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Journal of Divorce & Remarriage Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjdr20 A Review of the Empirical Literature About Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation Margo Anne Kushner a a Salisbury University , Salisbury, Maryland, USA Published online: 05 Oct 2009.
To cite this article: Margo Anne Kushner (2009) A Review of the Empirical Literature About Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation, Journal of Divorce & Remarriage, 50:7, 496-516, DOI: 10.1080/10502550902970595 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10502550902970595
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WJDR1050-25561540-4811Journal of Divorce & ARemarriage,Remarriage Vol. Review50, No. 7, Aug 2009: pp. 0–0 of the Empirical Literature About Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation
ChildM. A. KushnerDevelopment and Adjustment Postseparation MARGO ANNE KUSHNER Salisbury University, Salisbury, Maryland, USA
This article provides a substantial review of the empirical data that have steered the work of child custody experts for the last 30 years. Child custody evaluators who are designated the responsibility of designing parenting plans postseparation for children exposed to family breakdown must be capable of sifting through the literature to select valid and reliable data to support their recommendations and plans. This article provides a review of this literature and discusses the methodological impairments in this body of knowledge.
KEYWORDS separation, divorce, children, child development, evidence-based practice, research
It is estimated that 60% of divorces involve children under the age of 6 (Rogers, 2004). Consequently, researchers and policymakers have devoted considerable energy and attention to the study of these children. An influ- ence on the working role of the child custody evaluator is the scholarly literature pertaining to child development. It is important that child Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 custody evaluators understand the need for evidence-based practice. The following material not only provides a current review of the literature about the influence of separation and divorce on children; it also presents information about the methodological impairments inherent in this body of knowledge.
Address correspondence to Dr. Margo Anne Kushner, 632 River Oak Court, Salisbury, MD 21801, USA. E-mail: [email protected] or www.margokushnertherapist.com
496 Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation 497
THE LITERATURE
The literature about children’s adjustment in relation to custody and access matters is extensive. (Ahrons, 2004; Amato, 1993, 1994, 2001, 2003; Amato & Keith, 1991; Amato, Loomis, & Booth, 1995; Amato & Wong, 2000; Dunn, Davies, O’Connor, & Sturgess, 2001; Hetherington, 1999b; Hetherington, Bridges, & Insabella, 1998; Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, 1982; Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; Hetherington & Stanley-Hagen, 2000, 2001; Kalter, 1990; Kalter, Reimer, Brickman, & Chen, 1995; Kelly, 2003; Kelly & Emery, 2003; Kelly & Lamb, 2000; Pagani-Kurtz & Deverensky, 1997; Pruett & Pruett, 1998; Pruett, Ebling, & Insabella, 2005; Ram, Finzi, & Cohen, 2002; Roseby & Johnston, 1998; Smart & Neale, 2000; Wallerstein, 1991; Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980; Wallerstein, Lewis, & Blakeslee, 2000; Wallerstein & Lewis, 2004). This material presents a variety of opinions about the subject. Although most studies agree that separation or divorce has a negative relationship with children’s adjustment, they differ about the factors that influ- ence these outcomes. The conclusions drawn can be organized into two cate- gories. The first group deems that these negative consequences interfere with children’s development by affecting their academic and social competence, as well as their emotional and mental stability (Buchanan & Heiges, 2001; Buchanan, Maccoby, & Dornbusch, 1996; Garrity & Baris, 1994; Kelly & Emery, 2003; Pam & Pearson, 1998; Roseby & Johnston, 1998; Stahl, 1999, 2004; Wallerstein, 1991; Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980; Wallerstein et al., 2000; Wallerstein & Tanke, 1996; Warshak, 2001). Other studies explain the nega- tive effects of parental separation by using different factors correlated with divorce (Ahrons, 2004; Amato, 1993, 2000; Amato & Gilbreth, 1999; Amato et al., 1995; Amato & Rezac, 1994; Flowerdew & Neale, 2003; Hetherington, 2003; Hetherington et al., 1998; Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; Hogan, Halpenny, & Greene, 2003; Moxnes, 2003; Pike, 2003). This side of the con- troversy encompasses parental conflict, socioeconomic issues, and parenting issues as significant factors influencing children’s postseparation well-being. Amato (1994) has suggested that the controversy among social scientists about the consequences of divorce for children and the inconsistencies in Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 study results is because of varied sampling strategies, a diversity of outcomes to measure, and a variety of techniques used in obtaining and analyzing data. The past decade has seen a large increase in studies assessing the com- plex variables within marriages that profoundly affect child and adolescent adjustment. These variables include marital conflict, violence, and related parenting behavior. Kelly and Lamb (2000) have stated that children raised by divorced parents, as a group, might have more adjustment problems than do children of never-divorced parents. Yet the view that divorce per se is the major cause of these symptoms must be reconsidered in light of newer research documenting the negative effects of troubled marriages on children. 498 M. A. Kushner
During the past decade, there has been an increase in family research studying aspects of marriage and parenting that affect child adjustment and in longitudinal studies that assess children in both married and divorced families. The recent research has involved larger samples, is more sophisti- cated in design and statistical analysis, and provides a complex comprehen- sion of the sources of children’s adjustment problems in both married and divorced families. Several researchers have pointed out that the adjustment problems of children of divorced parents can, in part, be accounted for by the experiences of these children within marriages that later end in divorce (Amato, 2000, 2001; Hetherington, 2003; Hetherington et al., 1998; Kelly, 2000, 2003). Kelly’s work has brought the utility of prior divorce research into question. Historical studies have reported that children whose parents have divorced experienced more adjustment difficulties than children reared in intact familial systems. These studies did not use comparison or control groups of children who had never experienced divorce. Empirical data began to flood the divorce literature in the 1970s. The earliest reports were based on small, nonrepresentative samples. Compari- son groups were rarely used, nor were standardized measures pertaining to adjustment. These data collection techniques made it difficult to generalize about the larger population. Although these studies lacked rigor, they were enthusiastically embraced by a media interested in divorce. Wallerstein and Blakeslee’s (1989) study on the long-term effects of divorce on children received monumental attention. Wallerstein (1991) her- self referred to this attention as “the undifferentiated media focus on the negative outcomes of divorce” (p. 252). A far more helpful approach would have been for the media to report about the maturation process of this body of research and its related improve- ments over the prior few decades. If this had occurred, factors that promote resiliency might have been reported earlier in this scholarly discourse. Numerous social scientists have attempted to unravel the knot of meth- odological problems in child custody research into categories, including Krauss and Sales (2000), Hosley and Montemajor (1997), Bricklin (1995), Amato (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003), Hetherington (2003), Hetherington et al. Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 (1998), Emery (1999), Kelly (2003), Kelly and Lamb (2005), and Kushner (2006). It is important for child custody evaluators to be aware that referenc- ing inept research can marginalize the very people one attempts to assist. This article attempts to set the record straight regarding the public perception of separation and divorce. The following information provides a summary of the empirical literature about the adjustment of children postseparation.
Academic Achievement Several studies’ findings indicate that divorce increases the risk that chil- dren will experience academic difficulties (Emery, 1999; Furstenberg & Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation 499
Teitler, 1994; Hetherington, 1999a; McLanahan, 1999; McLanahan & Sandefor, 1994; Nord, Brimhall, & West, 1997; Pong & Ju, 2000). However, Furstenberg and Teitler (1994) have determined that high levels of marital discord prior to divorce account for the decline in educational achieve- ment. Pong and Ju’s (2000) study found that poverty postseparation is a factor for their decline in academic achievement. McLanahan and Sandefor (1994) identified lessened parental monitoring postseparation as a signifi- cant factor. McLanahan’s (1999) article cited poorer school attendance, more television watching, less attention to homework, and less overall parental supervision as consequences of divorce. She also found that the descendents of divorced parents do not obtain college degrees with the same frequency as children reared in intact families. The significance of the father factor was investigated by Nord et al. (1997), who discovered that fathers’ attentiveness to their offspring’s scholastic activities enhanced their academic successes. This review of the literature indicates that numerous variables influence academic success when children are reared in separated family systems. Amato and Rezac (1994) reported significant overlap between the academic success of descendents of divorced and nondivorced families. Their findings demonstrate that the majority of the children reared within divorced families fall within the average range for academic success. Amato (1994) has attributed inconsistencies in studies to the fact that the research about children’s adjustment postseparation varies considerably in its sampling, outcome choices, methods of data collection, and analysis. To deal with these research difficulties, he used a technique known as meta-analysis, in which the results of individual studies are expressed in terms of effect size. Effect size summarizes the dissimilarities between chil- dren in nonseparated and separated homes. Because effect size involves common units of measure, they can be combined across studies to deter- mine whether or not significant effects exist for each topic being reviewed. Thus, one can discern how design features of studies, such as sampling, might impact conclusions. The earliest example of meta-analysis located was a study completed Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 by Amato and Keith (1991). They investigated the well-being of children whose parents divorced. This review pooled the results from 92 studies involving more than 13,000 children ranging from preschool to college age. This meta-analysis confirmed that the children in divorced familial systems, on average, experienced more problems than those raised in intact two-parent families. Amato (1994) reported, “The view that children adapt readily to divorce and show no lingering consequences is clearly inconsistent with the cumulative research in this area” (p. 146). However, he tempered his statement by reporting that the difference between these two groups is small. 500 M. A. Kushner
Gender Numerous studies over the past three decades have reported that boys have more problems postseparation than girls do (Hetherington, 1999a; Kelly, 2000, 2003; McLanahan, 1999; Zill, Morrison, & Coiro, 1993). This problem behavior includes aggression, impulsiveness, and overall antisocial conduct. Boys also experienced more difficulty with relationships involving authority and peers. On the other hand, a national study by Vandewater and Landsford (1998) found no gender differences, regardless of familial structure. This study, which assessed 618 married, divorced, and never married families, did not support earlier contentions that depression and other internalized difficul- ties affect girls more than boys during their postseparation adjustment. Boys, however, were observed acting out their feelings in aggressive ways. Hetherington (1999a) highlighted the complex nature of the gender–age adjustment issue. She suggested other causal factors affecting both genders’ adjustment postseparation: age, period of time since the divorce, parenting style, and conflict. Noteworthy in the examination of gender issues is that the older, less sophisticated, and somewhat influential studies determined that boys experienced more adjustment problems than girls (Guidubaldi, Cleminshaw, Perry, & McLoughlin, 1983; Hetherington et al., 1982; Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). Amato and Keith (1991) attempted to clarify this difference by engag- ing in meta-analytic studies. By combining the effect sizes that summarize the differences between children raised in divorced and intact families, they were able to determine whether there were significant differences between the two groups. Their meta-analysis suggests that boys do not always experience more negative consequences of divorce than girls do. An advantage of meta-analysis is generalizability and greater precision of findings. This, in turn, provides policymakers with the definite evidence they require. However, meta-analysis is not without its difficulties. Glass, McGaw, and Smith (1981) documented problems with selecting only pub- lished studies, which might result in an overestimation of the differences between groups. (Professional journals tend not to publish findings deemed insignificant.) Furthermore, meta-analysis might overinflate differences
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 between groups because a high proportion of reported statistically signifi- cant results is deemed spurious and sample types involved in this type of analysis are diverse. Hence, knowing what populations are represented in the results becomes difficult. This researcher noted that one of Amato’s criteria in determining studies for meta-analysis was that they must be published in an academic journal or book.
Social and Physical Problems Often, a decline in standard of living occurs after divorce. This results in greater economic instability and reduced access to resources and pursuits Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation 501
that might enhance a child’s development, such as extracurricular activities. Kelly and Emery (2003) reported that a lessened involvement in extracurric- ular activities is most likely if the family system prior to separation had lim- ited resources, high parent conflict, and poor cooperation. McLanahan (1999) noted that the economic problems of divorced households account for as much as half of the adjustment problems observed in children. Neher and Short (1998) reported that children raised in divorced fami- lies are more likely to smoke cigarettes and use marijuana and alcohol than are children residing in intact familial systems. This finding relates to their reliance on friends and peer groups that use substances and their less effec- tive coping skills, as well as to minimal parental monitoring. McLanahan and Sandefor (1994) reported that teen pregnancy is twice as prevalent for children raised by divorced parents, compared with children whose parents have never divorced or with those who have expe- rienced the loss of a parent through death. According to Zill et al. (1993), these children experience more illness and medical problems and receive psychological treatment three times as often as those who have not been subjected to parental divorce.
Parents With Mental Health Problems Johnston (1995) reported that mothers having significant psychiatric or personality disorders after divorce are associated with children experiencing emotional, social, and academic adjustment. Moreover, when children expe- rience erratic, hostile, or depressed parenting in the custodial residence, the efforts of the nonresidential parents have no helpful effect. In studies about children whose parents have divorced, several researchers have correlated those receiving effective parenting with those experiencing less appropriate parenting to conclude that the former children were better adjusted (Buchanan et al., 1996; Hetherington, 1999b; Kelly & Lamb, 2000; Lamb, 1999; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992).
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 Access Planning and Adjustment During the past 10 years, the father factor has received considerable atten- tion in the literature (Lamb, 1999; McLanahan & Sandefor, 1994; Pruett & Pruett, 1998). The father’s involvement and the related impact on child adjustment after divorce appear to be linked to the intensity of conflict, parental involvement, and maternal acceptance, as well as to the regular payment of child support. Amato and Rezac (1994) reported that studies in which fathers maintained regular contact with their children demonstrated poorer adjustment for sons than for daughters when parental conflict is high. Hetherington (1999b) found that, after divorce, mother–son acrimony increases more than mother–daughter acrimony. This finding has interesting 502 M. A. Kushner
implications for child custody planning, suggesting that frequent contact with access fathers in high-conflict situations might increase turmoil for boys in the custodial home. Another strong influence on these children is the level of maternal dissatisfaction about the father. Hetherington’s study did not indicate whether maternal discomfort about visiting was a conse- quence of the father’s behavior and attitudes or the mother’s internal psychological state and anger postseparation. The literature also indicates that an adversarial process might limit parental involvement, which, in turn, restrains parental responsibility. Much of the current research indicates that boys, in particular, desire more time with their fathers than is generally permitted by the courts (Emery, Lauman- Billings, Waldron, Sbarra, & Dillon, 2001; Fabricus & Hall, 2000; Hetherington, 1999b; Lamb, 1999; Pruett & Pruett, 1998). With regard to nonresidential mothers and access (Depner, 1993; Hetherington, 1999b; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992), the literature reports that they are more likely to engage in frequent visitation and remain engaged in parental functioning, and are less inclined to cease contact with their children.
Legal and Physical Custody Arrangements According to Kelly (2000), many early studies comparing children’s adjust- ment based on access arrangements report that children raised within the auspices of joint custody arrangements were better adjusted than children reared within sole custody regimes. However, the use of small samples in these studies has been criticized. Current studies with larger samples have found fewer differences in adjustment between these two custodial arrange- ments. Johnston (1995) and Pruett and Pruett (1998) established that higher parental income, education, and regular child support payments enhance the success of shared parenting arrangements and children’s adjustment. To date, research is not available about the influence of the father in joint custodial arrangements. Consequently, child custody planners need to be cautious when considering shared custody plans. Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 Maccoby and Mnookin (1992) found that adolescents reared in shared parenting arrangements and exposed to low conflict were better adjusted than adolescents impacted by high conflict. Intractable conflict characteristic of high emotional intensity, frequent transitions between homes, and shared access were linked to increased emotional and behavioral problems, partic- ularly among girls (Johnston, 1995). Johnston’s research demonstrates the need for child custody evaluators, when planning for these children, to make every effort to alleviate conflict between divorcing parents. It is well known among child custody evaluators that children exposed to triangulation and enmeshed familial systems experience poorer adjust- ment than children whose conflicted parents refrain from using their Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation 503
children to communicate their distress. In fact, the adjustment of children whose parents avoid placing them in the middle of their conflicts is much the same as that of youngsters in families experiencing low conflict (Buchanan & Heiges, 2001). These findings highlight the need for interventions and legal processes that will promote cooperation and reduce ongoing conflict.
Familial Dynamics The literature includes a range of studies about the dynamics of divorcing families and children’s adjustment to divorce (Allen, 1993; Amato, 2001; Amato & Gilbreth, 1999; Brentano, 2001; Buchanan & Heiges, 2001; Emery, 1999; Pagani-Kurtz & Deverensky, 1997; Ram et al., 2002; Whiteside & Becker, 2000). This professional doctrine also contains studies about the family’s influence on a child’s development (Brentano, 2001; Hetherington, 1999b; Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; Hetherington & Stanley-Hagen, 2000, 2001). These studies relate to family functioning and adjustment to divorce using a family system’s life-span framework. The use of consistent measures and similar constructs has permitted researchers to pool data from multiple studies. Such longitudinal studies have addressed family functioning and adjustment in divorced and nondivorced families. Also considered were maternal custody families, adaptation in stepfamilies with adolescent chil- dren, and varied sibling experiences. These investigations have been deemed remarkable in that they involved more than 1,400 divorcing families over three decades of research. Hetherington’s work is particularly signifi- cant because it provides a general understanding about the difficulties faced by divorcing family members. Her findings sensitize child custody experts to the trials and tribulations of divorcing families and, in turn, assist these professionals in their task of designing child custody and access plans that reflect the needs of these families. Buehler, Krisnakumar, and Stone (1998) studied parental conflict styles and frequency of conflict. Overtly hostile conflict styles were correlated with externalizing and internalizing behavioral problems for children. Covert conflict styles such as passive-aggressive behavior and triangulation were Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 linked to internalized symptoms, such as depression, in children. Grych and Finchman (1993, 2001) found that severe marital conflict that focuses on children is more predictive of future adjustment problems than is marital conflict that is not focused on them. The literature reveals that children raised within high-conflict marriages appear to derive the most beneficial effects from their parents’ divorces. Booth and Amato (2001) reported that children exposed to midrange marital conflict have only slightly lower levels of psychological well-being. As this level of marital conflict represents only 50% of the families that divorce, it is not surprising that such a large number of children are resilient when it comes to surviving their parents’ marital breakups. 504 M. A. Kushner
Jaffee, Lemon, and Poisson (2003) were emphatic that the issue of domestic violence and divorce not be erased in the literature because of the contradictory research on children’s postseparation adjustment. They wrote:
When domestic violence ends in murder, there is no doubt about the danger of separation. Fatality reviews and inquests around the world point dramatically to the increased risk when abused women and children attempt to leave their batterer. In 1996, the rate of spousal homicide for separated women was seventy-nine per one million, com- pared with three per one million for married women. (p. 8)
Their work demonstrates a need for mental health professionals engaged in the work of child custody and divorce to educate the public about the real everyday, lived experiences of the children impacted by domestic abuse. Experts working in this field also need to be alert to the points of rupture between how these families experience their lives and how the literature describes them.
Adult Children Who Have Experienced Divorce Social scientists are beginning to investigate the impact that divorce has had on young adults. Writing about the common life experiences of adult chil- dren whose parents have divorced, Wallerstein et al. (2000) investigated the struggles of 131 children over a period of 25 years after their parents had divorced. The participants ranged in age from 28 to 43 years, and were interviewed as children, teens, and adults. These researchers were able to locate 80% of these adult children and interview them face-to-face. This lon- gitudinal study also involved a comparison analysis of adults who grew up in the same community, thus discovering how children of divorced parents eventually view life differently from their peers raised in intact families. The study concluded that divorce is a “life-transforming experience. After divorce, childhood is different. Adulthood—with the decision to marry or not and have children or not—is different” (p. xxvii). Also, these young
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 adults’ trust in committing to long-term intimate relationships and marriage is limited. According to Wallerstein et al. (2000), they lack an internal tem- plate of how a successful relationship works. Cartright (2006) conducted life-story interviews in New Zealand with 40 young adults between the ages of 19 and 29. These young adults had varied cultural backgrounds and had experienced parental divorce or sepa- ration during either childhood or adolescence. A minority of these children were positive about their parents’ separation, whereas the majority of the participants reported they had or were experiencing problems in everyday functioning, and problems with intimate relationships and family members, particularly with parents. Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation 505
Amato et al. (1995) completed a 12-year longitudinal study involving 471 adult children impacted by their parents’ divorce. This nationwide sam- ple was obtained randomly from an investigation that commenced in 1980 with more than 2,000 married people. Various scales were used to assess psychological well-being, kin support, friend support, intimate relations, parent–child relations, and socioeconomic achievement. These measures were then subjected to factor analysis. The study concluded that the conse- quences of parental divorce for young adults are dependent on parental conflict prior to divorce. Also revealed is that children raised in high-conflict families are better adjusted as adults if their parents divorce rather than stay together. In low-conflict families, the opposite was found to be true. Mahl’s (2001) investigation into the influence of parental divorce on the romantic relationship beliefs of young adults is worthy of mention. This qualitative study involved 28 college students who were interviewed about their romantic relationships and their experiences associated with their parents’ divorces. Potential participants were selected after completing a pretest measure of students in three undergraduate classes. Unstructured interviews with individuals were then conducted on two occasions. Two questionnaires were also used to obtain additional information regarding the participants’ views of romantic relationships. Many of the participants indicated that they felt cautious about marriage. These adult children feared they would make the same mistakes in their relationships that their parents made and worried about feelings of rejection if their partner were to betray them. This fear is particularly salient for individuals who described having a distant and unsupportive relationship with their parents following divorce. Mahl’s (2001) study is informative to mental health practitioners because it reinforces the variability of divorce-related experiences and the varied ways offspring respond to divorce. It also expands the literature to include how the next generation of grown children impacted by divorce is functioning in intimate relationships. Two studies found that young adults who are the descendants of divorced parents marry earlier, report more dissatisfaction with their mar- riages, and are more likely to divorce than young adults from intact mar- Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 riages (Amato, 1994; Booth & Amato, 2001). A surprising finding in these studies is that adult children who experienced their parents’ low-conflict marriages reported more problems with intimacy, feelings of isolation, and poorer psychological health than those whose parents exposed them to high conflict. Emery (1999) cautioned mental health professionals to be cognizant of the sleeper influence, a term that describes emotional problems due to divorce that lie hidden and might suddenly manifest themselves in adult life. The appearance of depression or anxiety is an example of this problem. To avoid the sleeper influence and prevent children from being labeled with the stigma associated with their parents’ divorce, it is important for the 506 M. A. Kushner
professionals who work with this population to understand that some chil- dren’s adjustment to divorce is influenced by resiliency.
