Desire, Time, and Ethical Weight
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An Evolutionary Heuristic for Human Enhancement
18 TheWisdomofNature: An Evolutionary Heuristic for Human Enhancement Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg∗ Abstract Human beings are a marvel of evolved complexity. Such systems can be difficult to enhance. When we manipulate complex evolved systems, which are poorly understood, our interventions often fail or backfire. It can appear as if there is a ‘‘wisdom of nature’’ which we ignore at our peril. Sometimes the belief in nature’s wisdom—and corresponding doubts about the prudence of tampering with nature, especially human nature—manifest as diffusely moral objections against enhancement. Such objections may be expressed as intuitions about the superiority of the natural or the troublesomeness of hubris, or as an evaluative bias in favor of the status quo. This chapter explores the extent to which such prudence-derived anti-enhancement sentiments are justified. We develop a heuristic, inspired by the field of evolutionary medicine, for identifying promising human enhancement interventions. The heuristic incorporates the grains of truth contained in ‘‘nature knows best’’ attitudes while providing criteria for the special cases where we have reason to believe that it is feasible for us to improve on nature. 1.Introduction 1.1. The wisdom of nature, and the special problem of enhancement We marvel at the complexity of the human organism, how its various parts have evolved to solve intricate problems: the eye to collect and pre-process ∗ Oxford Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy and James Martin 21st Century School, Oxford University. Forthcoming in Enhancing Humans, ed. Julian Savulescu and Nick Bostrom (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 376 visual information, the immune system to fight infection and cancer, the lungs to oxygenate the blood. -
Ethics – Handout 10 My Notes on Mill’S Utilitarianism
24.231 Ethics – Handout 10 My Notes on Mill’s Utilitarianism (1) General concerns: • Are interpersonal comparisons of utility even possible? • What are we talking about – maximizing total utility or average utility? • Both seem to ignore issues of distributive justice (except instrumentally – diminishing marginal utility of resources) • Average utility has some implausible implications (especially when considering harms, rather than benefits – is it really not worse for a total population of 100 people to be suffering torture than for a total population of 10 people to be suffering it?), and seems not to sit comfortably with utilitarian intuitions. Total utility invites the repugnant conclusion (but it’s important to remember that this isn’t just a problem for utilitarianism). (2) On higher and lower pleasures: • Should a utilitarian make any distinction between these? Is “pushpin as good as poetry,” if the quatity of pleasure they produce is the same? • How are we to determine which of two pleasures is higher? Is Mill’s appeal to “competent judges who have experienced both pleasures” plausible? And if competent judges prefer the higher pleasures, should we think they do so because activities leading them are more pleasurable, or have a higher quality of pleasure? Isn’t it perhaps more plausible to think they value them more for some other reason, having nothing to do with pleasure? • Relatedly, even if competent judges do take more pleasure in engaging in “higher” activities, are these activities more valuable because they are more pleasurable -
Heidegger, Personhood and Technology
Comparative Philosophy Volume 2, No. 2 (2011): 23-49 Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 www.comparativephilosophy.org THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY: HEIDEGGER, PERSONHOOD AND TECHNOLOGY MAHON O‟BRIEN ABSTRACT: This paper argues that a number of entrenched posthumanist positions are seriously flawed as a result of their dependence on a technical interpretive approach that creates more problems than it solves. During the course of our discussion we consider in particular the question of personhood. After all, until we can determine what it means to be a person we cannot really discuss what it means to improve a person. What kinds of enhancements would even constitute improvements? This in turn leads to an examination of the technical model of analysis and the recurring tendency to approach notions like personhood using this technical model. In looking to sketch a Heideggerian account of personhood, we are reaffirming what we take to be a Platonic skepticism concerning technical models of inquiry when it comes to certain subjects. Finally we examine the question as to whether the posthumanist looks to apply technology‟s benefits in ways that we have reflectively determined to be useful or desirable or whether it is technology itself (or to speak as Heidegger would – the “essence” of technology) which prompts many posthumanists to rely on an excessively reductionist view of the human being. Keywords: Heidegger, posthumanism, technology, personhood, temporality A significant number of Posthumanists1 advocate the techno-scientific enhancement of various human cognitive and physical capacities. Recent trends in posthumanist theory have witnessed the collective emergence, in particular, of a series of analytically oriented philosophers as part of the Future of Humanity Institute at O‟BRIEN, MAHON: IRCHSS Postdoctoral Research Fellow, School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Ireland. -
