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Bulletin 181101 (PDF Edition)
RAO BULLETIN 1 November 2018 PDF Edition THIS RETIREE ACTIVITIES OFFICE BULLETIN CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES Pg Article Subject . * DOD * . 05 == Overseas Holiday Mail ---- (2018 Deadlines) 05 == DoD MSEP ---- (VA Joins Military Spouse Employment Partnership) 06 == DoD Budget 2020 ---- (First Cut Under Trump | Limited to $700B) 07 == Iraq War [01] ---- (Unvarnished History to be Published by Xmas) 08 == DoD GPS USE Policy ---- (Deployed Servicemember Apps Restrictied) 08 == INF Russian Treaty ---- (Post-INF landscape) 10 == DoD/VA Seamless Transition [37] ---- (Cerner’s EHR Will Be Standard) 13 == Military Base Access [02] ---- (Proposal to Use for U.S. Fuel Exports to Asia) 14 == Military Base Access [03] ---- (American Bases in Japan) 15 == DoD Fraud, Waste, & Abuse ---- (Reported 16 thru 31 OCT 2018) 17 == Agent Orange Forgotten Victims [01] ---- (U.S. Prepares for Biggest-Ever Cleanup) 18 == POW/MIA Recoveries & Burials ---- (Reported 16 thru 31 OCT 2018 | 21) 1 . * VA * . 21 == VA AED Cabinets ---- (Naloxone Addition to Reverse Opioid Overdoses) 22 == VA Pension Program [02] ---- (Entitlement Regulations Amended) 22 == VA Transplant Program [04] ---- (Vet Denied Lung Transplant | Too Old) 23 == Agent Orange | C-123 Aircraft [16] ---- (Exposure Presumption Now Official) 24 == Right to Die Program ---- (Denied to Vets Residing in California Veteran Homes) 25 == VA Essential Equipment ---- (Availability Delays) 26 == VA Pension Poachers ---- (Crooked Financial Planners Target Elderly Vets) 26 == VA Claims Processing [18] ---- (Significant -
Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy
Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy July 18, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45818 SUMMARY R45818 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy July 18, 2019 Afghanistan has been a significant U.S. foreign policy concern since 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military Clayton Thomas campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored and supported it. Analyst in Middle Eastern In the intervening 18 years, the United States has suffered approximately 2,400 military Affairs fatalities in Afghanistan, with the cost of military operations reaching nearly $750 billion. Congress has appropriated approximately $133 billion for reconstruction. In that time, an elected Afghan government has replaced the Taliban, and most measures of human development have improved, although Afghanistan’s future prospects remain mixed in light of the country’s ongoing violent conflict and political contention. Topics covered in this report include: Security dynamics. U.S. and Afghan forces, along with international partners, combat a Taliban insurgency that is, by many measures, in a stronger military position now than at any point since 2001. Many observers assess that a full-scale U.S. withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the Afghan government and perhaps even the reestablishment of Taliban control over most of the country. Taliban insurgents operate alongside, and in periodic competition with, an array of other armed groups, including regional affiliates of Al Qaeda (a longtime Taliban ally) and the Islamic State (a Taliban foe and increasing focus of U.S. policy). U.S. -
My Life with the Taliban
MY LIFE WITH THE TALIBAN Courtesy of www.pdfbooksfree.pk ABDUL SALAM ZAEEF My Life with the Taliban Edited by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn Courtesy of www.pdfbooksfree.pk Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © Abdul Salam Zaeef 2010 Editors’ introduction and translation Copyright © Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, 2010 Foreword Copyright © Barnett R. Rubin, 2010 All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Za’if, ‘Abd al-Salam, 1967 or 8– My life with the Taliban / Abdul Salam Zaeef. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-231-70148-8 (alk. paper) 1. Za’if, ‘Abd al-Salam, 1967 or 8– 2. Taliban—Biography. 3. Afghan War, 2001—Biography. 4. Prisoners of war—Afghanistan—Biography. 5. Prisoners of war—United States—Biography. 6. Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp—Biography. I. Title. DS371.33.Z34A3 2010 958.104'7—dc22 [B] 2009040865 ∞ Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. This book is printed on paper with recycled content. Printed in USA c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared. Courtesy of www.pdfbooksfree.pk CONTENTS Kandahar: Portrait of a City ix Editors’ Acknowledgements xxv Editors’ Notes xxvii Character List xxix Foreword by Barnett R. Rubin xxxvii Preface by Abdul Salam Zaeef xli Maps xlviii–xlix 1. -
Unclassified//For Public Release Unclassified//For Public Release
