The Options Clearing Corporation Disclosure Framework for Financial Market Infrastructures

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Options Clearing Corporation Disclosure Framework for Financial Market Infrastructures THE OPTIONS CLEARING CORPORATION DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES © 2021 The Options Clearing Corporation Page 1 of 123 Responding Institution: The Options Clearing Corporation Jurisdiction in which the FMI Operates: United States Authority regulating, supervising or U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission overseeing the FMI: U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve The date of this disclosure is June 10, 2021. This disclosure can also be found at: https://www.theocc.com/Risk-Management/PFMI- Disclosures. For further information, please contact [email protected]. © 2021 The Options Clearing Corporation Page 2 of 123 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................4 II. Summary of Major Change Since Last Update .............................................................................4 III. General Background on OCC .......................................................................................................4 IV. Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations ...........................................................................................7 V. Principle-By-Principle Narrative Disclosure ..................................................................................9 Principle 1: Legal Basis; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(1) .......................................................................10 Principle 2: Goverance; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) ........................................................................15 Principle 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risk; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3) ...........................................................................................30 Principle 4: Credit Risk; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4) .......................................................................33 Principle 5: Collateral; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(5) ..........................................................................44 Principle 6: Margin; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6) ..............................................................................52 Principle 7: Liquidity Risk; SEC Rule 17-Ad-22(e)(7) ................................................................... 61 Principle 8: Settlement Finality; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(8) ............................................................69 Principle 9: Money Settlements; SEC Rule 17 Ad-22(e)(9) ..........................................................71 Principle 10: Physical Deliveries; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(10) .........................................................75 Principle 11: Central Securities Depositories; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(11) ....................................... 77 Principle 12: Exchange-of-Value Settlement Systems; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(12) ......................... 78 Principle 13: Participant Default Rules and Procedures; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(13) ...................... 80 Principle 14: Segregation and Portability; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(14) ............................................. 84 Principle 15: General Business Risk; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(15) ................................................... 88 Principle 16: Custody and Investment Risks; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(16) ....................................... 92 Principle 17: Operational Risk; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(17) .............................................................95 Principle 18: Access and Participation Requirements; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(18) ....................... 101 Principle 19: Tiered Participation Arangements; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(19) ................................. 105 Principle 20: FMI Links; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) ....................................................................... 108 Principle 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(21) ......................................... 113 Principle 22: Communication Procedures and Standards; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(22) .................. 117 Principle 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures and Market Data; SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23) ....................................................................................... 119 Principle 24: Disclosure of Market Data by Trade Repositories ................................................... 122 VI. List of Publicly Available Resources .........................................................................................123 © 2021 The Options Clearing Corporation Page 3 of 123 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The following disclosure constitutes the response of The Options Clearing Corporation, a Delaware corporation, to the Disclosure Framework for Financial Market Infrastructures developed by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and the Technical Committee of the International Settlements and the International Organization of Securities Commissions. This Disclosure Framework is updated following any material changes to OCC’s systems or environment or, at a minimum, every two years. This Disclosure Framework provides relevant information regarding the methods that OCC uses to manage the risks it faces as a central counterparty. In addition, this document facilitates OCC’s compliance with SEC 1 Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23). II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR CHANGES SINCE LAST UPDATE The primary changes