Global Catastrophic Risks Survey
GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS SURVEY (2008) Technical Report 2008/1 Published by Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University Anders Sandberg and Nick Bostrom At the Global Catastrophic Risk Conference in Oxford (17‐20 July, 2008) an informal survey was circulated among participants, asking them to make their best guess at the chance that there will be disasters of different types before 2100. This report summarizes the main results. The median extinction risk estimates were: Risk At least 1 million At least 1 billion Human extinction dead dead Number killed by 25% 10% 5% molecular nanotech weapons. Total killed by 10% 5% 5% superintelligent AI. Total killed in all 98% 30% 4% wars (including civil wars). Number killed in 30% 10% 2% the single biggest engineered pandemic. Total killed in all 30% 10% 1% nuclear wars. Number killed in 5% 1% 0.5% the single biggest nanotech accident. Number killed in 60% 5% 0.05% the single biggest natural pandemic. Total killed in all 15% 1% 0.03% acts of nuclear terrorism. Overall risk of n/a n/a 19% extinction prior to 2100 These results should be taken with a grain of salt. Non‐responses have been omitted, although some might represent a statement of zero probability rather than no opinion. 1 There are likely to be many cognitive biases that affect the result, such as unpacking bias and the availability heuristic‒‐well as old‐fashioned optimism and pessimism. In appendix A the results are plotted with individual response distributions visible. Other Risks The list of risks was not intended to be inclusive of all the biggest risks. -
Rational Desire and Rationality in Desire: an Unapologetic Defense Peter Railton Preliminary Draft of October 2008—Please Do Not Circulate Without Permission
Rational Desire and Rationality in Desire: An Unapologetic Defense Peter Railton Preliminary draft of October 2008—please do not circulate without permission Introduction Consider Robert Stalnaker’s well-known, elegant formulation of the interlocking, functional nature of belief and desire: Belief and desire … are correlative dispositional states of a potentially rational agent. To desire that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it about that P in a world in which one’s beliefs, whatever they are, were true. To believe that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to satisfy one’s desires, whatever they are, in a world in which P (together with one’s other beliefs) were true. [Stalnaker (1984), 15; emphasis added] This characterization gives a picture of a potentially rational agent as, so to speak, at the mercy of his beliefs and desires, whatever they are. Whether an individual agent is actually rational, one might naturally think, will depend on what fills in for ‘whatever they are’—for this will determine the shape of her life and, roughly, who, if anyone, is in charge. Put another way: Autonomy will depend heavily on how ‘whatever they are’ is filled in—what role does the agent herself play? And rationality will depend heavily on what is filled in—will the agent’s beliefs and desires be as they rationally should be?1 The thought is: If your beliefs and desires are as they rationally should be, and you as agent have played the right sort of role in acquiring them, then insofar as they are functioning normally—namely, as Stalnaker indicates—to guide how you act, then your actions, too, will be autonomous, and as they rationally should be. -
Understanding and Watering the Seeds of Compassion
Research in Human Development, 12: 280–287, 2015 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1542-7609 print / 1542-7617 online DOI: 10.1080/15427609.2015.1068060 Understanding and Watering the Seeds of Compassion Mark T. Greenberg and Christa Turksma Pennsylvania State University The authors call for a broad agenda to create comprehensive models and research on the devel- opment and promotion of empathy and compassion. This wish would lead to a new level of 5 developmental/ecological understanding of the growth of compassion as well as effective policies and practices and interventions that nurture caring, compassion, and service to others in our schools and communities. The authors define empathy and compassion, briefly discuss the outline of early developmental processes, and call for basic research on these essential aspects of human develop- ment. The authors conclude by discussing the need to develop new ways to promote empathy and 10 compassion in families, schools and communities. Our wish is for a life-span developmental psychology to make greater contributions to building a compassionate world society. This calls for a broad agenda to create comprehensive models and research on the development and promotion of emotional awareness, empathy, and com- passion. The practical outcome of such a comprehensive program would include (1) clearer 15 developmental/ecological models of the growth of compassion; (2) effective policies, programs, and practices that support the development of caring, compassion, and service to others in our schools and communities; and (3) children, youth, and adults who show greater service to others as well as caring about the preservation of the earth’s ecology. -
