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Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage

Luke Nguyen

Raymond Estrella

Toan Bui

James Crosby

Don Hatley

Jeremy Westerman

The University of Texas at Dallas

Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 1

History

The game industry owes much of its popularity generated today to one company: Nintendo. From its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, Nintendo has proven the ability to survive throughout dire circumstances, but the challenging dynamics of the industry proved companies could not survive without adapting a variety of business strategies.

In 1889, Nintendo was established by and began as a card company (Jones, 2013), producing playing cards similar to those found in casinos and game parlors. The company maintained this simple product line for over 50 years until the grandson of Fusajiro, , took over the company and began to explore ways to expand the business. Solidifying the first game card licensing deal in 1959,

Yamauchi agreed to produce playing cards for Disney’s iconic characters, bringing in significant revenue and a change of pace from the arena of gambling.

Success driven, Yamauchi expanded the company into “non-game related markets which included taxi services, hotels, and even the food industry, all which failed”

(Cohen, 2014). Taking to a host of different ventures while continuing to produce the majority of products for the playing card market, the company fell into debt and was at risk of facing bankruptcy. Nintendo needed to reinvent itself and did so by deciding to manufacture toys for children and hired engineers to develop and run the production lines. , a recently hired mechanical engineer, developed and constructed an extending arm toy on his own initiative. His creation was later discovered by Yamauchi on a factory visit. Nintendo developed and produced this toy, the “”, which Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 2 became an instant . Yokoi moved into the product development division and the company began to dabble in what is referred to as “video games”.

Nintendo started to produce electro-mechanical arcade cabinets and video games in the 1970’s. A successful breakthrough into the video game market occurred when

Shigeru Miyamoto developed and released Donkey Kong. Most arcade games in the

1970’s primarily focused on shooting or driving simulations. Nintendo introduced a new genre of gaming referred to as “platforming”, known as gameplay where an avatar jumps upon platforms and dodges obstacles. Due to extreme popularity, Donkey Kong was produced for multiple systems within the home video game market.

After years of initial success, Nintendo was greatly affected by the video game market crash in the early 1980’s. A number of factors significantly contributed to the crash, including negative perceptions, market saturation, and the introduction of home computers (Dillon, 2011). Shortly preceding the crash, Nintendo was seeking to enter the market of home video game computers and tried to secure a deal with Atari to distribute their system, “The Family Computer”, or Famicom. Atari suffered financially from the crash and never secured a deal to distribute the Famicom gaming console. As a result,

Nintendo developed and released the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) into the

American market in 1985. High quality control measures, nonexistent competitors, and financial capabilities led to first-mover and competitive advantages. Computers were far too expensive and difficult to operate and the video arcades had become less family friendly over the years, allowing Nintendo to control the entire home video game market.

Recognizing Nintendo’s success, rivals began to enter into the video game market. The immense success of the NES planted the seeds for the upcoming “Console Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 3

Wars” between Nintendo and a newly formed Japanese gaming company, . Boasting additional features from the arcade scene such as a light gun, Sega attracted software developers who were unhappy with the stringent requirements enforced by Nintendo.

Enjoying marginal success, the Sega prompted the company to produce a new generation of hardware.

The 16 bit generation began to touch on limitations of storage technology.

Nintendo and Sega used cartridges to house physical memory chips in order to store their video game software. Capacity for the software was prohibitive to game design and additional memory increased the price of games significantly. These technological limitations led Nintendo and Sega to research CD-ROM storage based technology.

Nintendo entered into a partnership with , an ally who had reliably produced the sound processor for the Super NES. Initial development produced several working systems to evaluate for production, but the company grew weary as they were not able to achieve a satisfactory licensing agreement with Sony (Dillon, 2011).

Sega released the CD-ROM add-on to a lackluster reception, but the industry had begun the movement towards optical drive systems using compact discs for storage.

Focusing efforts on more advanced video processing technology, Nintendo wanted to adhere to the internal mantra of “quality over quantity” developing the

(N64). The N64 was a cartridge based system with innovative hardware accessories but still remained true to the rigid Nintendo structure of licensing and quality control.

