “He [Williams] sought […] to downplay suggestions that his arrival alone could be Los Angeles’ salvation: ‘Willie Williams is not a miracle worker’.”581 As this example shows, in the Times’ news coverage, Willie Williams was embedded in a religious discourse. While before the unrest, he had been portrayed as, for example, ‘preaching’ community-harmony, the new chief was now even depicted as a ‘miracle worker,’ embodying ‘salvation’. Like Jesus Christ had saved mankind, he was expected to deliver Los Angeles and especially the L.A.P.D. from evil. And although Williams reportedly rejected this idea, the paper, in the few articles the Times dedicated to the new police chief during and after the unrest, kept stylizing him as a bearer of hope, stating – among other things – that he “brings an impressive record of reform.”582

Additionally, the Times repeatedly mentioned Williams distancing himself from the verdicts in the ‘King case’ as well as Gates’ crisis management, which certainly contributed to his positive image because it corresponded with many Angelenos’ critical perception of the then-current chief. Although his statements mirrored society’s overall perception of Gates and the L.A.P.D., and although this already contributed to his positive image as presented by the Times, the newspaper constructed it even further: It did not only mention Williams’ critique but also quoted him saying that Gates was “not a bad guy” but that “in some way, time has passed him by,”583 supplementing the new chief’s image with another positive characteristic which is that of compassion. It can thus be observed that that also in its after-unrest news coverage, the Times opposed Willie Williams and Daryl Gates. However, while previously, the comparison was mainly based on the respective chief’s management style, it was now also their personality that was contrasted. Other than the latter, who had increasingly been characterized as ‘angry’ and incapable of being a ‘good’ chief,

581 Healy, Melissa and Tumulty, Karen: “New Chief Inherits New Problems After Verdict”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B3. 582 Ibid. 583 Healy, Melissa: “Williams Maintains Distance From L.A. Strife: Police: Chief-designate says he has made a ‘conscious decision’ not to intervene in city leaders’ actions. Officers in King case won’t be welcomed back on force, he says”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A9. 160

Williams was depicted as reform-oriented and at the same time modest and sympathetic.

It is striking that in the racially-charged and race-focused news coverage of the L.A. Times, Williams’ racial background was hardly ever made a subject of discussion. Admittedly, it was repeatedly mentioned that he was the city’s first black police chief to be but considering the newspaper’s way of reporting about both the King incident as well as the unrest, it could be expected to have amplified on Williams’ race in greater detail. The reasons for that reticence can only be guessed: Possibly, the Times tried to avoid conveying the impression that Williams had not been appointed because of his skills but because of his race.

Beside Willie Williams, who – as Gates’ successor – acquired a positive position within the discourse about the police during the unrest, there were two other parties constituting a counterpart to the negatively connoted L.A.P.D.: the National Guard and the military troops sent by President George H. Bush. Despite presenting Angelenos criticizing the delayed dispatch of both forces, i.e. by asking “How could it take them [officials] so long? […] They are so fast to send troops to the other side of the world,”584 the Times portrayed both groups as highly welcomed by a large part of the city’s population. According to the Times, “[National Guard and military troops] […] have been fed food and candy and even had hymns sung to them. Residents have expressed their gratitude to the military and offered gestures of thanks.”585

Other than the police, the National Guard and military troops were depicted as helpers in a time of need able to protect those who did not participate in the riots. Particularly entrepreneurs (of all races and ethnicities), many of whom had in vain hoped for the police supporting them in protecting their properties, reportedly felt safe in the presence of the two forces since they were more formidable than the police: “People have no respect for the LAPD, but when the National Guard got here, people knew that they were serious.”586 Despite the fact that they were not supposed to replace but support the police, statements like “Let them stop the violence”587 or

584 Connell, Rich and Newton, Jim: “Guard Takes Position After Delays, Snafus”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A1/12, 1. 585 Newton, Jim and Pool, Bob: “Under the Gun”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06, 1992, A7. 586 Connell, Rich and Newton, Jim: “Guard Takes Position After Delays, Snafus”, A12. 587 Newton, Jim and Pool, Bob: “Under the Gun”, A7. 161

“It’s kind of scary but I’m glad they’re here”588 can repeatedly be found in articles dealing with the arrival of the National Guard and the military troops; this once again shows that they were thought to be capable of containing the violent outbreak, a task the L.A.P.D. was not able to fulfill. What the National Guard and the military troops exactly did, however, was not mentioned by the Times, creating the impression that it was their mere presence which conveyed a feeling of security. Yet, it is more likely that it was particularly the two groups protecting not only police but also firefighter and ambulance operations589 which contributed to their positive image. Thus, it is not astonishing that when on May 9th, the National Guard started pulling back to their assembly points and 2,500 of the 4,000 army soldiers and marines were withdrawn from Los Angeles so that the police could begin “reassuring their central law enforcement role,” many Angelenos “hated to see them go.”590

7.3 Back to the Future

Beside the term ‘riot,’ there was another in the L.A. Times’ reporting used repeatedly to refer to the current events, which was that of ‘crisis’. Particularly between May 1st and May 4th, all articles were published under the overall headline “A CITY IN CRISIS” which – depending on the respective developments during and after the unrest or rather on the newspaper’s shift in focus – was supplemented with another phrasing: While on May 1st and May 2nd , when the Times’ reporting concentrated especially on the connection between the verdicts in the ‘King case,’ the overall headline was “KING CASE AFTERMATH: A CITY IN CRISIS,” on May 3rd, steering towards problems beyond the King beating, this catchphrase was shortened to “A CITY IN CRISIS”; on May 4th – changing its focus from those participating in the unrest to those who started cleaning up L.A.’s ‘riot-torn’ areas – the Times spoke of the city “A CITY IN CRISIS: HOPE AND PRAYER AMID THE ASHES,” suggesting that Los Angeles (although hit heavily by the unrest) would emerge renewed from the violent outbreak, just like a phoenix from the ashes.

These expressions (among others which will be discussed later) show that during the unrest, the L.A. Times ‘recycled’ phrases already used during the King aftermath and

588 Ibid. 589 Cf. Reinhold, Robert: “RIOTS IN LOS ANGELES: The Blue Line; Surprised, Police React Slowly as Violence Spreads”. In: , May 01, 1992. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/ books/98/02/08/home/rodney-riots.html [06.12.2015]. 590 Braun, Stephen and Newton, Jim: “U.S. Army, Marine Troops Withdraw From Los Angeles”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1992, A1/32, 1. 162 adjusted them to the new yet connected situation. Now it was no longer just the “LAPD IN CRISIS” but Los Angeles as a whole. This new crisis did no longer affect police-minority relations only but – as the preceding chapters have shown – ranged from race relations to economic and social grievances finding their expression in the current civil unrest.

What the respective crises had in common, though, was the prospect of change and improvement. Although the Times depicted the unrest (just like the King beating) as a surprising and more than ever threatening event for the majority of Angelenos, it – by using the term ‘crisis’ – also implied that the violent outbreak involved the potential for change and thus improvement.591 By repeatedly using the expression of ‘a city in crisis,’ the Times characterized Los Angeles as a city in transition (also corresponding with the depiction of L.A. emerging from the ashes like a phoenix), with the crisis constituting a corridor between the two stages: the one L.A. used to be in and a future, hopefully better one. 592

7.3.1 Cleaning up Los Angeles

The L.A. Times did not only offer the prospect for change and improvement by using terms like ‘crisis’ but also through articles focusing on peoples’ deeds suggesting community spirit as well as the overcoming of racial borders. Beside peace marches in Koreatown, it particularly reported on clean-up operations of ethnically diverse groups in South Central that had started already during the unrest, on May 1st, and lasted for about two weeks.

In the context of this paper, these clean-up efforts are of great importance since the L.A. Times depicted them as a countermovement in opposition to the civil unrest. It created a binary opposition between ‘rioters’ as law-breaking and those cleaning up as law-abiding citizens. Time and again, actions by the latter were characterized as “signs of hope and recovery,”593 making an important first step towards improving (Los Angeles’) society. The newspaper repeatedly quoted Angelenos participating in the clean-up operations, saying, for example, “[…] we wanted to do something that in a small way might build a more equitable society. If it means getting out with

591 Bostorff, Denise M.: “George W. Bush’s post-September 11 rhetoric of renewal: Upholding the faith of the greatest generation”. In: Quarterly Journal of Speech, 89:4, 2003, 293-319. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0033563032000160963 [13.07.2014]. 592 Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 330. 593 “Signs of Hope and Recovery”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A5. 163 brooms and shovels to show that it’s not just us versus them, we’ll do it.”594 By presenting quotes like this, the Times stressed that many Angelenos actively contributed to a rapprochement of the respective racial groups, but referred to them in a way that kept up and stressed racial differences. This can already be surmised considering the quote presented above: Although the speaker – like many others – wanted to contribute to an ‘equitable society,’ this does not mean that racial borders were removed. Quotes like that rather imply a consideration of the respective racial groups as equal, with race still being an important (if not the most important) defining feature and identity marker. Although, since the second day of its reporting on the unrest, the Times itself did not longer mention peoples’ race595, it nonetheless quoted informants doing so and thereby kept up racial differences as well.

This became even more apparent in quotes like the one by African American Elmore Dingle, explaining his motives as follows: “I especially wanted to help Koreans […] I don’t want them to think so negatively about blacks.”596 Here, it becomes obvious once more that in many people’s minds (even in the minds of those who wanted unity) race was still a distinguishing feature. This was not only true for blacks and Koreans but also for many Latinos participating in the clean-up efforts. As José Luis Rezo puts it: “I am here to clean up the image of Latinos […]. It’s really shameful to see our youth looting other people’s properties […].”597 By presenting numerous quotes keeping up racial differences, the Times did not portray the multi-ethnic/- racial clean-up operations as measures supposed to overcome racial tensions but rather as the respective racial groups’ attempt to make amends for the deeds of members of their own group during the unrest; it depicted them as a kind of catharsis.

Beside the choice of quotes also the language that the L.A. Times itself used to refer to the cleaning efforts is remarkable. It can basically be differentiated into two categories: a, what I would like to rhetoric of military on the one hand and what Dana Cloud calls as a rhetoric of therapy on the other. The first concerns phrasings which make the clean-up operations appear like military actions. In the news

594 Boyer, Edward J. and Lacey, Marc: “Shovels, Brooms Become Tools of Healing and Hope: Community: Black, Anglo and Latino volunteers join to sweep up debris to reclaim their neighborhoods.” In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A1/15, 1. 595 Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis” 329. 596 Boyer, Edward J. and Lacey, Marc: “Shovels, Brooms Become Tools of Healing and Hope”, A15. 597 Wilkinson, Tracy: “Street Drama: Actor Plays Leading Role in Cleanup Effort”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, B1/4, 4. 164 coverage of the Times, those cleaning up South Central were repeatedly referred to as a “people’s army,”598 “multiethnic brigade,”599 or “broom brigade,”600 who “armed with rakes, shovels and brooms and bags”601 contributed to restoring ‘order’. Phrasings like these are noticeable on different levels: First, by describing those cleaning up with the help of military terms, the Times promoted the image of the unrest being a war; second, by ‘militarizing’ those cleaning up, the Times linked them to the positively connoted group of the military and the National Guard. ‘Together’ with them, they fought the chaos caused by the ‘rioters’.

What the Times did not mention, however, was that among the participants in the clean-up operations, there were numerous people who in the early hours of the unrest had actively taken part in the looting and arson. Having a guilty conscience about their behavior, they now engaged in cleaning up the damaged parts of the city.602 Nevertheless, in the L.A. Times’ reporting, helpers were rather portrayed as a homogenous group of law-abiding citizens constituting a counter movement to the ‘rioters’.

This opposition of those participating in the unrest and those cleaning up, of law- breaking and law-abiding citizens, once more shows an inconsistency with regard to the overall depiction of the unrest. Although the Times itself repeatedly identified and stressed the actual reasons for the violent outbreak, the depiction of the helpers as law-abiding citizens made (just like the term ‘riot’ itself) those participating in the unrest appear like criminals disturbing the peaceful rest of L.A.’s society without any recognizable cause.

The second category, the rhetoric of therapy, was less concerned with describing those cleaning up but more with the fact that the city was cleaned up at all. As

598 Fox, David J. and McMillan, Penelope: “Celebrities Organize Efforts to End Violence, Clean Up”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1991, A7/20, 20. 599 Pool, Bob and Scott, Janny: “Multiethnic Brigade Begins Hard Work of Cleaning Up: Volunteers: People came together spontaneously for their own purposes: To make a statement, to confront their fears, even to ease their consciences”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1991, A4/16, 4. 600 “Renewing the Spirits – and the Streets”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1991, A5. 601 Fox, David J. and McMillan, Penelope: “Celebrities Organize Efforts to End Violence, Clean Up”, A20. 602 In its Understanding the Riots: Los Angeles Before And After the Rodney King Case, the L. A. Times presented a number of statements by people, saying that they had taken part in the looting in the first hours of the unrest and later came back to the very same stores to help the owners clean up. Cf. Coffey III, Shelby (ed.): Understanding the Riots: Los Angeles Before And After the Rodney King Case, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, 1992, 100.

165 already mentioned above, these clean-up efforts were described as a ‘sign of recovery’. To understand the message this terminology conveyed, it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the unrest: From day one of the L.A. Times reporting on the violent outbreak, therapeutic terms had been used by the paper to describe both, the events themselves as well as reasons that had led to them. Examples of the latter are statements like “[…] a cancer of racism that’s been eating away at the nation’s moral fiber and infiltrating and infecting particularly every major institution in government, education, health – and the judicial system, the corner stone of democracy,”603 “[South L.A. has been suffering from] the ills of crime and drugs,” or “[…] we can heal the wounds of racial division […].”604 However, therapeutic terms were more frequently used in the Times’ reporting to refer to the unrest itself, describing it, for instance, as a “trauma,”605 “self-inflicted”606 or an “open wound”607. According to the Times, “this week’s spasm of destruction” was “cripple[ing] [the city]”608 and was giving its residents, regardless their ethnic affiliation, “a painful time.”609610 While previously the Times had rather quoted officials using rhetoric of therapy, it now used medicals terms itself in referring to the current events.

Although therapeutic terms were applied to both cause and effect, it is extremely important to distinguish between the two kinds of usage – especially with regard to the clean-up operations. As already pointed out, these were referred to as important first steps towards ‘recovery’ and ‘healing’. The message this conveys, however, is completely different depending on what is to be ‘healed’. When used to describe the reasons for the unrest, e.g. ‘cancer of racism,’ this, on a linguistic level, would not only mean aiming for an altered and improved society but also regarding this as actually being possible (similar to the usage of the term ‘crisis’). In the Times,

603 Nelson, Jack: “Bush Denounces Rioting in L.A. as ‘Purely Criminal’”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A9/30, 9f. 604 Braun, Stephen and Stolberg, Sheryl: City Returns to Work, School: Recovery: Freeways and buses are once again crowded as the day appears to go smoothly: Bush announces loans and grants for rebuilding. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, A1/19, 1. 605 “Stop the Violence, Start the Renewal: The King verdict spawns unwarranted violence, but also acts of courage and leadership that show the way to a better future”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B6. 606 Peterson, Jonathan and Tobar, Hector: “South L.A. Burns and Grieves”, A1. 607 Braun, Stephen and Dunn, Ashley: “View of Model Multiethnic City Vanishes in Smoke: Relations: Disturbances bare a simmering racial anger that community efforts never fully quelled”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A1/28, 1. 608 Braxton, Greg and Newton, Jim: “Looting and Fires Ravage L.A.”, A10. 609 Corwin, Miles: “Everyday Life Shattered in Many Ways: Closures: Businesses and services are forced to shut down throughout the city. Schools, mass transit and libraries halt operations. Pro sports events are cancelled”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A8/16, 8. 610 Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 331. 166 however, it was the unrest itself that was far more often characterized as a ‘wound’ or ‘disease’; it can thus be assumed that the act of ‘healing’ was first and foremost related to the violent outbreak. This would mean that the ‘broom brigades’ were not contributing to a change in society but rather to restoring the status quo.

This interpretation is supported by phrasings depicting the end of the unrest as ‘going back to normal’. One of the most vivid expressions implying exactly this can be found in the overall headline superseding the “A CITY IN CRISIS” catch-phrases: On May the 5th, the Times published its articles under the headline “RIOT AFTERMATH: GETTING BACK TO BUSINESS,”611 implying a return to the status quo rather than the beginning of a new era. This is also true for statements like “residents will soon return to their normal habits,”612 which in a similar manner can be repeatedly be found in the news coverage of the L.A. Times.

Conclusively, it can be said that with regard to the rhetoric of military and therapy there were a number of inconsistencies in the Times’ reporting on both content as well as language levels (and even on the language level itself). Although political, social, and economic changes were demanded to improve people’s lives, particularly those of ethnic minorities living in the City of Los Angeles, this could rarely be found in the language used; stylistic devices and phrasings suggested removing damages caused by the unrest and thus returning to the initial situation rather than inducing long-term changes.

7.3.2 National Politics – The 1992 Unrest and Its Impact on the 1992 Presidential Election Campaigns

It is striking that already on May 1st, which means one day after the LA Times had reported on the upheaval in the City of Los Angeles for the first time, it did not only inform its readers about the different presidential candidates’ reactions but also ventured a prognosis of how the urban unrest would most likely influence their respective campaigns. It predicted that

if the riots end quickly, Democrats could [and most likely would] portray them as the natural and inevitable consequence of what

611 “riot aftermath: getting back to business”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, A2. 612 Lazzareschi, Carla: “Slow Day for Movies, Eateries and Malls”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-06/business/fi-1307_1_slow-day-for-movies [14.12.2015]. 167

they will describe as Republican inattention to the problems of the nation’s cities. In addition, if outrage over the verdict spurs turnout among blacks, Democrats could benefit in the same way the female candidates have benefited from outrage over last fall’s senate interrogation of law professor Anita Hill.613 Here, the Los Angeles Times did not only foretell how the Democratic Party would try to profit from the LA unrest and how it would attempt to find its reasons in the opposing party’s politics, it is also one of the rare occasions in which the paper brought up the topic of gender. It allotted Democrats as well as women a secondary role in the run for political power by indicating that both are only capable of breaking traditional power structures in case of an unusual event, which may be one reason why the Times – as will be illustrated in this chapter – supported Democrats that obviously.

Furthermore, the Times elucidated in how far Republicans could profit from the uprising in L.A. on a national level, saying that “persisting anarchy could help conservative, law-and-order Republicans win support,”614 because it – as University of South Carolina political scientist Earl Black puts it – “create[s] the possibility of something similar to what Richard Nixon was able to do in 1968 – running as the law-and-order candidate [against a background of urban violence].”615 Presenting this prognosis of the two political parties’ reactions, the Times relativized the revolutionary principle behind the violent outbreak: After they had subsided, people would only have two opportunities to react politically to the foregone events. Instead of a ‘real’ urban transformation, as intended as demanded by the newspaper itself, there would only be the choice between two predictable and traditional alternatives.

Besides possible reactions of Democrats and Republicans, the L.A. Times also reported on actual statements issued by the presidential candidates, which – in most cases – consisted of incomprehension in the view of the Rodney King verdicts as well as the condemnation of the eruption of violence following it. Moreover, already in this first article by the Times dealing with the presidential contenders’ reactions to the L.A. unrest, there are tendencies recognizable which allow the assumption that this particular newspaper supported the Democratic candidates in their campaigns.

