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Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network

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Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network MARCH 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 3 New York Times even called the arrests a number of strategically significant cities, “strategic coup for Pakistan” because it Untangling the Punjabi such as the garrison city of Rawalpindi, restores control over the Taliban, draws Taliban Network Lahore, Multan and Gujranwala. applause from the United States and Moreover, the country’s civil and even releases U.S. money.23 By Raheel Khan military recruits are drawn mainly from the province. Any destabilization Conclusion since 2006, pakistan has been victim to of Punjab Province would have dire For Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban remain rising terrorist violence from a nexus of ramifications for Pakistan and would a card to be played after an expected militant factions consisting of al-Qa`ida, also endanger international coalition departure of most Western troops from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and operations in Afghanistan.6 Afghanistan. The arrests epitomize fighters from Punjab-based militant the ISI’s strategic manipulation of groups.1 All three entities share a The threat has become increasingly its assets in Afghanistan and might common, violent Islamist ideology, and serious. In September 2008, alleged result in the emergence of an entirely they have solidified bonds in response to militants of Punjabi origin were new Taliban leadership that would Pakistan limiting its operations against interrogated in the wake of the al- replace the founders’ generation.24 The Indian-administered Kashmir, while Qa`ida-linked Marriott Hotel bombing new leadership would be composed at the same time expanding operations in Islamabad that killed more than 50 of unknown and likely younger, more against Pakistani Taliban factions in its people.7 On March 3, 2009, Punjabi radical newcomers trained in Pakistani northwest.2 These factors have caused militants attacked the visiting Sri madrasas. These militants would be less previously disparate groups to join Lankan cricket team in the Punjab in touch with Afghanistan’s realities together against a common enemy, the capital city of Lahore, killing eight than the older Taliban generation that Pakistani government, which is allied people.8 On March 30, 2009, a police participated in the anti-Soviet war, and with the United States and NATO in training center just outside Lahore they would be more prone to listening the “war on terrorism.” As a result of was attacked and eight people killed.9 to Pakistan’s military and intelligence these developments, Punjab Province The unprecedented assault on the services. They would, in effect, be the itself is increasingly at risk. Punjabi military’s General Headquarters (GHQ) real “neo-Taliban.” Pakistan’s “strategic militants have established cells across in the garrison city of Rawalpindi depth” strategy, which has officially the province, and according to security on October 10, 2009 displayed the been discarded, is very much alive. officials are running their own training growing sophistication and intent of the facilities in southern Punjab.3 The March network.10 Finally, on October 15, 2009, For Afghanistan, however, the arrests 12, 2010 twin suicide blasts that killed at three teams of militants launched a have at least temporarily closed the least 45 people in a high security area of coordinated assault in Lahore, attacking window of opportunity for direct talks Lahore underscored this concern.4 the regional headquarters of the Federal with the Afghan Taliban leadership. As Investigation Agency, the Manawan a result, the fighting in Afghanistan will Punjab Province is Pakistan’s most Police Training School, and the Elite continue and President Karzai’s peace critical region. Geographically, it is Police Academy; the combined assault jirga announced for mid-spring may run Pakistan’s heartland and the country’s killed more than 30 people.11 Attacks aground before it even begins. most populated province.5 It contains a have continued into 2010. Thomas Ruttig is a Co-Director and Senior 1 The Punjabi Taliban comprise members from a num- This nexus of militants has evolved Analyst of The Afghanistan Analysts ber of Punjab-based groups that were formerly focused significantly since it first emerged Network (AAN), an independent think- on Indian-administered Kashmir or on sectarian attacks in 2006-2007. Although the tank based in Kabul and Berlin. Since against the Shi`a community in Pakistan. The Pun- sophistication and intensity of their 1983, he has spent 10 years in Afghanistan, jabi Taliban include members from Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, among other assignments as head of the UN Jaysh-i-Muhammad and Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan— million people live in Punjab Province. Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) fighters from other Punjab-based groups may be in- 6 Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Eric office in Kabul in 2000-2001 under the volved as well. For more details, see Issam Ahmed, “Why Schmitt, “United Militants Threaten Pakistan’s Popu- Taliban regime. He speaks Pashtu and Pakistan’s Old Jehadis Pose New Threat—At Home and lous Heart,” New York Times, April 13, 2009. Dari. in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 7 The suspected militants were alleged members of 2009; Kachan Lakshman, “Heartland Trauma,” Kashmir Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam. For Herald, February 7, 2010; Raza Khan and Ayesha Nasir, details, see Amir Mir, “South Punjab Threat,” The News “Punjabi Taliban Threat is Growing, Pakistan Fears Shift International, October 25, 2009. For the al-Qa`ida-link, auffliegen,”Salzburger Nachrichten, February 17, 2010. in Control,” Washington Times, October 21, 2009. see “Pakistan al-Qaeda Leaders ‘Dead,’” BBC, January 9, 23 Carlotta Gall and Souad Mekhennet, “Arrest of Tali- 2 Pakistan’s northwest consists of the Federally Admin- 2009. ban Chief May Be Crucial for Pakistanis,” New York istered Tribal Areas and North-West Frontier Province. 8 Ibid. Also see “‘Cricket Attacker’ Held in Lahore,” Times, February 16, 2010. 3 Alex Rodriguez, “Taliban Taps the Punjab Heartland,” BBC, June 17, 2009. 24 Similarly, immediately before the Afghan presidential Los Angeles Times, November 16, 2009. 9 “Siege at Pakistan Police Academy,” BBC, March 30, elections of August 2009, the author received reports 4 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility for 2009. that the ISI had pressured Taliban commanders to go the attack. For details, see “At Least 37 Killed in Pakistan 10 “Six Soldiers, Four Assailants Killed in Attack on fight inside Afghanistan or otherwise be handed over Bombings,” CNN, March 12, 2010; “TTP Claim Lahore GHQ,” Dawn, October 10, 2009. to the United States and sent to the detention facility at Bombings; 39 Dead,” Geo TV, March 12, 2010. 11 Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Guantanamo Bay. 5 According to 1998 census numbers, approximately 72 Links,” New York Times, October 15, 2009. 7 MARCH 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 3 operations reached new levels in 2009, Based on rough estimates, more than This fact was revealed in October 2009, the higher frequency of attacks also 5,000 individuals from the seminaries in after Pakistani security forces arrested shed more clarity on the network. This southern and northern Punjab Province Iqbal and Gul Muhammad, purportedly article will revisit the formation of the joined terrorist training camps in North two high-ranking Punjabi Taliban Punjabi Taliban network and show and South Waziristan in the wake members. According to a journalist for how its disparate militant groups are of the military operation against Lal Pakistan’s Dawn, coordinating operations.12 Masjid.19 Fighters now part of this loose collaboration among Taliban factions The two, who were in charge of Merging the Agendas in Pakistan’s northwest and formerly militancy in Punjab, officials claim, From 2001-2006, militancy in Pakistan Kashmir- or sectarian-focused militants served as the link between Taliban’s was largely divided into two different in the east and northeast are now main leadership in Waziristan and agendas. In the country’s northwest referred to as the “Punjabi Taliban.”20 the increasingly threatening Punjabi region, Taliban factions focused on Restrained from continuing activities Taliban network, a grouping of fighting international and Afghan forces in Indian-held Kashmir, members of sectarian and Kashmir focused in Afghanistan, and other Western Punjab-based militant groups joined militant groups responsible for targets in Pakistan. To the east, Punjab- forces with the TTP and al-Qa`ida to the Taliban hits in Punjab and the based militant groups such as Lashkar- undertake joint operations in Pakistan. federal capital.24 i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba and Jaysh- As described by Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, i-Muhammad focused their attacks on an Islamabad-based analyst, Punjab Similarly, “Dr. Usman,” the alias of Indian forces in the disputed region has been turned into a “factory where the militant who was arrested during of Kashmir or on Shi`a Muslims in suicide bombers are produced. Punjab the October 2009 attack on Pakistan’s Pakistan.13 has become a major recruiting ground GHQ, was also reportedly a member of and hub for the planning of terrorist the TTP’s shura.25 In 2006-2007, however, this dynamic attacks, and it’s a human resource for was altered in response to Pakistan the fighting in Afghanistan.”21 Joint Operations ceasing support for militancy in Indian- Al-Qa`ida, the TTP and the Punjabi administered Kashmir.14 In response, Moreover, there is evidence that Taliban network have cooperated many
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