LaborHistory, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2001

TheTrade Union Unity League: American Communists and the Transitionto Industrial Unionism:1928± 1934*

EDWARDP. JOHANNINGSMEIER

The organization knownas the Trade UnionUnity League (TUUL) came intoformal existenceat anAugust 1929 conferenceof Communists and radical unionistsin Cleveland.The TUUL’s purposewas to create and nourish openly Communist-led unionsthat wereto be independent of the American Federation ofLabor in industries suchas mining, textile, steeland auto. When the TUUL was created, a numberof the CommunistParty’ s mostexperienced activists weresuspicious of the sectarian logic inherentin theTUUL’ s program. In Moscow,where the creation ofnew unions had beendebated by theCommunists the previous year, someAmericans— working within their establishedAFL unions—had argued furiously against its creation,loudly ac- cusingits promoters ofneedless schism. The controversyeven emerged openly for a time in theCommunist press in theUnited States. In 1934, after Žve years ofaggressive butmostly unproductiveorganizing, theTUUL wasformally dissolved.After the Comintern’s formal inauguration ofthe Popular Front in 1935 many ofthe same organizers whohad workedin theobscure and ephemeral TUULunionsaided in the organization ofthe enduring industrial unionsof the CIO. 1 Historiansof American labor andradicalism have had difŽculty detectingany legitimate rationale for thefounding of theTUUL. ItsŽ ve years ofexistence during the Žrstyears ofthe Depression have oftenbeen dismissed as an interlude of hopeless sectarianism, inspiredmore by directivesfrom Moscowthan by theneeds of American

*Thanks toEricSchneider, Janet Golden,Randall Miller,and BruceNelson for their comments on earlierdrafts. 1HarveyKlehr, The Heydayof American Communism (NewYork: Basic Books, 1984),38– 48, 118– 134; TheodoreDraper, “TheCommunists and the Miners,” Dissent (1972), 373; Communist,April 1928, 197–198; ibid.,July 1928,404– 405; Fraser Ottanelli, The Communist Partyof the United States: Fromthe Depression to WorldWar II (NewBrunswick: RutgersUniversity Press, 1991), 17– 48; James Matlesand James Higgins, Themand Us: Struggles ofa Rank andFile Union (EnglewoodCliffs: PrenticeHall, 1974), 29–36. The CP-led unions that werealready in existencebefore the TUULconference were: the National MinersUnion, the National TextileWorkers Industrial Union, the NeedleTrades Workers Industrial Union, and the Auto WorkersUnion. Theunions that wereformed under TUUL auspices after the conferencewere the MarineWorkers Industrial Union, the AgriculturalWorkers Industrial League (later the Canneryand AgriculturalWorkers Industrial Union), the PackinghouseWorkers Industrial Union (in some areascalled the Food and PackinghouseWorkers Industrial Union), the TobaccoWorkers Industrial Union, the Shoe and LeatherWorkers Industrial Union, the LaundryWorkers Industrial Union, the Metal WorkersIndustrial League, the TobaccoWorkers Industrial Union, and the SharecroppersUnion. Total membership levelsclaimed by the Communists forthe TUULvary from57,000 (claimed at founding, 1929)and 40,000(William Fosterestimate, 1932);(see Ottanelli, 27,Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism:The Con¯ict that ShapedAmerican Unions (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1977), 357–358).

ISSN0023-656Xprint/ ISSN1469-9702online/ 01/020159–20 Ó 2001Taylor & Francis Ltd onbehalfof The Tamiment Institute DOI: 10.1080/00236560120047743 160 E.P.Johanningsmeier workersand unionists. After all, theTUUL wasfounded only onemonth after the TenthPlenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in Moscow,where the leader ofthe Red International ofLabor Unions,Alekandr Lozovsky,proclaimed that existing trade unionsin theUnited States were mere “schoolsof capitalism” that couldnever achieve arevolutionary purpose.The period 1928–1934 wasone of relentless leftward pressure in theComintern and its afŽliated bodies,as Josef Stalin consolidatedhis powerin theSoviet apparatus andruthlessly purged the“ right”opposition to his domesticpolicies. The Comintern’s policies during this so-called“ Third Period”created difŽ culties for Communistunion activities not only in theUnited States, but also in GreatBritain, Czechloslovakia, Spain and Germany.2 Occasionally, it hasbeen possible to glimpse evidencefor adifferentinterpretation of theimportance ofthe TUUL andthe new “ red”unions that wereformed during the Third Period in theUnited States. Few could credibly denythat many key unionsin theAFL during thelate 1920s weremoribund or ineffective,unable to contest the termsof employment for industrial workersin any signiŽcant way. The Communists andthe TUUL, in their brave manifestoes,promised totake upthe task of“organizing theunorganized” in basic industries,an undertaking at whichthe AFL had failed miserably. Working outsideof the AFL, Communists were able toachieve leadership oflarge strikesin thetextile industryat Passaic,Gastonia, and New Bedford, and in the clothing industryin NewYork City.The resulting angry confrontations,like thosethat had beenled by theIndustrial Workers ofthe World (IWW) in thepre-war period, dramatically called intoquestion the AFL’ s craft-basedstructure. Moreover, during this period signiŽcant sentiment had developedamong workersin thebituminous coal Želdsof western Pennsylvania for anewunion to replace theonce-powerful UMW. The Communistsresponded by creating thedual National Miners’Union in 1928, monthsbefore the founding of the TUUL. The Communist-ledstrikes of the 1920s werebrutally if somewhatinefŽ ciently repressed.However, in anumberof different contexts,the organizers ofthe TUUL wereable todemonstrate that despitethe cautiousconservatism of Samuel Gompersand many socialist unionists,the vitally important ideal ofindustrial unionismretained a powerfulappeal toworkers in some industriesin thelate 1920s. The TUULtestedthe limits ofradical industrial unionism in anumberof American communitieson the eve of the Great Depression. 3

2For interpretationsemphasizing the futility ofthe TUULunions, seeKlehr, Draper, above, also Cochran, 43–81; Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years (Boston: Houghton-Mifin, 1960),12, 20– 28, 39, 140–141, 343, 379– 381, 386– 389. Kevin McDermott and JeremyAgnew, The Comintern: AHistory of International Communism (NewYork: St. Martin’s, 1977),103– 110. 3Thebest overview of the TUULis in Ottanelli, 17–48. On the activitiesof TUUL unions in particular industries,see Joshua Freeman, InTransit: The Transport WorkersUnion in New YorkCity (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1989), 51, 53, 86; Michael K. Honey, Southern Laborand Black CivilRights: Organizing MemphisWorkers (Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press, 1993), 52– 58; George J. Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American:Ethnicity, Culture andIdentity in Chicano LosAngeles (NewYork: Oxford UniversityPress, 1993), 235– 238; Dorothy Healeyand MauriceIsserman, Dorothy Healey Remembers:A Lifein the American Communist Party (NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press, 1990), 42– 58; Vicki Ruiz, Cannery Women/Cannery Lives (Albuquerque: Universityof New Mexico Press, 1987), 41– 57; Howard Kimmeldorf, Redsor Rackets: The Making ofRadical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront (Berkeley: Universityof California Press,1988), 81– 88; Cletus Daniel, Bitter Harvest (Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press,1981), 105– 166; Bruce Nelson, Workerson the Waterfront (Urbana: Universityof Illinois, 1988), 28–29, 86– 102, 269– 279; Gary Gerstle, Working-ClassAmericanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1989), 161– 162; Lizabeth Cohen, Making aNew Deal (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1990),296– 97; Albert Fried, Communismin America:A History in Documents (NewYork: Columbia TheTrade Union Unity League 161

The newTUUL unions and the strikes they ledattracted agreat deal ofattention among American writersand intellectuals. It wasduring theperiod ofaggressive organiz- ing by theTUUL that suchprominent cultural Žguresas Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos,Richard Wright, Waldo Frank, Malcolm Cowley,Edmund Wilson, and Lewis MumfordŽ rstbecame involved in themargins ofthe Communist movement. Because of itsoutlaw status, revolutionary rhetoric, andconfrontational tactics, the Communist party ofthe Third Period heldan attraction for many class-consciousintellectuals. 4 The Gastoniastrike aloneinspired six novels.A closereading ofthe proletarian novelsof the period hasled one recent critic toconclude that “thereis little basisto the common charge that theThird Period Marxist critics imposeda narrow,sectarian, or ultraleft deŽnition ofproletarian literature uponwriters in theorbit ofthe left.” 5 The recentopening ofthe ProŽ ntern, CPUSA, and Comintern archives makes it possibleto explore in more detail theorigins andfate of the TUUL, with its logic of Communist-ledindustrial unionism.Evidence from thesearchives suggeststwo conclu- sions.First, although thesudden shift in “line”which resulted in thecreation ofthe TUULin 1929 wasformally promulgated by theComintern, signiŽ cant support already existedwithin theCPUSA for this change.This supportderived from anumber ofCommunist organizers whothemselves often came outof an indigenous tradition of radical industrial unionismand who could argue persuasively for their perspectiveas a resultof the manifest failures ofCommunist trade unionpolicy during the1920s. Second,the TUUL unionsrepresented a signiŽcant advance over theprevious Com- munistpolicy of“boring from within”existing AFLtrade unions.Although meager in membership andresults, the TUUL helped to establish anewtype andstyle of Communistunionism, more suitedto the organization ofAfrican-Americans, women, andmass-production workers. This change in emphasis wasconsistent with later achievementsof Communist organizers operating within theCIO. 6