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE --SESR-Efll-N0F0RN- Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010 Guantanamo Review Dispositions Country ISN Name Decision of Origin AF 4 Abdul Haq Wasiq Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 6 Mullah Norullah Noori Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 7 Mullah Mohammed Fazl Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 ), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 560 Haji Wali Muhammed Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 ), as informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further review by the Principals prior to the detainee's transfer to a detention facility in the United States. AF 579 Khairullah Said Wali Khairkhwa Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 753 Abdul Sahir Referred for prosecution. AF 762 Obaidullah Referred for prosecution. AF 782 Awai Gui Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 832 Mohammad Nabi Omari Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 ), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 850 Mohammed Hashim Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement appropriate security measures. AF 899 Shawali Khan Transfer to • subject to appropriate security measures. -
DMO Exhibit Page 1 Of2
UNCLASSIFIED DepartmentofDefense Officefor the AdministrativeReviewofthe Detentionof Enemy CombatantsatUSNavalBase GuantanamoBay, Cuba 18 July 2005 TO : WASIQ , ABDUL HAQ SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARYOF EVIDENCEFORADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWBOARDINTHE CASE OF WASIQ, ABDULHAQ 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convenedto review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary. 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case . At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to : (1) release you to your home state; ( 2 ) transfer you to your home state , with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state ; or ( 3 ) continue your detention under United States control. 3. The following primaryfactors favor continued detention: a. Commitment 1. The detainee served as Deputy Minister of Intelligence inthe Taliban Intelligence Service . 2. The detainee served as acting Minister of Intelligence when Qari Ahmadullah was away from Kabul performing his duties as governor of Tahar province. 3. The detainee was a participant inmilitary operations inKonduz. 4. Detainee used Icom radios and provided information oncommunications security procedures within the Taliban Intelligence Department. b . Connections/Associations 1. The detainee arranged to have an Egyptian al Qaida member, Hamza Zobir teach Taliban intelligence officers about intelligence work . 2. The detaineegave a suspectedAfghani arms smuggler a Codanhighfrequency radio set for safekeeping. The suspected arms smuggler allegedlyhad many weapons caches near Ghazni. 4. Thefollowingprimaryfactorsfavor releaseor transfer: UNCLASSIFIED DMO Exhibit Page 1 of2 000001 UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWBOARDINTHE CASE OF WASIQ, ABDUL HAQ a . At the time of his capture , the detainee claims he was attempting to assist the U.S. -
Leveraging the Taliban's Quest for International Recognition
Leveraging the Taliban’s Quest for International Recognition Afghan Peace Process Issues Paper March 2021 By Barnett R. Rubin Summary: As the United States tries to orchestrate a political settlement in conjunction with its eventual military withdrawal from Afghanistan, it has overestimated the role of military pressure or presence and underestimated the leverage that the Taliban’s quest for sanctions relief, recognition and international assistance provides. As the U.S. government decides on how and when to withdraw its troops, it and other international powers retain control over some of the Taliban’s main objectives — the removal of both bilateral and United Nations Security Council sanctions and, eventually, recognition of and assistance to an Afghan government that includes the Taliban. Making the most of this leverage will require coordination with the Security Council and with Afghanistan’s key neighbors, including Security Council members China, Russia and India, as well as Pakistan and Iran. In April 2017, in a meeting with an interagency team on board a military aircraft en route to Afghanistan, U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s new national security advisor, retired Army Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, dismissed the ongoing effort to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban: “The first step, the national security adviser said, was to turn around the trajectory of the conflict. The United States had to stop the Taliban’s advance on the battlefield and force them to agree to concessions in the process .... US talks with the Taliban would only succeed when the United States returned to a position of strength on the battlefield and was ‘winning’ against the insurgency.”1 1 Donati, Jessica. -
