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Implications of Foucault's Parrhesia EJBO Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies Vol. 17, No. 2 (2012) Can we organize courage? Implications of Foucault’s parrhesia Wim Vandekerckhove 1. Introduction order to manage the cattle. A shepherd Suzan Langenberg without self-criticism is not able to take As the financial crisis unfolded, it be- care of his cattle. The strength of the cat- came clear that many people inside the tle depends on the shepherd’s attention Abstract financial sector were aware of the risks for the smallest detail. Ethics in organizations, raising they were taking. We also heard of the In this paper we approach the issue of concerns, and whistleblowing rare individual who tried to raise his con- ‘standing up’ and raising concerns from have been previously theorized cerns with the SEC about Madoff. But Foucault’s third period – his writings on it was amazing how many people wilfully parrhesia, a concept of critique from an- through Foucault’s work on the played along, and how the few individu- cient Greece which denotes the courage power/knowledge bond. However, als who raised concerns were blocked or of speaking frankly and where the truth approaching these issues through overlooked. lies not necessarily in what is being said, the work from Foucault’s third Obviously, this is not the only cause of but rather in the fact that someone is period on parrhesia, or fearless the crisis. Moreover, it is not an exclusive taking the courage to speak and express speech remains an underdeveloped characteristic of the latest crisis. But the critique. organizational dynamic which appears to Whilst some authors argue that route. This paper contributes to this silence internal strategic dissent, despite there is a clear consistency throughout emerging research stream. Based internal policies encouraging critique, is Foucault’s three periods, during the on Foucault’s work on parrhesia, quite worrisome in terms of redesigning years before his sudden death in 1984, and the importance of courage internal risk management procedures. Foucault refocused his research away for fearless speech to occur, we Why does it seem like employees do from the analysis of power towards theorize the possibility of critique not stand up even when they have the what he saw as the kingpin of western formal power to do so? Why is it that culture, namely the obligation towards within organizations as a moment attempts to raise concern frequently re- truth (Foucault 1984). We seem to care of disorganizing, which requires main unheard? Is it possible to design more about truth than about the self, and a chain of parrhesia where not procedures that lift the empowerment to we seem to care about the self only as a only the speaker but also the stand up and raise concern beyond for- concern about truth. Foucault clarified hearer requires courage. The paper mal power? his position towards modern, western examines the possibility and risks of A vast stream of research has devel- analyses of truth through an elaboration oped that approaches these questions of the concept of critique. In practicing organizing courage through three from the perspective of the organization resistance towards a dominating truth, illustrations of ethical guidelines, as a site where the foucauldian knowl- a personal truth emerges. Any utterance whistleblowing, and open dialogue. edge/power bind operates (Burrell et al of critique is speaking a personal truth 1995 Calas and Smircich 1999; Carter et (hence the acknowledgement of the sub- Keywords al 2002; Clegg 1990, 1994; Knights 2002; ject) but this is done in an organizational McKinlay and Starkey 1997). Foucault’s context which is a relational and commu- Parrhesia, whistleblowing, business analysis of the concept of critique, first nicative reality. Thus critique in organi- ethics, courage in a lecture in 1978, followed by two zations appears as an interactive truth. It in-depth analyses in 1984, moves away will be heard or overheard, accepted or from the concept of the power/knowl- retaliated against, taken seriously or used edge bind. In his so-called third period, against the person who spoke critique. In Foucault moves to his original philo- foucauldian parlance, an interactive truth sophical area of attention, namely the appears through the critical judgements critical relation of truth with the subject which are part of a power game embed- and speech. The power/knowledge bind ded in the organizational praxis. did not leave any room for the judging In this paper, we analyse the topic of and speaking subject. However, Foucault raising a concern within organizations. re-acknowledged the subject in his work Our focus is on the relational quality of on parrhesia. There, the subject is the interactions, rather than mere actions. active rather than the passive element in Moreover, the aim of our analysis in this an event. A first indication of such re-ac- paper is to gain insight into the organiza- knowledgement can be noted in his con- tional structuring of those interactions. cept