UniversityPress, 1997), 93– 226; Rick Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor:Black andWhite Workersin Chicago’sPackinghouses, 1904±1954 (Urbana: Universityof Illinois, 1997),112– 125; Carl Meyerhuber, Lessthan Forever (Selinsgrove,PA: Susquehanna UniversityPress, 1987), 109– 136; Roger Keeran, The Communist Partyand the Auto Workers’Union (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1980); Peggy Dennis, The Autobiography ofan American Communist (Berkeley:Creative Arts, 1977),35, 48, 51, 68, 131; James Barrettand Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson: American Radical (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh UniversityPress, 1981),33, 70, 58; Steve Rosswurm, ed., The CIO’sLeft-LedUnions (NewBrunswick: RutgersUniversity Press,1992) 10– 13; Rosemary Feurer,“ William Sentner,the UE,and Civic Unionism in St. Louis,” ibid., 96–100; James Prickett,“ NewPerspectives on AmericanCommunism and the Labor Movement,” ibid., 5–8. Perspectivesof Communist historians arein William Z.Foster, FromBryan to Stalin (New York: International, 1932);Philip S. Foner, The TUEL:1925± 1929 (NewYork: International, 1994),246– 292. On the American“ ideal”of industrial unionism on the eveof the Depression,and its redeŽnition in the 1930s,see Robert Zieger, The CIO (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press,1995), 14– 15, 83– 89. 4Paula Rabinowitz, Laborand Desire: Women in Revolutionary Fiction in Depression America (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press,1991), 29– 30. For the viewthat the party’s appeal to intellectualsduring the Third Periodwas largelysectarian and ephemeral, seeKlehr, 69– 84; Daniel Aaron, Writerson the Left (NewYork: Harcourt,Brace, 1961), 269– 279; for other perspectives see Barbara Foley, Radical Representations: Politics andForm in USProletarian Fiction from1929± 1941 (Durham: DukeUniversity Press, 1993);Alan Wald, Writing fromthe Left (NewYork: Verso,1994), 67– 84, 100– 113; Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboringof American Culture in the Twentieth Century (NewYork: Verso,1996). 5Thesix novels were: Mary Heaton Vorse, Strike!;Sherwood Anderson, Beyond Desire ;FieldingBurke, CallHome the Heart ;GraceLumpkin, To MakeMy Bread ; Myra Page, Gathering Storm ;William Rollins, The ShadowBefore .Barbara Foley, 128. 6James Green, The Worldof the Worker (NewYork: Hill and Wang, 1980),131– 132. On IWWorganizing effortsamong African-Americans,see: Sterling Spero and Abram Harris, The BlackWorker (New York: Atheneum, 1969),328– 336; Howard Kimmeldorf and Robert Penney,“ ‘Excluded’By Choice: Dynamics 162 E.P.Johanningsmeier

In order tofully understandthe shift in Communisttrade unionpolicy, which resultedin thecreation ofthe TUUL, it isimportant torecognize that sincethe foundingof the CPUSA in 1919 it had beena forum for seriousongoing debateover theaims andculture of radical unionismin theUnited States. Beginning in 1921, the ofŽcial “line”of theComintern and ProŽ ntern was that American labor radicals should focustheir effortson establishing inuence within theAFL. This had initially caused consternationand dismay among American advocatesof industrial unionism,many of whomwere former or presentmembers ofthe IWW whodetested the AFL as a hopelesslyreactionary organization. Yet,the Communists, dutifully echoing Lenin’s perspectiveon unions in Left-WingCommunism: AnInfantile Disorder (1920), ofŽcially renouncedthe separatist assumptionsof the IWW, whichwas traditionally opposedto theAFL and its emphasis onorganizing theskilled, relative secureworkers in thecrafts. Industrial unionismin America, according toany Wobbly, wouldcome about through militant organizing effortsamong theunskilled in basic industries,and could never developthrough “boring from within”the AFL. This idea wasnot forgotten by Communistorganizers in America in the1920s. 7 Nonetheless,in 1921, theCommunists, working through William Z.Fosterand his Trade UnionEducational League (TUEL), initiated acampaign todevelop momentumfor industrial unionismwithin theAFL. Foster was convinced that indus- trial unionismhad todevelop among theminority ofdirect-actionmilitants in already- establishedunions; his paradigm wasstill thepre-war “federation”movement on the railroads andthe Great Steel Strike, whichhe had helpedorganize in 1919. Foster joinedthe Communist Party in 1921, shortly after participating in theŽ rstcongress of theRed International ofLabor Unions(ProŽ ntern) in Moscow,which increased Žnancial supportfor his TUEL.Among someradicals in theUnited States, Foster was referredto as “ E.Z.”Foster for his idea that workerscould be moved to action merely by afewCommunists attaining inuential positionsin theotherwise timorous AFL bureaucracy. 8 ofInterracial Unionism on the Philadelphia Waterfront,1910– 1930,” International Laborand Working-ClassHistory ,51(Spring 1997).On CPunionism and African-Americanworkers in the 1920s, see:Philip S.Foner, OrganizedLabor and the BlackWorker (NewYork: International, 1974,1981), 193–196; Foner, History ofthe LaborMovement ofthe US ,Vol. 10(New York: International, 1994), 191–192; Philip Fonerand James Allen, American Communismand Black Americans:A Documentary History, 1919±1929 (Philadelphia: TempleUniversity Press, 1987), x– xvi. For diverseviews of the achievementsof the Communist and left-ledunions ofthe CIO era,see: Herbert Hill, “TheProblem of Racein AmericanLabor History,” Reviews in American History ,24(1996), 202;Michael GoldŽ eld, “Race and the CIO: ThePossibilities forRacial Equalitarianism Duringthe 1930sand 1940s,”International Labor andWorking ClassHistory ,44(Fall 1993);Gary Gerstle, “ Working-ClassRacism: Broadenthe Focus,” ibid.;GoldŽeld, “Raceand the CIO: Reply to Critics,” ILWCH,46(Fall 1994);Bruce Nelson, “Class, Raceand Democracyin the CIO: The‘ New’Labor HistoryMeets the ‘Wagesof Whiteness,’ ” International Review ofSocial History ,41(1996), 353–355, 357– 360, 362– 365; Eric Arnesen, “ UpFrom Exclusion: Black and White Workers,Race and the State ofLabor History,” Reviews in American History , 26 (1998), 153–155; Alex Lichtenstein, “ ‘ScientiŽc Unionism’and the ‘NegroQuestion’ : Communists in the Transport WorkersUnion in Miami, 1944–1949,” in Robert Zieger,ed., Southern Laborin Transition: 1940± 1995 (Knoxville,TN: Universityof Tennessee Press, 1997). 7TheodoreDraper, The Roots ofAmerican Communism (NewYork: Viking,1957), 11– 28, 311– 315; EdwardJohanningsmeier, Forging American Communism:The Lifeof William Z. Foster (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1994), 150– 174. 8Draper, American Communism ,311–326; Johanningsmeier, 158.See also, HarveyKlehr, John Haynes and KyrillM. Anderson, The Soviet Worldof American Communism (NewHaven: Yale UniversityPress, 1998),127– 129, 131. TheTrade Union Unity League 163

William D.Haywood

Earl Browder,Foster’ s assistantduring his Žrstyears asa Communist,helped Foster promote his “boring from within”rationale in CommunistParty circles in Moscow.Responding to an inquiry from LeonTrotsky in 1921 about whetherthere had ever beena “revolutionary situation”in theUnited States, Browder cited the Steel Strike of1919, which Foster had ledand allowed that “theevents of 1919 provided theAmerican workerswith more fundamentaleducation by onehundred times than wasaccomplished by theCommunist Parties.” More importantly, Browderthought that revolutionary change in theUnited States would come about asa kindof coup d’etat ledby radical labor “executives”working within theAFL: “it is within therealm ofpossibility, in theimmediate future… ”Asfor theTUEL, Browderbelieved that “acompact,well-educated Communist minority in thegreat massorganizations, unitedupon a clear program ofpractical action,can obtain thestrategic positions ofpower in organized labor.”9 It wasa curiously “managerial”proposition, couched

