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The Battle of Marathon
J. B. Bury
The Classical Review / Volume 10 / Issue 02 / March 1896, pp 95 - 98 DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X00203302, Published online: 27 October 2009
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009840X00203302
How to cite this article: J. B. Bury (1896). The Battle of Marathon. The Classical Review, 10, pp 95-98 doi:10.1017/ S0009840X00203302
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Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/CAR, IP address: 128.122.253.212 on 07 May 2015 THE CLASSICAL REVIEW. 95 acquainted with the sruaragdos, a term I have purposely left to the last the which included down to the time of Theo- eikosihedron of the Timaeus. No such phrastus (315 B.C.) all the three kinds of crystalline form is known in nature. It is the same beautiful crystal, the beryl, the strange that Plato should have taken a emerald, and aqua marine—is put beyond number which gives no relation to the octa- doubt by the fact that the renowned signet hedron. The Pythagoreans held the num- of Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos (560- ber 24 of great value. It was the product 522 B.C.), which he cast into the sea to avert of 1 x 2 x 3 x 4, just as the sum of these Nemesis, was a smaragdos engraved for first four digits was 10. If Plato had him by the famous sculptor and engraver, taken a 24-sided figure, it would have been Theodorus of Samos (Herod, iii. 41). The in relation to 4 and 8 (the pyramid and beryl was found in Cyprus, as we learn double pyramid), and it would ftave had a from Theophrastus {pp. cit. 26), who alludes prototype in nature. But for our purpose to the beautiful cylindrical hexagons in it is unnecessary to discuss what Plato which it is found as rods (pa./38oi). The meant. With him the mathematical side Greeks used these elegant natural crystals was completely detached from the natural as earrings. Such have been found in phenomenon, the observation of which had Cypriote graves. Long cylindrical beads probably led Pythagoras to conceive that of emeralds and beryls have been found the world existed by the imitation of in the archaic tombs of Rhodes. natural crystals. As Theophrastus certainly knew the Imitation was an excellent term to difference between crystalline and amor- employ. Every one conversant with crystal- phous substances, there can be no reasonable lography knows how frequently crystals are ground for doubting that the engravers of mis-shapen, the facets irregular. Pytha- archaic gems must have learned very early goras as a practical engraver could not help this difference. In fact it is absolutely observing this and feeling that they fre- certain that the observation of such a quently were not perfect mathematical difference must have been first made by solids, but attempted imitations of such, those whose profession it was to seek after more or less imperfect. crystals. WILLIAM RIDGEWAY.
THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.
THE second volume of the excellent in which the Persians are represented as English translation of Holm's History of acting like children. Any one'who reads Greece J contains some of the best work of critically the Herodotean account must see the historian. When we come into the clear that Herodotus had not the smallest idea field of historical fact, Holm's narrative and why the battle was fought, and had a very exposition are masterly. It is in the dimmer inadequate notion of how it was fought. He regions where we find anecdote, legend, and has collected a number of details, some true, history mixed that he is less satisfactory; others absurd ; which, as he relates them, and his first volume is the weakest of are without any inner connexion. the four. The weakness consists in a certain In his extremely interesting and im- credulous caution, if I may use the expres- portant historical studies on Herodotus sion, in dealing with such a source, for (vol. ii. of his recent edition of Books iv., example, as Herodotus. His excessive dis- v., vi.) Mr. Reginald Macan has devoted a trust of scepticism leads him into distrust hundred pages to an elaborate examination of criticism. This defect is illustrated in of the problems connected with Marathon. vol. ii. in the account of the Persian war. He has not only done good service by his The narrative of the campaign of Marathon minute criticism of all the extant evidence, given by Herodotus is simply reproduced but he has made a distinct contribution to by Holm, without any adequate recognition the reconstruction of the battle. of the difficulties besetting that narrative, The first important step was taken by 1 History of Greece, by Adolf Holm. TranslatedLeake who saw that the Athenian camp was from the German. Vol. ii. The Fifth Century B. o. near Vrana, at the mouth of the valley of London and New York : Macmillan. 