Morality and Justice 22 Linda J

Morality and Justice 22 Linda J. Skitka , Christopher W. Bauman , and Elizabeth Mullen

Morality and justice have apparent similarities. Piaget, 1932/ 1997 ; Kohlberg, 1981 ). Others view Both facilitate social interaction, coordination, morality as one of several possible motivations and cooperation. Both can feel like external stan- for justice (e.g., Folger, 2001 ; Skitka, 2003 ). Still dards that somehow should carry more weight others argue that justice is merely one component than individuals’ preferences. That said, morality of morality (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004 ). The and justice are not synonymous. Scholars as far goals of this chapter are therefore to (a) review back as Aristotle have identifi ed ways that moral- these different perspectives on morality and jus- ity and justice differ (see Konow, 2008 ). In this tice, and (b) offer constructive critiques and iden- chapter, we review research programs from the tify ways that these theories might inform each literatures on moral development , the social psy- other. We conclude that three separate literatures chology of justice, and the burgeoning social converge on the basic idea that morality and jus- psychological literature on adult morality and tice are distinct but related constructs. However, examine how scholars have conceptualized the no consensus exists regarding more specifi c relation between morality and justice. We review aspects of the relation between the constructs. these literatures in roughly chronological order to illustrate how theorizing and research about morality and justice has changed over time. 22.1 Moral Development We fi nd a great deal of variability in how theo- and Justice rists have approached links between morality and justice. Some treat them as the same construct 22.1.1 Classic Theories of Moral (e.g., classic theories of moral development; Development

Justice has had a long and deep connection to L. J. Skitka (*) theory and research on moral development, University of Illinois at Chicago , Chicago , IL , USA beginning with Jean Piaget’s focus on the moral e-mail: [email protected] lives of children as revealed through games and C. W. Bauman play. He observed that children’s games are dom- University of California , Irvine , CA , USA inated by concerns about fairness (Piaget, e-mail: [email protected] 1932/1997 ). In early years, children are very con- E. Mullen cerned about following the rules, but they also San Jose State University , San Jose , CA , USA begin to understand that rules are relatively arbi- e-mail: [email protected] trary as they develop. Finding ways to coordinate

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016 407 C. Sabbagh, M. Schmitt (eds.), Handbook of Social Justice Theory and Research, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4939-3216-0_22 408 L.J. Skitka et al. play to facilitate group function becomes more 1982). There also have been many critiques of important than the rules themselves. Piaget there- the evidence that Kohlberg tried to mount in sup- fore came to view moral development as the port of the notion that moral development occurs result of interpersonal interactions through which in universal ordered stages (e.g., Simpson, 1974 ; people fi nd solutions all will accept as fair Sullivan, 1977 ). (Piaget, 1932/1997 ). Kohlberg ( 1981) embraced and elaborated on Piaget’s conclusion that moral development is 22.1.2 Contemporary Theories rooted in justice. Kohlberg described the stages of Moral Development of moral development in a variety of ways, but one clear way he thought they differed was in the Contemporary theories of moral development motivation that drives justice judgments. In have adapted some components of Kohlberg’s Stages 1 and 2, people do little more than seek to ideas, but have dropped its most controversial avoid punishment and obtain rewards. Their con- aspects, including normative claims that some ceptualization of justice is mainly defi ned by stages of moral development and reasoning are self-interest. At Stages 3 and 4, people begin to better or worse than others. Ties between moral consider others’ expectations for their behavior development and justice operations remain, but and the implications of their behavior for society the emphasis on justice is not as strong in con- as a whole. They show concern for other people temporary theories of moral development as they and their feelings, follow rules in an effort to be were in Kohlberg’s writing about the topic. Next, seen as a good person, and feel an obligation to we review two of these contemporary theories: contribute to the group, society, or institution. At Moral schema and domain theory. Stage 5, people defi ne justice in terms of uphold- ing people’s basic rights, values, and the legal Moral schema theory . Moral schema theory contracts of society. People at this stage under- reconceived Kohlberg’s stages as cognitive sche- stand social life is a social contract to abide by mas (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999a , the laws for the good of all and to protect the 1999b). According to this theoretical update, rights of the individual and the group. Finally, at people use three kinds of schemas to make socio- Stage 6, people believe that laws or social agree- moral judgments: personal interest, norm mainte- ments are valid only if they are based on univer- nance, and post-conventional. The personal sal principles, and their justice judgments are interest schema develops in early childhood, the motivated by concerns about self-condemnation norm maintenance schema develops during ado- rather than social approbation. In short, people lescence, and the post-conventional schema become increasingly able to take into account the develops in late adolescence and adulthood. Once perspectives of others as they progress through formed, people can use any one of the schemas to the stages, and the source of moral motivation guide their judgments and behavior, and theoreti- shifts from outside (i.e., heteronomy) to inside cally can move fl uidly between them as a func- the individual (i.e., autonomy). tion of how well features of situations and social Although Kohlberg’s theory was enormously relationships map onto and therefore prime the infl uential, it nonetheless has a host of problems. activation of one or another core schema. For example, people seldom give responses to When people apply the personal interest moral dilemmas that can be completely encapsu- schema, they tend to focus on their own self- lated or described by any single Kohlbergian interests in a situation or justify the behavior of stage. The theory also has been criticized for others in terms of their perceptions of others’ championing a Western worldview and being personal interests. The norm maintenance culturally insensitive (e.g., Simpson, 1974 ; schema focuses on (a) the needs of cooperative Sullivan, 1977), and sexist in both its construc- social systems and the group, (b) a belief that tion and interpretation of morality (Gilligan, living up to these norms and standards will pay- 22 Morality and Justice 409 off in the long run, and (c) a strong duty orienta- create and maintain order within the group. tion, whereby one should obey and respect Conventions are arbitrary in the sense that they authorities. Finally, the post-conventional depend on group norms and practices rather than schema primes a sense of moral obligation based intrinsic features of the actions they govern. For on the notions that laws, roles, codes, and con- example, greeting someone with a handshake or tracts facilitate cooperation. However, people by showing them the back of your hand with just also recognize that these standards are relatively your middle fi nger extended is only meaningful arbitrary, and there are a variety of social in a particular society that has established rules arrangements that can achieve the same ends. about those actions. Other societies have estab- This schema leads people more toward an orien- lished different practices for greetings that are tation that duties and rights follow from the equivalent in terms of how they regulate interper- greater moral purpose behind conventions, not sonal interactions (e.g., kisses on the cheek, fl ick- from the conventions themselves. Post- ing your hand under your chin); nothing about conventional thinking therefore focuses people these actions in-and-of-themselves is inherently on ideals, conceptions of the ultimate moral right or wrong. In sum, morals and conventions good or imperative (Rest et al., 1999a ). Although both establish permissibility or impermissibility moral schema theory does not explicitly refer- and create social order, but conventions depend ence justice or justice operations, Rest et al. on group context whereas morals are viewed as (1999a , 1999b); Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and more universal. In domain theory, as in formalist Thoma (1999b ) nonetheless emphasize that their ethics, morals (a) are not based on established theory is fundamentally about justice: “We still rules (i.e., rule contingency), (b) prohibit rules agree with Kohlberg that the aim of the develop- that would sanction undesirable actions (i.e., rule mental analysis of moral judgment is the rational alterability), and (c) generalize to members of reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice oper- other groups and cultures (i.e., rule and act ations” (Rest et al., 1999b , p. 56). generalizability). Supporting the notion that there is an impor- Domain theory . Domain theory was proposed as tant psychological distinction between the moral an alternative view of moral development as criti- and conventional domains, people judge and pun- cism of Kohlberg’s theory began to mount. A key ish moral transgressors more severely than those observation that helped launch domain theory who break conventions (Smetana, 2006 ; Turiel, was that people, even young children, differenti- 1998 ). Additionally, moral rules do not depend ate between actions that harm innocent people on authorities. Children say that hitting and steal- and those that break rules but do not harm anyone ing are wrong, even if a teacher says it is okay (Turiel, 1983 ; see also Nucci & Turiel, 1978 ; (Nucci & Turiel, 1978 ; Smetana, 1981 , 1984 ). Smetana, 1981). Based on growing support for Similarly, children endorse obedience to moral the distinction between transgressions that do requests (e.g., to stop fi ghting) made by any per- versus do not harm someone, Turiel surmised son, including other children, but they only that two distinct systems underlie people’s judg- endorse obedience to norms (e.g., seat assign- ments of social events; a system focused on ments) from legitimate authorities (Laupa, 1994 ). morality and another on social convention. Domain theory therefore provides a clear account Domain theory defi nes morality as concep- of when and why people sometimes are willing to tions of rights, fairness , and human welfare that break rules to achieve what is in their view a depend on inherent features of actions (Turiel, greater good. Moral rules supersede social con- 1983 ). For example, punching a stranger in the ventions and provide both the motivation and the face for no reason is wrong because it hurts rationale that attempts to change the system someone, not because it violates a law, social requirement. rule, or custom. Social conventions, in contrast, In summary, moral developmental theory are rules that a particular group has adopted to began with the core assumption that morality and 410 L.J. Skitka et al. justice operations were functionally the same psy- In the early 1980s, justice theory and research chological constructs. Although the emphasis on shifted from a dominant focus on distributive justice operations is less explicit in contemporary justice to consider the role that procedures play moral developmental theory than it was in Piaget in people’s conceptions of fairness , with a cor- and Kohlberg’s work, these theories nonetheless responding shift in assumptions about the continue to assume that justice and morality are motives that drive people’s concern with fair- either very deeply connected if not the same psy- ness. Procedural justice theorists posited that chological construct. Integrating the domain the- people’s concern about being fairly treated is ory distinction between morality and convention driven more by relational motives, such as needs with social psychological theory and research on to feel valued, respected, and included in impor- justice, however, suggests the connections are not tant groups, than it is by material self-interests as deep as these theorists might believe—an issue (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992 ). we revisit in the concluding section of this Both the quality of decision-making procedures chapter. and the quality of interpersonal treatment pro- vided by decision-making authorities, provide individuals with important information about 22.2 Morality their status and standing within a group (Blader from the Perspective & Tyler, 2003). 