Software developers unhappy with Nintendo’s strict internal procedures moved to a new competitor, the Sony PlayStation (PSN). The failed partnership with Sony produced the

PSN, debuting a full year ahead of the N64. Nintendo’s delayed entry and high cost of Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 4 development eventually led the PSN to dominate the N64 in terms of sales, availability, and market share. In reaction to the PSN, Nintendo’s next system release, the GameCube, showcased mini-DVD technology and multiplayer focused hardware, similar to competition from Sony. Many developers readily accepted the ease of licensing and development for the PSN, leaving Nintendo with few quality titles produced by in-house software development teams.

Uncertainty in the home video game market continued as Sega left the console market after weak showings from the Saturn and consoles. Sony enjoyed unbridled success with the release of the PlayStation 2 and emerged to challenge the industry with limitless financial means, forcing Nintendo to rethink market strategies. Competing in an increasingly competitive market required the company to develop a broader approach to future products. Relying on innovative technology,

Nintendo released the and showcased motion control as a new style of gameplay.

The system gained mass market appeal by attracting an audience who previously avoided video games and offering an online service with access to a library of Nintendo classics. To date, it is Nintendo’s best-selling console.

Riding the wave of success of the Wii, Nintendo conducted an internal analysis to inspiration for the next system, the . The focus of multiplayer gameplay that the Wii offered did not please some of the company’s long time fans, so Nintendo attempted to remedy the complaint by once again offering a unique piece of hardware, taking cues from the handheld GameBoy product line. The Wii U gave players a touch screen device that players used on the go and at home, never sacrificing progress due to leaving the base console unit. Competitors continuously out sell the Wii U by large Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 5 margins and the future is unknown, but examining key decision points in Nintendo’s history give insight as to how the company arrived here.

Three Critical Decision Points

Decision Point One: Nintendo’s Reaction to the Crash of 1982

Video games proved popular throughout the latter part of the 20th century, but inadequate system advancements and market stagnation led to the downfall of the gaming industry in 1982. Industry revenues fell 97% from 3 billion dollars to just under 100 million dollars in nearly a year (Werner, 2011). Multiple gaming platforms had flooded the market with lackluster systems and poorly designed games, leaving consumers uninterested. Prior to debuting in America, Nintendo enjoyed financial success in Japan allowing the company to take advantage of technological advancements despite their unfamiliarity of the market (McFerran, 2013). The company realized their innovations and gameplay were and the threat of rivalry was minimal following the crash in

1982. Through their external analysis, Nintendo discovered opportunities to exploit the market.

Nintendo’s new game console, the Famicom, was released in Japan in 1983. It was thoroughly redesigned and rebranded to exploit first mover advantages in the

American gaming market (Jones, 2013). The Famicom was renamed to the Nintendo

Entertainment System (NES) to introduce a product similar to the PC, yet distinct from previous video game consoles. Featuring an enclosed cartridge slot for the software games and controllers with improved functionality, Nintendo differentiated the product by increasing the perceived value for their customer base. The NES’s physical architecture was completely overhauled; the childlike hardware was redesigned into a Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 6 mature electronic product, combating the negative perception of pre-crash video game consoles. Facing heavy skepticism from retailers, Nintendo entered into non-equity alliances with distributors and managed to sell 50,000 units of the NES during the holiday season of 1985 (Kohler, 2010). To further persuade the American market, the company implemented a new mission statement: “...By listening closely to our customers, we constantly improve our products and services” (Nintendo, 2014).

Providing the foundation for company branding and design, Nintendo differentiated their product from every gaming console prior to their release by effectively marketing without deterring consumers.

At the end of 1986, over 1 million units of the NES were sold (Polsson, 2014).

With such high demand and popularity, multiple game developers wanted to produce titles for the NES. Nintendo dictated third-party software developers to limit production to no more than 5 titles and all cartridges manufactured held the “10NES” security chip, preventing unauthorized games from being released (Oxford, 2005). Superior standards allowed the company to have total control over the production and development of games. Nintendo fully controlled third party licensees, providing the company with a sustained competitive advantage within the video game market. This style of control was unfamiliar to software developers accustomed to total freedom throughout the development process. The “10NES” security chip permitted the company to uphold their mission statement and reiterate quality standards to the customer base.

Evaluating the general environment, Nintendo decided to pursue a diversification business level strategy by developing the Super Nintendo Entertainment System (SNES).

