ISSUE BRIEF 04.27.18 A Doomed Relationship: Ennahdha and Salafism

Sabrina Zouaghi, M.A., Laval University, Quebec, Canada Francesco Cavatorta, Ph.D., Laval University, Quebec, Canada

to the retreat of many young people from INTRODUCTION various forms of political participation. While Having weathered a period of volatility it is difficult to measure how large this after President Ben ’s sudden downfall, contingent is, there is evidence to suggest ’s main political and social actors that young people in Tunisia under 30 years saw in the mechanisms of a procedural of age are not as invested in elections and the solution to their ideological electoral politics as their counterparts in and organizational problems. This coincided other states transitioning to democracy, with the will of the majority of Tunisians and such as South Africa in the early 1990s. For the hopes of the international community instance, the voter turnout for young people for the country’s stability. Yet success in this decreased 11 percentage points between process has led to the marginalization and Tunisia’s 2011 and 2014 elections (Yerkes exclusion of Salafism1—which represented 2017). While many young Salafis might have a considerable number of Tunisia’s other reasons not to participate in electoral marginalized youth—from the public sphere. politics, such as ideological ones, their Building on fieldwork carried out in 2015 marginalization and official exclusion from and 2017, this brief provides an overview social and political activism nonetheless of the complex relationship between compounds the problem of low youth While the narrative Ennahdha2 and Tunisian Salafism, and interest in Tunisia’s formal political process. regarding the explains why and how Ennahdha “betrayed” At the peak of Salafi mobilization in 2011 and close relationship 2012, up to 30,000 people—mostly young its Salafist constituency. We argue that between mainstream while Ennahdha’s actions have had positive men—participated in the Kairouan annual consequences for the stabilization of congress of the largest in Islamists and Salafis is Tunisia’s political system and contributed the country. certainly an important to reducing the perceived polarization Similarly, democratic consolidation aspect of the transition has yet to deal with the causes that led between Islamists and laics, they have also to democracy in prevented Salafi associations and groups to to the rise of Salafism in the first place. voice legitimate grievances through radical Salafism is considered both an expression Tunisia, it tends to discourse and actions within a clear legal of socio-economic malaise and a tool of misrepresent the goals framework (Merone 2017). revolutionary mobilization that has a far of both Ennahdha and greater political dimension than one that is Relatively speaking, the issue of the Salafis. Salafism remains on the margins of current strictly religious or doctrinal. The majority debates on Tunisian politics. However, it is of Salafis in Tunisia were active in Ansar a central concern for the evolution of the al-, a Salafist movement with clear country’s relationship between and jihadi and revolutionary undertones that politics for several reasons. The official ban adapted to a transitional situation specific on Salafist discourses and practices that to Tunisia. Another movement, Political came into effect in the summer of 2013 led Salafism, emerged quickly in 2011 after RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.27.18

