DOES FREGE HAVE a PROBLEM with EMPTY NAMES? by Hans Robin Solberg
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
DOES FREGE HAVE A PROBLEM WITH EMPTY NAMES? By Hans Robin Solberg hink about the following two identity statements: flexivity of identity), while the second is not and might T carry new information. This is because although ‘Afla’ and (1)Darth Vader = Anakin Skywalker. ‘Ateb’ name the same mountain (the reference), they are (2)Darth Vader = Robin Hood. also names of two different modes of presentation of the mountain. It has been argued that on this picture senses are depen- Intuitively, given the universe of Star Wars and the story dent on the objects that are given (e.g. Evans 1982:12–13, of Robin Hood, (1) is true and (2) is false. Also, asserting 22–33). The argument goes something like this: If sense these sentences in a conversation could, very plausibly, is the way a reference is presented to us, then if there is create either agreement or disagreement. And if I were to no reference there is no way it can be presented to us, i.e. assert (2), someone correcting me on my mistake about there is no sense. Empty names lack reference. So, empty Robin Hood would be right in doing so. names have no sense. In this text I’ll show that Frege’s account of empty na- This wouldn’t be a problem for Frege if he claimed that mes is at odds with the intuitive understanding and use there is no sense without reference, but he repeatedly does. sketched above.1 The text contains four parts. Part I deals For Frege, a sense is meant to be independent4 both of with Frege’s account of sense and reference. Part II discus- the cognizer (we only grasp the sense) and the reference ses his view on the semantics of empty names. Part III, as (there can be sense without reference). Frege draws a very a conclusion, tries to accommodate, in a non-Fregean way, sharp distinction between the objective and mind-inde- the use of empty names and their semantic significance pendent (such as sense) on the one side and the subjective for sentences. Part IV provides a summary of the text and and mind-dependent (such as psychological ideas) on the points out further lines of inquiry. other. Since sense is wholly objective to Frege, it is also wholly mind-independent, in other words, independent I – Frege on sense and reference of the cognizer. When it comes to reference, Frege holds In “On Sinn and Bedeutung” (1997),2 Frege divides his that there can be sense without reference, but he never notion of the meaning of a sign (simple or complex) into gives any proper argument for this position. At most he what the sign stands for, the reference, and the mode of indicates that sentences like ‘Anakin Skywalker is Darth presentation of the reference to a cognizer, the sense. To Vader’ and ‘Odysseus was set ashore on Ithaca while sound quote Dummett on Frege: “[T]he sense of an expression asleep’ have meaning, and since we know them to be wit- is the way its reference is given to us” (2014:69). The re- hout reference they must have sense; if not, they would ference of a sign can be presented in different ways; this be meaningless (Frege 1997:157). It seems as if there is an is meant to explain the difference between identity state- inconsistency in Frege’s writing between the mode of pre- ments like: ‘Afla = Afla’ and ‘Afla = Ateb’. If the signs ‘Afla’ sentation account of sense, which seemingly leads to the and ‘Ateb’ share the same reference (say a mountain),3 and impossibility of sense without reference (at least for proper if reference is all there is to meaning, then these statements names), and statements to the effect that there exists sense would mean exactly the same. But clearly they do not. The without reference (even for proper names).5 This might be first identity statement is self-evident (according to the re- because the issue of empty names is of minor importance 8 to Frege, as he stipulates that all proper names in his for- mal language must be genuine proper names, i.e. have a According to Frege, there exist genuine proper names that reference (Frege 1997:163).6 I assume that Frege would refer and mock-names that fail to refer. Sentences like: have solved any apparent inconsistency, had he devoted more time to the issue, and I’ll agree with him that emp- (1)Darth Vader = Anakin Skywalker ty names must have sense to account for their cognitive (2)Darth Vader = Robin Hood significance. contain mock-names that combine into mock-thoughts Part II - Frege on the lack of truth value for senten- that are neither true nor false. For Frege, all proper ces containing empty names thoughts have a truth-value as reference of which there are So far, Frege agrees with the intuition that an identity sta- only two: the True and the False. Since the sense and refe- tement like: rence of a thought is constituted by the sense and reference of its parts, empty names leads to empty thoughts, in other (1)Darth Vader = Anakin Skywalker words, thoughts without reference. This lack of It seems as if there is an has some kind of meaning even though it lacks a reference. reference for thoughts is inconsistency in Frege’s Frege’s next step is where the disagreement really begins. a lack of truth-value. So writing between the As was claimed in the introduction, the intuitive under- all use of empty names in mode of presentation standing of (1) is that it is a true identity statement; but expressing thoughts fall account of sense, which according to Frege, it is neither true nor false. Here is what in the same category of seemingly leads to the im- Frege says in Logic: neither true nor false or possibility of sense without fictitious.7 reference (at least for proper This conclusion is Names that fail to fulfil the usual role of a proper name, highly counterintuitive. I names), and statements to which is to name something, may be called mock proper think there is a difference the effect that there exists names [Scheineigennamen]. Although the tale of William in truth-value between sense without reference Tell is a legend and not history and the name ‘William Tell’ (1) and (2), and that this (even for proper names). is a mock proper name, we cannot deny it a sense. But the sense of the sentence ‘William Tell shot an apple off his son’s can be seen by looking at 8 head’ is no more true than is that of the sentence ‘William how they are used. As stated in the introduction, anyone Tell did not shot [sic] an apple off his son’s head’. I do not say, familiar with the Star Wars movies and the legend of Robin however, that this sense is false either, but I characterize it as Hood would hold (1) as true (at least more true than (2)) fictitious. (1997:229–230) and (2) as false. According to Frege, we cannot ask about Illustrasjon: Trym Horgen 9 the truth-value of such sentences, but I think it is obvious knowledge about this domain. This ability to communica- that we can legitimately ask the question, “Is it the case te and share facts about make-believe domains gives such that Darth Vader = Robin Hood?” and be answered cor- facts an intersubjective quality; they become part of our rectly with the sentence, “No, that is not the case”. Frege shared socio-cultural knowledge. The more people that fails to explain why this is the case and therefore fails to share the pretense the more “objective” it gets. Domains account for all uses of empty names. In the next part, I’ll can be established by a group over time through a series of try to accommodate, inspired by Evans’ discussion on “ga- conventions deciding what is true and what is false of that mes of make-believe” (1982:353–372) and Sainsbury on domain. Examples of this are Greek and Norse mytholo- fictional names (1999:243–269), this intuitive understan- gies. Of course, the Greeks thought that their mythology ding of empty names.9 described reality. According to Frege’s analysis, when dis- covering that the names of the Greek gods are empty we Part III – A solution for empty names do not judge statements about them as false, but neither Let’s look at two statements containing an empty name: true nor false. So, the statement “Zeus lives on Mount Olympus” becomes neither true nor false. According to the alternative solution just discussed, we would say that it (1)Odysseus was set ashore on Ithaca while sound asleep. remains true within a make-believe representation of rea- (2)Odysseus was not set ashore on Ithaca while sound asleep. lity. Now we can explicate this as, “’Zeus lives on Mount Olympus’ is true in the domain described by Greek myt- According to Frege, it is only possible to determine the hology”. And we might as well say, counter to Frege, that truth-values of such statements if the presupposition ‘Zeus lives on Mount Olympus’ is false or fails to say11 “There exists such an x that x = Odysseus” is true. Only anything about reality because there is no object such as then can we judge if it is true or false that the thought Zeus. This, I believe, is a better solution to the problem obtains (1997:157).10 If no such x really exists then both of empty names than Frege’s own since it fits better with sentences are neither true nor false.