to this disclosure since the last publication in March 2021 are: • Revising the discussion of the allocation of losses in Principle 4, Key Consideration 7 and Principle 13, Key Consideration 1 to reflect amendments to OCC’s Rules and Capital Management Policy that (i) established a persistent minimum level of OCC’s own resources that OCC shall contribute in the event of a member default to cover losses or liquidity shortfalls; and (ii) permit OCC to apply liquid net assets greater than 110% of target capital (“Early Warning”) to losses caused by the failure of a bank or other clearing organization. • Revising Principle 15, Key Consideration 5 to carry through use of the defined term “Early Warning.” III. GENERAL BACKGROUND ON OCC General Description of OCC OCC, founded in 1973, is the world’s largest equity derivatives clearing organization. OCC’s mission is to provide market participants with innovative risk management solutions and provide high quality and efficient clearing and settlement services for options, futures, and other financial transactions. OCC also values the important role it plays in educating investors and the public about the prudent use of options and futures markets. As a systemically important institution, OCC recognizes its critical role in promoting financial stability and integrity in every market it serves. OCC issues and clears U.S.-listed options and futures on a number of underlying financial assets including common stocks, currencies, and stock indices. OCC’s clearing membership consists of approximately 105 of the largest U.S. broker-dealers, U.S. FCMs, and Canadian securities firms representing both professional traders and public customers. OCC performs a guarantee function, which ensures the financial integrity of the markets in which it clears contracts. In its role as guarantor and central counterparty, OCC ensures that the obligations of the contracts it clears are fulfilled. Through a novation process, OCC becomes the buyer for every seller and the seller for every buyer, thus protecting clearing members from counterparty risk and allowing the settlement of trades 1 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(23). © 2021 The Options Clearing Corporation Page 4 of 123 in the event a clearing member fails to meet its obligations. OCC does not assume any guarantor role unless it has a precisely equal and offsetting claim against a clearing member. OCC’s obligations under the guarantee arise in the event a clearing member is unable to meet its obligations to OCC. Margin deposits and Clearing Fund deposits are required to collateralize clearing members’ obligations and thus support OCC’s guarantee. The Markets OCC Serves OCC is the sole clearing organization for all securities options exchanges in the United States. Additionally, OCC clears transactions in commodity futures products and security futures traded on several additional markets and acts as a central counterparty for stock loan transactions. A current list of the exchanges, trading markets and trade sources for which OCC provides 2 clearing services is found OCC’s website. Data on Services and Operations For the most recent data on OCC’s volume by product type, exposures to participants, operational reliability, and other key data please refer to the PFMI Quantitative Disclosure, found at the following link: https://www.theocc.com/Risk-Management/PFMI-Disclosures. Legal and Regulatory Framework OCC is owned equally by five of the options exchanges for which it provides clearing services.3 This ownership, along with a diverse clearing member, participant exchange, Public Director, and management presence on OCC’s Board, ensures a continuing commitment to servicing the needs of OCC’s participant exchanges, clearing members, and their customers. OCC’s Board sets clearing fees based upon the current funding needs of OCC. OCC’s Rules set forth its governance structure. The oversight of OCC’s business and affairs is vested in its Board. The Board’s composition is intended to provide accountability to all relevant stakeholders. The Board maintains six Committees – the Audit Committee, the Compensation and Performance Committee, the Governance and Nominating Committee, the Regulatory Committee, the Risk Committee, and the Technology Committee,
Recommended publications
  • New Monetarist Economics: Methods∗
    Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 442 April 2010 New Monetarist Economics: Methods∗ Stephen Williamson Washington University in St. Louis and Federal Reserve Banks of Richmond and St. Louis Randall Wright University of Wisconsin — Madison and Federal Reserve Banks of Minneapolis and Philadelphia ABSTRACT This essay articulates the principles and practices of New Monetarism, our label for a recent body of work on money, banking, payments, and asset markets. We first discuss methodological issues distinguishing our approach from others: New Monetarism has something in common with Old Monetarism, but there are also important differences; it has little in common with Keynesianism. We describe the principles of these schools and contrast them with our approach. To show how it works, in practice, we build a benchmark New Monetarist model, and use it to study several issues, including the cost of inflation, liquidity and asset trading. We also develop a new model of banking. ∗We thank many friends and colleagues for useful discussions and comments, including Neil Wallace, Fernando Alvarez, Robert Lucas, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Lucy Liu. We thank the NSF for financial support. Wright also thanks for support the Ray Zemon Chair in Liquid Assets at the Wisconsin Business School. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Banks of Richmond, St. Louis, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis, or the Federal Reserve System. 1Introduction The purpose of this essay is to articulate the principles and practices of a school of thought we call New Monetarist Economics. It is a companion piece to Williamson and Wright (2010), which provides more of a survey of the models used in this literature, and focuses on technical issues to the neglect of methodology or history of thought.
