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2020-08-31 Śaṅkara on Kramamukti

Peat, Campbell S.

Peat, C. S. (2020). Śaṅkara on Kramamukti (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/112482 doctoral thesis

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Śaṅkara on Kramamukti

by

Campbell S. Peat

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

AUGUST, 2020

© Campbell S. Peat 2020

Abstract

The Hindu theologian Śaṅkara reads scripture to say that people attain liberation when they comprehend brahman (God). Some authors claim that Śaṅkara has an extremely narrow view of who can attain liberation. These scholars argue that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins (renunciates from the priestly class) are the only individuals who might attain liberation within Śaṅkara’s system of thought. Others argue for a more inclusive conception of Śaṅkara’s soteriology, according to which members of other groups might attain liberation as well. All of these scholars, however, tend to focus on sadyomukti (immediate liberation). In this dissertation, I consider Śaṅkara’s account of a second path to liberation – kramamukti (gradual liberation). I argue that Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti makes his soteriology much more inclusive than most scholars tend to acknowledge. Kramamukti is a path to liberation by which devotees attain liberation after they die, while residing in a heaven called brahmaloka (the heaven of brahman).

In order to attain brahmaloka, according to Śaṅkara, devotees must meditate on rituals, metaphysical doctrines, syllables, or deities. Śaṅkara’s view is that eligibility for kramamukti is a function of a person’s eligibility for brahmaloka. Since Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas (members of the ruler class), vaiśyas (members of the merchant class), śūdras

(members of the servant class), brahmacārins (students), gṛhasthins (householders), vānaprasthins (forest dwellers), and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka, he allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti. Analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti demonstrates that he holds that nearly anyone might go to brahmaloka and attain liberation by means of kramamukti. I also argue that my analysis is finally consistent with the work of most of

ii the scholars whose work I consider – so long as they are taken to advance accounts of who might attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

Keywords: Śaṅkara, Advaita Vedānta, upāsana, saguṇavidyā, devayāna, brahmaloka, kramamukti, mokṣa.

iii Preface

This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Campbell S. Peat.

iv Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Chris Framarin for all his time, insight, and patience. I would also like to acknowledge the support I received from the University of Calgary. And finally, I would like to thank my family for their love and encouragement.

v

To Sharon, Geordie, and Jackie

vi Table of Contents

Abstract ii

Preface iv

Acknowledgements v

Dedication vi

Table of Contents vii

List of Abbreviations ix

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: A Standard Interpretation of Śaṅkara 8

1.1 Jñānayoga and Mokṣa 9

1.2 The Study of the Upaniṣads and Mokṣa 18

1.3 The Renunciation of Karman and Mokṣa 25

1.4 Conclusion 32

Chapter 2: Alternative Interpretations of Śaṅkara 36

2.1 Non-Saṃnyāsins and Jñānayoga 38

2.2 Non-Saṃnyāsins and Scripture 42

2.3 The Renunciation of Karman 48

2.4 The Need to Become a Saṃnyāsin 55

2.5 Conclusion 59

Chapter 3: Śaṅkara on the Devayāna 61

3.1 Devayāna, Upāsana, and Saguṇavidyās 63

3.2 The Consistency of Śaṅkara’s Account of the Devayāna 74

vii 3.3 Conclusion 86

Chapter 4: Śaṅkara on Kramamukti 88

4.1 Kramamukti 89

4.2 Śaṅkara on the Attainment of Brahmaloka 102

4.3 Who Might Attain Kramamukti 118

4.4 Conclusion 121

Chapter 5: Kramamukti and Sadyomukti 123

5.1 Kramamukti and the Standard Interpretation 124

5.2 Kramamukti and the Alternative Interpretations 134

5.3 Conclusion 144

Conclusion 145

Bibliography 151

viii Abbreviations

Bhagavad Gītā – BG

Bhagavadgītābhāṣya – BGBh

Brahma Sūtra - BS

Brahmasūtrabhāṣya – BSBh

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad – BṛU

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya – BṛUBh

Chāndogya Upaniṣad - ChU

Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya – ChUBh

Kaṭha Upaniṣad – KaṭhU

Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad – KauU

Upadeśasāhasrī - Upad

ix

Introduction

Śaṅkara is one of the most celebrated thinkers in the Hindu traditions. The school of thought to which Śaṅkara belonged is called Advaita Vedānta. When someone refers to classical Advaita

Vedānta, they are usually referring to Śaṅkara and his immediate disciples. There are currently five monastic orders in India that trace their lineage back to Śaṅkara. Eight major hagiographies describe Śaṅkara’s life. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, former President of India, said that “Śaṁkara stands out as a heroic figure of this first rank… His philosophy stands forth complete, needing neither a before nor after. It has a self-justifying wholeness characteristic of works of art” (414).

Certainly high praise to say the least.

Śaṅkara reads scripture to say that the ātman (self) is brahman (God). Any perceived difference between the ātman and brahman is a consequence of avidyā (spiritual ignorance).

Śaṅkara states that people will attain further rebirths as long as they see themselves as different from brahman. People attain liberation when they comprehend brahman. This metaphysical knowledge is called brahmajñāna (knowledge of brahman). To possess brahmajñāna, according to Śaṅkara, is to attain mokṣa (liberation).

There are two paths to liberation within Śaṅkara’s system of thought – sadyomukti and kramamukti. Sadyomukti means immediate (sadyo) liberation (mukti). People who attain mokṣa by means of sadyomukti acquire brahmajñāna during their human lives. These devotees become jīvanmuktas (people who are liberated while alive) and attain final emancipation when they die.

Kramamukti means gradual (krama) liberation (mukti). Within Śaṅkara’s system of thought, kramamukti is a path to liberation by which devotees attain brahmajñāna after they die, while residing in a heaven called brahmaloka (the heaven of brahman). Since brahmajñāna is

1 liberation, these people attain liberation in brahmaloka. The devotees that have acquired brahmajñāna in brahmaloka attain final emancipation at the time of pralaya (the periodic dissolution of the universe).

Some authors claim that Śaṅkara has an extremely narrow view of who can attain liberation.

These scholars argue that saṃnyāsins (renunciates) are the only individuals that can attain brahmajñāna and liberation. According to Śaṅkara, males that belong to the brāhmaṇa varṇa

(priestly class) are the only individuals that can become saṃnyāsins. Thus male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain liberation on this standard reading of Śaṅkara.

In the first chapter, I will review three common arguments advanced by proponents of the standard reading of Śaṅkara. The first argument states that Śaṅkara claims that jñānayoga (the yoga of knowledge) is the means to attain brahmajñāna. Proponents of the standard view state that only saṃnyāsins might be jñānayogins (practitioners of jñānayoga). Since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, the argument entails that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna by means of jñānayoga.

The second argument for the standard interpretation states that in order to attain liberation, devotees must study the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru. These saṃnyāsin gurus only accept other saṃnyāsins as students. Since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might study the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru. So this argument, too, implies that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

The third argument for the standard interpretation states that devotees must renounce karman

(action) in order to attain liberation. While they disagree about the range of actions that must be renounced, all of the proponents of this argument agree that a person must renounce dharmic actions (religious actions) in order to attain liberation. Since saṃnyāsins are the only individuals

2 who can renounce dharmic action, the argument entails that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

If male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who can attain liberation, then Śaṅkara claims that only a small subset of people might attain mokṣa. If this reading is correct, then

Śaṅkara denies that women can attain liberation. He also denies that members of the three other varṇas (classes) can attain liberation. That is, he denies that kṣatriyas (members of the ruler class), vaiśyas (members of the merchant class), and śūdras (members of the servant class) might attain liberation. This reading also implies that members of the other three āśramas (modes of life) cannot attain liberation. So brahmacārins (students), gṛhasthins (householders), and vānaprasthins (forest dwellers) are precluded from liberation.

A second set of scholars reads Śaṅkara to allow that non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation as well. Some of these scholars argue that Śaṅkara allows that nearly anyone might attain liberation.

Others claim that only some smaller subset of non-saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa within Śaṅkara’s system. Proponents of all of these views agree, however, that the class of people who might attain liberation on Śaṅkara’s view is broader than the standard account allows. All deny that

Śaṅkara limits liberation to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins.

In the second chapter of this dissertation, I will outline four common arguments advanced by proponents of this alternative interpretation. The first argument accepts the claim that jñānayoga is the means to attain liberation. It denies, however, that Śaṅkara only allows saṃnyāsins to practice jñānayoga. Since Śaṅkara allows that non-saṃnyāsins might practice jñānayoga, he allows that non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation according to this view.

The second argument for the alternative interpretation claims that Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain brahmajñāna without studying the Upaniṣads. According to this view,

3 devotees can attain brahmajñāna by studying smṛti (secondary scripture). This implies that the study of the Upaniṣads is not a condition of the attainment of brahmajñāna. Since people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might study smṛti, people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

Proponents of the third argument claim that Śaṅkara does not require that devotees abandon karman in order to attain brahmajñāna. If the renunciation of karman is not a condition of brahmajñāna, then people other than saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna. Consequently, people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa on this reading.

The fourth argument for the alternative interpretation argues against the claim that Śaṅkara requires that a person become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain liberation. This claim is at least implicit in all three arguments for the standard interpretation. If it is true, then each of the first three arguments for the alternative interpretation are unconvincing, since each implies that

Śaṅkara denies that a person must become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain mokṣa. A number of scholars argue, however, that those passage in which Śaṅkara seems to claim that only saṃnyāsins can attain liberation should not be read literally. If this is right, then Śaṅkara’s account might be consistent with non-saṃnyāsins attaining liberation.

In chapters three and four, I will discuss Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. In chapter three, I will discuss Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna (the path of the gods). The devayāna is the path that leads to brahmaloka. Śaṅkara states that a person follows the devayāna by means of upāsana (meditation) on saguṇavidyās. In this context, saguṇavidyās are the objects of meditation. Śaṅkara holds that saguṇavidyās can be rituals, metaphysical doctrines, syllables, or deities. I will argue that Śaṅkara elaborates his account of the devayāna in detail. He argues, for

4 example, that if scripture outlines a saguṇavidyā, but does not say that it leads to the devayāna, it leads to the devayāna nonetheless. He also argues that scripture can reference saguṇavidyās without actually naming them. This suggests that his account of the devayāna is well-developed.

I will also outline Śaṅkara’s account of the stages of the devayāna in chapter three. I will argue that Śaṅkara has a consistent opinion about this sequence of events, despite divergent descriptions of the devayāna in the Upaniṣads and other authoritative texts. When Śaṅkara encounters these differences, he takes pains to resolve them into a consistent interpretation.

Consequently, it deserves serious consideration.

In the fourth chapter, I will show that Śaṅkara allows that one can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa in brahmaloka. To attain liberation this way is to attain mokṣa by means of kramamukti.

Śaṅkara is consistent in allowing that devotees can attain liberation via kramamukti. He mentions this path to mokṣa in all of his major commentaries. This suggests that kramamukti is a clear and well-defined path to liberation within Śaṅkara’s account.

Those who attain kramamukti are those who acquire brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. In order to establish Śaṅkara’s view on who can attain kramamukti, it is necessary to determine his view on who can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Śaṅkara denies that classifications like varṇa,

āśrama, and gender can be used to draw distinctions among the jīvas in brahmaloka. Moreover,

Śaṅkara doesn’t mention varṇa, āśrama, or gender in the passages in which he discusses the attainment of brahmajñāna in brahmaloka.

This implies that eligibility for kramamukti does not depend on these distinctions. Śaṅkara’s view is that eligibility for kramamukti is a function of a person’s eligibility for brahmaloka.

Since Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of the devayāna.

5 Thus Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

In the fifth chapter, I will return to the accounts of Śaṅkara that I examined in the first two chapters. Again, male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain liberation, according to the standard reading of Śaṅkara. This account might seem obviously inconsistent with my analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. At first glance, my account of kramamukti might seem more amenable to the alternative interpretation of Śaṅkara’s soteriology. Certain proponents for the alternative interpretation, after all, argue that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

In the fifth chapter, I will argue that Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti is compatible with the common arguments outlined in the first two chapters. I will argue that proponents of the standard and alternative views assume that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. If the standard and alternative readings are taken to advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, then these arguments are consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced. And if these common arguments are consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced, then they are consistent with the view that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation as well – by means of kramamukti.

Kramamukti and sadyomukti are asymmetric both convergent paths to liberation. They are asymmetric because devotees following these paths attain liberation at different times and in different places. The path of kramamukti and the path of sadyomukti are convergent, however, since both lead to liberation. Śaṅkara’s popularity and influence is much easier to explain in light

6 of kramamukti. Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti demonstrates that Śaṅkara allowed that wide range of people might attain the highest religious goal – brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Thus Śaṅkara did not just promote an austere intellectualism that was restricted to a narrow group of high- status men. There is a path to liberation within Śaṅkara’s soteriology for anyone who desires liberation.

7 Chapter 1:

A Standard Interpretation of Śaṅkara

Introduction

In this chapter, I will outline a standard interpretation of Śaṅkara’s views about who can attain mokṣa (liberation). I will argue that on the standard view, brāhmaṇa (priestly class) males are the only individuals who can attain brahmajñāna (brahmanic knowledge) and mokṣa on Śaṅkara’s account. According to this standard interpretation, Śaṅkara claims that devotees need to become saṃnyāsins (renunciates) in order to attain mokṣa. Śaṅkara holds that male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals who can become saṃnyāsins. Therefore, on the standard reading of Śaṅkara, male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who can attain mokṣa. There are three common arguments advanced in favor of this position.

The first argument states that Śaṅkara claims that jñānayoga (the yoga of knowledge) is the means to attain mokṣa. Proponents of the standard view state – or assume – that jñānayogins

(practitioners of jñānayoga) are saṃnyāsins. Male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can become saṃnyāsins. Since jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins, and since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, it follows that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only people who might attain liberation.

According to the second argument, Śaṅkara holds that devotees must study the Upaniṣads under senior saṃnyāsin gurus (teachers) in order to attain mokṣa. Senior saṃnyāsin gurus only accepted other saṃnyāsins as students. Hence, only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain mokṣa.

8 According to the third common argument, Śaṅkara states that people must renounce karman

(action) in order to attain mokṣa. Different proponents of this argument understand action differently. All assume, however, that dharmic (religious) actions are among the actions that a person must renounce. Since only saṃnyāsins might renounce dharmic actions, and since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, the argument entails that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa on Śaṅkara’s account.

All of this suggests that Śaṅkara has an exceedingly narrow conception of who might attain liberation. On the standard interpretation, Śaṅkara limits those who can attain mokṣa to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins. This implies that Śaṅkara denies that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas (members of the ruler class), vaiśyas (members of the merchant class), śūdras

(members of the servant class), brahmacārins (students), gṛhasthins (householders), and vānaprasthins (forest dwellers) can attain liberation.

1.1 Jñānayoga and Mokṣa

One standard interpretation of Śaṅkara states that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins (priestly class renunciates) are the only individuals who can attain mokṣa (liberation). There are at least three different arguments for this conclusion. The first of these arguments runs as follows. Jñānayoga

(the yoga of knowledge) is the means to mokṣa within Śaṅkara’s system of thought. Jñānayogins

(those who practice jñānayoga) are saṃnyāsins. This implies that only saṃnyāsins practice jñānayoga. Śaṅkara holds that only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins. So Śaṅkara claims that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who can attain liberation.

Within Śaṅkara’s system of thought, the state of understanding brahmajñāna (knowledge of brahman) is mokṣa (liberation). Among the authors that I consider in what follows, some claim

9 that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna. Others claim that jñānayoga is the means to attain mokṣa. These two claims are equivalent. Since attaining brahmajñāna and mokṣa occur simultaneously, jñānayoga is both the means to both brahmajñāna and mokṣa on these accounts.

It is common to divide jñānayoga into three sequential stages; śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana. Eliot Deutsch describes these stages as follows. In the first stage, devotees study

(śravaṇa) the Upaniṣads under qualified gurus (106). In the second stage, devotees “appropriate inwardly, by means of prolonged reflection [manana], the philosophical principles of Advaita and make these the stuff of his own living faith” (107). The last step in jñānayoga, according to

Deutsch, is the attainment of brahmajñāna through nididhyāsana (meditation) (109).

Deutsch argues that jñānayoga is the means to attain mokṣa. He says, “[m]okṣa or freedom is attained, according to Advaita Vedānta, through the mental-spiritual discipline of jñāna-yoga”

(104). So Deutsch identifies jñānayoga, which consists of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana, as the means to attain mokṣa within Śaṅkara’s system (109).

Yoshitsugu Sawai also claims that Śaṅkara says that jñānayoga is the means to mokṣa. He argues that that jñānayoga “is the means of attaining mokṣa” in the Bhagavadgītābhāṣya (BGBh)

(375). Sawai claims that Śaṅkara denies that the paths of bhaktiyoga (the yoga of devotion) and karmayoga (the yoga of action) – both of which the Bhagavad Gīta (BG) itself seems to cite as means to mokṣa – are independent means to acquire mokṣa. Bhaktiyoga and karmayoga can help prepare devotees to practice jñānayoga at a later time, according to Sawai. But in and of themselves, bhaktiyoga and karmayoga aren’t means to mokṣa, on Sawai’s reading of Śaṅkara.

This implies that Sawai takes jñānayoga alone to be the means to mokṣa on Śaṅkara’s account.

Bradley Malkovsky claims that “perfect comprehension of any one of the mahāvākyas leads to the liberating intuitive vision of non-duality [brahmajñāna]” (85). The mahāvākyas are

10 concise Upaniṣadic sayings that help a person realise that they are identical with brahman (God)

(Klostermaier 171). This knowledge is brahmajñāna. So to comprehend the mahāvākyas is to attain brahmajñāna. According to Malkovsky’s reading of Śaṅkara, then, mokṣa results from understanding one of the mahāvākyas.

Malkovsky also argues that śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana are the means to understand the mahāvākyas. According to Malkovsky (86), “[t]he purpose of the three-fold process of hearing (śravaṇa), reasoning (manana) and meditation (nididhyāsana) is to grasp the meaning of scripture, in particular the meaning of the mahāvākyas.” Since śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana are the three practices that constitute jñānayoga, Malkovsky’s claim is that devotees attain brahmajñāna by practicing jñānayoga within Śaṅkara’s system of thought.

Carl Olson agrees that jñānayoga is the means to mokṣa within Śaṅkara’s system. He claims that “by successfully following the path of jñāna-yoga… an intuitive insight occurs that reveals one’s true identity, freeing one from ignorance and the cycle of time and rebirth (saṃsāra)”

(250). This suggests that he takes jñānayoga to be the discipline that leads to brahmajñāna and mokṣa within Śaṅkara’s system of thought.

Niranjan Saha’s reading of the BGBh is similar to Sawai’s. According to Saha (262),

Śaṅkara’s view in the BGBh is that “jñāna-yoga alone leads to salvation [mokṣa].” Once the individual comes to know that they are brahman, they attain mokṣa. Therefore, jñānayoga is the only means to attain mokṣa on Saha’s reading of Śaṅkara.

11 There is compelling evidence to support the claim that Śaṅkara counts jñānayoga as the means to brahmajñāna and mokṣa. In Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya (BṛUBh) 2.4.51, for example, Śaṅkara claims,

[t]hus indeed, that (ātman) is understood by means of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana

being accomplished. When these are undergone in union, then perfect knowledge

[samyagdarśana] of the scope of the unity of brahman becomes clear. Not otherwise – by

hearing alone.”2

Since jñānayoga is constituted by śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana, this passage states that jñānayoga is the means to brahmajñāna. It also states that knowledge of brahman cannot be acquired by other means. So proponents of the standard view, then, seem justified in stating that

Śaṅkara counts jñānayoga as the means to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

Proponents of the standard reading also state – or assume – that jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins.

If Śaṅkara claims that jñānayoga is the means to mokṣa, and if jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins, this then implies that only saṃnyāsins can attain liberation. Sawai, for example, claims that jñānayogins do not perform nityakarman (obligatory daily rites, such as the agnihotra [fire

1 My translations of Śaṅkara refer to The Complete Works of Sri Sankaracharya in the Original

Sanskrit (Chennai: Samata Books, 1981).

2 evaṃ hyasau dṛṣto bhavati śravaṇamanananididhyāsanasādhanairnirvartitaiḥ / yadā ekatvametānyupagatāni tadā samyagdarśanam brahmaikatvamviṣayam, na anyathā sravaṇamātreṇa (BṛUBh 2.4.5)

12 offering]), naimittikakarman (occasional rites, such as the rites that are performed when a child is born), and kāmyakarman (the rites that are performed in order to acquire desired goals). He says, “[a] karma-yogin must perform the nitya-karmāṇi and on due occasion naimittika-karmāṇi, and is permitted to perform kāmya-karmāṇi. The jñāna-yogin is exempt from all these” (372).

This type of renunciation is typical of the saṃnyāsin. Only saṃnyāsins renounce rites, including nityakarman, naimittikakarman, and kāmayakarman. Patrick Olivelle (1992, 60) states that the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads – later Upaniṣads within the Advaita Vedāntin traditions – assume

“that renunciation [saṃnyāsa] essentially consists in the abandonment of ritual activities; renunciation is a non-ritual state.” The rules of conduct that require non-saṃnyāsins to fulfill specific dharmic obligations (religious obligations), which include nityakarman and naimittikakarman, are reversed within the saṃnyāsa āśrama. Āśrama rules prohibit saṃnyāsins from participating in Vedic rituals. There are a few exceptions to this prohibition. Certain classes of saṃnyāsins continue to perform specific rituals (Olivelle 1992, 64). Śaṅkara’s ideal saṃnyāsin, however, is one who has renounced all Vedic rituals.

When Sawai (372) states that jñānayogins are exempt from nityakarman, etc., then, he implies that jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins. Saṃnyāsins are the only group of individuals who are exempt from nityakarman, naimittikakarman, and kāmayakarman. This does not entail that all saṃnyāsins are jñānayogins. Sawai seems to assume, however, that jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins.

Since jñānayoga is the means to liberation, Sawai’s view seems to be that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa.

K.N. Tiwari (89) also takes jñānayogins to be saṃnyāsins. He states that “jñānayoga has been recognized as the path [towards liberation] par excellence… [it] has also been regarded as saṁnyāsa-mārga [the path of renunciation].” Tiwari argues that the terms ‘jñānayoga’ and

13 ‘saṃnyāsamārga’ are equivalent within Advaita Vedānta. This implies that jñānayoga is the path of saṃnyāsa within Śaṅkara’s soteriology. If jñānayoga is the means to attain mokṣa, and if jñānayoga and the path of saṃnyāsa (saṃnyāsa-mārga) are equivalent, then only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa.

Saha also equates jñānayogins with saṃnyāsins. He claims that “action and knowledge are distinct from each other, each being meant for a particular echelon of evolution of the aspirants, i.e. the karma-yogin-s and jñāna-yogin-s (who have adopted saṃnyāsa) respectively” (262). In this context, the word “action” refers to dharmic duties, including all ritual obligations. Saha claims that dharmic duties, such as nityakarman and naimittikakarman, are required for karmayogins. Jñānayogins, in contrast, are saṃnyāsins that renounce their dharmic duties.

Therefore, like Sawai and Tiwari, Saha takes jñānayogins to be saṃnyāsins within Śaṅkara’s system of thought. This implies that Śaṅkara claims that only saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

Malkovsky reads Śaṅkara to limit jñānayoga to saṃnyāsins. Malkovsky claims that “[o]f the four traditional Hindu stages of life (student, householder, forest dweller, renunciate), Śaṃkara asserts… that it is the last one, the ascetic alone who is capable of remaining absorbed in brahman” (81). Again, Malkovsky claims that jñānayoga is the means to brahmajñāna in

Śaṅkara. Malkovsky defines nididhyāsana as “unbroken concentration” on brahman (87). If jñānayoga entails nididhyāsana, and if saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can remain

“absorbed in brahman”, then jñānayoga is limited to saṃnyāsins because saṃnyāsins are the only individuals capable of practicing the type of meditation that jñānayoga entails. This implies that saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

14 It appears that by the time of Śaṅkara, brāhmaṇas were the only varṇa (class of people) considered to have the dharmic right to become saṃnyāsins. According to Olivelle (1993, 196),

“[t]he vast majority of prominent medieval writers, beginning at least with the Advaita theologian Śaṃkara (eighth to ninth century C.E.), support the position restricting renunciation

[saṃnyāsa] to Brahmin [brāhmaṇa] males.” If jñānayoga is the means to attain mokṣa, and if jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins, this implies that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. If brāhmaṇas are the only ones that can become saṃnyāsins, it follows that brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa.

There is textual evidence to support Olivelle’s claim. In BṛUBh 3.5.1, Śaṅkara seems to say that members of the brāhmaṇa varṇa are the only individuals that have the dharmic right to become saṃnyāsins. Bṛhadārayaka Upaniṣad (BṛU) 3.5.1 reads, “[i]ndeed, having known this

ātman, having renounced the desire for sons, wealth, and the world, brāhmaṇas then undergo mendicancy.”3 When commenting on this verse, Śaṅkara claims that brāhmaṇas are specifically mentioned because “only brāhmaṇas have the prerogative in the neglect of duties.”4 “The neglect of duties” refers to the renunciation of dharmic duties. This suggests that within

Śaṅkara’s system of thought, brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can become saṃnyāsins.

If jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins, and if jñānayoga is the means to attain mokṣa, it follows that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. Moreover, if male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that

3 etaṃ vai tamātmānaṃ viditvā brāhmaṇāḥ putraiṣaṇāyāśca vittaiṣaṇāyāśca lokaiṣaṇāyāśca vyutthāyātha bhikṣācaryaṃ caranti (BṛU 3.5.1)

4 brāhmaṇānāmevādhikāro vyutthāne (BṛUBh 3.5.1)

15 can become saṃnyāsins, like Śaṅkara suggests in BṛUBh 3.5.1, then male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa.

Sawai interprets Śaṅkara in this way. He claims that saṃnyāsa “is possible only for brāhmaṇas. It was they for whom Śaṅkara’s instruction was intended” (383). Therefore, on

Sawai’s reading of Śaṅkara, jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins and only brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins. Since jñānayoga is the means to liberation, this implies that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa.

Tiwari, Saha, and Malkovsky do not make this final connection. They do not explicitly state that only brāhmaṇas can be saṃnyāsins within Śaṅkara’s system of thought. The common view, however, is that Śaṅkara claims that only brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins. If this is Tiwari,

Malkosvky, and Saha’s opinion as well, it then follows that their readings of Śaṅkara imply that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain liberation.

The other three varṇas - kṣatriyas (members of the ruler class), vaiśyas (members of the merchant class), and śūdras (members of the servant class) – are unable to attain mokṣa according to this reading of Śaṅkara. Kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras do not have the dharmic right to become saṃnyāsins. Because they do not have the right to become saṃnyāsins, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras cannot practice jñānayoga. And since they are unable to practice jñānayoga, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras cannot attain mokṣa, according to the standard interpretation of Śaṅkara.

On this interpretation of Śaṅkara, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras cannot attain mokṣa. They belong to varṇas that do not have the dharmic right to enter the saṃnyāsa āśrama. Kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras can hope to be reborn as brāhmaṇas. In their current lives, however,

16 kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras are unable to attain mokṣa because they cannot become saṃnyāsins.

The Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads assume that saṃnyāsins are men. According to Olivelle (1992, 84),

“[i]t is abundantly clear… that these texts [the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads] were written by and for men and assume that renouncers are men. Women in Brāhmaṇical theology are not independent ritual actors.” Olivelle argues that by Śaṅkara’s time, women were forbidden from entering the

āśrama system (1993, 196). Therefore, when Śaṅkara claims that brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can become saṃnyāsins (BṛUBh 3.5.1), he claims that only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins.

Sawai, Tiwari, Malkovsky, and Saha read Śaṅkara to imply that women cannot attain liberation. If jñānayoga is the means to attain mokṣa, and if jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins, then only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. Since brāhmaṇa males are the only individuals that can become saṃnyāsins (BṛUBh 3.5.1), it follows that women are unable to attain mokṣa because they cannot become saṃnyāsins.