613 Lauter, David: “Political Leaders’ Analysis of Crisis Varies: Elections: Democrats are expected to blame rampage on GOP neglect of cities. But persisting anarchy could help conservative, law-and- order Republicans win support”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A4. 614 Ibid. 615 Ibid. 168

This on the one hand is done by simply mentioning Democrats before Republicans and on the other hand by giving further information about the respective candidates. The Times mentioned, for example, that Clinton as well as Brown delivered speeches and that the latter “cut short a campaign day in Nebraska to fly back to Los Angeles,”616 stressing his concern in the current event. With Bush, it is also reported that he “issued a series of statements appealing for calm and condemning violence,”617 but at the same time, readers got to know that he would not disrupt his campaign schedule. Furthermore, the Times mentioned that Bush condemned what was happening in LA “to applause at the $1,000 a plate fund-raising dinner,”618 suggesting that while people were dying in one of the most violent civil disruptions in U.S. history, he regarded it as more important to collect money at exclusive dinner parties than dedicating himself to the violent outbreak in Los Angeles.

Comparably critical (and in a similar subtle manner), the Times reported on the second Republican’s behavior, stressing that “only conservative Republican Patrick J. Buchanan seemed to find the day’s events easy to respond to.”619 According to him, the verdicts were “decided in a fair trial by a conscientious jury.”620 Stating that Buchanan ‘seemed’ to find it easy to comment on the verdicts as well as the unrest suggests certain incomprehension with regard to his statement identifying the verdicts as the result of a fair trial. By pointing to the fact that he was the ‘only’ one believing in a color blind justice system, the L.A. Times ascribes Buchanan the role of an outsider.

Within the following days, the news coverage dealing with the presidential candidates concentrated particularly on Clinton’s and Bush’s ideas aimed at reducing violence in L.A. as well as how they – as President of the United States – would plan to prevent future urban uprisings. Here, the Times’ preference for binary oppositions became obvious again. Although five candidates were running for president in the 1992 election campaign, the newspaper most widely neglected their responses to what was happening in L.A. or (if they were mentioned) depicted them in a rather unfavorable manner.

616 Lauter, David: “Political Leaders’ Analysis of Crisis Varies”, A4. 617 Ibid. 618 Ibid. 619 Ibid. 620 Ibid. 169

In one of its first reports on Bush’s reactions to the L.A. unrest, the Times informed its readers that he found himself “under intense pressure to involve the federal government in addressing the LA situation,”621 indicating that Bush and his speeches were perceived as too passive. Therefore, Bush announced that he had met with his advisors to develop strategies aimed at reducing violence in Los Angeles on the one hand and confronting “the nation’s broader racial problems”622 on the other. Although the Times reported that after this meeting, “Bush ordered 4,500 military troops into LA to help quell the violence,”623 it is striking that quotations by Bush presented in the paper were rather meaningless phrases: Bush, for instances, was quoted stating that “What is going on in LA must and will stop”624 or “As your President, I guarantee you: This violence will stop,”625 neither giving a hint at how the outbreak could be stopped nor how urban unrest could be prevented in the future.

The depiction of Bill Clinton was considerably different, though. He was portrayed as a hands-on candidate who did not just comment on the events taking place in L.A. from afar but traveled to the crisis area himself to meet with different community leaders and consult with them on the reasons behind the unrest as well as on the question of how to prevent similar events from happening in other cities. Even before Clinton actually visited L.A., he was characterized as reliable and honest by the Times. The newspaper mentioned, for example, that Clinton – although he condemned the violence taking place in Los Angeles – had “empathy for those who took it to the streets.”626 Furthermore, his calls for finally overcoming racial divisions in the U.S., were regarded as “frank [highlighted by author, K.M.] pleas for racial reconciliation,”627 which helped portray Clinton as an approachable and human politician.

Moreover, the L.A. Times stressed the innovative character of Clinton’s analysis of the L.A. crisis as well as the uniqueness of his strategies aimed at improving inner- city residents’ lives. According to this particular newspaper, Clinton’s politics

621 Nelson, Jack: “Bush Denounces Rioting in L.A. as ‘Purely Criminal’”, A9. 622 Ibid. 623 Lieberman, Paul and Murphy, Dean E.: “Bush Ordering Troops to L.A.”, A1. 624 Jehl, Douglas, Broder, John M.: “Bush Pledges Enough Force to Quell Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A1. 625 Ibid. 626 Brownstein, Ronald: “Racial Unrest presents Touchy Dilemma for Clinton”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A32. 627 Ibid. 170 differed from the typical views of other Democratic politicians. The Times, for instance, reported that

[…] Clinton stressed the obligations of society to heal racial wounds and invest in forgotten neighborhoods. But he also lamented the breakdown of the family and other institutions in many inner cities […]. Clinton’s analysis of inner-city violence departed from traditional Democratic thought in another key respect: He linked it not only to poverty, but to the erosion of the family in many neighborhoods. ‘Let’s not kid ourselves,’ he said. ‘So many people who go into these gangs and deal drugs and commit acts of violence were never the most important person in the world to anyone.’ Many of those observations echoed arguments favored by conservatives; but Clinton went further to insist that the broader society must accept responsibility to invest more in education, health care and job training. And he insisted that America cannot afford – either economically or socially – continued inequality and division along racial lines.628 This shows that Clinton’s policy was perceived as a kind of ‘sonderweg,’ (in the original sense of the word), offering the rare opportunity to overcome the U.S.’s rigid two-party-system or rather the two parties’ traditional politics.

The L.A. Times also informed its readers in greater detail about Clinton visiting Los Angeles and meeting “with Latino, black and Korean community leaders and elected officials.”629 Here, by giving well-chosen quotes, Clinton was once again portrayed as a hands-on politician. Statements like “I hope to hammer out some more concrete ideas about what we all can do [to avoid future urban outbreaks of violence]” contributed to Clinton’s image as a leading figure involving L.A.’s residents in negotiating the current crisis and – as Clinton himself put it – “to have some long- term change.”630

According to Clinton, this ‘long-term change’ had, among other things, become necessary because of widely spread racism among Caucasians because of which “too many whites had fled to the suburbs and now live in ‘isolation’ from minorities.”631 Clinton thus regarded (racial) division and ‘othering’ in U.S.-American cities as the main reasons for urban unrests like the one in L.A. and therefore strongly demanded their negotiation. It is striking, however, that in his rhetoric, Clinton ‘othered’

628 Brownstein, Ronald: “Racial Unrest presents Touchy Dilemma for Clinton”, A32. 629 Brownstein, Ronald: “Clinton: Parties Fail to Attack Race Divisions”, A8. 630 Ibid. 631 Ibid. 171 himself: He, for example, stated that a long-term change could only be brought about by “confronting racism among whites and rebuilding cultural values in inner- cities that he said have become ‘the other America’.”632 As Clinton put it, “People . . . are looting because they are not part of the system at all anymore. They do not share our values, and their children are growing up in a culture alien from ours, without family, without neighborhood, without church, without support.”633 While he initially spoke out against division, Clinton then divided America’s urban population roughly into inner-city and non-inner-city residents. He did not only call the first ‘the other America,’ talked about ‘us’ and ‘them,’ but also ascribed a lack of culture and values to the residents of the impoverished neighborhoods of major American cities.

It is furthermore rather unclear whom Clinton regarded as ‘we’ and which common criterion united ‘real Americans’. Although he was an opponent of racism, the then- Governor of Arkansas stated that – since many whites had moved to the suburbs – inner-cities were mainly inhabited by impoverished minorities. It is therefore obscure if Clinton made race, class, or a combination of both, an identifier of the two Americas. It is this liberal approach which race theorists like Cornel West criticized already in the 1990s by saying that

black people [and the same is true for all inner-city residents] are to be ‘included’ and ‘integrated’ into ‘our’ society and culture. […] [Liberals] fail to see that the presence and predicaments of black people are neither additions to nor defection from American life, but rather constitute elements of that life.634 The terminology West attacks can also be found in Clinton’s statements presented by the Times. He too spoke of ‘our values’ as well as a ‘culture alien from ours’. It is striking that this ‘othering’ remained uncommented in the L.A. Times and that no critical voices were mentioned, either. The only critique of Clinton that can be found in this particular newspaper is concerned with the fact that he had obviously altered his campaign with the outbreak of the L.A. unrest. As the Times put it: “From the start of the campaign, Clinton has urged America to reach across racial barriers, but since the violence broke out, he has talked about virtually nothing else,”635 showing that although the national politicians’ steering towards the racial division of

632 Brownstein, Ronald: “Clinton: Parties Fail to Attack Race Divisions”, A8. 633 Ibid. 634 West, Cornel: Race Matters. Beakon Press, Boston, 1993, 3. 635 Brownstein, Ronald: “Clinton to Press his Message of Rebuilding”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A9. 172

American cities was appreciated by the paper, it was viewed critically that they bid for votes by excessively focusing on this very topic.

While Clinton was hardly criticized in and by the Los Angeles Times, things were different with Bush: Although it was mentioned that he was planning a disaster aid which “would enable homeowners to qualify for low-interest loans of up to $100,000 to cover uninsured losses from disorder. Businesses would be able to qualify for loans up to $500,000 for such uninsured losses […],”636 information of this kind was very often located in less prominent parts of the newspaper.637 Articles positioned in more prominent parts were – by tendency – bristled with background information that cast Bush in a rather negative light. One article, for instance, was introduced by telling the reader that “President Bush, resting at his Camp David, Md., retreat, prayed Sunday for an end to the violence in Los Angeles and other cities during a morning chapel service […].”638 The term ‘resting’ suggests inactivity and contrasts Bush to the ‘active’ Bill Clinton. The information that Bush had ‘prayed’ for an end of the unrest furthermore creates the impression of him being a politician disconnected from reality, who places his country’s fate in God’s hands. Only in the course of the article, readers did get to know that Bush “summoned several Cabinet officers to the White House to discuss long-term solutions to the nation’s urban problems […]”639 and that – just like Clinton – he was now planning to visit LA in order to personally get an idea of the city’s condition.

Further criticism was raised when the White House announced that it “blamed the upheaval on the liberal programs of the 60s and 70s,”640 referring to the Great Society program proclaimed by Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964. The Times quoted White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, according to whom

[…] there’s a very direct relationship between people's pride in their community and having a job, first of all, having the hope of income and improving their lives . . . and being able to own their own property or homes to give them a stake in the community. We

636 “Federal Loans, Grants to Be Available for Losses”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, A24. 637 In this case on page A24, hidden between advertisements. 638 Jehl, Douglas: “Bush Seeks Solutions to Urban Ills”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A9. 639 Ibid. 640 Gerstenzang, James: “White House Blames ‘Liberal Programs’ for Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A9. 173

think the social welfare programs of the ‘60s and ‘70s ignored that and we’re now paying a price.641 According to the Times, this Republican attack on the Democratic politics of the 1960s made a great stir, telling its readers particularly about other politicians’ reactions like the following by Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (D-San Francisco), according to whom

[…] the President is clearly disconnected from reality when he would suggest to you that policies of the Great Society some 25 years ago – which included the opportunity for people to go to college, which included anti-poverty efforts, which included economic development, business development – somehow contributed and are responsible for these riots. I think the President is just flat wrong.642 Also Clinton’s statements concerning Fitzwater’s accusations were presented, saying that the Democratic presidential candidate “dismissed Fitzwater’s assessment as ‘the last refuge of the desperate person’.”643 According to Clinton, Republicans “have been running against the liberal social programs of the 1960s for 25 years and they abolished them in 1981. I mean, you cannot blame ‘60s social programs which have been pummeled out of existence.”644 Here it can be said that the Times used Clinton as a positive, liberal counterpart to Bush and other republicans.

It is striking that at first only statements by politicians were presented in the Times’ reporting, creating the impression that after ‘the people’ had tried to express their anger by ‘rioting,’ it was now up to politicians to restore order as well as to induce a social and economical transformation of the U.S.’s urban spaces. Nevertheless, the Times provided a first idea concerning peoples’ approval or rejection of the politicians’ actions by publishing a poll, according to which “voter support for Bush eroded by riots.”645 It compared a survey conducted by the U.S. News & World Report two weeks before the unrest (showing that in case of a presidential election, Bush would get 40%, Clinton 29% and Perot 24% of the votes) with one recently taken by the L.A. Times. According to that poll, only 33% of the 1,301 interviewees

641 Gerstenzang, James: “White House Blames ‘Liberal Programs’ for Riots”, A9. 642 Ibid. 643 Brownstein, Ronald: “Clinton Offers Views in Recovery”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A9. 644 Ibid. 645 Nelson, Jack: “Poll Finds Voter Support for Bush Eroded by Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A9. 174 would vote for Bush, but 30% for Clinton and another 30% for Perot.646 This loss of votes for Bush by 7% illustrates that there prevailed a certain disaffection among people (at least among those sampled by the Times) regarding the President’s way of proceeding in the view of the current L.A. crisis; prospect of change and improvement was rather associated with Perot and Clinton. The latter came off well with regard to the question of who would best be “able to deal with the problems of the poor.”647 Here, 41% thought Clinton to be the most capable candidate, 22% Perot, and only 15% Bush, already indicating that the events taking place in L.A. and the different politicians’ reactions to them would have a certain impact on the 1992 presidential election. However, despite identifying Clinton and Perot as comparably popular, the Times continued focusing particularly on Clinton.

During Bush’s and Clinton’s respective visits to L.A.’s ‘riot-torn’ areas, many people’s attitude – particularly of those actually affected by the destruction and violence – towards these two candidates was reported on, showing that both were perceived as external savior figures and were thus not welcomed by a large part of the city’s population. Reportedly, both were accused of having come to Los Angeles in order to bid for votes only. To the question if Clinton’s “visit did make any difference? […] a Latino man who took a break from volunteer chores […] [replied:] ‘I hope it will help. It’s too bad the only time they [the politicians] come is when there’s something like this’.”648 This shows that among LA’s residents there was the dominant impression that national (but also regional) politicians had neglected this urban space for decades and only bothered coming here after violent outbreaks like the current one. That many residents assumed this had to do particularly with the presidential candidates’ attempt to gain votes becomes clear in the following quotes by different bystanders watching Clinton and Bush. About the first it was said, for instance, that “It’s [Clinton’s appearance] a farce. It’s ludicrous”649 or “If he wasn’t running for office, he wouldn’t be here, right? There’s just nothing he can do,”650 furthermore showing many inner-city residents’ desperation; they just no longer believed in an improvement of the living conditions in South Central.

646 Cf. Nelson, Jack: “Poll Finds Voter Support for Bush Eroded by Riots”, A9. 647 Ibid. 648 Stall, Bill: “Clinton Treated Coolly on Firebombed Avenue”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 5, 1992, A9/14, 14. 649 Ibid. 650 Ibid. 175

Despite the skepticism he was confronted with, the Times presented Clinton as a ‘down-to-earth’ politician, literally being in touch with ‘his’ people.651 Reporting about his visit of the city’s ‘riot-torn’ areas, the paper told its readers how

[…] a man made a come-on-over gesture with his arm and caught the eye of Clinton, who was about 50 feet away and just concluding a sidewalk press conference with a gaggle of reporters and photographers. Clinton grinned, hesitated and hiked over. He shook hands and exchanged brief greetings with the volunteer and several other onlookers.652 On Bush’s visit to L.A., however, the Times reported in a far more negative way, stating, for example, that – in contrast to Clinton – he “met with civic leaders and handpicked audiences [highlighted by author, K.M.] while hundreds of residents who were kept at a distance [highlighted by author, K.M.] looked on with anger and skepticism.”653 The papers’ depiction of Bush as an impersonal politician was furthered by anecdotes like the following, portraying him as leaving behind L.A.’s residents in a state of desperation:

As Bush’s limousine emerged from a tent in the Radio Korea parking lot, after the early afternoon meeting, hundreds of demonstrators shouted, “Compensation! Compensation!” Behind tinted glass, the President leaned forward and offered a cramped wave and a smile. “We are victims!” one woman shouted. The limousine accelerated and, in seconds, was gone. Chest heaving, the woman’s voice began to crack. “Help us,” she cried.654 This passage, which almost seems like a fictional narration, portrays (similar to other articles) Bush as untouchable and detached from his people. It seems as if he had not only come from outside but did not take peoples’ problems seriously, either. Furthermore, and similar to the $1,000 dinner, mentioning the limousine creates the impression of wealth inaccessible to Korea Town’s as well as South Central’s residents. The description of the president leaving in a limousine together with a woman desperately crying contributed to the construction of a President who literally leaves behind his people when they actually need him most.655

651 Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 331. 652 Stall, Bill: “Clinton Treated Coolly on Firebombed Avenue”, A14. 653 Jehl, Douglas and Stall, Bill: “Bush offers Message of Healing to the City”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 8, 1992, A1/7, 1. 654 Ibid., A7. 655 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 331f. 176

Moreover, the paper repeatedly informed its readers about the ‘unmasked bitterness’ Bush was confronted with during his visit. As the paper put it:

Yet as Bush spoke of reconciliation and promised Angelenos a self-sufficient recovery aided by $600 million in federal loans and grants, political leaders, black and Latino residents and Korean- American riot victims on the fringes of his tour responded to his presence with unmasked bitterness.656 Therefore, it can be said that although Angelenos reportedly viewed both Clinton as well as Bush rather skeptically, the Times presented Clinton as the more favorable candidate of the 1992 presidential election.657

Furthermore, Bush was not only criticized with regard to his presence in public but also on a political level. According to the LA Times, Bush did not present sufficient measures aimed at rebuilding the city and preventing future outbreaks similar to the current one. Despite the “$19 million anti-crime, anti-poverty grant”658 of which Bush assured the city, the Times stressed that this was “the only [highlighted by author, K.M.] new federal long-term solution,”659 suggesting that the government was not doing enough for the victims of the unrest. Furthermore, the newspaper regarded it as “ironical”660 that this money – which was part of Operation Weed and Seed, a program the Bush administration had passed earlier in 1992 – had initially been denied to LA. This shows that national politicians had misjudged the situation in Los Angeles before the violent outbreak and that now a large part of society wanted them to make amends for the consequences of their politics.

Despite the $600 million in federal loans and grants and the additional $19 million anti-crime, anti-poverty grant, Bush’s political opponents continued criticizing him for not doing enough. State Sen. Diane Watson (D-Los Angeles), for instance, was quoted, saying

I feel that the President came [to L.A.] and made a very nice speech which was heartwarming. But he gave no specifics and no timetable. Without any specifics, it was just a nice trip out to

656 Jehl, Douglas and Stall, Bill: “Bush offers Message of Healing to the City”, A1. 657 Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 332. 658 Dean, Paul and Jehl, Douglas: “Bush Offers Grant but Some Hope for More”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 9, 1992, A1/6, 1. 659 Ibid. 660 Ibid., A6. 177

California… I heard nothing new. He could have made those comments from Washington.661 Here, Watson completely ignored the total sum of $619 million Bush had already assured LA of and instead, portrayed him as deedless and his speeches as meaningless. Bush made a similar impression on many residents of South Central. Karen Banks, 29, a bystander who watched Bush’s visit from behind one of the fences, criticized him by saying “He should have come here with a plan. I don’t want any feel-good speeches.”662 It is striking that in the Los Angeles Times, Bush’s proponents did not get a word in edgewise. Despite the loss of votes by 7% (and as the poll taken by the Times shows), there were still people who regarded the President’s policy as worth supporting. However, of this 33% in favor of Bush, none was quoted by the L.A. Times, supporting the assumption that the newspaper actively supported Clinton and his campaign.