    [Show full text]
  • TORC3: Token-Ring Clearing Heuristic for Currency Circulation
    TORC3: Token-Ring Clearing Heuristic for Currency Circulation Carlos Humes Jr.∗, Marcelo S. Lauretto†, Fábio Nakano†, Carlos A.B. Pereira∗, Guilherme F.G. Rafare∗∗ and Julio M. Stern∗,‡ ∗Institute of Mathematics and Statistics of the University of São Paulo, Brazil †School of Arts, Sciences and Humanities of the University of São Paulo, Brazil ∗∗FinanTech Ltda. ‡[email protected] Abstract. Clearing algorithms are at the core of modern payment systems, facilitating the settling of multilateral credit messages with (near) minimum transfers of currency. Traditional clearing procedures use batch processing based on MILP - mixed-integer linear programming algorithms. The MILP approach demands intensive computational resources; moreover, it is also vulnerable to operational risks generated by possible defaults during the inter-batch period. This paper presents TORC3 - the Token-Ring Clearing Algorithm for Currency Circulation. In contrast to the MILP approach, TORC3 is a real time heuristic procedure, demanding modest computational resources, and able to completely shield the clearing operation against the participating agents’ risk of default. Keywords: Bayesian calibration; Clearing algorithms; Heuristic optimization; Multilateral netting; Operational risk; Payment systems; Real-time heuristic procedures. 1. INTRODUCTION Clearing algorithms are at the core of modern payment systems, facilitating multilat- eral netting, that is, the settling of multilateral credit messages with (near) minimum transfers of currency. Traditional clearing procedures use batch processing based on mixed-integer linear programming algorithms. Large scale mixed-integer programming demands intensive computational resources; most of the traditional clearing algorithms require large mainframe computers. Furthermore, this approach delays all payments to after the batch processing (usually overnight). Moreover, batch processing introduces an operational risk originated from the possibility of a participant’s default in the iter-batch processing period.
    [Show full text]
  • International Barter
    WORKING PAPER ALFRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL BARTER Adrian E. Tschoegl Sloan School of Management M.I.T. Working Paper #996-78 May 1978 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139 INTERNATIONAL BARTER* Adrian E. Tschoegl Sloan School of Management M.I.T. Working Paper #996-78 May 1978 *I would like to thank Edward M, Graham, Donald R, Lessard, N.G. Tschoegl, and N.W. Tschoegl for their comments, criticism, and assistance. -1- I. Introduction Barter is the oldest form of trade. The payment for goods with goods predates the invention of money and is still with us today. This paper has two purposes: first, to expose the student of international business to this form of trade between nations; and second, to contradict the sentiments ex- pressed in this quotation: "It is difficult for Americans, so committed to free trade, to understand the logic behind trade without money. Per- haps there is no 'logic,' at least in terms of traditional Western economic theory. Maybe the-re are only reasons that few Americans can understand and even fewer can accept. "' In this section we summarily review the nature of 'trade without money' and its recent history. Section II examines the various modes of barter in some detail, focusing on the common provisions and pitfalls of such transactions. Section III discusses two proximate causes for barter, price distortions and the need for liquidity, and two benefits, improvement in the terms of trade and the creation of long-term contracts and trading relationships. Section IV concerns itself with the political-economy of barter, that is, the reasons behind the proximate causes.
    [Show full text]
  • Ben S Bernanke: Clearinghouses, Financial Stability, and Financial Reform
    Ben S Bernanke: Clearinghouses, financial stability, and financial reform Speech by Mr Ben S Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at the 2011 Financial Markets Conference, Stone Mountain, Georgia, 4 April 2011. The original speech, which contains various links to the documents mentioned, can be found on the US Federal Reserve System’s website. * * * I am pleased to speak once again at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s Financial Markets Conference. This year’s conference covers an interesting mix of topics bearing on the vital ongoing global debate on how best to prevent and respond to financial crises. Tonight I would like to discuss post-crisis reform as it relates to a prominent part of our financial market infrastructure – namely, clearinghouses for payments, securities, and derivatives transactions. This audience, I know, recognizes the importance of what is often called the “plumbing” of the financial system – a set of institutions that very safely and efficiently handles, under most circumstances, enormous volumes of financial transactions each day. Because clearinghouses and other parts of the financial infrastructure fared relatively well during the crisis – despite moments of significant stress – the public debate on financial reform has understandably focused on the risks posed by so-called too-big-to-fail financial firms, whose dramatic failures or near failures put our financial system and economy in dire jeopardy. Nevertheless, the smooth operation and financial soundness of clearinghouses and related institutions are essential for financial stability, and we must not take them for granted. Importantly, title 8 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) contains provisions aimed at improving the transparency, resilience, and financial strength of clearinghouses, which the act calls financial market utilities.