The Resiliency Factor Children whose parents divorce are clearly not responsible for their parents’ difficulties. Nevertheless, media focus has thrust a certain stigma upon them. This moral overtone has resulted in an abundance of studies on the effects divorce has on children. The research completed during the past three decades demonstrates that the adjustment of children to divorce is related to various factors. Until the past decade, it was assumed that the future development of these children was at risk. However, current studies with sophisticated methodology report small differences between the adjustment of children exposed and not exposed to divorce. The consensus is that most children whose parents divorce do not suffer irreversible harm. This is a crucial finding that mental health professionals would be well advised to share with their clientele. Ahrons (2004) provided an excellent example of a longitudinal study that supports this consensus. Interviewing 173 grown children whose divorcing parents she had conferred with 20 years earlier, Ahrons was able to demonstrate their resiliency. Her research was one of the first longitudinal investigations to use a random sample, focus on a broad range of divorced fam- ilies, and include parents, children, and stepparents in one study. Using tele- phone interviews, she located 173 adult children from 84 of the 98 families she had initially interviewed. She inquired how past and current co-parenting relationships affected the present quality of their parent–child relationships. Four major constructs represented the dependent variables in this study:
1. The quality of each parent–child relationship. 2. The absence or presence of loyalty conflicts and intensity of such conflicts. 3. The binuclear family cohesion. 4. The adult child’s self-assessment of the long-term effects of his or her parents’ divorce. Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014
Several analytic techniques, including cluster analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA), were used to determine family functioning. Ahrons’s (2004) findings demonstrate that parental divorce does not necessarily con- demn children to lives of misery. Rather, the storm clouds surrounding their parents’ marriages eventually disintegrated, and familial relationships even- tually became serene. Specifically:
1. Most of the adult children emerged stronger and wiser. 2. The majority of the offspring were clear that divorce had positive out- comes for both themselves and their parents. Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation 507
3. More than half reported that relationships with their fathers improved after divorce. 4. The majority of these young adults felt connected to members of their blended families.
These positive findings assist in eliminating the stigma associated with being the descendant of a divorced familial system. Other studies also demonstrate children’s resilience (Cherlin et al., 1991; Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; McLanahan, 1999; Zill et al., 1993). These longitudinal national studies involved psychological measures with clinical cutoff scores. They found that approximately 20% to 25% of children who are the descendents of divorced parents experienced serious psychological, behavioral, and social problems, compared with 10% of children raised in nondivorced families. Although this rate is two times higher than in nondi- vorced families, these figures indicate that 75% to 80% of children and young adults do not have significant problems with adjustment, adult rela- tionships, or social behavior. As Kelly (2003) wrote, “They enjoy intimate relationships, have not divorced, and are not depressed or anxious, and do not appear to be scarred forever” (p. 247). This body of empirical research asserts the following protective factors as supporting resiliency for children whose parents divorce:
1. Involvement of the nonresidential parent (Amato & Gilbreth, 1999; Menning, 2002)—the father’s provision of financial support is especially significant to the children. 2. Diminished conflict following divorce (Buchanan, Maccoby, & Dornbusch, 1991; Hetherington, 1999a). 3. Living with the psychologically most competent parent (Emery, Waldron, Kitzman, & Aaron, 1999; Hetherington, 1999a). 4. Quality of parenting (Hetherington, 1999a; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992)— these social scientists reinforce the need for warm and supportive parent- ing, authoritative discipline, age-appreciative expectations, and adequate monitoring. Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 5. Joint custody—new reports on sole versus joint custody indicate that the latter has a positive influence on children’s adjustment (Bausermann, 2002; Lee, 2002); Lee found that children adjusted positively when they resided in two homes, but high parental conflict suppressed these effects.
These findings about resiliency are very much at odds with Wallerstein et al.’s (2000) study, which found that these children had not coped well with their parents’ divorce. They were reported as being anxious, depressed, burdened, and fearful of commitment. Kelly (2003) suggested that, because the participants in this sample experienced and relived con- siderable distress when speaking about their parents’ divorce, they might 508 M. A. Kushner
have confused pain and pathology. Kelly pointed out that “painful reflec- tions in the past are not the same as an inability to feel and function in the present” (p. 249). These findings hold significant implications for the design of parenting plans postseparation. The amount of misinformation presented in earlier studies can be forgiven because of the immaturity and growing pains asso- ciated with the original research. What cannot be ignored is the influence that these data have had on child custody planning based on this child development discourse. This doctrine has clearly impacted the daily lives and future development of countless children. Consequently, the professionals who prepare child custody evaluations must be aware of the methodological limitations present within the child development discourse they rely on. This article is an attempt at bringing this text into line with what is in the best interests of these children. Failing to do so objectifies and falsifies the true experience of these children. The following section summarizes the research impairments that, if not revealed, will continue to normalize a child development discourse unaware of its own limitations.
A SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGICAL IMPAIRMENTS
Referencing the empirical literature about child development and family breakdown is key to the role and responsibilities satisfying the work of child custody and access planning. If decisions regarding custody and access are made with reference to the research on child development and this research contains serious methodological flaws, one does not wish to contemplate the influence that this text will have on the future development of these children. The following information provides a review of the meth- odological impairments inherent in the literature about the adjustment of children postseparation. Krauss and Sales (2000) attempted to unravel the knot of methodologi- cal problems inherent in child custody and access research by classifying Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 the difficulties into three categories: operational definition problems, inter- nal validity problems, and external validity problems. These categories explain a range of methodological impairments that, if not brought to the attention of child custody experts, might thwart the future development of these children.
Operational Definition Problems Social science researchers share the idea that they need to know exactly what they are studying to determine which factors are likely to affect it. In other words, lacking an operational definition prevents them from developing valid Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation 509
measurement techniques and standardized assessment instruments. No means of operationalizing constructs has been uniformly adopted by researchers. Consequently, outcome variables such as a child’s adjustment postseparation hinder or prevent comparison and summarization of research results. Hosley and Montemajor (1997) have pointed out that some of the instruments used to measure parenting should be redeveloped to be sensitive to the current views of fatherhood and the various ways that fathers define that role.
Internal Validity Problems Williams, Unrau, and Grinnell (1998) defined internal validity as the extent to which it can be demonstrated that the independent variable within a research study is the only cause of change in the dependent variable. According to Krauss and Sales (2000), “internal validity problems restrain researchers from interpreting direct causal relationships between changes in the independent variable or variables and changes in the dependent or out- come variable” (p. 850). Therefore, when researchers attempt to establish a relationship between any one factor and a specific outcome variable, they have a difficult, if not impossible, task in controlling factors such as age, gender, socioeconomic status, and parental conflict. Attempts to control these factors’ influences are rarely successful. It is also difficult to know how they relate to or affect one another. Hetherington et al. (1998) cau- tioned researchers that different risk and vulnerability factors come into play, and these factors vary in impact at different times in the transitions from a troubling marriage to divorce to single parenting. The inability of researchers to assign children randomly to varied cus- tody arrangements and then follow them for several years to determine which child custody arrangements would be the most effective is another issue relating to internal validity. Bricklin (1995) described a third method- ological issue: a time frame problem. Knowing how long to track these children and their families postseparation is difficult and not always possi- ble to determine. Although the expense involved and sample attrition make Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 longitudinal studies impractical, they are nevertheless worthy.
External Validity Problems External validity has to do with a study’s ability to generalize findings to other situations. Krauss and Sales (2000) noted that “generalizing findings from one jurisdiction to another is an issue researchers have been remiss in” (p. 853). Because legal jurisdictions have differing standards concerning joint legal cus- tody, comparing outcomes across multiple jurisdictions is difficult. This review of the scholarly child custody development discourse notes the variety of samples used by researchers. These samples fall into three 510 M. A. Kushner
categories: clinical, convenience, and random. Clinical samples provide information about the kinds of problems presented by children experienc- ing adjustment problems related to divorce. The difficulty with clinical samples is that the results cannot be generalized to nonclinical populations. Convenience samples refer to children attending a local group setting or organization. Although participants from these groupings are relatively easy to obtain, they might not necessarily be children impacted by divorce. Random samples provide the most rigorous approach to research, for they enhance generalization. Unfortunately, they are the most difficult samples to obtain and are often costly. Random sampling was not carried out in Wallerstein and Blakeslee’s (1989) 20-year longitudinal study that involved children from Orange County. Consequently, this study has been criticized for lacking validity. As noted previously, the growing sophistication in social science research tech- niques during the past decade has made Wallerstein’s research vulnerable to criticism. Current research demonstrates advances in research methods (Amato, 2000, 2003; Hetherington, 2003). Emery (1999) has written about another sampling issue: the cohort effect. Cohort refers to a group of people defined by a shared experience within a given period of time. In describing the impact of the cohort effect on divorce research, Emery (1999) suggested that divorce is quite possibly different for children raised in the 1950s than for those reared in the 1970s or 1980s. Divorce was obviously less acceptable in the 1950s than in the later part of the 20th or 21st centuries. Social and legal policies have also been significantly altered, establishing the climate for dramatically modified divorce laws. Nowadays, no-fault divorce is permitted. The cohort effect is significant and must be given serious consideration as a sampling issue. Another sampling issue discussed by Emery (1999) is that divorce is not likely to occur equally among entire populations of families. Personality characteristics, genetic factors, and predivorce family dynamics are a few of the numerous unmeasured dimensions contributing to divorce. Emery also expressed concern about nonrandom selection and divorce studies that involve a third variable problem. He suggested that the best solution is to Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:32 17 August 2014 measure and statistically control potentially relevant third variables, particu- larly in longitudinal research. With more than 7,000 articles presenting themselves in computerized databases, it becomes apparent that child development, when presented as a discourse, is overwhelming. The professional doctrine concerned with planning for these children has an immense effect on their potential adjust- ment and future lives. This influence has not always been considered by the professionals engaged in the work of designing residential plans for these children. However, recent studies (Kelly & Lamb, 2005; Pruett et al., 2005; Solomon & Biringen, 2005) have begun to consider the implications of child development theory, empirical research, and child custody planning. The Child Development and Adjustment Postseparation 511
knowledge and energy that many researchers have devoted to this very young field of scholarly discourse is laudable.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude, it is easy to grow obsessed with this litany of research prob- lems. Hence, one might disregard any study that does not meet the highest of standards. Is it not feasible that methodological differences among stud- ies could be viewed as an unsolved mystery, which when solved could be construed into a more complete picture that ultimately helps to address the needs of children who have experienced their parents’ divorce? The risk, at present, is that the confusing and contradictory picture of how children are affected by family breakdown has led the general population, the media, politicians, policymakers, child custody evaluators, and judges to base strong and somewhat rigid views on empirical data that fail to address the numerous factors affecting children’s adjustment postseparation.
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Journal of Child Custody Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjcc20 Attachment Methodology in Custody Evaluation: Four Hurdles Standing Between Developmental Theory and Forensic Application Benjamin D. Garber a a HealthyParent.com , Merrimack, New Hampshire Published online: 14 Jul 2010.
To cite this article: Benjamin D. Garber (2009) Attachment Methodology in Custody Evaluation: Four Hurdles Standing Between Developmental Theory and Forensic Application, Journal of Child Custody, 6:1-2, 38-61, DOI: 10.1080/15379410902894841 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15379410902894841
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Attachment Methodology in Custody Evaluation: Four Hurdles Standing Between Developmental Theory and Forensic Application
BENJAMIN D. GARBER HealthyParent.com, Merrimack, New Hampshire
Post-separation and post-divorce child custody guidelines have evolved from one-size-fits-all, gender-biased and adult-centered norms toward today’s resource-intensive, child-centered best- interests standard. For all of its broad appeal, the best-interest standard remains ill-defined. The present paper discusses attach- ment theory as an empirically rich, developmentally-informed and systemically-oriented model with great promise to some day inform child custody litigation but which remains, as yet, imprac- tical and without adequate validation for this application. Four hurdles are identified which family law professionals must yet overcome before this wealth of data can begin to become part of best-psychological-interests custody evaluations.
KEYWORDS attachment, best interests, custody, family law, strange situation
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 In contemporary Western society, the concept of the Best Interests of the Child persists as a popularly endorsed beneficence without clear definition or reliable measure. Despite (or perhaps because of) these failings, the best-interests standard is as often invoked in support of genuinely wise and selfless decisions as it is misused to exacerbate conflict and fuel acrimony (Bartlett, 2002; Glendon, 1986; Jellum, 2004).1
Submitted April 29, 2008; Revised June 1, 2008; Accepted October 11, 2008. Address correspondence to Benjamin D. Garber, 32 Daniel Webster Highway, Suite 17, Merrimack, NH 03054-4859. E-mail: [email protected]
38 Attachment and the Child’s Best Interests 39
For all of its broad institutional application,2 there may be no context in which the best-interests standard has a more immediate and definitive impact on individual lives than that of post-separation and post-divorce custody litigation. In this venue, the best-interests standard represents the current state of the continuing evolution of placement standards from parent- centered, gender-biased, one-size-fits-all models toward child-centered, individually-tailored and developmentally-informed decisions (e.g., Bartlett, 2002; Carbone, 1995; van Krieken, 2005). As a post-separation=post-divorce placement criterion, the best- interests standard has been broadly endorsed (Krauss & Sales, 2000) and frequently modified to incorporate jurisdictional priorities (Emery, Otto, & O’Donohue, 2005).3 For example, the British Children’s Act (1989), The United States’ Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (1973) and the Michigan Custody Guidelines (2001) each recommend a diverse list of criteria with which the best-interests standard is to be applied. While this approach has its advocates (e.g., Kelly, 1997; Pearson & Munson, 1984), particularly by comparison with alternatives such as the Approximation Rule (American Law Institute, 2002; cf., Warshak, 2007), it has been frequently criticized as lacking reliable means of measurement and relative weighting of its constituent variables (Bartlett, 2002; Mnookin, 1975). Such psychometric concerns may be of little con- sequence to a justice system which depends largely upon judicial inter- pretation and case law precedent (Bradbrook, 1971; Emery, 1999; Glendon, 1986),4 but create tremendous obstacles for psychologists whose work is constrained by rigorous ethical (APA, 1994, 2002, 2009), procedural (Tippins & Wittman, 2005; cf., Bala, 2005) and evidentiary standards (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 1993; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,1999;General Electric Co. v. Joiner,1997). The dilemma lies in the fact that the best-interests standard requires consideration of factors that go well beyond those social, emotional and cognitive variables that psychologists are prepared to address (APA, 2002, standard 2.01). These include, for example, matters of physical Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 health and the contesting parties’ respective financial abilities to provide for the child. However, even a narrower ‘‘best psychological interests’’ evaluation (Gould & Martindale, 2007) submitted to the trier-of-fact as one among many best-interests components remains an ethical and procedural minefield for psychologists. What is needed is an empiri- cally sound model of child and family development which lends itself to reliable measurement and valid predictions of healthy outcomes. The present paper examines attachment theory as potentially such a model. The remainder of this paper is devoted to a discussion of attachment theory, its measures and the hurdlesyettobeovercomebeforeitcan become one part of a best-psychological-interests forensic evaluation. 40 B. D. Garber
WHAT IS ATTACHMENT THEORY?
