The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict Contemporary Issues in the Middle East The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict BARRY RUBIN Syracuse University Press Copyright © 1981 by Barry Rubin First Published 1981 All Rights Reserved First Edition 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 6 5 4 3 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Rubin, Barry M. The Arab states and the Palestine conflict. (Contemporary issues in the Middle East) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Jewish-Arab relations —1917- .2. Arab coun tries—Politics and government. I. Title. II. Series. DS119.7.R75 327.5694017’4927 81-5829 ISBN 0-8156-2253-8 AACR2 ISBN 8-8156-0170-0 (pbk.) Manufactured in the United States of America “Interest of State is the main motive of Middle East Governments as of others, and here as elsewhere the idea of interest which determines policy is a blend of two elements: a certain concept of what is good for the State as a whole, and a concept of what is good for the rulers and the group which they immediately represent.” Albert Hourani, The Middle East and the Crisis of 1956 “All my friends ... Have but their stings and teeth newly ta’en out By whose fell working I was first advanced And by whose power I well might lodge a fear To be again displaced; which to avoid... Be it thy course to busy giddy minds With foreign quarrels....” William Shakespeare, King Henry IV, Part Two Contents Preface ………………………………………………………ix Introduction …………………………………………………xi 1. The Bitter Legacy of Defeat: 1948-81 ……………………… 1 2. Zionists, Hashemites, and Pan-Syrians 1897-1930 ……… 23 3. Entrance of the Arab Kings: 1931-36 …………………… 40 4. Domestic Politics and Palestine Iraq and Egypt ………… 53 5. The General Strike and the British Invitation: 1956 ……… 66 6. Opposition to Partition, Support for Revolt: 1937-38 …… 81 7. Partition Abandoned, Compromise Denied: 1938-39 …… 99 8. Fortunes and Misfortunes of War: 1939-42 ……………… 117 9. The Division over Unity:1943-45 ………………………… 133 10. The Failure of Arab Diplomacy: 1946-47 ………………… 148 11. The Perils of Partition: 1947-48 ………………………… 165 12. The Slippery Road to War: January—May 1948 ………… 185 13. Abdallah’s Perilous Peace-Making: 1948-51 …………… 205 14. Egypt’s Revolution, Israel, and America: 1950-56 ……… 216 Notes ……………………………………………………… 237 Bibliography ……………………………………………… 283 Index ……………………………………………………… 293 Author’s Note I have always liked to examine important subjects that most people thought were obvious and yet had never really been studied systematically. In this case, the topic of my 1981 book published by Syracuse University Press in hardcover and paperback (three printings), was how did the Arab states become involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict? What resulted is a detailed and highly documented study that reveals some surprising things. One key theme is the difference among the regimes--Egypt and Jordan being moderate; Syria and Iraq militant; Saudi Arabia bloodthirsty in rhetoric but doing relatively little. Another was that the conflict had been avoidable and that a number of Arab leaders had not wanted to go to war in 1948. The other key turning point was 1939, when the British were ready to sell out the Zionists if the Arabs only gave them some minor concessions. The Palestinian Arab leader, Amin al-Husaini, was central in refusing any deal because he--along with his radical allies--were certain that Nazi Germany would win the coming war and bring them complete victory. Also of special interest is the story, based on interviews and archives, of the early 1950s, showing how U.S. policymakers discovered only gradually that they could not conciliate the new Arab radical nationalists. A good story in its own right, the book provides many parallels to present-day issues. Barry Rubin, October 2012 Preface undreds of books and thousands of articles have been devoted to Hthe history and contemporary course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The confrontation within Palestine, the participation of Great Britain, the United States, and the United Nations, and the impact of these events on Jews and Palestinian Arabs have all been endlessly chroni cled. Surprisingly little attention, however, has been devoted to the question of how the Arab states entered the battle in the first place. In addition to tracing the events involved in the growing intervention by Arab states in Palestine, this book attempts to analyze two specific issues. How did internal conditions in the various Arab countries affect their involvement in Palestine? How did the network of alliances and conflict among the Arab governments shape their Palestine policies? How can one hope to understand the conflict without exploring this essential dimension? If Arab nations have spilled so much passion, spent many lives and so many billions of dollars over this issue—and remain willing to do so—the tale of how they arrived at this position must be a compelling and revealing one. This story should