9Referencesto materials held in the formerCentral Archives of the Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union, now calledthe Centerfor Research and Preservationof Documents on Modernand Contemporary History(RTsKhIDNI), areorganized as follows: 164 E.P.Johanningsmeier in thephraseology ofnon-ideological manipulation, control,and administration of workers. In somequarters, both in Moscowand in theUnited States, Foster’ s ideaswere met with skepticism,even derision. In Moscowin 1921, at theŽ rstProŽ ntern Congress, William D.Haywood,the fugitive former Wobbly leader,challenged thenew line, stating that “There are somefellows around here who say that thereare 159,000 good redsin theAFL. Anybody who says that isa damnedfool.” 10 Haywood,living in Moscowafter eeing from theAmerican justicesystem, found it necessaryto defend theIWW from criticism, circulating at thehighest levels ofthe Communist Inter- national, that theIWW had beenso effectively persecutedthat it wasnow essentially an undergroundorganization. Writing toLenin in August,he attempted to assert the continuedrelevance of the IWW: Igleaned from thelast time Isawyou, that youimagined theIndustrial Workers ofthe World wasan illegal organization, or at least compelled to domuch of its workunderground … Inowdesire to explain, that not- withstanding thebitter persecutionand prosecution that themembership ofthe IWW has beencompelled toundergo, it has neverbeen driven undercover. However,as evidence, Haywood could only citethe number of IWW newspapers thenpublishing in avariety oflanguages. 11 Preventedfrom openly challenging the leadership ofFoster and the “ boring from within”orientation ofthe TUEL after 1921, Haywoodnonetheless soon made it clear that hewasnot going tosit quietly in Moscow andaccept “ Fosterism.”12 In themeantime, Lozovskymade clear toFoster that despitethe general policy ofthe CommunistInternational after 1921, heexpected a concertedeffort to reach outto IWW militants in theUnited States. Lozovsky, a veteran unionistand Bolshevik who had beenactive in thelabor movementin Paris while in exile beforeWorld War I,and Secretary ofthe All-Russian Union of Railway Workers soonafter theOctober Revol- ution,became Secretary-General of theProŽ ntern in 1921, aposthe would hold until theorganization’ s dissolutionin 1937. 13 Hewas generally among Foster’s defendersin fractional disputesin both theRussian and American parties in the1920s, butit isnow

· Communist InternationalArchive: Fund 495. · Communist Party ofthe U.S. Archive: Fund 515,Opis (Catalogs) 1and 2. · RedInternational of Labor Unions, ProŽntern Archive, AmericanSection: Fund 534,Opis 7. Citations arelisted as: fund (f); followedby deloor Ž lenumber (d); and listok orpage number (1). For some documentsthe listok number was not recorded. EarlBrowder to LeonTrotsky, Moscow,May 19,1921, f. 515(Papers ofthe CPUSA), d. 39.Browder’ s letterwas in answerto Trotsky’s question about “whetherthere has everbeen a revolutionarymovement in the U.S.” 10Haywood, quoted in Truth (Duluth), Sept. 16,1921, 2. 11Haywood to Lenin,Aug. 12,1921, f. 5(LeninSecretariat), d. 275. 12However,in Moscow,Haywood signeda documentwhich stated: “Incase of disagreement between the AmericanBureau of the RILUand the Communist Party ofAmerica, the Party decisionprevails until Žnal decisionfrom Moscow.” Signed document, datedMoscow, July 18,1921, f. 515,d. 39. 13On Lozovsky, seeBranko Lazitchand MiloradDrachovitch, Biographical Dictionary ofthe Comintern (Stanford: HooverInstitution, 1986);Theodore Draper, The Roots ofAmerican Communism , 319–320; IssacDeutscher, Soviet TradeUnions: TheirPlace in Soviet LaborStrategy (NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press,1950), 18– 22; Albert Resis, “TheProŽ ntern: Origins to 1923”(Unpublished Ph. D.dissertation, Columbia University,1964), 10; McDermott and Agnew,34– 35, 50, 85, 93, 103, 105; Reiner Tosstorff, “TheRed International of Labour Unions,”paper in author’s possession. TheTrade Union Unity League 165 clear that from thebeginning oftheir relationship hewas critical ofFoster’ s somewhat narrow approach. Atthe second Congress of the ProŽ ntern, held in November andDecember 1922, the TUELwas roundly criticized for ignoring themajority ofunorganized workers, and speciŽcally required that theTUEL form akindof united front “ Councilof Action” with IWW representativesand other “independent”unions. A later resolutioneven proposed that theIWW “shouldbe represented in [the] ExecutiveBureau of the [TUEL].” 14 Lozovskyhimself issueddirect appeals tothe IWW rank-and-Žle tojoin the ProŽntern. Haywood’ s namewas noticeably absentfrom theseappeals, andLozovsky’ s entreatieshad little effect.Only in 1923 didthe TUEL becomethe ProŽ ntern’ s ofŽcial sectionin theUnited States. 15 In themeantime, Fosterwrote a pamphlet Bankruptcyof theAmerican Labor Movement ,whichderided the pre-war IWW andblamed the Wobblies for thedestruction of the once-powerful Western Federation ofMiners. 16 In Moscow,Haywood was enraged by this attack ontheIWW. In ablistering critique ofFoster’ s wholerationale, circulated at thehighest levels ofthe Comintern, Haywood offereda refutationof Foster’ s tract, aswell ashis owninterpretation ofthetasks facing labor militants in the1920s. Quite perceptively, Haywoodlatched onto a certain intellectual simplicity andcomplacency inherent in the“ boring from within”rationale. Foster’s pamphlet wasthin in concept,according toHaywood, the title being “much toopretentious … for thedepth and weight ofthe document itself.” Moreover, “ the pamphlet is wrongin concept,historically erroneousand offers no plausible remedy for theconditions which he meagerly describes.”Haywood, somewhat surprisingly, setout astrong defenseof the culture and even the politics of“ regular”AFL unionism: The Trade Unionmovement is energetically active, in every townand city, businessagents are runningabout in automobiles from place toplace attend- ing tothe interests of their trade.Meetings are helddaily whereconditions of eachjob are reported.Job stewardsare alert tothe interests of their craft. Every considerableplace has its central body.Delegates attendregular weekly meetings.Thousands of union headquarters are hives ofenergy. Hundreds of weeklyand monthly journalsare publishedand distributed. Sick anddeath beneŽts are paid. Therefore,asked Haywood, “ why notrecognize the fact, and acknowledge the life, energy andactivity ofthe American Labor Movement?” Haywoodposited a distinctionbetween the labor “movement”and the AFL appar- atus,which in his eyeswas exclusive, arrogant, racist, undemocratic,and utterly resistantto change. The oldWobbly resurfacedin Haywood’s critique: signing con- tracts “are thedeath warrant oflabor, andshould never beentered into with the Capitalist Classunder any circumstancesor conditions.”According to Haywood, Communistpolicy wasfatally awedbecause its approach tendedto mirror that ofthe trade unionbureaucracy:

14Resolutions andDecisions ofthe First International Congress ofRevolutionary Tradeand Industrial Unions (Chicago: AmericanLabor UnionEducational Society, 1921),62; Albert Resis, “TheProŽ ntern: Origins to 1923,”316; Typescript, “Fifth Session ofRILU Executive Committee, Resolutions [1923],”f. 534, op. 7(Papers ofthe ProŽntern, American Section), d. 461,1. 7. 15[Lozovsky],“ An Appeal to the Rank and File ofthe IWW,”Aug. 30,1922, IWW Collection, Reuther Library, Box25, folder 25; Typescript, to “ExecutiveCommittee, R.I.L.U.,”signed E.W. Lachem, 1922, IWWCollection, Box25, folder 28, p. 7. 16William Z.Foster, The Bankruptcy ofthe American LaborMovement (Chicago: TradeUnion Educational League,1922), 35– 36. 166 E.P.Johanningsmeier

William Z.Foster

The remedy for Bankruptcy is notthe TUEL conŽ ning itself tothe AFL or part ofthe Working Class.If so,what becomesof the revolutionary slogan “To theMasses! To theMasses!” Where are theunorganized? What about the coloredrace …In thenational tradeswhat has becomeof the great basic industries,agriculture andoil? Agriculture is primal [sic]. Are they tobe lumpedin themiscellaneous trades, with theunions of feather strippers and coconutcrackers? 17 Haywood’s critique wasgiven theimprimatur ofofŽ cial sanctionwhen a high-level Polish Communistechoed some of his ideasin anarticle in theComintern’ s ofŽcial organ, InternationalPress Correspondence .Fosterbitterly protestedpublication ofthe pieceto Lozovsky. Even so, Foster’ s fractional opponentsin theCPUSA would continueto criticize theTUEL approach throughout the1920s. 18 Perhaps themost pointed, and acute, critique ofParty labor policy in Comintern circleswas contributed by Foster’s son-in-law,Joseph Manley, no neophyte either in Communistpolitics or labor organizing. Hehad workedclosely with Foster during the 1919 SteelStrike, wasinvolved in theFarmer-Labor party movementof 1923, andwas EasternDistrict headof the TUEL in theearly 1920s. Hewas trusted enough to be usedas a courier for Soviet fundstransferred to the TUEL in theearly 1920s. 19 However,in 1924 Manley broke quiteopenly with theCommunists. He wrote to Lozovskythat hehad concludedthat Communiststrategy “is unrealistic andnot Ž tted tothe actual economicand political conditionsnow existing in this country.” Hewasconvinced that theAFL was simply nota forcein basic industries,except the coal andbuilding industries.Citing thefact that unionismwas almost completely