1 of Justice Theory Morality as a consideration or motivation that and Research shapes people’s justice reasoning is a relatively new development in justice theorizing and Justice theory and research evolved almost research. Some of this work connects with the entirely independently of theory and research in historical focus of justice research on questions moral development. Moral development theory of distributive and procedural justice, and some and research was focused on improving child- of it does not, but each of these perspectives hood education. Justice theory and research, in nonetheless posit that morality—and not only contrast, was initially motivated by a desire to self-interest or relational needs—plays a role in understand the factors that affect satisfaction how people think about fairness. with promotion decisions and wages, and the implications of just or unjust treatment on worker productivity (e.g., Adams, 1965 ; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949 ). Early justice theory and research focused largely 1 on questions of distributive justice, that is, how Some scholars consider interpersonal treatment a dimension of procedural justice (e.g., Blader & Tyler, 2003 ), people believe the benefi ts and burdens of social others argue that interpersonal treatment from those who cooperation should be distributed. Theories of implement procedures is a separate construct termed distributive justice generally assume that people interactional justice (Bies, 2005 ; Bies & Moag, 1986 ). approach life as a series of negotiated exchanges, Meta-analyses indicate that interactional justice and procedural justice are highly overlapping but nonetheless dis- and that human relationships and interactions are tinguishable constructs (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001 ; best understood by applying subjective cost- Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001 ). For exam- benefi t analyses and comparisons of alternatives. ple, people tend to experience higher levels of interac- Although based on an assumption that people are tional justice when decision makers provide justifi cations and explanations for outcomes compared to when they do rationally self-interested, these theories also pro- not, irrespective of the decision-making procedures used pose that properly socialized persons learn that to to generate the outcomes. Although theorists suggested maximize rewards in the long run, they need to from the outset that poor treatment can prompt moral out- understand and adhere to norms of fairness in rage (Bies, 1987 ), the potentially unique link between moral motivation and interactional justice has only their relationships with others (e.g., Walster, recently begun to be emphasized and articulated in detail Walster, Berscheid, & Austin, 1978 ). (e.g., Spencer & Rupp, 2009 ). 22 Morality and Justice 411

22.2.1 Moral Exclusion and the Scope rather than all of morality. In addition, there is of Justice confusion about whether the scope of justice should be conceptualized as a dichotomous (in The scope of justice is defi ned as the boundary which case targets are either in or out of the scope) condition on when morality and justice are per- or continuous variable (in which case exclusion ceived as applicable concerns: Moral rules and can range from mild to severe, Hafer & Olson, justice considerations only theoretically apply to 2003). The scope of justice concept also implies those psychologically included in people’s scope that if someone is “inside the scope,” then they get of justice (Opotow, 1990 ). Moral exclusion, a positive treatment, whereas if they are outside the related concept, refers to the entities (e.g., indi- scope, they do not. What this conceptualization viduals, groups of people, or animals) that are ignores is the possibility that entities—regardless excluded from people’s scope of justice and of whether they are included or excluded from therefore not considered as having the right to perceivers’ scope of justice—can vary in whether fair or moral treatment (Opotow, 1995 ). they are perceived as deserving positive or nega- Theory and research on the scope of justice has tive treatment (Hafer & Olson, 2003 ). its roots in evidence that people are relatively hard wired to sort others into categories of “us” versus “them” (Deutsch, 1990 ). Categorizing entities in 22.2.2 The Functional Pluralism this way corresponds with a tendency to see peo- Model of Justice ple within one’s group (and therefore scope of justice) as good, and those outside of it as less so The functional pluralism model of justice (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). attempts to integrate moral concerns into how The consequences of moral exclusion theoreti- people think about questions of procedural and cally range from mild kinds of micro-aggression distributive justice. According to the functional (e.g., verbal or behavioral indignities; Sue, pluralism model of justice (Skitka, 2003 ; Skitka, Bucceri, Lin, Nadal, & Torino, 2009) to much Aramovich, Lytle, & Sargis, 2009 ; Skitka & more harmful forms of exclusion, including exter- Wisneski, 2012 ), the adaptive challenges people mination, genocide, slavery, or mass internments confront in their everyday lives require the abil- (e.g., DeWind, 1990 ; Nagata, 1990 , 1993 ; Staub, ity to move fl uidly between different goal states 1990 ). Consistent with scope of justice predic- or motives. For example, people have to resolve tions, people are less likely to support social poli- the problems of (a) competing for scarce cies designed to help excluded groups (Beaton & resources, such as wages or jobs (the economist), Tougas, 2001 ; Opotow, 1994 ; Singer, 1996 ), more (b) how to get along with others and secure their likely to deny excluded groups legal procedures standing in important groups (the politician), and and rights (Boeckmann & Tyler, 1997 ), and more (c) building a meaningful sense of existence (the likely to express apathy when they witness nega- theologian).2 In short, the functional pluralism tive treatment of excluded than included groups model’s position is that people are intuitive econ- (Brockner, 1990 ; Foster & Rusbult, 1999 ). omists, politicians, and theologians. Which Although the notion that people maintain a homunculus is piloting the ship at any given time scope of justice has been generative, it has not (so to speak), depends on the current goal orien- escaped constructive criticism. Among other tation of the actor and the salience of various issues, there is not agreement that justice and situational cues that could activate one or another morality are functional equivalents, or if instead, of these mindsets. justice is only one aspect of morality or ethics (Hafer & Olson, 2003 ). Although Opotow and others treat these concepts as relatively inter- 2 Other mindsets or perspectives that can infl uence percep- changeable, it might be preferable to narrow the tions of fairness are the intuitive scientist and prosecutor “scope of justice” term to concerns about fairness , (see Skitka & Wisneski, 2012 for a review). 412 L.J. Skitka et al.