Like kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras, women can hope to be reborn as male brāhmaṇas. This would then give them the right to become saṃnyāsins. However, in their current life, according to Sawai, Tiwari, Malkovsky, and Saha’s reading of Śaṅkara, women are unable to attain mokṣa because they are not male brāhmaṇas.

Additionally, if jñānayoga is the only means to attain mokṣa, and if jñānayogins are members of the saṃnyāsa āśrama, it follows that members of the other three āśramas cannot attain mokṣa.

On Sawai, Tiwari, Malkovsky, and Saha’s reading of Śaṅkara, brahmacārins (students), gṛhasthins (householders), and vānaprasthins (forest-dweller) cannot attain mokṣa. If the brahmacārin, gṛhasthin, or vānaprasthin is a brāhmaṇa, they possess the dharmic right to

17 become saṃnyāsins. Until they become saṃnyāsins, however, they cannot attain mokṣa, according to this standard view.

The standard interpretation of Śaṅkara’s soteriology states that male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa. The first argument for this interpretation takes Śaṅkara to claim that jñānayoga is the means to mokṣa, and that only saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga.

This implies that only saṃnyāsins can attain liberation according to Śaṅkara. And since Śaṅkara claims that only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, the reading implies that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation on Śaṅkara’s account.

If only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation on Śaṅkara’s account, then Śaṅkara denies that that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins can attain liberation. This suggests that Śaṅkara has an exceptionally exclusive conception of the path to liberation, both in terms of who can attain liberation (only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins practicing jñānayoga) and in terms of the path to liberation (saṃnyāsa alone).

1.2 The Study of the Upaniṣads and Mokṣa

According to the second argument for the standard interpretation, Śaṅkara claims that devotees must study the Upaniṣads under a senior saṃnyāsin guru in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Senior saṃnyāsin guru only accept other saṃnyāsins as students. So according to this reading, a person must be a saṃnyāsin in order to attain mokṣa. Again, since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa on this reading of Śaṅkara.

18 Richard De Smet claims that according to Śaṅkara, the Upaniṣads are the only pramāṇa

(means to knowledge) that leads to brahmajñāna. Since “Śruti [the Upaniṣads] is the only pramāṇa of Brahmajñāna, the exact meaning and intention of the Śruti have to be determined” in order for one to attain liberation (168). Brahmajñāna, again, is equivalent to mokṣa. So according to De Smet, devotees must understand the Upaniṣads in order to attain mokṣa.

Anantanand Rambachan also argues that the Upaniṣads are the means to brahmajñāna within

Śaṅkara’s soteriology. According to Rambachan (1986, 29), “brahman is knowable, and… śruti is the valid means [to brahmajñāna].” Śruti (scripture), in this context, is the Upaniṣads. So on

Rambachan’s reading of Śaṅkara, knowledge of the Upaniṣads leads to brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

Sara Grant argues that the Upaniṣads are the only source of brahmajñāna within Śaṅkara’s soteriology. According to Grant (48), “the fact of everything having its Self in Brahman

[brahmajñāna] cannot be grasped without the aid of the śruti passage ‘That art thou’.” The passage that Grant is referring to is a mahāvākya – tat tvam asi – found in the Chāndogya

Upaniṣad (ChU 6.8.7). So according to Grant, Śaṅkara argues that a person must understand the

Upaniṣads in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

Malkovsky claims that according to Śaṅkara, the Upaniṣads are the primary source of brahmajñāna. Malkovsky claims, “[i]n matters of the highest importance, i.e. spiritual liberation, it is clear that śruti is the only reliable source of knowledge” (42). Here, again, the word śruti refers to the Upaniṣads. Malkovsky’s argument, then, is that a person must understand the

Upaniṣads in order to acquire brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

J.G. Suthren Hirst (2005, 37) argues that the “Vedāntin enquiry into brahman is dependent only on knowledge of brahman and yields permanent liberation from the world of ritual and rebirth.” On Hirst’s reading of Śaṅkara, brahmajñāna – knowledge of brahman – alone leads to

19 mokṣa. Hirst further argues that the Upaniṣads are the only source of brahmajñāna within

Śaṅkara’s soteriology. “Brahman can only be known through scripture” (2005, 59). Therefore, like Rambachan, Grant, and Malkovsky, Hirst claims that one must understand the Upaniṣads in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

Surendranath Dasgupta also identifies the Upaniṣads as the source of knowledge of Brahman

– brahmajñāna. According to Dasgupta (1:436), “the Upaniṣads revealed the highest truth as the

Brahman.” The highest form of knowledge is knowledge about brahman – brahmajñāna.

Moreover, on Dasgupta’s reading of Śaṅkara, “one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the ultimate reality” (1:436). So like the other scholars, Dasgupta argues that one must understand the Upaniṣads in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

In BGBh 13.12, Śaṅkara argues that brahmajñāna cannot be understood through perception or inference. Śaṅkara argues, “[b]ut this – by the quality of being beyond the senses – is to be known from the perceptibility of the one pramāṇa [means of knowing] – scripture [śabda].”5

Since brahmajñāna is beyond the senses, brahmajñāna cannot be known by perception. Nor can it be known by means of inference from what is perceived. Hence, brahmajñāna can only be known through scripture – and the Upaniṣads in particular. Thus one must understand the

Upaniṣads in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

The standard interpretation of Śaṅkara also claims that devotees must study the Upaniṣads with a senior saṃnyāsin guru. Saṃnyāsin gurus, on this reading, are the only individuals that can facilitate the attainment of brahmajñāna through study of the Upaniṣads. Therefore, the standard

5 idaṃ tu jñeyam atīndriyatvena śabdaikapramāṇagamyatvāt (BGBh 13.12)

20 interpretation of Śaṅkara implies that studying the Upaniṣads with a senior guru is a necessary condition of attaining mokṣa.

According to De Smet, śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana – jñānayoga – is the means to attain brahmajñāna (155). De Smet explains śravaṇa as “an exegesis of the revealed texts [the

Upaniṣads], conducted by the teacher for the benefit of the pupil” (160). Since śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana are required to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa, and since śravaṇa is study of the Upaniṣads with a guru, De Smet’s view is that a person must study the Upaniṣads under a guru in order to attain brahmajñāna.

Rambachan also argues that the study of the Upaniṣads is a necessary condition of the attainment of brahmajñāna within Śaṅkara’s system of thought (1986, 27). He claims that devotees need to study under qualified gurus in order to understand the Upaniṣads.

Śaṅkara almost always makes mention of the indispensability of the teacher side by side

with his emphasis on the Upaniṣads as a valid source of knowledge [brahmajñāna]. The

traditional method of Advaita is not solitary engagement with the text, but textual inquiry

with the guidance of a qualified teacher. (2006, 63)

Gurus possess the interpretive method needed to obtain brahmajñāna by studying the Upaniṣads, on Rambachan’s reading of Śaṅkara. So in order for devotees to attain brahmajñāna, on his reading, they must study the Upaniṣads under a guru.

Malkovsky also argues that in order to attain brahmajñāna, devotees must study the

Upaniṣads under a qualified guru. According to Malkovsky (85), the mahāvākyas of the

Upaniṣads can only be understood “after the seeker undertakes the triple-process of hearing

21 [śravaṇa], reflection [manana] and meditation [nididhyāsana] on them, under the guidance of a liberated guru” (85). So according to Malkovsky, Śaṅkara claims that devotees must study the

Upaniṣads under a guru in order to attain brahmajñāna.

Hirst advances the same basic argument. On her reading of Śaṅkara, “[b]rahman can only be known through scripture, but scripture can only be understood through a teacher” (2005, 59). So according to Hirst, devotees must study the Upaniṣads under an Advaitin guru in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

Hirst claims that Śaṅkara’s ideal guru is a paramahaṃsa saṃnyāsin (2005, 17).

Paramahaṃsa saṃnyāsins are the highest order of saṃnyāsins within the Advaitan hierarchy

(Olivelle 1993, 172). So according to Hirst, the guru is a saṃnyāsin of the highest order. It follows that on Hirst’s reading of Śaṅkara, devotees must study the Upaniṣads under a senior paramahaṃsa saṃnyāsin in order to attain liberation.

Śaṅkara advises gurus to only accept saṃnyāsins as students. At Upadeśasāhasrī (Upad)

1.1.1-2, Śaṅkara states that gurus should explain brahmajñāna to their students until it is understood. Śaṅkara then appears to claim that gurus should only explain brahmajñāna to students if they meet certain criteria. According to Śaṅkara,

[t]he means of mokṣa is this knowledge [brahmajñāna]. It should be proclaimed again and

again – until there is firm comprehension – to one who is dispassionate towards all

transient [rewards] attainable through means, to one who has abandoned the desire for

sons, wealth, and the world, to one who has undertaken paramahaṃsa mendicancy, to one

who is possessed of tranquility, self-restraint, compassion etc., to one who is endowed with

the qualities of a student that are well known in scripture, to someone who is a pure

22 brāhmaṇa, to one who has approached a teacher according to rule, and to one who has had

their family, knowledge, behavior, occupation, and birth carefully inspected.6

In this passage, Śaṅkara appears to claim that brahmajñāna can only be explained to a student if the student is, among other things, a paramahaṃsa saṃnyāsin.

Scholars have identified Upad 1.1.1-2 as a list of Śaṅkara’s preconditions for receiving instruction on brahmajñāna. Hirst claims that according to Upad 1.1.1-2, the aspiring pupil should “be a paramahaṃsa wandering ascetic, a pure Brahmin, [and] should approach his teacher in the proper way” (2005, 42). If a person must be a paramahaṃsa saṃnyāsin in order to study the Upaniṣads under a senior guru, and if this study is a necessary condition of attaining brahmajñāna, then only a saṃnyāsin can attain mokṣa according to Śaṅkara.

Malkovsky also argues that devotees must become paramahaṃsa saṃnyāsins in order to attain mokṣa. He states that “[o]ne of the requirements (adhikāra) laid down by Śaṅkara in the

Upad [1.1.1-2] for the attainment of liberation is the abandonment of ‘desire for sons, wealth and worlds’ and the consequent embrace of the ‘state of a paramahaṃsa wandering ascetic’” (81).

Rambachan cites Brahmasūtrabhāṣyṣa (BSBh) 1.1.1, in which Śaṅkara outlines four virtues that a seeker after liberation must possess. These include viveka (discrimination), vairāgya

6 tadidaṃ mokṣasādhanaṃ jñānaṃ - sādhanasādhyādanityātsarvasmādviraktāya tyaktaputravittalokaiṣaṇāya pratipannaparamahaṃsapārivrājāyaśamadamadayādiyuktāya

śāstraprasiddhaśiṣyaguṇasampannāya śucaye brshmaṇāya vidhivadupasannāya śiṣyāya jātikarmavṛttavidyābhijanaiḥ parīkṣitāya brūyātpunaḥpunaḥ yāvadgrahaṇaṃ dṛḍhībhavati

(Upad 1.1.1-2)

23 (dispassion), śamādiṣatkasampatti (mental equanimity), and mumukṣutva (the desire for liberation) (2006, 21). Rambachan (27) adds that “[i]n the Upadeśasāhasrī… Śaṅkara emphasizes the fourfold requirements along with the stipulation that the student must be of the brahmin caste.” The final claim in this quotation implies that brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can study the Upaniṣads under Advaitin gurus. If Rambachan takes Upad 1.1.1-2 to list qualifications to discipleship, then Rambachan’s view is that devotees must be both brāhmaṇas and paramahaṃsa saṃnyāsins in order to study under a qualified guru.

According to the second argument for the standard interpretation, Śaṅkara claims that devotees must study the Upaniṣads under a senior saṃnyāsin guru in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Senior saṃnyāsin guru only accept other saṃnyāsins as students. So according to this reading, a person must be a saṃnyāsin in order to attain mokṣa. Again, since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

So the second argument for the standard interpretation – like the first argument for the standard interpretation – concludes that Śaṅkara has an exceptionally exclusive conception of the path to liberation, both in terms of who can attain liberation, and in terms of the path to liberation itself. This second argument denies that denies that that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins can attain liberation.

24 1.3 The Renunciation of Karman and Mokṣa

According to the third argument for the standard interpretation, Śaṅkara claims that a person must renounce karman (action) in order to attain mokṣa. This argument infers that since only saṃnyāsins renounce karman, only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. And since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇas can attain mokṣa.

The claim that one must renounce karman is understood in different ways. Some proponents of this argument claim that Śaṅkara requires devotees to renounce all karman – all forms of action. Still others claim that Śaṅkara requires devotees to abandon all actions except for those that are essential to staying alive. Still others claim that Śaṅkara requires the renunciation of dharmic actions in order to attain mokṣa. Thus karman – and the renunciation of karman – can be taken to mean at least three different things. Consequently, the third argument for the standard reading of Śaṅkara might take at least three different forms.

Fortunately, all three versions of this argument can be treated together, since all three assume that the saṃnyāsin renounces dharmic action. The renunciation of all karman entails the renunciation of dharma. Likewise, the renunciation of all non-essential karman entails the renunciation of dharma. Hence, all three versions of the argument analyze the renunciation of karman in terms of the renunciation of dharmic actions in particular.

Since only the saṃnyāsin renounces dharmic actions, only saṃnyāsins can renounce karman on any of the three readings of the word karman in this third argument. The renunciation of all action requires the renunciation of dharma. Since only the saṃnyāsin renounces dharma, only the saṃnyāsin can renounce all karman. The renunciation of all but essential actions requires the renunciation of dharma. Since only the saṃnyāsin renounces dharma, only the saṃnyāsin can renounce all non-essential karman. And since only the saṃnyāsin renounces dharma, only the

25 saṃnyāsin can renounce all dharmic action. So the claim that only the saṃnyāsin can renounce dharmic action, in particular, is central to any reading of the third argument for the standard interpretation.

A frequent claim within Śaṅkara scholarship is that one must renounce all karman in order to attain liberation. Sawai, for example, claims that “all karmas should be abandoned for the sake of attaining mokṣa” (372). If all karman is taken literally, to mean all action, then a person must stop acting altogether in order to attain mokṣa. Elsewhere Sawai claims that according to

Śaṅkara, “action (pravṛtti) leads to the ‘bondage’ (bandha) of saṃsāra or transmigration, while non-action leads to mokṣa” (372). If action perpetuates saṃsāra, and if non-action leads to mokṣa, it follows that a person must renounce all karman in order to attain mokṣa.

The renunciation of all karman entails the renunciation of dharmic duties. Only saṃnyāsins renounce their dharmic duties. So saṃnyāsins are the only group that can renounce all karman.

Sawai’s claim that “all karmas should be abandoned for the sake of attaining mokṣa” (372) implies that devotees must become saṃnyāsins in order to attain mokṣa. Again, since male brāhmaṇas are the only ones that can become saṃnyāsins, it follow that only male brāhmaṇas can attain liberation on Sawai’s reading of Śaṅkara.

Saha claims that in Śaṅkara’s BGBh, mokṣa “is attained through the dharma that involves self-knowledge preceded by [the] renunciation of all actions (sarva-karma-saṃnyāsa)” (261).

Sarvakarmasaṃnyāsa is a three part compound – sarva (all), karma (action), saṃnyāsa

(renunciation). So Saha’s claim implies that mokṣa is preceded by the renunciation of all action – sarvakarmasaṃnyāsa.

Like Sawai’s, Saha’s reading of Śaṅkara implies that one must become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain mokṣa. The renunciation of all karman entails the renunciation of dharmic duties. Since

26 only saṃnyāsins renounce dharma, only saṃnyāsins are capable of renouncing all karman. If

Śaṅkara takes the attainment of mokṣa to be preceded by sarvakarmasaṃnyāsa – as Saha claims

– it follows that only saṃnyāsins can attain liberation. Only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins. Thus male brāhmaṇas are the only ones that can attain liberation, according to

Saha’s reading of the BGBh.

Śaṅkara’s commentary on BGBh 18.66 can be read to support the claim that one must renounce all karman. In BG 18.66, Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna, “[h]aving renounced all dharma, take refuge in me alone. I will liberate you from all evils. Do not grieve.”7 In this passage, Kṛṣṇa appears to outline conditions for attaining mokṣa. In his commentary, Śaṅkara glosses “having renounced all dharma (sarvadharmān parityajya)” as “having renounced all karman (saṃnyasya sarvakarmāni).” If sarvakarmāni – all action – is taken literally, BGBh 18.66 claims that people must renounce all forms of action in order to attain mokṣa. So there is some evidence in Śaṅkara to support the view that people must renounce all karman.

Other scholars endorse this reading of BGBh 18.66 as well. Patricia Y. Mumme, for example, claims that Śaṅkara’s opinion is that in “[t]he first pāda [of BG 18.66], ‘Having relinquished all dharmas’… enjoins Arjuna to completely renounce all actions, both those required and those prohibited” (72). According to Mumme, Śaṅkara believes that jñānayoga “demands the renunciation of all activity” (73). Since jñānayoga is the means to mokṣa, and since the renunciation of karman is a condition to jñānayoga, it follows that on Mumme’s reading of

BGBh 18.66, devotees must renounce all karman in order to attain mokṣa.

7 sarvadharmān parityajya mām ekaṃ śaraṇam vraja / ahaṃ tvā sarvapāpebhyo mokṣayiṣyāmi mā śucaḥ (BG 18.66)

27 Again, dharmic duties are a type of karman. So the renunciation of all karman entails the renunciation of dharma. Since only saṃnyāsins renounce dharma, it follows that saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce all karman. Male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can enter the saṃnyāsa āśrama. Thus male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only ones that can attain liberation, according to Mumme’s reading of BGBh 18.66.

A second version of the third argument takes Śaṅkara to say that the seeker of liberation must renounce all non-essential karman. This type of renunciation entails the renunciation of home, family, wealth, etc. It does not require the renunciation of basic, life-sustaining actions like eating and drinking. The renunciation of non-essential actions does, however, entail the renunciation of dharmic actions. Since only saṃnyāsins renounce dharmic actions, it follows that saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce all non-essential karman. Only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins. So if the attainment of liberation is contingent on renouncing all non-essential karman, then male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain liberation.

Rajendra Prasad reads Śaṅkara to say that one must renounce non-essential karman. Prasad claims,

[l]iberation can be attained only by knowing the Self [ātman] and not by any sort of action.

Not even desireless, benevolent action is sufficient to enable its doer to attain knowledge of

the Self. Rather, since a life of action lived by an individual may deflect him from the path

of knowing the Self, it is desirable or necessary to stop doing all but the minimal,

necessary, actions (251).

28 Since dharmic duties are a type of non-essential action, Prasad’s claim implies that one must renounce dharma in order to attain mokṣa. This is clear when Prasad claims that in order to attain mokṣa “an individual has to have only the knowledge of the Self [brahmajñāna], and not to pursue any course of action, not even actions which the Vedas prescribe” (252). ‘Actions prescribed by the Vedas’ is shorthand for dharmic duties. Since saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce dharma, this implies that one must become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain mokṣa. Male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can become saṃnyāsins. Thus male brāhmaṇas that become saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa, according to

Prasad’s reading of Śaṅkara.

There is evidence in the BGBh to support Prasad’s claim. In BG 4.21, Kṛṣna tells Arjuna that

“[h]e who is free from desire, who controls his self and sprit, who has renounced all grasping, performing karman with the body alone, he does not obtain demerit.”8 Śaṅkara’s gloss states that this person – the person who is controlled in self and spirit, etc. – performs karman only to maintain their body (śarīrasthitimātraprayojanam). This suggests that Śaṅkara allows that the person pursuing liberation might continue to perform essential, life-sustaining actions, but abandon all other actions. Thus BGBh 4.21 can be read to qualify BGBh18.66. Despite calling for devotees to renounce all actions (sarvakarmāni – BGBh 18.66), Śaṅkara allows that the seeker of liberation is free to continue to perform essential actions like eating, drinking, etc.

(BGBh 4.21). The actions that must be abandoned, then, are those that are not among these essential, life-sustaining actions.

8 nirāśīryatacittātmā tyaktasarvaparigrahaḥ / śārīraṃ kevalaṃ karma kurvannāpnoti kilbiṣam

(BG 4.21)

29 The third version of the third argument takes Śaṅkara to enjoin the abandonment of an even narrower set of actions – dharmic actions. Proponents of this view claim that according to

Śaṅkara, one must renounce dharma in order to attain liberation. This, again, implies that saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain liberation. Only saṃnyāsins renounce dharma. If the renunciation of dharma is a prerequisite of mokṣa, then saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain liberation. Only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins. Thus male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can attain liberation.

Dasgupta, for example, reads Śaṅkara to say that one must renounce Vedic duties in order to pursue brahmajñāna. He states that “[t]here could be no joint performance of Vedic duties

[dharma] and the seeking of the highest truth as taught in the Upaniṣads (jñāna-karma- samuccayābhāvaḥ)” (1:437). The compound jñānakarmasamuccayābhāvaḥ is a four part compound that translates as “the absence (abhāva) of the combination (samuccaya) of knowledge (jñāna) and action (karman).” It is clear that in this compound, Dasgupta takes karman to refer to Vedic duties, dharmic duties. So his claim is that karman in the form of dharma is incompatible with the search for brahmajñāna. Thus devotees must renounce their dharmic duties in order to pursue brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

This implies that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. Saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce dharma. If dharma and the pursuit of brahmajñāna are incompatible, it follows that one must renounce dharma. Only the saṃnyāsin can renounce dharmic actions. Thus saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can pursue brahmajñāna and attain liberation on

Dasgupta’s reading of Śaṅkara. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, it follows that only male brāhmaṇas can attain liberation.

30 I mentioned earlier that in BGBh 18.66, Śaṅkara glosses “having renounced all dharma

(sarvadharmān parityajya)” as “having renounced all karman (saṃnyasya sarvakarmāni).” If

Śaṅkara’s intention is to substitute sarvakarmāṇi (all action) for sarvadharmān (all dharma), then BGBh 18.66 states that one must renounce all actions in order to attain liberation. Another possibility, however, is that in this context, Śaṅkara takes karman to be a synonym for dharma.

Śaṅkara’s line of reasoning in BGBh 18.11 indicates that this might be the case. In BGBh 18.11,

Śaṅkara claims that a person must attain brahmajñāna before renouncing all actions. “Therefore the total renunciation of karman can only be accomplished by one with understanding of the highest truth, by one who is ‘unembodied’ – by one who has forsaken the opinion that the self is the body.”9 If acquiring brahmajñāna is a condition of the renunciation of all karman, it then follows that the inverse cannot be true. Renouncing all karman cannot also be a condition of acquiring brahmajñāna. Thus the line of reasoning at BGBh 18.11 suggests that at BGBh 18.66,

“all actions (sarvakarmāṇi)” should not be taken literally. A plausible alternative is that “all karman” is a synonym for “all dharma (sarvadharmān).” If this is the case, then BGBh 18.66 states that one must renounce all dharma in order to attain liberation.

Dharmic duties are a type of karman. They are also a type of non-essential karman. So both the renunciation of all karman – and the renunciation of all non-essential karman – entails the renunciation of dharma. The claim that ‘one must renounce karman’, then, entails the renunciation of dharma regardless of the scope of the word karman.

9 tasmāt paramārthadarśinaiva adehabhṛtā dehātmabhāvarahittena aśeṣkarmasaṃnyāsaḥ

śakyate kartum (BGBh 18.11)

31 Saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce dharma. Hence, saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce dharmic actions, all non-essential actions, or all actions. The claim that ‘one must renounce karman in order to attain mokṣa’, then, implies that devotees must become saṃnyāsins in order to attain liberation. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, this view implies that women, śūdras, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas are unable to attain mokṣa.

This argument implies that brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins cannot attain mokṣa for the same reason. Members of these āśramas have not renounced their dharmic duties. If attaining mokṣa is contingent on renouncing dharma, then any individual that belongs to an

āśrama that has dharmic requirements is unable to renounce karman, and hence, unable to attain mokṣa. Therefore, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins cannot attain mokṣa. If the brahmacārin, gṛhasthin, or vānaprasthin is a male brāhmaṇa, then he might become a saṃnyāsin. So long as he remains a brahmacārin, gṛhasthin, or vānaprasthin, however, he cannot renounce dharma and is unable to attain mokṣa. So the third argument for the standard interpterion also concludes that Śaṅkara has an exceptionally narrow conception of the path to liberation – both in terms of who can attain liberation, and in terms of the path to liberation itself.

Conclusion

The standard interpretation of Śaṅkara’s soteriology holds that saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa. Since Śaṅkara claims that only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins (BṛUBh 3.5.1), the standard argument implies that only male brāhmaṇas can attain mokṣa. If only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa, then women, śūdras, kṣatriyas,

32 vaiśyas, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins are unable to attain mokṣa according to this reading.

There are three common arguments that contemporary authors advance in support of the claim that saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa. According to the first argument, jñānayoga is the means to attain mokṣa within Śaṅkara’s system of thought. Proponents of this argument state – or assume – that jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins. If only saṃnyāsins practice jñānayoga, then saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that might attain mokṣa. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇas saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

The second argument states that devotees must to study the Upaniṣads with saṃnyāsin gurus in order to attain brahmajñāna. Saṃnyāsin gurus only accepted other saṃnyāsins as students. So saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can acquire brahmajñāna. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna.

The third argument states that people must renounce karman in order to attain mokṣa.

Saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce karman. So saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa.

Since the standard reading of Śaṅkara's soteriology claims that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa, it entails that women, kṣatriyas vaiśyas, and śūdras cannot attain mokṣa on Śaṅkara's account. It also entails that brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins cannot attain mokṣa, either. On this reading, Śaṅkara has an exceedingly narrow conception of who might attain liberation.

33 In the next chapter, I consider alternative readings of Śaṅkara's soteriology. According to these interpretations, Śaṅkara allows that people who are not male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation. The first argument for the alternative interpretation states that people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might practice jñānayoga on Śaṅkara's account. Since jñānayoga is the means to liberation, people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain mokṣa. This leaves open the possibility that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins might attain mokṣa on Śaṅkara's account.

The second argument states that Śaṅkara allows that people might attain brahmajñāna without studying the Upaniṣads, and hence, without studying under a senior saṃnyāsin guru. If study under a senior saṃnyāsin guru is not a condition of attaining brahmajñāna, then a person need not be a male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsin in order to attain brahmajñāna and attain mokṣa. This leaves open the possibility that women, śūdras, and so on might attain mokṣa on Śaṅkara's account.

The third argument for the alternative account states that the abandonment of action – and dharmic action in particular – is not a necessary condition of attaining mokṣa. If the abandonment of action is not a necessary condition of attaining mokṣa, however, then the attainment of mokṣa need not be limited to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins. So the third argument also entails that women, śūdras, and so on might attain mokṣa on Śaṅkara's account.

Some versions of the alternative interpretations allow that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain mokṣa on Śaṅkara's account. Others claim that only some smaller subset of non-saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. Proponents of all of these views agree, however, that the class of people who might attain liberation on Śaṅkara’s view is broader than the standard account allows. All deny that Śaṅkara

34 limits liberation to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins. Consequently, they assert a more inclusive conception of Śaṅkara's soteriology than the standard view does.

35 Chapter 2:

Alternative Interpretations of Śaṅkara

Introduction

According to the standard interpretation that I outlined in the last chapter, only saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa within Śaṅkara’s system of thought. According to the first argument for the standard interpretation, Śaṅkara claims that jñānayoga is the means to brahmajñāna. Since only saṃnyāsins practice jñānayoga, only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa.

Since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, this view implies that women, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins cannot attain mokṣa.

The second argument for the standard interpretation states that devotees must study the

Upaniṣads under an Advaitin guru in order to attain brahmajñāna. Since gurus only accepted saṃnyāsins as students, only saṃnyāsins can study the Upaniṣads and attain brahmajñāna on this view. And since only male brāhmaṇas might be saṃnyāsins, the argument implies that women, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins cannot attain mokṣa.

The third argument for the standard interpretation of Śaṅkara states that devotees must renounce karman in order to attain brahmajñāna. Since saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce action – and dharmic action in particular – only saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna. Since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, the argument entails that women, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins cannot attain mokṣa.