19 October 2020 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
Res. 1988 (2011) List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1988 (2011) Generated on: 19 October 2020 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals TAi.155 Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﯿﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non- Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL- UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices- Individuals click here TAi.121 Name: 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: ABDUL AHAD 3: na 4: na ﻋﺰﯾﺰ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻋﺒﺪ اﻻﺣﺪ :(Name (original script Title: Mr Designation: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates DOB: 1972 POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghanistan Passport no: na National identification no: Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 44323 na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan. -
The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: an Empirical Study
© Reuters/HO Old – Detainees at XRay Camp in Guantanamo. The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empirical Study Benjamin Wittes and Zaahira Wyne with Erin Miller, Julia Pilcer, and Georgina Druce December 16, 2008 The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empiricial Study Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Introduction 3 The Public Record about Guantánamo 4 Demographic Overview 6 Government Allegations 9 Detainee Statements 13 Conclusion 22 Note on Sources and Methods 23 About the Authors 28 Endnotes 29 Appendix I: Detainees at Guantánamo 46 Appendix II: Detainees Not at Guantánamo 66 Appendix III: Sample Habeas Records 89 Sample 1 90 Sample 2 93 Sample 3 96 The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empiricial Study EXECUTIVE SUMMARY he following report represents an effort both to document and to describe in as much detail as the public record will permit the current detainee population in American T military custody at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station in Cuba. Since the military brought the first detainees to Guantánamo in January 2002, the Pentagon has consistently refused to comprehensively identify those it holds. While it has, at various times, released information about individuals who have been detained at Guantánamo, it has always maintained ambiguity about the population of the facility at any given moment, declining even to specify precisely the number of detainees held at the base. We have sought to identify the detainee population using a variety of records, mostly from habeas corpus litigation, and we have sorted the current population into subgroups using both the government’s allegations against detainees and detainee statements about their own affiliations and conduct. -
Azu Acku Serial Ds371 2 A33
NEWS SUMMARY ON AFGHANISTAN 1999 PREFACE ACBAR has the pleasure to make available the "News Summary on Afghanistan" for the year 1999. This ACBAR publication, has been produced by extracting the significant events reported in different Pakistani newspapers- The News, Frontier Post and The Nation. No personal or organisational views have been included in this publication. The important events have been listed under the following topics: 0 Aid and Economic developments; @ Military developments; ~ Political development; 0 Security matters; and ~ Other news. Nancy Hatch Dupree Executive Director NEWS SUMMARY ON AFGHANISTAN 1999 CONTENTS Page Map of Afghanistan ............................................................................. Abbreviation...................................................................................... II Selected events of 1999......................................................................... III Afghani exchange rate in 1999............................................................... .. IX Aid and economic development. ............................................................... Military development.............................................................................. 9 Political development.............................................................................. 14 Security matters..................................................................................... 30 Other news........................................................................................... 37 PROVINCES -
The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004–2012