The intuitive economist . People take the perspec- one’s life who control valuable resources and tive of an intuitive economist when situations who have some legitimate right to inquire into the prime a materialistic mindset. According to the reasons behind one’s opinions or decisions. This functional pluralism model of justice, material knowledge activates the goal of establishing or goals and concerns are most likely to be activated preserving a desired social identity vis-à-vis when (a) there is a possibility of material gain, (b) these constituencies” (Tetlock, 2002 , p. 454). the relational context is defi ned in market terms, The functional pluralism model predicts that and (c) other goals are not particularly salient. people are more likely to take the perspective of Contexts that prime the intuitive economist there- the intuitive politician when: (a) their material fore include negotiations for goods and services, needs are at least minimally satisfi ed, (b) their purchases, investments, and other contexts in needs for belongingness, status, and inclusion are which the primary goal is material exchange. not being met or are under threat, (c) the potential When the intuitive economist, or materialistic for signifi cant relational losses or gains are made mindset is activated, people defi ne equitable out- especially salient, (d) the dominant goal of the comes as more fair than outcomes distributed social system is to maximize group harmony or equally or on the basis of need (e.g., Deutsch, solidarity, (e) people’s interdependency concerns 1985), a fi nding that is robust across cultures are primed, and (f) accountability demands are (Fiske, 1991). They also become physiologically high (Skitka, 2003 ; Skitka & Wisneski, 2012 ). distressed at either inequitable underpayment or Consistent with the idea that the goals associ- overpayment, and adjust their level of effort and ated with the intuitive politician perspective productivity to restore equity (see Walster et al., infl uence people’s reasoning, people care more 1978 for a review). Although no research to our about procedures and interpersonal treatment knowledge has studied the degree to which an intu- than material outcomes when (a) social identity itive economist mindset affects perceptions of pro- needs are particularly strong, (b) perceivers are of cedural justice, there are some logical possibilities. low rather than high status, (c) status concerns For example, intuitive economists should be espe- are primed, and (d) they are high rather than low cially concerned about consistency, for example, in interdependent self-construal and interdepen- that pricing rules or compensation guidelines are dent self-construal is activated (see Skitka & applied in the same way irrespective of who is pur- Wisneski, 2012 for a review). In a related vein, chasing the goods or performing the service. Given people are more likely to accept negative or unfa- that voice effects on procedural fairness are vorable material outcomes when they are the explained to some degree by the instrumental ben- result of fair rather than unfair procedures (the efi ts of process control (e.g., Lind, Kanfer, & “fair process effect,” e.g., Folger, 1977 ), in part Earley, 1 990), people in an intuitive economist because these procedures convey information mindset might also be especially sensitive to oppor- about belongingness (e.g., De Cremer & Alberts, tunities for voice, but primarily for instrumental 2004 ) and respect (Lind & Tyler, 1988 ; Tyler & rather than noninstrumental reasons. Lind, 1992 ). In short, people sacrifi ce material interests to serve social identity needs and goals, The intuitive politician . When situations activate when social identity needs are more salient than an intuitive politician mindset, people are moti- material ones. vated to achieve and maintain a position to infl u- Variables related to social identity also infl uence ence others, to accumulate the symbols, status, people’s judgments of distributive justice. For and prestige associated with infl uence and power, example, people primed with solidarity and group and seek approval from the social groups and harmony goals, who are chronically higher in com- individuals to whom they are accountable munal or interpersonal orientation, or who take a (Tetlock, 2002 ). Intuitive politicians’ motivation group rather than an individual level perspective, is rooted in “the knowledge that one is under the are more likely to allocate material rewards equally evaluative scrutiny of important constituencies in than equitably, and to rate equal allocations as more 22 Morality and Justice 413 fair than equitable ones. Other research indicates cases, they can simply evaluate whether authori- conceptions of fairness vary as a function of the ties get it “right.” “Right” decisions indicate that social role of the perceiver. For example, when authorities are appropriate and work as they one’s social role as a parent is more highly acti- should. “Wrong” answers signal that the system vated, one is more likely to perceive allocations is somehow broken and is not working as it based on need as fairer than those based on equity should. Consistent with these ideas, people’s fair- or equality (see Skitka & Wisneski, 2012 for a ness reasoning is driven more by whether author- review). ities get it “right” than by whether authorities provide opportunities for voice, respect the dig- The intuitive theologian . People adopt an intui- nity of those involved, or otherwise enact proce- tive theologian mindset when they are motivated dural fairness when people have a moral more by concerns about morality and immorality investment in decision outcomes (e.g., Bauman and questions of the greater good than by either & Skitka, 2009; Skitka, 2002 ; Skitka & Houston, their social standing or material self-interest. 