17William D.Haywood, “Bankruptcy is not the Term,”[1923], CPUSA, f.515,d. 251.Haywood’ s typescriptis marked “Radek”and “Trotsky.” 18Z.Leder,“ Wm. Z.Foster, The Bankruptcy ofthe American LaborMovement ,” International Press Correspondence ,Mar.1, 1923;Foster to Lozovsky, July 27,1923, f. 534,d. 459,1. 96;Max Bedacht, “The PresentTrend in the Labor Movement,” Communism,6(June 1927),212; Benjamin Gitlow, “The Crusadeof the AFL Against the Reds,” ibid.,215;Theodore Draper, American Communismand Soviet Russia, 217. 19On Manley, seeJohanningsmeier, Forging American Communism ,133–134, 160, 186; Manley’ s work as acourieris referredto in Julius Hammer to IsidoreSpilberg [1924],f. 534,d. 481. TheTrade Union Unity League 167 absentor ineffectualin large-scale industries,he observed that destructionof unions becauseof “ mechanical development”was an issue that was“ scarcely mentioned”in TUELpropaganda. In order tofacilitate thedevelopment of organizing in basic industries,Manley suggestedthat theCP begin toworkwith theIWW. Henoted that theIWW seemedto be making somegains in theNorthwest, where, not coincidentally, Farmer-Labor politics was“ recentlymost active.” Manley’ s letter musthave beena bombshell, coming asit didfrom oneof Foster’ s mosttrusted associates. Soon thereafter,Manley left theParty, andreturned to his trade asstructural iron worker.He fell tohis deathwhile working in NewYork City onthe Chrysler Building in 1925. 20 The largest category ofParty workersin theunion movement was concentrated in the building trades.Manley referredto agreements carried outbetween employers and unionsin thebuilding industryas a scandal—“but even in this industrythe tendency istowards centralization andelimination ofunions for skilled workers.”Manley’ s critique, however,didn’ t specifyhow the Communists were to lead organizing cam- paigns in basic or massproduction industry. And, the IWW seemedincreasingly marginal. Aletter from an oldassociate of Haywood’ s wassaved in ProŽntern Ž les:“ I will tell youthis that theWobbly movement,Bill, is nowon the rocks for fair. All the oldtimers have long ceasedto pay dues… ”21 William Fosterwas conscious of the need to establish Communistnuclei in mass- productionindustry. The party had establisheda small presencein theindependent AutoWorkers Unionby 1924, andin 1926 Fostercould write toLozovsky that the Communistsin theauto industry had formulated aprogram ofwork, established a headquarters,and elected a subcommitteeof organizers. That year, theCommunist presenceforced the AFL tobegin ahalf-hearted anddismally unsuccessfulorganizing campaign. Accordingto Foster in August1926, organizing in theauto industry was difŽcult because of “ comparatively”steady employment andhigh wages.Foster also reportedto Moscow that theCommunists had establisheda headquarters in Pittsburgh tobegin organizing workin theelectrical appliance industry,including theWesting- house,Western Electric andGeneral Electric plants.In 1928, in responseto internal criticism ofthe party’ s weaknessesin industrial unionism,Foster was citing increased Communistefforts in therubber andsteel industries, in addition toauto. 22 Despitethese efforts, the Party seemedunprepared, both philosophically andorgani- zationally, for thelarge andmilitant strike oftextile workersthat eruptedin Passaic in 1926. The striking textile operatives wereprecisely thekind of workerswho had been mostsusceptible to IWW-style appeals in thepast. In Moscow,Lozovsky excoriated Fosterfor “sacriŽcing” the leader ofthe strike, Albert Weisbord,and the Communist- dominatedstrike committee,by turning over thestriking workersto the AFL union, whichsubsequently expelled theCommunists and “ negotiated”a tokensettlement with theemployers. Fosterreplied that “Iunderstandthat youhave somedoubts about the wisdomof the course pursued.” He stated deŽ antly that thesettlement was the “ only practical way,”given themassive repressionfaced by thestrikers. 23

20Joseph Manleyto Lozovsky[1924], f. 515,d. 406,1. 35. 21Typescript, “IndustrialRegistration,” [1924], f. 515,d. 358,1. 32;Manley to Lozovsky, d. 406,1. 35;Ted Fraser to W.D. Haywood, Oct. 28,1925, f. 534,d. 469. 22Fosterto Lozovsky, Aug. 6, 1926,f. 534,d. 473,1. 1; Fosterto Lozovsky, Mar.7, 1928,f. 534,d. 481,1. 45;Roger R. Keeran,“ Communist Inuence in the Automobile Industry, 1920–1933: Paving the Way foran IndustrialUnion,” LaborHistory (Spring 1985);Keeran, 48– 51; Steve Nelson, James Barrett, Rob Ruck, 21–25. 23Lozovsky to Foster,Feb. 2, 1927,Box 4, BertramWolfe papers, NewYork Public Library; Foster to Lozovsky, Nov. 27,1926, f. 534,d. 473,1. 105. 168 E.P.Johanningsmeier

The Passaic strike wasan important turning point in Communisttrade union strategy. It encouragedFoster’ s critics within theParty tofurther amplify their concerns about “organizing theunorganized,” and foreshadowed a period oftransition in focus, style,and constituency for Communisttrade unionists.Henceforth, a complicated mixture ofinputs and criticisms, both foreign anddomestic in origin, resultedin the creation ofthe TUUL in 1929 with aradically differentperspective from that ofthe TUEL. The TUULshould be understood not simply asa “paper”organization, thesum of various party resolutionsand Comintern orders. Rather, it shouldbe regarded asan experiment in radical trade unionismthat had aŽrm grounding in organizers’experi- enceand in unionhistory. Atthe level ofimplementation, theformation ofthe TUUL helpedcreate a certain kindof oppositional culturein CPlabor organizing that addressednot only theconcerns of the CP’ sMoscowpatrons, but also related persistentquestions about thepotential ofthe trade unionmovement in theU.S. and themeaning ofthe IWW, about workers’ control and technology ontheshop  oor,and about theplaces of women and African-Americans in any newtype ofunion organiza- tion. The disastrousaftermath ofthe Passaic strike ultimately affectedthe policy ofthe Party in themine Želdsof Western Pennsylvania andEastern Ohio. There,the Party, underthe guise of a“Save theUnion” [UMW] movement, prepared for thestrike that developedas a resultof John L. Lewis’s failure togain arenegotiation ofthe “Jacksonville”wage agreement.Foster saw this asan opportunity togain enough prestige for acoalition ofprogressives toperhaps overthrow theLewis bureaucracy. In February, 1927, however,long beforethe ofŽ cial Cominternshift favoring thecreation ofentirely newunions in various industries,Lozovsky emerged as a vehementcritic of the“ Save theUnion” rationale. Writing toFoster from Moscowsoon after Lewis managed tooutvote John Brophy andthe “ Save theUnion” slate in the1926 elections for unionpresident, Lozovsky demanded that THEQUESTION OFSETTING UPANINDEPENDENT UNION MUSTBERAISED,otherwise you will neverescape from this viciouscircle. Youmay have 99 percentof the votes but if thesecretaries under Lewis [tear] upyour ballot-slips, make Žctitiousones, bring hirelings tothe Congress, you will have toremain in thepower of Lewis to the end of time. It is signiŽcant that Lozovsky’s letter wasdated nearly ayear beforethe Comintern’ s formal “change in line”in 1927. Fosterangrily soughtto defend the Progressive movementhe had helpedbuild. “ Aboutall Ihear is that ourslogan ‘savethe union’ is notgood, in spiteof thefact that it hasbeen the slogan aroundwhich wehave built the biggest left-wing massmovement in thehistory ofthe party.” 24 Meanwhile,in 1927 Foster onceagain had toconfront the question of working with theIWW— this time whena strike broke outamong Coloradominers. The IWW retaineda particularly strong reputation in this area—Foster wrote to Lozovsky that “Wecooperated with theIWW in preparing thestrike andin organizing it generally. They acceptedour cooperation very gingerly, refusingto allow usto circulate our literature or otherwiseto play aprominent part in themovement.” According to Foster, oneresult of the strike was“ amuchcloser relationship betweenus andthe IWW,” and anorganizer wroteto him ofthe “ warm feeling”existing betweenthe IWW andthe CP