Attachment theory is among developmental psychology’s most thoroughly researched, most frequently referenced and most comprehensively validated areas of study. Founded in Bowlby’s (1969, 1973) early work in ethology and first operationalized in Ainsworth’s Strange Situation Paradigm (SSP; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Ainsworth & Witting, 1969), attach- ment theory has survived more than 40 years of intense international and (to a far lesser degree) interdisciplinary scrutiny to be recognized today as a robust cornerstone of our understanding of human development. Attachment theory describes the child’s learned experience of security in relation to each of his or her caregivers as a function of the specific care- giver’s sensitive responsivity (Howes, Galinsky, & Kontos, 1998; Marvin, Cooper, Hoffman, & Powell, 2002) within the context of the dynamic larger family’s dynamics (Schermerhorn, Cummings, & Davies, 2008). Attachment security is carefully defined and can be reliably measured as the child’s observable ability to use the caregiver as a secure base from which to explore and to which he or she can reliably return to be comforted when stress arises. ‘‘Infants who most easily seek and accept support from their parents are considered secure in their attachments and are more likely to have received sensitive and responsive caregiving than insecure infants; over time, they display a variety of socio-emotional advantages over insecure infants’’ (Johnson, Dweck, & Chen, 2007, p. 501). Attachment relationships are most broadly distinguished as secure and insecure. Insecure attachments can be further differentiated into those who are ‘‘resistant’’ and those who are ‘‘avoidant’’ (Ainsworth, 1964; Ainsworth et al., 1978; Cassidy & Berlin, 1992). A child’s relationship with a specific care- giver is considered secure to the extent that s=he successfully uses the care- giver’s presence and cues to manifest mature and adaptive cognitive, social, and emotional skills (e.g., exploring an unfamiliar environment, returning to the caregiver to be emotionally ‘‘refueled’’ and comforted when stressed). By contrast, an insecure-resistant attachment relationship describes a child who clings to his or her caregiver, apparently unable to separate in order to Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 explore and play in a healthy and mature manner. An insecure-avoidant attachment relationship describes a child who remains apart or aloof and unable or unwilling to seek comfort from his or her caregiver. Together, the secure and insecure attachment classifications account for approximately 60–80% of the population. A fourth type accounts for an additional 15–30%, in part as a function of socio-economic variables (van IJzendoorn, Schuengel, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1999). These children are identified as having learned a disorganized attachment (Main & Solomon, 1986). Their experience of a chaotic caregiving environment leaves them unable to reliably predict the caregiver’s sensitive responsiveness. Attachment and the Child’s Best Interests 41
MEASUREMENT OF THE CONSTRUCT
Numerous alternative methods have been developed for measuring attach- ment security across contexts (e.g., home, office, playground) and across the lifespan from infancy through adulthood (Crowell & Treboux, 1995; Shaver, Belsky, & Brennan, 2000). These rely variously upon direct observa- tion of the parent and child together (Crittenden, 1994; Cassidy & Marvin, 1992; Waters, 1995), on parent interviews and self-report measures (Armsden & Greenberg, 1987; Brennan, Clark & Shaver, 1998; George & West, 2001; Greenberg, Siegel, & Leitch, 1984; Hesse, 1999; Kerns, Tomich, Aspelmeier, & Contreras, 2000; Kobak & Sceery, 1988; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985; Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992; Zeanah & Benoit, 1995), on projective data (Bretherington et al., 1990; Bretherton, Ridgeway & Cassidy, 1990) and on child interview and self-report questionnaire methods (Target, Fonagy, & Shmueli-Goetz, 2003). Proper administration of many of these (including the SSP itself)5 requires intensive, specialized training and equip- ment and extensive time to review, score and interpret relevant data. A handful of others are relatively straightforward, brief, low-tech and user-friendly. Among the latter is the Attachment Q-set (e.g., Caldera, 2004; van IJzendoorn, Vereijken, Bakermans-Kreanenburg, & Riksen-Walraven, 2004; Vaughn & Waters, 1990; Waters & Deane, 1985; Waters, Garber, Gornal, & Vaughn, 1983). The Q-set allows a minimally trained observer (e.g., parent, clinician or forensic evaluator) to reliably rate the attachment security of a child between 12 and 48 months in a naturalistic setting (van IJzendoorn et al., 2004; Waters, 1995; Waters, personal communication, July 14, 2004). Ninety cards containing descriptions of children’s behaviors (e.g., ‘‘Easily becomes angry with adult’’) are sorted into nine piles with regard to rele- vance as descriptors of the particular child’s behavior. The resulting prioriti- zation can be matched to criterion profiles in order to place the child on a continuum of attachment security6 with impressive reliability and criterion validity (Moss, Bureau, Cyr, & Dubois-Comtois, 2006; Waters, 1995). Van IJzendoorn and colleagues (2004), for example, conducted a meta-analysis of 139 Q-set studies incorporating data collected from nearly Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 14,000 children. Q-set security ratings were strongly related to Strange Situa- tion attachment security ratings (r .42). Of perhaps greater relevance are relationships to independent measures¼ of maternal sensitivity, one of the cornerstones of attachment theory. Q-set security measures were at least as strongly related to maternal sensitivity (r .45) as is attachment when measured in the Strange Situation (r .24). ¼ Originally developed as a research¼ instrument, the Q-set has a number of very desirable qualities as a clinical or forensic assessment tool. As a purely observational measure, the Q-set allows for multiple, sequential assessments without confounding learning or sequence effects, as when a child is 42 B. D. Garber
observed in one instance with mother and in another instance with father and=or when successive observations are necessitated over the course of an extended evaluation. As a non-intrusive measure, the Q-set is very unlikely to stress the child (or the accompanying parent), whereas the forced separation=reunion required during the SSP, for example, can be quite stressful for some. Although each Q-set assessment requires between two and four hours, there is no need for video recording and subsequent review as is necessary for the SSP and for many other attachment assessment instruments. The Q-set has been successfully used to assess attachment among clin- ical and developmentally delayed populations (Naber et al., 2007; Rutgers, van IJzendoorn Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & van Berckelaer- Onnes, 2004; Rutgers, van IJzendoorn, et al., 2007), but is yet to be validated for use in forensic contexts. Yet to be determined is the instrument’s test–retest reliability and predictive validity whenadministeredwithsubjectswhoarein the midst of acute distress as is commonly the case for individuals caught up in divorce and custody litigation. Although requiring significant training for administration and interpreta- tion,7 the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; Behrens, Hesse, & Main, 2007; Hesse, 1999; Main & Goldwyn, 1998; Roisman, Fraley, & Belsky, 2007; Roisman et al., 2007), offers similar promise as a best-psychological-interests evaluation tool. The AAI is a 20-item, 60–90-minute semi-structured interview suitable for participants from middle adolescence through adulthood. The AAI interview asks participants to talk about childhood experiences with their own historical attachment figures, including losses and traumas, and (as applicable) contem- porary experiences with their own children.8 The recorded interview is subsequently transcribed and scored by qualified raters using scales which characterize childhood experience with each parent (mother and father: loving, rejecting, neglecting, involving, and pressuring) and discourse style (coherence of transcript and of thought, passivity, idealization, lack of recall, anger, derogation, fears of loss, and ‘‘meta-cognitive monitoring’’). The AAI identifies participants as one of four discrete attachment styles (secure=autonomous, insecure=dismissing, insecure=preoccupied, and unre- Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 solved). These categories have been shown to be highly stable over time (Crowell et al., 1996; Sagi et al., 1994), to demonstrate impressive reliability and discriminant validity (van IJzendoorn, 1995), and to be independent of gender, language and culture (van IJzendoorn & Bakersmans-Kranenburg, 1996). Crowell and Treboux (1995), for example, report two studies in which attachment security as assessed among infants in the Strange Situation main- tains a very strong correspondence to AAI ratings more than a decade later. In one of these studies (Waters, 1995), the correspondence of the secure= avoidant=resistant groups across 20 years was as high as 64%. The AAI has particular promise in the forensic arena to the extent that it can, ‘‘predict parents’ responsiveness to their infants’ attachment signals’’ Attachment and the Child’s Best Interests 43
(van Ijzendoorn, 1995, p. 387) and that the tool, ‘‘systematically and predic- tably differentiates between families at risk and nonclinical families’’ (van IJzendoorn, 1995, p. 400). In fact, AAI clinical applications are quite promising (Ammaniti, Dazzi, & Muscetta, 2008; Black, Jaeger, McCartney, & Crittenden, 2000; Crowell &Hauser,2008;Fonagy,2001;vanIJzendoorn&Bakersmans-Kranenburg, 1996). For example, research demonstrates that AAI interviews with pregnant mothers reliably predict as much as 75% of the variance among their chil- dren’s attachment security in the SSP at 12 months of age (Fonagy, Steele, & Steele, 1991; Hesse, 1999). One interpretation of these data suggests that adults’ attachment experiences and expectations prior to giving birth bear directly upon children’s learned experience of attachment security. A number of adult self-report attachment measures have promise as potential forensic assessment tools (e.g., Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000; Shaver et al., 2000).9 These instruments typically ask adult respondents to qualify their own relationship patterns, in some instances with regard to romantic partners and in other instances with regard to their own parents and=or children. Although adult self-report data are at best only moderately related to AAI data (Fouladi et al., 2006; Jacobvitz, Curran, & Moller, 2002; Shaver et al., 2000), and have only begun to establish external validity (e.g., Berant, Mikulincer, Shaver, & Segal, 2005), research using self-report instruments has similarly begun to demonstrate that adult attachment style is related to parenting capacity and, thereby, child outcomes. Edelstein and colleagues (2004, p. 44), for example, using adult self-report attachment questionnaires find that, ‘‘over time, children of avoidant parents may develop perceptions that stressful situations are beyond their control.’’
FOUR HURDLES TO OVERCOME BEFORE ATTACHMENT MEASURES CAN BECOME PART OF THE CUSTODY EVALUATOR’S ARSENAL
Kelly’s (1997) call to breach the chasm between developmental research, Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 clinical application and child-centered litigation is slowly being heard (Garber, in press). Some clinics (e.g., Byrne, O’Connor, Marvin, & Whelan, 2005; Marvin et al., 2002; O’Connor & Byrne, 2007) and clinicians (Schmidt, Cuttress, Lang, Lewandowski, & Rawana, 2007; M. Ward, Personal electronic communi- cation, September 6, 2007), some forensic professionals (e.g., Dyer, 2004) and even some courtrooms (O’Rourke v. O’Rourke 0172-06-2, Court of Appeals of Virginia, December 19, 2006) have begun to introduce attachment theory and measures into best-psychological-interests forensic evaluations. For all of these pioneering efforts, attachment assessment methodologies cannot become widely accepted into the forensic evaluator’s arsenal and will not withstand Frye (Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013; D.C. Cir. 1923) and Daubert 44 B. D. Garber
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 1993) scrutiny until at least four specific hurdles have been overcome.
Hurdle Number 1: Implementation Costs May be Prohibitive The attachment instruments that have received the most attention and established the most robust psychometric qualities are also the most equipment-, cost- and time-intensive. The SSP and the AAI, as primary examples, each require extensive training to administer, score and interpret. Both require that raters participate in standardized training to establish inter-rater reliability and subsequent periodic checks to minimize rating drift. In addition, the SSP requires that the evaluator maintain a specific physical arrangement including a playroom with a one-way mirror and video recording facilities while the AAI, in turn, requires audio recording facilities. There appear to be two ways over this hurdle. On the one hand, foren- sic psychologists are not at all unfamiliar with or necessarily adverse to investing in materials, training and procedures in the interest of providing the courts with valid assessments that meet Frye and Daubert standards. In fact, several of the most commonly used instruments are arguably just as resource intensive (e.g., Exner, 2003). The popularity of such instru- ments suggests that their established added-value to the conduct of custody evaluations justifies these costs (Erard, 2007). Thus, it is reasonable to conjec- ture that the costs of an attachment measure as resource intensive as the Strange Situation or the AAI would cease to be a hurdle if and when its added value were solidly established. Conceptually, these attachment measures appear to promise a wealth of added value. Every custody evaluator, child protective worker and family court professional dreams of having at their fingertips an empirically sound instrument capable of reliably distinguishing the quality of a child’s relation- ships with each of two conflicted caregivers and the developmental outcomes associated with each. For the moment, we are a very long way from demonstrating that any attachment measure even comes close to Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 fulfilling this dream and thus, the cost of the associated assessments remains a significant hurdle. Developmental research has, however, generated at least one attach- ment measure with impressive psychometric credentials and relatively low equipment-, cost- and time-requirements. The attachment Q-set metho- dology (van IJzendoorn et al., 2004) requires a minimum of training, materi- als and a relatively brief period for administration, scoring and interpretation. It demands no particular physical space or hardware. It is non-intrusive, invulnerable to sequence effects and strongly related to a variety of concurrent and predictive measures, albeit thus far exclusively among research samples. Attachment and the Child’s Best Interests 45
Hurdle Number 2: Research With Contested Custody Litigants Presents Special Ethical and Statistical Challenges The leap from validation within research samples to validation among for- ensic samples is complicated for any instrument (Lamb, 2005). At the broadest level, research with court-involved populations demands rigorous attention to relevant legal and ethical (APA, 2002, standard 8.02 Ethics) mandates regarding informed consent, data collection, coding, storage and publication and the use of experimental methods. Moreover, sampling problems associated with some litigants’ understandable reluctance to engage in any process that does not directly bear on the life-altering mat- ters at hand threaten the generalizability of any conclusions. Wolman and Taylor (1991), for example, describe differential cooperation among cus- tody litigants as a function of socio-economic class. In addition, the legal process of discovery puts the well-intended foren- sic evaluator-cum-researcher in the tenuous position to argue that some data collected in the course of custody evaluation are relevant to the legal process while others are of yet-to-be-determined validity and must be excluded from judicial scrutiny. In the alternative, the researcher who works independent of the forensic evaluator faces the dilemma of what to do when an other- wise benign research procedure uncovers information that is then deemed relevant to and may be demanded by the court. This is not to say that research with custody litigants and their children is untenable (cf., Doolittle & Deutsch, 1999; Johnston, 1993; Zuberbuhler, 2001). Getting over this hurdle may require jurisdiction-wide endorsement of the research procedure, uniform orders sealing the research data from discovery and=or the provision of incentives to willing participants in the form of post-litigation consultation (e.g., Johnston, 2003).
Hurdle Number 3: Are Custody-Based Attachment Security Measures Meaningful and Predictive of Later Functioning?
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 If the goal of a best-psychological-interests evaluation is to serve the child’s long-term social and emotional needs, then a child’s post-separation or post-divorce placement should be based upon variables which are known to have a strong relationship with healthy (or, conversely, pathogenic)10 developmental outcomes. Developmental research suggests that attachment security may be one such variable (Hamilton, 2000; Waters, Hamilton, & Weinfield, 2000; Waters, Merrick, Treboux, Crowell, & Abersheim, 2000). However, as Main (1999) highlights, the question must be understood not in terms of the stability of any particular behavior across time, but instead in terms of the continuity of the underlying constructs, a concept she refers to as developmental coherence. 46 B. D. Garber
More than 80% of children evidencing secure attachments between 12 and 18 months maintain comparable security when reassessed in kindergarten (Wartner, Grossman, Fremmer-Bombik, & Suess, 1994; Wein- field, Whaley, & Egeland, 2004). More than 70% assessed at 18 months remain unchanged at 20 years old (George, Kaplan, & Main, 1996). Research demonstrates that the quality of attachment assessed as young as one year old reliably predicts later cognitive skills (Bretheringon, 1985), social confi- dence (Laible, Gustavo, & Raffaelli, 2000), leadership skills (Deason & Ran- dolph, 1998), peer relationships (Barnett, Butler, & Vondra, 1999; Schneider, Atkinson, & Tardif, 2001), anxiety (Thompson, 2000), larger family dynamics (Cook, 2000), and marital and sexual satisfaction (Butzer & Campbell, 2008). The magnitude of these otherwise impressive relationships declines, however, as the socio-economic status of the children studied declines (Weinfield, Sroufe, & Egeland, 2000), such that the quality of attachment security is least stable for those children who experience the greatest number and intensity of life stressors. In short, real-life stressors such as loss, abuse and illness (Solomon & George, 1999), exposure to co-parental conflict (Schermerhorn & Cummings, 2008) and divorce (Booth, Clark-Stewart, McCartney, Owen, & Vandell, 2000; Kelly, 1988; Lewis, Feiring, & Rosenthal, 2000) have been shown to disrupt the stability or developmental coherence of attachment security.11 This means that attachment security is coherent across development to the extent that the environment is stable. As environ- mental stressors become more frequent and severe, early attachment security can be threatened and its coherence compromised. Given that only the most acrimonious of divorces typically require a best-psychological-interests custody evaluation, it is reasonable to suggest (but yet to be empirically demonstrated) that insecure and disorganized attachments may be much more common within this population than within others. The good news is that attachment security is adaptive. In the same way that security can be eroded in response to stress, it can be rebuilt in response to improved parental sensitivity (Broberg, 2000; Marvin et al., 2002; Travis, Binder, Bliwise, & Horne-Moyer, 2001). Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 Thus, the third hurdle to be overcome is that of developmental coherence. If, indeed, the very circumstances which prompt evaluation also corrupt the variables to be studied, then there is no point studying them in this context. In response to this concern, the American Psychological Association (1994, 2009) provides general guidelines and a select few personality tests have established custody-related norms with which to overcome this hurdle (e.g., Bathurst, Gottfried, & Gottfried, 1997; Medoff, 1999; Singer, Hoppe, Lee, Oleson, & Walters, 2008). In order for attachment assessment methodo- logies to overcome this hurdle, research must first demonstrate that (child and=or adult) attachment measures administered in the midst of custody litigation have some relevance as predictors of post-litigation well-being. Attachment and the Child’s Best Interests 47
Hurdle Number 4: What are the Custody Implications of Valid and Coherent Attachment Data? This hurdle asks the essential question of how forensic evaluators armed with empirically sound attachment data might interpret this information as part of a best-psychological-interests summary report or placement recommendation. At the broadest level, custody evaluators are well-advised to include some assessment of the quality of the child’s relationship with each of his (or her) caregivers as part of a best-psychological-interests evaluation (Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, 2006; Gould & Martindale, 2007). Thus, Riggs (2005) objects to the American Law Institute’s (2002) Approximation Rule as a post-divorce placement standard based on the quantity of a child’s relationship with each caregiver. In a like manner, Holtzman (2006) argues that post-separation and post-divorce placement decisions should rely more on an understanding of the quality of a child’s relationships than on legal definitions of the family. More specifically, Kelly and Lamb (2000; cf., Gould & Stahl, 2001) advo- cate for parenting plans which accommodate the young child’s emerging ability to tolerate separations from attachment figures. Schmidt et al. (2007) call for the use of adult attachment questionnaires in parenting capacity= maltreatment evaluations with very young children. However, few firm guidelines have thus far been developed for applying particular attachment findings to custody and parenting time recommendations for specific case. At most, we have some potentially fruitful ideas that require further research and elaboration. For example:
A. Are the child’s needs more likely to be met in the care of a secure attachment figure than in the care of an insecure or disorganized attach- ment figure? Yes. All other things being equal, the attachment literature strongly suggests that a child’s experience of secure attachment estab- lishes a path toward healthier outcomes as compared with a child’s Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 experience of insecure attachment (e.g., Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2005). B. Are the child’s needs more likely to be met in the care of a secure or an insecure attachment figure than in the care of a disorganized attachment figure? Yes. The literature suggests that the experience of disorganized attachment sets the child on a course which is associated with the emergence of pathology by adolescence (Carlson, 1998; Ogawa, Sroufe, Weinfield, Carlson, & Egeland, 1997). C. What does comparable attachment security to each of two caregivers mean for post-separation=post-divorce placement? At least three scenarios apply: all other things being equal, a secure–secure outcome might 48 B. D. Garber
suggest that the child could succeed in either home or, better still, that the child could succeed in both.12 An insecure–insecure outcome raises concerns for the child’s well-being in any placement formulation. This outcome prompts further questions for study, including the extent to which the types of insecure attachment (Resis- tant versus Avoidant) might bear upon future, post-litigation outcomes. An insecure–insecure finding might best prompt interim recommendations for intervention in the interest of facilitating one or both caregivers’ sensitive responsivity (e.g., Marvin et al., 2002), in an effort to determine if either has the capacity to nurture a secure relationship. A disorganized–disorganized outcome must immediately raise red flags about both parents’ functioning and the child’s well-being. Immediate interventions intended to assure the child’s safety, to give the child a ‘‘port in the storm’’ (Garber, 2004a) and to determine the cause(s) of the parents’ instability (e.g., psychological testing, substance abuse evaluation) may be necessary. In more extreme instances, intensive in-home interventions, alerts to Child Protective Services, or even removal to foster care may be necessary. D. If a child evidences a secure attachment relationship with one parent and an insecure or disorganized attachment relationship with the other, does time spent with the latter corrupt the child’s experience of attachment security and compromise its’ positive developmental sequelae? Rutter and O’Connor (1999, p. 835) ask this question pointedly: ‘‘does the most important relationship predominate, is there a balance between differing relationships, or does one secure relationship compensate for insecurities in others?’’
Unfortunately, the attachment research has thus far been unable to answer this question (Cassidy, 1999). We do know, however, that children commonly evidence simultaneous secure and insecure attachments within the same home and across environments (Cugmas, 2007; Howes, 1999). Thus it appears that security and insecurity can co-exist as a function of discrete relationships. Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 Might the same inference also apply to a child who evidences a disorga- nized attachment to one parent? This is even less clear. On one hand, it is reasonable to infer that the extreme emotional and behavioral instability of a parent who fosters a disorganized attachment risks causing the child anxi- ety that would undermine his or her ability to benefit from another parent’s more appropriate, sensitive, responsive and consistent care. On the other hand, among children who grow up in chaos, abuse and trauma, those who have even one single, stable emotional anchor have the best chance of developmental success (e.g., Haggerty, Sherrod, Garmezy, & Rutter, 1996; Luthar, 2003). In like manner, parents who were themselves victims of chaos, abuse and trauma but who have healthy adult partners have the Attachment and the Child’s Best Interests 49
best chance of meeting their children’s needs (Sroufe et al., 2005), an obser- vation which suggests the tremendous potential contribution of divorcing parents’ new partners in custody considerations. Pending further research, the author’s anecdotal experience and simple optimism suggest that the answer is no: a child’s experience of at least one secure attachment will, at least in some cases, confer a degree of insulation from the deleterious effects of other, insecure and even disorganized attach- ment relationships so as to serve his or her best interests.
E. Looking beyond the dyad. Psychology has long recognized the complex interactions among relationships within the family, but has only just begun to look at factors outside of each parent–child pair as they might color custody-related questions (Schermerhorn et al., 2008).13 The contro- versy regarding parental alienation (Garber, 2004b), for example, essen- tially introduces the idea that the quality of a child’s relationship with one caregiver must be understood as it exists in juxtaposition to the other. Thus, for all of its tremendous potential as a necessary part of a best- psychological-interests investigation, attachment theory must never be mistaken as sufficient. The evolutionary pressures that have driven us from those out-dated, adult-centered and gender-biased custody stan- dards must ultimately continue to carry us forward into a genuinely systemic view of each child’s unique needs.
HOW ATTACHMENT RESEARCH CAN INFORM AND IMPROVE BEST-PSYCHOLOGICAL-INTERESTS CUSTODY EVALUATIONS IN CURRENT FORENSIC PRACTICE
For all that we do not yet know, have yet to validate and still hope to learn about attachment theory in the context of custody evaluations, there is a great deal that child-centered forensic professionals can and should do today. We must understand a child’s relationship with each caregiver as a Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 unique, evolving and dynamic composite of the child’s experience of that care- giver’s sensitive responsiveness within the larger context of family dynamics, individual temperaments and acute stresses. We must work to understand a child’s secure relationship with a given caregiver as both a reflection of that caregiver’s sensitive responsiveness and the family’s support of that relation- ship, just as we must work to understand a child’s insecure relationship with a caregiver both as a reflection of that caregiver’s relative emotional unavail- ability and the contextual factors which might reinforce this (Garber, 2007). Understanding the dynamic and adaptive nature of the child–caregiver relationship, we must acknowledge that the acute pressures of intense co-parental conflict, contested custody litigation and recent or impending 50 B. D. Garber
adult separation (to name just a few) may at least temporarily distort (and at most may permanently corrupt) the quality of the child’s relationship with one or both caregivers. With this in mind, we must make every reasonable effort to understand the history of the child’s relationship with each caregiver and observe the quality of their present interaction in the least pressured, most natural environment possible. This author has found review of sponta- neous family video recordings to be especially useful in this regard.14 We must include in our assessment of the quality of the child’s relation- ship with each caregiver observation of the child’s willingness to turn to the caregiver for support and reassurance in developmentally appropriate ways when stressed. This is one critical element underlying the attachment litera- ture and one compelling factor related to the quality of that child–caregiver relationship. We must include in our assessment of each caregiver a sense of his or her capacity to be sensitive and responsive to each child’s unique develop- mental needs, particularly under stress. This is a second critical element underlying the attachment literature and another compelling factor related to the quality of the child–caregiver relationship. Our assessments must account for the quality of each caregiver’s acknowledged and observed support for the other caregiver’s relationship with the child, understanding that the quality of the child’s relationship with each caregiver can be reinforced or undermined by extra-dyadic influences. And, finally, we must understand each caregiver’s relationship history, including remembered (and continuing) relationships with his or her own caregivers. We must learn to consider an adult’s factually grounded report that his or her own caregivers were sensitive and responsive as one among many factors associated with his or her capacity to be a sensitive and responsive caregiver.