36 A number of contemporary scholars deny that Śaṅkara limits those who might attain mokṣa to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins. In this chapter, I outline four arguments for this interpretation. The first argument for the alternative view accepts that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna within Śaṅkara's system. It denies, however, that Śaṅkara limits those who can practice jñānayoga to saṃnyāsins. Since non-saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga, people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation according to this reading.

The second argument for the alternative interpretation claims that Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain brahmajñāna without studying the Upaniṣads. According to this view, devotees can attain brahmajñāna by studying smṛti (secondary scripture). This implies that the study of the Upaniṣads is not a condition for the attainment of brahmajñāna. Since people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might study smṛti, people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain liberation.

Proponents of the third argument claim that Śaṅkara does not require that devotees abandon karman in order to attain brahmajñāna. If the renunciation of karman is not a condition of brahmajñāna, then people other than saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna. Consequently, people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

In a number of passages, Śaṅkara enjoins people to become saṃnyāsins. The standard view takes these passages to demonstrate that devotees must become saṃnyāsins in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Some authors, however, claim that Śaṅkara’s injunction to become a saṃnyāsin does not require all people to become saṃnyāsins in order to attain brahmajñāna. If entering the saṃnyāsa āśrama isn’t a condition of attaining brahmajñāna and mokṣa, however, then non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

37 Some of these alternative views infer that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras from any one of the four āśramas might attain liberation. Others claim that only some smaller subset of non-saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. Proponents of all these alternative readings agree, however, that the class of people who might attain liberation on Śaṅkara’s view is broader than the standard account allows. All deny that Śaṅkara limits liberation to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins.

2.1 Non-Saṃnyāsins and Jñānayoga

The first argument for the standard reading of Śaṅkara outlined in the last chapter claims that

Śaṅkara counts jñānayoga as the means to attain brahmajñāna. It also claims that only saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga. If jñānayoga is the means to brahmajñāna, and if only saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga, then saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Śaṅkara claims that male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals with the right to become saṃnyāsins. This implies that only male brāhmaṇas might attain liberation.

Hence, according to this reading, women, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins cannot attain liberation within Śaṅkara’s system of thought.

A number of scholars accept that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna in Śaṅkara’s system, but deny that Śaṅkara claims that only saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga. Like the proponents of the standard reading, the scholars in this section claim that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna. Unlike the standard interpretation, however, these scholars allow that non-saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga. If jñānayoga is the means to brahmajñāna, and if non- saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga, these alternative views allow that non-saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna.

38 Roger Marcaurelle, for example, claims that jñānayoga is the primary means to attain brahmajñāna within Śaṅkara’s system of thought. He states that

[t]he means of Self-knowledge [brahmajñāna] are found mainly in the discipline of

knowledge [jñānayoga], that is, hearing (śravaṇa) the scriptural passages concerning

Brahman-Ātman, the individuals self and its liberation; discursive reflection (manana) on

the meaning of these passages; and repeated meditation on them (nididhyāsana) to

transform the concept of Brahman-Ātman into a direct experience (29).

Here, again, the practices of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana refer to jñānayoga.

Marcaurelle's claim, then, is that jñānayoga is the means to brahmajñāna and mokṣa in Śaṅkara's system.

Marcaurelle claims that members of all four āśramas and varṇas can practice jñānayoga. He claims that according to Śaṅkara, “whatever one’s mode of living [āśrama] and caste [varṇa], one is qualified for the proximate means, consisting in the discipline of knowledge [jñānayoga]”

(31). This implies that members of all four āśramas – brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins – can practice jñānayoga. It also implies that all four varṇas – brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras – can practice jñānayoga. Since jñānayoga is the means to brahmajñāna, and since people from all four āśramas and all four varṇas can practice jñānayoga, people from all four āśramas and all four varṇas can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa, according to Marcaurelle’s interpretation of Śaṅkara.

Marcaurelle cites BSBh 3.4.38 to support this claim. In BSBh 3.4.38, Śaṅkara states that

“[k]nowledge – which has an acknowledged goal – authorizes the supplicant in śravaṇa, etc.

39 (jñānayoga) by only the absence of a reason for denial.”10 In this context, śravaṇa, etc. refers to

śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana. These, again, are the three standard components of jñānayoga. Marcaurelle paraphrases the passage as “anyone who wishes to obtain the result of knowledge is qualified for the discipline of knowledge [jñānayoga] and its result [brahmajñāna].

Only a scriptural prohibition could restrict such a universal qualification. But there is none as noted by Śaṅkara” (30).

Marcaurelle reads Śaṅkara to say that anyone who desires brahmajñāna can practice jñānayoga. Only an explicit scriptural prohibition would preclude an individual from practicing jñānayoga. For example, in order for kṣatriyas to be forbidden from practicing jñānayoga, there would need to be a clear rule stating that kṣatriyas – or non-saṃnyāsins more generally – cannot practice jñānayoga. According to Marcaurelle, Śaṅkara notes that there are no such rules that explicitly forbid certain people from practicing jñānayoga. This means that brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga and attain brahmajñāna. So Marcaurelle’s reading of Śaṅkara denies the standard view that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga and attain brahmajñāna.11

10 dṛṣṭārthā ca vidyā pratiṣedhābhavamātreṇāpi arthinamadhikaroti śravaṇādiṣu / tasmāt vidhurādīnāmapyadhikāro na virudhyate (BSBh 3.4.38)

11 According to Marcaurelle, Śaṅkara claims that “people unqualified for rites may be qualified for Self-knowledge, because various scriptures talk about people who were not qualified for

Vedic rites but did obtain Self-knowledge and liberation, such as Raikva (a widower),

Vācaknavī, Gārgī (a woman) and Saṃvarta (an ascetic who roamed about naked)” (29). My

40 Michael Comans also holds that śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana – that is, jñānayoga – are the means to attain brahmajñāna. He reads Śaṅkara to say that people must continue to practice jñānayoga until they attain brahmajñāna. According to Comans,

[i]n his commentary upon the well-known passage in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad [2.4.5]

where the words śravaṇa etc. occur… Śaṅkara says that immediate knowledge

[brahmajñāna] arises from all three means [śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana] in

combination, but ‘not by hearing alone’ (na…śravaṇamātreṇa) (312).

Śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana are meant to be practiced together. Simply hearing the

Upaniṣads is not sufficient to attain brahmajñāna.12 Devotees must practice śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana in conjunction in order to attain brahmajñāna.

While Comans accepts that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna, he denies that only saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga. Like Marcaurelle, he cites BSBh 3.4.38 to support this claim. According to Comans, in BSBh 3.4.38, “Śaṅkara goes on to enunciate the general principle that the mere absence of any prohibition to the contrary is sufficient to qualify a seeker to undertake hearing the texts etc. in pursuit of knowledge” (316). “Hearing the texts, etc.” refers

reading of Śaṅkara’s account of Gārgī and Raikva differs from Marcaurelle’s. I read Śaṅkara to say that Raikva and Gārgī are eligible for saguṇavidyās and kramamukti.

12 Comans reads Śaṅkara to say that some individuals can attain brahmajñāna by simply hearing the Upaniṣads for the first time. These instances are exceedingly rare, however. Most people need to practice śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana in conjunction (312).

41 to jñānayoga – śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana. According to Comans, the absence of a clear prohibition of any particular person from practicing jñānayoga is enough to qualify that person for jñānayoga. So Comans denies the standard view that only saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga. On his view, Śaṅkara allows that brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga, and hence, attain liberation.

Both the standard interpretation and the alternative interpretation outlined in this section claim that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna. The scholars that I have discussed in this section agree with the standard view that jñānayoga is the means to brahmajñāna. They deny, however, that only saṃnyāsins practice jñānayoga. Since jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna, and since non-saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga, these alternative views allow that non-saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna by means of jñānayoga. Consequently, the alternative interpretation asserts a more inclusive conception of Śaṅkara's soteriology than the standard view does.

2.2 Non-Saṃnyāsins and Scripture

According to the second argument for the standard interpretation of Śaṅkara that I outlined in the last chapter, devotees must study the Upaniṣads under an Advaitin guru in order to attain brahmajñāna. These gurus only accepted saṃnyāsins as students. This implies that only saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna. This denies that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

42 Some scholars deny, however, that Śaṅkara counts the study of the Upaniṣads under an

Advaitin guru as a necessary condition of brahmajñāna. These scholars claim that Śaṅkara allows that it is possible to attain brahmajñāna by studying smṛti. If devotees can attain brahmajñāna by studying smṛti, then the study of the Upaniṣads is not a necessary condition of brahmajñāna. And if the study of the Upaniṣads is not a necessary condition of brahmajñāna, then the attainment of brahmajñāna need not be limited to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins.

Marcaurelle, Comans, and Potter cite BSBh 1.3.34-8 to support their claim that Śaṅkara allows that a person might attain brahmajñāna through the study of smṛti. Since this is a common point of reference, I want to begin by reviewing these passages.

At BSBh 1.3.34, Śaṅkara replies to a pūrvapakṣin (opponent) who claims that śūdras can attain vidyā (knowledge). According to the pūrvapakṣin, śūdras can attain vidyā because there are no “prohibitions declared in the sacred texts like ‘hence śūdras are unfit for sacrifice’ [which state] that in the same manner, ‘śūdras are unfit for vidyā.’”13 Scripture is explicit that śūdras do not possess the dharmic right to perform Vedic rituals. The pūrvapakṣin points out, however, that there are no such scriptural passages that state that śūdras cannot attain vidyā. Similar to

Śaṅkara’s line of reasoning in BSBh 3.4.38, the pūrvapakṣin seems to say that the absence of a rule stating that śūdras cannot acquire vidyā implies that śūdras can acquire vidyā. 14

13 tasmācchūdro yajñe ‘navaklṛptaḥ itivat śūdro vidyāyāmanavaklṛpta iti niṣedhāśravaṇāt

(BSBh 1.3.34)

14 At BSBh 3.4.38, Śaṅkara claims that anyone desirous of brahmajñāna is qualified to practice jñānayoga as long as there are no scriptural rules prohibiting it. Again, “[k]nowledge – which has an acknowledged goal (the attainment of liberation) – authorizes the supplicant in śravaṇa

43 The pūrvapakṣin also notes that there are śūdras in smṛti who are described as possessing vidyā. According to the pūrvapakṣin, “Vidura, etc. – who were born of a śūdra womb – are mentioned in smṛti as being endowed with preeminent knowledge (viśiṣṭavijñānasaṃpannāḥ).

Hence śūdras are entitled to knowledge.”15 Since Vidura is described as possessing vidyā, and since Vidura was a śūdra, this implies that śūdras can acquire vidyā, according to the pūrvapakṣin.

Śaṅkara initially disagrees with the pūrvapakṣin. He claims that śūdras do not possess the right (adhikāra) to vidyā, since śūdras are forbidden from studying the Upaniṣads. In BSBh

1.3.34, Śaṅkara says,

no śūdra has the right [to vidyā] on account of the absence of Vedic study. Indeed, one

who has studied the Vedas, and understood the general sense of the Vedas, he is entitled in

the matter of the meaning of the Vedas. Moreover, the right to the study of the Vedas does

not belong to the śūdra because the study of the Vedas has the prerequisite upanayana

etc. (jñānayoga) by only the absence of a reason for denial.” Since jñānayoga is the means to brahmajñāna, Śaṅkara implies anybody that desires brahmajñāna can attain it, so long as there are no rules saying they cannot. The pūrvapakṣin seems to be using a similar line of reasoning, noting that there are no rules that state that śūdras cannot acquire vidyā.

15 viduraprabhṛtaya ca śūdrayoniprabhavāḥ api viśiṣṭavijñānasaṃpannāḥ smaryante / tasmādadikryate śūdro vidyāsvatevaṃ prapte (BSBh 1.3.34)

44 ceremony and because the upanayana ceremony has been restricted to the upper three

varṇas.16

The upanayana ceremony initiates young men of the top three classes into the brahmacarya

āśrama – the student stage of life. Śaṅkara’s opinion is that devotees must perform the upanayana ceremony before they can hear, recite, or study the Vedas in any capacity. Only brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas can perform this ceremony. So when the pūrvapakṣin claims that śūdras can acquire vidyā, Śaṅkara’s immediate reply is that śūdras do not have the ability to attain vidyā because they cannot study the Upaniṣads. This should sound like a version of the second argument for the standard interpretation from last chapter.

At BSBh 1.3.38, Śaṅkara acknowledges that there are śūdras in smṛti who are described as possessing jñāna (knowledge). It is not immediately clear what Śaṅkara takes jñāna to mean, however. It could refer to brahmajñāna, or it could refer to some other type of religious knowledge. Nonetheless, Śaṅkara seems to agree with the pūrvapakṣin that Vidura, etc. are described as possessing vidyā/jñāna. He explains that

those [śūdras] who have the knowledge being mentioned, due to the power of mental

impressions derived from past actions – those, like Vidura ‘the righteous hunter’, etc. –

16 na śūdrasyādhikāraḥ, vedādhyayanābhāvāt / adhītavedo hi viditavedārtho vedārtheṣvadhikriyate / na ca śūdrasya vedādhyayanamasti (BSBh 1.3.34) upanayanapūrvakatvādvedādhyayanasya, upanayanasya ca varṇatrayaviṣayatvāt (BSBh 1.3.34)

45 their obtaining the result [of knowledge] is impossible to prevent… and on account of the

traditional right of the four varṇas to the study of itihāsa (epics) and the Purāṇas.17

Here Śaṅkara claims that Vidura acquired jñāna because his past actions produced mental disposition to acquire it. He also says that all four varṇas – brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and

śūdras – have the right to study smṛti – such as the epics and Purāṇas.

Many scholars read BSBh 1.3.38 to say that śūdras can attain brahmajñāna by studying smṛti.

This way of reading 1.3.38 assumes that the word jñāna in this passage refers to brahmajñāna.

Moreover, this way of reading 1.3.38 implies that brahmajñāna can be attained by the study of smṛti. So this reading contradicts the claim that one must study the Upaniṣads (śruti) in order to attain brahmajñāna.

Marcaurelle, for example, reads BSBh 1.3.38 to claim that śūdras can attain brahmajñāna by studying smṛti. He states that at BSBh 1.3.38, Śaṅkara claims that “knowledge of Brahman

[brahmajñāna] is indeed available to Śūdras… through sources other than the revealed texts known as Śruti” (220). If śūdras can attain brahmajñāna through the study of smṛti, however, then śūdras can attain brahmajñāna without studying the Upaniṣads.

As I mentioned in the last section, Maraurelle claims that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna. He also holds that non-saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga. When Śaṅkara claims that the four varṇas have the right to study smṛti, Marcaurelle interprets this to mean that śūdras

17 yeṣām punaḥ pūrvakṛtasaṃskāravaśādviduradharmavyādhaprabhṛtīnāṃ jñānaotpattiḥ, teṣam na śakyate phalaprāptiḥ pratiṣeddhum, jñānasyaikāntikaphalatvāt… cetihāsapurāṇādhigame cāturvarṇyasyādhikārasmaraṇāt. BSBh 1.3.38

46 can practice jñānayoga on smṛti. So according to Marcaurelle’s reading of Śaṅkara, śūdras can hear, reflect, and meditate on the brahmajñāna found in smṛti. “[R]especting the scriptural statements that forbid Śūdras to study the Śruti, Śaṅkara holds in his BSBh 1.3.38 that Śūdras are entitled to a discipline of knowledge [jñānayoga] based only on epics and Purāṇas [smṛti]”

(32). This also contradicts the standard claim that devotees need to study the Upaniṣads under an

Advaitin guru.

Comans’ reading of BSBh 1.3.34-38 is similar to Marcaurelle’s. According to Comans,

śūdras do not have the dharmic right to study the Upaniṣads. He allows that for Śaṅkara, “there is a specific prohibition against their [śūdras] studying the Veda, because they are excluded from investiture with the sacred thread (upanayana) which is the prerequisite for entry into Vedic study” (317). Śūdras cannot study the Upaniṣads because they are forbidden from performing the prerequisite upanayana ceremony. If brahmajñāna is attained by studying the Upaniṣads, this implies that śūdras cannot acquire brahmajñāna.

Comans reads BSBh 1.3.38, however, to say that śūdras can attain brahmajñāna, through the study of smṛti. According to Comans, “while Śūdras were to be at least theoretically debarred from studying the Veda, they could acquire liberation from the various smṛti texts, which are based ultimately upon the Vedic revelation” (317). If śūdras can attain liberation through the study of smṛti, then the study of the Upaniṣads under an Advaitin guru is not a necessary condition of brahmajñāna.

Karl Potter also reads BSBh 1.3.34 to say that śūdras cannot attain brahmajñāna through the study of the Upaniṣads. He claims that śūdras “are not entitled to Brahman-knowledge, since they do not study the Vedas, do not receive the upanayana etc.” (40). Śūdras cannot acquire

47 brahmajñāna through study of the Upaniṣads because they do not have the dharmic right to study the Upaniṣads in the first place.

Potter reads BSBh 1.3.38, however, to allow that śūdras can acquire brahmajñāna through smṛti. He claims that “[n]evertheless, some śūdras do acquire such knowledge [brahmajñāna] by other means than Vedic study, admits Śaṃkara” (140). According to Potter, Śaṅkara allows that

śūdras can attain brahmajñāna through “other means,” such as smṛti. This contradicts the standard claim that the study of the Upaniṣads under an Advaitin guru is a condition of attaining brahmajñāna.

The scholars in this section read BSBh 1.3.34-38 to say that śūdras can attain brahmajñāna by studying smṛti. This contradicts the standard claim that the study of the Upaniṣads is a condition to brahmajñāna. It needs to be remembered, however, that at BSBh 1.3.38, Śaṅkara claims that all four varṇas (cāturvarṇya) can study smṛti. If śūdras can attain brahmajñāna through smṛti, then presumably brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas might be able to attain brahmajñāna through smṛti as well. This contradicts the claim that the study of the Upaniṣads is a condition of brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

2.3 The Renunciation of Karman

The third argument for the standard interpretation of Śaṅkara that I reviewed in the last chapter claims that devotees must renounce karman in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. In this context, the word karman can refer to all actions, all non-essential actions, or dharmic actions.

So the claim might be that devotees must renounce all action, non-essential actions, or dharmic actions. On any of these interpretations, saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce karman, since saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce their dharmic duties.

48 Dharmic duties are a type of karman. Hence the renunciation of all karman entails the renunciation of dharmic duties. Since only saṃnyāsins can renounce their dharmic duties, it follows that saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce all karman.

Dharmic duties are also a type of non-essential karman. So the renunciation of all non- essential karman entails the renunciation of dharmic duties. Since only saṃnyāsins renounce their dharmic duties, it follows that saṃnyāsins are the only ones that can renounce all non- essential karman. Since the renunciation of karman is a condition of brahmajñāna, and since only saṃnyāsins can renounce karman, it follows that saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa, according to this standard reading of Śaṅkara.

Male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa according to this argument. Male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can become saṃnyāsins within

Śaṅkara’s system. If the renunciation of karman is a condition of brahmajñāna, then saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain brahmajñāna. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can attain brahmajñāna. Women, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins cannot attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa according to this argument for the standard view.

Other scholars, however, argue that Śaṅkara allows that devotees might continue to perform dharmic actions while they pursue brahmajñāna. According to these scholars, it is not necessary for people to renounce dharma in order to attain brahmajñāna. This contradicts the claim that the renunciation of dharma is a condition of the attainment of brahmajñāna. If the renunciation of dharma is not a condition of attaining brahmajñāna, then people other than saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

49 According to Potter, for example, it isn’t necessary for a person to renounce dharma in order to attain liberation. This is clear in his analysis of Śaṅkara’s rejection of jñānakarmasamuccaya.

Potter explains that jñānakarmasamuccaya is the view that “the seeker must continue to perform prescribed action while he is securing his understanding of the Self, and specifically, even after he has achieved the understanding of his self-identity with Brahman he must continue to observe the scriptural prescriptions” (41). Potter seems to use the words ‘prescribed action’ to refer to dharmic actions. So according to the proponent of jñānakarmasamuccaya, devotees must continue to fulfill their dharmic duties both before and after they acquire brahmajñāna.

Śaṅkara rejects jñānakarmasamuccaya. Potter argues, however, that Śaṅkara only rejects one of the two claims that constitute the thesis of the jñānakarmasamuccayin.

Śaṃkara agrees that prior to the achievement of Self-knowledge the seeker must satisfy

high moral requirements, so that observance of scriptural injunctions is insisted on up to

this point by both parties. Śaṃkara parts company with the combined-path [that is, the

jñānakarmasamuccayin] view over the latter’s insistence on observance of scriptural

injunctions after liberation (41).

According to Potter, Śaṅkara rejects the claim that the person continues to perform scriptural injunctions after attaining brahmajñāna, but accepts that devotees must fulfill scriptural injunctions prior to attaining brahmajñāna. If a person must continue to perform dharmic actions until they attain brahmajñāna, however, then the renunciation of dharmic actions is not a condition of acquiring brahmajñāna. This implies that people other than saṃnyāsins might attain

50 brahmajñāna. So Potter’s reading of Śaṅkara leaves open the possibility that non-saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna.

John Taber claims that Śaṅkara outlines a three step sequence to liberation in his BṛUBh. The first step, he says,

is preparation, involving a combination of spiritual disciplines and the observance of

religious duties, resulting in the removal of demerit; second is insight or realization based

on hearing and contemplating the Vedic word, which informs the well-prepared, purified

intellect as the blow of a hammer confers shape to metal; third is consolidation or

resolution (cooling of the forged object) consisting in the refraining from all activity, both

overtly, in the sense of withdrawing from social religious obligation, and inwardly (19).

The first step makes one ready to pursue brahmajñāna. Taber claims that devotees remove demerit through spiritual disciplines and religious duties. This implies that during the first step, devotees fulfill their dharmic duties, and hence, continue to perform dharmic actions.

In the second step, people attain “insight or realization based on hearing and contemplating the Vedic word.” This most likely refers to the realization of brahmajñāna through jñānayoga –

śravaṇa (hearing), manana (contemplating), and nididhyāsana (meditation). If this is the case, then Taber’s reading of Śaṅkara states that devotees attain brahmajñāna during the second step.

According to Taber, it is only at the third step – after a person has acquired brahmajñāna – that they must renounce “all activity” – including dharmic actions. If a person only abandons dharmic actions after they have attained liberation, however, then a person need not abandon dharmic actions before they attain liberation. So Taber’s reading allows that people can continue

51 to perform their dharmic duties until they acquire brahmajñāna. This contradicts the claim within the third argument on the standard account of Śaṅkara. Moreover, if the renunciation of karman isn’t a condition of attaining brahmajñāna, then non-saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna for this reason.

Sengaku Mayeda also claims that devotees continue to perform karman prior to attaining brahmajñāna. Mayeda claims that according to Śaṅkara, “[b]efore the cessation of nescience, abstinence from injury (ahiṃsā) and other abstentions (yama), the regular rites [nityakarman], and even sacrifice (yajña) should be observed to purify the mind” (92). Nityakarman and yajña are types of dharmic actions. The “cessation of nescience,” in turn, refers to the attainment of brahmajñāna. So according to Mayeda, Śaṅkara encourages people to perform dharmic actions prior to attaining brahmajñāna. Mayeda claims that “[p]ractically speaking, therefore, the aspirant should perform actions until his attainment of final release” (92). If devotees must perform karman until they attain brahmajñāna, however, it then follows that the renunciation of karman is not a condition of brahmajñāna. This contradicts the third argument for the standard reading of Śaṅkara, which states that the renunciation of karman is a condition of brahmajñāna.

This view allows for people other than saṃnyāsins to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Mayeda claims that devotees may perform yama, nityakarman, and yajña prior to attaining liberation.

This implies that the renunciation of karman is not a condition of brahmajñāna. If it is possible to attain brahmajñāna while performing nityakarman and yajña, it follows that becoming a saṃnyāsin and renouncing dharma is not a condition of brahmajñāna. Mayeda’s reading of

Śaṅkara, therefore, does not obviously restrict people other than saṃnyāsins from attaining brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

52 As I outlined in the last chapter, Śaṅkara’s commentary on BG 18.11 seems to contradict the claim that the renunciation of all karman is a condition of attaining brahmajñāna. In BG 18.11,

Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna that people cannot renounce karman while they are embodied. According to

Kṛṣṇa, “[i]t is not possible to renounce all karman [for one] with a corporeal body”18 This seems to repeat his earlier claim (BG 3.5) that “[n]o one ever exists not performing karman, not even for an instant.”19 Kṛṣṇa’s position, then, is that action cannot be renounced entirely, because acting is an unavoidable consequence of embodiment.

In his gloss of BG 18.11, Śaṅkara claims that it is impossible for the unliberated person to renounce every form of karman. According to Śaṅkara, “it is not possible to entirely renounce – to give up – all karman without remainder – by one who is embodied and who lacks jñāna.”20

When Kṛṣṇa claims that people cannot renounce karman while embodied, Śaṅkara adds that people cannot renounce karman as long as they are embodied and unliberated. This implies that the renunciation of all karman is not a condition of attaining brahmajñāna. If it is impossible to renounce all karman prior to attaining brahmajñāna, it then follows that the renunciation of all karman cannot be a condition of brahmajñāna.

According to Śaṅkara, the liberated individual is the only person who can completely renounce karman. In BGBh 18.11, Śaṅkara claims that “the total renunciation of karman can only be accomplished by he who understands the highest truth, by one who has forsaken the

18 na hi dehabhṛtā śakyaṃ tyaktuṃ karmāṇy aśeṣataḥ (BG 18.11).

19 na hi kaś cit kṣaṇam api jātu tiṣṭhaty akarmakṛt (BG 3.5).

20 ataḥ tena dehabhṛtā ajñena na śakyaṃ tyaktuṃ saṃnyasituṃ karmāṇi aśeṣataḥ niḥśeṣeṇa

(BGBh 18.11)

53 opinion that the soul is the body, by he who does not adhere to the body.”21 In order to account for Kṛṣṇa’s claim that it is impossible to abandon karman while embodied, Śaṅkara claims that people cannot renounce karman as long as they are embodied and unliberated. He then adds that the liberated person is the only individual that can renounce every form of karman.

If it is impossible to renounce all karman prior to attaining liberation, it follows that Śaṅkara must allow that the seeker after liberation continues to perform karman while they pursue brahmajñāna. As stated in the previous chapter, Śaṅkara’s gloss of BGBh 4.21 states that the desireless and self-controlled individual continues to act in order to maintain their body

(śarīrasthitimātraprayojanam). This suggests that Śaṅkara allows that the person pursuing liberation – the person who seeks to develop the qualities mentioned in BG 4.21 – might continue to perform essential, life-sustaining actions.

In BṛUBh 4.4.23, Śaṅkara claims that King Janaka acquired brahmajñāna. This is significant because Janaka is a king, not a saṃnyāsin. According to Śaṅkara, after hearing the sage

Yājñavalkya’s instruction, “thus Janaka obtained Brahman.”22 If Janaka obtained brahman – that is, if Janaka came to know himself as being identical to brahman – it can be assumed that Janaka attained brahmajñāna. Since Janaka is a king and not a saṃnyāsin, it follows that Janaka attained brahmajñāna without having renounced his dharmic duties. Śaṅkara’s claim that Janaka attained brahmajñāna, then, implies that devotees can attain brahmajñāna while they continue to fulfill their dharmic duties.

21 tasmāt paramārthadarśinaiva adehabhṛtā dehātmabhāvarahittena aśeṣkarmasaṃnyāsaḥ

śakyate kartum (BGBh 18.11)

22 evaṃ brahmabhūto janakaḥ (BṛUBh 4.4.23)

54 According to the third argument for the standard interpretation of Śaṅkara, devotees must renounce karman in order to attain liberation. In this context, karman can be taken to refer to all actions, all non-essential actions, or dharmic actions. BGBh 18.11 states that it is impossible for the unliberated person to renounce every form of karman. If it is impossible to renounce all karman prior to attaining liberation, it then follows that the renunciation of karman cannot be a condition of liberation. Thus there is reason to believe that Śaṅkara allows that the seeker after liberation continues to perform karman as they pursue brahmajñāna. BGBh 4.21 suggests that devotees can continue to perform essential, life-sustaining actions. BṛUBh4.4.23 suggests that

Janaka attained brahmajñāna without having previously renounced his dharmic duties. This suggests that the renunciation of dharma is not a condition to liberation within Śaṅkara’s system of thought.