1896. Price 6s. Avlona; and this discovery was reinforced 96 THE CLASSICAL REVIEW. by Lolling who determined the site of the this is not what Herodotus says. Holm Herakleion in that valley. Mr. Macan has characteristically repeats the insufficient now explained, convincingly as I think, the solution of Herodotus. ' Here, the country occasion of the battle, and shown how the being level, they were able to use their cavalry Athenians were lured out of a position of to the best advantage.' If the main object great strategic strength. The Persians of landing at Marathon was to use their 'decided to make a movement upon Athens, cavalry, no one, on the old view of the with fleet and with infantry at once, and to battle, gave any reasons, that will bear make it by the pass to the south, the main examination, for the circumstance that they road to Athens. By this route navy and made no use of it at all. Curtius suggested army would remain in touch, at least while that the cavalry must have been re-embarked, in presence of the enemy...."Whether the and found in this hypothesis an explanation Persians were convinced that the Greeks of the Athenian attack.1 But the hypo- would in terror allow them to go by un- thesis was incomplete until an adequate molested or whether they were in utrumque motive for the re-embarkation had been parati, prepared to do battle if the occasion assigned. Mr. Macan's theory supplies *, arose, may be a question. The greater the needed motive. The Persians disembark probability seems to incline to the view that their cavalry; after the arrival of the the Persians were fully prepared' (p. 241). Athenians, ' for several days the armies ' Nothing in the traditions concerning the remained in their respective positions,' the actual milee would justify us in assuming Persians during that time desiring and that the Persians were taken in flank or off attempting ' to draw the Athenians down guard' (p. 242). But this hypothesis is into the plain towards the shore' (p. 240). not quite complete, so far as the battle The Athenians would not be drawn, and ' the is concerned, and requires to be supple- Persians at last decided to make a movement mented, as has been pointed out by Mr. upon Athens.' For this purpose the cavalry Macan's reviewer in the Athenaeum, (Dec. was re-embarked (p. 242); on the march to 21, 1895). The elements of the art of war Athens it would have been a useless demanded that, when the Persian army encumbrance. marched southward with the right flank exposed to the Greeks at Vrana, the Greek But, while the problem of the cavalry is position should be masked by a strong vital in determining our theory of the battle, detachment drawn up facing the Vrana it does not matter so much to the considera- valley. This assumption, which is simply a tion of the question why the Persians logical consequence of Mr. Macan's dis- landed at the Marathonian plain. If there covery, explains the details of the battle. had been no cavalry, this plain would have seemed to possess equal advantages Mr. Macan's hypothesis, thus supple- for deploying large numbers of infantry mented, while it elucidates the immediate against a far less numerous foe. The circumstances of the fight, does not, and important point which emerges—on any does not claim to, carry with it a fully theory—is that the Persians wanted to fight, satisfactory view of the whole campaign. or to accomplish something which might But it is a step, of which the importance involve a fight, whether with or without must be fully recognized, towards the solu- cavalry, at Marathon. This leads us to the tion of the larger problem. The question, why the Persians landed on 1 ' What became of the cavalry afterwards ? Why do we hear nothing of their re-embarkation ? What the Marathonian plain, was considered by room is there in the story for that lengthy and elabo- Herodotus and answered thus (vi. 102): rate operation after the battle ? How were they got Kal rjv yap 6 Mapa0o)V liri-nfieoTaTov \u>piov ri}s off ? Curtius's suggestion lets in some light on this ' ATTIKJJS hrnrrrevcrcu Kal dy^oTaTO) rijs 'Eperpirjs. dark place. The cavalry was brought, as might be supposed, to Marathon, and there put on shore. The Both the statements are false. Marathon cavalry was re-embarked ; and its re-embarkation was is not the part of Attica nearest to Eretria, the reason for the Athenian attack. This suggestion and the Cephisian