The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012 THEO FARRELL AND ANTONIO GIUSTOZZI* Ten years ago the Taliban appeared to have been defeated. In retaliation for the 9/11 attacks, the United States had invaded Afghanistan and, in a matter of months, had overthrown the Taliban regime.1 In December 2001 Hamid Karzai had been appointed the interim Afghan president by a loya jirga (grand council), and in January 2002 the international community had agreed to provide extensive assis- tance to stabilize and rebuild the Afghan state. By mid-2002, US and British task forces were chasing the last remnants of the Taliban out of the country and hunting down Al-Qaeda terrorists.2 A decade later, Karzai is still in power and Afghanistan has received massive international developmental and security assistance.3 But the Afghan state is also battling a Taliban insurgency that shows little sign of abating. How did the Taliban return to Afghanistan, and why have they not been defeated? We answer these questions by looking inside the Afghan insurgency, using Helmand province as a case-study. We draw on a large number of original interviews with Taliban field commanders and fighters to produce a uniquely detailed picture of the Taliban at war. The picture that emerges is of a resilient insurgency that has adapted under immense military pressure to become more centralized and more professional. The Taliban have suffered very heavy attrition in Helmand, but they are far from defeated. Up to now, assessments of the war have been primarily based on analysis of western and Afghan government efforts.4 In this article, we examine how the * For feedback on earlier drafts of this article, we wish to thank Mark Beautement, Ryan Evans, Carter Malkasian, Mike Martin and the two anonymous reviewers, as well as audiences at presentations in 2012–13 in the ‘Changing character of war’ programme at Oxford University, the Afghan Studies Group at King’s College London, and the Centre for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. -
I NEW YORK UNIVERSITY Separating the Taliban from Al-Qaeda: The
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY i CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan Alex Strick van Linschoten Felix Kuehn February 2011 NYU Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan | A CIC Study CIC NEW YORK UNIVERSITY CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International cooperation is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges. The NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) works to enhance international responses to conflict, insecurity, and scarcity through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community. CIC’s programs and research activities span the spectrum of conflict, insecurity, and scarcity issues. This allows us to see critical inter-connections and highlight the coherence often necessary for effective response. We have a particular concentration on the UN and multilateral responses to conflict. Table of Contents Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan | A CIC Study Key Findings 1 1. Overview 1 2. September 11 and the Taliban 5 3. An Avoidable Insurgency 6 4. Engaging Taliban on al-Qaeda 7 5. U.S. Policy and al-Qaeda 9 6. Conclusion 11 Endnotes 13 Key Findings 1. Overview • The Taliban and al-Qaeda remain distinct groups For much of the international community, relations with different goals, ideologies, and sources of recruits; between the Taliban and al-Qaeda – as well as the Taliban’s there was considerable friction between them before ties to the wider universe of jihadist groups – pose the September 11, 2001, and today that friction persists. -
Taliban History of War and Peace in Afghanistan
Taliban history of war and peace in Afghanistan Felix Kuehn Felix Kuehn is the co-editor of My Life with the Taliban, the poetry written by Taliban members; and co-editor of The Taliban autobiography of the former Taliban envoy to Pakistan, Mullah Reader (Hurst, forthcoming). Kuehn holds a degree from the School Abdul Salam Zaeef (Hurst, 2010); co-author of An enemy we created: of Oriental and African Studies in London and will defend his PhD The myth of the Taliban/Al-Qaeda merger, 1970–2010 (Hurst, 2012); thesis submitted to King’s College London Department of War co-editor of Poetry of the Taliban (Hurst 2012), a volume of Studies later in 2018. ABSTRACT What does conflict in Afghanistan look like to the The movement sees itself as inclusive – not aligned Taliban and how can greater knowledge of how the with any group nor based on ethnicity or a political movement functions inform better peace policy? programme but following Islam alone. The Taliban’s resurgence in the 2000s mirrored their initial rise to Misconceptions of the Taliban have complicated power, facilitated by widespread public discontent efforts to end the war in Afghanistan. A key example with the new government. They see themselves and is the extent to which the movement represents the the US as the real stakeholders in the conflict and so grievances of a significant section of Afghan society. likewise in any reconciliation process. The Taliban are not unified. From inception the movement The Taliban are perhaps less exceptional in Afghanistan has included distinct groups with different views on national than many people would prefer to believe, as they and international policy.