The authors that I’ve reviewed in this section allow that non-saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna. They deny the claim that devotees must renounce dharmic action in order to attain brahmajñāna. Saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce dharma. If the renunciation of dharma isn’t a condition of brahmajñāna, however, then devotees do not need to become saṃnyāsins in order to attain brahmajñāna. Therefore, the views in this section leave room for people other than saṃnyāsins to attain brahmajñāna.

2.4 The Need to Become a Saṃnyāsin

There are places where Śaṅkara seems to claim that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. For example, in BGBh 2.69, Śaṅkara claims that “[o]nly the wise saṃnyāsin (yati) – that has abandoned all desires and who is situated in knowledge – has the power to enter the state of

55 mokṣa.”23 If saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa, then devotees need to become saṃnyāsins in order to attain mokṣa. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇas can attain mokṣa. So passages like BGBh 2.69 seem to support the standard reading of Śaṅkara. Moreover, BGBh 2.69 is problematic for proponents of all three argument for the alternative reading, since these authors deny that only saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

A number of authors argue, however, that when Śaṅkara claims that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa, he does not mean that only members of the saṃnyāsa āśrama can attain mokṣa.

One view is that Śaṅkara uses the word saṃnyāsin in a non-standard way when he claims that a person must become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain liberation.

According to Potter, for example, Śaṅkara uses the term saṃnyāsin to refer to a person who has already attained brahmajñāna. “Whereas most Hindus view saṃnyāsa as an advanced spiritual state it is a peculiarity of Śaṃkara’s thought that he construes this stage as identical with living liberation, that is, with jīvanmukti” (35). A jīvanmukta is an individual that has acquired brahmajñāna. According to Potter, Śaṅkara uses the word saṃnyāsin as an honorific title for jīvanmuktas. Therefore, the title saṃnyāsin does not necessarily refer to members of the saṃnyāsa āśrama. In this context, it refers to somebody that is already liberated.

Potter’s argument for this reading notes that “Śaṃkara, when speaking of saṃnyāsa, frequently describes it in terms that seem appropriate only to the liberated person” (35). For example, in BGBh 3.17, Śaṅkara claims saṃnyāsins are grounded in the knowledge of the self

(ātmajñānaniṣṭha). Ātman is brahman. Ātmajñāna – knowledge about ātman – is brahmajñāna.

23 viduṣa tyaktaiṣaṇasya sthitaprajñasya yatereva mokṣaprāptiḥ (BGBh 2.69)

56 So when he claims that saṃnyāsins are steadfast in ātmajñāna, Śaṅkara implies that the saṃnyāsins are liberated. Therefore, there is some evidence to support Potter’s claim that

Śaṅkara uses the word saṃnyāsin to refer to jīvanmuktas.

On this reading, Śaṅkara’s claim that only saṃnyāsins can attain liberation is equivalent to the claim that only jīvanmuktas can attain liberation. According to Potter, “Śaṃkara insists that one can only ‘become liberated’ from the fourth stage [the saṃnyāsa āśrama]… However, because saṃnyāsa is liberation… it is tautologous to say one must pass through it to be liberated” (35).

Saṃnyāsins are jīvanmuktas. Therefore, the claim that ‘only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa’ implies that only jīvanmuktas can attain mokṣa. Jīvanmuktas are people that possess brahmajñāna, and are therefore liberated. So according to Potter, Śaṅkara’s claim is that people need to understand brahmajñāna and become jīvanmuktas/saṃnyāsins in order to attain mokṣa.

Potter’s reading of Śaṅkara does not imply that devotees need to become members of the saṃnyāsa āśrama in order to attain brahmajñāna. According to Potter, “Śaṃkara does not teach withdrawal from the world at any point along the path of spiritual progress, even at the saṃnyāsa or jivanmukta stage” (35). This implies that a person need not become a saṃnyāsin before or after attaining liberation. If devotees do not need to become members of the saṃnyāsa āśrama in order to attain mokṣa, this implies that non-saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

According to Marcaurelle, male brāhmaṇas are the only individuals who have the dharmic right to become saṃnyāsins (now in the standard sense of the word) within Śaṅkara’s soteriology. Marcaurelle argues, however, that when Śaṅkara states that devotees must become saṃnyāsins in order to attain mokṣa, he is speaking exclusively to male brāhmaṇas – the only individuals with the dharmic right to become saṃnyāsins (37). “Throughout his works, Śaṅkara maintains that the addressee of the prescription of physical renunciation [becoming a saṃnyāsin]

57 is always and only the Brahmin [brāhmaṇa]” (40). Since brāhmaṇas are the only individuals that can become saṃnyāsins, when Śaṅkara tells devotees that they need to become saṃnyāsins in order to attain liberation, he is speaking to the only individuals that can follow this injunction – namely, brāhmaṇas. His claim, then, is that brāhmaṇas must become saṃnyāsins in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa.24

This does not imply, however, that all devotees need to enter the saṃnyāsa āśrama in order to attain brahmajñāna. Nor does it imply that brahmajñāna is only available to brāhmaṇas.

According to Marcaurelle’s reading of Śaṅkara, the other three varṇas can attain brahmajñāna without becoming saṃnyāsins. Brāhmaṇas have to become saṃnyāsins in order to attain liberation, but the other three varṇas can attain brahmajñāna without entering the saṃnyāsa

āśrama. Therefore, Marcaurelle’s reading of Śaṅkara’s position on renunciation allows for non- saṃnyāsins to attain brahmajñāna.

Some proponents of the alternative view concede that Śaṅkara claims that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. This seems to imply that devotees must become saṃnyāsins in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. According to the alternative arguments, however, these passages do not imply that becoming a member of the saṃnyāsa āśrama is a universal condition to brahmajñāna. Potter argues that the word saṃnyāsin refers to a jivanmukta. Marcaurelle claims that only male brāhmaṇas need to become saṃnyāsins. Despite their different arguments, Potter

24 Some brāhmaṇas can attain brahmajñāna without having to become saṃnyāsins, according to

Marcaurelle. It follows, therefore, that becoming a saṃnyāsin is not a universal condition to liberation even for brāhmaṇas on Marcaurelle’s account of Śaṅkara.

58 and Marcaurelle come to the same conclusion – non-saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa despite

Śaṅkara’s claims that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed an alternative interpretation of Śaṅkara’s soteriology. The alternative interpretation claims that Śaṅkara allows that people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. The first argument states that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna. It argues, however, that non-saṃnyāsins might practice jñānayoga. This implies that people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa by this means.

The second argument denies that study of the Upaniṣads under an Advaitin guru is a necessary condition of the attainment of brahmajñāna and mokṣa. It states that Śaṅkara allows that a person might also attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa by means of the study of smṛti. If a person might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa by means of the study of smṛti, however, then people who do not have access to the Upaniṣads – like śūdras and women – might attain liberation on Śaṅkara’s account.

The third argument denies that devotees must renounce karman in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. This alternative reading holds that devotees can continue to perform karman until they attain brahmajñāna. If devotees can continue to perform karman until they attain brahmajñāna, then a person need not become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain mokṣa. If a person need not become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain mokṣa, in turn, then people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna.

59 In certain passages, Śaṅkara seems to claim that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. This seems to imply that devotees must become saṃnyāsins in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Some authors, however, dispute this interpretation. Potter, for example, claims that the word saṃnyāsin refers to a jīvanmukta, rather than members of the saṃnyāsa āśrama.

Marcaurelle claims that Śaṅkara only requires that brāhmaṇas become saṃnyāsins in order to attain mokṣa. Śaṅkara does not mean to claim that people who are not brāhmaṇas must become saṃnyāsins in order to attain liberation. These reading of Śaṅkara are consistent with people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins attaining brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

Thus far, I have reviewed the work of other Śaṅkara scholars. In the next two chapters, I will examine Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. Kramamukti is a Sanskrit compound that means gradual (krama) liberation (mukti). Within Śaṅkara’s system, kramamukti is a path to liberation by which devotees attain mokṣa while residing in a heaven called brahmaloka (the heaven of brahman).

In the next chapter, I will discuss Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna (the path of the gods).

The devayāna is the path that leads to brahmaloka. First, I will discuss Śaṅkara’s account of how a person enters the devayāna. Śaṅkara states that a person follows the devayāna by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās – particular objects like deities, metaphysical doctrines, and rituals.

Then I will outline Śaṅkara’s account of what happens along the devayāna. I will argue that

Śaṅkara presents a consistent account of this sequence of stages, despite seemingly inconsistent descriptions of the path in the relevant authoritative texts. When Śaṅkara encounters these differences, his interpretative strategy is to reconcile them. This suggests that Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna is a consistent and well defined theory that deserves serious consideration.

60 Chapter 3:

Śaṅkara on the Devayāna

Introduction

In the first chapter, I outlined a standard interpretation of Śaṅkara’s views about who can attain mokṣa. According to the proponents of this standard interpretation, male brāhmaṇas who become saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain liberation. Proponents offer three common arguments for this view. According to the first argument, jñānayoga is the means to attain liberation and only saṃnyāsins practice jñānayoga. Since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, it follows that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain liberation.

According to the second argument, devotees must study the Upaniṣads with a guru in order to attain liberation. Since gurus only accept other saṃnyāsins as students, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain liberation. According to the third argument for the standard view, Śaṅkara insists that devotees must renounce karman in order to attain liberation. Since saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce karman – because only saṃnyāsins can renounce dharma, in particular – only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain liberation. Since the standard interpretation claims that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain liberation, it entails that

Śaṅkara excludes women, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, and non-saṃnyāsins from the attainment of liberation.

In the second chapter, I outlined the views of scholars who defend alternative readings of

Śaṅkara. According to these alternative views, Śaṅkara allows that people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation as well. Some of these authors claim that Śaṅkara allows that non-saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga. If non-saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga,

61 however, then the first argument for the standard interpretation is unconvincing, and people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation. Other scholars claim that Śaṅkara allows that some individuals might attain liberation through the study of smṛti. If this is right, then the second argument for the standard interpretation is unconvincing, and people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation. Still others claim that Śaṅkara denies that the renunciation of karman is a condition of liberation. If the renunciation of karman is not a condition of liberation, then the third argument for the standard reading of Śaṅkara is unconvincing, and people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation as well.

Some of these authors also argue that Śaṅkara’s claims that a person must become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain liberation are not to be read literally. This, too, allows that people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

In the next three chapters, I will discuss Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. Kramamukti is a Sanskrit compound that means gradual (krama) liberation (mukti). Within Śaṅkara’s system of thought, kramamukti is a path to liberation by which devotees attain mokṣa while residing in a heaven called brahmaloka (the heaven of brahman).

In this this chapter, I will discuss Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna (the path of the gods). The devayāna is the path that leads to brahmaloka (the heaven of brahman). In the first section of this chapter, I will discuss Śaṅkara’s explanation of how a person enters the devayāna.

Śaṅkara states that a person follows the devayāna by meditating on saguṇavidyās – particular objects like deities, metaphysical doctrines, and rituals.

In the second section, I will outline Śaṅkara’s account of what happens as a person passes through the devayāna. I will argue that Śaṅkara presents a consistent account of this sequence of stages, despite rather wildly divergent descriptions of the path in the Upaniṣads and other

62 authoritative texts. When Śaṅkara encounters these differences, his interpretive strategy is to try and reconcile them. This suggests that Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna is a consistent and well defined theory that deserves serious consideration.

3.1 Devayāna, Upāsana, and Saguṇavidyās

According to Śaṅkara, upāsana (meditation) on saguṇavidyās (qualified objects of meditation) leads to the devayāna (the path of the gods). In order explain his account, I will first discuss

Śaṅkara’s views on upāsana. I will then examine saguṇavidyās. The final step will be to demonstrate that upāsana on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna.

In this context, the word upāsana refers to a specific method of meditation.25 Śaṅkara defines upāsana in BṛUBh 1.3.9.

Upāsana is, having mentally approached the form of a deity, etc. in the manner that it is

taught by śruti in the vedārtha (eulogium) section concerned with worship, sitting and

25 Upāsana literally means homage, worship, or adoration. The verbal root for upāsana is upās.

Upās means to pay attention to, or be intent upon. Thus the verbal root for upāsana denotes concentration. This suggests that the word upāsana refers to a form of prolonged, reverential concentration.

63 reflecting without being interrupted by worldly ideas until there manifests a conception of

the self in the form of that deity, which is similar to mundane notions of the self.26

Here, Śaṅkara claims that upāsana is a form of meditation in which devotees sit and concentrate on the object of meditation, to the exclusion of all other thoughts. As a result, a person comes to identify with this object in the same way that a person might identify with ordinary notions of the self.27

Dalal identifies three different types of upāsana within Śaṅkara’s theology: saṃpad upāsana, adhyāsa upāsana, and viśiṣṭakriyayoga upāsana. Saṃpad upāsana “is a meditation identifying the mind with the viśvadevas (a class of deities)” (183). Adhyāsa upāsana is when devotees superimpose brahman onto the object of meditation. According to Dalal, an example of adhyāsa upāsana is found in Chandogyopaniṣadbhāṣya (ChU) 3.19.1, which states that the sun (āditya) is brahman. In this case, the sun is the object of meditation, and brahman is superimposed onto it.

In viśiṣṭakriyayoga upāsana, the practitioner meditates on the similarities between their own

26 upāsanaṃ nāma upāsyārthavāde yathā devatādisvarūpaṃ śrutyā jñāpyate tathā manasopagamya, āsanaṃ cintanam, laukikapratyayāvyavadhānena, yāvat taddevatādisvarūpātmābhimānābhivyaktiriti laukikātmābhimānavat (BṛUBh 1.3.39)

27 Bader claims that “[t]he real aim of upāsanā is to effect a correspondence of subject

(meditator) and object (of the meditation)” (33). Witz claims that this new form of self- identification is meant to transfer into one’s everyday life (189).

64 actions and natural events. An example of this is when devotees meditate on the similarity between praṇa (breath) and vayu (wind) (183).

In BṛUBh 1.3.9, Śaṅkara defines upāsana as a form of meditation by which the practitioner concentrates on the form of a deity, etc. (devādisvarūpam). It is important to notice the language in this passage. Śaṅkara expands the range of possible objects of meditation by adding the word etc. (ādi). This implies that the object of upāsana does not need to be a deity per se. As some of the passages that I consider in what follows state, the object of upāsana might be a ritual, a syllable, or a metaphysical doctrine.

All of the objects of meditation described thus far are saguṇa (qualified). The sun, for example, possess the qualities of being yellow, hot, etc. Thus the sun is a saguṇa (qualified) object of meditation. Likewise, deities are qualified objects of meditation. They possess qualities like gender, form, etc. So while these objects of meditation are diverse, they share the similarity of being saguṇa objects of meditation.

Śaṅkara calls these objects of meditation saguṇavidyās. The word saguṇavidyā is a two part compound. Saguṇa, again, means qualified. Vidyās, in turn, are points of focus for upāsana.

Cenkner explains that

[u]pāsanā and vidyā are the two most common terms for meditation in the Upaniṣads.

Upāsanā denotes the act and state of meditation, while vidyā signifies the object of

meditation whether it is a ritual, a deity or a metaphysical statement, or any other form of

symbol (74).

65 The word saguṇavidyā is a two part compound. The word vidyā, in this context, refers to the object of meditation itself – the god, the syllable, the metaphysical doctrine, and so on.28 The word saguṇa, again, means qualified. A saguṇavidyā, then, is a qualified object of meditation.

Deussen points out that the Upaniṣads contain a wide range of saguṇa descriptions of brahman, in particular.

[t]he Upanishads swarm with fanciful and contradictory descriptions of the nature of

Brahman. He is the all-pervading akasa [sky], is the purusha [person] in the sun, the

purusha in the eye; his head is the heaven, his eyes are sun and moon, his breath is the

wind, his footstool the earth; he is infinitely great as soul of the universe and infinitely

small as the soul in us; he is in particular the Isvara, the personal God, distributing justly

rewards and punishment according to the deeds of man. All these descriptions are collected

by Sankara under the wide mantle of the exoteric theology, the saguna vidya of Brahman,

28 There is some terminological ambiguity in regards to the word vidyā. According to some, vidyā is a word for meditation. Narayanaswami Aiyar, for example, claims that vidyās refer to

“meditations which conduce to the getting of knowledge and other results” (forward 25).

Cenkner also notes that “Vedānta frequently uses vidyā and upāsana interchangeably” (74).

According to Witz, vidyā denotes “a line of wisdom, including a method of meditation, expounded in a particular Upaniṣadic text, which leads to Brahman. For this is a common meaning of vidyā in Śaṁkara’s commentary on the Brahma Sūtras” (201).

66 consisting of numerous ‘vidyas’ adapted for approaching the Eternal Being [brahman]

(1912, appendix 2).

This passage suggests that Deussen takes all of these descriptions of brahman to be possible objects of meditation, and hence, possible saguṇavidyās. They are objects upon which a person might meditate, and with which a person might identify in the way that

Śaṅkara describes.

The śāṇḍilyavidyā (ChU 3.14) is an example of a saguṇavidyā (BSBh 3.3.31). The beginning of the passage that describes the śāṇḍilyavidyā states, “[i]ndeed, all this is brahman. With a sense of inner-tranquility, one should meditate on it as ‘tajjalān’.”29 According to Olivelle, Śaṅkara analyzes tajjalān as “an acronym indicating that everything proceeds from (ja), dissolves into

(la), and lives by (an) brahman” (1998, 544). So the object of meditation – tajjalān – is equivalent to the claim that everything is brahman. The passage enjoins meditation on the metaphysical idea that everything is brahman. And here, brahman is qualified as that from which everything proceeds, and so on. Thus the śāṇḍilyavidyā is a saguṇavidyā.

The paryaṅkavidyā is another saguṇavidyā. The passage that outlines the paryaṅkavidyā describes brahman as sitting on a couch (paryaṅka) (Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad (KauU) 1.1-5).

Brahman asks the jīva “who are you?”30 In this passage, brahman is qualified by the act of sitting, the act of speaking, and by the assumption that brahman resides within a physical space to which a jīva can travel. Moreover, the passage outlining the paryaṅkavidyā states that

29 sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma tajjalān iti śānta upāsīta (ChU 3.14.1)

30 ko ‘sīti? (KauU 1.5)

67 brahman is everything. This, again, equates brahman with the world. Thus the description of brahman in this passage is a saguṇa description. This qualified conception of brahman, in turn, might serve as the object of upāsana.

To review, upāsana is a form of meditation. Saguṇavidyās are objects of meditation. These objects can be deities, doctrinal statements, or symbols. For Śaṅkara, these vidyās are saguṇa – possessed of qualities.

According to Śaṅkara, upāsana on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna. At BSBh 3.3.31,

Śaṅkara claims that “[p]assage [on the devayāna] is fitting in the case of saguṇavidyās [but] not in the case of vidyās of the highest-self that is without qualities.”31 One of the differences between saguṇavidyās and nirguṇavidyās (vidyās that take unqualified objects), according to

Śaṅkara, is that only saguṇavidyās lead to the devayāna.

The next topic in BSBh 3.3.31 is whether the different types of saguṇavidyās all lead to the devayāna. According to Śaṅkara, the jīva’s “passage [on the devayāna] is heard in saguṇavidyās like the paryaṅkavidyā, the upakosalavidyā, and daharavidyā, [and] not in others like the madhuvidyā, the śaṇḍilyavidyā, ṣoḍśakalavidyā, or the vaiśvānaravidyā.”32 Śaṅkara’s point here is that passages like BṛU 6.2.15 state explicitly that the pañcāgnividyā leads to the devayāna.

Some Upaniṣads outline saguṇavidyās, however, without stating that they lead to the devayāna.

31 saguṇāsu vidyāsu gatirarthavatī, na nirguṇāyāṃ paramātmavidyāyām (BSBh 3.3.31)

32 saguṇāsvapi vidyāsu kāsucidgatiḥ śrūyate – yathā paryaṅkavidyāyām, upakośalavidyāyāṃ, daharavidyāyāmiti na anyāsu yathā madhuvidyāyāṃ śāṇḍilyavidyāyāṃ ṣoḍśakalavidvidyāyāṃ vaiśvānaravidyāyāmiti (BSBh 3.3.31)

68 So Śaṅkara asks whether those passages that reference saguṇavidyās, but do not explicitly state that meditation on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna, lead to the devayāna nonetheless.33

Contrary to his opponent, Śaṅkara argues that all saguṇavidyās lead to the devayāna. If an

Upaniṣad outlines a saguṇavidyā, but does not say that it grants access to the devayāna, it should be thought to grant access to the devayāna nonetheless. Śaṅkara states, “this passage – named the devayāna – is to be granted without distinction of all saguṇavidyās that have the reward of obtaining prosperity.”34 According to BSBh 3.3.31, scriptural precedent dictates that all saguṇavidyās lead to the devayāna. This is the case even if an Upaniṣad outlines a saguṇavidyā, but does not say explicitly that it leads to the devayāna. So there is a clear effort on Śaṅkara’s part to categorise all saguṇavidyās as leading to the devayāna.

Some Upaniṣads imply that there are other ways to access the devayāna. The Chāndogya

Upaniṣad (ChU), for example, implies that knowledge of tapas (austerity) and śraddha (faith) leads to the devayāna. ChU 5.10.1 reads, “[n]ow, they who knew thus, and those in the forest who acknowledge that ‘tapas is śraddha’, they reach the flame [the first station on the devayāna].”35 According to Śaṅkara, “they who knew thus” refers to devotees who meditate on the pañcāgnividyā. This is consistent with the claim that upāsana on saguṇavidyās leads to the

33 tatra saṃśayaḥ -- kim yāsveṣā gatiḥ śrūyate, tāsveva niyamyeta; uta aniyamena sarvābhireva evaṃjātīyakābhirvidyābhirabhisaṃbandhyeteti (BSBh 3.3.31)

34 sarvāsāmeva abhyudayaprāptiphalānāṃ saguṇānāṃ vidyānām aviśeṣeṇa eṣā devayānākhyā gatirbhavitumarhati (BSBh 3.3.31)

35 tadya ittham viduḥ / ye ceme ‘raṇye śraddhā tapa ityupāsate / te ‘arciṣamabhisaṃbhavanti

(ChU 5.10.2)

69 devayāna. Tapas and śraddha, however, are not saguṇavidyās. So the ChU seems to imply that knowledge of tapas and śraddha is a means to the devayāna.

Śaṅkara argues that tapas and śraddha, in this context, are synonyms for an unnamed saguṇavidyā. He begins by explaining that tapas and śraddha do not, by themselves, allow one to follow the devayāna. According to BSBh 3.3.31, “[t]his passage [on the devayāna] is not obtained by tapas and śraddha alone without the force of [saguṇa]vidyās.”36 Śaṅkara acknowledges that the verse implies that knowledge of tapas and śraddha grants access to the devayāna, but he denies this reading. According to Śaṅkara, there is no way to obtain the devayāna by tapas and śraddha alone, without meditating on saguṇavidyās.

Śaṅkara adds that “in this case, the implicit designation of another saguṇavidyā is

[understood] from [the words] tapas and śraddha.”37 In order to account for the claim that tapas and śraddha are means to access the devayāna (ChU 5.10.1), Śaṅkara argues that in this case, they refer to an unnamed saguṇavidyā. To say that a person attains the devayāna by means of tapas and śraddha, then, is to say that a person attains the devayāna by means of meditating on some unnamed saguṇavidyā. This demonstrates that Śaṅkara is willing to expand his definition of what might constitute a saguṇavidyā. Since one must go to brahmaloka in order to attain kramamukti, Śaṅkara’s comprehensive definition of saguṇavidyā means there are numerous meditative practices that initiate the sequence towards kramamukti.

BGBh 8.22 discusses a group of yogins that follow the devayāna. Śaṅkara explains that these yogins superimpose brahman onto the syllable om, and then use om as an object of meditation.

36 na hi kevalābhyāṃ antareṇa vidyābalam eṣa gatirlabhyate (BSBh 3.3.31)

37 tasmāt iha śraddhātapobhyāṃ vidyāntaropalakṣaṇam (BSBh 3.3.31)

70

The northern path (the devayāna), which is going to be discussed next, is for the sake of

obtaining brahman [by] the yogins under discussion who have their notions of brahman

fixed on the sacred syllable om, and who are entitled to liberation after some time

(kālāntara).38

When Śaṅkara claims the devayāna “is for the sake of obtaining brahman,” he is referring to brahmaloka. Śaṅkara believes that people who meditate on the syllable om attain the devayāna.

So here, Śaṅkara takes om to be a saguṇavidyā.

Upāsana on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna, according to Śaṅkara. Upāsana is a form of meditation and saguṇavidyās are the corresponding objects of meditation. Śaṅkara holds that all saguṇavidyās lead to the devayāna. When scripture indicates there may be alternative ways to gain access to the devayāna, Śaṅkara argues that these passages refer to unnamed saguṇavidyās.

In the context of kramamukti, this demonstrates that Śaṅkara is willing to expand his definition of what might constitute upāsana on a saguṇavidyā – the practices that initiate the sequence towards kramamukti.

At this point, a word of caution is needed. Saguṇavidyās can be rituals, metaphysical doctrines, deities, etc. The specific examples that I have covered so far have been examples of saguṇavidyās. According to Śaṅkara, meditating on symbols (pratīka) also allows one to enter

38 prakṛtānāṃ yogināṃ praṇavāveśitabrahmabuddhīnāṃ kālāntaramuktibhājāṃ brahmapratipattaye uttaro mārgo vaktavya iti ‘yatra kāle’ ityādi vivakṣitārthasamarpaṇārtham gorpanyāsaḥ itaramārgastutyathaṇa (BGBh 8.22)

71 the devayāna. This form of meditation does not, however, allow one to enter brahmaloka. It follows that meditation on symbols does not lead to brahmaloka or kramamukti – even though it allows one to enter the devayāna.39

In BSBh 4.3.15, Śaṅkara cites Bādarāyaṇa as the authoritative view on this matter. He claims that “the teacher Bādarāyaṇa thinks ‘having excluded all those who rely on symbols, he leads all others who rely on modifications to brahmaloka.’”40 This is a complex claim that need some explanation.

There are two groups of practitioners discussed in BSBh 4.3.15. The first group is characterised as pratīkālambanān (resting on symbols). In this context, pratīkālambana refers to the person who meditates on symbols. These people are said to rest their meditative focus on symbols. Thus they are characterised as pratīkālambanān – resting on symbols. Alston refers to stone images as examples of symbols (3). In the context of BSBh 4.3.15, Śaṅkara probably has similar in mind. The second group is characterised as vikārālambanān (resting on modifications).

39 According to Alston, “when meditating on a symbol of the Self as the Self, one should remain clear that the Self is not limited to the symbol. To take the stone image of Viṣṇu as such for

Viṣṇu is idolatry in Śaṅkara’s eyes” (3). In BSBh 4.3.15, it is possible that Śaṅkara is discussing people who make this mistake. They have limited the larger concept – ātman/brahman – to the symbol used as the point of meditative focus.

40 pratīkālambanānvarjayitvā sarvānanyānvikārālambanān nayati brahmalokam – iti bādarāyaṇa ācāryo manyate (BSBh 4.3.15).

72 In this context, vikārālambana refers to the person who meditates on saguṇavidyās.41 The word

‘modifications’ is short hand for the qualities ascribed to brahman in saguṇavidyās. It refers to the qualities of the qualified object of meditation. So BSBh 4.3.15 references two different groups of people – those who meditate on physical symbols, and those who meditate on saguṇavidyās.