the fall of Ben Ali and attempted to make persuasions were motivated to act—to avoid inroads in parliament, but failed to mobilize passively witnessing what they perceived enough supporters to gain any elected could be the descent of post-revolutionary seats. A third movement, quietist Salafism Tunisia into a state based on un-Islamic (also referred to as scientific Salafism), built democratic pillars and corrupt morals (Grami on the institutions and networks that had 2014). The Salafis’ mobilization and activism emerged in the later years of the Ben Ali reflected their ideological leanings. During regime, positioning itself as an intermediary the elected assembly’s work to draft a new between the state and revolutionary constitution, Salafis pushed their agenda for Salafism. Its success was modest, however, a post-revolutionary Tunisia: a redefinition and revolutionary Salafis labeled quietist of tunisianité—or national identity—that and scholars as “Salafi lights” to included a major role for (Merone suggest that they did not have a genuine 2014). This would be achieved by recognizing attachment to a radical interpretation of the sharia as the sole source of legislation in the and the politics derived from it. new constitution: “we have the and the sunna that give us an alternative: with our religion we can dominate the world, just THE SALAFISTS’ AGENDA FOR like we used to in the past” (Merone 2013). POST-REVOLUTIONARY TUNISIA In their vision, sharia would halt corruption and redistribute wealth: “where there is The quietist form of Salafism that originated sharia, there is a complete program—no during Ben Ali’s regime was tolerated by more divisions, injustice” (Marks 2013). the authorities for two reasons: From an Salafi groups used top-down (institutional ideological standpoint, quietist Salafism Ennahdha was more changes) and bottom-up (societal changes) favored the political status quo and did not strategies similar to those employed by the committed to building constitute a challenge to the regime. From more traditional Islamist movements during democratic institutions a more pragmatic perspective, the regime the 1980s and 1990s (Roy 1992). The main wanted to increase its religious legitimacy than to maintaining its goal was the Salafization of society through and respond to popular demands for a links with the Salafis, dawa (proselytizing). greater role of religion in society (Personal In the early stages of the transition to as Ennahdha had communication with former Ennahdha MP, democracy, it seemed that the Salafis would abandoned its radical March 2017; Zeghal 2013; Haugbølle 2015) handle “street politics” to generate support without permitting a politicized form of Islamist agenda in for a greater role of religion in guiding public it. Quietist Salafism is apolitical; therefore, the 1990s. policies, while Ennahdha would take care of it appealed to the Ben Ali regime. Similar “institutional politics” to lay the groundwork decisions to tolerate and even encourage to legally take over the country. This was quietist Salafism were made in , Jordan, a popular interpretation of Islamist politics Morocco, and Algeria during the 2000s. among secular, nationalist commentators Historically, Salafism has been divided and politicians (Sayah 2012). Yet it was a in terms of its relationship to institutional fundamental misreading of both the Salafis— politics and how the goal of the Islamic particularly Ansar al-Sharia—and Ennahdha, state should be achieved (Wiktorowicz as their relationship was much more 2006 Revolutionary and politicized Salafi complex and conflicted. groups emerged in Tunisia in the aftermath Initially, Salafis lacked political of the general amnesty law3 adopted on representation in the National Constituent February 19, 2011. The new public freedoms, Assembly because no Salafi party was together with the return of Ennahdha registered to participate in the 2011 to political prominence, represented an legislative elections, and no independent opportunity for Salafi groups to mobilize candidates from the government-legalized and play a long-denied public role through Jabhat Al-Islah4 were elected. In the the creation of civil society associations, Salafis’ search for a powerful ally against political parties, and individual initiatives secular parties, it seemed that Ennahdha (Cavatorta 2015). Salafis of all ideological could fill the role, particularly through its 2 A DOOMED RELATIONSHIP: ENNAHDHA AND SALAFISM