The SNES improved on the aging weaknesses inherent in the NES, but carried over two Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 7 major flaws: the strict licensing measures and the limited storage capacity of cartridges.

The company’s strategy did not allow for changes to the licensing structure, but a solution to the storage limitation was discovered within the value chain. A strong history of success between Nintendo and Sony allowed for tacit cooperation, producing a hardware based solution to storage issues, but the product was never introduced into the market.

Decision Point Two: Failed Partnership with Sony

Nintendo enjoyed success following the video game crash of 1982, but the company faced formidable unit costs and limited game quality based on dependence of the cartridge format. Partnering with Sony in 1988, Nintendo developed a CD-ROM add- on into the SNES allowing first-mover advantages within the video game market.

Nearing completion, the two parties failed to agree on a contract for the use of the technology and as a result, Nintendo continued the use of cartridges while Sony became a new competitor in the market.

Nintendo’s internal analysis focused on quality and an increase in perceived value. A 1993 joint venture between Nintendo and Argonaut produced the Super FX

RISC microprocessor used in select software titles such as (McFerran, 2013).

The flexibility of the Super FX chip allowed software developers to enhance the graphical capabilities without requiring the customer to buy a new console, enhancing the value of the SNES. Implementing the chip proved difficult and increased cost to games, resulting in a lack of quality titles. Sony took advantage of the situation with the release of the PlayStation (PSN) in 1994, attracting third party developers frustrated with

Nintendo’s strict licensing procedures (Malik, 1997). Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 8

Nintendo lost significant ground in hardware and software development as a result of the delayed release of the next system, the Nintendo 64 (N64) in 1996.

Consumers desired a larger variety of games featuring new and exciting characters

Nintendo failed to provided. With a large software developer base, new titles released for the PSN introducing consumers with a desired gaming experience, giving a competitive advantage to Sony. Nintendo focused primarily on increasing graphical hardware capabilities instead of pursuing a CD-ROM based product. This decision affected

Nintendo’s overall outlook for the future as the company sought for a way to regain a competitive advantage in the video game market.

Nintendo’s product development slowed considerably due to the decision to rely on cartridges rather than adopting CD-ROM’s. The required space for game development advanced with hardware complexity, increasing the value of CD-ROM’s for software developers. Unlike cartridges, CD-ROM’s on the PSN allowed for a significant increase in megabytes of data, with 650mb compared to only 16mb on the N64 (Malik, 1997).

Nintendo’s high quality strategy retained a handful of software developers and produced limited numbers of popular titles. The PSN had 150 titles released by June of 1997 in comparison to only 17 for the N64 (Browder, 1997).

Nintendo continued to maintain a strategy of quality over quantity. While certain graphics are clearer, the sales numbers do not necessarily match the company’s strategy.

Sony had about $5 billion in video game revenues in 1996 and Nintendo ended the fiscal year with sales of $3.2 billion (Malik, 1997). As a result, Nintendo was to find methods to significantly compete in an industry where the company enjoyed a sustained competitive advantage previously. Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 9

The ability of Nintendo to implement a proper strategy was crucial to their success following a failed partnership with Sony. Despite the popularity of the N64, the company had failed to create a proper first-mover advantage in the creation of innovative hardware components into their systems. Nintendo needed to discover methods to regain a competitive advantage with the exponential growth of technology.

Decision Point Three: Post Wii Analysis

Entering a new era in gaming with the success of the Sony PlayStation 3 and

Microsoft , Nintendo faced pressure to release a device to revolutionize the gaming experience. The company proposed to target an extensive demographic neither Sony or

Microsoft was capable of acquiring and developed a console both young and mature audiences could enjoy. , the current CEO of Nintendo states, "We're not thinking about fighting Sony, but about how many people we can get to play games. The thing we're thinking about most is not portable systems, consoles, and so forth, but that we want to get new people playing games" (Chang, 2007). Continuing a trend of product differentiation, Nintendo introduced new technology to expand upon their consumer base.