At one point on the devayāna, devotees are said to encounter a super-human entity (amānavaḥ puruṣaḥ). Similar to Charon, who ferries souls over the River Styx, this god-like being escorts jīvas into brahmaloka. Śaṅkara claims that according to Bādarāyaṇa, only those who meditate on saguṇavidyās are taken to brahmaloka. People that meditate on symbols, in contrast, are denied entrance into brahmaloka by this super-human entity. This implies that meditating on symbols allows one to enter the devayāna, but does not allow one to enter brahmaloka. So when Śaṅkara says that a specific meditative practice grants access to the devayāna, it does not automatically follow that this practice is sufficient to allow one to enter brahmaloka.

41 In this context, I think it is acceptable to take vikārālambana as referring to one who meditates on saguṇavidyās. Vikārālambana is a two-part compound. Vikāra means modification.

Ālambana means depending on, or resting upon. In BSBh 4.3.15, Thibaut takes vikārālambanān to refer to people “who take their stand (i.e. who meditate) on the effected Brahman” (403). Two things to note: Thibaut adds “(i.e. who meditate)”, the “effected brahman” refers to saguṇa brahman. So Thibaut thinks vikārālambana refers to the person that meditates on saguṇa brahman. Saguṇa descriptions of brahman count as saguṇavidyās. Thus vikārālambanān can be taken to refer to people that meditate on saguṇavidyās.

73 Kramamukti is a soteriological sequence by which devotees attain liberation in brahmaloka.

The devayāna is the path that leads to brahmaloka. This section has argued that according to

Śaṅkara, upāsana on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna. Upāsana is a form of meditation that encourages the practitioner to identify with the object of meditation. In this context, vidyās are objects of meditation, and saguṇavidyās are qualified objects of meditation. These objects can be rituals, deities, metaphysical doctrines, or syllables. Śaṅkara demonstrates a willingness to expand his definition of what might constitute a saguṇavidyā. Since reaching brahmaloka is a condition to the attainment of kramamukti, Śaṅkara’s comprehensive definition of saguṇavidyā means there are numerous meditative practices that initiate the sequence towards kramamukti. I think it is clear that Śaṅkara’s account of how one enters the devayāna is a well-developed facet within his system of thought.

3.2 The Consistency of Śaṅkara’s Account of the Devayāna

Śaṅkara envisions heavens as actual places. In order to reach pitṛloka (the world of the fathers) or brahmaloka, jīvas must physically travel there. The devayāna is the path that leads to brahmaloka. According to Śaṅkara, there are numerous stations that jīvas pass through as they travel through the devayāna. These stations are described in the BṛU, ChU, KauU, and the BG.

There is a good deal of inconsistency, however, between these accounts. The ChU adds stations that are not present in the BṛU. The KauU doesn’t mention any of the stations found in the BṛU or ChU. The BG omits thirteen stations that are mentioned elsewhere. Some verses imply that these stations are atmospheric regions. Others claim that they are a series of heavens.

There is even some doubt about the devayāna’s final destination.

74 In this section, I will argue that Śaṅkara consolidates divergent scriptural claims about the devayāna into a comprehensive, and cohesive theory. Hence, it is clear that the devayāna is a well-developed, and well thought out facet within Śaṅkara’s system. Since kramamukti is attained in brahmaloka, and since Śaṅkara strives for consistency in his account of the devayāna, this demonstrates that the initial stages of Śaṅkara’s theory of kramamukti is well developed.

In BṛU 6.2.15, Jaivali Pravāhaṇa describes the devayāna to Uddālaka Āruṇi. He claims that devotees that meditate on pañcāgnividyā (the vidyā of the five fires), as well as those who revere satya (truth) as śraddha (faith), follow the devayāna when they die. Jaivali then lists the different stations that jīvas pass through as they travel on the devayāna.

[t]hey who knew this thus and those who live in the forest that acknowledge truth as faith –

they reach the flame, from the flame they reach the day, from the day they reach the

waxing moon, from the waxing moon they reach those six months where the sun travels

north, from the months they reach the world of the gods, from the world of the gods they

reach the sun, from the sun they reach lightning. Then an entity created from mind, having

come near lightning, brings them to go to brahmaloka.42

42 te ya evametadviduḥ, ye cāmī araṇye śraddhāṃ satyamupāsate, te ‘cirabhisaṃbhavanti, arciṣo

‘haḥ, ahna āpūryamāṇapakṣam, āpuryamāṇapakṣādyānṣaṇmāsānudaṅṅāditya eti; māsebhyo devalokam, devalokādādityam, ādityādvaidyutam tānvaidyutānpuruṣo manasa etya brahmalokān gamyati (BṛU 6.2.15)

75 Jīvas begin the devayāna by first ascending by means of a flame. This flame is often associated with the fire of the individual’s funeral pyre. As jīvas progress along the devayāna, they pass through different atmospheric regions. After passing through the sun and reaching lightning, jīvas are then met by a non-human entity that is created from mind – the mental form of a deity.

This deity escorts jīvas to brahmaloka.

ChU 4.15.5 describes a similar ascent to brahmaloka. The ChU, however, replaces the world of the gods (devaloka) with “the year” (saṃvatsara). It also adds a station between the sun and lightning.

They [the deceased] meet the flame. From the flame, they reach the day. From the day,

they reach the waxing moon. From the waxing moon, they reach the six months where the

sun goes upwards. From the months, they reach the year. From the year, they reach the sun.

From the sun, they reach the moon. From the moon, they reach lightning. In that place, a

non-human entity leads them to brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path of

brahman.43

ChU 4.15.5 and BṛU 6.2.15 state that jīvas pass through the flame, the day, the fortnight of the waxing moon, and onto the six months where the sun moves north. There is a contradiction

43 acārchiṣamevābhisaṃbhavanti / arciṣo ‘haḥ / ahna āpūryamāṇapakṣam /

āpūryamāṇapakṣādyānṣaḍudaṅṅeti māsāṁstān / māsebhyaḥ saṃvatsaraṃ / saṃvatsarādādityam

/ ādityāccandramasam / candramaso vidyutam / tatpuruṣo ‘mānavaḥ / sa enānbrahma gamayati

/ eṣa devapatho brahmapathaḥ (ChU 4.15.5)

76 between them, however, at this point. ChU4.15.5 states that jīvas travel to the year, while BṛU

6.2.15 claims they go to the world of the gods. Furthermore, the ChU claims that jīvas go to the moon before going to lightning, whereas the BṛU states that the sun is the station that one goes to before lightning. Another difference – and a potentially significant one at that44 – is that ChU

4.15.5 claims that the devayāna leads to brahman and not brahmaloka.

KauU 1.3 does not list any of the stations mentioned in the other Upaniṣads. It reads as follows:

[h]aving entered this path called the devayāna, he reaches the world of Agni, then the

world of Vayu, followed by the world of Varuṇa, the world of Indra, and the world of

Prajāpati. He reaches brahmaloka after this.45

Agni is the god of fire, Vayu is the god of wind, Varuṇa is the god of the sky, Indra is the god of lightning, and Prajāpati is the god of water.46 So KauU 1.3 claims that devotees go through the heavens of different gods, rather than passing through different atmospheric regions.

BG 8.24 briefly lists the stations on the devayāna. Like the BṛU and ChU, Kṛṣṇa claims that the devayāna begins with a flame. He then adds a station between the flame and the day. The

44 I consider this difference below.

45 sa etaṃ devayānaṃ panthānamāpadyāgnilokamāgacchati / sa vāyulokaṃ sa varuṇalokaṃ sa indralokaṃ sa prajāpatilokaṃ sa brahmalokam (KauU 1.3)

46 Prajāpati is sometimes called the lord of creatures among other things. Prajāpati is also an epithet for Soma and Indra. In BSBh 4.3.3, Śaṅkara claims that Prajāpati is the lord of water.

77 year, sun, moon, lightning, and the stations in KauU are omitted. Instead, 8.24 states that jīvas go directly to brahman after the fifth station. The passage reads, “[f]ire, light, day, the bright half of the lunar month, the period of the six months where the sun moves north of the equator. Under those circumstances, the deceased people who know brahman go to brahman.”47 Aside from the missing stations, BG 8.24 – like ChU 4.15.5 – claims that the devayāna leads to brahman instead of brahmaloka. So there is some ambiguity among the relevant texts as to both the stages of the devayāna and its final destination.

Śaṅkara tries to reconcile these scriptural contradictions at BSBh 4.3.1-15. At 4.3.1, he states that the pūrvapakṣin takes there to be multiple paths leading to brahmaloka. The sequence of stations in the BṛU and KauU do not align, because they are separate paths, according to the pūrvapakṣin. Śaṅkara rejects this view. He claims that the Upaniṣads describe different parts of the single, continuous, and consistent devayāna. In reply to the pūrvapakṣin, he says “this path entering brahmaloka is but one and has many qualifying stations. Sometimes it is expressed by one set of qualifying stations, sometimes it is expressed by another.”48 So according to Śaṅkara, the stations in the BṛU and KauU are not identical because they describe different parts of the devayāna.

BSBh 4.3.2-3 outlines a comprehensive list of the stations by combining BṛU 6.2.15, ChU

4.15.5, and KauU 1.3. The first two – BṛU 6.2.15 and ChU 4.15.5 – are relatively similar and

47 agnir jyotir ahaḥ śuklaḥ ṣaṇmāsā uttarāyaṇam / tatra prayātā gacchanti brahma brahmavido janāḥ (BG 8.24)

48 ekaiva tveṣā sṛtiḥ anekaviśeṣaṇā brahmalokaprapadanī kvacit kenacit viśeṣaṇenopalakṣita

(BSBh 4.3.1)

78 easy to integrate. The KauU is a little more difficult to make consistent with the others. The following chart outlines the different stations mentioned in the relevant texts.

BṛU 6.2.15 ChU 4.15.5 KauU 1.3

1. the flame 1. the flame 1. the world of Agni

2. the day 2. the day 2. the world of Vayu

3. the fortnight of the 3. the fortnight of the 3. the world of

waxing moon waxing moon Varuṇa

4. the six months 4. the six months 4. the world of Indra

when the sun moves when the sun moves

north north

5. the world of the 5. the year 5. the world of

gods Prajāpati

6. the sun 6. the sun

7. lightning 7. the moon

8. lightning

BSBh 4.3.2 states that the flame and the world of Agni are the same station. “The words

‘flame’ and ‘world of Agni’ have a single meaning on account of them both expressing fire.”49

This squares the first station in the KauU with the first station in BṛU and ChU. The world of the gods (the fifth station in the BṛU) is said to come after the year (the fifth station in the ChU).

49 tatra arciragnilokaśabdau tāvat ekārthau jvalanavacanatvād iti (BSBh 4.3.2)

79 Śaṅkara then states that the world of Vayu (the second station in the KauU) comes next.

According to BSBh 4.3.3, the worlds of Varuṇa, Indra, and Prajāpati are included after lightning.

So the amalgamated sequence outlined in BSBh 4.3.2-3 goes as follows: 1) the flame 2) the day

3) the fortnight of the waxing moon 4) the six months where the sun moves north 5) the year 6) the world of the gods 7) the world of Vayu 8) the sun 9) the moon 10) lightning 11) the world of

Varuṇa 12) the world of Indra 13) the world of Prajāpati.50 By this means, Śaṅkara explains how three seemingly contradictory descriptions of the devayāna are actually consistent, and reference a single path – the devayāna, rather than multiple paths.

The BṛU states that a non-human entity meets jīvas after they reach lightning. This being is said to escort jīvas into brahmaloka. The KauU doesn’t mention this non-human entity. The

KauU does, however, state that jīvas go through the worlds of Varuṇa, Indra, and Prajāpati before they reach brahmaloka. So in one text, jīvas go straight to brahmaloka after they reach lightning. In the other text, jīvas must pass through the worlds of Varuṇa, Indra, and Prajāpati before they reach brahmaloka

Śaṅkara holds that the non-human entity mentioned in the BṛU/ChU guides jīvas through the stations mentioned in the KauU, and then into brahmaloka. BSBh 4.3.6 reads, “it is to be understood thusly, from there – from the attainment of lightning – with the non-human entity situated immediately after lightning, that they go to brahmaloka being lead [by the non-human

50 Deussen’s reading of Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna to the same conclusion regarding the sequence of stations (1912, 441).

80 entity] amidst the world of Varuṇa, etc.”51 Śaṅkara accepts that jīvas are taken to brahmaloka by the entity mentioned in the BṛU. He adds, however, that prior to reaching brahmaloka, jīvas are lead through the worlds of Varuṇa, etc. This seems to reconcile the presence of the non-human entity in the BṛU/ChU with the extra stations that are mentioned in KauU.

Śaṅkara also claims that the stations on the devayāna are deities. Jīvas do not pass through a real flame on their way to brahmaloka. Rather, jīvas meet the god of the fire who escorts them to the god of the day. At BṛUBh 6.2.15, Śaṅkara states that

the word ‘flame’ is not merely the flame of a fire. How? In that case… the stated word

‘flame’ is a divinity indicating the northern path (the devayāna) on which it is stationed…

Indeed, wandering mendicants clearly have no association with the flame of the sacrificial

fire. Thus the stated word ‘flame’ is accepted as a divinity.52

According to Śaṅkara, the flame, etc. must be deities. Since saṃnyāsins can follow the devayāna, and since saṃnyāsins renounce their sacrificial fires, the flame mentioned in this verse cannot be the literal flame of a sacrificial fire. Since saṃnyāsins are buried instead of

51 tato vidyudabhisaṃbhavanādūrdhvaṃ vidyudanantaravartinaivāmānavena puruṣeṇa varuṇalokādiṣvativāhyamānā brahmalokaṃ gacchantītyavagantavyam (BSBh 4.3.6)

52 arciriti na agnijvālāmātram kiṃ tarhi… arcirśabdavācyā devatā uttaramārgalakṣaṇā vyavasthitaiva… na hi parivrājakānām agnyarciṣaiva sākṣātsaṃbandho ‘sti; tena devataiva parigṛhyate arciḥśabdavacyā (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

81 cremated, the flame in this verse is not the flame of the funeral pyre. Therefore, Śaṅkara argues, the flame must be the god of fire – Agni.

The same is true for the day. Śaṅkara claims that if jīvas traveled on the devayāna during the actual day, this would imply that only people who die during the daytime travel the devayāna.

Since people die at night as well, Śaṅkara concludes that the word ‘day’ refers to a deity.

From this they go to the god of the day. The word day is a divinity as well on account of

the insufficiency of means to the limitation of the time of death. The act of dying is at the

end of the duration of life. To control the time of the act of dying to the day is not possible

by the knower [of the saguṇavidyā] because one is liable to die in the day and night. Also

the sages who have died during the night do not wait for the day to begin their ascent to

brahmaloka. 53

Śaṅkara’s position in ChU 4.15.5 is the same. He claims that the flame, etc. are deities that escort jīvas to the next station. When ChU 4.15.5 states that jīvas go from the flame to the day,

Śaṅkara adds that jīvas go from the god of the flame (arcirdevatāya). When jīvas travel from the day to the waxing moon, Śaṅkara adds that jīvas go to the god of the waxing moon

(śuklapakṣadevatām). So for Śaṅkara, BṛUBh 6.2.15 and ChUBh 4.15.5 are consistent. In both passages, he argues that jīvas are met by a series of deities that guide them along the devayāna.

53 ataḥ ahardevatām; maraṇakālaniyamānupapatteḥ ahaḥśabdo ‘pi devataiva; āyuṣaḥ kṣaye hi maraṇam; na evaṃvidā ahanyeva martavyamiti ahaḥ maraṇkālo niyantuṃ śakyate; na ca rātrau pretāḥ santaḥ ahaḥ pratīkṣante (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

82 Varuṇa, Indra, and Prajāpati do not take an active role in guiding jīvas through their portions of the devayāna. Instead, the super-human entity that jīvas encounter after lightning is the primary guide through these final three stations. In BSBh 4.3.6, Śaṅkara claims that “it is to be understood that Varuṇa, etc. are favorable [to] him by effecting an absence of obstructions or somehow by giving assistance.”54 So the first ten stations on the devayāna are deities that escort jīvas through their heavens. The jīva on the devayāna crosses the final three stations with assistance from the divine entity that is met after lightning.

There is also the ambiguity concerning the final destination of the devayāna. The BṛU claims that the devayāna leads to brahmaloka. “Then an entity created from the mind, having come near lightning, leads them to brahmaloka.”55 The ChU states that the devayāna leads to brahman. “In that place, a non-human entity leads them to brahman.”56 The BG also claims that the devayāna leads to brahman. This is an obvious and apparently substantial difference. The claim in the BṛU is that the devayāna leads to a heaven. The claim in the ChU/BG is that the devayāna leads to brahman.

BSBh 4.3.7-14 outlines two ways of reading the claim that the devayāna leads to brahman

(ChU 4.15.5). Śaṅkara’s conclusion in BSBh 4.3.14 is based on his understanding of the saguṇa/nirguṇa distinction. Some texts attribute qualities to brahman. The passages that outline the paryaṅkavidyā, for example, describes brahman as sitting on a couch (paryaṅka) in the

54 varuṇādayastu tasyaiva apratibandhakaraṇena sāhāyyānuṣṭhānena vā kenacit anugrāhakā ityavagantavyam (BSBh 4.3.6)

55 tānvaidyutānpuruṣo manasa etya brahmalokān gamyati (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

56 tatpuruṣo ‘mānavaḥ / sa enānbrahma gamayati (ChU 4.15.5)

83 middle of brahmaloka (KauU 1.1-5). Śaṅkara argues that when scripture describes brahman as having qualities, the text is referring to saguṇa brahman. Nirguṇa brahman is devoid of any qualities. So BSBh 4.3.7-14 discusses if jīvas follow the devayāna to nirguṇa or saguṇa brahman.

The first reading is Bādari’s. According to Śaṅkara, “the teacher Bādari thinks ‘then, the superhuman entity brings these jīvas to the lower effected brahman which has qualities.’”57

Śaṅkara takes Bādari to say that the devayāna leads to saguṇa brahman in brahmaloka. This is consistent with the claim that jīvas meet a manifestation of brahman when they reach brahmaloka.

Śaṅkara attributes the second view to Jaimini. According to Śaṅkara, “the teacher Jaimini thinks [that in the passage stating] “he brings these jīvas to brahman,” here [the meaning is] “he brings them to the highest brahman.”58 This interpretation states that the primary meaning of the word brahman refers to its highest form. Since ChU doesn’t qualify brahman with saguṇa or apara (lower), it must be assumed that the text is referring to the highest manifestation of brahman. Thus Jaimini thinks that the devayāna leads to nirguṇa brahman.

In BSBh 4.3.14, Śaṅkara sides with Bādari. He claims that “indeed, the first view is explained as the settled doctrine while the second is the pūrvapakṣin view.”59 Śaṅkara insists that brahman

57 tatra kāryameva saguṇamparaṃ brahma enāngamayatyamānavaḥ puruṣa iti bādarirācāryo manyate (BSBh 4.3.7)

58 jaiministvācāryaḥ ‘sa enānbrahma gamayati’ ityatra parameva brahma prāpayatīti manyate

(BSBh 4.3.12)

59 iti ādya eva siddhānto vyākhyātaḥ dvitīyastu pūrvapakṣaḥ (BSBh 4.3.14)

84 is nirguṇa. It does not have a form that jīvas can literally attain. Since any qualification of brahman constitutes a superimposition, even the understanding of brahman as spatial, and located in some place is mistaken. So brahman does not reside within a physical space to which jīvas can travel. Consequently, Jaimini’s reading of ChU 4.15.5 cannot be accepted, according to

Śaṅkara. If brahman lacks spatiality and location, then there is no way for jīvas to reach nirguṇa brahman. Therefore, when jīvas are said to go to brahman, the “going [in this case] refers to the effected kingdom [brahmaloka], not the highest sphere [brahman].”60 This effected kingdom, in turn, is brahmaloka.

Śaṅkara’s commentary on ChU 4.15.5 follows Bādari’s interpretation. It states that after jīvas reach lightning, they are taken to brahman in satyaloka (the world of truth) – “that person brings them to brahman residing in satyaloka”61 Olivelle takes satyaloka as another name for brahmaloka (1998, 20). So ChUBh 4.15.5 and BSBh 4.3.14 are consistent in the way their interpretations of the word brahman. According to Śaṅkara, both verses state that jīvas are taken to a saguṇa manifestation of brahman that resides in brahmaloka. This way of reading the ChU makes its account of the devayāna consistent with what is said in the BṛU.

To review, the devayāna is the path to brahmaloka. Jīvas are said to pass through stations as they travel through the devayāna. Scripture does not provide a consistent account of the devayāna. Some texts mention stations that are absent in other accounts. There are also sequential differences between scriptural accounts of the stations on the devayāna. Additionally, there is some ambiguity as to where the devayāna leads to.

60 kāryaviṣayā gatiḥ na paraviṣyeti (BSBh 4.3.15)

61 sa puruṣaḥ enānbrahma satyalokasthaṃ gamayati (ChUBh 4.15.5)

85 Śaṅkara has a consistent and well-developed account of the devayāna. He consolidates divergent scriptural claims about the devayāna into a comprehensive, and cohesive theory. This implies that the devayāna is a consistent and well-developed facet within Śaṅkara’s system of thought. Again, brahmaloka is the place where devotees attain kramamukti. The consistency of

Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna – this is to say, the consistency of Śaṅkara’s account of how one gets to brahmaloka – demonstrates that the initial steps of kramamukti are well mapped out.

Conclusion

This chapter examines Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna – the path leading to brahmaloka. In the first section, I argued that upāsana on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna, according to

Śaṅkara. Upāsana is a form of meditation, and saguṇavidyās are the corresponding objects of meditation. These objects can be rituals, metaphysical doctrines, or even syllables. They are similar because they are said to possess qualities – they are saguṇa. Moreover, all saguṇavidyās are uniform in leading to the devayāna. If scripture outlines a saguṇavidyā, but fails to say that it leads to the devayāna, it should be thought of as leading to the devayāna. Other passages, according to Śaṅkara, describe saguṇavidyās even if they do not explicitly refer to them as saguṇavidyās.

In the second section of this chapter, I examined Śaṅkara’s account of what happens as devotees travel along the devayāna. Scripture holds that jīvas pass through different stations as they travel through the devayāna. These accounts are dissimilar and frequently contradict each other. Śaṅkara collects all of these passages and unifies them into a single cohesive account. All of this suggests that Śaṅkara’s account of how a person enters the devayāna, and the path of the devayāna is a well-developed aspect of his system.

86 In this next chapter, I will show that Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. To attain liberation this way is to attain mokṣa by means of kramamukti. Śaṅkara is consistent in allowing that devotees can attain liberation by means of kramamukti. He mentions this path in all of his major commentaries. This suggests that kramamukti is a clear and well- defined path to liberation within Śaṅkara’s account.

I will also argue that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Consequently, Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and

śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

87 Chapter 4:

Śaṅkara on Kramamukti

Introduction

According to Śaṅkara, kramamukti is a path to liberation by which devotees attain mokṣa after they die, while residing in a heaven called brahmaloka. In the previous chapter, I discussed

Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna. According to Śaṅkara, upāsana on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna. Upāsana is a form of meditation by which the practitioner identifies with the object of meditation. In this context, saguṇavidyās are the objects of meditation. Śaṅkara holds that saguṇavidyās can be rituals, metaphysical doctrines, syllables, or deities.

Śaṅkara elaborates his account of the devayāna in detail. He argues, for example, that if scripture outlines a saguṇavidyā, but does not say that it leads the devayāna, it leads to the devayāna nonetheless. He also argues that Upaniṣads can reference saguṇavidyās without actually naming them. Śaṅkara combines and elaborates seemingly inconsistent scriptural accounts of the stations that constitute the devayāna. All this implies that Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna is well-developed.

In this chapter, I will continue to examine Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. In the first section, I will show that Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa in brahmaloka. Since brahmajñāna is equivalent to mokṣa, Śaṅkara’s position is that one can become liberated in brahmaloka. To attain liberation this way is to attain mokṣa by means of kramamukti. Śaṅkara is consistent in allowing that devotees can attain liberation via kramamukti.

He mentions this path to mokṣa in the and BSBh, BṛUBh, ChUBh, BGBh. This suggest that kramamukti is a clear and well-defined path to liberation within Śaṅkara’s account.

88 In the second section of this chapter, I will discuss Śaṅkara’s account of who might attain brahmaloka. Śaṅkara allows that male dvijas – brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas – can attain brahmaloka. Brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka as well. So dvijas from any āśrama can attain brahmaloka, according to Śaṅkara. Other passages imply that Śaṅkara allows that women, śūdras, and others can attain brahmaloka as well.

Śaṅkara’s account of who can attain brahmajñāna, then, is broadly inclusive.

Who can attain kramamukti, in turn, is a function of who can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. Śaṅkara doesn’t mention varṇa, āśrama, or gender in the passages in which he discusses the attain attainment of brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. This implies that

Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

4.1 Kramamukti

As I argued in the last chapter, Śaṅkara claims that devotees reach brahmaloka by means of the devayāna. He also argues that certain devotees attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka, and hence, attain liberation in brahmaloka. Śaṅkara refers to this path to liberation as kramamukti (gradual liberation).

A number of authoritative texts claim that a person does not return from brahmaloka. In the last chapter, I discussed BṛU 6.2.15, which, again, provides a lists of stations that jīvas pass through as they progress along the devayāna. According to this passage, a person passes fire, day, the fortnight of the waxing moon, the six months when the sun moves north, the world of

89 the gods, the sun, and lightning. Once they reach lightning, a super-human entity escorts the jīva into brahmaloka.

The same verse states that jīvas do not return from brahmaloka. “A person created from mind comes near lightning and takes these jīvas to the heavens of brahmaloka. They reside in these heavens for an exceedingly long time. For them, there is no return.”62 The person created from mind is the god-like being that escorts jīvas into brahmaloka. Lightning is the last station on the devayāna, according to 6.2.15. The important claim, however, is that devotees do not return from brahmaloka. This implies that jīvas are not reborn once they reach brahmaloka.

ChU 4.15.5, too, claims that the devayāna leads to brahmaloka. Like some of the passages that I reviewed in chapter three, this passage uses the word brahman to refer to brahmaloka. The passage states that a non-human entity “leads them to brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path of brahman. Those who proceed by this path do not return to this human whirlpool.”63 ‘This human whirlpool’ refers to saṃsāra (the cycle of rebirth). The claim, then, is that a person who attains brahmaloka does not return to saṃsāra.

BG 8.26 reads, “these two paths of this world, one light and one dark, are thought to be eternal. The person goes to anāvṛtti by the one and returns again by the other.”64 In this verse,

62 ādityādvaidyutam tānvaidyutānpuruṣo manasa etya brahmalokān gamayati / te teṣu brahmalokeṣu parāḥ parāvata vasanti; teṣāṃ na punarāvṛttiḥ (BṛU 6.2.15)

63 sa enānbrahma gamayati / eṣa devapatho brahmapathaḥ / etena pratipadyamānā imaṃ mānavamāvartam nāvartante nāvartante (ChU 14.5.5)

64 śuklakṛṣṇe gatī hy ete jagataḥ śāśvate matī / ekayā yāty anāvṛttiṃ anayayāvartate punaḥ (BG

8.26)

90 the devayāna is called the white path (śuklagati), while the pitṛyāna (the path of the fathers) is called the dark path (kṛṣṇagati). This passage also implies that a person who attains brahmaloka does not return to saṃsāra. According to Malinar, at BG 8.26, “[t]he realm of non-return is, as in the Upaniṣads, equated with reaching brahman” (143). Since anāvṛtti is the state of final emancipation, BG 8.26 reiterates the claim of ChU 4.15.5 and BṛU 6.2.15 that the jīvas who follow the devayāna do not return to saṃsāra from brahmaloka.

Śaṅkara takes these passages to refer to kramamukti. According to Śaṅkara, scripture outlines a path to liberation by which devotees attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. The realisation of brahmajñāna is liberation. Thus a person might attain liberation in brahmaloka. This way to liberation is called kramamukti. Śaṅkara’s commentary on BSBh 4.3.10 provides the clearest explanation of kramamukti.