CONCLUSIONS
In the court’s hands, today’s best-interests standard is a wide net with which many and varied facets of a child’s well-being might be captured and interpreted Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 in consideration of post-separation andpost-divorcecustodial assignment. In the hands of an investigating psychologist, however, the same best-interests standard must be implemented in a manner consistent with the ethics and psychometrics required of the profession. Psychology’s efforts to operationalize the best-interests standard within these constraints have yielded much more heat than light, leaving the child-centered forensic pro- fessional to cobble together his or her own idiosyncratic means of assessing the child, the family and advising the court how to understand the best psychological interests of the child. Attachment theory and research have generated a wealth of data with tremendous potential to inform best-psychological-interests custodial Attachment and the Child’s Best Interests 51
investigations. In the abstract, attachment theory provides both a language and a conceptual framework within which to characterize a child’s unique relationship with each of his or her caregivers. As a practical matter, however, at least four critical hurdles must still be overcome before existing attachment measures can be routinely incorporated into forensic psychologists’ best-psychological-interests evaluations. These include: 1) practical issues associated with the training, administration, inter- pretation and physical requirements of the various attachment assessment tools; 2) ethical and legal issues that must be overcome before validation stu- dies can be begun; 3) empirical questions related to the predictive validity or coherence of attachment assessments conducted under the acute stresses asso- ciated with contested custody litigation; and 4) the ‘‘now what?’’ question of how to interpret the attachment observations thus derived. In truth, this author set out to write this paper with the naı¨ve notion that forensic family evaluations should immediately incorporate existing attach- ment assessment instruments and that, in fact, one might operationalize that elusive best-psychological-interests concept in the language and methods of attachment theory. Instead, this paper has become a call for developmental researchers and forensic investigators to merge energies and expertise so that we might together learn how to understand the best interests of the child. In the interim, the riches of attachment research can help child-centered forensic evaluators to better conceptualize the unique and dynamic quality of the child’s relationship with each caregiver.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is indebted to Robert Erard, Ph.D., Ginger Calloway, Ph.D., and Leslie Drozd, Ph.D. for encouragement, patience, insight, and invaluable editorial guidance in developing these ideas for publication.
NOTES
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:28 17 August 2014 1. Judge Neely is quoted in Glendon (1986, p. 60) as stating that, ‘‘The vague and open-ended ‘best interests of the child’ test appears reasonable, he says, ‘until we understand how much sinister bargaining is carried on in the shadow of this unpredictable, individual-oriented system.’’’ 2. The best-interests standard pervades our contemporary institutions, from the United Nations’ 1959 Declaration for the Rights of Children (United Nations, 1959), to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (European Union, 2000). It is explicitly referenced by organizations as diverse as the American Academy of Pediatrics (e.g. Diekema, 2005), only the American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry (2003), the American School Counselor Association (2004), the National Association of Social Workers (1996), the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (2002) and the American Psy- chological Association (APA; 2002) and is no less popular among legal professional groups, throughout local, state and federal legislation and court rulings on all levels. By 2005, ‘‘every state ... indicates that custody decisions are to be made according to [the] ‘best-interests of the child’ standard’’ (Emery, Otto, & O’Donohue, 2005, p. 5). In one recent review (Garber, 2007b), over 90 references to serving the ‘‘best-interests of the child’’ (or a variant of the phrase) were identified in the Wisconsin statutes regarding, 52 B. D. Garber
‘‘Actions Affecting the Family’’ as in the direction that, ‘‘the Guardian ad litem shall be an advocate for the best-interests of the minor child.’’ 3. Pearson and Munson (1984) cite a 1979 study which found 299 published custody determination criteria. 4. Glendon (1986, p. 59) argues specifically that, ‘‘in divorce law, the traditional stronghold of judi- cial discretion, the judge’s discretionary power should be brought within a framework of clear, ordered and consistent principles.’’ 5. ‘‘The principal limitations of the Strange Situation procedure are that it is only applicable within a narrow age range (perhaps as narrow as 12–18 months), that repeated assessments have to be spaced to prevent strong carryover effects, and that the situation and scoring procedures do not lend themselves to research on developmental changes in the attachment control system. The procedure is also expensive to administer and score, and scoring is difficult to learn without direct instruction’’ (Waters & Deane, 1985, p. 47). 6. The literature has traditionally discussed the four major attachment types as categorical and distinct. The Q-set generates a continuous measure of attachment security, consistent with more recent theorists (e.g., Fraley & Spieker, 2003). 7. Two weeks of intensive training followed by 18 months of reliability testing. ‘‘The AAI is one of the most time-consuming instruments in the area of developmental and clinical psychology and develop- mental psychopathology. It requires extensive training and practice, careful verbatim transcription of 1-hr interviews, and mastery of a laborious coding procedure’’ (Steele & Steele, 2008, p. 85–86). 8. The AAI protocol is discussed in Hesse (1999) and available at: http:==www.psy chology.sunysb.edu/attachment/measures/measures_index.html 9. Many adult self-report attachment measures are reviewed at http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/labs/ Shaver/measures.htm 10. This perspective is embodied in the use of the Least Detrimental Alternative standard for custodial assignment (Goldstein, Freud, & Solnit, 1979). 11. Kelly and Lamb (2000, p. 302) summarize: ‘‘Although secure and insecure attachments were once thought to be fixed and stable over time, this appears to be true only when the infants experience reasonably stable family conditions .... Factors known to influence the security and stability of attachments include poverty; marital violence and high conflict between parents; and major life changes such as divorce, death, or the birth of a sibling, which in each instance are associated with more insecure attachments.’’ 12. It is this author’s clinical experience that children embroiled in high conflict divorce seldom have secure attachment relationships with either parent and rarely, if ever, appear to have secure attachment relationships to both parents. 13. The author notes with chagrin that the literature has largely neglected the role of the sibling group (e.g., Teti, Sakin, Kucera, Corns, & das Eisen, 1996) in custodial research and recommendations. 14. In some instances, viewing family video recordings with a child, a parent, a sibling group or a child–parent dyad proves an invaluable source of evaluative data.
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Quest Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uqst20 Children’s Development Through Sports Competition: Derivative, Adjustive, Generative, and Maladaptive Approaches Hong Suk Choia, Britton Johnsona & Young K. Kimb a Health, Physical Education and Recreation, Missouri Western State University, St. Joseph, Missouri b The City University of New York, Queensborough Community College, Bayside, New York Published online: 24 Apr 2014.
To cite this article: Hong Suk Choi, Britton Johnson & Young K. Kim (2014) Children’s Development Through Sports Competition: Derivative, Adjustive, Generative, and Maladaptive Approaches, Quest, 66:2, 191-202, DOI: 10.1080/00336297.2013.861757 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00336297.2013.861757
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Children’s Development Through Sports Competition: Derivative, Adjustive, Generative, and Maladaptive Approaches
HONG SUK CHOI and BRITTON JOHNSON Health, Physical Education and Recreation, Missouri Western State University, St. Joseph, Missouri
YOUNG K. KIM The City University of New York, Queensborough Community College, Bayside, New York
Sports competition can play an important role for children because it contributes to developmen- tal outcomes for a healthy lifestyle. Through sports competition, children can learn about physical, social, and cognitive skills. Sports competition can be either positive or negative in terms of develop- ment, depending on how experiences are perceived by children and how competitions is designed. This article examines derivative, adjustive, generative, and maladaptive approaches to sports to determine the positive and negative effects on the development of children. Competition in sports related to development in four principal ways: sports competition was a result of development, it can be a respite from developmental pressure, it was a source of development, and it can be detri- mental to development. This article discussed the optimal youth competitive sports program after the positive and negative aspects of human development for children were considered. The influence of coaches and family members was important to children’s development and transforms the social, psychological, and emotional benefits that children receive through sports competition.
Keywords Children, human development, sports, competition, cooperative games
In a postmodern society, competition is a pervasive phenomenon in an individual’s every- day life of work and leisure, regardless of age. Competitiveness is a social process that requires subjective evaluation of a situation. Sports competition is analyzed in terms of
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:48 17 August 2014 applying behavioral, psychological, social, and physiological capacities and its conse- quences. It also included positive, negative, or neutral feedback for future use (Baker, Cobley, & Fraser-Thomas, 2009;Scanlan,Babkes,&Scanlan,2005;Watson,1984;White &McTeer,2012). Sports competition has been considered positive leisure involvement because of its contribution to developmental outcomes for a healthy lifestyle. Through exposure to sports early in life, sports participation can bring sound behavioral development. In addition to the physical domain, psychosocial benefits can result from sports participation. For example, youth sports provide an arena for the development of moral attitudes and social behav- iors, including cooperation and healthy competition (Branta, Lerner, & Taylor, 1996;Holt,
Address correspondence to Hong Suk Choi, Health, Physical Education and Recreation, Missouri Western State University, 4525 Downs Drive, St. Joseph, MO 64507. E-mail: [email protected]
191 192 H. S. Choi, B. Johnson, and Y. K. Kim
Kingsley, Tink, & Scherer, 2011;Light,2010). These contexts allow for the development of positive and negative behavior ranging from empathy to aggression and from fairness to depersonalization of others. While competition in sports influences children’s development, there is also a different aspect of human development that is influenced through sports competition. Beside posi- tive outcomes in competition, many studies have indicated the costs of competition in youth sports. Though youth sports participation has either been steady or increased in the United States (National Alliance for Youth Sports, 2013), the hurried pace of society places chil- dren in stressful and competitive environments. Parents and coaches either have too little guidance or too much involvement in their children’s development through sports (Lauer, Gould, Roman, & Pierce, 2010). Since most sports are taught by adults who are focused on winning, many sports create too many losers for each winner and teach a dangerously over- competitive principle (Scanlan et al., 2005). Therefore, competition in sports reinforces unacceptable and impractical behaviors, such as poor social skills, unrealistic expectations, and poorly developed self-concepts (Branta, 2010;Gould&Carson,2004;McCormack& Chalip, 1988). It is well proven that competition in sports both positively and negatively affects physical, psychosocial, behavioral, and spiritual aspects of development. While provid- ing opportunities for engagement with others through competition in youth sports, these activities also provide contexts for learning (Theokas, 2009;White&McTeer,2012). Each context engages participants in a set of behaviors and rules that results in learning skills and a body of knowledge. Therefore, we examine the positive and negative implications of competition in sports on derivative, adjustive, generative, and maladaptive development in children. Then, we discuss a new games approach that promotes positive outcomes in a child development.
Derivative Development Derivative development drives children’s involvement in competitive sports. Traditionally, as people age, they go through different stages of development that are crucial to their suc- cess in life (Erikson, 1963;Piaget,1963). In the case of obtaining cognitive skills through competition, most 7-year-old children do not yet have the mental capacity to comprehend the role of their position when compared to most 15-year-old adolescents who can strate- gize in order to play well (Kleiber, 1999). While many theories abound as to how people develop in each of these areas, the most accepted theories of cognitive and psychosocial
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:48 17 August 2014 development are the developmental stages and tasks proposed by Erikson and Piaget. Changes in what children choose to do as they age reflect changing issues and tasks. Thus, children’s behavior and experience through competition in sports are merely expres- sions of the biological and social developments the children are going through (Barnett & Weber, 2008;Kleiber,1999). The earliest age children start to compete in sports is around three years of age, thus encompassing the third to fifth stages of Erikson’s theory (1963)and the preoperational to the formal operational stages of Piaget’s concept (1963). Within each stage, it is proposed that children establish a new orientation to themselves and other people in their social world. New social orientations, newfound conditions of life, and emerging developmental tasks influence and transform children’s activities (Kleiber). Further, com- petitive games provide significant contexts for childhood socialization (Baker et al., 2009; Ford, Collins, Bailey, Macnamara, Pearce, & Toms, 2012). While children’s competition in sports is externally driven by adult influences in Erikson’s (1963)thirdstage,childrenwanttobegoodattheirsportskillsandbetterthan Children’s Development Through Sports Competition 193
other children in the fourth stage. Through competition, children not only develop physi- cally and enjoy feeling part of the group, but also gain an appreciation for physical activity, responsibility, and sportsmanship (Capps, 2007). Moreover, they are able to practice taking on rules and reciprocally influencing their peers. In the fifth developmental stage, adoles- cents begin to define themselves as unique and different from others. They may participate in various sports and leisure activities both alone and with peers, and those activities play a prominent role in the identity defining and competing processes (Kleiber, 1999). Meanwhile, Piaget (1963)believedthatchildrenactivelyconstructtheirownknowl- edge of the environment using what they already know to interpret new events and objects. He proposed that children’s development follows an invariant sequence, and, thus, children’s play will change as they move through the various periods of development. As children develop, their methods of play change through competition. Competition, life and leisure events, and children’s social expectations and role responsibilities all influ- ence behavior. Competition may make life events more tolerable and manageable (Fox & Riconscente, 2008). When children engage in associative play (e.g., imitate each other or play pretend) during Piaget’s (1963)preoperationalstage,theyparticipateingameswithrules.They organize themselves collectively for play activities in the concrete operational stage. Games and sports are the primary context for children to learn organizational skills such as the abil- ity to manage and cope with a diversity of perspectives, adjudicate disputes, and work for collective goals (Curelaru, Abalasei, & Cristea, 2011;James,2001;Light,2010). Through trial and error in play and the constant repetition of practice for sports competition, chil- dren can increase their self-esteem and self-confidence (Schumacher Dimech & Seiler, 2011;Singer&Gerson,1980;Weiss,2008). Thus, sports competition provides excellent opportunities to strengthen children’s character. In the concrete operational stage, adoles- cents further develop the ability to use propositional, inductive, and deductive logic (Piaget, 1963). These skills are demonstrated in a typical high school football game as strategies are outlined by the team members in a huddle and players remember plays, where to go and what to do (Bibace, 2013;Malerstein&Ahern,1979;Nakagaki,2011;Valsiner,2005). Children develop their social adjustment, integration, and emotional growth through sports competition. Sports activity among children helps establish and maintain social affinities (Curelaru et al., 2011). Interaction with others while playing can be beneficial for the development of normal social behavior. One of the most important social functions of sports competition is enabling the children to learn proper social communication (Light, 2010). During competitive sports, children can learn patterns of social cooperation without
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:48 17 August 2014 exceeding certain limits of aggression (Russell, 2007). Playing with other children is per- haps the major context for learning social skills, and it is regarded as an important factor in social integration. Competition in sports brings out cooperative efforts among teammates pursuing a com- mon goal (James, 2001;Wong&Bridges,1995). Involvement in sports is encouraged because it is thought to contribute to the child’s ability to work with others in the achieve- ment of shared goals. Therefore, competition in sports helps children to learn to work together to strive for mutual goals and reduce the overemphasis and pressure on winning (Lauer et al., 2010).
Adjustive Development Adjustive development maintains that sports competition allows for a respite from the devel- opmental pressures and stresses of life (Kleiber, 1999). Kleiber believed that people can 194 H. S. Choi, B. Johnson, and Y. K. Kim
learn valuable lessons through negative life events. Since individuals likely perceive various constraints (intrapersonal, interpersonal, and structural components) differently, they adopt distinctive patterns of negotiation to continue participation in sports (Crawford, Jackson, &Godbey,1991;Hwang&Choi,2012). To be engaged in sports competition, children must successfully utilize negotiating strategies to overcome the effects of constraints by acquiring information, altering the scheduling of games, and developing specific sport skills (Scott, 1991). Jackson and Rucks (1995)empiricallyexaminedvariousapproachesofnegotiation strategies in sports participation among high school students. When adolescents confronted constraints, they used various negotiation strategies such as cognitive resources (e.g., ignore problems, be positive, and have fun) and behavioral resources (e.g., modifying time and commitments, acquiring skills, changing interpersonal relations, improving finances, undergoing physical therapy, and changing leisure aspirations). Because constraints are connected to sports competition, adolescents often negotiate a specific constraint by imple- menting negotiation strategies related to that particular constraint (e.g., engaging in sports with people of similar age to overcome interpersonal constraints). Different populations with chronic disabling conditions also experience constraints when they participate in physical activities (Henderson, Bedini, Hecht, & Schuler, 1995; Lyu, Oh, & Lee, 2013). Individuals who participate in any given sport repeatedly imple- ment various strategies to alleviate the effects of constraints, either by altering their sport or modifying other aspects of their lives (Hwang & Seo, 2009). For example, Henderson and her associates (1995)describedthatwomenwithchronicpainconditionsweresuccess- fully involved in physical activities through the use of negotiation strategies, which allowed them to respond to constraints actively rather than passively, resist gender role expectations, and balance the benefits and costs of participation. According to a study about magazine portrayal of recovery and adjustment following men’s spinal cord injuries, three themes (a commitment to battle, heroic qualities, and heroic action) affect an individual’s success- ful adjustment to his or her injuries (Hutchinson & Kleiber, 2000). This type of approach may improve psychosocial and emotional development by providing a positive impact on adjustment to men’s spinal cord injuries. In another study of the emotional adjustment and continuity of leisure activities in people with spinal cord injuries, participants contin- ued participating in activities they did prior to their injuries, but struggled emotionally in attempting to find reasons to continue the activity (Lee, Dattilo, Kleiber, & Caldwell, 1996). When the patient was able to establish a connection to life before the injury occurred, he or she was on the road to recovery. Sports as well as leisure activities are adjustive at times
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:48 17 August 2014 because they provide a degree of continuity in the face of loss. Children’s identities can be transformed and developed through sports competition. Groff and Kleiber (2001)foundthatchildrenwithdisabilitieswhoparticipatedinsportsdis- covered a freedom to express themselves and had a decreased awareness of their disability. Further, based on personality traits, individuals with disabilities adopt diverse negotiation strategies to participate in sports (Lyu et al., 2013). Similar results were found in a study on self-efficacy in the constraints negotiation process among people with fibromyalgia syn- drome (Loucks-Atkinson & Mannell, 2007). Higher levels of negotiation efficacy increased both motivation and negotiation efforts while higher levels of motivation increased efforts to negotiate and participate. Therefore, the majority of children in adapted sports programs show remarkable improvements in skill, competence, emotional expression, and social interaction with others while decreasing awareness of their own disability. Sports, as well as leisure activities, come into play both in the experience of loss and in the process of adjustment and transformation. Physiologically, activities that bring about Children’s Development Through Sports Competition 195
laughter, peace, and flow are potentially restorative and therapeutic. In addition, mean- ingful activities, such as sports or leisure for those with disabilities, can be a respite or abuffer.AsKleiber(1999)suggested,enjoymentofleisuresportsmayindeedbethe best medicine in some cases because such enjoyment provides fun, meaningful patterns of personal expression, in the course of personal transformation, and adjustment.