Meanwhile, White House officials were looking for further money to rebuild LA; one possibility was selling the city’s international airport. The disposal of LAX, “whose value is estimated at $2 billion or more,” was nothing new since it “has been discussed for the last several years by LA officials.” 663 Now, in the view of the crisis, however, “there is concern [in the mayor’s offices] that it might be a way for Washington to tell the city to solve its problems on its own.”664 This shows that in LA, politicians regarded the current crisis as part of a national urban problem and therefore expected national help, as well. This help was not easy to obtain: As the Times reported on May 15th, “[i]n a sign of trouble ahead for costly urban aid programs, the House on Thursday overcame unexpectedly strong opposition before approving an initial $494 million for disaster loans and relief payments for riot- scattered Los Angeles and flood-damaged Chicago.”665 The urban aid opponents’ main doubts concerned the question whether or not money alone could induce an anticipated urban transformation. As Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Long Beach) put it, “[j]ust shoveling in the money won’t solve the problem – we need fundamental reforms.”666 At this point, it is worth mentioning that, different from its opponents,

661 Dean, Paul and Jehl, Douglas: “Bush Offers Grant but Some Hope for More”, A6. 662 Ibid. 663 Ibid., A1. 664 Jehl, Douglas: “Bush Officials Urge LAX Sale For Urban Aid”, A36. 665 Eaton, William J.: “House OKs Aid for L.A., Despite Foes”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1992, A1/38, 1. 666 Ibid. 178 the government indeed focused on allocating money rather than on strategies of how to use this money.

In addition, the distribution of the money is striking. The fact that the flood damages in Chicago and the man-made destructions in Los Angeles were dealt with alike makes the unrest seem like a ‘natural disaster’ which had hit the city unforeseeably and inevitably. This once again shows that regional as well as national politicians had turned a blind eye not only on what had been happening in L.A.’s and other U.S.-American inner-cities; the intensity in which people’s disaffection had erupted in L.A. caught officials by surprise. Although the Times itself did not use this equation of the unrest with natural disaster in its reporting, it corresponds with the newspaper’s depiction of the violent outbreak as a ‘crisis’ or ‘disease,’ both carrying the notion of an unexpected and disruptive event.

Besides, the Times seemed to have been eager to show that in the wake of the unrest, people’s disaffection concerning many politicians’ ‘looking-away-mentality’ had been becoming more and more apparent on local as well as on national levels. To prove this, the paper published self-implemented surveys, saying that “[p]olls and interviews show voters are angry at politicians, bewildered by issues and disgusted with choices.”667 According to the Times, this disenchantment with politics could not only be found among Angelenos but affected Americans nationwide. For example, the paper quoted Kim Freud, resident of the central Wisconsin town of Waussu, declaring that “politics just stinks. It’s disgusting.”668 Despite the fact that this political apathy did not have its reason in the L.A. civil unrest but was – as the paper itself put it – perceived as “the story behind the stories of the 1992 campaign,”669 it can nonetheless be said that the events taking place in Los Angeles reinforced many people’s negative attitude towards politics. According to the Times, the different presidential candidates’ reactions to the urban uprising could essentially influence the outcome of the ‘92 election since it had “caused hunger for new heroes.”670

For many people, this hero could be Texan businessman Ross Perot, and although the Times identified this public opinion, the newspaper itself reported on him rather

667 Peterson, Jonathan: “Washing Our Hands in Politics”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 20, 1992, A1/10, 1. 668 Ibid. 669 Ibid. 670 Peterson, Jonathan: “Washing Our Hands in Politics”, A1. 179 seldom. In the few articles dealing with Perot and his political campaign, though, there are again tendencies recognizable allowing the assumption that the Times tried to influenced the way he was perceived negatively: His campaign, which reportedly included the “build up [of] the family, the church and schools,”671 (which is basically what Clinton demanded, too) was described as being “short on specifics,” and Perot himself was characterized as “a bit testy.”

Similar to Ross Perot, Patrick Buchanan did not get as much attention by the Los Angeles Times as Bush and Clinton did, probably because of his evaluation of the unrest. According to the paper, for him the ‘riots’ had their reasons in “schools, pornography, movies, rock concerts and some churches”672 as well as illegal immigrants, making him call “for the construction of new ditches and fences as well as doubling of US Border Patrol personnel.” 673 Since this old enemy image of the invading foreigner from south of the border did not correspond with the paper’s liberal viewpoint, the Times largely neglected him and his presidential campaign.

7.3.3 Local Politics – Peter V. Ueberroth and Rebuild L.A.

In its news coverage on the unrest and its aftermath, the L.A. Times did not only report about the 1992 presidential candidates’ reactions to the violent outbreak as well as the improvements they suggested, it also addressed local initiatives launched by city officials to rebuild the city. Here, especially the appointment of Peter V. Ueberroth, organizer of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, as chair of an extra- governmental taskforce to rebuild the ‘riot-torn’ parts of L.A. was in the center of the paper’s interest: On May 2nd, still during the unrest, the Times reported that Ueberroth had accepted Tom Bradley’s proposition to become the unpaid head of Rebuild L.A. “to make the ravaged parts of the city much better than they were before the disturbance.”674 Referring to him as “one of the finest salesmen around”675 whose “confidence and ambition are infectious,”676 the Times openly welcomed this

671 Pine, Art: “Perot Favors U.S. Charges for Officers”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A9. 672 Dart, John: “Buchanan Calls Riot Part of Religious War for Soul of U.S.”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 08, 1992, B3. 673 Brownstein, Ronald: “Buchanan Links Riots to Border Problem”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1992, A11. 674 Clifford, Frank and Schwada, John: “Ueberroth Will Direct City Rebuilding Effort”, A1. 675 Scheer, Robert: “LOS ANGELES TIMES INTERVIEW: : A Man of Privilege Aims to Get Down and Dirty to Rebuild L.A.”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 17, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-17/opinion/op-279_1_los-angeles [02.03.2015]. 676 Ibid. 180 decision.677 This positive portrayal of Ueberroth was moreover fostered by the paper repeatedly praising him as the successful organizer of the Olympics, reporting, for example, that “Peter V. Ueberroth, who guided the city through one of its greatest modern triumphs – the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics – has agreed to take charge of the city’s efforts to recover, materially and spiritually, from the holocaust of the past week.”678 Although the Times chose to write ‘holocaust’ with an initial small letter, describing “an event or situation in which many people are killed and many things are destroyed especially by fire,”679 the term certainly reminded the paper’s readers of the killing of millions of Jews by the Nazi regime. And although it can only be guessed whether or not this was intended, it is – because of the Times having identified race and racism as essentially having contributed to the outbreak and the developments of the unrest – most likely that the paper used this comparison intentionally. Saying that Ueberroth was going to help L.A. recover from this ‘holocaust,’ the Times did not only stress the severity of the unrest but also contributed to Ueberroth’s positive image once more. Together with constantly reminding its readers of his achievements as well as his good will, the paper did not only emphasize Ueberroth’s qualities as an economist, it also invited them “to look for a brighter future under his ‘guidance’.”680

Although the Times itself greatly welcomed Bradley’s decision to appoint Ueberroth to head Rebuild L.A., it also reported that Angelenos’ reactions to the latter’s key role in rebuilding the city were deeply divided: While most city officials were “generally enthusiastic about Ueberroth’s role,”681 some – also those who supported his appointment in general – raised the question of whether he could really cope with the task he was facing. Nelson Rising, for example, civic activist and a former aid to the Mayor, was reportedly “thrilled that someone like Peter has stepped forward. But this is a real fundamental challenge. Our society isn’t working. The slender thread that holds us together broke, and we all watched it.”682 Although not explicitly mentioned by the Times, it nonetheless became apparent that (beside the economic feasibility of his plans) it was especially Ueberroth’s race that made people call his appointment

677 Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 332. 678 Clifford, Frank and Schwada, John: “Ueberroth Will Direct City Rebuilding Effort”, A1. 679 “holocaust”. In: Merriam-Webster Online. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ holocaust [04.12.2015]. 680 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 332. 681 Clifford, Frank and Schwada, John: “Ueberroth Will Direct City Rebuilding Effort”, A13. 682 Ibid., A1. 181 into question. According to the paper, members of the city’s racial minorities almost instantly asked if “a single white man could cater to the needs of L.A.’s various ethnic groups,”683 arguing that it was a highly debatable point whether the head of Rebuild L.A. had “sufficient understanding of the devastated neighborhoods where the repairs will need to be made.”684 Although the paper repeatedly mentioned these critical voices, it presented these opinions without commenting on them any further, a method the Times had already used before to distance itself from what was said. This assumption is confirmed by the paper continuously portraying Ueberroth as a hands-on businessman.685

This support for the head of Rebuild L.A. also became apparent in situations in which he actually made himself and his arguments vulnerable. Elaborating on his plans of how to improve the living conditions in the parts of the city most affected by the unrest, he pointed out that his aim was “for corporations to make long-term commitments to the devastated inner-city neighborhoods and to create ‘sustainable jobs on a profitable basis’ rather than short-term donations.”686 According to Ueberroth, this would require the collaboration of the private sector, the obligation of which would be the creation of

[…] lasting jobs in impoverished areas that have suffered from a job exodus in the recent years. If successful, such neighborhoods – where jobs have often been at the corner liquor store or check- cashing outlet – might one day be transformed into centers for a range of industry, utilizing trained workers.687 Referring to South Central L.A., it is remarkable that Ueberroth ascribed to this area only one kind of reconstruction, which was the renewal of manufacturing industries comparable with those characteristic of this region during and after the Second World War. Apparently, he did not consider external factors like low-cost production especially in Latin America or Asia that had caused a collapse of industries in L.A. during the 1970/80s and which had led to an urban transformation harmful to this part of the city in the first place.688 Therefore, it can be argued that by supporting

683 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 333. 684 Shiver Jr., Jube and Rainey, James: “Reaction Divided Over Key Role for Ueberroth” In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A1/20, 1. 685Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis” 332. 686 Peterson, Jonathan and Lee, Patrick: “Ueberroth Says Calls to Aid Rebuilding Are Flooding In”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06, 1992, A1/13, 1. 687 Ibid. 688 Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 333f. 182

Ueberroth’s plans, the Times’ reporting was self-contradictory: While on the one hand, the paper itself had identified changes in economy (and the failure to not react to them adequately) as one of the prime reasons for the downward movement of South Central and other parts of L.A. (and thus for the violent outbreak of 1992), it did not scrutinize Ueberroth’s plans. Instead of questioning or at least commenting on his approach, the paper rather focused on portraying Ueberroth as a hands-on businessman trying to live up to the expectations of all Angelenos. It, for instance, stressed more than once that in order to do so, Ueberroth did not only meet the city’s respective community leaders to include their recommendations but that he also invited ‘ordinary citizens’ to become an active part in his rebuilding and revitalizing efforts. Readers were, for example, informed that Ueberroth and his staff provided questionnaires “at tables outside about 30 Los Angeles Churches […] for people to voice their opinion on how they think rebuilding should be done.”689

The image of Ueberroth as a hands-on businessman was additionally furthered by the Times regularly reporting about him raising money to rebuild Los Angeles. It was emphasized that already shortly after the violent outbreak, he had persuaded various foreign L.A.-based companies to contribute to the task-force’s revitalizing efforts. Reporting that numerous associations of companies like the Japan Business Assn. of Southern California, a coalition of 700 firms comprising 60,000 employees, were “concerned and want[ed] to help communities rebuild,” and stressing that also numerous other companies were awaiting “a Rebuild LA master plan for revitalizing the city,”690 reveals that the L.A. Times promoted Ueberroth. Calling his approach a ‘master plan’ and at the same time presenting but not further elaborating on his critics’ arguments exemplifies exactly this.691

As abruptly as the Times’ news coverage on Peter Ueberroth had started and as intensive as it had been, as quickly did it disappear again. On May 18th, readers were informed that Ueberroth’s energetic personality had made people decreasingly

689 Peterson, Jonathan: “After the Riots: Rebuilding the Community: Rebuild L.A. Asks Residents for Their Input”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05- 11/news/mn-1187_1_community-input [13.07.2014]. Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis”, 334. 690 White, George: “Foreign Firms Joining Rebuild L.A. Effort: Commerce: The Japanese are leading the effort. But some are irritated about demands for their help because of recent ‘Buy American’ campaigns”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 13, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05- 13/business/fi-1770_1_japanese-firms [13.07.2014]. 691 Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis” 334. 183 perceive his racial background as a problem. According to the Times, there were admittedly still critical voices arguing that “a white man residing outside the city [could not] be sensitive to the needs of riot-torn neighborhoods,”692 but there was also an increasing number of “cautiously supportive voices from the minority communit[ies].”693 After pointing out that now Ueberroth was attracting support from the city’s ethnic minorities, too, the Times’ reportage on him and Rebuild L.A. declined significantly. From then on, Ueberroth and his extra-governmental taskforce were only mentioned in passing,694 serving as a reminder that they were still working on rebuilding and revitalizing Los Angeles.

7.3.4 ‘Back to Business’ – The End of the Los Angeles Times’ News Coverage on the ‘L.A. riots’

However, it was not only the Los Angeles Times’ news coverage on Peter Ueberroth that ended in an abrupt manner, also the paper’s overall reporting on the 1992 unrest came to a rather sudden end: From May 11th until May 15th, the Times published an extra section (T), the purpose of which – as the titles already gave it away – was “Understanding the Riots.”695 During these five days, the new sections presented a compressed ‘riot analysis,’ to “explain the causes and effects of the dramatic upheaval [and] seek a sense of understanding through different means.”696 It explored, among other things, the events of the foregone days from various perspectives including (the history and nature of) race relations in Los Angeles, the amount of destruction caused by the unrest as well as possible future steps. The different parts of the special section were entitled

“Part 1: The Path to Fury,”697 “Part 2: Images of Chaos,”698 “Part 3: Witness to Rage,”699

692 “Ueberroth Denounces Critics of His Role: Project: ‘Rebuild L.A.’ chief rejects idea he can’t be sensitive to the needy.” In: Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992- 05-14/local/me-3256_1_ueberroth [13.07.2014]. 693 Peterson, Jonathan: “Ueberroth Does Balancing Act as Rebuild L.A. Chief: Riots: Leaders lobby chairman for roles for minorities in restoring the city. Task force has not named a board of directors”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-18/local/me- 108_1_task-force [13.07.2014]. 694 Cf. Muschalik, Kathrin: “Ways Into and Out of the Crisis” 334. 695 Cf. “Understanding the Riots, Part 1: The Path to Fury”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1992, T1. 696 “Understanding the Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1992, A1. 697 “Understanding the Riots, Part 1: The Path to Fury”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1992, T1. 698 “Understanding the Riots, Part 2: Images of Chaos”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 12, 1992, T1. 184

“Part 4: Seeing Ourselves”700 and “Part 5: The Path to Recovery.”701 These titles portrayed the unrest similar to a dramatic five-act play, including an exposition, a rising action, a climax, a falling action and a dénouement.702 Like in its foregone news coverage, the paper – alone by using these titles – presented the unrest as resulting from a number of (interconnected) problems (indicated by the term ‘path’) and as a severe (stressed by the terms ‘fury,’ ‘chaos’ and ‘rage’) but solvable crisis (as shown by the term ‘recovery’). Furthermore, the paper suggested that the reasons for the unrest were to be found in L.A.’s society itself, implied by the phrasing ‘seeing ourselves’.

After this detailed ‘analysis’ of what had happened, the Times news coverage on the 1992 Los Angeles ‘riots’ faded appreciably into the background. While until mid- May the paper’s reportage on the unrest comprised roughly 37 articles per day, it, after the five-day publication of section T, decreased to an average of 6 articles per day; at the end of the month, the Times had almost completely returned ‘back to business’ (to use the paper’s own terminology), with May the 28th being the first day without any reportage on the unrest. Thus, the additional section constituted the climax of the news coverage on this specific topic, prompting the assumption that the L.A. Times regarded the subject as being exhausted.

8.0 Changes After the 1992 Unrest

The purpose of the next chapters is to describe a number of changes that are most likely to have been triggered by the events of 1992. Thus, the following examinations are no discourse analysis of the Times’ news coverage on the unrest’s aftermath but constitute an attempt to link the urban transformation of Los Angeles to the violent outbreak discussed above. It will furthermore be analyzed whether or not it is possible to identify the extensive reportage by mass media like the L.A. Times as having influenced political, social and economic developments. Hence, the

699 “Understanding the Riots, Part 3: Witness to Rage”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 13, 1992, T1. 700 “Understanding the Riots, Part 4: Seeing Ourselves”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1992, T1. 701 “Understanding the Riots, Part 5: The Path to Recovery”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1992, T1. 702 Cf. Freytag, Gustav: Freytag’s Technique of the Drama: An Exposition of Dramatic Composition and Art (transl. MacEwan, Elias), BiblioLife, 2008. 185 newspaper articles cited will solely be used as sources of information and not as objects of discourse analysis.

8.1 Remembering the Civil Unrest

The 1992 civil unrest undoubtedly etched itself onto Los Angeles’ collective memory. The event’s anniversaries, especially those every five years, are commemorated in various ways; they are islands of time, firmly established in the city’s calendar. The media, for instance, focus on the past events in their respective ways, providing their audiences with documentaries, photo series, or evaluations and analysis of the past and present situation. Churches as well as social organizations of all ethnicities organize (ecumenical and multiethnic) memorial services, vigils, prayer breakfasts, or art projects, the purpose of which is to remember the 1992 unrest and its victims on the one hand, and to educate people to prevent similar outbreaks and to promote unity on the other hand.

However, the civil unrest did not only influence Los Angeles in the sense that it provided the city with another albeit unofficial date to remember. The media attention which, the Rodney King incident as well as the violent outbreak raised, led to a conscious and profound analysis of the grievances in the City of Angels. Thus, the purpose of the following chapters is to examine if after this analysis there have been changes and improvements, especially with the regard to the topics that had been of particular interest in the news coverage: police brutality, ethnic, social, and economic urban transformation as well as race relations. However, while some developments can directly be related to the 1992 events, there are others of which it can only be assumed that they were initiated by the violent outbreak as well as the media and public attention it aroused. Nevertheless, to gain a picture as comprehensive as possible, those will be included in the following examination, too.