    [Show full text]
  • Nber Working Paper Series David Laidler On
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES DAVID LAIDLER ON MONETARISM Michael Bordo Anna J. Schwartz Working Paper 12593 http://www.nber.org/papers/w12593 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 October 2006 This paper has been prepared for the Festschrift in Honor of David Laidler, University of Western Ontario, August 18-20, 2006. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. © 2006 by Michael Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. David Laidler on Monetarism Michael Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz NBER Working Paper No. 12593 October 2006 JEL No. E00,E50 ABSTRACT David Laidler has been a major player in the development of the monetarist tradition. As the monetarist approach lost influence on policy makers he kept defending the importance of many of its principles. In this paper we survey and assess the impact on monetary economics of Laidler's work on the demand for money and the quantity theory of money; the transmission mechanism on the link between money and nominal income; the Phillips Curve; the monetary approach to the balance of payments; and monetary policy. Michael Bordo Faculty of Economics Cambridge University Austin Robinson Building Siegwick Avenue Cambridge ENGLAND CD3, 9DD and NBER [email protected] Anna J. Schwartz NBER 365 Fifth Ave, 5th Floor New York, NY 10016-4309 and NBER [email protected] 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Exchange Clearing of Financial Transmission Rights (Eftrs)
    APRIL 22, 2021 Exchange Clearing of Financial Transmission Rights (EFTRs) NEPOOL Budget & Finance Subcommittee Meeting Cheryl Arnold DIRECTOR, FINANCE & ACCOUNTING ISO NEW ENGLAND Sylvie Jobes SENIOR MANAGER, RISK & STRATEGIC ANALYSIS NODAL EXCHANGE, LLC ISO-NE PUBLIC Contents of Presentation Page(s) • Project Objectives 3 • Introduction: Current Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) Mechanisms 4-7 • Overview of Design Concept 8-9 • Proposed Design 10-33 – Participating Entities – Background on Clearing House Model – Sequence for Exchanging FTR Awards to Futures Contracts – Billing, Collections and Settlement Process – Benefits of Proposed Design/Risk Management • Legal and Regulatory Considerations 34 • Tentative Project Schedule 35-36 ISO-NE PUBLIC 2 Project Objectives • Replace ISO-NE Financial Assurance requirements for holding Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) with clearing of equivalent futures contracts by a CFTC jurisdictional exchange / clearing house – A clearing house is better positioned to handle valuation (margin) on an ongoing basis – Default risk is shifted from ISO-NE’s market participants to clearing house • Facilitate secondary market trading ISO-NE PUBLIC 3 Introduction: Current FTR Mechanisms (1) • An FTR is a financial instrument − acquired in an ISO-NE auction − that entitles the holder to receive compensation for congestion costs. It can be used to hedge the Day-Ahead LMP congestion component difference on a specific path between receipt and delivery points in the New England energy market. • Revenues from the
    [Show full text]
  • Clearing and Settlement
    Clearing and Settlement OmniPay is First Data’s™ cost effective, industry-leading payment processing platform. Flexible data capture, batch handling and posting options At-a-Glance First Data’s goal is to provide the data that you need, when you need The OmniPay platform enables efficient and cost effective it. The OmniPay platform receives, consolidates, formats and posts Clearing and Settlement services transaction data at a designated frequency and according to a client’s and outstanding responsiveness required processing calendar. And because it’s designed for domestic to acquiring customers and their and international schemes, processing can occur in alignment with banks’ customer’s needs. different time zones, different bank holidays, and varying volumes across varying countries, etc. Even sub-groups of activity within an institution can each be processed distinctly. Clearing and Settlement Extensive business, transaction and Settlement product support Settlement data is instantly visible through First Data’s The OmniPay platform supports acquiring for a broad Remote Access Module (RAM). One click lets you locate range of merchant segments: scheme reports or utilise a suite of production reconciliation reporting tools. • The volume of contract deliverables puts a strain on resources to keep up with timely review and approval The OmniPay platform predicts when settlement will occur—even before the transactions are cleared—by assessing • Retail the characteristics of individual transactions to determine the • eCommerce service under which they will be settled. : • Aggregator merchants Interchange management • Airline acquiring Interchange fees are estimated before settlement occurs, • Car hire ensuring clients can bill at least what they will pay in interchange.