2001 ; Skitka & Mullen, 2002 ; Skitka, Aramovich People should be more likely to use a moral et al., 2009 ; Skitka, Bauman & Lytle, 2009 ). frame of reference for evaluating fairness when In summary, theories of procedural and dis- (a) their material and social needs are minimally tributive justice have emphasized materialistic satisfi ed, (b) they have a moral conviction about and social motivations underlying justice and the outcome being decided (e.g., whether abor- ignored or dismissed the possibility that people’s tion is or is not legal); (c) moral emotions are conceptions of fairness might connect to underly- aroused, such as moral outrage, guilt, or shame; ing moral motives. Justice theory and research (d) there is a real or perceived threat to people’s has been preoccupied with which of these two conceptions of morality (not just normative con- motives—materialistic/egoistic motivation ver- ventions), (e) people’s sense of personal moral sus social identity and belongingness—best authenticity is questioned or undermined, or (f) explains people’s reasoning about procedural and people are reminded of their mortality (Skitka, distributive fairness . A working defi nition of jus- 2003 ; Skitka, Aramovich et al., 2009 ; Skitka & tice and what it means to people, however, could Wisneski, 2012 ). just as reasonably start with morality, righteous- Consistent with these hypotheses, people are ness, virtues, and ethics rather than with self- more likely to believe that duties and rights fol- interest, belongingness, or other nonmoral low from the greater moral purposes underlying motivations. The functional pluralism model of rules, procedures, and authority dictates, than justice treats materialistic and social identity con- from the rules, procedures, or authorities them- cerns as valid motivations that can contingently selves when they have a moral investment in out- infl uence how people think about fairness comes (Skitka, Bauman & Lytle, 2009; see also (instead of framing these as competing theoreti- Kohlberg, 1976). Moral beliefs are not by defi ni- cal alternatives), but it also recognizes that moral tion antiestablishment or anti-authority; they just concerns sometimes shape people’s fairness rea- are not dependent on establishment, convention, soning as well. rules, or authorities. Instead, when people take a moral perspective, they focus more on their ideals, and the way they believe things “ought” or 22.2.3 Fairness Theory and the “should” be done, than on a duty to comply with Deonance Approach authorities. When people have moral certainty about what outcome authorities and institutions Fairness theory focuses less on questions of pro- should deliver, they do not need to rely on stand- cedural and distributive fairness, and more on ing perceptions of legitimacy as proxy informa- people’s reactions to transgressions. Fairness tion to judge whether the system works—in these theory posits that justice is fundamentally about 414 L.J. Skitka et al. accountability and the assignment of blame in Rupp, 2010 ). However, deontic responses also response to counter-normative outcomes and include opportunities for social reconciliation, interpersonal conduct (Cropanzano, Byrne, which open the door to future interactions once Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001 ; Folger & Cropanzano, a situation has been satisfactorily resolved. 1998 , 2001; Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, Taken together, these aspects of the deontic 2005 ). According to the theory, perceived fair- approach highlight a facet of the way people ness depends on people’s answer to three central experience injustice that has been absent from questions: (a) Would the situation have turned out many theories of justice. better if things were done differently? (b) Could In summary, fairness theory attempts to the actor have behaved differently? (c) Should the integrate and organize theory and research on actor have behaved differently? That is, “would” moral judgment with justice, and proposes the judgments assess whether something negative social cognitive and emotional processes that occurred by considering counterfactual alterna- may underlie when, why, and how people judge tives as reference points. “Could” judgments and react to unfairness. Empirical research that determine whether the actor realistically could formulates and tests specifi c hypotheses have chosen a different course of action. “Should” derived from fairness theory has recently gath- judgments ascertain whether the actor violated ered momentum (e.g., Umphress, Simmons, moral or ethical standards. In short, people judge Folger, Ren, & Bobocel, 2012 ), but as with any fairness by comparing aspects of events associ- relatively young theory, there are many areas ated with accountability to counterfactual of fairness theory that remain untested, unad- alternatives. dressed, and underspecifi ed. For example, fair- The “should” component of fairness theory ness theory currently has only addressed explicitly links justice and morality. It argues negative events, that is, people’s responses to that perceived transgressions of moral norms perceived transgressions. Although the theory for interpersonal conduct—the product of may ultimately be extended to explain people’s “should” judgments—arouse deonance, a moti- reactions to positive events (Folger & vational state akin to reactance and dissonance Cropanzano, 2001 ), asymmetries in how peo- (Folger, 1998 , 2001 ). Deontic responses have at ple process positive and negative events are least fi ve important attributes that distinguish likely to complicate this effort (e.g., them from other responses to unfairness (Folger Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, et al., 2005 ). Deontic responses often involve 2001). Therefore, f airness theory provides a rapid evaluations of situations that alert per- broad framework for understanding justice ceivers to injustice. Although people can and judgments in the context of transgressions that do consciously deliberate about justice, initial may provide increasing utility as it continues appraisals of unfairness can arise from auto- to develop. matic attribution processes that detect and cat- egorize stimuli as negative for the perceiver. Deontic responses do not always serve individ- 22.3 Justice from the Perspective uals’ self- interest and often include strong of Theory and Research emotions, especially anger and hostility that on Adult Morality drive behavioral responses. Furthermore, deontic responses prompt a desire for retribution. Justice theorists are not alone in their recent Rather than seek compensation for the losses interest in morality; in recent years other social they incurred, aggrieved persons can be moti- psychologists have also become fascinated by vated to restore justice through punishment or morality. We turn next to how social psycholo- other means perceived to decrease the likeli- gists interested in morality have made connec- hood of future violations (e.g., Skarlicki & tions with psychological concerns with justice. 22 Morality and Justice 415