Generative Development Generative development asserts that competition in youth sports fosters development. Competition can be beneficial to children in several ways. Because of the benefits of com- petition, many children are encouraged to participate in sports (Holt et al., 2011;Weiss, 2008). Competition provides a background for creating personal growth and transformation (Curelaru et al., 2011;Watson,1984). For children, experimental play generates alterna- tives that are distinctive, while repetitive practice play offers conforming, adaptive purpose (Gould & Carlson, 2004;Wong&Bridges,1995). There is no doubt that competition provides children with excellent opportunities to build their skills. According to Murphy (1999), a competitive urge is crucial for improving the skills of an individual; improvement of skills leads to higher levels of performance. In competition, children learn and improve not only skills, but also mental, emotional, and spiritual strength by setting goals to achieve them. Children are motivated by others through competition. Better performances are produced when children are challenged by their competitors (James, 2001). Competition encourages children to reflect on their behavior under emotionally intense situations and to develop strong emotional intelligence (Scanlan et al., 2005). In competi- tion, children learn effective emotional and psychological skills and strategies to deal with winning and losing, as well as success and failure. Competitive sports that promote a sense of self-determination and competence tend to enhance intrinsic motivation. Experience and self-determination significantly influence both perceived competence and motivation (Light, 2010;Singer&Gerson,1980). These are helpful for children throughout their life- time. Therefore, the value of competition results in long-term success; it helps children be better prepared for the challenges they will face in the future. Although competition produces anxiety, pressure, and stress, competitive sports are no more anxiety-evoking than other experiences such as test taking in the classroom. Many studies regarding sports competition revealed that constant exposure to, or expe- rience under, stress can result in the development of the ability to function adequately
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:48 17 August 2014 in stressful situations (Branta, 2010;Holtetal.,2011;Light,2010;Lindner&Johns, 1991). For instance, in golf, pressure increases children’s motivation to practice and boosts their concentration, which helps them with a difficult shot, and supplies extra energy or adrenaline for a long drive. Through this experience, children can better handle emotional and psychological pressures. According to Boyd and Callaghan (1994), there is a direct, fundamental link between competence and performance and an indirect link between competence and physical achievement. Further, control and competence are correlated. External control negatively determines both perceived competence and a preference for a challenge. An internal per- ception of control positively influences children’s preference for a challenge. Feelings of anxiety and the behavior of coaches significantly influence children’s perception of control. Children who perceive themselves as competent persist longer and maintain greater interest in a particular skill domain. It is assumed that unknown control is associated with higher levels of physical performance and is predictive of an intrinsic motivational orientation. 196 H. S. Choi, B. Johnson, and Y. K. Kim
It seems obvious that most people compete in games voluntarily because it challenges them and gives them pleasure. The voluntary control of attention in most competition enhances both enjoyment and developmental impact (Siegenthaler & Gonzalez, 1997; Weiss, 2008). Control of attention during free-time activities, as it is applied to improving competence and maintaining enjoyment, results in the kind of self-discipline that is neces- sary for success in other areas of life (Hofferth & John, 2001). For this reason, competition in sports can be a major source of joy. In children’s play, derivative, adjustive, and generative development can overlap. Development is an active process, not something that simply happens to someone. Children are likely to choose which sports activities they engage in (either alone or with others) based on whether or not the activities are enjoyable or self-expanding (Findley & Bowker, 2009). In other words, play may be an expression of a new stage of cognitive development, a way of working through fears and anxieties in play therapy, or a bold venture into new representations of reality (Kleiber, 1999).
Maladaptive Development Although there are many benefits of competition, there are also costs and downfalls. Competition can hinder children’s development because there is the possibility of over- investment in competition. Competition is a process of social evaluation against an objec- tive standard. Due to adults’ pervasive behaviors surrounding competitiveness, children also may focus on winning rather than on the task orientation aspect of the competition. Competition provides a circumstance that could produce the fear and stress of failure (Ramsey & Rank, 1997;SchumacherDimech&Seiler,2011). For instance, children who are introverts may tend to cope more productively with successive events by becoming more active, demanding, and inquisitive of their surroundings than before. Children can enjoy sports activities when they are intrinsically motivated. However, if they are unable to deal with the pressure or there is too much emphasis on winning, children are no longer intrinsically motivated to compete. This may cause children to withdraw from sports and may also distract from their psychosocial and cognitive development. In competition, rigid rules and extrinsic rewards are imposed. For this reason, competi- tion can be counter-productive. Rather than motivating children to play, improve their skills, and experience intrinsic rewards from the activity itself, competition imposes an external form of control that simply shifts attention to extrinsic factors. These factors can cause peo- ple to focus their attention on the goal at the expense of learning the task. Competition also
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:48 17 August 2014 causes children to derive satisfaction from external sources rather than from themselves, and they subsequently may lose interest (Findley & Bowker, 2009). According to develop- mental theory, motivation generally drops in the teen years due to cognitive developmental changes such as realization of lack of talent, not liking the coach, or the emphasis on com- petition (Butcher, Lindner, & Johns, 2002). Children who lose interest in competition tend to look for other activities that interest them outside of the immediate sport milieu. Competition does not always produce superior performance but instead can actually hurt performances. In today’s sports world, the intense anxiety, pressure, and frustration produced by competition can often choke children’s performances (Scanlan et al., 2005). For example, in a junior golf tournament, many talented players make bad shots at cru- cial moments and ruin their game due to the mental pressure of making a good shot. This can cause children to be in a slump, and they can lose self-confidence and self-esteem in the competition. According to competence motivation theory, when children realize they lack competence or are unable to satisfactorily demonstrate achievements, they are no Children’s Development Through Sports Competition 197
longer interested in competition but may look for other sports or leisure activities to give them pleasure (Lindner & Johns, 1991). However, once children withdraw from competi- tion, they may be at-risk to become involved in dangerous, delinquent situations or gang activities. Competition can be ego deflating. It can bring down self-esteem and self-confidence. In competition, someone always has to be the loser. The success of one participant or team causes the failure of another. The experience of losing can be quite damaging to the early stages of building children’s self-esteem. However, the experience of success does not always boost self-esteem. According to achievement orientation theory, when children perform to their ability during competition, they are acknowledged for their achievements from their peers or others (Butcher et al., 2002). Therefore, competition can be positive or negative in terms of self-esteem and confidence. Competition can diminish the enjoyment of the sports activities that have become com- petitive. In youth sports, many children are playing to win. Pressure to compete can cause children to experience psychological stress disorders with distinct symptomatic behaviors and feelings of mental exhaustion. In elite sports, children may risk prematurely narrowing their identity and neglecting other developmental tasks due to competition (Lauer et al., 2010;Singer&Garson,1980). Further, children may feel they are letting someone down if they lose. The original intention of joining in the play and activities for fun and enjoyment is gone because of the intense competition. According to social exchange theory, the social and psychological changes that come with increasing age cause other leisure and social activities to become more attractive to children (Butcher et al., 2002). Children evaluate the benefits they are deriving from the sports participation against the input that is required and the sacrifices that have to be made. If they discover other beneficial activities, they withdraw from the sport. Competition can produce hostility and aggression among participants (Ramsey & Rank, 1997). Intense levels of competition can cause children to take an aggressive approach to the world. Aggression during competition causes children to do whatever it takes to win, which can result in cheating, loss of sportsmanship, substance abuse, and even intentionally injuring an opponent (Ramsey & Rank). In addition, the competitive ori- entation of athletics can create a dehumanized, stereotypical perception of the opponent. Because of this, the game resembles a miniature war, because everyone loves his or her own team, but hates the other. Lastly, adults use children’s sports activities as opportunities for their own social inter- actions. Moreover, adults try to fulfill their need for satisfaction and success through their
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:48 17 August 2014 children. As a result, adults and coaches behave inappropriately at their children’s sports events. Though the structure of youth sports is prohibitive to an aggressive and obtrusive approach, a growing number of parents and coaches seem to be out of control, even using violence and verbal abuse toward their children instead of encouragement (Lauer et al., 2010).
New Games Movement Children’s withdrawal from organized sports is usually due to one of three main reasons: sports-related, milieu-related, and developmental change with age (Butcher et al., 2002). Approximately 75% of kids drop out of sports programs by the time they are 13 years of age because of lack of basic skills or lack of enjoyment (NAYS, 2013). For instance, when the sport no longer satisfies the participants, they drop out. Some may return to the sport later, but at a more recreational level because of other developing interests, puberty, sports 198 H. S. Choi, B. Johnson, and Y. K. Kim
burnout, less chance to play, too much pressure, negativity from the coach and the club, competence, injury, and ability (Barnett & Weber, 2008;Butcheretal.,2002). There is no doubt that these issues limit children’s psychosocial, cognitive, and emotional development. One hypothesis for sports withdrawal is that non-sport influences, such as studying, family commitments, and leisure activities, are often stronger motives for sport disassocia- tion than dissatisfactions with the sport (Lindner & Johns, 1991). Reasons for withdrawal change with age. Activities that increase in preference among adolescents are leisure activ- ities, such as dating, going out, and visiting with friends. Girls’ interests, especially, often shift from sports to more leisurely activities. For instance, the sports dropout rate for girls is six times higher than the dropout rate for boys (Lench, 2013). Among females, sports activities were ranked number 1 among extracurricular activities in grade 6 while sports activities ranked number 5 by grade 10 (Butcher et al., 2002). Alternatives become appeal- ing when the sport no longer fulfills the need. Whether children enjoy their leisure activities or competitive sports, active involvement produces positive outcomes in human devel- opment. Currently, approximately 40 million children in the United States participate in organized sports, beginning as young as 4 years of age (NAYS, 2013). In addition to inves- tigated information on dropout patterns and reasons for dropout from competitive sports, youth sports dropouts cannot be considered as a single entity. Since winning does not become important for children until around the age of 10 or 11 years, challenge and cooperation are emphasized along with non-competitiveness (Findley & Bowker, 2009). Through cooperative sports, kids can develop cooperation, cre- ativity, and choice because cooperative games emphasize helping others, collaboration, and cooperation (James, 2001). In this sense, cooperative games, as a serious physical activity in youth sports, are excellent for children’s physical, psychosocial, and cognitive development. In cooperative sports, the group as a whole is more important than individual achieve- ment. Without hindering children’s cognitive and psychosocial development, cooperative sports build social skills that allow children to progress as effective contributing members of society (Branta, 2010). For instance, lessons learned in cooperative sports, such as lower- ing aggressive behavior and violence, carry over to other aspects of life because cooperative games lead to positive socialization with others. Cooperative sports focus on process rather than outcome and strive for a common interest among children. Research on cooperative games has shown increased personal self-esteem, decreased aggressive behaviors, increased cooperation, and enhanced posi- tive socialization among participants (Light, 2010). For example, children discover hidden
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:48 17 August 2014 talents through cooperative sports. They can pass on new information to others and test their new abilities. As a result, cooperative sports increase children’s happiness with the new tasks and abilities they have learned. The combination of cooperative and competitive games is a workable option that should be utilized whenever possible. According to child development and socialization research, parents played the largest role in influencing the healthy development of their children (McCormack & Chalip, 1988; NAYS, 2013). Parenting skills can help avoid specific practices that increase the risk for adolescent problem behaviors. Verbal give-and-take characteristics of parents and children foster cognitive and social competence in children (Lauer et al., 2010). Both parents and children may be reciprocally affecting each other. For instance, authoritative parenting provides nurturing and involvement. It creates an environment more positive and recep- tive to parental influence while giving the children a chance to share their opinions with their parents. Positive parenting can encourage sports participation and may set appropriate development goals for children’s performance in sports. Children’s Development Through Sports Competition 199
If success is experienced when failure was expected and successful performances occur more often than unsuccessful ones, children may begin to attribute this success to their abil- ity. Children who perceive powerful others or unknown sources as being responsible for outcomes in sports report lower levels of competence (Butcher et al., 2002). The more anx- ious children are, the more likely they are to endorse external sources as being responsible for outcomes in sports. According to attribution theory, children make causal explanations about their own behavior and the behavior of others (Boyd & Callaghan, 1994). Ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck would be factors that children attribute to their behavior. These could be major characteristics of intrinsically motivated behavior. Children should be evaluated on effort rather than on the outcome of the competition. Research has revealed that children with an intrinsic motivational orientation and low parental pressure to participate in sports reported higher levels of season-long enjoyment than did other children (Lauer et al., 2010;Wong&Bridges,1995). The use of external rewards must be used judiciously or else discarded. If used, external rewards should be carefully selected so children understand where, when, and for what actions rewards will be given. Participation in competition should be rewarded rather than actual performance outcomes. The most desirable outcome of participation in competitive youth sports would be the development of positive self-esteem (Curelaru et al., 2011). Coaches and their feedback influence children’s perceived competence and motivation (NAYS, 2013). Adults should lead children to focus on interaction with the activity rather than on defeating an opponent. Applications, such as coach’s training or methods of struc- turing youth sports, should be used so that children continue to be intrinsically motivated and enjoy their experience. Parents and coaches should give children opportunities to demonstrate mastery or task accomplishment during sports participation and completion rather than through peer com- parison (Lauer et al., 2010; Kanters & Estes, 2002). According to social cognitive theory, ataskgoalperspectivereferstoamasteryapproach,self-improvement,andperforming beyond personal expectations; a task goal perspective induces perceptions of competence (Boyd & Callaghan, 1994). This perspective also increases the likelihood that children will continue to maintain healthy, physically active lifestyles and will participate in sports in the long term; this is especially true for children who have yet to acquire motor skill proficiency (Barnett & Weber, 2008;Boyd&Callaghan).
Conclusion
Downloaded by [Northcentral University] at 13:48 17 August 2014 We have examined the importance of competition in youth sports in children’s devel- opment. Competition in youth sports combines derivative, adjustive, generative, and maladaptive development. Competition is derivative from other aspects of development; it is adjustive in allowing for some respite to developmental pressures and life events; it is generative of developmental changes; it is maladaptive because it can hinder development (Kleiber, 1999). Although unhealthy outcomes such as maladaptive development and sports withdrawal are always possible, we desire the positive aspects of competition in children’s develop- ment. The development of children from infancy to adulthood requires substantial parental and community investments of time, as well as psychosocial and emotional effort (Hofferth &John,2001). When adults with healthy beliefs and attitudes are in charge, competition can be used for teaching conflict resolution that could lead to the reduction of antisocial behaviors and the enhancement of responsibility and empathy (Theokas, 2009). The sports setting can be a natural place for these behaviors to be modeled and reinforced. 200 H. S. Choi, B. Johnson, and Y. K. Kim
The role of coaches and parents is important to the children’s cognitive develop- ment and influences the social, psychological, and emotional benefits the children receive through competition. Coaches and parents can educate children about cooperation, helping, sharing, and how to handle losing in competitions. However, the benefits of competition can be compromised when parents and coaches use youth sports for their own leisure purposes, become violent, or use abusive language towards children participating in youth sports (Kanters & Estes, 2002). The key to using sports as a context for the healthy development of behavior is to start early with programs that use positive role models, reinforce appropriate behaviors, and teach healthy competition and conflict resolution. Participation in cooperative sports is likely to be associated with healthy behaviors because such activities are likely to improve children’s self-esteem through the development of physical and social skills. The outcomes can be extremely positive for youth because the sports context lends itself very well to the development of two qualities—empathy and fairness (Theokas, 2009). In addition to the necessary behavioral skills that are taught, children can practice orga- nizational skills when playing games and become introduced to the issues of personal space, control of force and violence, and respect for others (Gould & Carson, 2004;Hofferth& John, 2001). The children can also become involved in remediation of disputes as the setting becomes a natural context for the development of social skills. Moreover, cooperative sports are linked to both cognitive and psychosocial devel- opment. Those who play cooperative sports are better problem solvers and have fewer emotional problems (Ramsey & Rank, 1997). The cognitive skills learned on the playing field contribute to problem solving, and the social and physical skills developed contribute to better emotional adjustment (Light, 2010). The cooperative sports context can be used as an alternative way to teach healthy competition or to limit the development of aggression. Foremost, children’s activity should be personally meaningful and challenging or per- sonally expressive whether the activity is a competition, a leisure activity, or a cooperative sport. Through these activities, children can obtain a sense of self and the realization of personal potential (Kleiber, 1999). By participating in these activities, children can feel comfortable being themselves rather than basing their self-perceptions on the evaluations of others. No matter which activities children enjoy, they intrinsically associate the activity with self-expression. Thus, competition, leisure activities, and cooperative sport that are intrinsically motivated can all have a positive influence on the development of children.
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Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Developmental Review
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/dr
Children’s lies and their detection: Implications for child witness testimony
a, b Victoria Talwar ⇑, Angela M. Crossman a Department of Counselling and Educational Psychology, McGill University, 3700 McTavish Street, Montreal, QC, Canada H3A 1Y2 b Department of Psychology, John Jay College-CUNY, 524 W 59th Street, New York, NY 10019, United States article info abstract
Article history: The veracity of child witness testimony is central to the justice sys- Received 3 June 2012 tem where there are serious consequences for the child, the Available online 16 July 2012 accused, and society. Thus, it is important to examine how chil- dren’s lie-telling abilities develop and the factors that can influence Keywords: their truthfulness. The current review examines children’s lie-tell- Deception ing ability in relation to child witness testimony. Although Lie-telling Honesty research demonstrates that children develop the ability to lie at Child witness testimony an early age, they also understand that lie-telling is morally unac- ceptable and do not condone most types of lies. Children’s ability to lie effectively develops with age and is related to their increasing cognitive sophistication. However, even children’s early lies can be difficult to detect. Greater lie elaboration requires greater skill and children’s ability to lie effectively improves with development and as a function of cognitive skill. Different methods of promoting children’s truthful reports as well as the social and motivational factors that affect children’s honesty will be discussed. Ó 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Scientists and laypersons alike have long been fascinated by children’s lie-telling. Not only can it have practical consequences, it also can serve as a lens through which one can examine a multitude of behaviors, including children’s developing cognitive, social, and moral abilities (Darwin, 1877; Hall, 1891; Hartshorne & May, 1928; Stern & Stern, 1909/1999). The scientific study of the development of lying began around the turn of the 20th century, when the field of developmental psychology was just being established. However, given the broader field’s shift away from examining social influences and
Corresponding author. ⇑ E-mail address: [email protected] (V. Talwar).
0273-2297/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2012.06.004 338 V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 mental activity toward behaviorist principles, the investigation of deception lay dormant for nearly half a century. During the last three decades, as cognitive factors regained acceptance among devel- opmental scientists as playing a role in the development of intentional systems in children, lying has again become a focus of investigation. The widespread prevalence of lying in everyday life (e.g., DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), coupled with a strong emphasis on the promotion of children’s truthful behaviors in society (e.g., Aldridge & Cameron, 1999; Bull, 1995; Goodman & Bottoms, 1993), have also made the topic of interest to parents, educators, and professionals who work with children in clinical and forensic settings. Research on children’s lying behavior has been of particular interest to psychology-law and foren- sic scholars studying child witness testimony. In recent years, there has been a steady increase in the number of children testifying in court proceedings in North America (Bala, Lee, Lindsay, & Talwar, 2000), and courts have been concerned about the reliability of such witnesses (London & Nunez, 2002; Morris, Laney, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2006; Robinson & McGuire, 2006; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lind- say, 2004). However, even young children are able to produce accurate accounts of past events (Koriat, Goldsmith, Schneider, & Nakash-Dura, 2001). Although young children can be suggestible (Bruck & Ceci, 1999), children as young as 3 years of age are capable of accurately responding to questions dur- ing interviews, despite an interrogator using misleading questioning techniques (Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 1992). Hence, children’s ability to recall and report events from memory is not as poor as once suspected and children can make competent witnesses when truthfully recalling an event. Beyond their capacity to testify, children’s truthfulness when testifying is of critical importance. However, few studies have investigated children’s abilities to tell fabricated stories. Unlike a false memory, where a person truly believes their memory is accurate or their statement is truthful, a fab- ricated story is a report where a person intentionally lies. Research investigating children’s lying (and/ or barriers to their truth-telling) might be especially relevant to custody proceedings or child abuse cases. Thus, forensic psychologists and justice system professionals are interested in understanding the motivations for and development of children’s lie-telling behavior, whether child witnesses under- stand the importance of honesty, whether there are ways of distinguishing between children’s truthful and deceitful statements, and what measures can be taken to facilitate children’s truthful reports. Forensically, it is crucial to identify false reports. Children’s testimony can be the deciding factor when assessing the guilt of a defendant or the outcome of a custody hearing. False or coached reports can have severe consequences if an innocent person is accused. Moreover, if children’s honest testimony is perceived as untrustworthy and lacking in credibility, then actual child abuse victims may be doubted, remain in danger, and justice will not be served (Goodman, 2006). The current review will describe the development of deception in children and explore the implications of lie-telling and the detection of children’s lies for child witness testimony.