8.2 The Los Angeles Police Department

As shown in chapter 7.2 Police, the perception of the L.A.P.D. changed significantly during the civil unrest. While in aftermath of the King incident, the police had been perceived as a powerful institution abusing their power regularly, the violent outbreak made them appear unorganized and powerless. Because of the fact that neither characteristic was tolerable, it was clear – for city officials as well as a large part of L.A.’s society – that the city’s police force urgently required reforms. 186

As the future would show, the history of reforming the Los Angeles Police Department has intimately been related to its different police chiefs. Therefore, in the following, it will be pointed out which reforms were initiated between 1992 and today and especially by whom. Before doing so, however, it is important to mention that one of the most important reforms in the history of the L.A. police had already been introduced before Daryl Gates’ retirement on June 28th, 1992: Almost a month earlier, on June 2nd, Los Angeles’ residents voted for Amendment F, ignited by the Christopher Commission report, which had exposed racism widely spread among Los Angeles police officers after the King beating. In this historic vote, 67% of L.A.’s voters embraced the police reform, with “the strongest support coming from black, Jewish and Latino neighborhoods,”703 thereby ending the police chief’s often criticized omnipotence. Beside limiting the chief‘s tenure to two five-year terms and authorizing the mayor to choose a chief in consultation with City Council, especially providing civilian review of police officer misconduct (traditionally, such cases had been worked on by L.A.P.D. internals and which in the past had led to many complaints going by the board) was greeted by a majority of Angelenos.704

For many L.A. residents, Amendment F was an important first step towards a community-oriented and fair police department. As John Mack, executive director of the L.A. chapter of the Urban League put it, the “[…] vote was a home run for justice, but it is only the first inning and the game is far from over.”705 However, besides those greeting Amendment F, there were other (far more critical) voices, too. Especially police officers voiced public criticism, remarking that the changing of the city charter and the corresponding new disciplinary procedures would most likely “inhibit officers from doing their jobs and exacerbate already low morale.”706

703 Sonenshein, Raphael, J: “After the riots: The day L.A. changed. Historic reforms passed on June 2, 1992, altered the accountability and behavior of the LAPD”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 31, 2012. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/31/opinion/la-oe-sonenshein-police-reform-anniversary- 20120531 [03.12.2014]. 704 Cf. Sahagun, Louis and Schwada, John: “Measure to Reform LAPD Wins Decisively”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 03, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-03/news/mn-641_1_police- department [03.12.2014]. 705 Rainy, James and Sahagun, Louis: “LOCAL ELECTIONS: Measure F Vote Called Just Start of Police Reform”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 04, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06- 04/local/me-1456_1_police-department [03.12.2014]. 706 Berger, Leslie: “Elections ‘92: “LAPD Disciplinary System to Undergo Major Restructuring: Police: Passage of Charter Amendment F adds demotion to possible punishments. Placing a civilian on review boards will increase scrutiny”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 04, 1992. http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-04/local/me-1468_1_charter-amendment [04.12.2014]. 187

Another important change was Daryl Gates’ retirement and Willie Williams’ assumption of office on June 30th. However, it was not only Amendment F that was viewed critically by a large part of the police force but also the newly appointed Police Chief Willie Williams. Not only was he the first African American ever to lead the Los Angeles Police Department, he – coming from the Philadelphia Police Department – also was the first outsider in forty-three years to hold the chief’s office. Since a majority of policemen had preferred an insider as head of the L.A.P.D., they approached Williams with skepticism.707

The public, however, largely greeted Tom Bradley’s choice. As already pointed out in chapter 4.4 The Selection of the New Police Chief, Williams was perceived as a hero supposed to reform the city’s scandal-beset police force and thereby improve police-community/-minority relations permanently. And he seemed to keep his word: In his first months as L.A.P.D chief, Williams

attended hundred of meetings with an array of community, religious, homeowner, and business groups of every racial and ethnic background. He won support from the gay community by changing an objectionable question on the LAPD application form.708 In the following years, L.A.’s police force changed slowly but continuously: Implementing Amendment F, citizens’ complaints were processed thoroughly and the department became more diverse since more women and ethnic minorities were hired as well as promoted than ever before – a development which can directly be related to the King incident in the aftermath of which the L.A.P.D. had often been criticized for not representing the city’s ethnic make-up but being disproportionally white.

Other than his critics had assumed, the realization of Amendment F and Williams’ reforms neither influenced the officers’ morale negatively nor did they encourage an increase in crime. On the contrary, crime went down significantly during Williams’ tenure, with gang-related killings in South Central declining by 50%, from 466

707 Reese, Cal Poly Pomona: “The Rise And Fall of a Public Leader: The Case of Willie Williams and the LAPD”. In: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT & SOCIAL POLICY, Vol. 6, No. 1, Summer/Fall 2000. URL: https://www.csupomona.edu/~rrreese/WILLIAMS.HTML [04.12.2014]. 708 Cannon, Lou: Official Negligence, 537. 188 incidents in 1992 to 223 in 1998. Citywide, drive-by shootings fell by 27% and gang- related homicides by 36.7% compared to the previous five-year average.709

Furthermore, during Williams’ term in office, “there was not the equivalent of a Rodney King beating, Watts Riot, Rodney King Riot, chokehold deaths, and multiple deaths of unarmed citizens.”710 One reason for that might be a pilot project in which video cameras were installed in 36 police cars. Despite the fact that Williams, when he asked to be reappointed, was criticized for not yet having implemented cameras in all cars,711 it can be regarded as an important first step towards preventing officers from using their power arbitrarily. At the same time, these cameras served to protect policemen from false accusations and thus contributed to more relaxed encounters of L.A.’s residents and officers.

In addition, the L.A.P.D also managed to improve its reputation with regard to crisis management. As the Los Angeles Times put it:

A mini-riot on Dec. 14, 1992, was put down assertively and without serious incident, contrasting the LAPD’s tepid reaction to the unrest eight months earlier. In 1994, the Northridge earthquake knocked out power and city services, but the LAPD responded with speed and vigor. In the chaotic days that followed, many agencies were overwhelmed, but the disaster was marked by a noteworthy absence of looting, at least in part thanks to the Police Department's actions.712 Considering all the measures listed above, it is not surprising that the image of the L.A.P.D. improved steadily during Williams’ tenure. According to a poll taken by the L.A. Times, the approval rating of the city’s police force increased by 37%, from 34% after the King beating to 71% in 1995. Furthermore, and that is particularly important with regard to the Rodney King incident and the urban unrest following it, “a majority of black, white and Latino residents said they liked the job the police force was doing.”713

709 Cf. Hayden, Tom: “Has Bratton’s LAPD Really Transformed?”. In: The Nation, July 07, 2009. URL: http://www.thenation.com/article/has-brattons-lapd-really-reformed [04.12.2014]. 710 Reese, Cal Poly Pomona: “The Rise And Fall of a Public Leader”. 711 McGreevy, Patrick, “L.A. adopts less than third of post-riot police reforms”. In: Los Angeles Daily News, January 03, 1995. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-01-03/news/1995003010_1_police- department-reforms-christopher-commission [04.12.2014]. 712 Newton, Jim: “Williams Officially Asks for New Term as Chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, January 03, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1997-01-03/news/mn-14999_1_chief-willie-williams [04.12.2014]. 713 Cf. Ibid. 189

Despite the public support, Willie Williams’ tenure ended prematurely, having its reason – among other things – particularly in the strained relationship between him and Tom Bradley’s successor .714 During his tenure, Riordan and City Council increasingly lamented Williams lacking cooperativeness. As Councilman Ridley-Thomas stated in 2002: “When Williams was chief, he wouldn’t even call the city council members back if we called. Parks [Williams’ successor] could be in Hawaii and we’ll get a call back.”715

However, it was not only Williams’ limited willingness to communicate with city officials that brought about his downfall: In 1995, he was heavily criticized for accepting free hotel rooms in Las Vegas and denying the allegations when questioned.716 Since according to L.A.P.D. politics accepting gifts was intolerable, his credibility as well as his leadership qualities were questioned. From his critics’ point of view, a chief who ignored the department’s guideline was just unfit for office.717

Therefore, although not stated officially and despite continuing support from the public, Williams’ request for a second term as head of the L.A.P.D. was refused in March 1997. According to City Council, Williams had failed to fulfill his promises to transform the city’s demoralized police department and was thus no longer acceptable as chief.718 Thus, Williams stepped down on May 17th, seven weeks before his contract ended officially, receiving $375,000 compensation as well as his full $173,000 salary and remaining as an L.A.P.D. consultant for one year.719

Willie Williams was superseded by another African American, Bernard C. Parks720, who was the L.A.P.D.’s head of operations under Williams721 and, according to the

714 Mayor of Los Angeles from July 1st, 1993, until July 1st, 2001. 715 Reese, Cal Poly Pomona: “The Rise And Fall of a Public Leader”. 716 Cf. Newton, Jim: “Williams Officially Asks for New Term as Chief”. 717 Cf. Reese, Cal Poly Pomona: “The Rise And Fall of a Public Leader”. 718 Cf. Drummond Ayers Jr., B.: “Chief of Police In Los Angeles Suffers Setback”. In: The New York Times, April 20, 1997. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/20/us/chief-of-police-in-los-angeles- suffers-setback.html [04.12.2014]. 719 Cf. Morello, Carol: “Willie Williams Will Get $375,000 To Leave Los Angeles Police Early Foes Called The Deal ‘extortion.’ All Agreed It Would Avert A Suit”. In: The Inquirer, April 23, 1997. URL: http://articles.philly.com/1997-04-23/news/25531971_1_police-chief-willie-williams-civilian- bosses-severance-package [04.12.2014]. 720 From May 18th until August 12th, Bayan Lewis was interim chief but since he did not contribute to reforming the L.A.P.D., he will be ignored here. 721 Newton, Jim: “Williams Officially Asks for New Term as Chief”. 190

L.A. Times, “one of the department’s best known and most respected officers.”722 He continued his predecessor’s work, focusing particularly on improving police- community relations, making the department more diverse and – most importantly – fighting police misconduct, especially the use of force.

In order to do so, Parks did not only renew training methods for recruits but also introduced a number of non-lethal weapons such as pepper spray or beanbag rounds and most-widely abandoned the use of metal batons.723 Furthermore, similar to Williams’ time in office, citizens’ complaints were treated thoroughly. Under Parks, about 6,000 disciplinary procedures were filed against the department’s 9,000 officers per year, leading to a controversial perception of his tenure: While his supporters regarded these drastic measures as a clear sign for an effective police reform, his critics argued they were influencing the police officers’ morale negatively, saying, for instance,

[i]magine a workplace in which many if not most employees are facing the possibility of discipline at any given time, where nearly everyone knows of someone who has been punished, and where bosses devote almost as much time to discipline as to supervision. That is the LAPD under Parks.724 However, it was probably this clamping down on his officers that made Parks very popular among L.A.’s residents, particularly the city’s ethnic minority groups, which had been disadvantaged by the police for decades. Different from before the King incident and 1992 unrest, the L.A.P.D. was now perceived as “doing something it [had] never […] [done] before: listening to the powerless.”725

Another aspect that certainly contributed to Parks being perceived as a reform- oriented chief was his aspiration to make the department reflect L.A.’s ethnic make- up. Until 2001, 3,000 of the city’s 9,000 officers were of Latin American, 1,200 of African American, and 700 of Asian descent, 2,000 were women.726 It can thus be said that both Williams as well as Parks complied with many Angelenos’ wish for a more diverse L.A.P.D. that had become noticeable in the King aftermath.

722 Newton, Jim: “City Council Members Back LAPD Official”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 20, 1994. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1994-08-20/local/me-29217_1_council-members [13.12.2014]. 723 Cf. Sides, Josh: “20 Years Later: Legacies of the Los Angeles Riots”. 724 Leovy, Jill: “A New Way of Policing the LAPD”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 03, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2002/feb/03/news/mn-26132 [04.12.2014]. 725 Ibid. 726 “Interview with Chief Bernard Parks”. PBS. Frontline. URL: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/lapd/interviews/parks.html [14.12.2014]. 191

Nonetheless, the L.A.P.D. under Bernard Parks was not only marked by reforms. In 1997, it was shattered by a corruption affair whose impact on the city’s police force was comparable to that of the Rodney King incident and the 1992 civil unrest: the Rampart (Division) or C.R.A.S.H. scandal, which transformed the L.A.P.D. significantly: After a number of incidents involving the L.A.P.D. Rampart Division’s Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums (C.R.A.S.H.), ranging from an encounter of two undercover policemen leaving one of them dead to drugs that went missing from an L.A.P.D. property room, the division became the center of “one of the worst police scandals in American history.”727 A commission investigating the incident, soon discovered that 58 officers (of whom 12 were suspended between 1997 and 2001) had been involved in crimes such as drug dealing or framing suspects.728

After the exposure of the by the L.A.P.D. itself, the United States Department of Justice (D.O.J.) informed the City of Los Angeles that it was going to file a civil law suit against its police department because it “was engaging in a pattern or practice of excessive force, false arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures.”729 In order to avoid this law suit, however, Mayor Richard Riordan, City Council, the Police Commission as well as the L.A.P.D. signed a consent decree with the D.O.J. on November 2nd, 2000, allowing the Federal District Court to monitor the department’s management, supervisory, and enforcement practices.730

In this consent decree, the D.O.J. repeated its allegation that the city’s police force had been involved in a pattern of misconduct but it also stressed that both, the L.A.P.D. as well as the City denied all accusations. Instead, they entered the decree

[…] to provide for the expeditious implementation of remedial measures, to promote the use of the best available practices and procedures for police management, and to resolve the United States’ claims without resort to adversarial litigation.731

727 Rice, Constance L. [et al.]: “Rampart Reconsidered. The Search for Real Reform Seven Years Later”. 728 Ibid. 729 “Consent Decree Overview. Civil Rights Consent Decree”. LAPD Online. URL: http://www.lapdonline.org/search_results/content_basic_view/928 [11.12.2014]. 730 Stone, Christopher [et al.]: “Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree: The Dynamics of Change at the LAPD”, 2. HARVARD Kennedy School. URL: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/ download/67474/1242706/version/1/file/Harvard_LAPD_Report.pdf [04.12.2014]. 731 Stone, Christopher [et al.]: “Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree”, 5. 192

In almost two hundred paragraphs, the decree enlisted the numerous changes the City committed to making with regard to the L.A.P.D.’s way of operating. Among them were the following obligations:

• creating a new data system that tracks the performance of every sworn officer and alerts supervisors to signs that individual officers are headed for trouble • creating new definitions, new rules, and new management systems governing the use of force by police officers • creating new systems for tracking police stops of motor vehicles and pedestrians, breaking down the patterns by race and ethnicity, by the reasons for the stops, and by the results of the stops in terms of crime detected • creating new management procedures in the LAPD’s anti-gang unit and its other special divisions, tightening the management of ‘confidential informants’ and otherwise increasing checks against possible corruption.732 Entering into this decree paved the way for reforms greater than those that had been initiated after the Rodney King incident. According to civil rights attorney Constance L. Rice, the King beating had instigated changes in the city’s police department but “real changes to the LAPD’s culture didn’t begin until years later.” From her point of view,

the department first had to hit bottom, and that happened in 1998 with a scandal at the department’s central Rampart Division. If King was an 8 on the Richter scale […] Rampart was a 10: Dozens of LAPD officers were accused of corruption, drug dealing and other crimes. Federal authorities came in and a consent decree was imposed. […] the scandal forced a substantive change in leadership.733 However, as the impact of the consent decree on the L.A.P.D. was not immediately recognizable but became particularly apparent under Park’s successor, William J. Bratton, it will be discussed later.

Despite the Rampart scandal, Parks’ and the L.A.P.D.’s popularity among the city’s residents remained relatively high (probably having its reason in the way Parks handled the affair). According to a survey poll established by Loyola Marymount

732 Stone, Christopher [et al.]: “Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree”, 5. 733 Kahn, Carrie: “After Riots, Scandal Sparked Reform In LAPD”. National Public Radio , April 25, 2002. URL: http://www.npr.org/2012/04/25/151354376/after-riots-scandal-sparked-reform-in-lapd [14.12.2014]. 193

University in 2002, the majority of those interviewed considered the department doing “an excellent” or “a good job” (16% and 62%, respectively); only 13% regarded the job the L.A.P.D. was doing as “poor,” 6% as “very poor”. With regard to the chief’s forthcoming reappointment, 43% of the interviewees stated they would reappoint Parks, while 34% would not, the remaining 23% were undecided or refused to answer.734

Regardless of this public support, Richard Riordan’s successor, James K. Hahn735, decided against reappointing Bernard Parks, arguing that he had “not done enough to fight crime, reform the LAPD, or strengthen relations between police and residents.”736 This, however, did not correlate with the impression Parks’ critics as well as supporters had of him. Although judging Parks’ reforms differently, they agreed upon him “rattl[ing] the LAPD [legendary for resisting change] to its bones.”737 Therefore, it is not surprising that – upon finding out that Mayor Hahn, City Council and the Police Union were opposing a second term for Parks – his proponents reacted with anger. In February 2002, the city’s African American community, religious and political leaders “mobilized various campaigns to secure his [Parks] reappointment and discredit the police union that is leading the campaign against him.”738 For many black Angelenos, Parks was the savior figure they had hoped Williams would be and although Williams had already introduced changes in the L.A.P.D., it was Parks who was regarded as “a chief for the whole community.”739 Asked why he was supporting Parks, Joe Tuner, a black demonstrator protesting for Parks’ reappointment, declared that “[f]our years ago, we stopped having to get out of our cars and lay down on the streets in the rain in a suit,”740 thereby alluding to the ‘proactive’ and often racist policing as described in chapter 2.11 Heading for the Urban Crisis of 1992.

734 Guerra, Fernando J. and Marks, Mara: “2002 Los Angeles Riots 10th Anniversary Survey,” 61. 735 Mayor of Los Angeles from July 1st, 2001, until July 1st, 2005. 736 Gold, Metea and Leovy, Jill: "Hahn Opposes Second Term for Chief Parks, Sources Say”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 05, 2002. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2002/feb/05/news/mn-26405 [13.12.2014]. 737 Leovy, Jill: “A New Way of Policing the LAPD”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 03, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2002/feb/03/news/mn-26132 [04.12.2014]. 738 Gold, Matea: “Black Activists Rally Backers of Chief Parks”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 04, 2002. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2002/feb/04/local/me-chief4 [04.12.2014]. 739 Ibid. 740 Ibid. 194

With Parks’ not having been re-appointed, the atmosphere became more and more racially charged again. Parks’ supporters as well as his opponents accused the respective counterparty of not judging the chief based on his qualities as the head of the L.A.P.D. but on his racial background: While members of City Council and the Police Union argued that many African Americans were supporting Parks solely because he was black, many blacks accused them of opposing him for the same reason.741

When it became increasingly apparent that all measures taken to assure Parks’ reappointment would be in vain, African American community leaders informed Mayor Hahn on March 12th that if he did not change his mind, he would no longer be welcomed in their “pulpits, at annual dinners and other events.”742 This last attempt to assure a second term for Parks, however, remained ineffective, too. After the Police Commission had spoken out against Parks, too, arguing that he had not put enough effort into boosting officer recruitment and lowering the city’s crime rate,743 he, similar to Willie Williams before him, decided to leave the L.A.P.D. early. Superseded by interim chief Martin H. Pomeroy, Parks left office on May 7th, 2002.744

The end of Williams’ and Parks’ careers as Los Angeles police chiefs revealed a weakness of Amendment F: Even if a chief’s work was greeted and supported by a large part of L.A.’s society, they first and foremost depended on a good relationship with the mayor. If chief and mayor did not get along, the head of police was most likely not to be reappointed. As Raphael Sonenshein, political science professor at Cal State Fullerton, put it: “The real bar is the mayor. If the mayor really doesn’t want someone to be chief, then it really doesn’t matter what the Police Commission or the council want to do.”745

741Cf. Gold, Matea: “Black Activists Rally Backers of Chief Parks”. 742 “Hahn Isn’t Welcome, Black Leaders Say”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 06. 2002. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2002/apr/06/local/me-hahn6 [04.12.2014]. 743 Daunt, Tina: “L.A. Turns to Retiree as Interim Chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 08. 2002. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2002/may/08/local/me-chief8 [16.12.2014]. 744 From May 7th until October 26th, 2002, Martin H. Pomeroy served as interim chief; since he did not contribute to reforming the L.A.P.D., he is neglected here. 745 Rubin, Joel and Willon, Phil: “Councilman proposes rescinding term limits for LAPD chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, Mach 26. 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/26/local/me-lapd- bratton26 [19.12.2014]. 195

Five months later, on October 27th, Pomeroy was ousted by Caucasian American William J. Bratton, former Chief of the New York City Transit Police, Boston Police Commissioner and New York City Police Commissioner. Although he was not a member of the L.A.P.D., he was among the three chief candidates (together with Art Lopez and John Timoney) the Police Commission had recommended to Mayor Hahn in a letter on September 19th, 2002.746

When Bratton took office, he declared that his main goals were terminating the consent decree, reducing crime as well as building strong police-community relations – an aim that from his point of view could solely be achieved by gaining L.A.’s residents’ trust. For Bratton, this trust could only be obtained by meeting Angelenos of all races and social classes face-to-face, particularly those who had been abandoned by city officials as well as the police in the decades previous to the 1992 unrest. Therefore, he (even more than Williams and Parks before him) invested time in “going into troubled communities, schools, and churches to listen and address people’s concerns”747 and thereby contributed to building strong police-community relations. The police was no longer perceived as an outsider dominating the communities it had been supposed to serve and protect but rather as a part of them.