22.3.1 Moral Foundations Theory To date, however, empirical research on additional candidates for “foundationhood” has Moral foundations theory (MFT) incorporates focused mainly on Liberty/oppression, which concerns with justice as part of a larger pluralist underlies the negative reactions people have to theory of morality. Drawing on similarities individuals or institutions that meddle in the lives between works in anthropology (e.g., Fiske, of others (see Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & 1992; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, Haidt, 2012 ). 1997 ), and evolutionary theories of human soci- The harm and fairness foundations are indi- ality, Haidt and colleagues proposed MFT (Haidt vidualizing foundations (in which individuals are & Joseph, 2004 , 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007 ; the locus of moral value, and concerns with see Graham et al., 2013 for a review) to explain autonomy and protecting individuals’ rights are variation in morality across (sub)cultures. In par- paramount), whereas in group, authority and ticular MFT argues that there is a small set of purity are binding foundations (in which the innate “foundations” upon which cultures con- group is the locus of moral value, and concerns struct their moral systems. Thus, MFT argues with loyalty, duty, and self-control are para- some aspects of morality are organized in mount; Graham et al., 2009 ). Haidt and col- advance of experience (Marcus, 2004 ), but never- leagues argue that most research in moral theless get revised during childhood through cul- psychology has tended to focus on the individual- tural practices and experiences. The revision izing foundations, and has neglected the other process accounts for the diversity of moralities foundations. witnessed across cultures and across groups Much of the research on MFT has been applied within a culture (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009 ). to understanding ideological disagreements MFT asserts that there are at least fi ve moral between liberals and conservatives (and of late, foundations: (1) Harm/care, (2) Fairness/reci- libertarians). In particular, Haidt and colleagues procity, (3) In-group/loyalty, (4) Authority/ have argued that liberals endorse the harm and respect, and (5) Purity/sanctity (Graham et al., fairness foundations more than the other founda- 2013). The harm/care foundation underlies vir- tions, whereas conservatives tend to endorse all tues of kindness, generosity, and nurturance and fi ve foundations more equally (Graham et al., evolved from our ability to feel the pain of others. 2009 ; Haidt & Graham, 2007); both groups The fairness/reciprocity foundation underlies equally endorse liberty (Graham et al., 2013 ). ideas of justice, rights, equity, and autonomy and Thus, according to MFT, the root of some ideo- is related to the process of reciprocal altruism. logical disagreements rests in the fact that con- The in-group/loyalty foundation underlies the vir- servatives endorse moral principles that liberals tue of self-sacrifi ce for the group and values such don’t recognize as moral (Haidt & Graham, as loyalty and patriotism; it evolved in response to 2007 ). MFT and moral motives theory (reviewed our ancestors’ ability to form shifting coalitions. later in this chapter) together suggest that justice The authority/respect foundation underlies the researchers may have missed an important mod- virtues of obedience to legitimate authorities and erator of how people judge fairness, specifi cally, respect for tradition; it evolved from our history of the political orientation of the perceiver. hierarchical social interactions. Finally, the purity/ Although MFT has generated a lot of research sanctity foundation underlies ideas about religios- in the short time since its original formulation, it ity and how the body can be desecrated by con- has also been subject to criticism (for a review taminants and impure activities; it evolved from see Graham et al., 2013 ). In particular, MFT has disgust mechanisms that protect the body. been criticized for lacking conceptual clarity on Notably, Haidt and colleagues believe that several what constitutes a foundation and for not provid- additional foundations may exist, including but ing enough evidence that moral intuitions are in not limited to Liberty/oppression, Effi ciency/ fact innate (Suhler & Churchland, 2011 ). Some waste, and Ownership/theft (Graham et al., 2013 ). scholars reject its pluralist perspective and argue 416 L.J. Skitka et al. that all morality comes down to the dimension of Social relationships generally fi t one of four harm (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012 ). Others basic relational models: communal sharing, argue that only the harm and fairness dimensions authority ranking, equality matching, and market are truly moral, and the other foundations repre- pricing (Fiske, 1991 , 1992 ; see also Haslam, sent conventional beliefs (e.g., Jost, 2009 ). Still 2004 ). How people defi ne fairness and morality others criticize MFT for missing vital elements therefore depends on the relational system. In of morality (see Janoff-Bulman’s work reviewed communal sharing relationships, all people within below) or for not paying enough attention to the a given group (e.g., a family) hold equivalent and relational context in which concerns about moral- undifferentiated status and can expect equal ity arise (Rai & Fiske, 2011). The authors of access to resources, but the same is not true for MFT acknowledge these criticisms in their recent outsiders. The authority ranking model provides writings and discuss ways that MFT could organization within a group by introducing asym- address these criticisms in future research metry among members according to ordinal posi- (Graham et al., 2013 ). tions that indicate linear patterns of dominance In summary, MFT argues that concerns about and deference. In equality matching relationships, harm and justice (which have been the dominant people seek to balance their outcome relative to focus in the literatures on moral development and others’ in terms of both valence and magnitude the social psychology of justice) are only two along one dimension at a time (e.g., effort). In foundations on which morality is built. By draw- market pricing relationships, people take into ing our attention to other possible foundations of account a wide array of disparate dimensions of morality (e.g., authority), MFT has highlighted comparison and combine them along a common that justice and morality are not identical con- metric (often money) into a single ratio that facili- cepts because concerns about justice and harm tates complex comparisons and exchanges. The are only part of the larger pie of morality. four basic relational models help people antici- pate and coordinate behavior, evaluate interactions and exchanges, and identify transgressions. 