Introducing the Nintendo Wii in 2006, the system quickly became a popular console on the market by implementing motion-controlled gaming, exploiting firm linkages with and Hulu, and creating intuitively simplistic games. To date, the

Wii has been Nintendo’s best-selling console with over 100 million units sold, initially selling over 3 million units in its first quarter alone (MacDonald, 2013). The groundbreaking technology of the Wii attracted new consumers, which fulfilled Iwata’s goal of having “...new people playing games” (Chang, 2007). Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 10

Following the Wii’s success, Microsoft and Sony released competing products in order to challenge Nintendo’s’ claim of the entire market. Within a year, Microsoft and

Sony created a competitive parity which impeded Nintendo’s advantage. The release of

Microsoft’s ‘’ and Sony’s ‘Move’ technology quickly overshadowed the Wii, decreasing overall sales by 32% (Murphy, 2011). With the Wii sustaining significant losses, Nintendo relied on the handheld gaming strategy to remain profitable.

Nintendo has held a sustained competitive advantage in the mobile gaming market. With the release of the original GameBoy in 1989, the company pioneered the development of the portable gaming market by introducing a mobile platform featuring the quality titles available on the home system. Following the trend of building high quality products, competitors were unsuccessful in introducing an alternative to challenge any handheld device produced by Nintendo.

As home console sales declined, the company continued to innovate by offering the Nintendo DS in 2004 and the Nintendo 3DS 2012. Worldwide, the DS accounted for over 150 million units while the 3DS has sold over 40 million units to date (VG Chartz,

2014). The overall profit earned by handheld gaming devices further compensated for the

Wii’s loss in sales. The company then sought after a new strategy which would help regain competitive advantage through product differentiation.

Nintendo conducted an external analysis of several markets, but misinterpreted the needs of consumers. Technological advancements have led into a new era due to the popularity of touch screen mobile devices. The majority of American consumers currently own a smartphone or tablet proving touch-screens were the future of technology. Nintendo saw the opportunity to gain first-mover advantages by utilizing Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 11 touch-screen development to essentially redesign how interactivity would once again be perceived.

Introducing the Wii U in 2013, Nintendo pursued a strategy of product differentiation. By adding technological features and combining elements from the handheld and home console market, the company attempted to increase its perceived value. For example, an individual could remotely use the controller as a handheld console, in addition to the regular home use on a television. This unique experience into playing video games introduced a new style of innovation, differentiating itself from other consoles. Despite the creativity of the product, the Wii U has already faced setbacks such as projection of sales. For example, Nintendo altered their global Wii U sales forecast from nine million to 2.8 million units for the year to March 31, 2014 (SWOT,

2014). This change in projection significantly alters the future success of the product and its ability to remain relevant.

Nintendo’s historical lack of attracting third party developers continued with the new system. The library of available titles remains small, relying on in house developed games with a focus on younger audiences. The strict control measures from the original

NES remain in place and severely limit the quality and quantity of titles. The digital content policies directly tie products to an individual device, showing Nintendo’s lack of ability to adapt and remain relevant to an increasingly mobile audience.

Alternate History

A new generation of demanded more innovation with the home entertainment system since the beginning of the 21st century. Remaining in the market, but often overlooked, Nintendo made the decision to release the Wii U in hopes of Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 12 regaining relevance. Unfortunately, their external market analysis was greatly misinterpreted as the product was not well received. At this moment in Nintendo’s history, the release of a home entertainment system would benefit the company’s stance within the video game market, allowing them to compete with their biggest competitors,

Microsoft and Sony.

The company analyzed their external market in 2013 to position themselves towards a competitive advantage within the gaming industry. Nintendo saw home entertainment systems and PCs dominating the market while the desire for mobile gaming units quickly declined. Smartphones and tablet game applications were taking over the mobile market while home entertainment systems were grossing revenues at record highs due to their demand. This resulted in Nintendo’s decision to create a new innovative product, the NV-US entertainment system, setting them apart within the industry.