This ‘consolidation’ of the L.A.P.D and L.A.’s population was certainly also furthered by the chief’s hiring policy. During Bratton’s (first) tenure, the L.A.P.D. changed significantly. The department did not only increase by 420 officers from 9,067 to 9,487, it – as the following chart show – also became a mirror of L.A.’s continuously changing demographics:

• Number of African Americans [in the L.A.P.D.] in 2002 was 1,217, and in 2007 is 1,177, a decrease of 3.4% • Number of Hispanics in 2002 was 3,137, and in 2007 is 3,675, an increase of 17.1% • Number of Asian Americans in 2002 was 498, and in 2007 is 605, an increase of 21.4% • Number of Caucasians in 2002 was 4,025, and in 2007 is 3,815, a decrease of 5.5% • Number of American Indians in 2002 was 42, and in

746 Cf. Caruso, Rick J. [et al.]: “Police Commission Letter to Mayor Hahn Recommending Three Finalists: , Art Lopez, John Timoney”. Los Angeles Community Policing LACP.org, September 19, 2002. URL: http://www.lacp.org/New%20Chief/CommissionRecommends3Letter.html [19.12.2014]. 747 Wood, Daniel B.: “LAPD chief Bratton leaves a police force transformed” In: The Christian Science Monitor, October 31, 2009. URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2009/1031/p02s10- usgn.html [20.12.2014]. 196

2007 is 42, no change • Number of Filipinos in 2002 was 148, and in 2007 is 171, an increase of 15.5% • Number of female officers in 2002 was 1,716 and in 2007 is 1,778, an increase of 3.5%748

Like going into the different neighborhoods and getting in contact with their residents, this proportional reflection of the city’ demographics in the L.A.P.D. also played its part in improving police-community relations. The Los Angeles Police Department was no longer perceived as a homogeneous group, representing white interests only, but as an increasingly heterogeneous institution, performing duty for all Angelenos.

Besides enhancing the image of the police by reflecting the society it served, Bratton furthermore – as he had promised at the beginning of his L.A.P.D. career – essentially contributed to a notable reduction of crime: Between 2002 and 2006, Part I Crimes749, for example, declined overall by 34.1% (with homicides decreasing by 36.8%), a development that can be attributed to anti-crime programs such as COMPSTAT (short for COMPlaint STATistics), which “focuses on the individuals who are responsible for a large percentage of criminal activity, and the effective use of deployment of available resources to match the current crime trends.”750

Moreover, in order to comply with the stipulations of the consent decree, Bratton established the so-called Audit Division, an internal quality assurance division,

responsible for developing the Department Annual Audit Plan (AAP), coordinating and scheduling audits contemplated by the AAP, ensuring the timely completion of audits, and conducting audits as directed by the Chief of Police. Audit Division conducts seven large-scale audits on an annual basis. Those seven audits, which are required by paragraphs 128 and 129 of the Consent Decree, are as follows: warrant applications and affidavits; arrest reports; motor vehicle and pedestrian stops; confidential informant packages; categorical use of force investigations; non-categorical

748 “Police Commission Reappoints Chief William Bratton to a Second Term”. LAPD Online. URL: June 19, 2007. URL: http://www.lapdonline.org/june_2007/news_view/35667 [22.12.2014]. 749 Part I Crimes comprise Part I Crimes against persons (violent crimes like homicide, sexual assault, robbery and aggravated assault) and Part I property crimes (burglary, larceny and theft from motor vehicle, auto theft and arson). For more information see e.g. “Part I Crimes”. City and County of Denver (US). URL: https://www.denvergov.org/Portals/0/documents/Part%201%20Crimes.pdf [22.12.2014]. 750 “Police Commission Reappoints Chief William Bratton to a Second Term”. 197

use of force investigations; and, personnel complaint investigations.751 Under Bratton, the L.A.P.D. was furthermore expanded by the Force Investigation Division, supposed to investigate all categorical use of force incidents. Its task comprised (and still does) the investigation of use of deadly force by officers. In addition, it pursues cases resulting in an injury that needs to be treated in hospital, all deaths of arrestees as well as accidental and animal shootings.752 Besides, Bratton established the Ethics Enforcement Section, ensuring that not only officers but all L.A.P.D. employees adhere to the department’s ethical conduct and operate within the L.A.P.D. law and policies.753

Examining the changes the Los Angeles Police Department underwent between 2002 and 2007, it is not surprising to learn that when William Bratton asked for a second tenure on April 2nd, 2007, his request was highly welcomed by the city officials. Mayor Villaraigosa, for instance, declared: “I believe Bill Bratton is the finest police chief in America – and we have the numbers to prove it. […]. While crime is on the rise across the country, it continues to drop in Los Angeles. I enthusiastically support the chief.”754

However, despite all these positive developments, Bratton did not manage to solve all problems identified by the Christopher Commission report. As a study published by the Harvard Kennedy School in 2009755 shows, blacks and Latinos were still far more often stopped for interrogations than whites:

Overall, there was little change in the racial and ethnic distribution of individuals stopped, despite the great increase in volume. Blacks comprised 22 percent of all individuals stopped in 2002, and 23 percent of all individuals stopped in 2008. Whites were 18 percent of all individuals stopped in 2002, and 15 percent in 2008. Hispanics comprised 43 percent of all persons stopped in 2002 and 48 percent in 2008.756

751 “Internal Audits and Inspections Devision”. LAPD online. URL: http://www.lapdonline.org /inside_the_lapd/content_basic_view/8772 [23.12.2014]. 752 Cf. “Force Investigation Division”. LAPD online. URL: http://www.lapdonline.org/ internal_affairs_group/content_basic_view/8790 [23.12.2014]. 753 “Police Commission Reappoints Chief William Bratton to a Second Term”. 754 McGreevy, Patrick: “Bratton to seek a second term as L.A. police chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 03, 2007. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/03/local/me-bratton3 [22.12.2014]. 755 The study had been commissioned by William Bratton himself in order to evaluate the L.A.P.D.’s work under the consent decree. 756 Stone, Christopher [et al.]: “Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree”, 23. 198

Furthermore, according to the Harvard report, African Americans and Latinos were still far more likely to fall victim to (non-lethal) use of force than whites: “A troubling pattern in the use of force is that African Americans, and to a lesser extent Hispanics, are subjects of the use of such force out of proportion to their share of involuntary contacts with the LAPD.”757 Here, it could be argued that with regard to (non-existing) colorblindness little had changed between 1992 and 2009 but there was one major difference, which was the transparency with which the L.A.P.D. met these problems. During Daryl Gates’ tenure, it would have been unconceivable to make such grievances public – another aspect that certainly contributed to Bratton’s as well as the police’s growing popularity.

This is also true for the way Bratton responded to incidents comparable to the King case. When on June 4th, 2004, for instance, the beating of Stanley Miller was about to engulf the L.A.P.D. in another crisis, Bratton – different from Gates – did not try to downplay the incident as an aberration but immediately took action. He dismissed the officer who had used his large metal flashlight like a baton and prohibited all officers from carrying these flashlights.758 His way of handling incidents like the Miller beating was largely praised759 and improved the image of the city’s police department further.

William Bratton’s popularity as chief became particularly apparent when in 2009 (three years before his second term would have ended officially) voices were being raised, asking whether to rescind the limit of two tenures for the police chief. On March 25th, City Councilman Herb Wesson called for public hearings on scrapping the provisions made by Amendment F and thereby allowing Bratton to remain head of the L.A.P.D. until 2017.760 While after the King incident and the 1992 civil unrest Amendment F was greeted as a possibility to avoid life-long chiefs like Daryl Gates or his predecessors, respectively, it was now perceived as an obstacle by many,

757 Stone, Christopher [et al.]: “Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree”, 37. 758 Cf. Leonard, Jack and Winton, Richard: “Will Bratton’s reforms survive after his departure?”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 06, 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/06/local/me-legacy6 [19.12.2014]. 759 Cf. Rubin, Joel: “William Bratton announces he will resign as LAPD chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 06, 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/06/local/me-bratton6 [19.12.2014]. 760 Cf. Rubin, Joel and Willon, Phil: “Councilman proposes rescinding term limits for LAPD chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/26/local/me-lapd- bratton26 [19.12.2014]. 199 preventing “a prime example of a chief”761 from serving the city another term. Bratton himself, not knowing if he would want to remain head of the L.A.P.D., even considered abolishing the term limit “an important step in moving the department out of the shadow cast by the King beating.”762 For him, the city’s police force was no longer the one it had been at the time of the Rodney King incident and should thus no longer be bound by regulations induced in its aftermath, either. However, the idea of granting the chief a third term was not only met with approval. Critics, even those who supported Bratton’s policy in general, cautioned against stiffening structures. As Richard E. Drooyan, L.A. attorney, for instance, stated: “You need to have new blood after a certain time, new energy. Ten years is a very good term, longer than most elected officials serve.”763

It were not only politicians and officials who supported Bratton and the L.A.P.D. According to an L.A. Times survey of the same year, eight out of ten registered voters stated that they “strongly approve” or “somewhat approve” the police’s performance, which was an increase of 18% percent compared to the last survey conducted by the newspaper in 2005. Additionally, in the view of the fact that before and after the King incident, particularly ethnic minorities had had a negative image of the police, the following findings are of great importance:

The percentages of blacks and Latinos who approve of the LAPD both rose by double digits since the 2005 survey, almost closing a long-running discrepancy between white and minority attitudes. Among Latinos, 76% approved of the department’s job performance while 19% disapproved. Among blacks, the split was 68% to 25% and among whites, 81% to 11%.764 Despite numbers like these showing the chief’s as well as the whole police force’s growing popularity, Bratton decided to leave office before the end of his second term in favor of the private sector. On August 5th, 2009, he announced his demission, taking L.A.’s political and police leadership by surprise.765 Since he had essentially contributed to the L.A.P.D.’s transformation, Bratton’s early retirement was perceived as a loss by most city officials. According to Mayor Villaraigosa “[w]ith

761 Rubin, Joel and Willon, Phil: “Councilman proposes rescinding term limits for LAPD chief”. 762 Ibid. 763 Ibid. 764 Rubin, Joel: “LAPD gains new approval from the public”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 22. 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/22/local/me-poll22 [19.12.2014]. 765 Cf. Rubin, Joel: “Los Angeles Police Chief William J. Bratton to step down”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 05, 2009. URL: http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/08/los-angeles-police- chief-william-bratton.html [17.12.2014]. 200

Chief Bratton at the helm, the Los Angeles Police Department transformed itself into a beacon of progress and professionalism, a department seen as a partner, not an adversary, no longer bound by the misdeeds of the past.”766

On November 1st, 2009, William Bratton was superseded by interim chief Michael P. Downing who, for his part, gave way to Caucasian , former L.A.P.D. Deputy Chief and Chief of Detectives, on November 16th.767 Since then, Beck, like his predecessors, has been focusing on the continuous reduction of crime, particularly gang-related delinquencies. In order to do so, he, for example, merged the department’s Gang Operations Support Division and Narcotics Division into the so-called Gang and Narcotics Division, undermining the gangs’ “ability to perpetuate as an ongoing criminal enterprise” effectively. As the L.A.P.D. itself put it,

[b]y bringing the expertise of both gang and narcotics detectives together, their investigative efforts are expanded in a synergetic effort directed at targeting the gang’s infrastructure and ability to profit from illicit narcotics and firearms sales, resulting in reduced gang violence.768 Furthermore, since Beck assumed office, he has been concentrating on the prevention of terrorist attacks, which gained more attention after 9/11, as well as the continuation of those reforms that had been launched by the consent decree. Furthermore, he has been putting emphasis on building a sense of community and ‘racial harmony’ by making police work as transparent as possible,769 making him one of the most popular chiefs after the 1992 civil unrest.

To come to a conclusion, it can be said that more than twenty years after the King beating, the incident can be regarded as an important turning point in the history of the Los Angeles Police Department since it was the intensive examination of this case that had induced reforms addressing a variety of subjects ranging from police brutality to institutionalized racism within the city’s police force.770 One major first

766 Rubin, Joel: “William Bratton announces he will resign as LAPD chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 06, 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/06/local/me-bratton6 [19.12.2014]. 767 “Charlie Beck: Chief of Police”. LAPD Online. URL: http://www.lapdonline.org/ lapd_command_staff/comm_bio_view/7579 [19.12.2014]. 768 Cf. “Charlie Beck: Chief of Police”. 769 Cf. ibid. 770 Cf. Siegler, Kirk: “LAPD Chief Has Lessons To Share About Department’s Past ‘Ghosts’”. National Public Radio npr, December 14, 2014. URL: http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/ 12/15/370952512/lapd-chief-has-lessons-to-share-about-departments-past-ghosts [19.12.2014]. 201 step was the adoption of Amendment F, limiting the police chief’s tenure to two five- year terms and thereby preventing Gates’ successors as well as the L.AP.D. from getting used to a routine and tolerating grievances. Now being dependent on the mayor’s as well as the City Council’s approval, Willie Williams, Bernard Parks, William Bratton, and Charlie Beck focused on changing the police department’s culture. They successfully invested extensive resources on making the police force more diverse as well as new training methods, the introduction of non-lethal weapons, and a reliable citizens’ complaint management – all having one aim: improved police-community relations.

Because of these consistently implemented reforms, the L.A.P.D. is today considered a ‘model-department,’ having one of the most positive images in the U.S. After the shooting of the African American Michael Brown by a white police officer in Ferguson/Missouri, for example, the Ferguson Police Department was compared with the pre-reform L.A.P.D. As Tim Rutten, columnist for the Los Angeles News Group, states: “The people of Ferguson, Mo., like all Americans, deserve the constitutional policing that comes with reform – and the racial healing, imperfect though it still may be, that Los Angeles now enjoys is all the proof a person of good will should need.”771 This shows that since the Rodney King incident, the L.A.P.D.’s image has transformed from racist and bigot to a role model of policing.

This, however, is not supposed to deny that there is still room for improvement. Among other things, especially the topics of use of force as well as colorblindness will have to be addressed in the future. Occasionally, there are still violent encounters between Angelenos and the L.A.P.D. and although ethnic minorities generally state that they are treated with respect by police officers, they are nonetheless far more often stopped for questioning than whites. What is different today, though, is that the police are more likely to acknowledge mistakes and to take appropriate steps. This does not only contribute to improved police-community/- minority relations, but is also likely to prevent violent outbreaks like the 1992 unrest because people feel their concerns are being heard.

771 Rutten, Tim: “LAPD has made great strides, thanks to consent decree, reform-minded chiefs”. In: Los Angeles Daily News, August 22, 2014. URL: http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20140822/lapd- has-made-great-strides-thanks-to-consent-decree-reform-minded-chiefs-tim-rutten [19.12.2014]. 202

8.3 Economic and Ethnic/Racial Transformation of South (Central) Los Angeles

Since the 1992 civil unrest, albeit unaffected by it, Los Angeles’ demographics changed significantly. While the city’s white population decreased from 37% in 1990 to 28.7% in 2010, the number of Latinos grew from 40% in 1990 to 48.5% in 2010. And also L.A.’s Asian population experienced a considerable increase, constituting 9% in 1990 and 11.3% in 2010. In the same period of time, the number of African American Angelenos decreased from 13% in 1990 to 9.6% in 2010.772

Despite the continuing immigration influx from various countries, it is difficult to call Los Angeles a ‘multiethnic’ city in the sense that people of different ethnic/racial backgrounds live together in the same neighborhoods. There are of course multiethnic/-racial communities but there is still a great number of people living in geographical concentrations of their own ethnic group. In 2013, for instance, about half of the city’s population was organized in monoethnic neighborhoods and/or ethnic enclaves like, for instance, Little Armenia, or Little Tokyo.773

Both, L.A.’s monoethnic neighborhoods as well as its enclaves, however, are not static but subjects to constant changes. Influenced by the ongoing demographic transition, they relocate, expand, shrink, or vanish completely – a development that can also be found in South Central Los Angeles. Here, the demographic change that had already begun before the Rodney King incident, transforming the once predominantly African American neighborhood into a mostly Hispanic one, continued: While in 1990, Latinos made up 45.5% of the population of South Central L.A., they constituted 58.5% in 2000, and 66.3% in 2010; in the same year, only 31.8% of the inhabitants of the once African American neighborhood were actually black,774 having its reason in the steady exodus of South Central’s impoverished black population.

Different from in the past, when the area’s affluent African American middle class had left South Central in favor of the city’s middle class neighborhoods, it (in the late

772 Cf. Chang, Edward T.: “Confronting Sa-i-gu: Twenty Years after the Los Angeles Riots”. The Young Oak Kim Center for Korean American Studies at the University of Riverside, Cal., 2012, 5. URL: http://yokcenter.ucr.edu/docs/other/11-12_Confronting_Sa-i-gu_Article.pdf [07.01.2015]. 773 Cf. “Ethnic Change and Enclaves in Los Angeles”. Association of American Geographers (AAG). March 08, 2013. URL: http://www.aag.org/cs/news_detail?pressrelease.id=2058 [20.01.2015]. 774 Sides, Josh: “20 Years Later: Legacies of the Los Angeles Riots”. 203

1990s and early 2000s) was now poorer African Americans who left the area for places offering more affordable housing. This group, however, was by no means homogeneous: On the one hand, there were those considering living in a metropolis too expensive and thus decided to leave L.A. completely, moving to neighborhoods in Riverside County, Antelope Valley or Nevada;775 on the other hand, there were those who could not even afford leaving the city and thus headed for places like Skid Row,776 an area of Downtown Los Angeles. As General Jeff, founder of Issues and Solutions, a social organization to help people in Skid Row, puts it: “It’s almost like a direct pipeline from South Central to Skid Row. […] There are a lot of folks who fall flat in South Central and they go straight to Skid Row,”777 suggesting the assumption that after the 1992 civil unrest, the social and economic problems that had been distinctive of South Central were not solved but merely ‘relocated’ to Skid Row. The examination of this development as well as the mechanisms behind it leaves room for future studies but is not supposed to be carried out here.