be expected to reveal important principles of international relations and of the connections between domestic politics and foreign policy. In this sense, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and Israel’s independence represent not only a beginning but also an end. These developments marked the failure of diplomacy and indirect intervention by the Arab states. They seemed to mark as inevitable an evolution of affairs which might often have taken alternative paths. The remnants of pre-1948 ideas and relationships continued to play an important role until 1956. By then, the collapse of the old order, the rise of a new type of Arab leader and of a new model of Arab politics gained the ascendancy. Yet the importance of the Palestine issue and the distinct roles and attitudes of the different Arab states had been largely set through their earlier experiences. One other point should be especially stressed here. Analysts and scholars often explain some aspect of an Arab government’s foreign policy by presenting it as an attempt to distract public attention from domestic problems. In this light Arab rulers are seen as the masters and manipulators of their political culture. On the contrary, given the power- ful and widely accepted premises of Islam and of Arabism, Arab leaders themselves are often seriously constrained. The failure to take certain actions, which may be dangerous and against their personal or national interests, will expose them to the campaigns of domestic and foreign rivals. The ruler may become the subject and even the victim of such necessities. This theme will constantly reappear in the study, and it is an important component in the inner logic of Arab politics. When the research for this book began I confided my plans to an Arab historian. The idea was, I explained, to write about the efforts of the Arab states over Palestine, particularly in the pre-1948 period. “Oh,” he replied with a cynical smile, “they really didn’t do very much.” I hope this book will convince him otherwise. Barry Rubin Introduction he origins of Arab state intervention in the Palestine conflict Thave received surprisingly little attention. Perhaps this happened since, given the variety of powerful factors at work, Arab governments’ actions were predictable and inevitable. Yet the course of Middle East history between 1918 and 1956 was not so simple. The pressures which led Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria to pledge lives, fortunes, and sacred honor for an Arab Palestine should not be lightly dismissed from special study and emphasis. In many ways they provide a key to understanding both contemporary and later events. Listing these motivations is not difficult. The problem lies in recon- structing the relations between these factors and in showing how some of them gained ascendancy at critical points. Arabs outside Palestine opposed Zionism on a religious and nationalist basis, but the expression of this anti-Zionism was largely shaped by the domestic politics and rivalries of these regimes. The sharply conflicting aims of Zionism and Arab nationalism dic- tated their clash. The former sought to make Palestine into a Jewish state; the latter wanted Palestine as an Arab state. Dozens of attempts to bridge that gap foundered on mistrust and over specific issues. For the Arabs, their own case was clear and compelling. Palestine and its popu- lation had been Arab for centuries in language and culture. By geog- raphy and history, Palestine had been an integral part of the Arab world. Religious arguments for Palestine’s Islamic character held great appeal among the Arab masses. Alongside this, Pan-Arab and Arab nationalist ideology won the allegiance of the political elite, gradually displacing the traditional concepts. Indeed, Islamic and nationalist sentiments often became impossible to separate. The battle against Western imperialism — the Anglo-French ar- rangement which dominated the Middle East after World War I —also became intertwined in the opposition to Zionism. Jewish nationalism became identified as an arm, example, or consequence of the humiliating experience of foreign domination, although this view could never be an unambiguous one. Most Arab leaders spent the years between 1918 and 1948 trying to win the British over to their side in the conflict. In retrospect, this strategy, which almost succeeded, was the most promis- ing route for Arab success. Nevertheless, the result of these influences was to make Palestine such an emotional and symbolic question as to prompt extraordinary risk and self-sacrifice. An understanding of the development of Arab politics up to 1948 shows the rationality of these decisions, though this made them no less damaging to those who made them. A useful analogy might be made to the East-West Cold War as manifested in American policy toward the Soviet Union. The battle against Zionism became a life-and-death struggle in Arab minds, a fight for self-preservation against a fearful enemy which must be opposed on every level.