Following careful internal analysis, Nintendo realized they did not have the capabilities to immediately compete against the market giants such as Microsoft and

Sony. The company entered into a joint-venture with the - a and company (Dunn, 2013). This resulted in the formation of a subsidiary company, the Nintendo-Valve Universal Systems Corporation

(NVUS). Nintendo sought out the venture due to Valve’s worldwide active user base and their dominance within the PC gaming industry. Nintendo encompassed the capabilities to create a next generation console while Valve contained a valuable resource to differentiate itself from the other home entertainment systems. Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 13

Steam, the world’s largest online gaming platform created by Valve, connects over 35 million active users who can “easily buy, play, share, modify, and build communities” around multiple independent game titles (Valve, 2014). The software is a free application and programming interface developers can use to integrate with their products such as networking, matchmaking, in-game achievements, cloud saving, and communication functionality (Valve, 2014). Differentiating itself from Microsoft’s

‘Live’ and Playstation’s ‘PSN’ interface, enhanced both the expectations of PC and console gamers. The software also allows for unique connectivity options, granting users multi-server access, enabling them to choose which games to join. User controlled connectivity allowed gamers to join their preferred server based upon their location. User satisfaction was increased by eliminating latency issues and consistent server disconnections.

The modular ability of the NV-US constantly allows an upgrade from a variety of hardware options. Benefiting from the evolving PC hardware market, consumers can purchase and install any component with appropriate driver packages to enhance the raw performance of the individual’s system. By giving the consumer control over hardware selection, the NV-US gives the customer the choice between a system that incorporates high amounts of product features versus tailoring to a specific use. As a home entertainment system, the SteamOS features video, audio, and streaming content playback. The connected abilities of the NV-US give the consumer access to any software currently loaded on the device and offer an enhanced experience when connected to the internet. Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 14

Differentiating the system allowed Nintendo and Valve to establish a first-mover advantage by allowing the PC and console communities to unite for the first time in gaming history. For years, the gaming industry sought ways to bridge the gap by attempting cross-platform connectivity. Through the use of Valve’s cloud interface, users who play on the Steam software were able to connect and play against each other on a console or PC. This created perceived value allowing for the user to keep with their own style of gameplay by either using a keyboard and mouse or handheld controller. Users controlled the capabilities to customize and create different applications such as maps, levels, and game types to enhance their gaming experience.

The cloud technology removed the dependency for CD-ROMs as multiple games could be downloaded directly through the Steam application and saved onto the user’s account. This led to a reduction in costs for game distribution as development studios no longer needed to invest in protective hardware for their games. Game storage was made virtually limitless by allowing scalable hardware for the consumer, attracting more third party developers towards the NV-US system, generating new and unique titles.

Historically, Nintendo remained strict with third party licensing agreements by refusing developer’s games to be released upon any system which did not align with their core values. The company recognized game variety played a major role in generating revenue for their competitors. Changing the licensing policies would allow the company to compete within the market. Prior to the release of the NV-US, Nintendo made the decision to implement a hands-off approach when dealing with third party developers, allowing them to design and produce game titles never before seen within the industry. Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 15

Introduced in October 2013, the NV-US was an instant success, beating out both the and Playstation 4 systems throughout the holiday season. Marketing strategies, such as bundling and captive deals, played a vital role in the initial success of the system. A select library of classic Nintendo titles, dating back to the NES, was bundled with the release of the system. Nintendo imitated Walt Disney’s strategy to open its’ vault and redistribute their most popular game titles, adding value to the system. NV-

US sales soared as nostalgia allowed broader audience to connect their emotions with

Nintendo classics. A bundle with additional controllers and one game exclusive to the

NV-US was an alternative option. Exclusive titles were produced for the console to build system loyalty and a reputation of quality game releases as seen by the Halo series with the .

Nintendo used its backlog of game titles as an incentive for users to purchase the system. The most popular games such as Super 64, , and GoldenEye

007 were packaged with the release of the system at no additional charge to entice consumer purchases. An extensive library of Nintendo’s classic games were further integrated into the software installed on the NV-US system, allowing only NV-US consumers to have exclusive access to various Nintendo titles. PC gamers, who chose not to integrate towards the NV-US system, did not have free access to Nintendo classics.

Instead, the NVUS Corporation decided to retail the classic titles in bundles associated with the system in which they were released to. This exclusive offer is an extension of the

NV-US’ capabilities which provide unique incentives for their customer base.

With an extensive history, Nintendo has undergone constant shifts within the . Upon entry into the market, the company offered innovations not Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 16 previously seen. Their focus on product differentiation continued throughout the life cycles of various systems, but ultimately conceded to the increasingly competitive market. With the adaptation of the NV-US system, Nintendo looks to regain the competitive advantage the company previously held.

Nintendo: The Illusive Competitive Advantage 17

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