As already mentioned above, the exodus of African Americans from South Central made room for newly arriving immigrants, particularly from Latin American countries. But other than expected at the turn of the decade, the ‘Latin Americanization’ of L.A.’s South Central area was not a mere replacement of African Americans by poor Latinos. Instead, in the middle of the 1990s, it turned out that South Central experienced “a burst of economic activity led by Latino immigrants.”778 Having relatively high employment rates (although often in the low- wage sector), they developed a solid purchasing power, leading to a high number of Latinos starting their own businesses. This, together with a continuously dropping crime rate, furthermore attracted retailers from outside investing in the area. Once

775 Cf. Sides, Josh: “20 Years Later: Legacies of the Los Angeles Riots”. 776 The term ‘skid row’ originally defined an area in which homeless people live. In Los Angeles, however, Skid Row is used like a name (just like South Central) rather than a term defining the areas inhabitants. In Jones vs. City of Los Angeles (2006) Skid Row was defined as the area east of Main Street, south of Third Street, west of Alameda Street, and north of Seventh Street. Cf. “Jones v. City of Los Angeles. No. 04-55324, decided: April 14, 2006”. In: FindLaw. URL: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1490887.html [12.12.2015]. 777 Blakely, Angela: “L.A. Riots: Little Change For South Central's Pipeline To Skid Row”. Neon Tommy Annenberg Digital News. University of Southern California, April, 27, 2012. URL: http://www.neontommy.com/news/2012/04/la-riots-south-centrals-pipeline-skid-row [24.12.2014]. 778 Cannon, Lou in: Sides, Josh: “20 Years Later”. 204 regarded as too risky to invest in, South Central became more and more lucrative for retail chains like, for example, Starbucks or Home Depot.779

To support this positive economic development, City Council decided to rename the area ‘South Los Angeles’ in 2003. By erasing ‘Central,’ council members hoped to extricate it from its negative image as a crime-stricken neighborhood and thereby make it even more attractive for potential investors – a decision that was not welcomed by all Angelenos. Particularly those living in South Los Angeles criticized the city officials’ decision for different reasons: While some believed that renaming the area would just cost a lot of money but would not change anything for its residents, others, especially blacks, even regarded it as offensive because, for them, it amounted to a denial of one’s origin. As Evann Tavares, an African American living and working in South L.A., puts it: “There’s nothing wrong with being from the ‘hood.’ You should be proud of your roots. It’s nothing to be ashamed of.”780 As will be shown in the next chapter, this shows how closely connected many (particularly African American) residents felt with the area. For them, the negative image South Central Los Angeles had had for decades seems to have essentially contributed to their identity formation. By losing the ‘hood,’ and be it just by its name, they felt as if they were losing their identity.

The area’s economic improvement during the 1990s, however, is not supposed to hide the fact that South Los Angeles was still lacking behind other districts: In 2012, like in the rest of the city, crime was down in the area, but high school dropout rates were still higher than on average in L.A. Furthermore, South L.A.’s residents complained about a deficient infrastructure, criticizing particularly lacking transportation services as well as the low number of shops providing healthy food in the area. Despite the growing number of shopping facilities, convenience and grocery stores were hopelessly outnumbered by liquor stores, which (although their number

779 Cf. McDonald, Patrick R.: “Then And Now: Images from the same spot as the L.A. riots, 20 years later”. In: L.A. Weekly, March 08, 2012. URL: http://www.laweekly.com/microsites/la-riots/ [06.01.2015]. 780 Sims, Calvin: “In Los Angeles, It’s South-Central No More”. In: New York Times, April 10, 2003. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/10/us/in-los-angeles-it-s-south-central-no-more.html [05.01.2015]. 205 had decreased significantly in the area since the 1992 civil unrest) were still disproportionally frequent compared to other neighborhoods.781

Beside African Americans and Latinos, there was another racial group that contributed to the transformation of South L.A., which was that of Korean Americans. After the 1992 civil unrest, more and more Korean shop owners started withdrawing from the area’s economic landscape, making room for new entrepreneurs. Since the unrest, the number of Korean-run businesses decreased by almost 40% until 2012. Instead, East Asians, Middle Easterners, and – as already mentioned above – especially Latinos had been taking over the formerly Korean- owned and -operated liquor and grocery stores.782

Taking into consideration all the evidence presented above, it can be said that – having its reason in a continuing immigration influx – Los Angeles and its different neighborhoods have been experiencing a steady (ethnic) transformation since the 1992 civil unrest. However, other than the label ‘multiethnic city’ implies, only about one half of all Angelenos lives in multiethnic communities, while the other half resides in monoethnic neighborhoods or enclaves. These areas, however, are by no means static but are subject to constant changes. One of these neighborhoods in a state of flux is South Los Angeles, which – once home to mostly black Angelenos – has been transforming into a neighborhood predominantly inhabited by Latinos since the beginning of the 1990s. As will be pointed out in the following chapter, this transformation was accompanied by inter-ethnic/-racial conflicts.

8.4 Race and Race Relations in (South) Los Angeles

In terms of race and race relations in the City of Angels, it is impossible to overestimate the significance of the 1992 civil unrest. For the first time in the history of L.A. (and maybe even the U.S.), discussions on race were not only led on a biracial but on a multiracial level. Although – as the analysis of the media coverage has shown – people initially showed a tendency to try to explain the current crisis especially on a black-and-white level, they soon had to realize that the old binary system was no longer sufficient to cover the existing racial conflicts.

781 Cf. Medina, Jennifer: “In Years Since the Riots, a Changed Complexion in South Central” In: New York Times, April 24, 2012. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/us/in-south-los-angeles-a- changed-complexion-since-the-riots.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [05.01.2015]. 782 Cf. Chang, Edward T.: “Confronting Sa-i-gu”, 19f. 206

In the years following the unrest, race and race relations remained an important topic. By conducting opinion polls, for instance, the media as well as scholars from various fields regularly analyzed how Angelenos themselves perceived the living together in multi-ethnic Los Angeles. Here it became obvious that – similar to before and during the unrest – the perception of race relations depended heavily on who was asked. Although there were general tendencies recognizable in L.A., race relations were – as will be pointed out in the course of this chapter – judged differently depending on peoples’ ethnic/racial background as well as their social status within L.A.’s society.

One of the most important surveys analyzing the perception of race relations in the entire city was certainly a long-term study published by Loyola Marymount University783. Conducted in 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012, this survey shows (as subsumed in the following chart) that since the 1992 civil unrest, the overall perception of race relations in Los Angeles has been a subject to constant change:

Guerra, Fernando J. and Marks, Mara: 20th Anniversary of the Survey”. Loyola Marymount University, California, 2012. URL: http://www.lmu.edu/Assets/riots_results.pdf [21.01.2014].

While in 1997, 34% of those sampled regarded the living together in multi-ethnic L.A. as “good,” this number increased significantly within the next five years. In 2002, 74% of the interviewees felt positive about race relations, a number that decreased again until 2007, when only 47% of the respondents were thinking that the city’s ethnic/racial groups were getting along well. However, in 2012, twenty years after the civil unrest, the perception of race relations improved again. Now, 68% of the people considered the ethnic/racial situation in L.A. as being good.

783 The topic of race relations is just one topic in these surveys. However, since other topics like “citizen participation in city government” are of no interest in the context of this paper, they are to be neglected here. 207

However, the survey established in 2012 also showed that the perception of race relations varied depending on the interviewees’ ethnic/racial background. As pointed out above, 68% of those sampled regarded the city’s different ethnic/racial groups as getting along “very well” or “somewhat well”. However, when the replies were analyzed with regard to the respondents’ ethnic/racial background (as is done in the chart below), it turned out that whites perceived race relations more positive than non-whites. In contrast to 76% of all Caucasians interviewed, only 63.75% of those with another ethnic/racial background considered the living together as very or somewhat good.

Guerra, Fernando J. and Marks, Mara: 20th Anniversary of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots Survey”. Loyola Marymount University, California, 2012. URL: http://www.lmu.edu/Assets/riots_results.pdf [21.01.2014].

The Loyola University L.A. riots anniversary reports are not only noticeable because of the data they present. Besides showing how race relations changed over time, the polls themselves mirror how the approach to the topic changed, too. While in the first three surveys it was just mentioned that those sampled were “randomly selected citizens,”784 the last survey also roughly elaborates on the interviewees’ ethnic/racial background. Instead of providing readers with a general perception, they were informed about how different ethnic groups, in this case ‘black,’ ‘Asian,’ ‘white,’ ‘Latino,’ and ‘others,’ judged the respective topics. Although the university’s approach, at first glance, seems rather innovative as it approached the question of how ethnic/racial groups were getting along from the perspective of different races/ethnicities, the poll did so in a rather old fashioned manner. As Hollinger had already criticized in the 1990s, categorizing people with the help of this five-part

784 Guerra, Fernando J. and Marks, Mara: “1997 Los Angeles Riots 5th Anniversary Service Summary Guide”, 3. URL: http://academics.lmu.edu/media/lmuacademics/centerforthestudyoflosangeles/ 1997%205th%20Summary.pdf [06.01.2015]. 208 demographic structure is neither a sufficient depiction of the U.S.’s population nor does it allow any personal affiliations by people of mixed heritage.785

Besides, the diction used in the 2002, 2007, and 2012 polls is striking: Asking people how different races are ‘getting along,’ implies that Angelenos of different ethnic/racial backgrounds were living side by side rather than together, an assumption that suggests itself because of statements like the following: Asked in 2012 how she would rate the sense of cooperation of different racial groups, in this case Latinos and African Americans, Lilian Marenco, a South L.A. resident, answered that

‘[t]here’s not a great sense of community, people stay in their own worlds until there is some crisis to bring them together […]. It happens with every group. Mexicans say things only to other Mexicans, blacks to blacks.’ And what people say in public, she said, often masks the suspicions that groups harbor behind closed doors.786 This statement does not only support the idea of different ethnic/racial groups sharing the same living space but without being a community, it also alludes to one of the currently most tensed relationships in L.A., which is that of Latinos and blacks, particularly becoming apparent in South L.A..

One factor that might have been fostering frictions between these two groups in the area is certainly the strong connection many African Americans feel with ‘their’ neighborhood. Having been a predominantly black area for decades, South L.A. provides its residents with a sense of identity. Today, however, the growing Latin American population in South L.A. makes many African Americans feel that they – by ‘losing’ South L.A. – are losing their history and thereby their identity. As Raphael J. Sonenshein states: “It [South L.A.’s changing ethnic make-up] affects the African American community’s sense of self as it sees a geographic core that really matters to people erode. It changes the whole sense of the neighborhood.”787 Thus, it can be said that history has been repeating itself in South L.A. As pointed out in chapter 2.2 African American Job and Housing Opportunities, a large part of South (Central) Los Angles had been white before the beginning of the African American

785 Cf. Hollinger, David A: Postethnic America, 23. 786 Medina, Jennifer: “In Years Since the Riots, a Changed Complexion in South Central”. 787 Sonenshein, Raphael J. in: Medina, Jennifer: “In Years Since the Riots, a Changed Complexion in South Central”. 209 immigration influx previous to and during WWII. With the growing number of blacks, the already existing conflict between them and whites aggravated because of many Caucasians feeling threatened by the increasing number of African Americans. Now that the black population sees itself being outnumbered by Hispanics, frictions seem to be inevitable.

Additionally to the idea of Latinos ‘invading’ South Central and thereby depriving them of their identity, many blacks perceived Latinos as profiting from ‘their’ social achievements without having contributed to them. According to the Washington Post,

[M]uch as blacks demanded a fairer share of the power and resources from whites a generation ago, Latinos are now demanding that blacks and others share jobs, special school programs and political control. And like whites before them, many African Americans feel threatened by those demands. ‘Latinos have their own. Blacks have their own,’ said Royce Esters, former president of the NAACP branch that includes Compton, a city in the South Central corridor. ‘It’s a power play. Blacks feel like they have marched and marched and the Latinos have not marched. As a result, blacks are afraid of another race coming in and taking something they have worked so hard to get’.788 The power play Royce Esters speaks about has been particularly becoming apparent on South L.A.’s labor market. Competing for the jobs, many African Americans perceive Latinos as a major threat. In 2012, Danny Bakewell, for example, who had already stirred up hatred against Koreans during the summer of boycott, cautioned against Latinos taking away jobs from blacks in South L.A. As the New York Times, for example, put it:

Strains lie mostly beneath the surface, typically bubbling up when someone gets angry about [for example] construction jobs taken by illegal immigrants who are willing to work for less than minimum wage. ‘It’s not that I hold it against them to work,’ said Danny Bakewell […] ‘But if we can’t get jobs and make money in our own neighborhood, where can we get them? This is from where we came; there are other people living in it and they are welcome, but this is our community’.789

788 Fletcher, Michael A.: “America’s Ethnic and Racial Divides: In L.A., a sense of future conflict”. In: Washington Post, April 07, 1998, A1. URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/national/longterm/meltingpot/melt2.htm [14.01.2015]. 789 Medina, Jennifer: “In Years Since the Riots, a Changed Complexion in South Central”. 210

Here, it becomes apparent that the accusations against Latinos closely resemble those that were once raised against Korean entrepreneurs. It is again the idea of outsiders invading South Los Angeles and making money at the African American residents’ expense. It can thus be said that one scapegoat is replaced by another, a mechanism that is described in the frustration-aggression-hypothesis: Postulated by John Dollard et al. in 1939 and further developed by Roger Barker et al. in 1941 as well as Leonard Berkowitz in 1969, this theory’s principal argument is that “aggression is always a consequence of frustration” or rather that “the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression.”790 Here, frustration is understood as the result of intended but interrupted aims. Because of the disruption of the intended activity, the already mobilized psychological and physical energy is bottled up and thereby endangers the psychological balance. To restore this balance, frustration has – more or less inevitably and automatically – to erupt into aggressive behavior, which is basically targeted against the causal agent of the frustration. However, and that is important in the context of this study, if the root causes of the frustration cannot be identified and/or removed, the aggression is directed against ‘scapegoats,’ which are often weaker minority groups.791

Applying this theory to the interethnic/-racial conflicts in South L.A., it can be said that blacks – not able to challenge the actual reasons for their grievance (i.e. economically and socially unequal conditions for African Americans) for decades – blamed Korean entrepreneurs for their disadvantages. When after the 1992 civil unrest, Korean shop-owners retreated from the area’s economic landscape, blacks, remaining in conditions similar to those before the ‘riots,’ transferred their aggression to another target, namely Latinos. Among other things, these aggressions found their expression in prejudices like those mentioned above (e.g. Latinos taking away living space as well as job opportunities from blacks).

How strained the relationship between blacks and Latinos has become, can, for example, be seen in the 2007 riot anniversary survey by Loyola Marymount University. Although it referred to race relations all over L.A., it specifically asked people if they regarded the relationship between African Americans and Latinos as

790 Dollard, John in: Ganther, Stephan: “Determinanten ethnischer Grenzziehung Mikroanalytische Grundlagen und Erklärungsansätze”. Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES), Mannheim, 1997, 8. 791 Cf. Ganther, Stephan: “Determinanten ethnischer Grenzziehung Mikroanalytische Grundlagen und Erklärungsansätze”, 7ff. 211 any kind of ‘threat’. Requested to rate “[o]n a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being no threat at all and 10 being a major threat,” 84.02% of the interviewees picked a number between 5 and 10, showing that tensions between these two ethnic groups reached far beyond the ‘borders’ of South L.A.792

While frictions between Latinos and blacks have been high since the beginning of the ethnic transformation of South L.A., the ones between Korean Americans and African Americans have eased recently. With the departure of Korean entrepreneurs from South L.A. in the aftermath of the 1992 civil unrest, the relationship of African and Korean Americans improved recognizably. According to Edward T. Chang, this had its reason particularly in the fact that the unrest had made members of both groups wanting to learn more about each other. As he states,

Korean Americans showed great interest in learning about […] African American history and culture. Korean-language newspapers, television and radio stations continued to inform, educate and enlighten the community about African Americans and Latino experiences. For example, Korean radio stations in Los Angeles and Chicago serialized the author’s Korean-language book Who African Americans Are. It was received well by Korean American listeners. On May 1, 1993, a local Korean-language radio station Radio Korea (KBLA-AM 1580) and KJLH-FM 102.3, a station which primarily serves the African American community, aired a joint broadcast ‘Bridging the Gap’ to discuss misconceptions and promote mutual understanding.793

From Chang’s point of view, the improved relationship between blacks and Korean Americans can furthermore be found in organizations like the Black-Korean Christian Alliance as well as in scholarships for African American students or trips to South Korea financed by the Korean government.794

Here, however, it has to be made clear that another factor is far more likely to have eased tensions between Korean and African Americans. Although – as various surveys show – the unrest contributed to a conscious engagement with the respective ethnic/racial ‘other’ and thereby led to an increased mutual understanding, this argument is rather neglectable with regard to the relationship of blacks and Koreans.

792 Guerra, Fernando J. and Marks, Mara: “2007 Los Angeles Riots 15th Anniversary Survey Summary Guide”. Loyola Marymount University, California, 2007, 39. URL: http://academics.lmu.edu/media/lmuacademics/centerforthestudyoflosangeles/2007%2015th%20Sum mary%20Guide.pdf [21.01.2014]. 793 Chang, Edward T.: “Los Angeles Riots and Korean-African American Conflict”. Riverside. URL: http://www.irwinator.com/126/wdoc204.htm#_ednref1 [13.01.2014]. 794 Cf. ibid. 212

Admittedly, as pointed out above, there has indeed been a number of initiatives from both sides supposed to ease the tensions between these two groups; however, since the main source of conflict was to be found in encounters between Korean shop owners and their blacks customers and since the number of Korean entrepreneurs has decreased significantly, it is far more likely that members of the two groups meet less frequently than they did in the past. It can thus be presumed that the black-Korean conflict was not fully solved but rather subsided because of the ethnic/racial transformation of South L.A.

In summary, it can be said that the 1992 civil unrest had a certain influence on race relations in L.A., insomuch as it led to thoughtful examinations of how people of different ethnic backgrounds perceive each other as well as to a greater awareness of the challenges of living in a multiethnic city. This awareness, in parts, might have contributed to an increased mutual understanding of certain ethnic/racial groups, but all in all, it can be said that there are still (more or less subliminal) ongoing frictions between the city’s different groups.

This, at least in parts, can be attributed to Los Angeles’ fragmented character. Even today, the number of people living among members of their own race/ethnicity equals that of those residing in multiethnic communities. Not knowing the respective ‘other,’ prejudices are widely distributed, supporting already existing inter-ethnic/- racial conflicts. These conflicts become particularly apparent in neighborhoods that are in a state of an ‘ethnic flux,’ like South (Central) L.A., which was once predominately black but has recently been turning into a mostly Latino neighborhood.