24Lozovskyto Foster,Feb. 3,1927,copy in BertramWolfe papers, Box4; Fosterto Lozovsky, April 14,1928, f. 534,d. 481,1. 128;Draper, American Communismand Soviet Russia , 278–290. TheTrade Union Unity League 169 in Colorado.Earl Browdermade a tourof the strike district in October andreported that although Communistswere active in thestrike, leadership wasstill in thehands of the Wobblies.A numberof UMW locals wereswept into the strike aswell. It wasan unashamedly“ dualist”movement, organized by theIWW toappeal tominers long since ignored by theUnited Mine Workers. Foster himself wasreluctant to endorse the IWW strike until theorganization “liquidated”their “wrongideas” about dual unionismand “thegeneral questionof Soviet Russia,”but, typical ofhis ambivalence during this vital period,he recognized that “in spiteof these differences in policy weshould try towork with them sofar aswe can.” 25 Still, James Cannon,a former Wobbly whowould soon help foundthe American Trotskyist movement,expressed his exasperation in oneCP plenumabout the party’ s disconnectionwith American syndicalists.Ever sincethe foundingof the CP, Cannon stated, he had felt that “it wasa weaknessin thetactics of theParty that it had notlearned to combine the ideological Žght against syndicalism with thetask of Ž ghting sideby sidewith thesyndicalist workersand winning them tothe Party.”The Party, hethought, was “ learning”how to do this in theColorado strike. 26 The Coloradostrike seemedparticularly toimpress Lozovsky, who wanted to know why theIWW wasmore compelling tothe Colorado miners than theCommunists. Foster,referring tothe thinly spreadCommunist forces in mining, replied that “We have perhaps notover 20 English-speaking comradesin theentire industry capable of exercising any appreciable degreeof leadership.” It was“ worsethan ridiculous”to expect theTUEL to cover every unorganizedterritory. Foster’s frustration in explaining his policies toMoscow is easily discernedhere; Lozovsky was knowledgeable about unionism andlabor issuesin general, butoccasionally quitenaive aboutAmerican conditions. Fostertried togive Lozovskya history andgeography lesson:“ Coloradois 2100 miles from NewYork. It isa district in whichour party hasnever functioned, whereas the IWW has beenestablished there more or lessever sinceits inception 23 years ago.”27 Whenthe Colorado strike wasŽ nally called offin March 1928, theminers emerged with asmall wage rise,but little else.The Communists,however, now bitterly attacked theIWW management ofthestrike. Perhaps mostsigniŽ cantly, thestrike had raised the questionof how Communists should confront the problem oftechnological change in theworkplace. In themining industry,the unemployment created by theintroduction ofloading anddigging machinesin thelate 1920s waswidespread. In other industries aswell, as Joseph Manley had earlier indicated,the problem ofworkers’ control and howto assert it had tobe readdressed if American radicals weregoing toformulate a meaningful approach tounionizing mass-productionindustry. Accordingto a Communistparty post-mortemof the strike, the Wobblies in Colorado, in encouraging theidea that workerscould return to work and continue the strike “onthe job,”had spread“ perniciousillusions” among theminers. “ The impossibility ofslowing downon the job effectively for any length oftime in highly organized machine industry, or evenin coal mining”was obvious to most workers, the party concluded.The IWW “mustbe considered an organization whoseactivities, especially in this period ofgreat concentrationof capital, hugecombinations of capitalists andcentralization ofgovern- mentpower … createsconfusion and division in theworking class.”28

25Fosterto Lozovsky, Nov. 7, 1927,f. 534,d. 476,1. 138;Foster to Lozovsky, Dec.28, 1927, f. 534, d. 476,1. 185;Earl Browder to Fosterand Lovestone,Oct. 26,1927, f. 515,d. 1199,1. 25;Foster to HugoOehler, Dec. 14, 1927, f. 515,d. 1103,1. 110. 26“Cannon-Discussion at Plenum, Feb. 5,1928,”f. 515,d. 1256,1. 83,p. 4. 27Fosterto Lozovsky, Mar.7, 1928,f. 534,d. 481,1. 45. 28Daily Worker ,Mar.10, 1928, 8. 170 E.P.Johanningsmeier

Fosterhimself tried tocome to grips with theproblem of“ efŽciency” in aseriesof articles in theParty’ s theoretical organ, TheCommunist , in 1928.29 Heproposednothing newin theway oforganizational strategy anddisregarded the problem ofunemploy- ment,but he did raise thequestion of how radicals wereto confront the rule ofthe stopwatch-wielding“ experts”on the shop  oor.Foster proposed that capitalist efŽciency experts had capturedthe imaginations ofmany workerswith their promises ofa “managed”capitalism andunending prosperity, what heawkwardly called “Capitalist EfŽciency Socialism.” Foster, however, was quickly repudiatedin theParty press.John Pepper, a powerfulally ofthe Lovestone faction in theparty andan acute observer ofideological trendsin Moscow,blustered that “controlof production by the workersunder capitalistic conditionsis nonsensicaland opportunistic … The workers cannotcontrol capitalistic industry… workers’control can be established only after the expropriation ofthe industries and after rationalization ofproduction.” In oneAmeri- canforum, Foster’ s ideasabout the“ illusions”of efŽ ciency were ridiculed: “ Certainly it wouldbe difŽcult to Ž ndworkers who are underthe illusion that thespeed-up system will lead tothe abolition …ofcapitalism,” according toone speaker. 30 Foster immedi- ately backedoff. The task ofthoroughly analyzing thephenomenon of “ capitalist engineering ‘socialism’” was“ atask for theCommunist International,” he weakly concludedin oneessay. 31 Evenso, the experiences of American Communistsduring this period with mass- productionindustry and technological change raised thequestion of workers’ “ inside” controlin aparticularly acuteand urgent way, and pointed to the necessity of organizing among theunemployed. Foster himself acknowledgedthat efŽciency “illusions”among workerswere resisted far more among thosein thegreat unorganized industriesthan among theAFL unions and leadership. 32 Onecentral argument for the formation ofthe new National MinersUnion by theCommunists in 1928 wouldbe that theUMW had “failed entirely todo anything whatever toprotect the interests of themen as the loading machine andother mechanical devicesadvanced … ”The idea that workers’control could lead toorganization, rather than vice versa,would be commonamong Communistunionists in the1930s. 33 To besure, the “ Third Period”change in perspectivethat resultedin theTUUL formally originated in Moscow,but a signiŽcant number of American organizers found thenew outlook congenial. Joseph Zack and Earl Browderwere among thosepromi- nent“ trade unionist”members ofFoster’ s factionwho wrote open, and penetrating, criticisms ofthe Party’ s policies in theAmerican andinternational pressduring this period,re-asserting theidea that theParty mustpay far more attentionto organizing on its ownin basic industries.Zack pointedly referredto the “ boring-from-within”strategy

29Foster,“ Capitalist EfŽciency ‘ Socialism’, ” Communist (Feb. 1928);“ Capitalist EfŽciency ‘ Social- ism’, ” ibid. (March1928), 169– 174. 30John Pepper, “AProgramof Action forAmerica,” ibid.,7(June 1928),335; “ Wicks’Speech at Plenum,”f. 515,d. 1256,1. 108. 31Foster,“ Capitalist EfŽciency ‘ Socialism’, ” Communist,7(Feb. 1928),104. 32Fosterdraft, “Capitalist EfŽciency Socialism,” presented to PolCom, 1/18/28,f. 515,d. 1259, 1.1, 11. 33Daily Worker ,Aug. 31,1929, 6; ArneSwabeck, “TheNational Miners’Union: ANewConception ofUnionism,” Communist,Oct. 1928,623; Nelson Lichtenstein, WalterReuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit (NewYork: Basic Books, 1995),67, 107– 113; Robert Zieger, American Workers,American Unions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1986),51– 52; Zieger, The CIO,32,46– 54, 118– 119; Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor ,130–155; Henry Kraus, The Many andthe Few (Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press,1947, 1985),43– 56; James Green, The Worldof the Worker ,131–132, 155, 157, 159– 160. TheTrade Union Unity League 171 asa typical American “get rich quick”scheme whereby the workers would somehow be handedover tothe Communists as a resultof bureaucratic maneuvering. 34 As well, the IWW seemedto be a factor in Foster’s thinking in 1928. The Wobblies weremaking inroadsamong bituminouscoal miners in thePennsylvania– Ohio district that theParty had helpedorganize. 35 Shortly after Lozovskyissued his public call for newunions, Fosterwrote to Lozovsky demanding that theProŽ ntern make aformal statement clarifying its standand “ combatting assertionsof the IWW andothers that ourpolicy has beenwrong all theseyears.” 36 Whatever thein uence of the IWW asa resultof the new line whichemerged in Moscowin 1928, newunions were soon established by theCommunists in avariety of industriesthat had long beenignored by theAFL. New unions had already beenset up in thecoal, textile, needle,auto and food industries; after 1929 TUULunionswere establishedin marine andsteel as well. During this period,Foster forthrightly implored his patronsin Moscowto send money, if they really wantedto see the Americans set upan effective federation of new unions. In order toconduct the Ž rstconvention of the newTrade UnionUnity League in Clevelandin 1929, Fosterwrote that “thevery minimum necessaryfrom youis 10,000$.” The exact amountthat wasŽ nally for- wardedby Moscowis unclear. 37 During theperiod following thecreation ofthe TUUL, Foster immersed himself in organizing for thenew National Miners’Union in Pennsylvania andKentucky. Ever the realist, Fosterfought tomaintain abasis for working with theAFL progressives, even after heŽ nally realized that theofŽ cial CP“boring from within”policy wasdoomed. It wasafter theinauguration ofthe “ Third Period”perspective in Moscow,with its call for “Negro Self-Determination in theBlack Belt”that theCommunist Party began making signiŽcant efforts to organize African-Americans. 38 Almost from thebeginning ofits existence,the TUEL underFoster had neglectedwork in this area. From 1922 in Foster’s bailiwick, Chicago, alarge numberof blacks had driftedaway from theParty becauseof the “ patronizing attitudeof whites,” according toone cadre. In Pittsburgh in 1924, theattempts ofone African-American tojoin the local Party split theentire