The development of lying in children
Motivations for lying
Lying is commonly defined as a statement communicated with the intent to mislead another into believing something to be true that the lie-teller knows to be false (e.g., Bok, 1978/1999; Chisholm & Feehan, 1977; Coleman & Kay, 1981; Lee, 2000). That is, there is a discrepancy between what is said by the lie-teller and what the lie-teller knows to be true. Although most of our daily communications with others are truthful, lying is more than an occasional occurrence. In fact, there is evidence to sug- gest that adults tell lies on a daily basis (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996), with a multi- tude of underlying motivations and rationales for doing so. Some lies are antisocial in nature. These lies are typically self-serving, told to protect oneself from harm or for personal gain. For instance, a child may choose to lie because they fear punishment after committing a transgression and wish to protect themselves from that negative consequence. Anecdotal evidence and observational studies suggest that the earliest lies children tell are to escape imminent punishment. These early lies tend to be unsophisticated, often readily detected with some probing, and are generally self-protective in nature, not intended to harm others (Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Indeed, the most frequent lies that V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 339 children tell tend to be lies to conceal misdeeds (Newton, Reddy, & Bull, 2000; Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Wilson, Smith, & Ross, 2003). Other early lies that children tell are lies to obtain a reward, and these may be motivated first by a desire for material benefits (i.e., a cookie from a forbidden coo- kie jar) and later by a desire for social rewards (e.g., self-presentation lies). For instance, children might lie to claim someone else’s work as their own to win a prize. One might also lie for impression management, as when a child lies to their peers about their athletic abilities to appear more attractive or accomplished. In forensic contexts, children may lie for material/financial reasons (e.g., to get dis- ability benefits or accommodations), to avoid punishment (e.g., feign incompetence), to please another person (e.g., custodial parent) or to be seen as important or credible by adults. For example, Lyon and colleagues (e.g., Evans & Lyon, 2011) have demonstrated that children will answer court competency examination questions incorrectly, despite knowing the correct answers, ostensibly for fear of seem- ing dishonest, but in ways that likely undermine their own credibility (e.g., stating that they have never lied before). While some lies are primarily self-serving, other types of lies are told to benefit others. These lies might be prosocial in nature, but they are not necessarily so. For example, some lies are told to be po- lite, such as telling Grandma that you love the knitted, itchy, woolen socks she made for you, even though you dislike them. Such politeness lies are often told to prevent hurt feelings and to smooth so- cial relations and tend not to be judged harshly by others (Crossman et al., submitted for publication; Ning & Crossman, 2007). However, one can also lie to conceal another’s transgression, perhaps for their protection. For instance, an adolescent might lie to help a peer get out of a difficult situation (e.g., perjury for a friend), a lie that does benefit another, but would not be perceived as prosocial or socially acceptable. While there has been extensive research on adults’ lie-telling behavior (e.g., Bond et al., 1992; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996; Ekman, 1985; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991), research is lim- ited on the motivations for children’s lie-telling. However, in large part, it appears that children are motivated to tell lies for the same reasons as adults (Newton et al., 2000; Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Wilson et al., 2003). As children’s lies about their own or another person’s wrongdoings are most relevant to child witness testimony, this review will focus on those types of lies (see Talwar & Crossman, 2011, for discussion of the development of prosocial lie-telling).
Children’s understanding of lies
Early research on children’s lying examined their conceptual and moral understanding of lies (e.g., Piaget, 1932/1965). This research demonstrated that children’s understanding of what it means to lie evolves over time, seemingly from a concrete, literal conceptualization to an abstract construct (e.g., Bussey, 1992, 1999; Bussey & Grimbeek, 2000; Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983; Piaget, 1932/1965; Strichartz & Burton, 1990). Specifically, children’s initial understanding of truth and lies emerges early in the preschool years. Piaget (1932/1965) first reported that young children did not differentiate among types of inaccurate statements (e.g., lies versus guesses), making factuality rather than inten- tionality critical, and that they primarily distinguished a lie from the truth based on the degree to which the lie-teller would be punished for their false statement. However, Peterson et al. (1983) found that 5-year-olds did not judge a punished lie any worse than an identical, unpunished self-protective lie. They also found the transition in lie-telling to be more gradual than Piaget had originally thought, as 75% of 9-year-olds, but only 28% of 11-year-olds cited punishment as their only motivation for not telling lies and that lies were wrong regardless of the possible consequences (Peterson et al., 1983). Indeed, other studies have also found that even very young children rate lying as a negative behavior, particularly for self-serving lies, and recommend that story characters tell the truth (e.g., Bussey, 1992, 1999; Crossman et al., submitted for publication; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2002; Wagland & Bussey, 2005). In terms of children’s understanding of the defining qualities of truths and lies, Strichartz and Burton (1990) also found that children as young as 3 years defined a statement as a lie solely based on factuality (see also Lyon, Carrick, & Quas, in press). It was not until ages 6–10 years that children tended to consider the speaker’s beliefs and intentions when characterizing the honesty of their state- ments (Strichartz & Burton, 1990). However, others have shown that even young children (aged 340 V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359
4 years) can differentially evaluate lies told with different intentions (e.g., to harm or protect another; Bussey, 1992, 1999; Crossman et al., submitted for publication; Siegal & Peterson, 1996). Yet, this abil- ity seems to develop unevenly over time, as Lyon et al. (in press) found that 3- to 5-year-olds were better at identifying truths than lies, while Bussey (1992) found that 8- and 11-year-olds were more accurate at identifying lies than 5-year-olds. Indeed, children seem initially to include all good acts in their concept of truth and all negative acts in their concept of a lie, coming to distinguish between honesty and valence of an action across the preschool years (Wandrey, Quas, & Lyon, in press). Thus, children’s conceptual and moral understanding of lies increasingly differentiates with age, as they de- velop an appreciation for the intentionality component of lies. That is, ‘‘children understand that lies are false before they understand that lies are intentionally false’’ (Lyon et al., in press, p. 14). Moreover, with age, children begin to differentiate lies from honest mistakes, guesses, exaggerations, jokes, and eventually sarcasm and irony (Creusere, 1999; Perner, 1997). Children also gradually take into consid- eration the social context in which lies are told. Overall, by early adolescence, children’s conceptual and moral understanding of lying and truth-telling becomes comparable to adults. Beyond its developmental significance, the research on children’s conceptual understanding of truth- and lie-telling has important legal implications. In many jurisdictions, unlike adult witnesses, children must undergo examinations to determine whether they are legally competent to offer sworn testimony (Bala et al., 2000; Haugaard, Reppucci, Laird, & Nauful, 1991; Lyon, 2011). Ques- tions are asked to test the child’s conceptual understanding of truth-telling and lying and to estab- lish the child’s moral commitment to truth-telling (Bala et al., 2000; Haugaard et al., 1991; Lyon, 2000). If the judge is satisfied with the child’s answers, the child will be asked to promise to tell the truth and then be allowed to testify. If not satisfied with the child’s answers, the judge might allow the child to offer unsworn testimony or the child might not be permitted to testify at all. While it is not clear that providing unsworn testimony undermines child credibility (Crossman, 1999), lack of testimony could result in a guilty offender’s acquittal and release. A child’s understanding of truth and lies thus plays a crucial role in court determinations of testimonial com- petence and potentially of trial outcomes (Bala et al., 2000; Haugaard, 1993; Haugaard et al., 1991; Lyon, 2000, 2011). Indeed, prosecutors in a 1993 survey reported that, in most sexual abuse cases, the testimonial competence of child witnesses was an issue at trial (Smith & Elstein, 1993). It is not uncommon for many attorneys and judges to continue to inquire into children’s understanding of truth and lies (Myers, 2005). In Galindo v. United States (1993), the court stated that a child is competent to testify if he or she is able to ‘‘recall the events which are the subject of the testimony; and ... understand[s] the difference between truth and falsehood and appreciates[s] the duty to tell the truth’’ (pp. 206– 207). In that case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a decision that a 3-year-old was competent to testify because of the child’s ‘‘repeated spontaneous insistence that she doesn’t tell lies, that she does tell the truth, that she in her mind feels it was important to tell the truth and not to tell a lie’’ (p. 207). The same court in Owens v. United States (1996) upheld a trial judge’s ruling that an 8- year-old was not competent to testify because ‘‘she specifically stated that she did not understand the difference between the truth and a lie’’ (p. 404). Recently, the significance of children’s ability to dem- onstrate understanding of such concepts as part of the oath-taking competency in criminal require- ments was increased by the United States Supreme Court. Defendants’ rights against the admissibility of hearsay from declarants who fail to testify at trial were expanded (Crawford v. Wash- ington, 2004; Davis v. Washington, 2006), which means that as children who fail to qualify as testimo- nially competent are rendered unavailable, this prohibits admission of their ‘‘testimonial’’ hearsay, including statements to the police and forensic interviewers. This approach has led to the reversal of a number of convictions for crimes allegedly committed against children (e.g., State v. Henderson, 2007; State v. Hooper, 2007). The types of questions that children are asked to establish competency in the courts are often developmentally inappropriate and likely underestimate children’s understanding of these terms (Bala et al., 2000; Evans & Lyon, 2011). This raises concerns about the usefulness of such questioning with child witnesses. More importantly, it is not clear how such evaluations relate to children’s actual lie-telling behavior, which is of greater consequence for the legal system. V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 341
The relation between beliefs and action
As noted above, child witnesses are typically asked about their understanding of truth and lies as a means of assessing their competence to testify, whether in court or in pretrial interviews (Lyon, Carrick, & Quas, 2010). Such questioning is based on the assumption that once one knows and has internalized that lying is bad, then behavior falls in line and one remains honest. Yet, a moment’s reflection reveals the glaring simplicity of such an argument. Adults tell lies despite knowing that lie-telling is considered morally wrong under most circumstances (Batson & Thompson, 2001) and perjury laws exist to enforce truthfulness in court, as it cannot be assumed. Understanding the concept of lies does not ensure that a child’s statements are true, nor does a lack of clear understanding ensure a child’s dishonesty (Lyon et al., in press; Talwar et al., 2002). Children can tell the truth well before they can define it (Lyon et al., in press). Unfortunately, there has been limited research to examine the association between children’s understanding of lies and their actual lying behavior. Talwar et al. (2002) found no relation between children’s actual lie- and truth-telling and their conceptual and moral understanding of lies. The majority of children reported that lying to conceal a transgression was bad, could correctly identify such a lie, and recommended that others tell the truth. Nevertheless, most of them told lies to conceal their own transgressions. Another study by Talwar et al. (2004) found a significant but modest corre- lation between children’s conceptual and moral understanding and their lie-telling behavior to con- ceal a parent’s transgression. Taken together, these studies suggest that typical competency questioning, which asks about children’s understanding of truth and lies in order to assess their likely truthfulness, is an unnecessary barrier to children’s testimony in court. Such a practice might prevent children who are able to give truthful, accurate and useful testimony from testifying. In both Talwar et al. (2002, 2004) studies, children’s conceptual and moral understanding was as- sessed using typical court procedures for assessing competency (Bala et al., 2000; Lyon, 2000). The procedures were very brief and only assessed whether children had a minimal understanding of lying and truth-telling. As a result, there was low variability in children’s scores, which may have obscured a genuine relationship between children’s developing conceptual and moral knowledge of lies and their lie-telling behavior. However, it is possible that more extensive, developmentally appropriate ques- tioning might find a relation between moral understanding and behavior. To address this possibility, Talwar and Lee (2008) used a battery of measures that assessed the con- ceptual and moral understanding of lying and honesty in children between 3 and 8 years of age, along with the temptation resistance paradigm for assessing lying behavior. Using this more extensive assessment, Talwar and Lee found that children’s lying behavior was related not to their understand- ing of lies, but to their moral evaluations of truthful and untruthful statements. Children who admit- ted their transgression were more likely to value truthfulness and give it higher ratings regardless of the situation. In contrast, children who chose to lie tended not to have stringent views about the need to be truthful. These results suggest that children who hold more relativist views about the moral implications of lying might be more inclined to tell lies, while those holding more stringent moral views about lying might be more likely to confess their own transgressions. Thus, while children’s ability to classify whether a statement was the truth or a lie (a common courtroom technique with children) was not related to their behavior, their perceptions of the acceptability of lie-telling were significantly related to lie-telling about their own transgressions. However, it remains unclear how their moral evaluations relate to providing actual testimony in court or to lie-telling about another person’s transgressions.
Children’s lies about their own behavior
Recently, researchers have turned their attention to examining children’s actual lie-telling abilities. Most of this research has examined basic questions about when lie-telling emerges, what types of lies children tell, and their relation to cognitive abilities, particularly children’s meta-representational abilities. Greater clarity in these areas of development can help in assessing whether and when child witnesses might engage in deception. 342 V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359
In theory, lies for self protection or enhancement ought to begin appearing after a sense of self has emerged, which is typically around 2 years of age (Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989). One must have a sense of self in order to seek to protect it or enhance it. Indeed, anecdotal evidence and observational studies suggest that children start telling lies as early as 24 months of age (Bussey, 1992; Darwin, 1877; Leekam, 1992; Newton et al., 2000; Wilson et al., 2003). The most frequent lies committed by children this young tend to be antisocial lies used to conceal their misdeeds and protect themselves from the consequences of their transgressions (Newton et al., 2000; Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Wilson et al., 2003). While there are reports of children telling self-protective lies to avoid punishment as early as 2½years of age (Newton et al., 2000), experimental studies examining children’s lies to avoid negative consequences and for self-interest have focused mainly on preschool children ages three and up (e.g., Lewis et al., 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a), when children’s verbal abilities tend to be better for telling such lies more consistently. Experimental studies contribute heavily to recent research on deception because lying is difficult to observe. By its very nature, it is a behavior that is concealed and can be difficult to detect. As a result, observational studies may not easily capture lying, especially if it is successful. Furthermore, research- ers need to know the factual truth (i.e., who ate the cookie) to know if a statement (‘‘no, I didn’t eat it’’) is true or false. However, to effectively capture children’s everyday lie-telling abilities researchers can- not simply instruct children to lie, because that does not create a realistic situation in which the liar is motivated to create a false belief in the listener’s mind. When individuals lie, they typically do so spon- taneously, without instructions to do so by the lie-recipient. Thus, researchers have created experi- mental paradigms to examine children’s spontaneous lie-telling in the laboratory. To best observe lying as it exists in everyday situations, one must create naturalistic conditions in which an individual can spontaneously choose to lie or tell the truth (i.e., are self-motivated to lie) and where the truth is objectively verifiable. A common paradigm used to examine children’s spontaneous lying is the modified temptation resistance paradigm (Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2008; modified from Sears, Rau, & Alpert, 1965). In this paradigm, children are given an opportunity to com- mit a transgression and are later asked about their behavior. For example, preschool children are com- monly invited to play a guessing game where they are instructed not to peek at a toy when an experimenter momentarily leaves the room (e.g., Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a). Some children choose to peek, others do not. Upon the experimenter’s return, children are asked whether or not they peeked at the toy. Children can choose to lie or tell the truth. This situation is usually vid- eotaped using a hidden camera so that children’s true peeking behavior can be verified and compared with their responses to the experimenter. Children’s behavior in this situation is spontaneous and self- motivated, as they are not directed how to behave. Thus, children who do peek can choose to confess or lie about their transgression. Using such a procedure, researchers have been able to mimic the nat- ural settings in which children lie for their own self-protection and examine their lie-telling abilities. Using this modified temptation resistance paradigm, Lewis et al. (1989) found that a third of 3-year-olds who peeked at the forbidden toy denied peeking. To investigate whether children understood that they had committed a transgression by peeking at the toy, Polak and Harris (1999) replicated the procedure used by Lewis et al. (1989) with 3- and 5-year-olds, and included a control group of children who were permitted to look at the toy. Polak and Harris (1999) found that, compared to control children (i.e., who had permission to look at the toy), children who were prohibited from looking hesitated to look and peeked at the toy less often, as they did interpret peeking as a transgres- sion. Similarly, Talwar and Lee (2002a) investigated children’s lie-telling behavior between 3 and 7 years of age. They found that the majority of children between 4 and 7 years of age lied about peek- ing at a toy, whereas only about one-third of 3-year-olds lied, a rate similar to that found by Lewis et al. (1989). Talwar, Gordon, and Lee (2007) adapted the temptation resistance paradigm for older children, be- tween 7 and 12 years of age, by asking them to answer trivia questions whose answers were on the back of the exam cards. As with younger children, older children had a chance to peek at a difficult answer when the experimenter left the room and then lie about it upon the experimenter’s return. The majority of older children lied about peeking at the answer. Thus, it appears that some children as young as 2 or 3 years of age, and most children by 4 years of age, do tell lies to conceal transgres- sions, perhaps to avoid potential punishment. These findings have potentially important legal V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 343 ramifications. While preschoolers are unlikely to be accused of a criminal transgression, beginning in preschool, any child witness could be motivated to lie to conceal an event that they perceive to be a transgression or for which they anticipate punishment if they tell the truth. In such cases, younger children may be especially influenced by their perceptions of the possibility of punishment (Wagland & Bussey, 2005), highlighting the importance of reassurance to children when interviewing them. Moreover, it highlights both the risk of older children lying about their own transgressions, as well as the risk that they could falsely confess to a crime if their perceptions of the consequences for admis- sion versus continued denial are sufficiently manipulated (Leo, 2009). It is worth noting that the age pattern in which 3-year-olds are relatively less inclined to lie about their transgression than older children has been observed among American, Canadian, British, Chinese, Japanese, and West African children (Lewis, 1993; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2011; Talwar et al., 2002; Xu & Lee, 2007). Hence, there is convergent evidence to suggest that this age pat- tern could be a universal phenomenon and suggests that less concern might be warranted regarding lie-telling among the youngest preschoolers. There is also evidence that children’s lie-telling for personal gain starts to emerge in the preschool years as well. In one study, for instance, children were taught to mislead a puppet about the location of a prize in order to keep the prize for themselves (Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner, 1991). Four-year-old children were reliably capable of committing this deception. In a similar study, Peskin (1992) found that 87% of 5-year-olds lied about the location of a prize to the puppet, whereas only 29% of 3- year-olds did so. Finally, in a recent study, we found that children as young as 3 years of age would falsely claim someone else’s work as their own for personal gain (Crossman, Talwar, Mandelbaum, Saykaly & Segovia, 2011). Hence, it is possible that children could lie in forensic contexts for personal gain – such as feigning severe injury following an accident for financial gain (Carmody & Crossman, 2005, 2011). Overall, these findings demonstrate that children can lie from as early as 2 or 3 years of age and escaping negative consequences is a powerful motivator for these early lies. Thus, in some forensic contexts, children could be motivated to lie to conceal their own misdeeds (real or imagined) if they anticipate punishment for those deeds. In addition, young children are able to lie for their own gain, though it is not clear how frequently they do so in legal settings. However, there is clear risk of older children and adolescents falsely admitting misdeeds to avoid negative consequences and/or to protect loved ones (Leo, 2009; Redlich, Silverman, Chen, & Steiner, 2004). In fact, of particular forensic concern are instances where children testify about transgressions committed by someone else. In these cases, children might be coached to lie about the events and threatened with negative consequences if they tell the truth.