9.0 Conclusion

Returning to the question posed at the beginning of how the L.A. Times reported about the Rodney King incident and the 1992 L.A. unrest, it can first of all be said that – as this thesis has shown – it could not have adequately been answered without analyzing also the paper’s news coverage on the ‘black-Korean conflict’. Having examined the reporting on these three closely connected topics, it is now possible to say that the Times resorted to a number of stylistic devices occurring in its reporting on all three events. This, however, does not mean that they were covered alike. Instead, there are also a number of radical differences.

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The discourse analysis of the Times’ news coverage has shown that the paper reported about the Rodney King beating, the ‘black-Korean conflict’ as well as the 1992 unrest with the same racialized approach: It did not only portray race/ethnicity as one of the most important identity markers but also as the underlying reason for all three events. However, the Los Angeles Times did not approach the topic of race/ethnicity critically: Instead, it made recourse to the rigid categorization of people with the help of what David Hollinger referred to as the ‘ethno-racial pentagon,’ dividing people into five different groups only, without leaving room for other ethnic backgrounds or personal affiliations by people of mixed heritage.

By not only reporting about people identifying race as the reason for the respective events but also stressing the respective protagonists’ ethnic/racial background over and over again, the paper did not only mirror the public discourse but contributed to maintaining the idea that race had played the most important role in the Rodney King incident, the conflict of merchants and customers in South Central as well as the 1992 unrest. This was furthered by the Times, reporting that people of different ethnic/racial backgrounds perceived certain topics (e.g., the question of whether Gates should resign or not) very differently. Speaking of, for instance, ‘stark racial lines,’ the Times created the impression of L.A. perishing by its multiethnic character. This depiction of a continuously dividing city corresponds – at least in parts – to what Arthur Schlesinger identified as a process of ‘disuniting’. According to him, the ‘cult of ethnicity,’ which means the stressing of everyone’s ethnic/racial background, fostered a drifting apart of American society. Although the Times never used Schlesinger’s terminology, it nonetheless identified a drifting apart of Angelenos of different races, referring to this process as a ‘growing divisiveness’.

While the Times’ racialized approach could be found in its news coverage on all three events examined in this paper, there were also a number of differences: One of the most obvious distinctions can be found in the reporting’s intensity: Admittedly, the paper’s discourse on the King incident soon shifted towards one on Police Chief Daryl Gates and Mayor Tom Bradley, but here the beating was still brought in as a reason for the then-current debate. Thus, it can be said that the paper’s uninterrupted reporting on the March 3rd incident lasted longer than a year and usually comprised several articles per day. In comparison, the intensity of the Times’ reportage on the ‘black-Korean conflict’ clearly remained behind that following the King beating.

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Indeed, reports dealing with violent encounters between Korean entrepreneurs and their African American customers had been published over several months too but only sporadically and very rarely exceeding one article per day. The paper’s news coverage on the 1992 civil unrest differed noticeably from its ‘everyday-reporting’. For almost a month, it focused solely on ‘riot’-related topics, which (different from the King incident and the ‘black-Korean conflict’) were reported about in an inconsistent manner.

Returning to the different intensity of the Los Angeles Times’ news coverage on the King beating and the ‘black-Korean conflict,’ it can be argued that it was probably their similarities that made the paper neglect the latter. Since at the beginning of the 1990s, blacks as well as race relations were rather unpopular media stories, the Times probably regarded them as already sufficiently dealt with by intensively covering the King beating (aftermath). This assumption sees itself confirmed by the paper reporting not only about these two topics but also the 1992 unrest with the same ‘racialized’ approach. It could of course be argued that race and racism had indeed been an important factor in all three events, but the Times only broached the topic without evaluating the meaning of race in American or at least L.A. society in greater detail. Instead, once having identified racial animosities as the underlying cause of the respective events, the paper limited its reportage to conflicts comprising two (racial) groups only. Informing its readers about the Rodney King beating and the ‘black-Korean conflict,’ the L.A. Times concentrated on opposing African Americans and the white-dominated police and African Americans and Koreans, respectively. In both cases, other racial/ethnic groups were most widely ignored. It was not (or very rarely) reported that, for example, also Latinos had been involved in encounters with both the L.A.P.D. as well as Korean merchants in South Central or that the relationship between blacks and Latinos was strained, too. Instead, the paper focused on the historically most accepted victimized racial group, i.e. African Americans, and one respective other. Even in the Times’ reportage following the violent outbreak of 1992, the newspaper – although it had identified the events as multiethnic – presented them first from black and white, later from black and Korean perspectives only. Other ethnic/racial minorities affected by the unrest, were hardly ever included in the news coverage. By (over-) simplifying the issue of racial conflicts, the L.A. Times certainly sought to make them more graspable, but at the same time it broke them down to such an extent that occasionally they were depicted rather distortedly. 215

Furthermore – as the discourse analysis has shown – the paper even went a step further: It did not only simplify multiracial conflicts by opposing only two racial groups but broke these self-constructed binary oppositions further down into two individuals representing these races. This became particularly obvious in the Times’ reporting on the King beating aftermath, when the initial discussion on racially motivated police misconduct was soon given up in favor of one on the animosity between Police Chief Daryl Gates and Mayor Tom Bradley. This was certainly not just a binary opposition of two people but was used to simplify the far more complex conflict between blacks and whites (or rather the white-dominated L.A.P.D) of which the two officials – because of their racial backgrounds – were ‘representatives’. The same holds true for the paper’s depiction of the Rodney King and Reginald Denny incidents after the outbreak of the unrest. Because of the racial constellation of the respective beatings, the paper contrasted them repeatedly, the purpose of which was not only to show that African Americans and Caucasians could be both victims as well as perpetrators but also to ‘personalize’ and thereby simplify the conflict between black and white.

However, binary oppositions were not only used to make highly complex race relations more graspable but also as important ‘comparison parameters’. The L.A. Times did not only, for instance, compare the 1965 Watts ‘riots’ and the 1992 unrest to stress the intensity of the latter, it also used them to position itself and to portray one person/institution more positively: Praising Clinton’s qualities as a politician, it simultaneously stressed Bush’s inability to respond to the L.A. unrest; portraying the police as paralyzed and impotent during the violent outbreak, it simultaneously glorified the National Guard and military troops.

Taking a clear stance, the Times did not only promote one person or institution, it also developed a ‘watchdog mentality,’ making sure that its readers were informed about continuing grievances. As has been pointed out, this was particularly true for the paper’s news coverage following the release of the Christopher Commission report after which the Times increasingly reported about problems the survey had called attention to, which was the discrimination of women, ethnic/racial minorities and homosexuals within as well as by the L.A.P.D. By pointing to these cases of police misconduct, the paper followed its ‘actual aim’ which was pointing out that

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Daryl Gates was no longer acceptable as the city’s police chief and thus had to be removed to make L.A. a better place.

This ‘watchdog mentality,’ however, could only be found when the paper used an internal approach and ‘perceived’ itself as part of the city, working for its greater good (as it did in the King beating aftermath as well as during and after the unrest). Reporting about the ‘black-Korean conflict,’ in contrast, it rather made use of an external approach, reporting about the events taking place in South Central as an outside observer only. Hardly ever commenting on what was going on in this area, the paper rather presented members of the two opposing racial groups evaluating the actions of the respective other. It was not elaborated on how the growing tensions in South Central would affect Los Angeles as a whole. Even when reporting about African Americans cautioning against their anger erupting in a violent outbreak, the paper did not amplify this any further.

As this thesis has furthermore shown, presenting quotes without commenting on them any further was a method commonly used by the paper to distance itself from these statements. This particularly became apparent in the newspaper informing its readers about Bradley having appointed Peter V. Ueberroth to head the newly established extra-governmental task force Rebuild L.A.: Reporting about arguments by ethnic/racial minorities according to which a single white man could not meet the needs of the city’s various communities, the Times left them uncommented but instead concentrated on portraying Ueberroth as a hands-on businessman who includes all races in his rebuilding efforts.

As has been illustrated, the Times’ news coverage on Ueberroth was only one way to show that – if officials as well as residents were responding adequately to the grievance the King beating as well as the unrest had brought to light – L.A. could hope for a brighter future. Especially the highly recurrent rhetoric of therapy and crisis showed that the Times regarded both events as severe but solvable. Clean-up efforts by Angelenos were furthermore reported about by using a military rhetoric, showing how ambitiously they were working. By using military terms when referring to those cleaning up, the Times linked them to the positively connoted group of the military and the National Guard. ‘Together’ with them, they fought the chaos and destruction caused by the participant in the unrest. In the Los Angeles Times’ reporting, their cleaning efforts were presented as an important first step towards a 217 brighter future. What this was supposed to look like was also part of the paper’s news coverage: Although the terminology used by the Times was sometimes misleading (indicating both returning to the pre-unrest status quo as well as reconstructing society fundamentally), societal changes were nonetheless presented as having top priority: Focusing on ‘experts’ of various scholarly fields as well as politicians calling for greater investments in education, health care and job training in L.A.’s inner-city and the South Central area as well as measures to improve race relations, the Times regarded social changes as essential for preventing comparable violent outbreaks. This became particularly clear by the paper repeatedly referring to the history of Los Angeles as well as the U.S.: With regard to black-on-white racism, for example, the Times pointed out more than once that this had been a problem for generations and that – as long as society did not overcome racial boundaries – incidents like the King beating and the unrest would reoccur.

Although it is hardly possible to evaluate the influence newspapers like the L.A. Times had on post-unrest developments, it can nonetheless be said that it contributed essentially to a particular reflection of the events. Making a broader audience aware of social and economic grievances as those having come to light after the King beating and the 1992 unrest, media like the Times put pressure on officials to address them and to finally induce positive changes. And as has been pointed out in this thesis, there have indeed been a number of improvements since then: With regard to the L.A.P.D., it can be said that especially the King beating incident had launched massive reforms. These had been induced already before the violent outbreak with L.A. voters approving City Charter Amendment F, limiting the police chief’s tenure to five years and to two terms only as well as giving the mayor and the Police Commission greater authority over the city’s police force. As has furthermore been illustrated, Daryl Gates’ successors gradually worked on making the formerly predominately white and male L.A.P.D. mirror L.A.’s demographics. Additionally, community-based policing programs have contributed to the police becoming part of the city’s respective communities rather than their opponents. This, however, is not supposed to hide that occasionally there are still violent encounters between Angelenos and the L.A.P.D. and although ethnic/racial minorities state that they are predominantly treated with respect by police officers, they are more often stopped for questioning than Caucasians. What has changed, though, is that the police are more

218 likely to acknowledge mistakes and to take appropriate steps, which has contributed to the L.A.P.D.’s image as one of the U.S.’s ‘model-departments’.

With regard to race relations, however, positive changes are not that easy to be recognized. Besides a number of organizations the aim of which has been mediating between the city’s ethnic/racial groups, it is particularly an increased awareness of cultural differences to which the 1992 unrest has led. Knowing differences, however, does not mean overcoming them. With about half of Angelenos living in monoethnic/-racial neighborhoods or enclaves, prejudices against the ‘unknown other’ remain high. Other points of friction can be found in neighborhoods in a state of ‘racial flux,’ e.g. South Los Angeles, where newly arriving Latinos have gradually been ‘taking over’ the traditionally black neighborhood. Competing for the same job and housing opportunities, South L.A.’s African American population tends to perceive their Hispanic neighbors as a major threat.

Since today, almost 25 years after the King beating, similar incidents still occur in the U.S., the results of this thesis lend themselves to a comparison of the analysis presented here and the news coverage on comparable, more recent events. Here, especially the killing of Michael Brown suggests itself for further research as the incident itself as well as the violent protests following it, show certain parallels to the King beating and the 1992 unrest. Doing so would certainly help to evaluate if the published discourse on race and race relations in the U.S. has developed over the last two decades.

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Ferrell, David: “Grim Gates Faces Heated Questions: Media: The chief seems to know that the news conference on police beating might be the most significant of his stormy tenure”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 08, 1991, B1/4.

Ferrel, David and Wallace, Amy: “Verdicts Greeted With Outrage and Disbelief”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1992, A1/24.

Fiore, Faye and Gollner, Philipp: “Video Showing Beating by L.A. Officers Investigated“. In: Los Angeles Times, March 05, 1991, A26.

Fiore Faye and Wood, Tracy: “Beating Victim Says He Obeyed Police: Law enforcement: He is freed from jail. D.A. files no charges against him”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 07, 1991, A1/20/21/22.

Fletcher, Michael A.: “America’s Ethnic and Racial Divides: In L.A., a sense of future conflict”. In: Washington Post, April 07, 1998, A1. URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/meltingpot/melt2.htm [14.01.2015].

Ford, Andrea: “King Beating Reunites Civil Rights Groups”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1991, B1/6.

– – –: “Videotape Shows Teen Being Shot After Fight: Killing: Trial opens for Korean grocer who is accused in the slaying of a 15-year-old black girl at a South-Central store”. In: Los Angeles Times, October 01, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-01/local/me-3692_1_black-girl [15.06.2015].

– – –: “911, TV Tapes Tell Different Tales in Killing of Teen-Ager: Murder trial: The Korean store owner told a police operator that the black girl had tried to take money. But the security recording conflicts with that version”. In: Los Angeles Times, October 02, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-02/local/me- 3102_1_black-girl [21.07.2015].

– – –: “1st-Degree Murder Ruled Out in Grocer Trial: Courts: Judge says Korean-American woman should face no more than a second-degree penalty in shooting of black teen- ager.” In: Los Angeles Times, October 04, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-04/local/me-3260_1_1st-degree-murder [16.06.2015].

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Ford, Andrea and Lee, John H.: “Slain Girl Was Not Stealing Juice, Police Say: Shooting: The incident in which the 15-year-old was killed by a market owner was captured on a security system videotape.” In: Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-19/local/me-456_1_dead-girl [11.06.2015].

– – – / – – –: “Racial Tensions Blamed in Girl’s Death: Shooting: Prolonged distrust, insults and violence between the Korean store owners and their black neighbors are cited by both sides”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-20/local/me-455_1_black-neighbors [11.06.2015].

Ford, Andrea and Fritsch, Jane: “Police Commissioners Reject Council’s Offer: Beating: Proposal would have ended dispute over Gates. It provided nothing new, a panel member says.” ”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1991, A1/22.

Ford, Andrea and Kelly, Darryl: “King Case to Be Tried in Ventura County: Courts: Proceedings for four LAPD officers charged with brutality will get under way Feb. 3.”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 27, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-27/news/mn-220_1_ventura-county-s-population [05.07.2015].

Ford, Andrea and Wilkinson, Tracy: “Panel Urges Gates to Retire: Report on Police Cites Racism, Excess Force: Investigation: The Christopher Commission blames a failure of leadership. It calls for the formation of a new and stronger Police Commission”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07- 10/news/mn-1889_1_police-commission [23.07.2015].

Ford, Andrea and Wilkinson, Tracy and Wood, Tracy: “Panel Urges Gates to Retire: Report on Police Cites Racism, Excess Force: Investigation: The Christopher Commission blames a failure of leadership. It calls for the formation of a new and stronger Police Commission”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-10/news/mn-1889_1_police-commission [01.06.2015].

Fox, David J. and McMillan, Penelope: “Celebrities Organize Efforts to End Violence, Clean Up”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1991, A7/20.

Franenberg, Estellaleigh: “Outrage over King verdict”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B6.

Fritsch, Jane: “King Case Sparks Start of Mayoral Race”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1991, B1/3.

– – –: “Unanticipated Contenders for Gates’ Job--Outsiders: Police: For the first time in decades, there is a chance that the next chief will not come from within the LAPD”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 07, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08- 07/news/mn-102_1_job-of-police-chief [10.07.2015].

Fritsch, Jane and Ford, Andrea: “Police Commissioners Reject Council’s Offer: Beating: Proposal would have ended dispute over Gates. It provided nothing new, a panel member says”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1991, A1/22.

Fritsch, Jane and Muir, Frederick M.: “Council Majority Backs Police Panel Reform Package: Commission: They seek full implementation of the Christopher report, including its call for a new chief. Former Chief Davis also urges Gates to step aside”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07- 11/news/mn-2872_1_council-members [01.06.2015].

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Galloway, Laura A. and Serrano, Richard A.: “Prospective Jurors in King Case Express Sympathy for Police: Trial: Of five potential members of panel with strong law enforcement leanings, only one is excused”. In: Los Angeles Times, February 20, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-25/local/me-2883_1_police-officers [15.07.2015].

Gerstenzang, James: “White House Blames ‘Liberal Programs’ for Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A9.

Gibb, Geoffrey Taylor: “Who Says They Can’t Fire the Chief?” In: Los Angeles Times, March 15, 1991, B7.

– – –: “Can African-Americans Now Truly Believe in Judicial Fairness?: Race relations: Soon Ja Du’s sentence sends a message that black life is worthless. Such a message, however, doesn’t come without a price”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 24, 1991.

“Girl, 15, Shot to Death Over Orange Juice”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-17/local/me-888_1_orange-juice [10.06.2015].

Gold, Matea: “Black Activists Rally Backers of Chief Parks”. In: Los Angeles Times, Feb 04. 2002. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2002/feb/04/local/me-chief4 [04.12.2014].

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Griego, Tina: “2 Cities – Under Siege and Under Threat”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B1/8.

Hager, Philip: “LAPD Losing Public Support, Judge Says”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 08, 1992, A1/6.

“Hahn Isn’t Welcome, Black Leaders Say”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 06. 2002. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2002/apr/06/local/me-hahn6 [04.12.2014].

Healy, Melissa: “Williams Maintains Distance From L.A. Strife: Police: Chief-designate says he has made a ‘conscious decision’ not to intervene in city leaders’ actions. Officers in King case won’t be welcomed back on force, he says”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A9.

Healy, Melissa and Tumulty, Karen: “New Chief Inherits New Problems After Verdict”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B3.

Holguin, Rick and Lee, John H.: “Boycott of Store Where Man Was Killed Is Urged: Racial tensions: The African-American was slain while allegedly trying to rob the market owned by a Korean-American.” In: Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-18/local/me-837_1_african-american-man [15.06.2015].

Hubler, Shawn and Lacey, Marc: “Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores; 4 Reported Dead”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 29th, 1992, A1/31.

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Ingram, Carl and Timnick Lois: “Judge Rejects Separate Trials for 4 in King Beating”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-05- 15/news/mn-1728_1_separate-trials [05.07.2016].

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Jackson, Jesse: “A ‘Terrible Rainbow of Protest’”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, B7.

Jehl, Douglas: Bush Seeks Solutions to Urban Ills. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A9.

– – –: “Bush Officials Urge LAX Sale For Urban Aid”: In: Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1992, A1/36.

Jehl, Douglas and Broder, John M.: “Bush Pledges Enough Force to Quell Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A1.

Jehl, Douglas and Stall, Bill: “Bush offers Message of Healing to the City”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 08, 1992, A1/7.

Jones, Charisse: “Black Cops Caught in the Middle: In the aftermath of the King beating, many must suffer taunts of fellow African-Americans. The LAPD officers struggle to sort through conflicting emotions”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 15, 1991, A1/21.