more conservative and traditionalist wing featuring Mohamed Hassan, a controversial represented by MPs such as Sadok Chourou Egyptian preacher (Business News 2013). and Habib Ellouze (International Crisis Group These examples underscore the fact that 2013). At the same time (according to a Salafis attempted to be closer to Ennahdha personal interview with a former Ennahdha irrespective of whether they recognized the MP), Ennahdha was trying to broaden its legitimacy of involvement in formal politics. voter base and to delegate tasks it could not While the narrative regarding the close perform as a major, credible elected political relationship between mainstream Islamists party—tasks such as filling the streets with and Salafis is certainly an important aspect young men demanding “the impossible,” i.e., of the transition to democracy in Tunisia, the creation of a sharia-based it tends to misrepresent the goals of both (Cavatorta 2015). Accordingly, we observe Ennahdha and the Salafis. Ennahdha’s that both Ennahdha and Salafis professing strategy of inclusion was based on the a range of ideologies had interests that idea that Salafis should take part in the With time, it became coincided, and they worked together to transitional process in order to moderate clear that whatever an extent for what appear to be different the Salafis’ discourses through interactions links the Salafis had ends. In other words, both ostensibly had a with political movements of different with Ennahdha would common objective (the of the political persuasions (personal interview state through sharia), seemed to belong to with a former member of Ennahdha’s be severed once the the same ideological family, and played a politburo, March 2017) and to avoid their latter announced its complementary role in post-revolutionary marginalization in society. Ennahdha intention to refuse the Tunisia. In reality, Ennahdha wanted as many considered dialogue to be the only way to insertion of sharia in the votes and as much support as it could gather correct the Salafis’ strict, narrow religious constitution draft, and outside the assembly in order to negotiate interpretations (Greenberg 2015). Ennahdha from a position of strength with the elected also believed that the marginalization that violent episodes representatives of secular ideologies, all the of Salafism would represent a national attributed to Salafis while being fully aware that the most radical security threat and that the conciliatory and would increase. Islamist demands would never be accepted pragmatic path Ennahdha followed during by its prospective institutional partners. For its political integration in the 1990s and its part, Ansar al-Sharia wanted institutional 2000s was the best way forward. Ennahdha and political outcomes that were often was more committed to building democratic at odds with the will of the majority of institutions than maintaining its links with Tunisians and were ultimately unpalatable to the Salafis, as Ennahdha had abandoned its Rachid Ghannouchi’s party. radical Islamist agenda in the 1990s (Allani Joint participation in various activities 2009; Cavatorta and Merone 2013) and had such as demonstrations, political meetings, made it clear after the fall of Ben Ali that Ansar al-Sharia gatherings, and religious it would honor the agreement made with conferences reinforced the perception other opposition parties in October 2005 to of a close relationship between Salafis participate in the construction of a liberal- and Ennahdha. For example, a large democratic order in partnership with secular demonstration on March 16, 2012, featured and nationalist movements equally opposed various Islamist actors: “political” Salafis to Ben Ali’s rule. from Jabhat Al- (Zelin 2012b); Ennahdha Three reasons stand out for rejecting the members, including MPs Sahbi Atig and idea that there was a united Habib Ellouze; representatives from the of Ennahdha and the Salafis in opposition Tunisian Front of Islamic Associations; and to the secularists. First, the preservation of quietist Salafis (Radio-Canada 2012; AFP Ennahdha’s organization was paramount for 2012). Ghannouchi attended the founding the vast majority of decision-makers within congress of Jabhat Al-Islah; likewise, he the party and a successful transition to attended two Ansar al-Sharia official democracy was the only way to guarantee gatherings, along with fellow party members it, particularly after the Egyptian military Sadok Chourou and Habib Ellouze. The latter coup. Netterstrøm’s (2015) investigation two were also present during a conference of how the party’s leadership went about 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.27.18