Children’s lies about another’s wrongdoing
An important concern with regard to children in legal settings is the possibility that they may expe- rience coaching by an adult to fabricate, misrepresent or deny an event (e.g., abuse). It has often been claimed that children can be readily manipulated into reporting events that did not actually happen (Ekman, 1989). In particular, it is argued that children may fabricate a report of an alleged event at the behest of an adult, such as abuse allegations against one parent during a custody dispute (Bala & Schuman, 1999; Brennan, 1994; Haugaard & Reppucci, 1992; Jones & McGraw, 1987). In court, de- fense attorneys frequently argue that children fabricated reports of abuse because they were coached to do so (Brennan, 1994). Consequently, research investigating children’s fabricated reports is espe- cially relevant to address issues that might arise during custody proceedings or child abuse cases (putting aside the contentious issue of how frequently such fabricated allegations truly occur; Lyon, 1995; Mikkelsen, Gutheil, & Emens, 1992). Little evidence currently exists regarding children’s intentionally fabricated reports. Lyon, Malloy, Quas, and Talwar (2008) found that children would lie to conceal an adult’s transgression, and that children would fabricate details about an event at the request of an adult. However, we are not aware of any other investigation of children’s intentionally false denials and false assertions or children’s ability to maintain such assertions convincingly when questioned. Yet, it is important to examine whether children can be coached to fabricate false events or false details of an interaction or conceal 344 V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 a transgression to protect an adult. Children’s ability to maintain such false reports is of particular importance, given the potential implications for forensic settings. In abuse cases, children are typically testifying about another’s transgressions during events that involved an interaction between themselves and an adult. At times, the adult involved may ask the child to keep parts of the events secret and lie to protect the adult (Lyon et al., 2008; Talwar et al., 2004). The scant research on children’s understanding of secrets has reported that younger children are both more (Pipe & Goodman, 1991) and less (Watson & Valtin, 1997) inclined to believe that se- crets should be kept. Children’s evaluation of secrets is likely dependent on several factors, including inducements to secrecy by the adult instigator and inducements to disclose by the interviewer. There may also be developmental influences. Older children and adolescents may be less susceptible to inducements to lie due to internalized moral standards against lying, whereas younger children may be less able to remember the instigator’s coaching, less aware of the negative consequences of disclosure and less able to sustain a lie (Bussey & Grimbeek, 1995). Nevertheless, some children may be motivated to tell lies for others to conceal their transgressions. Wilson and Pipe (1989) had an unfamiliar adult ‘‘magician’’ ask 5- and 6-year-olds to conceal the adult’s accidental spillage of ink on a pair of gloves. They found that the children did not spontane- ously mention the accident when later interviewed. In a similar study, Pipe and Wilson (1994) had 6- and 10-year-olds participate in a ‘‘magician show’’ in pairs. One child was made an assistant to the magician and the other was a spectator. During the magic show, the magician spilt ink on the assistant’s gloves and asked the child to keep it secret. They found that 6-year-olds were significantly more likely than 10-year-olds to keep the secret about damage caused by the unfamiliar adult when later asked about the event (Pipe & Wilson, 1994). However, of the younger children, 60% revealed the truth about the accident when first interviewed, while 84% of older children revealed the truth. Thus, although some children did comply, particularly younger children, most children were unwilling to lie to conceal the magician’s transgression, which is consistent with an early finding that children would not lie for another child, even though the child had helped them previously (Greenglass, 1972). One possible explanation for Pipe and Wilson’s (1994) finding that most children refused to lie for the magician is that the adult was unfamiliar to the children. Thus, the children did not have a strong motivation to help them by lying for them. If this is true, children should be more likely to lie for someone with whom they are highly familiar. This is, of course, relevant to legal cases in which chil- dren are induced to lie by adults with whom they have a close interpersonal relationship, such as mal- treatment cases, which are overwhelmingly likely to involve a relative (or partner of a relative; U.S. Department of Health, 2011). Under such circumstances, children may feel a greater motivation to conceal a transgression and may fear negative consequences for their interpersonal relationship if they reveal the truth. Findings by Bottoms, Goodman, Schwartz-Kenney, and Thomas (2002) partially support this explanation. In their study, while the experimenter was out of the room, mothers and children played with ‘‘forbidden’’ toys. Mothers ‘‘accidentally’’ broke one toy and told the children to keep it a secret that they had played with the forbidden toys because she might get in trouble. In this study, older children withheld information when asked to keep their mother’s secret, while younger children did not. Thus, it appears that older children, at least, would be willing to conceal their parents’ transgression, perhaps out of loyalty to them. Children’s loyalty to their parents, however, is rather fragile as evidenced by the findings of Talwar et al. (2004). In their study, parents committed a minor transgression (i.e., breaking a puppet) while the experimenter was out of the room. They coached their child not to tell the experimenter that the parent had broken the puppet because they might get in trouble if the experimenter found out. Later, children were interviewed about what happened to the puppet either with or without parents present. Regardless of condition, the majority of children told the truth and did not conceal their par- ent’s transgression. In fact, many of the children told on their parents immediately, even though the experimenter had not yet ‘‘noticed’’ the broken puppet. Interestingly, children were more likely to lie for their parents after it was clear to the children that they themselves would not be blamed for break- ing the puppet. These results suggest that children will tell lies for others, but may be motivated to do so only when that lie does not impinge on their own self-interest. It may also be that the identity of the interviewer affects children’s disclosure of the truth. In a re- cent study by Williams, Kirmayer, Simon, and Talwar (submitted for publication), children were more V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 345 likely to disclose a transgression to a parent than to an unfamiliar researcher. In fact, children’s per- ceptions of the acceptability of lying are affected by the familiarity and status of the lie-recipient (e.g., adult versus child), as well as the type of lie involved, (Crossman et al., submitted for publication; Ning & Crossman, 2007; Seiter, Bruschke, & Bai, 2002). Hence, it will be important in future studies to exam- ine the influence of familiarity and perceived authority of the interviewer on children’s truth and lie- telling. The impact of such variables is of particular importance to the courts, where children are often interviewed by unfamiliar adults who may (or may not) be perceived as authority figures. How the influence of such variables interacts with inducements by other adults to lie is an important issue for investigation. Overall, then, whether or not children decide to deceive in a situation seems to be based on the child’s assessment of whether doing so will result in a positive or favorable outcome for themselves in adverse circumstances (e.g., reduced punishment or no hurt feelings), and whether it will lead to attainment of some goal, regardless of whether or not the goal is functional (Rogers, 1990). The weighting of various factors in such a cost/benefit analysis likely evolves and broadens with age. For instance, younger children may simply consider immediate concerns, such as the relative benefit or cost to themselves (Popliger, Talwar, & Crossman, 2011) when deciding whether or not to lie. Older children and adolescents, however, may weigh both the immediate benefits of truth- versus lie-telling, as well as longer-term considerations, such as the interpersonal costs of getting caught in a lie (e.g., parental disappointment, peer rejection), as the adaptiveness of lie-telling as a strategy likely shifts with age as well (Talwar & Crossman, 2011). A recent study by Talwar and Lee (2011) illustrates the influence fear of punishment can have on younger children’s lie-telling behavior. In this study, West African children in two schools participated in a temptation resistance paradigm. In one school, a punitive, corporal punishment model was used to punish children and correct their behavior, while the other school did not use corporal punishment. Talwar and Lee found that children in the punitive discipline school were more likely to lie about their transgressions and were better at maintaining their lies in follow-up questioning than children from the non-punitive school. Thus, children in the former school may have learned that lying is a success- ful strategy for avoiding adverse consequences (Talwar & Lee, 2011). Perhaps they learned that if they committed a transgression, they had nothing to lose by lying: they would be punished severely for the transgression if discovered (and if their lie was discovered), but if they lied successfully, they could possibly avoid punishment completely. Lying was a more adaptive choice than being honest in such an environment. Similarly, children seem more likely to lie for another when the costs or conse- quences to themselves are minimized (e.g., Popliger et al., 2011; Talwar et al., 2004). Therefore, in attempting to elicit children’s complete and honest reports (and potentially overcome inducements to lie), forensic interviewers must bear in mind the potential impact of this cost-benefit analysis and address children’s perceptions of the consequences of lie- and truth-telling. In addition, when children do decide to lie, it is important to investigate factors that affect their ability to maintain plau- sible fabricated reports – that is, what factors make their lies successful.
Lie-telling and children’s cognitive development
The creation and maintenance of a lie is a relatively complex task that requires a sophisticated level of cognitive development. A successful liar must take into account another individuals’ knowledge, construct a false statement that differs from their own true beliefs, and readily adapt or manipulate their non-verbal and verbal expressions to remain convincing. Thus, deception is considered to be a hallmark of cognitive maturity that emerges once children begin to understand another’s mental states and consciously control their own behaviors (Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Children’s lie-telling skills continue to evolve throughout their first decade of life (Talwar & Lee, 2008; Talwar et al., 2007) and these improvements appear to coincide with significant advancements in cognition, specif- ically ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ understanding and executive functioning development (Talwar & Lee, 2008). Similar developmental timelines have led researchers to suspect that these cognitive abilities are clo- sely related to children’s deceptive practices (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002a). However, only recently have researchers begun to empirically investigate the role that 346 V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 these specific cognitive factors play in children’s abilities to successfully lie (Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2008; Talwar et al., 2007).
Theory of mind understanding and lying Theory of mind understanding is commonly defined as the ability to attribute mental states to one- self and others and to recognize that others’ beliefs, desires, and intentions may differ from one’s own (Baron-Cohen, 1999; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Thus, lying is closely related to this ability as, by def- inition, telling a lie requires one to intentionally instill a false belief in the mind of another (Bok, 1978; Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi, & Shulman, 1996). Doing so successfully necessitates an awareness that other peoples’ knowledge of a situation may vary from one’s own and, moreover, awareness that this knowledge can be manipulated through deceit (Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Lying is thus theory of mind in action (Talwar & Lee, 2008) and acts of deception have been identified as early indicators of at least a rudimentary understanding of belief and false belief (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991; Sodian, 1991; Sodian et al., 1991). Previous research suggests that children’s theory of mind understanding progresses through two developmental phases (Talwar & Lee, 2008). In the first phase, children acquire a basic awareness of others’ mental states, or first-order belief understanding, around 3–4 years of age (e.g., Chandler et al., 1989; Ruffman, Olson, Ash, & Keenan, 1993; Sodian, 1991; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). The development of this relatively simple insight corresponds with the emergence of children’s lie- telling behavior (e.g., Lewis et al., 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2008). At and after 4 years of age, the majority of children will readily tell a lie to conceal their own transgression which, according to Talwar and Lee (2008), only requires them to represent a belief that is different from the true state of affairs. Indeed, Polak and Harris (1999) reported that most children who chose to lie and deny a minor transgression had high first-order theory of mind understanding scores. Thus, children’s initial lies may reflect their ability to represent a false belief that is different from their own belief about the true state of affairs. Talwar and Lee (2008) also found that children’s performance on false belief tasks predicted false denials of their transgressions. However, at this stage, children appear to have difficulty maintaining their lies. Their subsequent statements following an initial false statement tend to be inconsistent with the initial lie and thus make their deception readily detectable by naïve adults (Talwar & Lee, 2002a). Polak and Harris (1999) also reported that the majority of children (63%), including those with high theory of mind understanding scores, were unable to sustain their lies by appropriately respond- ing to follow-up questions regarding their behavior. In light of this, researchers have suggested a developmental model of deception whereby the decision to tell a lie requires a relatively simple understanding of false beliefs, whereas the ability to maintain the lie during follow-up questioning re- quires a more advanced belief understanding (Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2008). At approximately 6 or 7 years of age, children begin to develop a more advanced theory of mind, or second-order belief understanding (Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995) and it has been suggested this is crucial to the second developmental stage of lying (Talwar & Lee, 2008). Polak and Harris (1999) and Talwar and colleagues (e.g., Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2008; Talwar et al., 2007) have suggested that this more sophisticated awareness is necessary to sustain a false denial suc- cessfully. Children must exercise ‘‘semantic leakage control’’ (i.e., control the semantic content of their statements to avoid providing contradictory information) to feign ignorance and respond consistently to follow-up questions (Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2002b; Talwar et al., 2007). This requires them to create a false belief in another individual (e.g., ‘‘I didn’t peek at the toy’’) and then infer what belief they ought to have, given the false belief (e.g., ‘‘I don’t know what the toy is’’; Talwar & Lee, 2002a). In other words, they must be able to create a belief based on a false belief, or a second-order belief representation. At this stage, children become gradually more and more sophisticated at semantic leakage control. Children will tell a deliberate lie while ensuring that their subsequent statements do not contradict the initial lie and thus make their deceptive statements difficult to distinguish from statements made by a non-liar. For instance, Talwar et al. (2007) investigated children’s lie-telling practices and second- order belief understanding. Children, 6–11 years of age, participated in the modified temptation V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 347 resistance task using trivia questions. A series of follow-up questions assessed the children’s ability to exercise semantic leakage control and sustain their initial false denials. As predicted, Talwar et al. (2007) discovered that children with higher second-order belief scores were more likely to success- fully control semantic leakage and feign ignorance when responding to follow-up questions by the experimenter. Talwar and Lee (2008) found a similar relationship with their sample of children aged 3–8 years who were told not to peek at a forbidden toy. That is, they reported that children who per- formed better on first-order belief tasks were more likely to tell an initial lie, and those children who performed better on second-order belief tasks were more likely to provide plausible explanations for knowing the identify of a toy they should not have otherwise known. Further support for a link between children’s false belief understanding and lie-telling abilities comes from studies involving children with an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). ASD is commonly associated with deficits in theory of mind understanding (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). In addition, most research suggests that children with ASD tend to be poor lie-tellers (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Sodian & Frith, 1992). For instance, Baron-Cohen (1992) found that children with ASD demonstrated greater difficulty in the penny hiding deception task compared to typical 3- to 4- year-olds and a mental age-matched, developmentally delayed group. While participants with ASD were able to deceive their opponent by keeping the desired penny out of sight (i.e., object occlusion), they were not able to conceal information about location of the penny (i.e., information occlusion). Furthermore, children’s success on the deception game was significantly correlated with their perfor- mance on a false belief task. More recently, Li, Kelley, Evans, and Lee (2010) concluded that although children with ASD tell lies, they tend to have difficulty controlling their verbal expressions and as a result are less able to maintain their initial false denials during follow-up questioning. Talwar, Ras- mussen, Zwaigenbaum, Manji, and Loomes (2012) examined children with ASD’s lie-telling behavior and its relation to false belief understanding with a comparison group of typically developing children. While almost all of the typically developing control children lied about peeking at a toy, significantly fewer children with ASD lied. In addition, children with ASD were poorer at maintaining their lies than the control group and liars had higher false belief scores than truth-tellers. Taken together, research on the development of children’s lying behavior indicates that a signifi- cant relationship between lie-telling and theory of mind understanding exists among typically and non-typically developing children. While these studies show a seemingly consistent relationship pat- tern between lying, lie maintenance, and false belief understanding, it is likely that other variables, such as executive functioning, facilitate and support the development of children’s lie-telling capabilities.
Executive functioning and lying There is some evidence to suggest that children’s lie-telling behaviors are related to their executive functioning abilities (Carlson et al., 1998; Hala & Russell, 2001; Talwar & Lee, 2008), though this area remains largely unexplored. Executive functioning refers to a set of higher-order psychological pro- cesses that serve to monitor and control thought and action (Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991; Zelazo & Muller, 2002). Executive functioning encompasses a variety of cognitive skills, including self-regulation, inhibitory control, planning, attentional flexibility, and working memory (Welsh et al., 1991; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997), all of which could theoretically contribute to success- ful lie-telling. Executive functioning skills have been shown to emerge during late infancy and develop throughout childhood (Welsh & Pennington, 1988; Zelazo & Muller, 2002), a time when researchers have also noted increases in lie-telling behavior (Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a). Thus, it has been suggested that advances in executive functioning may be associated with improvements in children’s deceptive capabilities (Carlson et al., 1998; Hala & Russell, 2001; Talwar & Lee, 2008). In particular, researchers have posited that inhibitory control and working memory are directly re- lated to children’s lying behaviors (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 1998; Hala & Russell, 2001; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Inhibitory control refers to the ability to suppress interfering thought processes or actions (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002), while working memory is a system for temporarily hold- ing and processing information in the mind (Baddeley, 1986). When choosing to tell a lie, children must suppress the truth (i.e., conceal the transgression or misdeed), while simultaneously represent- ing and communicating false information that differs from reality to avoid being detected (Carlson 348 V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 et al., 1998; Talwar & Lee, 2008). To maintain their lies, liars must carefully inhibit any verbal or non- verbal behaviors that may contradict their false statement while maintaining in their memory the contents of their lie (Talwar & Lee, 2008). That is, a liar must hold in their mind conflicting alternatives regarding what they actually did and what they said they did in order to sustain their initial lie and remain undetected (Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Carlson and colleagues (1998) were among the first to examine the link between children’s exec- utive functioning and their deceptive abilities. Carlson et al. (1998) reported that by overloading chil- dren’s inhibitory control skills, children’s ability to physically deceive a research assistant was less successful. Specifically, children who were told to deceive under conditions that required a high de- gree of inhibition (i.e., pointing to a misleading location to deceive a research assistant as to the whereabouts of a prize) were less successful, compared to children in relatively low inhibitory control conditions (i.e., using a picture of an arrow to deceptively direct the researcher). Similar results were reported by Hala and Russell (2001). Based on these findings, researchers concluded that young chil- dren’s difficulties with deception may be related to their underdeveloped inhibitory control skills. However, while previous studies examined non-verbal deception, only one published study to date has explicitly examined the relationship between executive functioning and verbal lie-telling behavior in children. Talwar and Lee (2008) investigated the roles of inhibition and working memory in the development of children’s lying. Children ranging in age from 3 to 8 years participated in the modified temptation resistance paradigm. Children also completed several executive functioning tasks that examined their inhibitory control and working memory. Talwar and Lee (2008) found that children’s false denials were related to their performance on a Stroop task, a test that measures both inhibition and working memory skills. Specifically, children with higher Stroop task scores were more likely to lie about their transgression regarding peeking at a forbidden toy. Based on these results, Talwar and Lee (2008) concluded that lying may require a dual ability to remember the rule that was violated while simultaneously inhibiting any mention of the wrongdoing, as it was the combined effect of both these abilities that was significantly related to lying. Similarly, findings emerging from a longitudinal study of children’s developing lie-telling indicate that children with higher scores on executive func- tion measures (i.e., inhibitory control and card sort tasks) were more likely to engage in early prosocial lie-telling (Crossman et al., 2011).
Summary: Lie-telling and children’s cognitive development In summary, although children begin telling lies from an early age, they are not yet skilled at main- taining these lies or concealing the truth, as they tend to leak information either verbally or nonver- bally that reveals the truth. Once children are in elementary school, they become better at telling lies and have better skills to maintain their lies beyond their initial false statements. Being able to lie with increasing ease requires a sophisticated understanding of beliefs and false beliefs, as well as executive functioning abilities, including working memory and inhibitory control. The necessity of relatively sophisticated cognitive skills for elaborate lie-telling has implications for evaluating the reliability of child witness testimony. First, it suggests that children who struggle cog- nitively, either due to developmental delays or specific disorders, such as ASD, are less likely to be capable of generating and/or maintaining credible false reports. It also suggests that younger child witnesses are less capable of lying effectively when verbal elaboration is required. Finally, particularly in terms of the development of executive functioning, it suggests means of detecting children’s lie- telling through interviewing techniques, as described below.
Lie-telling success
Children’s verbal and nonverbal expressive behavior Lie-telling, whether for personal gain or for the benefit of another, can have grave consequences if one’s lies are detected. To be successful, lie-tellers must control both their verbal and nonverbal behavior. This behavioral control must be exerted not only during the initial lie statement, but also throughout all subsequent conversations about the topic. Successful lying thus requires inhibition of one’s genuine verbal and nonverbal reactions to a situation and maintenance of expressive behavior in a manner congruent with the lie. V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 349
As noted above, verbal control is referred to as semantic leakage control (Talwar & Lee, 2002b). The ability to control one’s bodily movements and facial expressions to avoid arousing suspicion due to incongruent nonverbal displays requires ‘‘nonverbal leakage control’’ (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). For in- stance, when lying to deny eating a forbidden cookie, one has to avoid saying anything that is incon- gruent with that lie (e.g., saying how good it tasted), remember the false details to remain consistent over time, and avoid displaying any non-verbal cues to the lie (e.g., fidgeting, looking nervous) to arouse suspicion. Similarly, an individual feigning sickness must alter their non-verbal appearance to appear ill, while regulating their verbal statements to be consistent with that lie. Lie-telling that effectively manages semantic and nonverbal leakage control is no simple task, par- ticularly for children. Nevertheless, while research has found that children may show a few non-verbal signs of their deception, there are no non-verbal cues that reliably distinguish between lie-tellers and truth-tellers or help adults consistently detect children’s lies (Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Talwar, Murphy, & Lee, 2007). For instance, Talwar and Lee (2002a) found that lie-tellers between 3 and 7 years of age were almost indistinguishable from truth-tellers. While analysis of the children’s non-verbal behaviors revealed one small difference between lie-tellers and truth-tellers (i.e., smiling behavior), when video-clips were shown to adults, they could not differentiate the lie-tellers from the truth-tellers on the basis of their non-verbal behaviors. However, verbal behaviors might have greater potential to be revealing. More difficult than simply denying a transgression, sustaining an elaborate lie requires a situation- specific assessment of what should (and should not) be said (Polak & Harris, 1999). Young children struggle to do so (Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Talwar et al., 2007, 2007). In one study, for instance, younger children were overwhelmingly likely to reveal incriminating information in subsequent statements after falsely denying a transgression, while approximately half of 6- and 7 year-olds were able to con- ceal and maintain their lies when answering follow-up questions (Talwar & Lee, 2002a). When adults were asked to judge which children were lying based on transcriptions of the children’s verbal reports, they easily detected the younger children who revealed their transgressions verbally, while the older children maintained their lies and were indistinguishable from children who told the truth. Subse- quent studies have found similar developmental patterns in children’s lie-telling to conceal a trans- gression, and children’s ability to maintain those lies in subsequent statements improves with age through childhood and adolescence (Evans & Lee, 2010; Talwar & Lee, 2008; Talwar et al., 2007). Thus, younger children are limited in their skills at maintaining their lies and consequently are not effective lie-tellers. As children get older, however, they become more sophisticated at concealing their lies verbally. Furthermore, adults find older children’s statements more credible and experience greater difficulty differentiating between their true and deceptive statements (Feldman & White, 1980; Leach, Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2004; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2006). In other words, the older one becomes, the more likely one is able to convincingly deceive others and, as discussed earlier, this ability is related to their growing cognitive sophistication.