[i]n proximity to the presence of the dissolution of the occurrence of brahmaloka, the

beings in which samyagdarśana (right perception) has appeared – along with the

superintendent, Hiraṇyagarbha – attain the highest purified point of Viṣṇu. Thus,

kramamukti must be accepted on account of the declarations in scripture, etc. about

anāvṛtti.65

65 kāryabrahmalokapralayapratyupasthāne sati tatraiva utpannasamyagdarśanāḥ santaḥ, tadadhyakṣeṇa hiraṇyagarbheṇa saha ataḥ para pariśuddhaṃ viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ pratipadyante --

- itītthaṃ kramamuktiḥ anāvṛttyādiśrutyabhidhānebhyo ‘bhyupagantavyā (BSBh 4.3.10)

91 Here Śaṅkara states that jīvas can attain samyagdarśana while residing in brahmaloka, and that jīvas attain “the highest purified point of Viṣṇu” at the time of pralaya.

At BSBh 4.4.22, Śaṅkara implies that samyagdarśana is brahmajñāna. He says, “those who have darkness destroyed by samyagdarśana and who are devoted to the ever perfect nirvaṇa, they have become perfect. They have indeed attained final emancipation (anāvṛtti).”66 Darkness

(tamas) is a synonym of avidyā (ignorance). So the role that Śaṅkara ascribes to samyagdarśana indicates that it is equivalent to brahmajñāna. According to Hirst, samyagdarśana is “true understanding of the Self” (1996, 62). According to Taber, “Śaṅkara emphasizes that liberation is to follow upon correct, unambiguous, self-verifying knowledge (saṃyagdarśana)” (13). So the first part of Śaṅkara’s claim in BSBh 4.3.10 is that jīvas might attain brahmajñāna while residing in brahmaloka. The realisation of brahmajñāna is liberation. Thus one can become liberated in brahmaloka, according to BSBh 4.3.10.

In BSBh 1.4.1, Śaṅkara clarifies that the “highest abode of Viṣṇu” refers to anāvṛtti. He cites

Kaṭha Upaniṣad (KaṭhU) 3.9: “he reaches the end of the road, the highest abode of Viṣṇu.”67 In explanation, Śaṅkara asks: “[w]hat is the end of the road, the highest state of Viṣṇu?”68 He answers: “[t]he highest state of Viṣṇu, the end of this road, is proven to be the paramātman”69

The parātman is brahman. Hence, the attainment of paramātman is the attainment of brahman

66 samyagdarśanavidhvastatamasāṃ tu nityasiddhanirvaṇaparāyaṇānāṃ siddhaiva anāvṛttiḥ

(BSBh 4.4.22)

67 so ‘dhvanaḥ pāramāpnoti tadviṣṇoḥ paraṃ padam (KaṭhU 3.9)

68 kiṃ tadadhvanaḥ pāraṃ viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam? (BSBh 1.4.1)

69 paramātmānamadhvanaḥ pāraṃ tadviṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padaṃ darśayati (BSBh 1.4.1)

92 and final emancipation. So the second part of Śaṅkara’s claim in BSBh 4.3.10 is that devotees attain anāvṛtti when they leave brahmaloka (at the time of pralaya). Thus BSBh 4.3.10 demonstrates that Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

This is to say, Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Thus, he allows that one can become liberated in brahmaloka. Śaṅkara also claims that devotees can attain anāvṛtti when they leave brahmaloka. This too implies that Śaṅkara allows that it is possible to attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

In BSBh 1.3.13, Śaṅkara claims that “attaining brahmaloka is the fruit for one who meditates upon the parātman through the medium of the sacred syllable om of the three mātras, and after that, gradually (krameṇa), there is the emergence of samyagdarśana.”70 In this passage, Śaṅkara claims that devotees can go to brahmaloka and attain brahmajñāna by meditating on the syllable om. As I said in the last chapter, Śaṅkara takes om to refer to a saguṇavidyā. So BSBh 1.3.13 corroborates that Śaṅkara claims that one can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka by meditating on a saguṇavidyā. Meditating on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna, the devayāna leads to brahmaloka, and one can attain liberation in brahmaloka. So in this sense, meditating on saguṇavidyās leads to the attainment of brahmajñāna in brahmaloka.

BGBh 8.22, again, states that yogins who superimpose brahman onto the syllable om follow the devayāna and are “entitled to liberation after some time.” Again, BGBh 8.22 reads:

70 trimātreṇoṃkāreṇālambanena paramātmānamabhidhyāyataḥ phalaṃ brahmalokaprāptiḥ, krameṇa ca samyagdarśanotpattiḥ (BSBh 1.3.13)

93 [t]he northern path (the devayāna), which is going to be discussed next, is for the sake of

obtaining brahman of the yogins under discussion, who have their notions of brahman

fixed on the sacred syllable om, and who are entitled to liberation after some time.

Since the parātman is brahman, the type of meditation discussed here is the same as in BSBh

1.3.13. Thus BGBh 8.22 reiterates BSBh 1.3.13. It confirms that a person might attain the devayāna and brahmaloka by meditating on a saguṇavidyā, and then attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa in brahmaloka. This, again, is just the attainment of mokṣa by means of the path of kramamukti.

BG 8.24, again, states “[f]ire, light, day, the bright half of the lunar month, the period of the six months where the sun moves north of the equator. Under those circumstances, the deceased people that understand brahman go to brahman.” The first half of the verse refers to the stations of the devayāna. In his commentary to this passage, Śaṅkara elaborates the second half of the verse as follows. “Those deceased people that know brahman – those who are intent on brahman and practice the highest form of upāsana on brahman – they go to brahman on this path – gradually (krameṇa).”71 His use of the word krameṇa refers to the gradual path to liberation.

Here Śaṅkara specifies that the people that go to brahman are those who meditate on saguṇavidyās. He adds the word ‘gradually’ (krameṇa) to indicate that these people attain brahman only after going to brahmaloka and attaining brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. In this sense, they are said to attain brahman gradually.

71 tatra tasmin mārge prayātāḥ mṛtāḥ gacchanti brahma brahmavido brahmopasakāḥ brahmopāsanaparā janā krameṇa iti vākyaśeṣaḥ (BGBh 8.24)

94 Śaṅkara confirms this is his view at BGBh 8.26. In this passage, Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna that the devayāna leads to anāvṛtti while the dhūmapatha (the path of smoke) leads to rebirth. According to Śaṅkara, the devayāna is characterised as “white” on account of the illuminating explanation of brahmajñāna that jīvas receive when they reach brahmaloka. “The one [path] is white on account of the explanation of knowledge. The other [path] is dark on account of the absence of this instruction.”72 Jīvas follow the devayāna to brahmaloka, and then acquire brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. These jīvas then attain anāvṛtti at the time of pralaya. Hence, BSBh 4.3.10, BSBh

1.3.13, BGBh 8.22, BGBh 8.24, and BGBh 8.26 demonstrate that Śaṅkara accepts that devotees might attain liberation by attaining brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. This, again, is just kramamukti.

At this point a word of caution is needed. According to Śaṅkara, it is possible for devotees to be reborn from brahmaloka. In his BṛUBh, Śaṅkara notes that the Mādhyaṃdina recension of

BṛU 6.2.15 states that the word ‘here’ (iha) must be added to the claim that there is no return from brahmaloka. The relevant passage from Śaṅkara reads: “for those who have gone to brahmaloka there is no return. There is no rebirth into this saṃsāra ‘here’ – according to the reading of the related śākhā” (BṛUBh 6.2.15).73 This changes the meaning of the passage. Rather than stating that jīvas are not reborn from brahmaloka, it states that jīvas are not reborn from brahmaloka here – that is, on earth. This might be taken to imply that jīvas might be reborn somewhere other than earth. Śaṅkara claims that from the addition of the word ‘here’, “a return

72 jñānaprakāśakatvāt śuklā tadabhāvāt kṛṣṇā (BGBh 8.26)

73 teṣāṃ brahmalokaṃ gatānāṃ nāsti punarāvṛttiḥ asminsaṃsāre na punarāgamanam ‘iha’ iti

śakhāntarapāṭhāt (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

95 to the previous state is understood to occur after the end of this period of time (kalpa).”74 So according to BṛUBh 6.2.15, jīvas might be reborn from brahmaloka. They are not, however, reborn here on earth.

ChU 4.15.5 states that there is no return to “this human whirlpool.” This can be read as stating that jīvas do not attain rebirth after reaching brahmaloka. Śaṅkara, however, reads this as indicating that jīvas will not be reborn as human beings. Śaṅkara takes ‘this human whirlpool’ to refer to human existence in particular. Again, this changes the meaning of the claim that there is no return from brahmaloka. Instead of saying there is no rebirth at all from brahmaloka, Śaṅkara states that there is no return to human existence for the jīvas in brahmaloka.

If these jīvas did not return in every respect, then the qualifying adverbs ‘this human

[whirlpool]’ and ‘here’ would be nonsensical… Therefore, in order to account for the

significance of the adverbs ‘this’ and ‘here’, it is assumed that there is rebirth in another

place.75

Śaṅkara does not identify where jīvas might go when they are reborn from brahmaloka. He is clear, however, that jīvas might rebirth from brahmaloka in some non-human – and perhaps non- earthly – birth.

74 tasmāt asmātkalpādūrdhvam āvṛttirgamyate (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

75 yadi hi ekāntenaiva nāvarteran, imam mānavam iha iti ca viśeṣaṇamanarthakaṃ syāt… ataḥ imamiha iti ca viśeṣaṇārthavattvāya anyatra āvṛttiḥ kalpanīya (ChUBh 5.10.2)

96 So Śaṅkara makes two claims about what happens when jīvas leave brahmaloka. In some passages, Śaṅkara claims that jīvas attain anāvṛtti (BSBh 4.3.10, 4.4.22, BGBh 8.24, 8.26). In others, he claims that jīvas can be reborn (BṛUBh 6.2.15, ChU 5.10.2). The most straightforward explanation of this apparent inconsistency is that Śaṅkara qualifies those who attain liberation in brahmaloka as those who attain samyagdarśana in brahmaloka. Those who return to rebirth, in contrast, presumably fail to attain samyagdarśana in brahmaloka. Potter explains these seemingly inconsistent claims in just this way.

[o]n the one hand, he [Śaṅkara] argues that the texts saying that the selves do not return

from Brahmaloka mean they do not return to rebirth in this world; they do, however, return

to other forms of existence, presumably on a divine plane. On the other hand, he is willing

to admit that those attaining the Brahmaloka, provided they have in the meantime attained

knowledge of the highest Brahman, will be liberated at the time of reabsorption (pralaya).

(26)

When Śaṅkara claims that jīvas attain anāvṛtti, he implies that these jīvas have acquired brahmajñāna while residing in brahmaloka. The jīvas who are reborn, in contrast, have not attained brahmajñāna, and therefore return to the cycle of rebirth.

It is possible to speculate on why some jīvas attain brahmajñāna while others do not.

Scripture sometimes refers to brahmaloka in the singular and sometimes in the plural. Śaṅkara suggests that this reflects different levels of brahmaloka. At BṛUBh 6.2.15, he says, “from the application of the plural number, it is to be understood that brahmaloka is divided into parts by the partition into higher and lower regions. And from the employment of [different] gradations of

97 upāsana.”76 Here Śaṅkara seems to claim that different forms of upāsana (meditation) lead to higher and lower regions of brahmaloka. If this is right, then it is possible that only the jīvas in the highest regions of brahmaloka attain brahmajñāna. Those who reside in the lower regions of brahmaloka, in contrast, return to the cycle of rebirth.

A jīva might attain the highest regions of brahmaloka, in turn, only by means of certain types of upāsana. KauU 1.3-7, for example, implies that one must possess a specific type of metaphysical knowledge in order to reach the highest levels of brahmaloka. KauU 1.3 names specific landmarks that jīvas pass on their way through brahmaloka.77

[h]e finally reaches brahmaloka. In this world there is the Lake Āra, the moment of time

called Yeṣṭiha, the river Vijarā, the tree Ilya, the plaza Sālajyam, the palace Aparājita,

76 brahmalokāniti adharottarabhūmibhedena bhinnā iti gamyante, bahuvacanaprayogāt, upāsanatāratamyopapatteśca (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

77 This will appear familiar because it is part of the paryaṅkavidyā. This is the saguṇavidyā where devotees travel to brahmaloka and meet a manifestation of brahman that is described as sitting on a couch (a paryaṅka). According to Śaṅkara, the paryaṅkavidyā is a saguṇavidyā. It is a metaphysical doctrine that can be used as an object of meditation. It is also a metaphysical doctrine that contains a description of brahmaloka. So the paryaṅkavidyā can be examined for evidence about brahmaloka.

98 Indra and Prajāpati as doormen, the hall Vibhu, the throne Vicakṣaṇā, and the couch

Amitaujas.78

According to Olivelle, the name Āra could be connected to the word araṇya (forest). He explains that Yeṣṭiha is “approximately forty-eight minutes. Vijāra means ‘undecaying’ or ‘ageless’,…

[and] [t]he meanings of Ilya and Sālajya are uncertain” (1998, 583). Determining the precise meaning of these landmarks is not essential. The important point is that in subsequent passages, some of these landmarks serve as checkpoints that regulate who can reaches the highest level of brahmaloka.

KauU 1.4 states, “he comes to Lake Āra and passes beyond it with his mind. Having reached

Āra, those who do not have knowledge drown in it.”79 This implies that one must possess a certain type of knowledge in order to pass through Lake Āra. Since this person is already in heaven, drowning presumably alludes to the jīva’s inability to progress further into brahmaloka.80 So according to KauU 1.4, devotees must possess an unnamed form of knowledge

78 tasya ha vā etasya lokasyāro hrado muhūrtā yeṣṭihā vijarā nadīlyo vṛkṣaḥ sālajyaṃ saṃsthānamaparājitamāyatanamindraprajāpatī dvāragopau vibhu pramitaṃ vicakṣaṇāsandyamitaujāḥ paryaṅkaḥ (KauU 1.3)

79 sa āgacchatyāraṃ hradam / taṃ manasātyeti / tamṛtvāsaṃprativido majjanti (KauU 1.4)

80 According to Aiyar, “[t]his lake [Āra] according to Śaṃkara is one that stops the entrance to the world of Brahmā” (114). This is different from my suggestion. I hold that Āra regulates who can proceed into higher regions of brahmaloka. Aiyar does not provide a citation to support his view, but his claim is similar to my general point that Āra counts as a checkpoint.

99 in order to pass through Lake Āra. In this sense, Āra is a checkpoint regulating who can reach the highest level of brahmaloka.

KauU 1.5-6 states that when devotees meet brahman, they are asked a series of questions beginning with, “who are you?”81 The correct reply is:

I am a season, I belong to the seasons. Born from the womb of ether, like semen to the

wife, like the splendour of the year. I am the self (ātman) of any living being that exists.

You are the self of any living being which exists. That which you are, I am that. Brahman

then says to him “who am I?” He should reply “the real.”82

It might be that knowledge of the answers to brahman’s question is also the knowledge that allows one to pass through Lake Āra. If this is the case, then KauU 1.4-1.5 can be read to say that one must possess metaphysical knowledge about the ātman/brahman in order to pass Lake Āra, and into the highest regions of brahmaloka.

So Śaṅkara makes two sets of claims about what happens in brahmaloka. In some passages,

Śaṅkara claims that devotees attain brahmajñāna. In others, he claims that devotees are reborn.

Those who attain kramamukti are those who acquire brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. In BṛUBh

6.2.15, Śaṅkara claims that brahmaloka consists of different levels. My suggestion is that only

81 taṃ brahmāha ko’sīti (KauU 1.5)

82 ṛturasmi / ārtavo’asmi / ākāśādyoneḥ saṃbhūto bhāryāyai retaḥ saṃvatsarasya tejo bhūtasya bhūtasyātmā / bhūtasya bhūasya tvamātmāsi / yastvamasi so’hamasmīti / tamāha ko ‘hamasmīti

/ satyamiti brūyāt (Kau 1.5-6)

100 those who attain the highest level of brahmaloka attain brahmajñāna. KauU 1.3-7 implies that the person who has metaphysical knowledge of brahman/ātman reaches the highest plane of brahmaloka. This knowledge allows one to pass through Lake Āra. If attaining kramamukti is contingent on reaching the highest level of brahmaloka, then one must possess knowledge of the

ātman in order to attain liberation by means of kramamukti.83

There is another reason to think this is Śaṅkara’s view. On Śaṅkara’s account, karman is not a sufficient means to attain liberation. Scholars are unanimous on this point. If all those who reach brahmaloka attain kramamukti, then upāsana on saguṇavidyās is a sufficient means to liberation.

Upāsana, however, is a type of karman. Hence, it cannot, by itself, lead to liberation. So by admitting that one can be reborn from brahmaloka, Śaṅkara avoids the implication that karman

(in the form of upāsana) might be sufficient to attain liberation.84 And by insisting that only the person who attains brahmajñāna in brahmaloka attains liberation, Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti remains consistent with his otherwise consistent claim that knowledge, not action,

83 The next logical question is what one must do in order to attain the knowledge that leads to the highest level of brahmaloka. My inclination is that according to Śaṅkara, the knowledge derived from any saguṇavidyā is sufficient, and not just the knowledge mentioned in KauU 1.5-6.

84 BGBh 8.22 is problematic because it implies that devotees who meditate on the syllable om are guaranteed to attain kramamukti. This comes close to acknowledging that karman can be used to attain liberation. I think this is a very interesting question that needs more attention.

Moreover, the role of karman in kramamukti seems like it supports Taber’s claim about the role of karman in Śaṅkara’s system of thought (23).

101 causes liberation. In the case of kramamukti too, it is finally knowledge that causes liberation directly – not the upāsana responsible for attaining brahmaloka.

Śaṅkara accepts that devotees might attain liberation by means of kramamukti. There are passages that clearly state that jīvas can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Since brahmajñāna is liberation, Śaṅkara holds that one can become liberated in brahmaloka. Śaṅkara further claims that the liberated jīva attains final emancipation – anāvṛtti – upon leaving brahmaloka. So

Śaṅkara accepts that kramamukti is a viable path to liberation. Not all those who reach brahmaloka will attain kramamukti, but kramamukti is a path to liberation for some.

Furthermore, the extent of Śaṅkara’s consideration of the doctrine, and his account’s degree of detail suggest that this is an important component in his soteriology.

4.2 Śaṅkara on the Attainment of Brahmaloka

Śaṅkara argues that male dvijas – brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas – can attain brahmaloka by means of the devayāna. Brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka as well. So Śaṅkara accepts that male dvijas from any āśrama can attain brahmaloka.

BṛU 6.2.15, again, outlines the jīva’s ascent to brahmaloka. In this verse, two different groups are said to follow the devayāna. The passage reads, “[t]hey who knew this thus, and they who revere satya as śraddha in the forest, they reach the flame [the first station on the devayāna].”85

85 te ya evametadviduḥ, ye cāmī araṇye śraddhāṃ satyamupāsate, te ‘cirabhisaṃbhavanti

(BṛUBh 6.2.15)

102 “They who knew this thus” are devotees that meditate on the pañcāgnividyā – a saguṇavidyā.

The second group retreats to the forest and reveres (upās) truth (satya) as faith (śraddha).

In order to identify the first group, Śaṅkara asks “[w]ho again, are they who knew thus?”86 He answers “gṛhasthins assuredly.”87 So Śaṅkara’s view is that gṛhasthins who meditate on the pañcāgnividyā follow the devayāna. Thus gṛhasthins can attain brahmaloka.

Śaṅkara’s opponent then asks, “is it not intended their obtaining the path of smoke, etc. with the fulfillment of sacrifice, etc.?”88 Here he asks if gṛhasthins follow the dhūmapatha (path of smoke), since they perform rituals and other dharmic duties. Śaṅkara answers, “no, this is not so.

The knowledgeable gṛhasthins have no connection to the path of smoke from their connection to the fulfilment of sacrifices, etc.”89 Normally, gṛhasthins follow the dhūmapatha to candraloka as a consequence of having fulfilled their dharmic duties. Gṛhasthins who meditate on the pañcāgnividyā, however, follow the devayāna and attain brahmaloka, despite having performed rituals and having accumulated the corresponding karmabīja – karmic seeds.

The prevailing view during Śaṅkara’s time was that brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas could become gṛhasthins. Since Śaṅkara doesn’t say anything about varṇa in this passage, BṛUBh

6.2.15 seems to imply that all gṛhasthins – brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas – can go to brahmaloka by meditating on the pañcāgnividyā.

86 ke punaste, ye evaṃ viduḥ? (BṛUbh 6.215)

87 gṛasthā eva (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

88 nanu teṣāṃ yajñādisādhanena dhūmādipratipattiḥ vidhitsitā (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

89 na, anevaṃ vidāmapi gṛhasthānāṃ yajñādisādhanepapatteḥ (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

103 The same passage references “those who revere satya as śraddha in the forest.”90 According to Śaṅkara, these individuals are “vānaprasthins and parivrājakins dwelling in the forest.”91

Vānaprasthins are members of the third, forest dweller āśrama. Parivrājakin is another name for a saṃnyāsin. Thus vānaprasthins and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of meditating on an unnamed saguṇavidyā referred to by satya and śraddha.

Śaṅkara says that “brahmacārins are not accepted as ‘they who knew thus’. Their entrance onto the northern path [the devayāna,] [however,] is [known] from the authority of smṛti.”92

Brahmacārins are not included among “they who knew thus” – the individuals who meditate on the pañcāgnividyā. According to Śaṅkara’s reading of smṛti, however, brahmacārins can still follow the devayāna and attain brahmaloka. Presumably brahmacārins attain the devayāna and brahmaloka by means of a saguṇavidyā other than the pañcāgnividyā.

Hence BṛUBh 6.2.15 states that brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can follow the devayāna. Male dvijas have the dharmic right to become brahmacārins and gṛhasthins. Since Śaṅkara doesn’t say anything to imply that certain varṇas are excluded in

BṛUBh 6.2.15, this passage suggests that all male dvijas – brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas – might attain brahmaloka by means of saguṇavidyās and the devayāna.

90 te ya evametadviduḥ, ye cāmī araṇye śraddhāṃ satyamupāsate, te ‘cirabhisaṃbhavanti

(BṛUbh 6.2.15)

91 vānaprasthāḥ parivrājakāśāraṇyanityāḥ (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

92 ataḥ nāpi brahmacāriṇaḥ ‘evam viduḥ’ iti gṛhyante; teṣām tu uttare pathi praveśaḥ smtiprāmāṇyāt – ‘aṣṭhāśītisahasrāṇāmṛṣīṇāmūrdhvaretasām (BṛUBh 6.2.15)

104 ChU 5.10.1 states, “[n]ow, they who know thus, and those in the forest who acknowledge

‘tapas is śraddha’, they reach the flame.”93 Like BṛU 6.2.15, this passage talks about two groups that follow the devayāna. The first are “they who knew thus.” The second are those who acknowledge that tapas is śraddha.

Śaṅkara’s argument at ChUBh 5.10.1-2 confirms and expands on what is found in BṛUBh

6.2.15. ChUBh 5.10.1-2 reads, “gṛhasthins understanding the pañcāgni[vidyā], and those who are in the forest – vānaprasthins and parivrājakins – [along] with naiṣṭhikabrahmacārins

[perpetual students]… and those who worship satya brahman by the name of Hiraṇyagarbha, they all reach the flame”94 Again, “they who knew thus” are gṛhasthins that meditate on the pañcāgnividyā. This corresponds to what is said in BṛUBh 6.2.15. Vānaprasthins and saṃnyāsins are the second group. Śaṅkara then adds that naiṣṭhikabrahmacārins (life-long students) can go to brahmaloka as well. Furthermore, devotees who worship (upās)

Hiraṇyagarbha are said to follow the devayāna. This implies that Śaṅkara allows that naiṣṭhikabrahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, saṃnyāsins – as well as the unnamed devotees of Hiraṇyagarbha – can follow the devayāna and attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās.

93 tadya ittham viduḥ / ye ceme ‘raṇye śraddhā tapa ityupāsate / te ‘arciṣamabhisaṃbhavanti

(ChUBh 5.10.1)

94 ataḥ pañcāgnivido gṛhasthāḥ, ye ca ime araṇye vānaprasthāḥ parivrājakāś ca saha naiṣṭikabrahmacāribhiḥ… ye ca satyam brahma hiraṇyagarbhākhyamupāsate, te sarve arciṣam

(ChUBh 5.10.1-2)

105 All dvijas have the right to become brahmacārins and gṛhasthins. So the naiṣṭhikabrahmacārins and gṛhasthins in ChUBh 5.10.1-2 might include brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas. Since Śaṅkara doesn’t say anything to imply that certain varṇas might be excluded,

ChUBh 5.10.1-2 also implies that all male dvijas can attain brahmaloka.

BGBh 8.22, again, discusses a group of yogins that follow the devayāna and attain brahmaloka. The passage says,

the northern path [the devayāna], which is going to be discussed next, is for the sake of

obtaining brahman of the yogins under discussion who have their notions of brahman

fixed on the sacred syllable om, and who are entitled to the fruit of liberation after some

time.

As discussed in the third chapter, Śaṅkara uses the word brahman to refer to brahmaloka in this passage. So his claim is that devotees who meditate on the syllable om follow the devayāna and attain brahmaloka.

The following passage (BGBh 8.23) identifies these yogins. Śaṅkara states that “on account of religious rites, yogins are declared, then, according to quality, performers of action (karmin) –

‘with the karmayoga of the yogins’ – thus, they are yogins on account of specification.”95 The yogins in BGBh 8.22-23, then, are karmins (performers of actions) because they perform religious rites – a type of karman. Since saṃnyāsins renounce religious rites, it can be assumed

95 yoginaḥ karmaṇaśca ucyante, karmiṇastu guṇataḥ -- ‘karmayogena yoginām’ iti viśeṣaṇāt – yoginaḥ (BGBh 8.23)

106 that the yogins in BGBh 8.22-23 do not belong to the saṃnyāsa āśrama. So 8.22 states that a group of non-saṃnyāsin yogins follow the devayāna and attain brahmaloka.

Śaṅkara cites BG 3.3 in BGBh 8.23 when he says, “with the karmayoga of the yogins.” BG

3.3 reads, “[i]n this world, a twofold attachment has hitherto been declared by me, O Arjuna.

Through the jñānayoga of the Sāṃkhyins, [and] through the karmayoga of the yogins.”96 In BG

3.3, Kṛṣṇa claims to have taught two religious practices – karmayoga and jñānayoga. He associates jñānayoga with Sāṃkhyins and karmayoga with yogins. When Śaṅkara cites BG 3.3 at BGBh 8.23, he implies that he takes the yogins in BG 8.23 to be karmayogins. This implies that Śaṅkara allows that karmayogins can attain brahmaloka.

Marcaurelle defines karmayoga within Śaṅkara as “the performance of obligatory rites, preferably along with the practice of meditation on the qualified Brahman, by members of the first three varṇas (dvijas or twiceborns)” (130). There are two relevant claims here. First,

Marcaurelle suggests that Śaṅkara connects meditation on saguṇa brahman with karmayoga.

These meditations presumably refer to meditation on saguṇavidyās. This implies that those who practice karmayoga might attain brahmaloka. Second, Marcaurelle claims that Śaṅkara connects

“members of the first three varṇas (dvijas or twiceborns)” with the practice of karmayoga. If

Śaṅkara allows that dvijas can become karmayogins, then BGBh 8.22-23 implies that dvija karmayogins can attain brahmaloka.

At BSBh 3.4.36, Śaṅkara asks whether a specific group of people is qualified for vidyā. The passage reads:

96 loke ‘smin dvividhā niṣṭā purā proktā mayā ‘nagha / jnānayogena sāṃkhyāyāṃ karmayogena yoginām (BG 3.3)

107

how do those who abide in the middle [between āśramas] like widowers, etc., those who

are bereft of the means to any one of the many āśramas, who are wanting of the conditions

of a suitable person, etc., how do they have a claim to vidyā?97

In this passage, Śaṅkara asks if widowers (vidhura), etc. (ādi) are qualified for vidyā. According to Olivelle, Śaṅkara mentions widowers “as the primary example of an anāśramin” (1993, 220).