    [Show full text]
  • Required Clearing Balances by E.J
    Required Clearing Balances by E.J. Stevens E.J. Stevens is an assistant vice president and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve- land. The author thanks Cheryl L. Edwards for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and Ann Dombrosky for invaluable re- search assistance. Introduction Bank to comply with the combined require- ments. For each of these institutions, the conse- Few people realize that in addition to complying quences of modest account deficiencies or with a Federal Reserve System regulation for surpluses are reckoned on the basis of re- holding a required reserve balance, many banks quired clearing balance rules. Only if a bank simultaneously meet an additional requirement fails to meet any of its clearing balance require- to hold a clearing balance in their account at a ment does it face the familiar "discount rate Federal Reserve Bank. This clearing balance re- plus 2 percent" penalty for a required reserve quirement differs from the familiar reserve re- deficiency. Likewise, such a bank wastes sur- quirement in three significant ways. First, a bank's plus balances by earning no rate of return only agreement to meet the requirement is typically a if its actual balance exceeds its required bal- business decision, not a legal necessity. Second, ance by more than a preestablished margin. the amount of the requirement is mostly discre- Almost all analyses of bank reserve manage- tionary, not a fixed percentage of the bank's de- ment behavior focus entirely on reserve require- posit liabilities. And third, the rate of return on a ments, ignoring clearing balances because they clearing balance is about equal to the federal are a relatively recent innovation.2 Clearly, how- funds rate, not zero, although a bank can use the ever, an important set of banks now maintains earnings only to pay for services it buys from a balances at the Fed following a somewhat differ- Federal Reserve Bank.
    [Show full text]
  • By:Bill Medley
    By: Bill Medley Highways of Commerce Central Banking and The U.S. Payments System By: Bill Medley Highways of Commerce Central Banking and The U.S. Payments System Published by the Public Affairs Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 1 Memorial Drive • Kansas City, MO 64198 Diane M. Raley, publisher Lowell C. Jones, executive editor Bill Medley, author Casey McKinley, designer Cindy Edwards, archivist All rights reserved, Copyright © 2014 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior consent of the publisher. First Edition, July 2014 The Highways of Commerce • III �ontents Foreword VII Chapter One A Calculus of Chaos: Commerce in Early America 1 Chapter Two “Order out of Confusion:” The Suffolk Bank 7 Chapter Three “A New Era:” The Clearinghouse 19 Chapter Four “A Famine of Currency:” The Panic of 1907 27 Chapter Five “The Highways of Commerce:” The Road to a Central Bank 35 Chapter Six “A problem…of great novelty:” Building a New Clearing System 45 Chapter Seven Bank Robbers and Bolsheviks: The Par Clearance Controversy 55 Chapter Eight “A Plump Automatic Bookkeeper:” The Rise of Banking Automation 71 Chapter Nine Control and Competition: The Monetary Control Act 83 Chapter Ten The Fed’s Air Force: A Plan for the Future 95 Chapter Eleven Disruption and Evolution: The Development of Check 21 105 Chapter Twelve Banks vs. Merchants: The Durbin Amendment 113 Afterword The Path Ahead 125 Endnotes 128 Sources and Selected Bibliography 146 Photo Credits 154 Index 160 Contents • V ForewordAs Congress undertook the task of designing a central bank for the United States in 1913, it was clear that lawmakers intended for the new institution to play a key role in improving the performance of the nation’s payments system.