Detecting children’s lies Given that children seem to master effective lie-telling by school age, it is important and forensi- cally relevant to determine how children’s honesty can be accurately assessed. The majority of re- search in this domain has focused on the abilities of jurors, law professionals and especially adults (lay-persons) to ‘‘intuitively’’ identify whether or not a child is being truthful or deceitful. Intuitive lie detection implies that individuals make decisions about the truthfulness of a statement based so- lely on their opinion, with no use of deception detection techniques, such as a polygraph (Leach et al., 2004). While research on the detection of adult deception has found that adults identify deceit in other adults at near chance levels (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Leach et al., 2009), the handful of studies investigating detection of children’s lies have obtained mixed results. Some re- search has found that younger children’s lies are easier to detect than those told by adolescents and adults (Chahal & Cassidy, 1995; Feldman, Jenkins, & Popoola, 1979; Feldman & White, 1980) and that, as children get older, adults find it harder to detect their lies. Feldman et al. (1979) suggested that this is because children become better able to control their facial expressions with age. However, in most of these studies children were asked to ‘‘fake’’ their responses and thus their lies were not spontaneous 350 V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 or naturalistic. More recent work has shown that adults may have difficulty detecting younger chil- dren’s deceit when the lies are more ecologically valid (e.g., Crossman & Lewis, 2006; Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar, Crossman, Gulmi, Renaud, & Williams, 2009; Talwar & Lee, 2002a). Overall, adult detection rates for children’s lies hover around chance levels (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Edelstein, Luten, Ekman, & Goodman, 2006; Talwar et al., 2006). For instance, Talwar et al. (2006) investigated adults’ judgments of the veracity of children’s coached true and fabricated reports during a mock court proceeding. Undergraduate students viewed video files of children between the ages of 4 and 7 years describing events that are common, but not universally experienced (such as going camping). Half of the children gave true accounts; half of the children gave false accounts. Chil- dren assigned to the false condition were coached by a parent to describe an event they never expe- rienced. When adult laypersons viewed the video tapes, they were not able to reliably discriminate between the child lie-tellers and truth-tellers. In fact, the adult detectors demonstrated a truth bias, such that they had a tendency to judge children’s reports as truthful, regardless of study condition. However, adults’ judgments of children’s veracity were significantly predicted by their perceptions of the children’s maturity, suggestibility, as well as integrity. Similarly, Edelstein et al. (2006) showed undergraduate observers videotapes of adults (undergrad- uate students) and children (between 5 and 7 years) discussing an event (a play session) involving a male research assistant (RA). During the event, the RA had touched half of the participants on their bare stomach, nose and neck (in the context of the game). Participants that were touched gave truthful accounts while participants who were not touched were asked to lie and state they were in fact touched on their bare stomach, nose and neck. Results showed an overall lie-detection accuracy rate of 50% for both children’s and adult’s statements. Despite the low detection rate, overall, observers were significantly more accurate at detecting children’s versus adult’s lies. Also, observers were more accurate at detecting truths in adults than they were with children. It is possible that results differed between studies due to the nature of the stories that children were telling (i.e., a story involving per- sonal touching versus a story about innocuous events like camping). However, further strengthening the argument that adults are poor at intuitive detection deception, Leach et al. (2009) found that undergraduate students’ lie detection performance for both adults and children was not reliable across five experiments. Although these studies illustrate a shift toward more ecologically valid research paradigms and methodologies, it is not clear that existing lie detection studies are relevant to clinical and forensic contexts, as their findings are typically based on one or two short statements provided by child par- ticipants. In real settings, children might be interviewed for long periods of time and be questioned repeatedly during extensive interviews (Cross, Jones, Walsh, Simone, & Kolko, 2007; Goodman et al., 1992; Malloy, Lyon, & Quas, 2007). There remains a need for research that not only examines children’s true and fabricated statements over multiple interviews, but also includes interviews that are lengthy and repeated to better replicate the real-life settings encountered by child witnesses. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the challenge inherent in differentiating between true and false child witness reports.
Factors that aid deception detection To facilitate better discrimination between true and false testimony, researchers have begun to focus on practices that can help improve deception detection with child witnesses. This includes research on both interview techniques and interviewer skills. For example, some research suggests that detection accuracy can improve when children are ob- served under forensically relevant interview conditions and when they are asked follow-up questions (e.g., Leach et al., 2004; Orcutt, Goodman, Tobey, Batterman-Faunce, & Thomas, 2001; Talwar et al., 2007). Specifically, Leach et al. (2004) found that asking children questions about lies or eliciting a promise to tell the truth (similar to court competence examinations) led to greater accuracy in adult observers’ detection of children’s lies. Thus, the interview technique of making truth-telling salient to child witnesses improved raters’ lie detection, despite the fact that raters did not view the actual truth-telling/promise discussions. Other approaches also seek to enhance the presence of cues to deception. One particularly promising technique involves manipulating cognitive load, which refers to information-processing V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 351
(attentional or working-memory) demands (Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010), which are heightened when one lies. That is, when truth-tellers recall information, they are not likely to be preoccupied with appearing convincing because they are telling the truth. A liar, in contrast, cannot take their credibility for granted and so must regulate their thoughts, feelings, behaviors and mental states to appear con- vincingly truthful to others, as well as plan and recall their story and remain consistent in their reports (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003; Kassin, 2005; Vrij et al., 2008). Hence, liars may be simultaneously monitoring an interviewer’s reactions to determine if their ac- count is believable (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), monitoring their own non-verbal behaviors (DePaulo et al., 2003) and trying to actively suppress the truth, while simultaneously telling the lie, all of which is more cognitively taxing than recall of a true story (Gilbert, 1991). Thus, telling and maintaining a believable lie is a complex endeavor that, in itself, increases one’s cognitive load. Researchers have suggested that the use of questioning techniques that further tax liars’ cognitive load (e.g., Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006; Vrij et al., 2008) might help to increase the leakage of cues to deception. For exam- ple, Vrij et al. (2008) manipulated cognitive load of adult participants by asking half to recount their story in reverse order. They found that raters perceived liars as more nervous and as needing to think more about their responses. This procedure yielded better detection rates by police officers than tra- ditional questioning techniques. Similarly, because liars may be more likely to plan their lies in advance and anticipate likely ques- tions, cognitive load can also be taxed using unanticipated questions. Faced with such questions, liars must decide whether to reconcile their story and create plausible responses or feign ignorance, which could raise credibility questions (Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Rachel, & Colwell, 2007; Liu et al., 2010). Children might be particularly vulnerable to such effects, as they have less well developed planning abilities, working memory, and abilities to read social cues. To explore this possibility, Liu et al. (2010) asked unanticipated questions of children 10–12 years of age who had been asked to re- port a true life event or a fabricated life event. Consistent with expectations, children in the lying con- dition reported having to plan their stories more and there were differences in their responses to unexpected questions, compared to truth-tellers. With the exception of Liu et al. (2010), all other research on the role of cognitive load in deception has examined adults’ lies. Given that children’s ability to lie is related to their developing cognitive abilities, it may be that children will be particularly susceptible to these types of interview methods and less likely to be able to maintain their lies when their cognitive load has increased. However, it is also possible that such techniques may adversely affect truth-tellers as well. More research is needed in this area to investigate cognitive load as a potential means of improving the discrimination of chil- dren’s truth- and lie-telling. Beyond interviewing techniques, researchers also have investigated interviewer skills in detecting children’s lies. It has been suggested that professionals who have extensive experience working with many children over a range of contexts may have an advantage detecting children’s lies (Crossman & Lewis, 2006; O’Sullivan, 2005), but only a couple of studies have examined this question. Westcott, Davies, and Clifford (1991), for instance, found that professionals who interact with children as part of their work (e.g., educational psychologists, occupational psychologists) were more accurate in detecting children’s deception than others. However, the children had been instructed to falsely report about a trip to a museum, a relatively mundane event which children may not have been motivated to conceal. Talwar, Crossman, Williams, and Muir (2011), on the other hand, examined detection of chil- dren’s naturalistic lies. They demonstrated that professionals with increasing amounts of varied expe- rience with different children were somewhat better at detecting lies than were less experienced individuals or those with more narrow experience (e.g., parents; see also Crossman & Lewis, 2006). In contrast, Chahal and Cassidy (1995) reported that parents were better at detecting children’s lies than other adults, suggesting that even this more narrow experience with children might facilitate detection skill. Again in this study, however, children were instructed to make a false report about a TV program they had watched. Thus, the children’s lies might not have been representative of the lies they tell in more naturalistic situations. In addition, Talwar and Renaud (2010) found that parents may have a general bias to believe that their children are honest, perhaps as a protective strategy to avoid negative feelings about their children or the quality of their parent–child relationship. This would likely interfere with their ability to detect their own children’s lies. In general, however, it 352 V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 appears that lay-people (e.g., jurors) discriminate poorly between children’s true and fabricated re- ports, but that emerging interviewing techniques might facilitate better detection of children’s lies.
Promoting truth-telling
Along with efforts to elicit cues to children’s deception and to detect their lies when told, another promising strategy is to use truth promotion techniques with child witnesses. There is some evidence that simply asking children to promise to tell the truth increases their truth-telling (Lyon et al., 2008; Talwar et al., 2002, 2004). Talwar et al. (2002), for example, found that children who promised to tell the truth were less likely to lie about their own peeking behavior. Also, Talwar et al. (2004) found that promising to tell the truth decreased the likelihood that children would lie for their parents and Lyon et al. (2008) found that promising to tell the truth increased the likelihood that children would truth- fully report an adult’s transgression. Unfortunately, the mechanism for the effectiveness of such appeals is currently unclear. It could be that truth promotion impacts children’s behavior through their assessment of whether honesty versus dishonesty impinges on their self-interest (Bandura, 1991; Bussey, 1992; Lyon, 2000). For example, abuse victims often report that their decision to disclose the abuse (or not) was affected by their expectations for how others would react to the disclosure and the effects of disclosure on themselves and others close to them (Anderson, Martin, Mullen, Romans, & Herbison, 1993). Some children might fear telling the truth because of what they believe will happen to them if they disclose (Bussey & Grimbeek, 1995). Similarly, some adolescents falsely confess to criminal acts because they fear what might happen to themselves or their loved ones if they do not (Leo, 2009; Redlich et al., 2004). Thus, children’s motivations to lie may be affected by whether they expect negative or positive consequences for disclosing the truth or lying, a cost-benefit analysis that might be influenced by truth promotion techniques. Consistent with these findings, Bandura’s (1991) social cognitive theory of moral action asserts that people’s beliefs about outcomes expected for different types of conduct play a central role in deter- mining their behavior. Children go through a normative process of socialization as they begin to inter- nalize moral standards held by their parents and society. Over the course of this socialization process, children’s behavior is influenced by both external and internal factors (Bandura, 1986). Young children initially rely on guidance from others to encourage their behaviors either through external physical factors (i.e., punishments) or external social factors (i.e., social rewards for pleasing another person), and as children internalize their culture’s moral standards, they are also affected by internal social fac- tors (i.e., pleasing oneself by doing the ‘‘right’’ thing). Preliminary findings suggest that even very young children’s honesty can be increased by exposing them to models of reward for truth-telling, while modeling punishment for lying does not increase honesty (Talwar & Arruda, 2012). Specifically, Talwar and Arruda (2012) found that children were less likely to lie about a transgression when their ‘‘interrogators’’ appealed to either external or internal motivations to tell the truth, but not when external consequences were raised. To the extent that this theoretical mechanism can explain the im- pact of truth promotion techniques on child witness honesty, it suggests potential future avenues for both research and practice. That is, recognizing and helping to develop children’s internal motivations for honesty could help adults bolster social incentives for truth-telling and remove competing social barriers to honesty. Currently, it is unclear what impact truth-induction methods will have on children’s willingness to lie for another who asked them to keep a transgression secret. Making consequences salient (e.g., through moral stories, appeals for promises of honesty) could possibly enhance honesty, as children fear getting into trouble for another’s wrongdoing. Alternatively, it could highlight the risk to the child and adult of getting caught lying, and encourage better lies. Children also might respond differently depending on their understanding of the interrogative situation. In one study (Hartwig & Wilson, 2002), 6- to 7-year-olds reported that child story characters would interpret an interviewer’s repeated questions as a signal that they had done something wrong (i.e., were lying or keeping a secret), and that they would change their answers in response. They also indicated that story characters would be more likely to tell the truth about a secret when faced with a more threatening interviewing strat- egy (e.g., suggesting a child would get in trouble if she did not tell), versus a ‘‘friendlier’’ approach (e.g., V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 353 interviewer invokes child’s friendship as incentive to tell truth). Hence, different truth induction methods might be effective in eliciting children’s honest reports under different circumstances, such as when they fear getting into trouble themselves or when they have been coached to lie. The only study to examine truth induction and coaching found that promising to tell the truth did increase hon- esty when children were coached to lie (Lyon et al., 2008), suggesting that even the effects of coaching may be ameliorated by some truth induction methods. Again, however, more research is necessary to determine the boundary conditions for the effectiveness of truth promotion techniques with child witnesses.
Legal implications
Courts are particularly concerned with the veracity of young children’s testimony. Research suggests that although children’s lie-telling emerges in the preschool years, children are not skilled lie-tellers until the later elementary school years. Children can be coached to lie for another, although such lies do not come as early or as readily to children as lies to protect themselves. Children’s deci- sions to lie are motivated by their evaluation of the potential consequences to self and a desire to min- imize negative consequences. Thus, if a child believes that lying will protect them from such consequences, they may decide to conceal or fabricate information. It should be noted, however, that this research does not imply that children are more dishonest than adults. Research with adults finds that they commonly tell lies (DePaulo et al., 1996), and that children lie for the same reasons as adults. Yet, children’s lies are less elaborate and they have diffi- culty sustaining them when questioned. Therefore, the risk of harm from children’s lie-telling in court is, at worst, no greater than it is for adult witnesses. Nevertheless, concern remains about children’s lie-telling and its potential forensic impact. Indeed, a key concern with much of the literature discussed thus far is that the situations explored do not mi- mic the conditions in actual courtrooms – that they lack ecological validity. Lies produced in experi- mental paradigms are not typically high stakes lies, such as those found in legal settings. For ethical reasons, it is difficult to replicate the same conditions that children who are testifying might be faced with (e.g., physical or sexual abuse; coaching to falsely allege abuse). Thus, most of the paradigms used to examine children’s lie-telling have relied on ethically acceptable situations that elicit lies anal- ogous to the types of lies children might tell in court. This may lead one to conclude there is limited relevance to actual legal situations. It should be noted, however, that what we consider high stakes is perceived through an adult lens rather than a child’s. For young children, lying in the modified temp- tation resistance paradigm might be high stakes, as they could fear possible punishment for their transgression and they may be concerned about getting caught in their lie. Furthermore, a number of studies examining children’s coached lies for others have endeavored to make these situations highly relevant to forensic situations. Nevertheless, more research is needed to better approximate the types of lies children tell in legal contexts. This will require creativity by researchers to create sit- uations that are ecologically valid and ethically acceptable. Despite the need for extrapolation, how- ever, the current findings have a great deal to offer to the legal system in terms of understanding children’s lie-telling and implications for how to address child witness participation in legal settings. In particular, research findings suggest that different lie motivations are likely to generalize to dif- ferent forensic contexts. That is, coached lies may be more likely to occur in contexts such as custody disputes or when a child seeks to protect another individual, such as an abusive parent. Self-protective lie-telling may be more likely when a child commits an illegal act and lies to avoid punishment for it, but also could occur if a child denies their own victimization to avoid family disruption. Such lies may also be differentially effective. Lies of omission, for example, in which a child denies an event (e.g., abuse by a trusted adult), seem likely to be more credible than lies of commission, for which a child must elaborate (e.g., make up an alibi or an allegation), which has important implications for the pros- ecution of child abuse allegations. Research findings also suggest that the characteristics of real-life cases will enhance the honesty of child witnesses. As there are negative consequences for lie-telling in real life that often do not exist in experiments and given the research findings which suggest chil- dren are motivated to lie or tell the truth based on the desire to reduce negative consequences to self, children are less likely to lie in actual forensic cases than in researchers’ experimental procedures. This 354 V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 assumes, however, that the benefit of the lie (e.g., acquittal) does not outweigh the risk of getting caught in the lie. In addition, young children’s weak lie maintenance abilities make it unlikely, though not impossible, that they would successfully deceive interviewers during elaborate investigative inter- viewing. Finally, promises to tell the truth influence children’s honesty, suggesting that in actual cases, children who swear an oath or promise to tell the truth are less likely to testify dishonestly in court, compared to children participating in research. Additionally, literature on children’s moral understanding and evaluation of lie-telling demon- strates clearly that children begin to understand the (im)morality of lying by age 2–3 years. Although children may initially over-generalize the concept of a lie, and seem to understand truths earlier than lies, they do recognize self-serving and hurtful lies as lies and perceive most lie-telling as a negative behavior. However, their conceptual and moral understanding of lies and truths does not seem to be diagnostic of honest behavior. As a result, questioning children about the difference between truths and lies is not likely to be diagnostic of their ability or willingness to provide a truthful and/or accurate account in court. These findings suggest that competency evaluations that rely on children’s truth-lie knowledge or definitions are of little utility in ensuring that children offer truthful testimony or in helping the courts determine if a child is capable of testifying truthfully and accurately. At best, these assessments are ineffectual, as they are not diagnostic of children’s honesty. At worst, they could contribute to a mis- carriage of justice, if an otherwise competent child is barred from testifying. Moreover, they are often not developmentally appropriate. Asking about the intent of hypothetical honest or deceptive speak- ers, for example, might unnecessarily confound a young, but honest child witness. In addition, they may encourage children to lie in an effort to seem credible (e.g., ‘‘I have never lied’’), undermining a potentially competent child’s credibility. In these ways, they are likely to underestimate young children’s competency. The findings also highlight the important distinction between children’s understanding of lie-tell- ing and their motivations for lie-telling. As with adults, understanding what lies are and that they are ‘‘wrong’’ does not eradicate them. Children’s decisions about whether or not to lie are often motivated by their perceived self-interest, which in some instances appears to run counter to their objectively- defined self-interest. Interviewing child witnesses in ways that acknowledge and address their moti- vations for truth- or lie-telling might be more effective at eliciting honesty. In addition, assessing their moral evaluations of truth- and lie-telling might be more diagnostic of their honest behavior. Thus, another implication for the legal system is that novel procedures are needed to enhance and encourage children’s motivations for truth-telling. Investigators must attempt to evaluate the motiva- tions that might be driving children’s behaviors, including those that appear self-destructive. Reassur- ing children that their self-interests are served by truth-telling and reducing negative consequences for honesty would be beneficial as well. Finally, eliciting children’s promises that they will tell the truth (or use of other truth induction techniques) may help to heighten the salience of honesty and shift children’s motivations toward truth-telling. While truth induction techniques seem to create interviewing conditions that elicit children’s hon- est reports, and require very little in the way of intervention (e.g., asking children to promise to tell the truth), some children and adolescents might still be motivated to lie in forensic contexts. However, research convincingly demonstrates that most laypersons (e.g., jurors) have difficulty distinguishing fact from fiction in children’s reports. Adults are poor at lie detection generally. Some of this difficulty is due to the lack of consistent nonverbal cues to deception for adults to use. They are left with intu- itive theories about how lie-tellers behave, which could be misleading, non-diagnostic and unfairly undermine children’s credibility. Fortunately, interviewing techniques that seem to increase cues to deception can be deployed with relative ease. Indeed, emerging studies on the use of cognitive load may be of great value to legal and forensic professionals who wish to assess the veracity of children’s reports. As young children’s lie- telling abilities are developing, their lies may be more readily revealed, mainly through verbal chan- nels. Yet, children’s skills improve with age and the usefulness of such interview techniques may thus increase for older children and adolescents. However, caution is warranted, as children’s cognitive immaturity and those with cognitive delays might be vulnerable to greater inaccuracy if faced with V. Talwar, A.M. Crossman / Developmental Review 32 (2012) 337–359 355 heightened cognitive load. Nevertheless, legal professionals may eventually be able to apply such techniques effectively to enhance the distinction between children’s truths and lies. Hence, the final implication of these findings is that deception detection tactics must be further developed and employed. Lie detection skill is unequivocally poor, even for children’s lies. But a few techniques seem promising. Younger children have greater difficulty with verbal deception and semantic leakage control, hence requesting elaboration may be sufficient to undo a false preschooler. However, for older children and adolescents, whose lie-telling skills are better developed, modestly increasing the cognitive load might be more effective. Whether through use of unanticipated ques- tions or reverse story order, even recall of nonsense syllables, careful use of the procedure could potentially help to discriminate false from honest child witnesses. The goal for future researchers will be to continue identifying the developmental progression of children’s lie-telling abilities and testing techniques and procedures for helping to ensure child wit- ness testimony will be complete, accurate and honest, as well ensuring reliable discrimination be- tween children’s lies and truths. Additional approaches that could prove fruitful include exploring the likelihood, role and impact of deception in early relationships, particularly for delinquent youth (Baker, Tabacoff, Tornusciolo, & Eisenstadt, 2003; Stouthamer-Loeber & Loeber, 1986; Warr, 2007) and seeking to identify brain-level correlates of deception, even among children (Kozel et al., 2005; Kruesi & Casanova, 2006). In this way, we can hope to better protect children and adults from the im- pact of lies in the legal system.
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