The word anāśramin refers to any person that does not belong to an āśrama. According to

Olivelle, “āśramas were considered as ways of life meant solely for adult [twice-born] males”

(1993, 188). This implies that women are anāśramins. Olivelle states that śūdras are anāśramins according to the Vaikhānasa Dharmasūtra (1993:191). So when Śaṅkara asks whether anāśramins have a claim to vidyā, he can be taken to ask whether women and śūdras might attain vidyā.

Śaṅkara reads Bādarāyaṇa to allow that anāśramins qualify for vidyā. Bādarāyaṇa claims,

“[b]ut also [those] between, on account of beholding those [examples in scripture].”98 Here

Śaṅkara takes antarā (between) to refer to anāśramins. Śaṅkara takes the phrase ‘on account of beholding those (taddṛṣṭeḥ)’ to refer to the scriptural examples set by Raikva and Gārgī at ChU

4.2.3 and BṛU 3.8.3. He claims, “Raikva, Gārgī, etc. have surely been obtained from the

97 vidhurādīnāṃ dravyādisaṃpadrahitānāṃ ca anyatamāśramapratipattihīnānāmantarālavartināṃ kiṃ vidyāyāmadhikāro ‘sti (BSBh 3.4.36)

98 antarā cāpi tu taddṛṣteḥ (BS 3.4.36)

108 observation in scripture about their knowledge of brahman.”99 Raikva is a low-status cart-driver.

Gārgī is a woman. So according to Śaṅkara, widowers, women, and śūdras are qualified for vidyā since authoritative scripture provides examples of this – Raikva and Gārgī.

The examples of Raikva and Gārgī come from the Upaniṣads. At ChU 4.2.3, Raikva explains the saṃvargavidyā to Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa. The doctrine of the saṃvargavidyā states that when fire, the sun, and the moon are extinguished, they dissolve into the wind (vāyu). Likewise, when an individual is asleep, speech, breath, sight, hearing, and mind dissolve into one’s breath

(prāṇa). Thus the saṃvargavidyā is a metaphysical doctrine about saṃvarga – the resolution of one thing into another. This doctrine might be an object of meditation. Thus it is a vidyā in this sense.

The saṃvargavidyā is a saguṇavidyā. The saṃvargavidyā is a metaphysical doctrine about the similarities between vāyu and prāṇa. Indeed, the saṃvargavidyā is the example that Dalal uses to describe viśiṣṭakriyayoga upāsana. Dalal claims that

[s]uch cases use the similarity of actions as a focus for meditation. Just as the individual’s

activities are resolved into the breath in deep sleep, so too the activities of fire, sun, and

moon resolve into wind. Thus one meditates on the identity of breath and wind due to their

similarity (183).

So at ChU 4.2.3, Raikva teaches Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa a saguṇavidyā – the saṃvargavidyā. So this passage, taken in the context of BSBh 3.4.36, implies that Raikva is qualified to meditate on

99 raikvavācaknavīprabhṛtīnāmevaṃbhūtānāmapi brahmavittvaśrutyupalabdheḥ (BSBh 3.4.36)

109 saguṇavidyās and attain the devayāna and brahmaloka. Indeed, as the teacher of Jānaśruti,

Raikva is portrayed as a master of this vidyā. Since Raikva is a cart driver, he is presumably low- status. Hence, the passage implies that low-status individuals might attain brahmaloka by means of meditation on a saguṇavidyā.

Śaṅkara also cites the example of Gārgī at BSBh 3.4.36. At BṛU 3.8.3, Gārgī asks

Yajñavalkya a metaphysical question about the foundation of the universe. Gārgī asks,

that which is higher than heaven, O Yajñavalkya, that which is lower than the earth, that

which is between this earth and heaven, that which they declare ‘the past, present, and

future.’ On what, then, is this woven and interwoven?100

In his reply, Yajñavalkya outlines the akṣaravidyā. Yajñavalkya first answers that the universe is founded on ākāśa (ether/space). Gārgī then asks what is the foundation of ākāśa. Yajñavalkya’s reply is that ākāśa is founded on akṣara (the imperishable). Aiyar argues that in this context, akṣara is a name for brahman (83). Hence, the akṣaravidyā is a metaphysical doctrine that states that the universe is established on brahman. This implies that the akṣaravidyā is a saguṇavidyā.

Since Gārgī learns this saguṇavidyā from Yajñavalkya, presumably Gārgī is qualified to meditate on this saguṇavidyā. This implies that she might attain the devayāna and brahmaloka by means of meditation on saguṇavidyās.

100 sā hovāca / yadūrdhvam yājñavalkya divo yadavākpṛthivyā yadantarā dyāvāpṛthivī ime yadbhūtaṃ ca bhavacca bhaviṣyaccetyācakṣate kasmiṁstadotaṃ ca protaṃ ceti (BṛU 3.8.3)

110 So Śaṅkara’s citation of the examples of Raikva and Gārgī at BSBh 3.4.36 imply that he takes

śūdras and women to be qualified for meditations on saguṇavidyās. This, in turn, implies that

śūdras and women might attain the devayāna and brahmaloka by this means.

It might be argued that my interpretation of the word anāśramin in BSBh 3.4.36 is too broad.

I take Śaṅkara’s reference to anāśramins to include all women and śūdras. It might be argued, however, that when Śaṅkara mentions anāśramins, he has widowers and only widowers

(vidhura) in mind. This interpretation may be justified, since Śaṅkara mentions widowers as an example of an anāśramin. If Śaṅkara’s discussion of anāśramins at BSBh 3.4.36 is limited to widowers, however, then his conclusion is that widowers can attain vidyā. This does not necessarily support my conclusion that women and śūdras can attain vidyā.

If Śaṅkara holds that unmarried women can acquire vidyā, then he should allow that married women can acquire vidyā as well. The theological status of an unmarried women is lower than the status of a married women. Moreover, through her husband’s religious activity, a married woman has a closer connection to rituals and other religious rites. So if an unmarried woman can attain vidyā, then Śaṅkara should allow that the married women can do so as well.

Another possible objection to my reading of BSBh 3.4.36 relates to my interpretation of the word vidyā (knowledge). Again, I take vidyā, in this context, to refer to saguṇavidyās. It might be argued, however, that in the context of BSBh 3.4.36, the word vidyā refers to brahmajñāna. If this is the case, then BSBh 3.4.36 states that anāśramins – like women and śūdras – can acquire brahmajñāna. Since brahmajñāna is liberation, BSBh 3.4.36 implies that anāśramins can attain liberation. Reading BSBh 3.4.36 to claim that anāśramins can attain brahmajñāna does not support my argument that Śaṅkara allows that women and śūdras can practice upāsana on saguṇavidyās.

111 This way of reading BSBH 3.4.36, however, does not contradict my reading of Śaṅkara. If anything, it might be taken to implicitly support my argument. If Śaṅkara allows that anāśramins can acquire brahmajñāna, then Śaṅkara allows that anāśramins might attain liberation. If

Śaṅkara allows that anāśramins can acquire brahmajñāna, however, then there is little reason to think that he denies that anāśramins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās.

BGBh 9.32 can be read to say that women and śūdras can enter the devayāna and attain brahmaloka. The BG passage itself reads, “O Arjuna, they who, having taken refuge in me, even should they be of low birth, women, so also vaiśyas, [and] even śūdras, they go to the highest mode of existence.”101 In this verse, Kṛṣṇa says that worshipping him is a means to attain “the highest mode of existence.”

Malinar claims that the highest mode of existence, in this passage, is mokṣa. According to

Malinar, “[r]arely considered social sectors like women, traders [vaiśyas] and servants [śūdra] are invited to practice bhakti and gain liberation (9.32)” (155). If the highest mode of existence is mokṣa, then BG 9.32 states that women, vaiśyas, and śūdras can attain mokṣa by worshipping

Kṛṣṇa. Passages like this are frequently cited as demonstrating that mokṣa is universally accessible within the BG.

Śaṅkara’s commentary on BG 9.32 is mostly a gloss. With the original text of BG 9.32 underlined, BGBh 9.32 reads,

101 māṃ hi pārtha vyapāśritya ye ‘pi syuḥ pāpayonayaḥ / striyo vaiśyāstathā śūdrāste ‘pi yānti parām gatim (BG 9.32)

112 [b]ecause oh Arjuna, having taken refuge in me, having chosen me with the state of

attachment (āśrayatvena), even should they be of a low birth – they have an inauspicious

birth, being produced of a low womb. Who are “they”? Women, so also vaiśyas, and

śūdras, they indeed go (yānti), go (gacchanti), to the highest eminent mode of existence.102

This gloss seems to confirm that women, vaiśyas, and śūdras go to the highest mode of existence. If Śaṅkara takes the highest mode of existence to be mokṣa, then BGBh 9.32 confirms that women, vaiśyas, and śūdras can attain mokṣa by worshipping Kṛṣṇa.

Attaining mokṣa, however, is not contingent on any type of physical movement. Since mokṣa is a state of understanding, people don’t have to “go” anywhere in order to attain it. So BGBh

9.32 is problematic because it states that women, vaiśyas, and śūdras travel somewhere – they go to the highest mode of existence. If the highest mode of existence is mokṣa, however, then BGBh

9.32 claims that devotees travel to mokṣa.

Much of this problem depends on how the verbs yānti (√yā) and gacchanti (√gam) are translated. In this context, the root gam can mean either ‘to go’ or ‘to obtain’. The Sanskrit root

√yā means ‘to go’. Unlike √gam, however, √yā does not mean ‘to obtain’. BG 9.32 states that women, vaiśyas, and śūdras go (yānti) to the highest mode of existence. Śaṅkara’s commentary adds that women, vaiśyas, and śūdras go (gacchanti) to the highest mode of existence.

102 māṃ hi yasmāt pārtha vyapāśritya mām āśrayatvena gṛhītvā ye ‘pi syuḥ bhaveyu pāpayonayaḥ pāpā yoniḥ yeṣāṃ te pāpayonaya pāpajanmānaḥ / ke te iti, āha – striyaṃ, vaiśyāṃ tathā śūdrāṃ te ‘pi yānti gacchanti parāṃ prakṛṣṭām gatim (BGBh 9.32)

113 By using the verb gacchanti, Śaṅkara could be affirming that devotees literally, physically travel to the highest mode of existence – as the verb yānti implies. If Śaṅkara is saying that devotes travel to the highest mode of existence in this sense, and if the highest mode of existence is mokṣa, however, this would then contradict his claim that a person does not travel – in a literal sense – to mokṣa (BSBh 3.3.29).

This problem might be avoided if Śaṅkara is taken to use gacchanti to mean “they obtain.” If

Śaṅkara is trying to say that women and śūdras obtain the highest mode of existence, then he does not imply physical movement. This would be consistent with his claim that it is impossible to literally travel to mokṣa. On this reading, the “going” in BG 9.32 is figurative, and Śaṅkara points this out by using the verb gacchanti for yānti. This still doesn’t explain, however, why

Śaṅkara claims that women and śūdras can attain brahmajñāna by means of bhakti. Śaṅkara, again, does not allow that bhakti is a direct means to the attainment of mokṣa.

Both of these problems can be avoided, however, if Śaṅkara’s reference to “going” at BGBh

9.32 is taken to refer to a person’s movement along the devayāna to brahmaloka. Śaṅkara holds that brahmaloka is a physical destination to which one must travel. If the highest mode of existence refers to brahmaloka in this passage, then the going (√yā/gam) discussed in BGBh 9.32 refers to the jīva’s passage on the devayāna. This way of reading BGBh 9.32 makes sense of

Śaṅkara’s use of both gacchanti and yānti. Women and śūdras need to travel somewhere in order to reach brahmaloka. Śaṅkara uses a verb of movement to indicate this. His claim is that as a consequence of worshipping Kṛṣṇa, women and śūdras go to brahmaloka – the highest mode of existence.

114 Reading BGBh 9.32 this way assumes two things. First, it assumes that the highest mode of existence refers to brahmaloka. Second, it assumes that Śaṅkara takes bhakti to refer to a saguṇavidyā. There is significant evidence for both of these assumptions.

At BGBh 8.22 and BGBh 8.13, Śaṅkara discusses people who meditate on the syllable om. As previously stated, BGBh 8.22 states that meditating on om leads to the devayāna. In BGBh 8.13,

Śaṅkara claims that one who dies (mṛyate) while uttering (vyāharan) om and meditating

(anucintayan) on īśvara (god) goes (gacchati) to the highest mode of existence.103 Due to the proximity of the two passages – BGBh 8.13 and 8.22 – and since Śaṅkara starts his discussion of kramamukti at BGBh 8.11 – these two passages suggests that at least in some cases, Śaṅkara refers to brahmaloka as the highest mode of existence.

BGBh 8.13 and BGBh 9.32 are nearly identical. If BGBh 8.13 indicates that “the highest mode of existence” is brahmaloka, then the similarities between the 8.13 and 9.32 suggest that this might be the case in 9.32 as well. The only difference between the two verses is that instead of using the pronoun saḥ (he), BGBh 9.32 claims that women and śūdras go to the highest mode of existence. Here is BGBh 8.13 and 9.32, again, with the original text underlined,

BGBh 8.13: sa eva yāti gacchati paramāṃ prakṛṣṭāṃ gatim – “he indeed goes, goes, to the

highest eminent mode of existence.”

BGBh 9.32: striya vaiśya tathā śūdra te ‘pi yānti gacchanti parāṃ prakṛṣṭāṃ gatim –

“women, so also vaiśyas and śūdras, they indeed go, go, to the highest eminent mode of

existence.”

103 sa eva yāti gacchati paramāṃ prakṛṣṭām gatim (BGBh 8.13)

115

In both BGBh 8.13 and 9.32, Śaṅkara qualifies a conjugated form of yā with the same form of gam. Moreover, he adds prakṛṣṭām (eminent) to qualify the mode of existence to which a person goes at both BGBh 8.13 and 9.32. The relationship between BGBh 8.13 and BGBh 8.22 suggests that the highest mode of existence might refer to brahmaloka. Since BGBh 8.13 and 9.32 are similar, this suggests that at BGBh 9.32, the highest mode of existence is also brahmaloka.

If ‘the highest mode of existence’ refers to brahmaloka, then Śaṅkara’s position at BGBh 9.32 is that women and śūdras might go to brahmaloka. This reading explains why Śaṅkara uses a verb that indicates movement in this passage. His claim is that these people are actually going somewhere – to brahmaloka. Moreover, this reading of BGBh 9.32 explains why Śaṅkara doesn’t say anything about brahmajñāna. The devotees in this passage haven’t acquired brahmajñāna yet – as they would have to if they were to “go” to mokṣa. So Śaṅkara should be read to allow that women and śūdras can go to brahmaloka in these passages.

Śaṅkara allows that scripture can refer to a saguṇavidyā without actually naming it (BSBh

3.3.31). Again, Śaṅkara takes tapas and śraddha (BṛU 6.2.15) to refer to an unnamed saguṇavidyās. It is possible that at BGBh 9.32, Śaṅkara’s idea of bhakti involves upāsana on a saguṇavidyā. Moreover, the claim in BGBh 9.32 isn’t different from the one in ChUBh 5.10.2:

“those who worship satyabrahman by the name of Hiraṇyagarbha, they all reach the flame [the first station on the devayāna].”104 Thus it is possible that in BGBh 9.32, Śaṅkara takes bhakti towards Kṛṣṇa to refer to upāsana on a saguṇavidyā.

104 ye ca satyam brahma hiraṇyagarbhākhyamupāsate, te sarve arciṣam (ChUBh 5.10.1-2)

116 According to Malinar, BG 9.32 states that bhakti is a means to liberation for women, vaiśyas, and śūdras. My suggestion is that in his commentary, Śaṅkara takes the highest mode of existence to refer to brahmaloka. So instead of claiming that bhakti is a means to liberation,

Śaṅkara reads the passage to claim that bhakti is a means to reach brahmaloka. The relevant bhakti, in turn, is upāsana. Upāsana is a form of reverential concentration that denotes meditation and worship.105 Thus bhakti might refer to upāsana – reverential meditation. This implies that women, vaiśyas and śūdras can attain brahmaloka by worshipping Kṛṣṇa.

In BGBh 8.26 Śaṅkara states, “[t]hese two paths – one light [the devayāna] and one dark [the dhūmapatha] – are for those who are qualified for jñāna and karman. These two paths are not possible for all people.”106 In this context, jñāna might be taken to refer to knowledge of the

Vedas. Karman might be taken to refer to religious rites. Śaṅkara holds that only dvijas are qualified for knowledge and rites. So BGBh 8.26 can be read to imply that dvijas are the only individuals that can attain brahmaloka.

105 Again, upāsana literally means homage, worship, or adoration. The verbal root for upāsana is upās. Upās means to pay attention to, or be intent upon. Thus the verbal root for upāsana denotes concentration. This suggests that the word upāsana refers to a form of prolonged, reverential concentration. At BṛUBh 1.3.9, Śaṅkara defines upāsana as a form of meditation where devotees concentrate on a deity. So there is a clear connection between bhakti and upāsana.

106 ete suklakṛṣṇe hi gatī jagataḥ iti adhikṛtānāṃ jñānakarmaṇoḥ, na jagataḥ sarvasyaiva ete gatī saṃbhavataḥ (BGBh 8.26)

117 Much of the evidence that I’ve reviewed in this chapter, however, implies that Śaṅkara allows that women and śūdras not only enter the devayāna, but also attain brahmaloka. This evidence could be ignored or discounted. An alternative, however, is to read the reference to jñāna and karman in 8.26 to refer to knowledge of saguṇavidyās by means of upāsana. This way of reading

BGBh 8.26 allows that women and śūdras can attain brahmaloka. It also makes Śaṅkara’s commentary on BG 8.26 consistent with his commentaries on other verses.

According to Śaṅkara, upāsana on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna. The devayāna, in turn, leads to brahmaloka. So upāsana on saguṇavidyās, according to Śaṅkara, leads to brahmaloka. Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of saguṇavidyās.

Thus Śaṅkara allows that nearly anyone can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās.

4.3 Who Might Attain Kramamukti

Those who attain kramamukti are those who acquire brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. So in order to establish Śaṅkara’s view on who can attain kramamukti, it is necessary to determine his view on who can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka.

The jīvas residing in brahmaloka do not belong to varṇas or āśramas. Śaṅkara thinks that classifications like varṇa and āśrama can only be used to draw distinctions among humans. At

BGBh 4.13, for example, Śaṅkara states that there are no varṇas outside of earth – “this system of the four varṇas does not exist in other worlds.”107 I think it is safe to assume that Śaṅkara

107 idaṃ cāturvarṇyaṃ na anyeṣu lokeṣu (BGBh 4.13)

118 holds the same position about āśramas. Since there are no varṇas or āśramas in brahmaloka, eligibility for kramamukti cannot depend on varṇa or āśrama in brahmaloka.

At BSBh 1.1.11, Śaṅkara classifies the various types of upāsanas by their purposes (arthāḥ).

The relevant passage reads, “[t]here are those upāsanas of brahman that have happiness as their motive (artha). [There are] those that have the attainment of kramamukti as their motive. [And there are] those that have success in karman as their motive.”108 The second set of upāsanas should sound familiar. These are the upāsana on saguṇavidyās that lead to the devayāna. The devayāna, in turn, leads to brahmaloka, where a person might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. So in this sense, certain types of upāsana have the purpose of attaining kramamukti.109 The attainment of brahmajñāna in brahmaloka is equal to the attainment of kramamukti. So

Śaṅkara’s claim at BSBh 1.1.11 implies that some forms of upāsana have the purpose of attaining brahmajñāna in brahmaloka.

108 tatra kānicidbrahmaṇa upāsanānyabhyudayārthāni kānicitkramamuktyarthāni kānicitkarmasamṛddhyarthāni (BSBh 1.1.11)

109 Śaṅkara argues that meditating on rituals increases the rewards. According to Bader, in

BṛUBh 3.1.6, “Śaṅkara refers to an upāsana which substitutes meditation for ritual action. He explains that meditation is a more effective mean of obtaining the desired results” (33). So when

Śaṅkara claims that upāsana can have success in karman as a motive, he is referring to upāsanas that increase the reward attained through rituals. When Śaṅkara claims there are forms of upāsana that have happiness as their motive, he is referring to upāsanas that prevent misfortune.

Neither of these types of upāsana lead to brahmaloka. It is only upāsana on saguṇavidyās that allow one to attain brahmaloka.

119 If upāsana on saguṇavidyās have the purpose of attaining brahmajñāna in brahmaloka, then anyone eligible for upāsana on saguṇavidyās might attain kramamukti. Śaṅkara holds that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can practice upāsana on saguṇavidyās. So there is reason to believe that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka.

Another possibility is that only those who attain the highest regions of brahmaloka attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Remember that at BṛUBh 6.2.15, Śaṅkara explains that brahmaloka is composed of different levels – “[f]rom the application of the plural number, it is to be understood that brahmaloka is divided into parts by the partition into higher and lower regions. And from the employment of [different] gradations of upāsana.” I speculated in the last chapter that different types of upāsana might determine the level of brahmaloka one attains. It is possible that only the jīvas in the highest regions of brahmaloka attain brahmajñāna. These jīvas attain the highest regions of brahmaloka, in turn, only by means of certain types of upāsana.

If attaining brahmajñāna in brahmaloka is contingent on reaching the highest level of brahmaloka, however, then a counter argument might run as follows. Male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that practice the type of upāsana that leads to the highest regions of brahmaloka.110 Thus saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain brahmajñāna

110 This is just an example, however. One could argue that only male dvijas reach the highest regions of brahmaloka. Or, one could argue that female śūdras are the only individuals that reach the level of brahmaloka where one acquires brahmajñāna. The point is that one could

120 in brahmaloka. This interpretation denies that that women, non-saṃnyāsins brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

This counter argument is problematic, however, in that it overlooks the example of Raikva.

Raikva, again, teaches Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa the saṃvargavidyā – a saguṇavidyā. This suggests that Raikva is a master of the saṃvargavidyā, despite being a low-status anāśramin. If Raikva is a master of the saṃvargavidyā, then presumably he can reach the highest regions of brahmaloka.

Śaṅkara states that upāsana on saguṇavidyās has the purpose of attaining brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Śaṅkara also claims that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. Since upāsana on saguṇavidyās has the purpose of attaining brahmajñāna in brahmaloka, and since women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās, it follows that these individuals are eligible to attain kramamukti.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. The first section argued that

Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Since the attainment of brahmajñāna is mokṣa, Śaṅkara’s position is that one can become liberated in brahmaloka. To attain liberation this way is to attain mokṣa by means of kramamukti. Śaṅkara confirms that a

argue that only certain people can practice the types of upāsana that lead to the level of brahmaloka where one acquires brahmajñāna.

121 person can attain liberation by means of kramamukti in the BSBh, BṛUBh, ChUBh, and BGBh.

This suggests that kramamukti is a clear and well defined path to liberation.

The second section in this chapter outlined Śaṅkara’s account of who might attain brahmaloka. Upāsana on saguṇavidyās leads to the devayāna, and the devayāna leads to brahmaloka. Śaṅkara allows that male dvijas – brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas – can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. He allows that brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka as well. There is evidence to suggest that

Śaṅkara allows that women and śūdras can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās.

Eligibility for kramamukti is a function of who can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. It follows that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

In the next chapter, I will return to the standard and alternative accounts of Śaṅkara that were discussed in the first two chapters. I will argue that the standard and alternative views assume that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti (immediate liberation). If the standard and alternative readings advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, then these arguments are consistent with my reading of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. I will argue that both the standard and alternative readings are consistent with the view that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

122 Chapter Five

Kramamukti and Sadyomukti

Introduction

In the last chapter, I argued that Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Since brahmajñāna is equivalent to mokṣa, Śaṅkara’s position is that one can become liberated in brahmaloka. To attain liberation by this means is to attain mokṣa by kramamukti. I also argued that Śaṅkara is consistent in allowing that devotees can attain liberation by means of kramamukti. He mentions this path to mokṣa in the BSBh, BṛUBh,

ChUBh, and BGBh. This suggests that kramamukti is a clear and well-defined path to liberation within Śaṅkara’s account.

I also examined Śaṅkara’s account of who might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

Śaṅkara qualifies those who attain kramamukti as those who attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka.

There are no varṇas, āśramas, or genders in brahmaloka. So the attainment of brahmajñāna in brahmaloka cannot be restricted to certain types of people. Who can attain kramamukti is a function of who can reach brahmaloka. Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. This implies that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

In this chapter, I will argue that Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti is compatible with the common arguments outlined in the first two chapters. I will argue that proponents of the standard and alternative views assume that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti (immediate

123 liberation). If the standard and alternative readings are taken to advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, then these arguments are consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced. And if these common arguments are consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced, then they are consistent with the view that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation as well – by means of kramamukti.

5.1 Kramamukti and the Standard Interpretation

The standard interpretation of Śaṅkara holds that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa. It might seem obvious that this view is inconsistent with my reading of Śaṅkara’s position on who can attain kramamukti. My reading of who can attain kramamukti denies that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa. Indeed, I read Śaṅkara to allow that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthin, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

A closer consideration of the three arguments for the standard interpretation, however, suggest that they might be consistent with my interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti after all. The first of these arguments, again, states that jñānayoga is the means to attain mokṣa within Śaṅkara’s system of thought. Only saṃnyāsins practice jñānayoga. So only saṃnyāsins might attain mokṣa. Since only male brāhmaṇas have the dharmic right to become saṃnyāsins, male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who can attain liberation. This argument

124 implies that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins cannot attain liberation.

Śaṅkara might hold that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who practice jñānayoga, however, without denying that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. The claim is also consistent with allowing that women, non- saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins might attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Hence, the claim that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins practice jñānayoga is consistent with allowing that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas,

śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

The second common argument for the standard interpretation states that devotees must study the Upaniṣads under a qualified guru in order to acquire brahmajñāna and liberation. According to Śaṅkara, these gurus only accept saṃnyāsins as students. If gurus only accept saṃnyāsins as students, then only saṃnyāsins can attain liberation. This argument, too, implies that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins are unable to attain liberation. And since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

Śaṅkara might hold that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can study the Upaniṣads with a saṃnyāsin guru, however, without denying that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. The claim is also consistent with allowing that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins,

125 and vānaprasthins might attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. So the claim that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might study the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru is consistent with allowing that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

According to the third argument for the standard view, Śaṅkara claims that devotees must renounce karman in order to attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. In this context, karman can refer to all actions, all non-essential actions, or dharmic action. Only saṃnyāsins might renounce dharmic actions. Since only saṃnyāsins might renounce dharmic action, only saṃnyāsins might renounce all non-essential actions. Likewise, since only saṃnyāsins might renounce dharmic action, only saṃnyāsins might renounce all actions. The third argument, then, can be simplified to state that only saṃnyāsins might attain liberation, because only saṃnyāsins might renounce dharmic actions. Since only male brāhmaṇas might be saṃnyāsins, this argument entails that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain liberation.

Śaṅkara might hold that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might renounce action, however, without denying that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. The claim is also consistent with allowing that women, non- saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins might attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. So the claim that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might renounce action is consistent with allowing that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas,

śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

126 These considerations suggest that Śaṅkara’s own account might be consistent with the account of kramamukti that I have developed. It might still seem, however, as if the authors who endorse the standard view must deny that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas,

śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

Proponents of the first argument, for example, argue that a person can only attain liberation by means of jñānayoga. Since kramamukti does not involve jñānayoga, this view is not consistent with the claim that a person can attain liberation by means of kramamukti. Proponents of the second argument state that the study of the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru is a necessary condition of attaining brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Since the path of kramamukti does not involve study the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru, this view is not consistent with the claim that person can attain liberation by means of kramamukti. Likewise, proponents of the third argument seem to argue that a person must abandon action – and dharmic action in particular – in order to attain liberation. Since the path of kramamukti does not typically involve the abandonment of action, this view is not consistent with the claim that a person can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

If proponents of the standard reading of Śaṅkara are taken to be concerned with sadyomukti, however, then these common arguments are consistent with the claim that a person can attain liberation by means of kramamukti. There are two paths to liberation within Śaṅkara’s system of thought – sadyomukti and kramamukti. Sadyomukti means immediate (sadyo) liberation (mukti).