plain was much better for does not leave the cavalry to be accounted for after cavalry ' than the confined and marshy the battle, as do all the other suggestions previously noticed [Leake's, Blakeslsy's] ; it explains, as well as ground at Marathon, crossed by stream- the suggestions of Leake, of Blakesley, and of Raw- beds and commanded by hills and highland ' linson, the absence of all notice of the cavalry in the (Macan, note ad loc). "We might indeed, description of the battle ; and it explains better than by combining the two clauses, construct a any other hypothesis the determination of the moment of attack.' But it ' cannot in itself explain the as- true statement; namely, that the Mara- sumption of the offensive by the Athenians or the thonian plain was the nearest place to probable circumstances of the actual fight.' (Macan, Eretria that was suitable for cavalry ; but ii. pp. 163-4.) THE CLASSICAL REVIEW. 97 ultimate problem, what was the plan of to Athens, by the Stamata and Cephisia strategy in which the battle of Marathon road, by which they had come. In this way was a designed incident, and which was they might by a forced march either reach defeated by the unexpected result. Athens first, or make a dangerous attack on The first - thing to grasp is the obvious the Persians between Pentelikon and Hy- truth that the ' objective' of the Persians mettus. Against this danger it was needful was Athens. This fact must govern our to guard, and it could be obviously met by interpretation of the campaign. Herodotus sending round the south of Pentelikon a did not grasp it, though, in his characteristic small detachment to occupy a position near way, he implies it incidentally. ' The Stamata, sufficient to bar for hours, if not Persians,' he says, 'expected to do to the to hinder entirely, the passage of the Greeks. Athenians what they had done to the There was no difficulty in effecting this. Eretrians'; and after the defeat they sail, Troops for example could be landed by night in his pages, round Attica to make an at- in boats at some distance south of the little tempt on the city, as a sort of afterthought. marsh of Vrexisa, and reach their destina- tion under the guidance of local adherents That the Persians did not decide to sail 1 straight to Athens is explained by an easily of the Pisistratids. The road was not intelligible desire to avoid a wearisome siege likely to be guarded, for the Athenians of the Acropolis, which, as Hippias might could not spare troops. We may calculate inform them, would have been no light that the Persian soldiers (landing south of labour. Their decision to land at Marathon Mount Agrieliki) would have required about implies that they proposed to accomplish six hours to march, by Pikermi and Cephisia, something before an attack upon Athens. to the place beyond Stamata where the path The purpose clearly was to lure the Athenian to Vrana parts from the path to Marathon. forces to Marathon and keep them there, Posted there, on the slopes of Aphorismos, so that the city might be left unprotected. the northern spur of Pentelikon, they would If the Athenian army were either defeated await events; ready either to oppose the on the plain or cooped up in the hills, the passage of the Greek army, or, if a battle Persians could march upon Athens, by the were fought, and the Athenians were routed, route south of Pentelikon—by Pikermi and to intercept the fugitives. Charvati—and seize it without difficulty. In Herodotus, of course, there is not a The point was to detain the Athenians in syllable as to such a device on the part of the region of Marathon, either alive or dead. the Mede. But here, as in some other cases, The more desirable alternative for the we find that he has preserved, in a wrong Persians was that their opponents should be connexion and embedded in fable, a distinct induced to fight. Delay on the other hand vestige of the truth. I refer to the signal was obviously the game of the Athenians ; of the shield. thei» position was strong and they expected The episode of the shield cannot be set Spartan aid. Mr. Macan reasonably accounts aside, as Mr. Macan has rightly insisted. for the delay of some days which elapsed If there is anything in the whole story that between the arrival of the Athenians at the Herodotus is positive about, it is this ; and Herakleion and the battle by supposing his certainty about the fact is rendered all that the Persians were in vain endeavouring the more weighty by his uncertainty as to to bring on an action. The fact of the delay the explanation.2 Accordingly ' any attempt cannot be fairly questioned, although at a rational reconstruction of the story