convincing ordinary members and activists (Guazzone 2013), including “the leftists, of the necessity to drop the issue of sharia the Marxists, and the very secular elites” in the new constitution makes this clear. (Personal interviews with sitting Ennahdha Second, ideological change had taken MPs, March 2017). Such a move would also place within the party over time. It had create a “red line” that its political partners, become more moderate for years, and the Congrès pour la République (CPR)—a securing a smooth transition away from center-left secular political party—and the Ben Ali regime had been a priority. The Ettakatol, a social democratic political party, relative strength of the Salafis could be could not cross. Thus, the party’s , or employed to put pressure on other parties consulting council, issued a statement on during the negotiations over the text of March 26, 2012, confirming its commitment The radicalism the new constitution, but a successful to preserve Article 1 of Tunisia’s 1959 of Salafism was transition to democracy with the party as constitution as it stood. The article states marginalized in favor of one of its central actors was more of a that Islam is Tunisia’s religion, but it does a pragmatic approach priority than adhering to the radical Salafi not mention that its precepts should be to political change— agenda. Ennahdha’s priorities and interest employed as a source of legislation. in governing can be seen in its participation For their part, the Salafis saw the refusal but the success of the in a grand coalition with the secular Nidaa to insert sharia in the constitution as “giving liberal-democratic Tounes party following the 2014 elections, nothing to them” (Personal interview with institutions that despite the potential costs to Ennahdha. former Ennahdha MP, March 2017). This Ennahdha played a Third, Ennahdha represented a social class development, as anticipated, represented that had very little interest in radical and the breaking point in the relationship significant part in revolutionary change when it came to between the Salafis and Ennahdha. Indeed, creating has not led socio-economic issues (Merone 2014). This it led to profound disappointment and to improvements social class wanted to be integrated into the frustration among Salafis toward Ennahdha in Tunisia’s socio- state and “share” in the project of national because many considered the party to construction from which they had been belong to a common Islamist front for the economic conditions. excluded since Tunisia’s independence Islamization of state and society (Personal from France in the 1950s. Like its political interview with former Ennahdha MP, representative, Ennahdha, this middle-class March 2017). In addition, there existed a social bloc had no interest in subverting the certain level of misunderstanding on the socio-economic order. part of political actors and commentators With time, it became clear that as to what Salafis wanted and stood for. whatever links the Salafis had with This was because the Salafis’ ideological Ennahdha would be severed once the boundaries had not been clearly identified latter announced its intention to refuse and Salafis themselves, for several reasons, the insertion of sharia in the constitution had difficulty expressing—beyond easy draft, and that violent episodes attributed sloganeering—what they wanted. to Salafis would increase. In this complex First, the complexity of the Salafi situation, many within Ennahdha maintained political landscape was underestimated in a pragmatic approach, a moderate discourse, political circles in Tunisia and abroad. While and a long-term vision (Personal interview some Salafis—the so-called politicos— with member of Ennahdha, March 2017) disagreed with Ennahdha on the issue of when it came to the Salafis. Some within the sharia, they did not break entirely with party had argued for Ennahdha to walk back institutional politics. Instead, they promoted from its position on sharia, and to instead their radical policy positions (such as the push for its addition to the constitution creation of a morality police) in the free because it could represent a potential market of ideas created during electoral political gain in the 2014 elections (Personal campaigns, although they failed to elect a interview with former constituent Ennahdha single representative. MP, March 2017). However, the “costs” were Second, Ansar al-Sharia represented deemed too high, i.e., a polarized society a social bloc that did not seek inclusion around pro- and anti-sharia contingents in the state. Instead, it called for the 4 A DOOMED RELATIONSHIP: ENNAHDHA AND SALAFISM

dismantlement of the liberal-democratic Ennahdha MP, March 2017). Notwithstanding institutional system being created because the criticism leveled against it, Ennahdha the group had never benefited from it, and advocated for democracy and women’s would not do so if a compromise on the rights, notably by campaigning for a Code of concept of tunisianité were to be reached Personal Status that would establish equality through liberal-democratic institutions. between men and women in many areas, A “continuation of the revolution through and against polygamy (Personal interview Salafism” found support in areas of the with current Ennahdha MP, March 2017). country that had always been marginalized and deprived of socio-economic opportunities (Lamloum and Ben 2016). CONCLUSION In many ways, the relationship between Contrary to the expectations of those who the Salafis, in particular those linked to Ansar observe Tunisian politics, the relationship al-Sharia, and Ennahdha was doomed from between Ennahdha and the Salafis was the start. The vitriol following the ban on destined for failure. Religious and doctrinal Ansar al-Sharia is testimony to that. Salafis differences between the two were not began issuing several virulent critiques only profound, but they also masked a toward Ennahdha and its deputies when it class conflict of sort. While Ennahdha became apparent in mid-2013 that Ansar finds support among the pious bourgeoisie, al-Sharia’s legal status would be withdrawn Salafis are strong in disenfranchised and that Ennahdha would drop them in working class areas where citizens are favor of consolidating its ties with Tunisian much more interested in material gains political actors committed to the new and the subversion of the social order, as liberal-democratic order (Personal interview promised by the revolution. The radicalism with current Ennahdha MP, March 2017). of Salafism was marginalized in favor of Salafism offers different The Salafis’ scathing critiques recounted a pragmatic approach to political change the numerous concessions Ennahdha had paths of mobilization, in the post-Ben Ali era—but the success made to save the troïka government5 and and a radical political of the liberal-democratic institutions former members of Ben Ali’s party. Such that Ennahdha played a significant part agenda could compromises collided with the Islamist in creating has not led to improvements re-emerge in the face mission, according to Salafis. Salafis also in Tunisia’s socio-economic conditions. accused Ennahdha of being a puppet of of Tunisia’s current This failure threatens to undermine the the West and Israel (Personal interview social and economic consolidation of democracy and suggests with former Ennahdha MP, March 2017), that while Salafism might have disappeared difficulties. focusing on its own interests as a “normal” from the public scene, many of the reasons political entity rather than on promoting why a large number of young people Islamic values in politics (Boukhars 2017). looked to it for revolutionary purity and Accompanying this criticism were public inspiration have not. For the moment, Salafi denunciations of Ennahdha members by revolutionary radicalism is manifested in Salafis—an attempt to delegitimize the isolated acts of political violence, but armed religious credentials of Ennahdha’s ideology is unlikely to topple Tunisia’s and suggest that the party’s progressive democratic institutions. Of much greater principles contradicted the values of Islam concern is the widespread dissatisfaction (Personal interview with current Ennahdha with the lack of socio-economic progress, MP, March 2017). Finally, Ennahdha’s particularly among young people. Salafism deputies were labeled atheists, traitors, and offers different paths of mobilization, and kuffar (nonbelievers) (Personal interviews a radical political agenda could re-emerge with current Ennahdha MPs, March 2017). in the face of Tunisia’s current social and At the same time, Ennahdha escalated its economic difficulties. In light of this, both anti-Salafi discourse to distance itself from domestic and international actors interested Salafis, stating the latter were “intruders in the stability of the Tunisian regime should in Islam” and “extreme among extreme not take the defeat of Salafism for granted. individuals” (Personal interview with current 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.27.18