People who attain mokṣa by means of sadyomukti acquire brahmajñāna during their human lives. These devotees become jīvanmuktas (people who are liberated while alive) and attain anāvṛtti when they die. Again, kramamukti is the process by which devotees attain brahmajñāna

127 in brahmaloka. If the common arguments are only concerned with sadyomukti – or are taken as arguments about who can attain liberation by means of sadyomukti – then these arguments are consistent with the view that one can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

Sawai advances a version of the first argument for the standard interpretation. He claims that a person attains liberation within Śaṅkara’s system of thought by practicing jñānayoga (375). He also claims that only saṃnyāsins are jñānayogins. This, again, implies that saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who can attain mokṣa. Since kramamukti does not seem to involve jñānayoga, it appears that Sawai must deny that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas,

śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

A close examination of Sawai’s argument, however, demonstrates that he assumes that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. He claims, for example, that “[t]o attain brahman, one has to be a paramahaṃsa-parivrājaka (wandering ascetic), constantly living in his own ātman, removing nescience” (383). Paramahaṃsa saṃnyāsins are humans that belong to the fourth stage of life. Sawai’s claim, therefore, is that devotees must be a certain type of human being in order to attain brahmajñāna. Humans that acquire brahmajñāna attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. They acquire brahmajñāna, become jīvanmuktas, and attain anāvṛtti when they die. So when Sawai talks about the path to liberation, he assumes that the path under discussion is sadyomukti.

Sawai talks about liberation as an embodied state. He claims that according to Śaṅkara, there are

128 nine necessary attributes of one who attained mokṣa. In brief, these are: one must (1 be

dispassionate toward all things non-eternal, (2) abandon the desire for sons (putra), wealth

(vitta) and future life (loka), (3) reach the state of a paramahaṃsa-parivrājaka, (4) be

endowed with calmness (śama), self-discipline (dama), compassion (dayā), and so on, (5)

be possessed of the qualities of a disciple (śiṣya-guṇa) which are well known from the

scriptures, (6) be [internally and externally] pure, (7) be a brāhmaṇa and (8) approach

one’s teacher in the prescribed manner. Lastly, one’s caste (jāti), actions (karman),

behaviour (vṛtta), knowledge [of the Veda] and family must have been properly examined

(379).

As I pointed out in the last chapter, Śaṅkara claims that varṇas – and presumably āśramas – only apply to embodied human beings. Since Sawai claims that the person who reaches the state of liberation is a saṃnyāsin, he assumes that liberation is an embodied state. Devotees that attain liberation while embodied become jīvanmuktas. Thus Sawai’s description of the path to mokṣa assumes that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

In the context of this assumption, Sawai’s version of the first argument states that jñānayoga is the means to the attainment of mokṣa by means of sadyomukti. Since only saṃnyāsins practice jñānayoga, only saṃnyāsins might attain mokṣa by means of sadyomukti. And since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain mokṣa by means of sadyomukti.

So long as Sawai is taken to advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, however, his version of the argument is consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced. And if Sawai’s version of the argument is consistent with the

129 interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced, then it is consistent with the view that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation as well – by means of kramamukti.

Hirst advances a version of the second argument for the standard interpretation. According to

Hirst’s reading of Śaṅkara, a person attains liberation by studying the Upaniṣads under a senior saṃnyāsin guru. Since only saṃnyāsins might study under a saṃnyāsin guru, only saṃnyāsins might attain liberation. And since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇas might attain liberation. Since the attainment of kramamukti does not entail the study of the Upaniṣads, it would appear that Hirst must deny that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

A close examination of Hirst’s argument, however, demonstrates that she assumes that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. Hirst claims, for example, that in order to study the Upaniṣads,

the pupil should also be a paramahaṃsa wandering ascetic, a pure brahmin, should

approach his teacher in the proper way, and should have been scrutinized with respect to

his caste, occupation (or ritual action), conduct knowledge (of the Veda), and family (2005,

42).

Again, paramahaṃsa saṃnyāsins are human beings that belong to the fourth āśrama. So Hirst’s claim is that devotees must be a certain type of human in order to receive the instruction that

130 leads to brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Human beings who acquire brahmajñāna, however, attain liberation and become jīvanmuktas. This is the process of sadyomukti. So when Hirst talks about the path to liberation in Śaṅkara, she assumes that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

Hirst’s description of the guru-student relationship suggests that she envisions liberation as an embodied state. Hirst claims that on Śaṅkara’s account,

the teacher skilfully teaches the pupil to come to know brahman, using the methods as well

as the content provided by scripture. It is these very methods, employed by a previous

Advaitin teacher, which have brought the present teacher to realization. This realization is

the pragmatic criterion of the truth of Advaita. (It works: it does set you free). It qualifies

the teacher to draw others to the truth, precisely because it is the result of the correct

interpretation of scripture (2005, 59).

A lineage of enlightened gurus suggests that Hirst sees the liberative process as leading to sadyomukti. Advaitin gurus are jīvanmuktas that make use of the teaching methods that their own liberated teachers used to teach them. If gurus are meant to liberate students, as they were liberated, however, then the Advaitin system leads one to become a jīvanmukta. Jīvanmuktas attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. This suggests that Hirst assumes that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

If Hirst’s version of the second argument for the standard interpretation is understood in the context of this assumption, however, then the argument states that studying the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru is the means to the attainment of mokṣa by means of sadyomukti. Since only

131 saṃnyāsins study the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru, only saṃnyāsins might attain mokṣa by means of sadyomukti. And again, since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

So long as Hirst is taken to advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, however, her version of the argument is consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced. And if Hirst’s version of the argument is consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced, then it is consistent with the view that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti. Moreover, one can hold that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can study the Upaniṣads – and one can hold that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only humans that can attain brahmajñāna – without denying that people can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

Dasgupta advances a version of the third argument for the standard interpretation. He argues that the seeker of liberation must renounce dharmic actions, in particular, in order to pursue brahmajñāna and mokṣa. Since saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can renounce dharmic duties, only saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. And since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation. Since kramamukti doesn’t entail the renunciation of dharma, this suggests that Dasgupta must deny that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

Dasgupta too, however, assumes that people attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. He claims, for example, that

132 [e]ven when the true knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a while, if

the individual’s previously ripened karmas demand it. Thus the emancipated person may

walk about and behave like an ordinary sage, but he is emancipated and can no longer

acquire any new karma. As soon as the fruit due to his ripe karmas are enjoyed and

exhausted, the sage loses his body and there will never be any other birth for him, for the

dawn of perfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas of beginningless

previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any of the illusions subjective or objective

which could make any knowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man is called

a jīvanmukta, i.e. emancipated while living (1: 491).

According to Dasgupta, people who attain brahmajñāna become jīvanmuktas. They attain liberation while living, and continue to live as liberated human beings. This process of attaining liberation while living, however, is sadyomukti. Thus Dasgupta’s analysis of Śaṅkara’s soteriology assumes that people attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

Dasgupta does not mention that Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain liberation by means of kramamukti. In fact, Dasgupta is nearly silent about the possibility of attaining liberation by means of kramamukti. Judging from the lack of reference to kramamukti, it is most likely the case that Dasgupta assumes that people attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

If Dasgupta’s argument assumes that people attain liberation by means of sadyomukti, however, then Dasgupta argues that a person must renounce dharmic actions in order to attain mokṣa by means of sadyomukti. Since only saṃnyāsins can renounce dharmic action, only saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. And since only male brāhmaṇas can become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa by means of sadyomukti.

133 So long as Dasgupta is taken to advance an argument about sadyomukti, however, his version of the argument is consistent with the account of kramamukti that I have advanced. And if his argument is consistent with the account of kramamukti that I have advanced, then it is consistent with the view that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

The standard interpretation of Śaṅkara holds that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who can attain mokṣa. The first common argument advanced by proponents of this view states that a person can only attain liberation by means of jñānayoga. The second common argument states that the study of the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru is a necessary condition of liberation. The third common argument states that a person must abandon action – and dharmic action in particular – in order to attain liberation. Kramamukti does not involve jñānayoga, the study of the Upaniṣads, or the renunciation of action. Thus it would seem like proponents of these arguments must deny that it is possible to attain liberation by means of kramamukti. If these argument are concerned with the conditions of attaining liberation by means of sadyomukti, however, then the argument for the standard view are consistent with allowing that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

5.2 Kramamukti and the Alternative Interpretations

As I noted in chapter two, some scholars hold that Śaṅkara allows that non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation as well. I described this as the alternative view. Some proponents of the alternative view argue that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras,

134 brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation. Others claim that only some smaller subset of non-saṃnyāsins might attain mokṣa.

Proponents of all of these alternative readings agree, however, that the class of people who might attain liberation on Śaṅkara’s view is broader than the standard account allows. All deny that Śaṅkara limits liberation to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins. At first glance, these accounts might seem more amenable to my own analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti for this reason, since my own analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti entails that he allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa.

On closer consideration, however, the first two arguments for the alternative view seem to preclude the attainment of liberation by means of kramamukti, despite permitting many of the same classes of people from attaining liberation. The first argument for the alternative interpretation, for example, accepts the claim that jñānayoga is the means to attain mokṣa within

Śaṅkara’s system of thought. Proponents of this argument claim that Śaṅkara allows that non- saṃnyāsins, however, can practice jñānayoga. Hence, they allow that non-saṃnyāsins might attain mokṣa.

Since the path of kramamukti does not involve jñānayoga, however, this argument is not obviously consistent with the claim that a person can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

If a person must practice jñānayoga in order to attain liberation, then a person cannot attain liberation by means of kramamukti, just because the path of kramamukti does not involve jñānayoga. So the first argument for the alternative interpretation might seem inconsistent with the analysis of kramamukti that I have advanced.

135 The second argument for the alternative interpretation denies that the study of śruti is a necessary condition of attaining liberation. Instead, the argument claims that devotees might also attain liberation through the study smṛti. Since women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and

śūdras from any one of the four āśramas might study smṛti, women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras from any one of the four āśramas might attain liberation.

Since the path of kramamukti does not require the study of smṛti for the purpose of attaining brahmajñāna, this view is not consistent with the claim that a person can attain liberation by means of kramamukti. If a person must study smṛti in order to attain liberation, then a person cannot attain liberation by means of kramamukti, just because the kramamukti path does not require the study of smṛti. So the second argument for the alternative interpretation seems inconsistent with the analysis of kramamukti that I have advanced.

If proponents of the first two arguments for the alternative reading of Śaṅkara are taken to be concerned exclusively with sadyomukti, however, then these arguments are consistent with the claim that a person can attain liberation by means of kramamukti. Comans, for example, accepts that jñānayoga is the means to liberation in Śaṅkara’s system. He also claims, however, that

Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras from any one of the four

āśramas might practice jñānayoga and attain liberation. This argument might seem to preclude the attainment of mokṣa by means of kramamukti, however, since kramamukti does not involve jñānayoga.

Comans seems to assume, however, that liberation is at least initially an embodied state. He says,

136 [w]hat style of life would the liberated person follow? In Śaṅkara’s opinion, if he is a

householder he would renounce the domestic life to become a wandering ascetic (321)…

In some other verses Śaṅkara is more forthright in accepting that enlightened people are

not invariably paramahaṁsa renunciates. In his commentary to [BG] 4.20 and 23, Śaṅkara

accepts that an enlightened person may continue to perform the activities associated with

his stage of life (325).

Here, Comans claims that Śaṅkara allows that a liberated person might or might not be a renunciate. The important point, however, is that Comans describes the liberated person as embodied. That is, he describes the liberated person as a jīvanmukta. Jīvanmuktas, again, attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. So Comans’ reading of Śaṅkara assumes that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

In the context of this assumption, Comans’ version of the first argument states that jñānayoga is the means to the attainment of mokṣa by means of sadyomukti. Comans argues that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, vaiśyas, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga. It follows that according to Comans’ reading of Śaṅkara, women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation via sadyomukti.

So long as Comans is taken to advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, however, his version of the first argument for the alternative interpretation is consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced. Śaṅkara might hold that jñānayoga is the means to attain liberation by means of sadyomukti, however, without denying that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins,

137 and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. The claim is also consistent with allowing that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins might attain brahmajñāna and in brahmaloka. So the claim that jñānayoga is the means to the attainment of mokṣa by means of sadyomukti is consistent with allowing that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can also attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

Read this way, Comans’ version of the first argument for the alternative interpretation states that jñānayoga is the means to the attainment of mokṣa by means of sadyomukti. Since non- saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga, non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. This is consistent with allowing that a person might also attain liberation by means of kramamukti. And if Comans’ version of the argument is consistent with the attainment of liberation by means of kramamukti, then it is consistent with the view that women, brāhmaṇa, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

Marcaurelle advances a version of the second argument for the alternative interpretation of

Śaṅkara. Again, he argues that according to Śaṅkara, a person can attain liberation by the study of śruti or smṛti. Since women and members of all four āśramas can study smṛti, women and members of all four āśramas can attain liberation. This argument, too, might seem to preclude the attainment of kramamukti, since kramamukti does not involve the study of smṛti – or śruti for the purpose of attaining brahmajñāna.

Like Comans, however, Marcaurelle seems to assume that a person attains liberation by means of sadyomukti. According to Marcaurelle, “Śaṅkara acknowledges in various places that one can reach direct Self-knowledge and liberation-in-life even when one has not adopted

138 physical renunciation” (40). Devotees who attain liberation-in-life are jīvanmuktas. They attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

Śaṅkara might hold that the study of scripture is the means to attain liberation by means of sadyomukti, however, without denying that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. The claim is also consistent with allowing that women, brāhmaṇas, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. So the claim that the study of scripture is the means to attain liberation by means of sadyomukti is consistent with allowing that women, brāhmaṇas, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

Read this way, Marcaurelle’s version of the second argument for the alternative interpretation states that the study of śruti or smṛti is a condition of the attainment of liberation by means of sadyomukti. Since women and members of all four āśramas can study smṛti, members of all four

āśramas can attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. This version of the argument, however, is consistent with my analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti, since sadyomukti and kramamukti are distinct path by which a person might attain liberation. If Marcaurelle’s version of the second argument is consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced, then it is consistent with the view that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

The third argument for the alternative interpretation denies that a person must abandon action in order to attain liberation. This argument implies that a person need not be a saṃnyāsin in order to attain liberation. So it implies that a person need not be a male brāhmaṇa in order to attain

139 liberation. Hence, the third argument entails that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

This argument is less obviously inconsistent with my analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti than the first two arguments for the alternative interpretation. Proponents of the first two arguments maintain that jñānayoga and the study of scripture, respectively, are conditions of the attainment of mokṣa. Since kramamukti does not essentially involve jñānayoga or the study of scripture, however, these accounts initially seem to preclude the attainment of liberation by means of kramamukti. Since proponents of the third argument for the alternative interpretation do not assert the necessity of jñānayoga, the study of scripture, or any other condition that would limit members of specific genders, āśramas, or varṇas from attaining liberation, however, the third argument is not obviously inconsistent with my analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. So no additional work is strictly necessary to show that my analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti is consistent with the third argument.

It is worth noting, however, that proponents of the third argument for the alternative interpretation also assume that the path to mokṣa, on Śaṅkara’s account, is sadyomukti. Taber, for example, claims that Śaṅkara allows that a person might continue to perform dharmic actions until they attain liberation. This implies that a person need not be a saṃnyāsin to attain liberation. He also claims, however, that devotees must renounce “socioreligious obligations” after they acquire brahmajñāna (19). He elaborates that

[o]nce the self is known, the carrying out of karma become irrelevant, even an obstacle, to

liberation; for those who have already grasped the essential truth of the identity of

140 Brahman and the self, the renunciation of mundane activity and the avoidance of spiritual

exercises is enjoined (17).

The liberated person should abandon their dharmic duties once they acquire brahmajñāna. Since only embodied human beings can abandon their dharmic duties in this sense, however, the liberated person is an embodied human being. Embodied humans who acquire brahmajñāna, in turn, are jīvanmuktas. So they attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. Taber’s discussion of the path to liberation, then, assumes that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

If Taber’s version of the third argument for the alternative interpretation is understood in the context of this assumption, then the argument states that devotees might continue to fulfill their dharmic duties while they seek to attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. This implies that non-saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa by means of sadyomukti. So Taber’s reading of Śaṅkara allows that non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of sadyomukti.

So long as Taber is taken to advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, however, his version of the argument is consistent with my interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti.

Śaṅkara might hold that the person who attains liberation by means of sadyomukti, and becomes a jīvanmukta, must abandon dharmic actions without denying that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. The claim is also consistent with allowing that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. So the claim that a person abandons dharma as a jīvanmukta is consistent with allowing that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras,

141 brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

The fourth argument for the alternative interpretation considers Śaṅkara’s claim that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa. If this claim is taken literally, it implies that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain liberation, since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins.

Proponents of the fourth argument for the alternative interpretation argue, however, that

Śaṅkara’s claim that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa should not be taken literally.

Potter, for example, argues that Śaṅkara uses the word saṃnyāsin to refer to jīvanmuktas in this context. So when Śaṅkara claims that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa, he simply states that only jīvanmuktas attain mokṣa. Since Potter claims that Śaṅkara denies that a person must be a member of the fourth āśrama in order to become a jīvanmukta (where the word saṃnyāsin is now taken in its traditional sense), might attain liberation.

Potter’s discussion clearly implies, however, that he is concerned with Śaṅkara’s account of sadyomukti. Again, a person attains liberation by means of sadyomukti if they become jīvanmuktas. So Potter’s interpretation of Śaṅkara’s analysis of saṃnyāsin in terms of jīvanmukta implies that a person attains liberation by means of sadyomukti.

So long as Potter is taken to advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, his version of the fourth argument is consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced. And if Potter’s version of the argument is consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced, then it is consistent with the view that women, vaiśyas, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

142 Proponents of the alternative interpretation argue that Śaṅkara allows that non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation as well. These authors advance at least four arguments for this view. The first argument accepts that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna, but denies that

Śaṅkara claims that only saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga. If non-saṃnyāsins can practice jñānayoga, then non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation. The second argument for the alternative interpretation denies that the study of the Upaniṣads under an Advaitin guru as a necessary condition of brahmajñāna. These scholars claim that Śaṅkara allows that it is possible to attain brahmajñāna through smṛti. If the study of the Upaniṣads is not a necessary condition of brahmajñāna, then the attainment of brahmajñāna need not be limited to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins.

These two arguments might seem inconsistent with my reading of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. Since the path of kramamukti does not entail jñānayoga or the study of scripture for the purpose of attaining brahmajñāna, these two arguments seem incompatible with my reading of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. If proponents of these arguments are taken to be concerned exclusively with sadyomukti, however, then these arguments are consistent with the claim that a person can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

According to the third common argument for the alternative view, Śaṅkara allows that devotees might continue to perform dharmic actions while they pursue brahmajñāna. If the renunciation of dharma is not a condition of attaining brahmajñāna, then people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. According to the fourth argument, when Śaṅkara claims that only saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa, he does not mean to imply that members of the saṃnyāsa āśrama are the only individuals that can attain mokṣa. Śaṅkara’s non-

143 standard use of the word saṃnyāsin leaves room for Śaṅkara to accept that non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

These arguments are less obviously inconsistent with my analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. Proponents of the third and fourth arguments also assume, however, that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. If the arguments are understood in this way, then my analysis of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti might be seen to supplement them. When read together, the accounts state that people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation, within Śaṅkara’s system of thought, by means of either sadyomukti or kramamukti.

Conclusion

According to the standard reading of Śaṅkara, male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. According to the alternative reading,

Śaṅkara allows that non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation as well. Proponents of these accounts assume, however, that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. If the standard and alternative readings are taken to advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, then these arguments might be consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced. And if these common arguments are consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced, then they are consistent with the view that women, non-saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

144 Conclusion

Śaṅkara reads scripture to say that the ātman is brahman. Any perceived difference between the

ātman and brahman is a consequence of avidyā. Śaṅkara states that people will attain further rebirths as long as they see themselves as different from brahman. This metaphysical knowledge is called brahmajñāna. To possess brahmajñāna, according to Śaṅkara, is to attain mokṣa.

There are two paths to liberation within Śaṅkara’s system of thought – sadyomukti and kramamukti. People who attain mokṣa by means of sadyomukti acquire brahmajñāna during their human lives. These devotees become jīvanmuktas and attain final emancipation when they die.

Kramamukti is the path to liberation by which devotees attain brahmajñāna after they die, while residing in brahmaloka. Since brahmajñāna is liberation, these people attain liberation in brahmaloka. The devotees that have acquired brahmajñāna in brahmaloka attain final emancipation at the time of pralaya.

Some authors claim that Śaṅkara has an extremely narrow view of who can attain liberation.

The standard interpretation of Śaṅkara states that male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals that can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa. This standard view denies that women, non- saṃnyāsin brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins can attain liberation.

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I reviewed three common arguments advanced by proponents of the standard reading of Śaṅkara. The first argument states that Śaṅkara claims that jñānayoga is the means to attain brahmajñāna. Proponents of the standard view state – or assume – that jñānayogins are saṃnyāsins. Since only male brāhmaṇas might become

145 saṃnyāsins, the argument entails that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna by means of jñānayoga.

The second argument for the standard interpretation states that in order to attain liberation, devotees must study the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru. These saṃnyāsin gurus only accept other saṃnyāsins as students. Since only male brāhmaṇas might become saṃnyāsins, only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might study the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru. So this argument, too, implies that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

The third argument for the standard interpretation states that devotees must renounce karman

(action) in order to attain liberation. While there is disagreement about the range of actions that must be renounced, all of the proponents of this argument agree that a person must renounce dharmic actions in order to attain liberation. Since saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who can renounce dharmic action, the argument entails that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

If male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins are the only individuals who can attain liberation, then Śaṅkara claims that only a small subset of people might attain mokṣa. If this reading is correct, then

Śaṅkara denies that women can attain liberation. He also denies that members of the three other varṇas can attain liberation. That is, he denies that kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śūdras might attain liberation. This reading also denies that members of the other three āśramas can attain liberation.

So brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, and vānaprasthins are precluded from liberation as well.

If Śaṅkara’s conception of who might attain liberation is as narrow as the standard account implies, however, his historical popularity and influence should be puzzling. Buddhism, Jainism, and the bhakti movements provided alternative sets of practices that allowed a much wider range of people to attain the highest religious goals. If Śaṅkara’s path to liberation is an austere

146 intellectualism, and if Śaṅkara’s path to liberation is only meant for high-status men – as the standard reading suggests – then it is hard to explain Śaṅkara’s widespread historical fame.

These tensions might seem alleviated by alternative readings of Śaṅkara’s soteriology. Some scholars read Śaṅkara to allow that non-saṃnyāsins might attain liberation as well. Some of these scholars argue that Śaṅkara allows that nearly anyone might attain liberation. Others claim that only some smaller subset of non-saṃnyāsins can attain mokṣa within Śaṅkara’s system.

Proponents of all of these views agree, however, that the class of people who might attain liberation on Śaṅkara’s view is broader than the standard account allows. All deny that Śaṅkara limits liberation to male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins.

In the second chapter, I reviewed four common arguments advanced by proponents of this alternative interpretation. The first argument accepts the claim that jñānayoga is the means to attain liberation. It denies, however, that Śaṅkara only allows saṃnyāsins to practice jñānayoga.

Since Śaṅkara allows that non-saṃnyāsins might practice jñānayoga, he allows that non- saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

The second argument for the alternative interpretation claims that Śaṅkara allows that devotees can attain brahmajñāna without studying the Upaniṣads. According to this view, devotees can attain brahmajñāna by studying smṛti. This implies that the study of the Upaniṣads under a saṃnyāsin guru is not a condition of the attainment of brahmajñāna. Since people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might study smṛti, people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

Proponents of the third argument claim that Śaṅkara does not require that devotees abandon karman in order to attain brahmajñāna. If the renunciation of karman is not a condition of brahmajñāna, then people other than saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna. Consequently,

147 people other than male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins might attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa on this reading.

The fourth argument for the alternative interpretation argues against the claim that Śaṅkara requires that a person become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain liberation. This claim is at least implicit in all three arguments for the standard interpretation. If it is true, then each of the first three arguments for the alternative interpretation are unconvincing, since each implies that

Śaṅkara denies that a person must become a saṃnyāsin in order to attain mokṣa. A number of scholars argue, however, that those passage in which Śaṅkara seems to claim that only saṃnyāsins can attain liberation should not be read literally. If this is right, then Śaṅkara’s account might be consistent with non-saṃnyāsins attaining liberation.

In chapters three and four, I examined Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti. Chapter three considered Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna. Śaṅkara states that a person follows the devayāna by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās. In this context, saguṇavidyās are the objects of meditation. Śaṅkara holds that saguṇavidyās can be rituals, metaphysical doctrines, syllables, or deities. Śaṅkara is systematic in his treatment of saguṇavidyās. He argues, for example, that if scripture outlines a saguṇavidyā, but does not say that it leads to the devayāna, it leads to the devayāna nonetheless. He also argues that scripture can reference saguṇavidyās without actually naming them. Śaṅkara’s careful and systematic treatment of the devayāna suggests that it is an important facet within his system of thought.

I also argued that Śaṅkara has a consistent view of the sequence of events that occur as jīvas pass through the devayāna. Despite divergent descriptions of the devayāna in the Upaniṣads and other authoritative texts, Śaṅkara takes pains to resolve these accounts into a consistent interpretation. Consequently, Śaṅkara’s account of the devayāna deserves serious consideration.

148 In the fourth chapter, I argued that Śaṅkara allows that one can attain brahmajñāna and mokṣa in brahmaloka. To attain liberation this way is to attain mokṣa by means of kramamukti. Śaṅkara is consistent in allowing that devotees can attain liberation via kramamukti. He mentions this path to mokṣa in all of his major commentaries. This suggest that kramamukti is a clear and well- defined path to liberation within Śaṅkara’s account.

Those who attain kramamukti are those who acquire brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. In order to establish Śaṅkara’s view on who can attain kramamukti, it is necessary to determine his view on who can attain brahmajñāna in brahmaloka. Śaṅkara denies that classifications like varṇa,

āśrama, and gender can be used to draw distinctions among the jīvas in brahmaloka. Moreover,

Śaṅkara doesn’t mention varṇa, āśrama, or gender in the passages in which he discusses the attainment of brahmajñāna in brahmaloka.

This implies that eligibility for kramamukti does not depend on these distinctions. Śaṅkara’s view is that eligibility for kramamukti is a function of a person’s eligibility for brahmaloka.

Since Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain brahmaloka by means of the devayāna,

Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

The standard interpretation of Śaṅkara states that only male brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins can attain liberation. This might seem inconsistent with my reading of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti.

My account of kramamukti might seem more amenable to the alternative interpretation of

Śaṅkara’s soteriology. Certain proponents of arguments for the alternative interpretation argue, after all, that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation.

149 In the fifth chapter, I argued that my reading of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti is compatible with both the standard and alternative views. Proponents of the standard and alternative views assume that devotees attain liberation by means of sadyomukti. If the standard and alternative readings are taken to advance an account of who might attain sadyomukti, then these arguments are consistent with the interpretation of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced. And if these common arguments are consistent with the interpretation of

Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti that I have advanced, then they are consistent with the view that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain liberation as well – by means of kramamukti.

Kramamukti and sadyomukti are asymmetric, but convergent paths to liberation. They are asymmetric because devotees following these paths attain liberation at different times, in different places, and by different means. The path of kramamukti and the path of sadyomukti are convergent, however, in the sense that both lead to liberation. I have argued that Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins can attain the devayāna and brahmaloka by means of upāsana on saguṇavidyās.

Thus Śaṅkara allows that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti.

Since my reading of Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti is compatible with both the standard and alternative views, it follows that Śaṅkara can hold an extremely narrow – or inclusive – view about who can attain sadyomukti, without denying that women, brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas,

śūdras, brahmacārins, gṛhasthins, vānaprasthins, and saṃnyāsins might attain liberation by means of kramamukti. So Śaṅkara’s account of kramamukti demonstrates that Śaṅkara allows that a wide range of people to attain the highest religious goal – brahmajñāna and mokṣa.

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