Jones, Robert A.: “City’s two worlds collide as the riots reach out and grab white Los Angeles: A Few Hours When Our Town Hung in the Balance”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, A4.

Katz, Jesse and Clifford, Frank: “Many Find Verdict Fair, But There Is Still Outrage: Killing: Leaders in African-American and Korean-American communities think the Du jury picked the least inflammatory verdict.” In: Los Angeles Times, October 12, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-12/news/mn-195_1_korean- american-community [16.06.2015].

Kim, Bong H. and Oh, Angela E.: “PERSPECTIVE ON BLACK/KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: Don’t Fall for ‘Divide and Conquer’: Blaming one store-owner is easier than correcting problems that affect both our struggling communities”. In: Los Angeles Times, September 04, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09- 04/local/me-1389_1_american-community [11.06.2015].

King, Peter: “Judge’s Sentence Draws Fire”. In: Los Angeles Times, November 25, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-25/local/me-214_1_fountain-valley [16.06.2015].

– – –: “The King Case as a Modern-Day War Crimes Trial”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 06, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-06/news/mn-3326_1_crimes- trial [16.07.2015].

“Korean Stores Firebombed; 2 of 3 Hit Have Seen Black Boycotts”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 18, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-18/local/me- 1554_1_black-girl [15.06.2015].

Kowsky, Kim and Ashi, Bernice Hirabayashi: “Tension Add Awkwardness to Everyday Encounters: Race Relations: Mistrust is pervasive. Even small talk and forced politeness point to a heightened unease”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A1/18.

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Kwon, Soon Chang: “’This riot is the ugly other side of America’”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 13, 1992, T10.

Lauter, David: “Political Leaders’ Analysis of Crisis Varies: Elections: Democrats are expected to blame rampage on GOP neglect of cities. But persisting anarchy could help conservative, law-and-order Republicans win support”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A4.

Lazzareschi, Carla: “Slow Day for Movies, Eateries and Malls”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-06/business/fi-1307_1_slow-day-for- movies [12.12.2015].

“Learning From the Mistakes of Others: Sheriff Block studies Christopher Commission report for applicable lessons”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 04, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-04/opinion/op-472_1_christopher-commission- report [07.07.2015].

Lee, John H. and Ramos, Georges: “Demonstrators Demand That Korean Market Never Reopen: Shooting: A crowd of 150 at the store reflect growing tensions over the slaying of a 15-year-old girl by a grocer.” In: Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-22/local/me-656_1_korean-community [10.06.2015].

Lee, John H. and Katz, Jesse: “Conflict Brings Tragic End to Similar Dreams of Life: Shooting: An immigrant grocer is accused of murdering a girl, 15. Both sought to overcome adversity.” In: Los Angeles Times, April 08, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-08/news/mn-121_1_ja-du [15.06.2015].

Lee, John H.: “Diary of a War of Attrition in Volatile Urban Dispute: Boycott: Business has plummeted in a store whose Korean-American owner killed a black man.” In: Los Angeles Times, July 02, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07- 02/news/mn-1591_1_african-american-man [15.06.2015].

Leonard, Jack and Winton, Richard: “Will Bratton's reforms survive after his departure?”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 06, 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/06/local/me-legacy6 [19.12.2014].

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Lieberman, Paul and Murphy Dean E.: “Bush Ordering Troops to L.A.” In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A1/13.

Lopez, Steve: “The forgotten victim from Florence and Normandie”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06, 2012. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/06/local/la-me-0506- lopez-riot-20120506 [04.08.2015].

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Lozano, Carlos V: “4 Officers to Be Tried in Spartan Conditions: Rodney King case: The courthouse in Simi Valley has been virtually empty and unused since opening in March. There are no amenities”. In: Los Angeles Times, January 27, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-27/local/me-670_1_simi-valley [04.07.2015].

– – –: “Simi Valley Coping Smoothly With King Case: Courts: Opinions in the community still differ about playing host to one of the state's most publicized trials. But attorneys' fears that office space and food would be lacking have proved unfounded.”

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Martinez, Al: “Scenes from the Battlefield”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B2.

McDonald, Patrick R.: “Then And Now: Images from the same spot as the L.A. riots, 20 years later”. In: L.A. Weekly, March 08, 2012. URL: http://www.laweekly.com/microsites/la-riots/ [06.01.2015].

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McGraw, Carol: “Judge Upholds City Council’s Reinstatement of Chief Gates: Government: The ruling is a crushing defeat for the Police Commission. It could have ramifications for other agencies overseen by appointed panels”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1991, A1/21.

McGreevy, Patrick, “L.A. adopts less than third of post-riot police reforms”. In: Los Angeles Daily News, January 03, 1995. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-01- 03/news/1995003010_1_police-department-reforms-christopher-commission [04.12.2014].

– – –: “Bratton to seek a second term as L.A. police chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 03. 2007. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/03/local/me-bratton3 [22.12.2014].

McMillan, Penelope: “Video Captures Police Retreat at Outbreak of Violence”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A4.

McNamara, Joseph D.: “Police Story: Report Just Underlined the Obvious: Gates Has Long Acted Questionably: Leadership: The chief set the tone for an aberrant style of policing that condoned a brutal, racist and sexist subculture on the LAPD. Now it's time for the people to correct it.” In: Los Angeles Times, July 14, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-14/opinion/op-3131_1_police-chief-talks- assistant-chief-gates-christopher-commission [01.06.2015].

– – –: “When the Police Create Disorder”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, M1.

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Meyer, Josh: “Seminar Aims at Making Police Culturally Aware: Community relations: Improving trust between police and public is goal of sensitivity class for officers on the Westside”. October 14, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10- 14/local/me-419_1_police-department [08.07.2015].

Mitchell, John L. “Woo Takes Call for Gates to Quit to Black Churches, Ministers”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 02, 1991, B1/8.

“Molotov Cocktail Tossed Onto Boycotted Store”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-19/local/me-817_1_molotov-cocktail [15.06.2015].

Morello, Carol: “Willie Williams Will Get $375,000 To Leave Los Angeles Police Early Foes Called The Deal ‘extortion.’ All Agreed It Would Avert A Suit”. In: The Inquirer, April 23, 1997. URL: http://articles.philly.com/1997-04- 23/news/25531971_1_police-chief-willie-williams-civilian-bosses-severance- package [04.12.2014].

Morrison, Patt: “The Press under Fire: Riots targets Journalists”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A4.

– – –: “Symbol of Pain Survives Flames”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 07, 1992, B3.

Muir, Frederick M. and Stumbo, Bella: “Gates Says He Might Not Retire Until 1993: Police: Chief wants to wait until a vote is taken on recommended reforms. Council allies who announced his departure still expect him to leave this year.” In: Los Angeles Times, July 14, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-14/news/mn- 3488_1_police-reform [01.06.2015].

Mulligan, Thomas S.: “Adjusters Fan Out as Insurers Brace for $1 Billion in Claims”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, B3.

Murphy, Dean E.: “When Cops Go Back on the Beat: Houston has pioneered community- based policing, a practice now urged for Los Angeles. While some see benefits, many officers are skeptical. And crime there keeps rising”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 27, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-27/news/mn- 1690_1_houston-police-department/3 [07.07.2015].

– – –: “Gates Bitterly Steps Out of Spotlight: Retirement: Outgoing head spends the day fighting with council, predicting a tough time for Williams and scourging department ‘traitors’”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-16/news/mn-919_1_tough-time [13.07.2015].

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Nelson, Jack: “Bush Denounces Rioting in L.A. as ‘Purely Criminal’”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A9/30.

– – –: “Poll Finds Voter Support for Bush Eroded by Riots”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A9.

Newton, Jim: “Williams Officially Asks for New Term as Chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, January 03, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1997-01-03/news/mn- 14999_1_chief-willie-williams [04.12.2014].

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Newton, Jim and Pool, Bob: “Under the Gun”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06, 1992, A7.

Oh, Angela E.: “Talk Is Fine; What the City Needs Is Leadership: Race relations: The pact between Korean-Americans and African-Americans is a fragile first step, not a ‘victory.’” In: Los Angeles Times, October 09, 1991. http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-09/local/me-17_1_african-american-business [17.06.2015].

“The Open Wound That Los Angeles Must Now Work to Heal”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, B9.

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– – –: “Ueberroth Does Balancing Act as Rebuild L.A. Chief: Riots: Leaders lobby chairman for roles for minorities in restoring the city. Task force has not named a board of directors”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-18/local/me-108_1_task-force [13.07.2014].

– – –: “Washing Our Hands in Politics”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 20, 1992, A1/10.

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Peterson, Jonathan and Tobar, Hector: “South L.A. Burns and Grieves: Life has been hard in the neglected area for years. But now, as self-inflicted wounds mount, residents fear for the future”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, A1/24.

Pine, Art: “Perot Favors U.S. Charges for Officers”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A9.

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“Prescription for LAPD: An Independent Panel.” In: Los Angeles Times, April 01, 1991, B4.

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Rainy, James and Sahagun, Louis: “LOCAL ELECTIONS: Measure F Vote Called Just Start of Police Reform”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 04, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-04/local/me-1456_1_police-department [03.12.2014].

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“Renewing the Spirits – and the Streets”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1991, A5.

Risen, James and Tumulty, Karen: “Numbers Show Most Blacks Remain Mired in Poverty”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1992, A10.

Rodriguez, Antonio H.: “So, You Have A Complaint: Police: Citizens who want to report being mistreated must run a gauntlet of obstacles, hostility and fear”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 14, 1991, B7.

Rohrlich, Ted: “Key Work in Picking Police Chief to Be Secret: LAPD: Civic leaders will cut list of candidates to about 15 in private sessions. Even names of panel members will be confidential”. In: Los Angeles Times, September 06, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-06/local/me-1897_1_police-commission [10.07.2015].

– – –: “LAPD Seeking to Improve Rookies’ Training: Police: The common advice from field officers to 'forget everything you learned at the academy' is subverting teaching on restraint in the use of force, administrators say”. In: Los Angeles Times, September 17, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-17/local/me-2874_1_field- training-officers [08.07.2015].

Rohrlich, Ted and Serrano, Richard A.: “Criticism Over Use of Force Inhibited by Police, Gates Says”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 07, 1992, A1/8.

Rotella, Sebastian: “Community Policing to Be Expanded: Law enforcement: The pilot program sends veteran officers to work full time with neighborhood groups. Civilian volunteers will join the effort”. In: Los Angeles Times, September 04, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-04/local/me-1517_1_police-officers [08.07.2015].

Rubin, Joel: “LAPD gains new approval from the public”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 22, 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/22/local/me-poll22 [19.12.2014].

– – –: “Los Angeles Police Chief William J. Bratton to step down”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 05, 2009. URL: http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/08/los-angeles- police-chief-william-bratton.html [17.12.2014].

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– – –: “William Bratton announces he will resign as LAPD chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 06, 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/06/local/me-bratton6 [19.12.2014].

Rubin, Joel and Willon, Phil: “Councilman proposes rescinding term limits for LAPD chief”. In: Los Angeles Times, Mach 26. 2009. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/26/local/me-lapd-bratton26 [19.12.2014].

Rutten, Tim: “Unity Also A Victim of Shooting”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-21/news/vw-935_1_korean-people [15.06.2015].

– – –: “LAPD has made great strides, thanks to consent decree, reform-minded chiefs”. In: Los Angeles Daily News, August 22, 2014. URL: http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20140822/lapd-has-made-great-strides-thanks- to-consent-decree-reform-minded-chiefs-tim-rutten [19.12.2014].

Sahagun, Louis: “Gates Urges Education on Arrest: Police: The chief endorses the idea of a video program on how to be taken into custody. He tells a council panel it would make encounters with the police less frightening”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1991, B1/4.

– – –: “Bradley Tries to Calm Racial Animosities : Neighborhoods: Mayor sets up a meeting between detectives and organizers of a boycott of a Korean-owned store in South- Central. Blacks are upset over treatment by shopkeepers”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1991. http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-30/local/me-1372_1_korean- community [19.06.2015].

Sahagun, Louis and Schwada, John: “Measure to Reform LAPD Wins Decisively”. In: Los Angeles Times, June 03, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06- 03/news/mn-641_1_police-department [03.12.2014].

Scheer, Robert: “Cecil Murray: A Voice of Reason in a Time if Troubles”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 03, 1992, M3.

– – –: “Interview: Jesse Jackson”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1992, C8.

– – –: “LOS ANGELES TIMES INTERVIEW: Peter Ueberroth: A Man of Privilege Aims to Get Down and Dirty to Rebuild L.A.”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 17, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-17/opinion/op-279_1_los-angeles [02.03.2015].

Serrano, Richard A.: “Police Documents Disclose Beating Was Downplayed: Investigation: Highway Patrol officers say they were ‘shocked’ at the level of violence used by the police: Reports studied by grand jury add detail to King incident”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1991, A1/12.

– – –: “Gates Put on Leave, Pledges to Appeal Commission Action: King beating: Police chief says he has been disgraced. His lawyers will ask court on Monday to overturn decision”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 05, A1/23.

– – –: “Police Union Head in Line for New LAPD Job: Labor: George Aliano says there is no connection between the expected promotion and his uncharacteristically strong support of Chief Gates after the Rodney G. King beating”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-16/local/me-2365_1_police- union [01.06.2015].

– – –: “Gates Announces April Date for Retirement as Police Chief: Law enforcement: Embattled leader tells of his decision in letters to city officials and in message to

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officers. He says he will stay longer if successor is not chosen”. In: Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-23/news/mn- 98_1_police-department [01.06.2015].

– – –: “Gates Bars Uniforms at Festival: Police: Gay and lesbian officers can wear only civilian clothes at Sunset Junction fair. Chief also dismisses gay recruitment as a waste of time”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 07, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-07/local/me-264_1_gay-recruitment [06.07.2015].

– – –: “Attempt to Blunt Effect of Video Seen as Key to Trial: Defense: Court documents indicate officers’ strategy”. In: Los Angeles Times, January 16, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-16/news/mn-293_1_court-documents [05.08.2015].

– – –: “2 Views of King Drawn by Lawyers: Trial: In a dramatic statement, the attorney for Officer Briseno says his client was trying to stop the beating by others who, he says, were 'out of control”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 06, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-06/news/mn-3324_1_rodney-king [27.07.2015].

– – –:.“Staggering King Scared Him, Officer Says: LAPD: Witness likens scene to ‘a monster movie.’ His description of baton blows differs from earlier testimony”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 11, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03- 11/local/me-3602_1_monster-movie [21.07.2015].

– – –: “Prosecution to Rest Without Calling King: Trial: It remains uncertain whether attorneys for the LAPD officers will call the beating victim to the witness stand”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03- 17/local/me-3896_1_witness-stand [20.07.2015].

Serrano, Richard A. and Stolberg, Sheryl: “Gates, Bradley Declare a Truce. Police: Mayor and chief join City Council President in agreeing to stop public feuding. Ten rookie officers say they have immunity in beating case”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 10, 1991, A1/18.

Serrano, Richard A. and Wilkinson, Tracy: “All 4 in King Beating Acquitted: Violence Follows Verdicts; Guard Called Out”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1992, A1/22.

Shiver Jr., Jube and Rainey, James: “Reaction Divided Over Key Role for Ueberroth” In: Los Angeles Times, May 04, 1992, A1/20.

“Signs of Hope and Recovery”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 02, 1991, A5.

Sims, Calvin: “In Los Angeles, It's South-Central No More”. In: New York Times, April 10, 2003. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/10/us/in-los-angeles-it-s-south- central-no-more.html [05.01.2015].

Sipchen, Bob: “Angry and Weary, Gates Continues to Parry Criticism”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 09, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-09/news/mn- 1587_1_daryl-gates [01.01.2015].

Sonenshein, Raphael, J: “After the riots: The day L.A. changed. Historic reforms passed on June 02, 1992, altered the accountability and behavior of the LAPD”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 31, 2012. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/31/opinion/la-oe-sonenshein-police-reform- anniversary-20120531 [03.12.2014].

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Stall, Bill: “Clinton Treated Coolly on Firebombed Avenue”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A9/14.

Stolberg, Sheryl: “Hundreds of Protestors Demand That Gates Resign: Police: Angered at the beating of a black motorist, demonstrators at Parker Center vow to rally each weekend until the head of LAPD steps down”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 10, 1991, B1.

– – –: “31% of Angelenos Say Gates Should Quit Now”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1991, A1/41.

– – –: “Divided City Sees Politics in Mayor’s Move”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 06, 1991, A1/25.

– – –: “Leaders Appeal for Calm After King Verdict: Trial: Impassioned pleas are made to stay cool no matter what happens in the case involving four LAPD officers. Church plans a solidarity rally”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-27/local/me-613_1_king-verdict [05.08.2015].

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Stolberg, Sheryl and Wood, Tracy: “Patrol Car Log in Beating Released: Police: The officers’ massages include racial slurs about an earlier case. ‘A big time use of force’ against Rodney King is referred to in the transcript.” In: Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1991, A1/20.

“Stop the Violence, Start the Renewal”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 01, 1992, B6.

“Tales of Two Cities: Rich and Poor, Separate and Unequal”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 06, 1992, B8.

“Text of Mayor’s Statement”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 03, 1991, A10.

Timnick, Lois: “Judge Turns Down Request to Move King Beating Trial: Courts: The four officers charged wanted a change of venue. Jurist says he is confident an impartial panel can be found in L.A. County”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 17, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-05-17/local/me-1791_1_king-beating [04.12.2015].

Tobar, Hector: “Community-Based Policing Begins in 5 LAPD Divisions: Law enforcement: Officers are told to form partnership with citizens to decide best ways to fight crime”. In: Los Angeles Times, January 27, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-27/news/mn-609_1_police-officers [08.07.2015].

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Weinstein, Henry: “Attorneys for 2 Officers Clash at Trial in King Case : Courts: Lawyers for Officers Powell and Briseno try to make each other's clients look bad over the way they behaved during the beating of the motorist”. In: Los Angeles Times, April 03, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-03/local/me-89_1_police- officers [27.07.2015].

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“What’s Best for Los Angeles: A new chief should be selected by April, and the chief should leave in April”. In: Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-16/local/me-2706_1_l-a-police-chief [10.07.2015].

White, George: “Foreign Firms Joining Rebuild L.A. Effort: Commerce: The Japanese are leading the effort. But some are irritated about demands for their help because of recent ‘Buy American’ campaigns”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 13, 1992. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-13/business/fi-1770_1_japanese-firms [13.07.2014].

“WHO DO YOU CALL WHEN THE GANG WEARS BLUE UNIFORMS?” In: Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1991, A21.

Wilkinson, Tracy: “Uniformed Gay Officers to Staff Recruit Booth”. In: Los Angeles Times, August 10, 1991. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-10/news/mn- 104_1_recruitment-booth [06.07.2015].

– – –: “Street Drama: Actor Edward James Olmos Plays Leading Role in Cleanup Effort”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, B1/4.

Woo, Elaine: “Fissure of Race Tear Fabric of L.A.: A third-generation Chinese-American comes to a haunting realization about multiracial L.A. For the first time, she feels prejudice – and fear”. In: Los Angeles Times, May 05, 1992, A1/12.

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