Reaching the Minds and Hearts of Those We Serve
Connection Through Self-Compassion and Compassion for Others: Reaching the Minds and Hearts of Those We Serve Roseann Cervelli, MS, LACDC, CCS, CPS [email protected] 732-937-5437 Ext.122 Compassion, COVID 19 And the Year 2020: A New Threshold for Humanity Objectives • To analyze and explore how Mindful Self-Compassion serves as an antidote to apathy and disconnection in today’s world. • To define Mindful Self-Compassion and Compassion for Others as an approach to well-being, physically, mentally, emotionally and spiritually. • To describe how Compassion Awareness can address meeting Basic Core Needs and healing Core Wounds • To explore the Neuroscience within Compassion Focused Therapy and Compassion Awareness. • To introduce and experience several Mindful Compassion Exercises and Practices What words come to mind when you hear or see the word "APATHY"? ⓘ Start presenting to display the poll results on this slide. What Is Apathy ? A feeling and/or attitude of indifference, unconcern, unresponsiveness, detachment, dispassion. An absence of interest or concern about emotional, social, spiritual, philosophical and/or physical life and the world. Why Apathy? To understand the part of us that Rarely is it good to run, but we are wants nothing to do with the full wiser, more present, more mature, necessities of work, of more understanding and more relationship, of loss, of seeing thoroughly human when we realize what is necessary, is to learn we can never flee from the need to humility, to cultivate self- run away. compassion and to sharpen that - David Whyte, Consolations: The Solace, Nourishment and sense of humor essential to a Underlying Meaning of Everyday Words (2106) merciful perspective of both a self and another. -
The Perfect Storm: Gay Men, Crystal Meth and Sex Cultural Considerations for Gay Affirming Treatment
The Perfect Storm: Gay Men, Crystal Meth and Sex Cultural Considerations for Gay Affirming Treatment Craig Sloane, LCSW, CASAC Private Practice New York City [email protected] 917-670-0483 How did Crystal Meth become so popular with Gay Men? In order to figure this out we need to understand: • Pharmacology of Crystal Meth • Cultural consideraons • Crystal meth, gay men and sex • Crystal meth and HIV • Gay Male Sex and Drug SuB-Cultures • Gay Men’s Vulnerabili:es to SuBstance ABuse and Why Crystal Meth is such a “Good Fit” How can addic9on professionals help? In order to figure this out we need to understand: • Gay Affirmave Treatment • How to Treat the Fusion of Crystal Meth Use and Sex • How to Overcome the Unique Challenges of Treang this PoPulaon Pharmacology of Methamphetamine Street Names for Methamphetamine • Chrissy • Ice • Crystal • Speed • Meth • Crank • Tina • Glass What is Crystal Meth? Crystal meth can Be found as a white, yellowish or reddish Powder, a waxy solid or a clear rock. A 1⁄4 gram dose costs about $20. As a s:mulant, crystal increases the release of doPamine and norePinePhrine, the Brain’s Pleasure and alert chemicals. This Produces euPhoria, increases energy, Prolongs sexual Performance, and suPPresses apPe:te. Crystal can also Produce feelings of Power, confidence, invulnerability, and intense sexual desire. The high can last 8 to 12 hours (dePending on tolerance) and is followed By a Period of exhaus:on, dePression, irritability, and (some:mes) Paranoia known as the “crash.” Crystal is extremely addic:ve. Many gay and Bi men overes:mate their ability to keeP recreaonal use from escalang into dependence History of Methamphetamines • 1887 synthesized By German Pharmacologist L. -
Sharing the World with Digital Minds1
Sharing the World with Digital Minds1 (2020). Draft. Version 1.8 Carl Shulman† & Nick Bostrom† [in Clarke, S. & Savulescu, J. (eds.): Rethinking Moral Status (Oxford University Press, forthcoming)] Abstract The minds of biological creatures occupy a small corner of a much larger space of possible minds that could be created once we master the technology of artificial intelligence. Yet many of our moral intuitions and practices are based on assumptions about human nature that need not hold for digital minds. This points to the need for moral reflection as we approach the era of advanced machine intelligence. Here we focus on one set of issues, which arise from the prospect of digital minds with superhumanly strong claims to resources and influence. These could arise from the vast collective benefits that mass-produced digital minds could derive from relatively small amounts of resources. Alternatively, they could arise from individual digital minds with superhuman moral status or ability to benefit from resources. Such beings could contribute immense value to the world, and failing to respect their interests could produce a moral catastrophe, while a naive way of respecting them could be disastrous for humanity. A sensible approach requires reforms of our moral norms and institutions along with advance planning regarding what kinds of digital minds we bring into existence. 1. Introduction Human biological nature imposes many practical limits on what can be done to promote somebody’s welfare. We can only live so long, feel so much joy, have so many children, and benefit so much from additional support and resources. Meanwhile, we require, in order to flourish, that a complex set of physical, psychological, and social conditions be met. -