    [Show full text]
  • CLEARING and SETTLING MONEY MARKET INSTRUMENTS David L
    Page 173 The information in this chapter was last updated in 1993. Since the money market evolves very rapidly, recent developments may have superseded some of the content of this chapter. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Richmond, Virginia 1998 Chapter 13 BEHIND THE MONEY MARKET: CLEARING AND SETTLING MONEY MARKET INSTRUMENTS David L. Mengle Whenever a money market instrument is traded, some means must exist for transferring the instrument and for making payment. In other words, there is a necessity for clearing and settling the trade, tasks that are usually referred to as operational, or back-office, functions. Clearing refers to processing a trade and establishing what the parties to the trade owe each other. Settlement refers to the transfer of value between the parties so the trade is completed (Group of Thirty 1989, p. 35). The first step in the clearing and settlement process involves conveying the details of the trade from traders to the back office. Second, the details must be compared and matched between the buyer and seller to ensure that both buyer and seller agree on what is to be traded and on what terms. Failure to do so might lead to delivery problems. This chapter will focus on what happens next: determination of the obligations between the parties and settlement of the trade. Clearing and settlement systems link the participants in the money market. This chapter uses examples to describe how clearing and settlement take place for various types of money market instruments.1 In addition, it discusses risks inherent in clearing and settlement, and the steps being considered to reduce such risks.
    [Show full text]
  • Modernisation of Cheque Clearing
    Modernisation of cheque clearing The Bank of Mauritius in collaboration with the Mauritius Bankers Association introduced a modern system for clearing cheques in September 2011. From this date, banks send only the digital image of cheques to the Bank of Mauritius for clearing. This process, called ‘Truncation’, is the most secure and fastest mode of cheques clearing and is already in use in several countries amongst which Singapore, Hong Kong and India. What are the benefits of the system? Cheque truncation will bring speed, efficiency and security to the whole chain of processes related to payment by cheques. The system will: • speed up the process of collection of cheques and reduce the time required for payment, • reduce the delay in processing and associated cost of transit; and • identify high value cheques which will undergo a fast track clearing (High value cheques are those with value above Rs 1 million). What changes for me as a cheque user or cheque receiver? The new system impacts mainly the processes of banks and the clearing house. For cheque users, the new system will imply: • no change if the cheque is in order and it is honoured. • that if the cheque is dishonoured, an authenticated copy of the image of the cheque is returned instead of the original cheque. Depending on the reason for return, the image can be used for re-presentment. How does the system work? • Cheques will be deposited at the collecting bank in the same manner as it is currently done. • Cheques are scanned by collecting bank and the images are sent, as in the current process, to the Clearing House at the Bank of Mauritius where exchange of cheque images is carried out.
    [Show full text]
  • Toward a More Universal Currency: the Impact of the Clearing Mechanism on Developing Economies
    State University of New York College at Buffalo - Buffalo State College Digital Commons at Buffalo State Applied Economics Theses Economics and Finance 5-2019 Toward a More Universal Currency: The mpI act of the Clearing Mechanism on Developing Economies Evan Ross Kaderbeck State University of New York College at Buffalo - Buffalo State College, [email protected] Advisor Dr. Ted Schmidt First Reader Dr. Ted Schmidt Second Reader Dr. Frederick Floss Third Reader Dr. Joelle LeClaire Department Chair Dr. Frederick Floss To learn more about the Economics and Finance Department and its educational programs, research, and resources, go to https://economics.buffalostate.edu/. Recommended Citation Kaderbeck, Evan Ross, "Toward a More Universal Currency: The mpI act of the Clearing Mechanism on Developing Economies" (2019). Applied Economics Theses. 40. https://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/economics_theses/40 Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/economics_theses Part of the Finance Commons, and the International Economics Commons Toward a More Universal Currency: The Impact of the Clearing Mechanism on Developing Economies by Evan Kaderbeck An Abstract of a Thesis in Applied Economics Submitted in Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts May 2019 Buffalo State College State University of New York Department of Economics and Finance ii ABSTRACT OF THESIS Toward a More Universal Currency: The Impact of the Clearing Mechanism on Developing Economies As part of a broader plan to reform the system of international finance, experts have indicated the need to modify the system of international money. They point to problems such as the difficulties faced by developing countries in obtaining hard currency needed for imports, or the flows of hot money which make the financing of long-term development projects difficult.
    [Show full text]