22.3.2 Relational Models Theory Each relational model prescribes the basis for and Moral Relationship moral motivation and judgment that people use to Regulation derive appropriate standards of conduct given the nature of the relationship between the individuals The relationship regulation approach to morality involved (Rai & Fiske, 2011 ). Unity is the princi- posits that people derive their standards for pal moral motive in communal sharing relation- morality and justice from their understanding of ships. People in communal sharing situations are the social relationships within specifi c situations expected to take care of their own. They ought to (Rai & Fiske, 2011). According to this perspec- satisfy any in-group members’ unmet needs, tive, moral principles do not exist independent of experience threats to individual members of the the social-relational contexts in which they oper- group as a threat to the group as a whole, and ate. Instead, moral concepts such as harm, equal- protect the integrity of the group from both inter- ity, or purity are situationally determined as a nal and external disruptions. Hierarchy is the function of the type of social relationship a given principal moral motive in relationships character- situation involves. Diversity in moral thought, ized by authority ranking. People expect inequal- feelings, and actions therefore is not the product ity in these situations; lower ranking individuals of erroneous recognition of moral facts but a claim fewer resources and have a duty to support legitimate consequence of how different people and defer to higher ranking individuals. Higher interpret social situations and implement a fi nite ranking individuals, in contrast, claim more set of schema about the nature of a given resources but are obligated to lead and look after relationship. lower ranking individuals. 22 Morality and Justice 417

Equality is the principal moral motive in the fl ict that is accompanied by moral outrage equality matching model. In relationships char- (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). Tradeoffs that are rel- acterized by equality matching, people strive to atively easy to make when viewed through the provide equal opportunities or outcomes lens of one relational model can appear inap- through processes such as turn taking, in-kind propriate—or even ghastly and unthinkable— reciprocity, and lotteries in which each person when viewed through the lens of another. Goods has the same opportunity to be chosen. Finally, and services, for example, are bought and sold proportionality is the principal moral motive in every day, and the vast majority of these trans- market pricing relationships. When market actions are acceptable because people apply the pricing applies, people monitor multiple inputs market pricing model to such exchanges. When and outputs simultaneously and ensure that it comes to human organs, however, people rewards and punishments are equitable. Taken often apply the communal sharing model, together, the relational regulation approach which causes them to view organ markets as integrates a wide array of perspectives, includ- taboo and morally repugnant. Somewhat simi- ing prior research on care (e.g., Opotow, 1990 ), larly, friendships often operate under the equal- authority (e.g., Tyler & Lind, 1992 ), and mul- ity matching model. If one couple invites tiple distributive justice criteria (e.g., Deutsch, another to their home for dinner, the appropri- 1985). By doing so, it provides a comprehen- ate response is to reciprocate at a later date. sive and contingent theory of when and why Offering to pay a sum that would cover the cost moral rules and motives vary across situations of dinner would be perfectly acceptable under and individuals. the market pricing model (e.g., at a restaurant), From the perspective of relational models but awkward and uncomfortable under the theory, moral confl ict is largely the result of dis- equality matching model in someone’s home. agreement over implementation rules that spec- In sum, relational models and the moral motives ify when, how, and to whom each relational that accompany them facilitate social interac- model applies (Fiske, 1991 , 1992 ; Fiske & tions, but confl ict arises when people apply dif- Tetlock, 1997). The relational models them- ferent implementation rules, or worse, a selves are universal but abstract. Beliefs about completely different model. how to operationalize the models to address In summary, relational models theory and the specifi c situations and relationships vary across moral relationship regulation approach provide a cultures, groups, institutions, ideologies, and rich framework for understanding how and why individuals’ familiarity with possible prece- morality and justice vary across situations, and it dents. Consider, for example, a situation in also explains when and why people sometimes which most people agree that the equality moralize confl ict and resist the type of tradeoffs matching model fi ts. If one person does another that are necessary to resolve disagreements. The a favor, everyone might agree that reciprocation relational systems model is solidly grounded in is appropriate. In the absence of more precise interdisciplinary theory and empirical research implementation rules, however, it remains about how people coordinate social relationships. unclear how or when the favor should be recip- However, it is presented at a level of abstraction rocated. Different interpretations of the ways to that may make it diffi cult to formulate hypothe- satisfy the requirements of a model can there- ses about how the theory should apply in specifi c fore lead to misunderstanding, disagreement, situations. Moreover, the theory allows that any and confl ict. given situation can simultaneously involve parts Disagreement over which model ought to of each model, which may limit its utility or apply to a given situation is less common than make it unfalsifi able. Therefore, greater specifi - disagreement over implementation rules, but it cation of the theory is needed before it can be tends to generate intense and intractable con- tested cleanly. 418 L.J. Skitka et al.

