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Origins and Development of Morality CHAPTER 17 Origins and Development of Morality MELANIE KILLEN and JUDITH G. SMETANA INTRODUCTION 702 Neuroscience of Moral and Conventional Judgments 727 Organization of the Chapter 702 Summary: Moral Judgments and Moral Reasoning 727 Overview of Definitions of Morality 702 MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE Classical Theories of Morality and Their Evolution 704 FAMILY 728 Beyond False Dichotomies 708 Attachment Relationships and a Mutually Responsive THE ROOTS AND EARLY EMERGENCE Orientation 729 OF MORALITY 710 Parenting Styles and Discipline Strategies 729 Early Origins: Awareness of Moral Categories in Family Discourse, Conflicts, and Responses to Infancy 710 Transgressions 730 Moral Judgments in Early Childhood 714 Summary 733 Summary: Roots and Early Emergence of Morality MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF PEER 715 AND INTERGROUP RELATIONSHIPS 733 MORALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ABOUT MENTAL Peer Interactions Promoting Morality 734 STATES 716 Hierarchies and Inequalities in Interpersonal Peer False Beliefs, Diverse Beliefs, and Moral Judgments 716 Relationships 734 Understanding of Intentionality and Moral Judgments Interpersonal and Intergroup Aspects of Peer 717 Relationships 735 Desires, Emotions, and Moral Judgments 718 Intergroup Contact Facilitating Moral Judgments 736 Direction of Effects Between Moral Judgments and Theory Peer Groups, Prejudice, and Classroom Expectations 736 of Mind 719 Summary 737 Neuroscience of Intentionality and Morality 719 MORALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIC Deception, Lying, and Theory of Mind 720 ENGAGEMENT, SOCIETY, AND POLITICAL Summary: Morality and Mental State Knowledge 720 INSTITUTIONS 737 MORAL JUDGMENTS AND MORAL Civic Engagement 738 REASONING 721 Evaluations of Democratic and Other Forms of Social-Cognitive Developmental Processes 721 Governments 738 Straightforward and Complex Social Interactions 721 Social Trust Beliefs 739 Judgments About Harm to Others 722 Reasoning About the Sources of Social Inequalities in Concepts of the Fair Distribution of Resources 723 Society 739 Judgments About the Unfair and Prejudicial Treatment CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE of Others 724 DIRECTIONS 740 Conceptions of Rights 726 REFERENCES 742 We extend our appreciation to Laura Elenbaas for her assis- Rote for their invaluable feedback on the manuscript, and Sharon tance with editorial work on the manuscript. We thank Courtney Chan, Sue Cho, and Leon Li for proofreading the manuscript. Ball, Shelby Cooley, Laura Elenbaas, Aline Hitti, Marc Jambon, We greatly appreciate the helpful editorial feedback from Michael Copyright © 2015. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. All rights reserved. & Sons, Incorporated. © 2015. John Wiley Copyright Kelly Lynn Mulvey, Jeeyoung Noh, Michael Rizzo, and Wendy E. Lamb. 701 Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Science, Socioemotional Processes, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rochester/detail.action?docID=1895802. Created from rochester on 2017-08-30 12:53:08. 702 Origins and Development of Morality INTRODUCTION of 50 years ago have changed, with disagreements taking on new dimensions. Morality is a central aspect of social life and has been at the core of psychological theories for more than a Organization of the Chapter century. The scientific study of morality poses enduring questions about how individual psychological needs for Developmental scientists have made tremendous progress autonomy and attachment to groups and society can be met in understanding the origins and development of morality while also ensuring the integrity, dignity, and equal and (for a review of different approaches, see Killen & Smetana, fair treatment of others. Drawing on philosophy, biology, 2014). This is promising because developmental science anthropology, and sociology, developmental scientists and the study of morality continue to serve as reference have addressed these questions by studying the origins and points for scholarship and research across a wide range of acquisition of morality as well as the sources and nature fields, as well as foci for the popular media. of change. We begin with a description of the major developmental Debates about the nature of morality have a long history science definitions of morality. We provide a brief review dating back to the Greek philosophers. Plato, who wrote of the theories that provided the foundation for research about idealized forms of morality in 380 b.c., was chal- over the past half-century and then reflect on the contro- lenged by his student, Aristotle, who speculated about what versies and misconceptions that still exist. Next, we review it means to live a good