Greenberg, Nathaniel. 2015. “The Rise and ENDNOTES Fall of Abu ‘Iyadh: Reported Death 1. Salafism is an ultraconservative and Leaves Questions Unanswered.” literalist interpretation of Islam. Jadaliyya, July 13, 2015. http://www. 2. Ennahdha is the main Tunisian jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22176/the- Islamist party. It has now become the party rise-and-fall-of-abu-‘iyadh_reported- of Muslim democrats and has officially death-lea. separated its religious and political activities. Guazzone, Laura. 2013. “Ennahdha Islamists 3. Amnesty legislation came into effect and the Test of Government in Tunisia.” in February 2011 and allowed for the release The International Spectator: Italian of all political prisoners incarcerated during Journal of International Affairs 48 (4): the Ben Ali regime. 30–50. 4. Jabhat Al-Islah is a Salafi party Haugbølle, Rikke Hostrup. 2015. “New that opted to participate in democratic Expressions of Islam in Tunisia: An institutional politics. Ethnographic Approach.” The Journal of 5. The first post-Ben Ali elected North African Studies 20 (3): 319–35. government was a coalition of three parties— International Crisis Group. 2013. “Tunisie: Ennahdha, Ettakatol, and CPR—commonly violences et défi salafiste” (Tunisia: referred to as the troïka. Violence and the Salafi Challenge). Middle East/North Africa Report no. 137, . REFERENCES Lamloum, Olfa and Mohamed Ali Ben Zina. 2016. Les jeunes de Douar Hich er et Allani, Alaya. 2009. “The Islamists in d'Ettadhamen: Une enquête sociologique Tunisia Between Confrontation and (The young people of Douar Hicher and Participation: 1980–2008.” The Journal Ettadhamen: A sociological inquiry). of North African Studies 14 (2): 257–72. Tunis: . Boukhars, Anouar. 2017. “The fragility of “Manifestation pro-charia en Tunisie” (Pro- elite settlement in Tunisia.” African sharia demonstration in Tunisia). 2012. Security Review 26 (3): 257–70. Radio-Canada with Agence France- Business News. 2013.“Tunisie? Le prédicateur Presse, March 16, 2012. http://radio- Mohamed Hassen remplit la coupole canada.ca/nouvelle/554029/tunisie- d’El Menzah.” April 30. https://bit. islamistes-salafiste. ly/2HNkmYG. Marks, Monica. 2013. “Youth Politics and Cavatorta, Francesco. 2015. “Salafism, Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Liberalism and Democratic Learning Jihadi Current.” Mediterranean Politics in Tunisia.” Journal of North African 18 (1): 104–11. Studies 20 (5): 1–14. Merone, Fabio. 2017. “Between social Cavatorta, Francesco and Fabio Merone. contention and takfirism: the evolution 2013. “Moderation through exclusion? of the Salafi-jihadi movement in Tunisia.” The journey of the Tunisian Ennahdha Mediterranean Politics 22 (1): 71–90. from fundamentalist to conservative Merone, Fabio. 2014. “Enduring Class party.” Democratization 20 (5): 857–75. Struggle in Tunisia: The Fight for Identity Ghannouchi, Rachid. 2016. “The evolution beyond .” British Journal of Political Islam during the transition.” of Middle Eastern Studies 42 (1): 74–87. In The Constitution of Tunisia: Part 2 Merone, Fabio. 2013. “Salafism in Tunisia: (New York: United Nations Development An Interview with a Member of Ansar Programme), 173–82. al-Sharia.” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013. Grami, Amel. 2014. “The Debate on Religion, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/ Law and Gender in Post-Revolution index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_ Tunisia.” Philosophy and Social Criticism an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 40 (4–5): 391–400. 6 A DOOMED RELATIONSHIP: ENNAHDHA AND SALAFISM