34On Zack’s critique,see Theodore Draper, American Communismand Soviet Russia ,293,499. Despite Foster’s protestto Lozovskythat aZackarticle in the Comintern pressof January 1928“ presentsmuch information, [and]tends to createvery wrong impressions regardingTUEL policy towardsthe formation ofnew unions,” more of Zack’ s ideasappeared in the Daily Worker ,May 14and June 10,1927. See Foster to Lozovsky, May 9, 1928,f. 534,d. 481,1. 45;Foster to Lozovsky, May 9, 1928,f. 534,d. 481,1. 197. Seealso, Draft, Joseph Zack,“ TheQuestion ofNew Unions in the USA: ACriticismof Our Trade Union Policy in America.”Annotation: “writtenin December[1927] appeared in Feb. issueof ProŽ ntern magazine—in German,Russian and French—not in Englishas thereis no such edition.”f. 515,d. 1223, 1. 43,Browder article in Die Gewerkschafts International (Feb. 1928),referred to in Fosterto Lozovsky, May 3, 1928,f. 534,d. 481,1. 165. 35Wagenknechtto Lovestone,Jan. 9, 1928,f. 515,d. 1342. 36Fosterto Lozovsky, May 3, 1928,f. 534,d. 481,1. 165. 37Fosterto Lozovsky, Feb. 16,1929, f. 534,d. 485,1. 33. 38NellIrvin Painter, Narrativeof Hosea Hudson (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1979), 13– 19; MarkNaison, Communists in HarlemDuring the Depression (Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press,1983), 16–23; Fraser Ottanelli, 36–37; Robin D.G. Kelley, Hammerand Hoe: AlabamaCommunists During the GreatDepression (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press),1990, 13– 14; Foner and Allen, American Communismand Black Americans ,xiv–xvi; Foner, OrganizedLabor and the BlackWorker , 193–197, 202– 203; Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik (Chicago: Liberator,1978), 317, 319, 349; Robin D.G. Kelley,“ Afric’s Sons with BannerRed: AfricanAmerican Communists and the Politicsof Culture, 1919–1934,” in Kelley, Race Rebels:Culture, Politics andthe Black Working Class (NewYork: FreePress, 1994,1996); George M. Frederickson, Black Liberation:A ComparativeHistory ofB lackIdeologies in the United States andSouth Africa (NewYork: Oxford,1995), 199– 202. 172 E.P.Johanningsmeier membership, with many refusingto attend meetings in his presence.Finally hegave up trying tojoin the Party in Pittsburgh andwent elsewhere. Most AFL unionspracticed someform ofexclusionor segregation. For avariety ofreasons,therefore, the number ofblacks in theParty before1928 wasminuscule. The deepSouth was largely out-of-boundsfor Communistorganizers in the1920s, andit wasan unwrittenpolicy that theparty opposedAfrican-American migration tothe North becauseit would underminethe position of unionizedwhite workers and exacerbate racial antagonism. 39 Aslate as1927, in theheyday ofthe“ Save theUnion” movement in themineŽ elds of westernPennsylvania, the DailyWorker warnedstrikebreaking black miners somewhat ominously that their “excuse”for “scabbing,”that theUMW discriminated against blacks,was erroneous and that theUMW didnot exclude blacks from membership. 40 At theSixth CominternCongress the idea ofa black nationin therural American Southsounded surrealistic andsectarian tomost black Communists.In 1930, atop Soviet ofŽcial, Dmitri Manuilsky,quizzed some African-American Communistsin a Moscowforum about theself-determination slogan, saying “Ihave beentold that the Negro workersin America don’t wantan independent republic in theSouth, they want tocarry onthe struggle with whiteworkers.” One African-American Communisttold Manuilsky that theslogan wouldalienate whiteworkers, and he pointed to the example ofHaiti, “wherethey have astatebut it doesn’t meananything.” When it seemed evidentthat thediscussion was not going his way,Manuilsky endedthe interview by atly proclaiming that “this slogan has beenveriŽ ed by theexperiences of the Soviet Union.The Soviet Unionis acountrywith more than 110 nationalities inhabiting the countryand we have foundin ourwork that this slogan isthe correct slogan in sucha country.”41 Despitethis seemingukase, the exact meaning ofthe “ negro nationin theblack belt” remained opento interpretation, debate,and adjustment as the slogan wasimple- mentedat various levels by organizers in theUnited States. The mostcareful recent studentof theComintern’ s shift in line has concludedthat “thepower of self-determi- nationlay notin itstheoretical validity, butin its pragmatic implications….The vision ofblack national oppression… galvanized theParty intounprecedented activities for Negro rights in the1930s.” 42 Asidefrom controversiesarising over the“ negro nationin theblack belt,”at the Sixth Congressthe American party’s general lack ofprogress in recruiting blacks was thesubject of “ muchdiscussion,” and a critique emergedin Cominterncircles after

39“Interviewof Manuilsky with AmericanComrades,” Sept. 1,1930,f. 495,op. 37(Comintern papers, Anglo-AmericanSecretariat), d. 73,1. 115;Otto Huiswood, “TheNegro and the TradeUnions,” Communist,Dec.1928, 775; Cyrill Briggs,“ OurNegro Work,” ibid.,Sept. 1929,496; William Foster, “Party TradeUnion Work During Ten Years,” ibid.,Sept. 1929,612; Theodore Draper, American Communismand Soviet Russia , 334. 40Daily Worker ,Nov. 30,1927, 4. 41“Interviewof Manuilsky with AmericanComrades,” Sept. 1, 1930,f. 495,op. 37,d. 73,1. 117–120. 42MarkSolomon, The CryWas Unity: Communists andAfrican Americans, 1917± 1936 (Jackson: Universityof Mississippi Press,1998), 68– 91); seealso Robin D.G. Kelley, Hammerand Hoe (1990), 13–33; 92– 116; Nell Irvin Painter, The Narrativeof Hosea Hudson (1979), 14–18. See also the assessment ofa South Africanhistorian: KeithP. Grifer, WhatPrice Alliance? Black RadicalsConfront White Labor, 1918± 1938 (NewYork: Garland, 1995),65: “ Theoriginal Comintern directivecontaining the so-called ‘Black BeltThesis’ was ahopelessly confusedand contradictorydocument.” However, it should also be bornein mind that the Third Period’s “fusion ofMarxism and anti-imperialist nationalism would become the twentiethcentury’ s most successfulstrategy of revolution. InAmerica, it infusedthe communist commitment to racialequality with an unusual intensitylong after the Comintern linehad changed… ” SeeGerstle, “ WorkingClass Racism: Broadenthe Focus,”34. TheTrade Union Unity League 173