of pastoral power (Foucault 1994: The contribution of this paper is two- 134-161), where Foucault describes pas- fold. First, previous research on ‘raising toral power as a power that can only work concerns’ has mainly focused on actions when the shepherd risks his own life in rather than interactions. Research on 35 http://ejbo.jyu.fi/ EJBO Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies Vol. 17, No. 2 (2012) whistleblowing has focused on the person blowing the whistle Practicing critique is transgressive. It questions the primacy (who blows the whistle and about what), rather than interac- of objective truth. Critique has an unbounding effect on exist- tions between those who raise a concern and those with whom a ing limits to knowledge. Hence critique connects power and concern is raised (Vandekerckhove 2010; Vandekerckhove and truth to the subject. To the extent that power-knowledge binds Lewis 2012). shape the subject, the truth of those power-knowledge binds Second, although ethics in organizations, raising concerns, (objective truth) are inaccessible to that subject. Where the and whistleblowing have been previously theorized through subject distances itself (de-subjectification or désassujettisse- Foucault’s work on the power/knowledge bond (Alford 2001, ment) from proclaimed personal truths-as-shaped-by-power- Perry 1998, Teo and Caspersz 2011, Vandekerckhove 2006), knowledge, power and objective truth become accessible. These this paper aims at creating an understanding of these issues moments are moments of critique. They are moments in which through Foucault’s work on parrhesia, an as yet rarely taken the subject gives itself the right to question knowledge through route into this issue (Barratt 2004, French 2007, Mansbach its power effects, and to question power through its knowledge 2011, Skinner 2011). As Foucault has left his work on parrhe- discourses. In this sense, Foucault inserts critique as a moral sia underdeveloped, the analysis offered in this paper through attitude to acknowledge the subtle and vulnerable practices of conceptual work and illustrated by document analysis and power between truth and the subject (Foucault 1978). interview-based research, points at a route to further develop The etymology of critique leads us back to the Greek be- Foucault’s concept of parrhesia as a framework for research in tween 200 B.C. and 400 A.D. Krinein means to separate, to the field of organization studies. distinguish and to decide. From krinein the word krisis was The paper develops these contributions as follows. The next derived, which means in ancient Greek: decision, judgment, re- section sets out our reading of Foucault on parrhesia. Section search, outcome. In the history of philosophy the concept of three presents our conceptual expansion of parrhesia. We argue critique evolved along two separate lines: (1) the power of judg- that parrhesia (frankly speaking truth) not only requires cour- ment and discernment of the human mind has been used by age from the parrhesiastes, but also from the hearer, who in turn the Stoa in text-research and the allegorical explanation of text, becomes parrhesiastes. Section four offers three illustrations of and (2) a dialectic (opposed to rhetoric) doctrine of judgment our expanded parrhesia framework. We use the framework to or truth. Foucault’s work on parrhesia tries to dig up a radi- discuss a document analysis of guidelines for the implementa- cal conceptualization of critique, undoing the alterations of the tion of whistle-blowing policies (example 1), how the organiza- meaning of critique throughout history (for a more thorough tion of free speech went on at a steel company (example 2), and historical analysis see Langenberg 2008). One such derivation the analysis of a case of sexual harassment (example 3). Section might be the appearance of contractual parrhesia. For example, five concludes by returning to our main question, is it possi- under the Hellenic monarchs, the king's advisor was required ble to design procedures so that the empowerment to stand up to use parrhesia not only to help the king make decisions, but and raise concern goes beyond formal power? Drawing from also as a means of tempering his power (Mansbach 2011). The previous sections and our expanded parrhesia framework, we examples we provide of our notion of the parrhesiastic chain conclude that organizing courage involves the courage to dis- in organizations, which we develop in this paper, illustrate the organize. risk contractual parrhesia entails with regard to the meaning of critique. 2. Foucault’s take on parrhesia After more than a thousand years the word ‘parrhesia’ as di- rectly related to the concept of critique, had disappeared. In the Foucault is known mostly for his work on the knowledge/power late Middle Ages it appeared again as text critique with the rise bind, tracing how the locus of power came to be the organized of humanism and its critical position towards the domination cognitive boundaries of what qualifies as knowledge.
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