Netterstrøm, Kasper. 2015. “The Islamists’ Compromise in Tunisia.” Journal of AUTHORS Democracy 26 (4): 111–24. Sabrina Zouaghi, M.A., obtained a joint Roy, Olivier. 1992. “Les voies de la master's degree in international relations ré-islamisation” (The ways of and in law at Laval University in Quebec, re-Islamization), Pouvoirs 62: 81–91. Canada. Her research project examined Watanabe, Lisa and Fabien Merz. 2017. the role of Salafi movements during the “Tunisia’s Jihadi problem and how to deal transition to democracy in Tunisia. This issue brief is part with it.” Middle East Policy 24 (4): 136–47. of a two-year research Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2006. “Anatomy of Francesco Cavatorta, Ph.D., is an project on pluralism in the Salafi Movement.” Studies in Conflict associate professor of political science at the Middle East after & Terrorism 29 (2): 207–40. Laval University in Quebec, Canada. His research focuses on democratization and the Arab uprisings. Wolf, Anne. 2017–2018. “Beyond the in the Arab world; political The project is generously ‘Revolution’: authoritarian revival and parties and Islamist movements; and elite reconfiguration in Tunisia.” The supported by a grant international relations in the Arab world. Middle East in 14 (1): 12–13. from the Carnegie He received a Ph.D. in political science Yerkes, Sarah. 2017. Young people are staying from Trinity College in Dublin, Ireland, and Corporation of New York. away from Tunisian politics—here’s why. a master’s in international relations from Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, Syracuse University. March 20. https://www.brookings. edu/blog/markaz/2017/03/20/young- people-are-staying-away-from- tunisian-politics-heres-why/.

Zeghal, Malika. 2013. “Competing Ways See more issue briefs at: of Life: , Secularism, and www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs Public Order in the Tunisian Transition.” Constellations 20 (2): 254–74. This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who Zelin, Aaron. 2012a. “Tunisia’s Contentious participated in a Baker Institute project. Transition.” Al-Wasat, August 23. Wherever feasible, this research is https://thewasat.wordpress.com/ reviewed by outside experts before it is category/hizb-ut-tahrir-tunisia/. released. However, the views expressed herein are those of the individual ——— . 2012b. Who is Jabhat Al-Islah? author(s), and do not necessarily New York: Carnegie Endowment represent the views of Rice University’s for International Peace, July 18. Baker Institute for Public Policy. http://carnegieendowment.org/ sada/?fa=48885. © 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy

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Cite as: Zoughaghi, Sabrina, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2018. A Doomed Relationship: Ennahdha and Salafism. Issue brief no. 04.27.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

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