1928 ofCPUSA policy towardsblacks whichfocused not as much on “ selfdetermi- nation”as on the problem ofindustrial unionism:“ The party has notyet obtained accessto the real American proletariat andis scarcely linked upat all with themost oppressedsections of the workers of America— the Negroes,” read oneinternal Cominternassessment. In asearing speechat theSixth Congress,James Ford declared that although the“ Negro Industrial Proletariat”had increasedby millions during World War I,therewere only 50 blacks in theCPUSA. And “ Negro comradeshave beendriven outof the trade unionmovement, without the Party raising ahandor doing anything tocounteract this situation.”And he stated “ Negro comradeswho are continually bringing this questionbefore the Party are persecutedand driven outof the Party andinto the IWW andother organizations.”43 At theinaugural conventionof the TUUL in Clevelandin 1929 anew“ Negro Department”was established. A large numberof African-American delegateswere in attendanceand there was a discussionof “ tasks,”but for thetime being therewere no tangible organizational gains. J.W.Johnstone, a high-ranking whiteorganizer whohad experienceorganizing black packinghouseworkers in Chicago during thewar years, admitted conŽdentially that the“ Negro Department”was merely a“paper organiza- tion.”Another prominent organizer complained ofcontinued resistance to the new strategy, noting that therehad beenno real systematicrecruiting effortsamong blacks in thepre-convention period. Lozovsky sharply criticized theTUUL for offering little butvague general “demands”to African-American workers.Yet, one organizer reportedan incident that wouldnot have occurredat previous conventions:“ Atoneof thehotels where a large body ofour delegates stayed, the management refusedto permit Negro delegatesto stay there;whereupon the other delegatesimmediately went onstrike against this hotel.”As aresult,“ mostof them had towalk thestreets all night withouta place tostay.” 44 Communistsbegan toshift their attentionto the South after 1928, andby 1930 Fosterhad revealed toLozovsky his discoverythat industrial workerswere more militant in theSouth than in theNorth. Citing thelarge numbersof blacks andwhites attending meetingsconducted by James Ford in arecentSouthern tour, Foster wrote toLozovsky that “thecenter [of] gravity ofourwork will beshifted more intothe heavy industriesof Alabama, Kentucky,West Virginia, etc.”One internal TUULreport statedthat “thenegroes are betterŽ ghters than whiteworkers in thesteel mills.” Ford himself assertedin onereport that theearly years ofthe Depression had shownthat “theold theory that theNegro ofthe South in particular wasa ‘reserveof capitalist reaction’has beensmashed.” He was now convinced that theProŽ ntern line on self-determinationfor blacks,combined with “jointstruggle ofwhite and negro work- ers”would be increasingly successfulin theSouth, especially in theBirmingham area. 45 African-Americans weresomewhat responsive to the new line onunions in the mining industry,but a signiŽcant level ofracial antagonism existedfrom thebeginning

43Dear[?], July 15,1928, f. 515,d. 1248,l. 18,p. 1;“Supplement to the Draftof the Resolution” [ExecutiveCommittee ofthe Communist International],1/ 27/28,f. 515,d. 1226,p. 5;“Resolution on WorkAmong NegroMasses of the USA”[1928, VI Congress],f. 515,d. 1226.Ford’ s speechis in International PressCorrespondence ,25July 1928,708; see also, ibid.,3Aug., 1928,722. 44Lozovsky to National Committee, TUEL,12/ 30/28,f. 515,d. 1498,1. 8; Jack Johnstone to Lozovsky, Nov. 15,1929, f. 534,d. 485,l. 195;[?] to Lozovsky, Sept. 6, 1929,f. 534,d. 486,1. 45. 45“Third Session ofthe National ExecutiveBoard [1930],”Report ofOvergaard on Steeland Metal, f. 534,d. 494,l. 1; Ibid.,“Report ofFord on NegroWork,” Johnstone to Lozovsky, Nov. 15,1929, f. 534,d. 485,l. 198;[?] to Lozovsky, Sept. 6, 1929,f. 534,d. 486,l. 45. 174 E.P.Johanningsmeier in theCommunist-led National MinersUnion, founded in Pittsburgh in 1928. 46 A large numberof blacks participated in anNMU-sponsored strike in westernPennsylva- nia in 1931. Earl Browderbragged tothe Comintern that “thesituation among the negroesin thestrike isa great advanceover everything that hasever beenin this district before….The negroesare onthestrike committees,and then in mostcases there is not theslightest division betweenthe whites and the negroes.” 47 Browderwas exaggerating about thelevel ofsolidarity that existed,but Communist efforts to organize African- Americans andunemployed workers in thebituminous Ž eldsnear Pittsburgh con- tributed tothe largest strike in thehistory ofradical unionismin America in 1931, involving some40,000 miners. 48 In theaftermath ofthe strike, however, attempts torecruit blacks into theNMU suffered.The unionchose to forego holding interracial social events(e.g. dances) in the Pittsburgh area becauseof thecon icts created. When a black unionmember had his houseburned by theKKK, theunion refused to take astandin his support. 49 Reports oframpant “whitechauvinism” in theunion surfaced, and one report concludedthat “consideringthe number of Negro workersin themining industry,the percentage of thosein ourunion is very small.”By 1932, in thenew TUUL unions, according toone frank assessment,“ everywherethe weakest spot is theNegro membership.”Clearly, racism continuedto plague Communistefforts to organize African-Americans.The successof thenew emphasis onorganizing African-Americans dependedmostly onthe effortsof a fewdedicated Communist cadres to implement their vision ofradical industrial unionism,and on African-American organizers themselveswho had been energizedby theramiŽ cations of the “ Black Belt thesis.”50 Beginning in thelate 1920s, theAmerican CPmadea far more concertedeffort to begin organizing among women.The origins ofthis change in emphasis remain obscure,but in late 1926, aComintern’s “Women’s Department”sent a letter tothe American Party demandinga program ofimmediate demandsfor workamong women, theorganization ofa Women’s Department in theParty, andre-direction of Party work towardsindustrial womenworkers rather than housewives.The Party wasspeciŽ cally askedto demand admittance ofwomen into the unions. 51 Perhaps theProŽ ntern had takennote of the important role ofwomen in thePassaic strike.Kate Gitlow, Secretary ofan organization called the“ UnitedCouncil of Working-Class Housewives,”asserted in onereport that 50% ofthePassaic strikers werewomen and most were married with

46Meetingof TUUL National Buro-Minutes,Stachel Report on Convention ofNational Miners’ Union, Mar.28, 1928, f. 515,d. 2979,l. 55. 47“Report ofComrade Browderon the Miners’Strike,” June 16,1931, f. 534,d. 498,l. 137. 48For threedifferent views of this strike,see Linda Nyden, “Black Minersin WesternPennsylvania, 1925–1931,” Science andSociety ,41(1977), 94;Draper, “ TheCommunists and the Miners,” Dissent, Spring 1972,377– 379; Carl Meyerhuber, Less Than Forever ,109–136; Minutes of Anglo-American Secretariat,June 26,1932, f. 495,op. 72,d. 150,l. 35. 49“Report ofComrade Borich, National Committee ofNMU,” Sept. 10,11, 1932, f. 515,d. 2989,l. 78, p. 14. 50“DearAlexander” , February 29,1932 [Report to Anglo-AmericanSecretariat from Comintern Representativein U.S.], f. 515,d. 2616,l. 1, p. 25;“ ThePresent Situation in the MiningIndustry of the U.S. and the Tasks ofthe NMU”[1931],f. 515,d. 2558,l. 93;“ Report ofRandolph to Anglo-American Secretariat,”June 26,1932, f. 495,op. 72,d. 15,l. 36. 51“Directivesfrom the E.C.C.I. [ExecutiveCommittee ofthe Communist International]to the AmericanCP fromthe 6th ECCIPlenum to Date,”11/ 25/27,f. 515,d. 934,l. 198.On the Communist party’s Third Periodorganizing among women, the most penetratingcritical accounts are in Alice Kessler-Harrisand Paul Lauter,“ Introduction,”to FieldingBurke, CallHome the Heart (Old Westbury, NY: Feminist); Rabinowitz, Laborand Desire ;Barbara Foley, RadicalRepresentations . TheTrade Union Unity League 175 children.“ The strikers speakseveral languages, butthey understandeach other well,” shewrote in evaluation. 52 During this period,one writer in theParty’ s organizing bulletin explicitly connected theidea ofindustrial unionismwith theincreasing importance ofwomen in mass-pro- duction.Two of the greatest weaknessesof theParty, this writer concluded,were that theCommunists seemed to ignore organizing “in thebasic industrieswhere the masses ofworkers are tobe found,” and that in shopnuclei “ thereare scarcely any women members.”Other womenorganizers citedwidespread rationalization, large-scale intro- ductionof machinery, andrelentless wage reductionsamong menin basic industriesas forcing ever-increasing numbersof women into industryto supplement family income. Oneorganizer, GertrudeWelsh, noted that this provided aperfectopening for the Communists.The leadersof the old craft unionshad been“ deaf,dumb and blind to thesituation, being opposedto the organization ofwomen ® rst becausethey are women, second becausethey are unskilled;and third becausethe American labor bureaucracy has altogether ceasedto function as an organization apparatus towardany group ofworkers.” One effect of the development of new TUUL unionsin thetextile industrywas the development of programs appealing speciŽcally towomen workers, calling, for instance,for aminimum wage for women,vacation with pay for twomonths beforeand two months after childbirth, permissionfor mothersto leave their work every threehours to nurse their children,and free day-care. 53 In theUnited States, 72 womenwere represented at theCleveland TUUL conference,most from outsidethe needletrades. 54 Vera Buch,a prominent TUULorganizer, called attentionto the importance of womenfor theParty’ s organizing workin Michigan. Shenoted in a1928 ProŽntern report that therewere now 57,000 womenindustrial workersin thestate, including many autoworkers. During this period,the party establishedwomen’ s columnsin various shoppapers, including the AutoWorkers News , the Ford Worker, the Hudson Worker, and the FisherB ody Worker ,anda regular “Working Woman”column in the DailyWorker .ProŽntern Ž lesafter 1928 containa numberof reports from women cadres,outlining conditionsin industryand lobbying for increasedfunding for women’s organizing, something almost completely lacking in theearlier period.The numberof womenin theparty doubledbetween 1931 and1933. 55 Despitesuch emphasis, women didnot get all that muchsupport. One organizer complained that at arecentParty conferenceof 127 steeland auto workers, only twowere women: “ This isa very outstandingweakness in ourgeneral work.”In 1930 awomanorganizer complained about thelack ofwomen in shopnuclei and the continued lack ofwomen’ s depart- mentsin thevarious industrial districts. 56 During the1931 miners’strike, rank-and-Ž le strike committees,usually butnot always ledby Communists,split in responseto a