Towards a Conceptual Model of Affective Predictions in Palliative Care
Accepted Manuscript Towards a conceptual model of affective predictions in palliative care Erin M. Ellis, PhD, MPH, Amber E. Barnato, MD, MPH, Gretchen B. Chapman, PhD, J. Nicholas Dionne-Odom, PhD, Jennifer S. Lerner, PhD, Ellen Peters, PhD, Wendy L. Nelson, PhD, MPH, Lynne Padgett, PhD, Jerry Suls, PhD, Rebecca A. Ferrer, PhD PII: S0885-3924(19)30059-4 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpainsymman.2019.02.008 Reference: JPS 10037 To appear in: Journal of Pain and Symptom Management Received Date: 4 September 2018 Revised Date: 24 January 2019 Accepted Date: 10 February 2019 Please cite this article as: Ellis EM, Barnato AE, Chapman GB, Dionne-Odom JN, Lerner JS, Peters E, Nelson WL, Padgett L, Suls J, Ferrer RA (2019). Towards a conceptual model of affective predictions in palliative care. Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 57(6), 1151-1165. doi: https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.jpainsymman.2019.02.008. This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 1 Running title: AFFECTIVE PREDICTIONS IN PALLIATIVE CARE Towards a conceptual model of affective predictions in palliative care Erin M. Ellis, PhD, MPH (National Cancer Institute, Bethesda, MD, USA; [email protected]) Amber E. -
Desire and Desire Regulation
CHAPTER 3 Desire and Desire Regulation Wilhelm Hofmann Hiroki P. Kotabe Kathleen D. Vohs Roy F. Baumeister A good deal of people’s waking time is, more or less directly, spent think- ing about and dealing with desire. There is no question that desires are often benign, functional, and evolutionary adaptive for the individual. However, there are cases where desire stands in conflict with important (self- regulatory) goals or (moral) values. Prime examples include the ex- smoker who, upon seeing other people smoke, reexperiences a strong craving for a cigarette despite her intention to never smoke again, or two colleagues at work who cannot help feeling sexually attracted to each other despite the fact that one of them has made public vows of faith on the not-so-long-ago wedding day. And sometimes, much more trivially, the time or opportunity to fulfill a certain desire is just not “right,” such as when someone feels a strong need to pee on a long bus ride and, alas, the toilet is broken. There are both individual and societal reasons for why the capacity for desire regulation is such a highly important aspect of everyday functioning. The primary questions that we seek to answer in this chapter are: What is desire? When does it become problematic? How does desire regulation work? When and why can it go wrong? And how can it be improved? To approach issues of desire regulation, we will draw both on the literature of self- control and emotion regulation. The self- control literature is central because desires are driving forces that sometimes need to be held in check through inhibition or overriding. -
Global Catastrophic Risks
Global Catastrophic Risks Edited by Nick Bostrom Milan M. Cirkovic OXPORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Contents Acknowledgements ν Foreword vii Martin J. Rees 1 Introduction 1 Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Cirkoviô 1.1 Why? 1 1.2 Taxonomy and organization 2 1.3 Part I: Background 7 1.4 Part II: Risks from nature 13 1.5 Part III: Risks from unintended consequences 15 1.6 Part IV: Risks from hostile acts 20 1.7 Conclusions and future directions 27 Part I Background 31 2 Long-term astrophysics! processes 33 Fred C. Adams 2.1 Introduction: physical eschatology 33 2.2 Fate of the Earth 34 2.3 Isolation of the local group 36 2.4 Collision with Andromeda 36 2.5 The end of stellar evolution 38 2.6 The era of degenerate remnants 39 2.7 The era of black holes 41 2.8 The Dark Era and beyond 41 2.9 life and information processing 43 2.10 Conclusion 44 Suggestions for further reading 45 References 45 3 Evolution theory and the future of humanity 48 Christopher Wills· 3.1 Introduction 48 3.2 The causes of evolutionary change 49 xiv Contents 3.3 Environmental changes and evolutionary changes 50 3.3.1 Extreme evolutionary changes 51 3.3.2 Ongoing evolutionary changes 53 3.3.3 Changes in the cultural environment 56 3.4 Ongoing human evolution 61 3.4.1 Behavioural evolution 61 3.4.2 The future of genetic engineering 63 3.4.3 The evolution of other species, including those on which we depend 64 3.5 Future evolutionary directions 65 3.5.1 Drastic and rapid climate change without changes in human behaviour 66 3.5.2 Drastic but slower environmental change accompanied by changes in human behaviour 66 3.5.3 Colonization of new environments by our species 67 Suggestions for further reading 68 References 69 4 Millennial tendencies in responses to apocalyptic threats 73 James J.