Morocco Country Report BTI 2018
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BTI 2018 Country Report Morocco This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018. It covers the period from February 1, 2015 to January 31, 2017. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in 129 countries. More on the BTI at http://www.bti-project.org. Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Morocco. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Contact Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl-Bertelsmann-Strasse 256 33111 Gütersloh Germany Sabine Donner Phone +49 5241 81 81501 [email protected] Hauke Hartmann Phone +49 5241 81 81389 [email protected] Robert Schwarz Phone +49 5241 81 81402 [email protected] Sabine Steinkamp Phone +49 5241 81 81507 [email protected] BTI 2018 | Morocco 3 Key Indicators Population M 35.3 HDI 0.647 GDP p.c., PPP $ 7838 Pop. growth1 % p.a. 1.4 HDI rank of 188 123 Gini Index 40.7 Life expectancy years 75.5 UN Education Index 0.542 Poverty3 % 17.0 Urban population % 60.7 Gender inequality2 0.494 Aid per capita $ 39.3 Sources (as of October 2017): The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2016. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than $3.20 a day at 2011 international prices. Executive Summary Major political trends in Morocco have not changed since the previous review period. The Moroccan neo-authoritarian monarchy weathered the “Arab Spring” through constitutional reforms and early elections (in 2011). The constitutional reforms promised greater judicial independence and a more relevant role for parliament. In essence, however, these reforms have not altered the distribution of power in Morocco. Provisions concerning judicial independence and auditing have not yet led to an actual change in practice. While the parliament has adopted several reform packages – including judicial reforms and the protection of freedom of expression – their practical implications remain unclear. In the 2011 early parliamentary elections, the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) came out victorious. The PJD formed a typical Moroccan governing coalition of ideologically diverse parties. In the latest parliamentary elections in October 2016, the PJD further increased its vote share, winning about 30% – the largest share of seats. As of January 2017, the PJD had not, however, been able to form a government, due to obstacles orchestrated by the “deep state” of the monarchy. The PJD needs three to four parties to successfully form a governing coalition, but the other parties are mainly responsive to the monarchy or vying to lead powerful ministries ultimately under monarchical control. Among the general population, political disaffection remains high, demonstrated by high abstention rates and low trust in parliament and political parties. Press freedom remains low and human rights abuses continue. In addition, the activities of local human rights associations remain restricted. The government has continued its program of economic liberalization, further reducing tariffs and strengthening investor protections. Although economic growth remains heavily dependent on agriculture, there have been improvements in macroeconomic performance. Most notably, the budget deficit has been successfully reduced and reforms passed that will increase macroeconomic BTI 2018 | Morocco 4 stability and foreign investment. Although Morocco has begun to implement a health care scheme for the poor, insufficient social safety nets, illiteracy and gender inequality remain challenges. Morocco continued to enjoy the strong financial and political support of both the United States and European Union. The country has also continued its strategy of diversifying international cooperation, a significant step being its readmission to the African Union in January 2017. Notwithstanding, there have been a series of setbacks relating to the Western Sahara and relations with neighboring Algeria have remained poor. History and Characteristics of Transformation Following the country’s independence from France in 1956, the Moroccan monarchy based its rule on the rural elites, urban bourgeoisie and military. Over the next decades, political opposition from leftists and nationalists was contained through harsh repression, co-optation and divide et īmpera politics. As the regime relied on the support of the major rural landowners, it refrained from initiating massive industrialization programs financed through wealth transfers from the agricultural sector. At the same time, it implemented tariff barriers to promote national industries which helped to generate support among the bourgeoisie, emulating other developing nations. Contrary to its neighboring former French colonies Tunisia and Algeria, Morocco did not follow an explicit modernizing agenda upon independence. This resulted, among others in education and literacy levels remaining comparatively low. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, King Hassan II reacted to social unrest and two military coup attempts through redistributive policies aimed at appeasing the constituencies of the political opposition. He raised the minimum wage, granted scholarships to all students attending university and expanded the parastatal sector. During the early 1970s, the financial cost of this economic reorientation was initially borne by a surge in phosphate prices, Morocco’s key export. Subsequently, Morocco resorted to foreign loans, which eventually led the country into massive debt. Additional costs were generated by Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara territory in 1975 which created an expensive and lengthy war with the Polisario Front. The ensuing crisis of public finances and subsequent restrictions of structural adjustment programs triggered waves of social unrest and bread riots in the 1980s and early 1990s. Morocco’s economic and social challenges strengthened the political opposition, forcing the regime to enact economic and political reforms in the 1990s. On the economic front, Hassan II modernized the legal environment for the business sector. New laws were implemented in the banking sector, the tax system was overhauled to simplify and optimize tax collection and a major privatization program was set in motion. This fell short, however, of dismantling Morocco’s complex and deeply entrenched patronage system. Political liberalization measures appeased the opposition and lessened international pressure regarding Morocco’s deplorable human rights record. Political prisoners were released and press BTI 2018 | Morocco 5 freedom increased. A constitutional reform provided for the first direct elections of all members of parliament in 1997. This same reform also introduced a new upper chamber with wide-ranging prerogatives and a pro-regime composition to counterbalance the strengthened lower chamber. King Hassan II reached out to the political opposition and appointed opposition leader Abderahmane Youssoufi, then secretary-general of the major opposition party the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, as prime minister in 1998. The government also included two other opposition parties: the Istiqlal and Party of Socialist Progress. Until 2011, these parties and various pro- regime parties formed the government coalition, losing much of their reform drive and mobilization potential over time. Another important feature of the 1997 elections was the participation of the first Islamist political party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), representing one of the two main currents of political Islam in Morocco. The other major current of Islamism, the Justice and Charity (JC) association, has to date refused to accept the monarchy’s religious and political leadership; it remains illegal and is occasionally persecuted. After Hassan II died in July 1999, his successor, Mohammed VI, positioned himself as a political and social reformer. Initially, two symbolic gestures stood out: his release of the JC leader Abdessalam Yassine from house arrest and firing of Driss Basri, the former interior minister. Basri had been Hassan II’s most trusted adviser as well as the embodiment of human rights abuses and rigged elections. Mohammed VI also established the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, with a mandate to identify and compensate former victims of human rights violations. Additionally, he initiated a new personal status law that improved the legal situation of women. In spite of these improvements, Mohammed VI’s reign has not changed the configuration of power – the political system remains undemocratic. Parliamentary elections (in 2002, 2007, 2011 and 2016) under his reign have been more transparent, but excessive gerrymandering and the toleration of vote-buying have ensured a fragmented parliament. Since the Casablanca terrorist bombings on 16 May 2003, human rights abuses and violations of press freedom are again on the rise. As other Middle Eastern and North African countries, Morocco experienced important protests by the “February 20” movement in 2011. The monarchy managed to stay on top of these protests with two key initiatives. The first were constitutional reforms, approved in a popular referendum. The second were early parliamentary elections in November 2011 in which PJD, previously the most