52KateGitlow, “What the WorkingclassWomen have Doneto HelpWin the PassaicStrike,” f. 515, d. 1223,l. 58. 53Daily Worker ,Mar.3, 1928,7, 8; ibid.,Mar.5, 1928,6; GertrudeWelsh, “Report on RILU Commission on Workamong Women [nd]”, f. 534,d. 482,l. 328;“ Resolutions Passedat National Convention held in NewYork City,”Sept. 22–23 [NTWU], f. 534,d. 482,l. 32,5; RebeccaGrecht in PartyOrganizer ,3(Feb. 1930),12– 14. 54[?]to Lozovsky, Sept. 6, 1929,f. 534,d. 486,l. 45. 55See,for instance, Rebecca [Grecht] to CEC, Apr. 2,1928,f. 515,d. 1520,l. 21;Harvey Klehr, The Heydayof American Communism , 163–164. 56VeraBuch, “Report on Women’s Work,”District 7, Mar.5, 1928,f. 534,d. 481,l. 189;Schmies to Lozovsky, June 19,1930, f. 534,d. 491,l. 146; PartyOrganizer ,3(Feb. 1930),12– 14; Daily Worker , Sept. 16,1929, 2. 176 E.P.Johanningsmeier sheriff’s edictprohibiting womenfrom picketing. Unionmembers resistedattempts by womento report ontheir activities during meetings,and after thestrike thewomen’ s departmentsin thePittsburgh area seemedto have lostsupport from party headquar- tersand dissolved. 57 Howeverreluctant to embrace thechange in Party line beginning in 1928, William FosterŽ nally becamean articulate defenderof the idea ofnew unions in Comintern circles.Part ofthe reason for this wasundoubtedly a desireto outmaneuverhis political opponentin theparty, Jay Lovestone,who hewed to the boring-from-within line long after it wasconsidered a “right deviation”in Moscow.Yet, in 1928 Fosteracknowl- edgedthat theever-escalating rationalization ofthe workplace wasa primary causeof discontentamong workersin mass-productionindustry. In oneforum heŽ nally concededthat theold craft unionswere simply incapable oforganizing mass- productionindustry. Foster predictedquite accurately that “toestablish this task will require asystematiccampaign ofestablishing newunions.” 58 In aspeechgiven at the special “American Commission”session in Moscow,which resulted in Lovestone’s expulsionin 1929, Fosteracknowledged that his initial resistanceto the new unions had beenmistaken. On a personal level, herevealed his essentially radical temperament,a temperament which had alienated him from theAFL hierarchy during thegreat steel strike of1919 andstill preventedhim from working effectively within theAFL “establishment.”He declared that despitethe fact that hehad been“ offeredgood jobs” in theAFL, “ Icame tothe [Comintern] andI stayedwith the[Comintern] andI shall bewith the[Comintern] whenmany ofthose comrades who have theguts to stand up andcriticize mewill beon the other sideof the barricades.” 59 Although Foster’s hesitancywas undoubtedly a factor in slowing theeffects of the change in Party line in 1928, both his loyalty tothe Comintern and his knowledgeof American industryand the labor movementensured that hewould grudgingly accept therelevance of his critics’arguments— arguments hehad resistedthroughout his career. The newunions that wereformed as a resultof thechange in Moscow’s line met with fewtangible organizational or strike successes.However, by 1934, a“militant minority” ofCommunist organizers had “colonized”a numberof strategic auto,rubber, meat- packing, andsteel plants, and had madeimportant progress in shifting theParty’ s attentionto African-Americans andwomen. Dual unionismand the Third Period helpedmeasure the limits ofCommunist unionism in America, andrepresented an opportunity tobegin learning howto organize thekind of workers that theAFL (and American Communists)had largely ignored in the1920s. Asone recent study of the inuence of Communists in theCIO concluded,in regard tore-deŽ ning themeaning ofindustrial unionismin termsof race andgender, “ theCommunist-in uenced CIO afŽliates stoodin thevanguard.” 60 Evidencein CominternŽ lesconŽ rms that in 1936 JohnL. Lewisquickly turnedto theCommunists to aid in thedevelopment of theCIO “from thebottom up.”61

57Hathaway Speech, Anglo-AmericanSecretariat, Jan. 7, 1932,f. 495,op. 72,d. 168,l. 108–110. 58FosterSpeech, 7/17/28,Anglo-American Secretariat, f. 495,op. 72,d. 36,l. 178. 59FosterSpeech, May 6, 1929,“ AmericanCommission,” f. 495,op. 72,d. 66,l. 96–97. 60Zieger, The CIO,257;on the natureof CP achievementsin the Želdof race, see sources under n. 6. 61Inameetingof the Anglo-AmericanSecretariat in Moscowin September of1936 William Weinstone reportedon meetingshe had had with John L.Lewis,in which Lewispromised to help re-instateexpelled Communist unionists, placethem as paid staffon the SteelWorkers Organizing Committee, and allow Communists to be electedto ofŽces in the UMW.According to Weinstone’s summary ofhis meetings TheTrade Union Unity League 177

While theextent of his activities andinterest in American policy are yet tobe revealed,it isreasonably certain that William D.Haywoodwas lobbying behindthe scenesin Moscowin favor ofthe change in perspective.There isno reason to doubt accountsthat Haywood’s apartment wasa convivial gathering place for American Communistsin Moscow,and that Haywoodwas not reticent about thefailures ofthe Party’s labor organizing in the1920s. However,in March of1928, justas he was preparing toattend the Fourth Congressof the RILU, where Lozovsky would begin to demandthat theAmericans change their approach tothe unions, Haywood suffered a stroke.Although Haywood“ receivedmany ofthe RILU congress delegates who were still in thecity, anddiscussed the problems ofthe congress” with them,he died in a Kremlin hospital in May.A typical CPassessmentof his career concludedthat hewas “an agitator ofthe masses” but “ notdeeply-based in Communisttheory.” 62 Despite Haywood’s supposedtheoretical weaknesses,it cannotbe denied that in thelate 1920s theCommunist Party began for theŽ rsttime toseriously answer his question: “Whatever becameof the slogan ‘tothe masses?’ ” Although theevidence to be gleaned from theMoscow archives isstill incomplete, thewillingness of Haywood and others to offer pointed challenges tothe Communists’ labor policy in the1920s suggestsmore ofalink betweenthe tradition andoutlook of thepre-war IWW andCommunist activism in theindustrial unionismmovement of the 1930s than has previously beenacknowledged. Although theTUUL never achieved signiŽcant organizational momentum,its activities nonethelessrepresented an import- anttransitional phasein theCPUSA’ s reorientation towardsa more inclusive,mass- basedunionism during theGreat Depression.

with Lewis,“ duringthis periodand in theseelections [in the UMW],Communists have beenelected into the leadership, and this in no sensewithout his knowledge.”Because of Lewis’ s needfor Communist organizers“ fromthe bottom”in the crucialsteel campaign of1936 and CPsupport forRoosevelt, “the Communists arewinning a placefor themselves that they have not occupiedat any time in the history ofthe Party,”Weinstone concluded. See Weinstone Report, “Meetingof Secretariat of Comrade Marty, Sept. 15,1936,” f. 495,op. 14,d. 16,l. 1–16. 62Bill Haywood’sBook: The Autobiography ofWilliam D. Haywood (NewYork: International, 1929), 364–365; Louis Engdahl, “William D.Haywood,” Communist,July 1928;Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik (Chicago: Liberator,1978), 170– 172. See also, Foster, History ofthe Communist Partyof the United States (NewYork: International, 1952),124. Foster may have neverfully reconciledhimself to TUUL,despite his endorsementof some ofits perspectives.See Maurice Isserman, Dorothy Healey Remembers (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1990), 159; Earl Browder interview, Theodore Draper papers, WoodruffLibrary Special Collections, Emory University,B1, f.3,pp. 1, 2.