of Herodotus assigns an unacceptable reason Marathon must reckon with this episode' for it. But the Persians could not wait too (p. 165). Not the least valuable part of long ; it would have been clearly inexpedient Mr. Macan's appendix is his criticism of the to wait long enough for the arrival of Spartan shield incident. He acutely discerned that reinforcements. Accordingly the march on the words (vi. 115) eoScri T/8?7 iv rrjai vujvcri Athens—the ultimate object from the let out part of the secret. The Persians beginning—was resolved on. The Greeks were already in their ships before the signal might do one or other of two things, and was shown ; it was therefore a signal not to both possibilities had to be provided for. 1 They might attack the flank of the Persian Holm (p. 18) gives, like others, a second reason for the landing of the Persians at Marathon, the army as it marched past into the southern circumstance that it was ' the district in which the pass of the plain ; this was provided for, as Peisistratidae had long had their adherents.' we saw, by masking the recess of Vrana. 2 His words are (vi(vi. 124) avetiixfv /« /«" "yty y , Or they might hesitate to run such a Kal TOVTO OVK tan &\\as elireiv lyevero yip- bs /J.4VTOI risk, and might determine to march back fy i aeaSe'Jas OVK t%<>> vpoaunipw elirtiv roirav (viz. suspicions about the Alcmaeonidae). NO. LXXXV. VOL. X. 98 THE CLASSICAL REVIEW. embark, but to sail (p. 167); it was shown soldiers, warned by him, could return to the before the battle was fought. shore by the way they had come, and be But the question as to the meaning of the picked up by the ships of their friends.1 signal remains, in Mr. Macan's reconstruc- We may conjecture that this is what actually tion, still unsolved. Why did the moment happened. It is useless to speculate how for departure depend on a signal shown on far the Greeks at the time apprehended the the summit of a mountain ? The suggestion Persian strategy. One might naturally ex- that it was intended to notify to the pect that news of the movement in the rear Persians that the coast at Phaleron was clear would have been conveyed at once from is not plausible, nor any other suggestion Stamata to the Greek generals; and this implying vague dangers. The only explana- intelligence might, in the supreme moment, tion which can carry conviction is one which have decided them to risk battle. But in will fit the episode of the shield into the those days no official accounts were drawn strategy of the campaign, as a definite and up of military operations; nor was there a necessary part of it. contemporary historian like Thucydides to The inference, which I made above from ask searching questions and record the truth. the conditions of the problem, that the Some of the circumstances of the battle—if Persians must have taken measures to beset ever fully known—were soon forgotten, the Stamata road, involves the supposition with the result that the rest lost their right that the army in the plain could be by some significance. The flashing of the signal means apprized of the successful execution impressed itself on men's imaginations, and of this move in the game. A signal from as the memory of the actual facts of the the top of Mount Pentelikon was the obvious campaign grew dimmer, and the events device for conveying the news. Nothing shaped themselves into a story, the shield impressed me more when I visited the scene became the centre of a new mysterious in- of the battle than the sight of the summit cident, which lent itself to a malicious inter- of Pentelikon, which seemed designed by pretation by the political enemies of the the foresight of nature for the dvdSefis of Alcmaeonidae. Mr. Macan discovered the the shield. The signalman, posted there, key to the solution of the problem. could discern what befell in the plain, and J. B. BURY. signify to the troops of Aphorismos whether the enemy had decided to face the risks of a 1 I have added this conjecture (which occurred in- battle. And in the case, too improbable to dependently to Mr. Marindin), as showing that every eventuality could be provided for easily by the contemplate, of an Athenian victory, these Persian strategy.
AB.ISTOPHANICA.
Plutus. The two lines here bracketed are made 45—52: up of several adscripts, which we may KAP. Kara fuvavras 8^ra Trparru) Tovrtai approximately restore as follows :— fir' ov ^vviw; Ttjv imvoiav TOV Otov (1) xpivtis; yvmvax SOKCTS. Compare an d adscript still to be found among the scholia, dcrKctv TOV vlbv TOV iin^uipiov Tp&jrov; K p i v e i s : /cpivai 0eAeis. XP. T<3 TOVTO Kpiveis; KAP. SrJXov OTITJ KCU (2) 8 rj A, o v : A (i.e. AeiVei) cart. TV