Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan
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Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan Alexander Betts, Ali Ali, and Fulya Memişoğlu Amman, Jordan © UNHCR / Mohammad Hawari Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis Contents Executive Summary 2 Introduction 3 Theory: Explaining Sub-National Variation in Refugee Politics 5 Jordan 9 Lebanon 15 Turkey 19 Conclusion 28 Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the Human Security Division of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for funding the research on which this report is based. Cover photo: A street in Za’atari refugee camp, Jordan. Credit: L Bloom. 1 Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis Executive Summary ● In order to explain responses to Syrian refugees, it is important to understand politics within the major host countries. This involves looking beyond the capital cities to examine variation in responses at the local level. ● Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan followed a similar trajectory as the crisis evolved. Each began the crisis in 2011 with a history of relative openness to Syrians, then increased restrictions especially around October 2014 with the growing threat of ISIS, before agreeing major bilateral deals with the European Union in early 2016. ● These common trajectories, however, mask significant sub-national variation. To explore this we examine three local contexts in each of the main countries: Gaziantep, Adana, and Izmir in Turkey; Sahab, Zarqa, and Mafraq in Jordan; and predominantly Christian, Shia, and Sunni areas in Lebanon. ● In each country, some governorates and municipalities have adopted relatively more inclusive or restrictive policies towards Syrian refugees. The main sets of factors that appear to mediate this relate to identity and interests, but also to the personalities of individual heads of municipal authorities. ● In Lebanon, the Sunni municipalities we spoke with have been the most welcoming. Elsewhere, Hezbollah-run Shia areas have become the least welcoming, with Christian areas ranging across the spectrum. Confessionalism has mattered because of the predominantly Sunni identity of Syrian refugees – assumed rightly or wrongly to be supportive of the Syrian Revolution – by Hezbollah which is allied to the Assad regime. However, this has also been shaped by class dynamics and importantly, the personalities of particular mayors. ● In Jordan, at the governorate level Mafraq was relatively more open, followed by Sahab and Zarqa. The role of tribal affiliation and the historical relationship between the area and Syrians has been influential. But so too have perceptions of economic opportunity and for local elites seeking resources from the central government. ● In Turkey, Gaziantep municipality, followed by Adana, followed by Izmir have been the relatively most active in offering supplementary support to refugees. Party politics appears to have played a significant role, with different parties in municipal authority having different perspectives. Alongside this, business interests have also mattered, with local entrepreneurs and chambers of commerce especially important for inclusion in Gaziantep. The report argues that political analysis – across all levels of governance – matters for refugee protection. There is a need to enhance the capacity for political analysis within humanitarian organisations. 2 Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis Introduction Refugee protection is inherently political. While international law and values inevitably influence governments’ decisions about how to respond to refugees, so too do power and interests. Host and donor states’ commitment to assist, protect and provide solutions for refugees are all shaped by whether and to what extent they perceive refugees to be a burden or a benefit in relation to security and development outcomes, for example. Evidence for this can be found in almost every aspect of the functioning of the refugee system: from donors’ earmarking of humanitarian contributions to resettlement decisions to host states’ decisions about whether to provide socio- economic freedoms to refugees. Yet international humanitarian organisations have working between context-specific knowledge and more sometimes lacked the capacity to adequately universally applicable analytical tools. Done well, engage with this politics. UNHCR’s Statute of 1950 this may offer insights into what forms of external states that “the work of the High Commissioner influence can leverage better outcomes for refugees. is humanitarian and social and of an entirely non- political character”. This clause – created for the Most pressingly the politics that needs to be early Cold War context in order to ensure the Office understood is that of refugee-hosting states closest was perceived as ideologically non-aligned – has to major displacements. Nearly 90% of the world’s frequently been misinterpreted as proscribing analysis refugees remain in states adjacent to their country of and engagement with the politics that determines of origin. And the challenge is geographically outcomes for refugees. For example, in contrast to concentrated: just 10 countries host 60% of the legal or operational expertise, political science has world’s refugees – Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, never been seen as an important area of expertise Pakistan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Chad, and 1 or professional competence in the work of the the Democratic Republic of Congo. The key to organisation. The presumption is that it is ‘learned on leveraging better protection and solutions for refugees the job’ or ‘what country Representatives inherently is therefore to be able to influence political decision- do’. Yet, there is a key difference between being making in these countries: to respect non-refoulement, ‘politicised’ and being ‘politically engaged’. The to offer opportunities for socio-economic inclusion, former is about taking an ideological position whereas and perhaps, where appropriate, even to consider the latter is about having analytical capacity. long-term local integration. This is difficult given that these countries often face significant security To be politically engaged is to have analytical tools and development challenges related to hosting large and lenses through which to recognise and understand numbers of refugees. the behaviour of elite decision-makers. In relation to power: which actors matter for influencing and But the politics of these host states is diverse. They shaping particular outcomes? In relation to interests: vary by regime type: they may be democracies, what motivates or determines the tactical or strategic authoritarian, or competitive authoritarian regimes. choices they make? Being able to answer these They may have different relationships to the questions matters for policy-makers. If we know international community, of greater dependency, which key gatekeepers and veto players are shaping independence, or interdependence. Particular identity agenda-setting, negotiation, and implementation structures may underpin authority in particular ways: of policy choices, we in turn have the means to ethnicity, religion, or kinship, for example. They may influence outcomes. Methodologically, answering occupy different positions in the global economy: these questions relies upon in-depth process-tracing whether primarily agricultural, manufacturing, to establish which outcomes have been shaped by or extractive economies, and this may in turn be particular structures and actors, and identifying related to the presence of patrimonial or rent- counterfactually how outcomes would have been seeking behaviour by elites. They may have different different in the absence of those variables. It requires approaches to migration: nationalist, developmental, 1 UNHCR (2017), Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2016 (Geneva: UNHCR). 3 Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis or neo-liberal, for example, shaping the conditions We focus on understanding the politics behind the under which the presence of non-citizens is regarded response of those three main host countries. Based on as threat or opportunity. fieldwork and elite interviews in all three countries we examine: 1) the trajectory of each country’s response Refugee politics, however, is not deterministically to the Syrian influx between 2011 and 2016; and 2) shaped by these macro-level variables. Nor is it the variation in response at the sub-national level exclusively the outcome of what happens in capital within each country. In addition to data collection at cities. Looking at politics in Nairobi, Ankara, or the capital city level, we focus on three different sites Bangkok will only tell you so much about the politics in each host country. In Turkey, we focus on Izmir, of host states. Although increasingly urban, refugee- Gaziantep, and Adana. In Jordan, we focus on Mafraq, hosting often takes place in geographically remote Sahab, and Zarqa. In Lebanon, we focus on areas with areas, close to international borders. Consequently, it predominantly Christian, Sunni, and Shia populations frequently implicates a range of sub-national actors with different historical relationships with Syria and and structures. Refugee politics is ‘local’ politics; Syrian migrants. regional, district, and municipal authorities are often key gatekeepers. Whether they perceive refugees as While we find commonalities in the trajectories of the opportunity or threat shapes not only local policies three countries’ national policies, we find variation but also the creation