22.3.3 Moral Motives Model The moral concerns identifi ed by MFT overlap to a considerable degree with the moral Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013 ) moral motives motives model, with one primary exception. model has been offered as an alternative to MFT MFT defi nes fairness in individuating terms—it and the relational models theory. Building on the describes microjustice (i.e., justice from the per- scaffolding of theory and research on behavioral spective of the individual). In contrast, moral regulation and motivation (e.g., motives of motives theory differentiates between micro- and approach and avoidance, and behavioral activa- macrojustice, or justice at the level of the indi- tion versus inhibition; e.g., Carver & Scheier, vidual versus the collective, respectively. 1998 ), Janoff-Bulman and Carnes argue that Although the macro- or social justice compo- morality fundamentally involves behavioral reg- nent of moral motives theory has already proven ulation to facilitate an optimized social existence. to be somewhat controversial (see Graham, 2013 In particular, proscriptive moral regulation is for a critique), it has strong empirical grounding focused on avoiding immorality or transgres- in research that has revealed important differ- sions, and is inhibitory and protection oriented. ences between how people think about justice for In contrast, prescriptive morality is an approach individuals versus collectives (Brickman, Folger, motivation oriented toward providing rather than Goode, & Schul, 1981 ). Individual justice focuses protecting. on person-specifi c variables, such as merit. In addition to arguing that morality engages Macrojustice (or what Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, these two motivational systems, Janoff-Bulman 2013 called social justice) instead focuses on the and Carnes (2013 ) argue that these moral motiva- shape of the outcome distribution writ large, such tions can play out at three different levels of anal- as the distribution of annual income of a given ysis, specifi cally morality of the self, the other, public. Discourse about growing income inequal- and the group. At the level of the self, proscrip- ity is a concrete example of a macrojustice tive and prescriptive moral motivations are asso- concern. ciated with self-restraint and moderation on the MFT also implies that liberals for the most one hand, and industriousness on the other. Other part do not have a communal moral orientation. directed moral motivation is interpersonally Moral motives theory challenges this idea, and directed, and is proscriptively focused on avoid- argues that liberals do have communal moral ing harm, and prescriptively focused on helping concerns, they just are not captured well by the and fairness. Finally, the group-based or collec- foundations of in-group, authority, and purity, tive oriented moral motives are concerned with which are largely described in proscriptive terms, social order and communal solidarity when they which appeal to conservatives. In contrast, moral are proscriptively oriented (e.g., status quo main- motives theory proposes that liberals’ communal tenance), and focused on social justice and com- moral motivations are prescriptively oriented munity responsibility when they are prescriptively around concerns about social justice and commu- motivated. Similar to MFT, Janoff-Bulman and nal responsibility, and not in-group, authority or Carnes ( 2013 ) argue that liberals and conserva- purity. tives differ in their moral motivations. According Strengths of moral motives theory include its to this model, however, ideological differences explicit grounding in psychological theory and are not classifi ed around individuating or binding research on motivation, as well as reinvigorating foundations, but are focused instead on differ- the important distinctions between micro- and ences in the motivational priorities of liberals and macrojustice. Especially given recent public conservatives. Political conservatives’ moral debate about issues such as income inequality, motivations are more likely to be proscriptively social class divisions in access to higher educa- motivated, whereas political liberals’ moral moti- tion, and various other macrojustice topics, how vations are prescriptively motivated. people reconcile confl icts between micro- and 22 Morality and Justice 419 macrojustice concerns will be an important area ments (e.g., Brockner et al., 1998 ; Skitka & for future research. Mullen, 2002 ; van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998 ). Furthermore, the claim that justice rules are more often based on normative con- 22.4 Morality and Justice: ventions than moral imperatives is reinforced by The Same or Different the degree to which defi nitions of justice include Constructs? not only informal norms, but also a host of for- malized codes and guidelines that can vary across This review highlights the considerable variabil- organizational structures or communities. ity in the literature regarding how morality and Homeowners’ associations, for example, gener- justice are related. For Piaget and Kohlberg, ate very localized versions of their covenants; morality and justice were viewed as essentially workplaces vary in their pay and benefi t policies, the same thing; more contemporary theories of and so forth. Although all homeowners’ associa- moral development, however, have de- tions and workplaces (for example) will develop emphasized the links between morality and jus- their covenants and policies in ways that ensure tice operations. Contemporary theories of fairness (and therefore increase compliance), morality differ from theories of justice in the there is no one just set of rules, nor do people kinds of connections they make between moral- experience these rules as universally generaliz- ity and justice. Moral foundations and moral able or objective truths. motives theories, for example, posit that justice is In contrast, people do not generally accept and merely one aspect among many that defi ne the expect that their conceptions of morality are or moral domain. Alternatively, recent theories of should be contextually contingent or situationally justice maintain that morality is one concern that variable, and are offended at the very idea that underlies why people care about justice. morality could be relative (e.g., Darwell, 1998 ; One way to help clarify the similarities and Smith, 1994). Even philosophers who reject the differences in the psychology of justice and idea of moral objectivism (e.g., Mackie, 1977 ) morality may be to integrate the distinction nonetheless accept that people’s commitment to domain theory makes between normative con- the idea that there are objective moral truths is ventions and moral imperatives with justice the- central to folk metaethic s (i.e., people’s beliefs ory and research. Specifi cally, it may be that and assumptions about the nature of morality). people’s conceptions of justice are often grounded In summary, our review of the rather dis- more on conventional beliefs than moral impera- jointed literature on morality and justice leads us tives. Consistent with this assertion, people tend to tentatively conclude that morality and justice to acknowledge and accept the idea that determi- are distinct, but sometimes overlapping psycho- nants of fairness can and should vary across situ- logical constructs. Perceptions of justice are typi- ations, but they experience their moral beliefs cally more negotiable and fl exible than moral and conviction s as universally generalizable and beliefs. Justice judgments also are at least as objective truths (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2008 ; likely to be driven by nonmoral as moral con- Morgan, Skitka, & Lytle, 2013 ). Moreover, cerns. That is, justice judgments often are made researchers have identifi ed a plethora of alloca- using what Rest et al. (1999a , 1999b ) referred to tion norms and standards that are seen as differ- as personal interest or norm maintenance sche- entially fair and appropriate in different contexts, mas, or what Skitka and Wisneski (2012 ) labeled relationships, or situations (e.g., Deutsch, 1985 ). as the intuitive economist or politician mindsets. A broad range of factors similarly shape percep- Justice only becomes moralized when it is based tions of procedural fairness (e.g., Leventhal, on post- conventiona l beliefs about fundamental 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988 ) and the relative weight questions of right and wrong, which unlike nor- that people place on distributive versus proce- mative conventions, are nonnegotiable, authority dural considerations when making fairness judg- independent, and autonomous. 420 L.J. Skitka et al.

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