life. Aristotle appealed to virtues as current literature on the developmental roots of morality, well as to core principles of justice. In the 1700s, debates mental state knowledge and morality, and moral judgments about morality arose which have continued to this day. and reasoning. Subsequent sections examine the various Hume (1739/1969) focused on the sentiments (emotions) contexts, ranging from the family and peer groups to that motivate morality, and Kant (1785/1959) theorized society, in which moral development occurs. We conclude about rationality and the categorical imperative (e.g., “Act with implications and directions for research. Throughout only in accordance with that maxim through which you can the chapter, we demonstrate how the study of morality has at the same time will that it become a universal law” (p. x). shed light on fundamental topics in developmental science, Evolutionary (Darwin, 1871/2004) and sociological theory contributed novel methods, and discovered new knowledge (Durkheim, 1925/1973) also brought new claims to bear about child development. on the conceptualization of morality. Current philosophers have continued these debates, albeit in different forms. Overview of Definitions of Morality They have drawn on psychological theories and provided new interpretations of classic theories to develop more inte- In this section we review and highlight the different ways grated treatments of morality, which are influential in how that developmental scientists have defined morality and developmental scientists study morality today (Appiah, its acquisition. We identify some of the central positions, 2005; Gewirth, 1978; MacIntyre, 1981; Nussbaum, 1999; recognizing that our brief overview does not fully capture Rawls, 1971; Sen, 2009). the complexity or nuances of any given approach. Despite varying interpretations, most developmental Deontological Moral Judgments scientists agree that morality refers to individuals’ treat- ment of others, not (just) the self, and reflects individuals’ For researchers studying moral judgment, the definition intentions and motivations for actions. Beyond this, there of morality is derived primarily from moral philosophers are many different emphases, issues, and methodolog- taking a deontological perspective (Kant, 1785/1959). ical approaches, which we will review in this chapter. According to this approach, morality refers to a set of pre- Because conceptual and methodological approaches vary, scriptive norms about how individuals ought to treat one comparisons across different theoretical perspectives and another, including concerns with fairness, others’ welfare, research programs are often difficult. Nevertheless, as we equality, and justice. To act in a way consistent with moral detail here, developmental approaches derived from very principles, one is required to be impartial and fair and to not different foundational theories have moved toward more be bound by the dictates of group norms or consensus when integrative approaches. Progress toward integration does they are in conflict with fairness and justice. According not mean that controversies no longer exist; they do and to Gewirth (1978), morality is a set of categorically Copyright © 2015. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. All rights reserved. & Sons, Incorporated. © 2015. John Wiley Copyright will be identified here. Yet, some of the heated arguments obligatory requirements for action for which compliance Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Science, Socioemotional Processes, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rochester/detail.action?docID=1895802. Created from rochester on 2017-08-30 12:53:08. Introduction 703 is mandatory regardless of institutional norms, laws, or involved in moral development in humans. The evidence etiquette. Moral judgments, in their full and realized form, for this comes from cross-species comparisons as well as promote equality and reflect a focus on intentions, not from neuroscience studies, with a focus on evolutionary outcomes. Further, Gewirth (1978) argues that moral judg- principles of adaptation and change. Evolutionary the- ments respect the integrity of persons and recognize the orists propose that morality functions to regulate social importance of promoting others’ welfare. Notably, this def- interactions cooperatively, not selfishly, and to promote inition identifies what is not included in the moral domain, the community’s common good. The assertion is that the such as personal desires and laws or customs. Researchers emergence of cooperation requires specific mechanisms who study moral judgment development examine the that balance the organism’s self-interest with concern emergence of these judgments in ontogeny and focus on and respect for others. Darwin (1871/2004)
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