Pugwash NEWSLETTER

issued by the Council of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs Nobel Peace Prize 1995

New York, September 10, 2001

Volume 38 Number 2 December 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS

To the Pugwash Community ...... 1

SPECIAL SECTION: SEPTEMBER 11 AND ITS AFTERMATH “The Dangers of Nuclear Terrorism,” Statement of the Pugwash Council, 12 November 2001 ...... 3 Sir Joseph Rotblat, Letter to the editor, The Times (UK), 15 September 2001 ...... 4 Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Why Root Causes Are Important”, Toronto Globe and Mail, 26 September 2001...... 4 “Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” Statement of the Pugwash Council, 12 November 1999 ...... 6 REPORTS ON RECENT PUGWASH MEETINGS

Pugwash Meeting no. 262...... 8 7th Pugwash Workshop on the Middle East: Palestine, Israel and the Middle East Peace Process Alexandria, Egypt, 26-29 April 2001 Pugwash Meeting no. 263...... 14 3rd Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security: Humanitarian Intervention – Forging an International Consensus Castellón de la Plana, Spain, 3-5 May 2001 Pugwash Meeting no. 264 ...... 21 15th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the CBW Conventions Oegsteest, Netherlands, 23-24 June 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 265 ...... 33 4th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security: A Consultation with the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 20-21 July 2001 Pugwash Meeting no. 266 ...... 41 2nd Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Stability and Missile Defenses Como, Italy, 6-8 September 2001

SELECTED ESSAYS “Israeli-Palestinian Relations: An Appraisal,” by Maher El-Kurd ...... 49 “The Oslo Process: Failures, Lessons, Alternatives,” by Joseph Alpher ...... 51 Pugwash ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL PUGWASH GROUPS The US Pugwash Group...... 59 Volume 38 Number 2 Pugwash Netherlands ...... 60 December 2001 REPORT OF STUDENT/YOUNG PUGWASH ACTIVITIES Editors: International Student/Young Pugwash ...... 61 Jeffrey Boutwell and George Rathjens OBITUARIES: Production Assistant: Johan Lundin, Maxwell Bruce, Paul Warnke...... 63 Anthony Baird Members of the Pugwash Council ...... 66 Design and Layout: Anne Read Calendar of Future Meetings ...... Inside back cover To the Pugwash Community

Global Cooperation: their cause, are able to circumvent if not neutralize the A 21st Century Imperative military power of modern industrial states. For those The global effect of the September 11 terror attacks on countries possessing nuclear weapons, the concept of New York and Washington, DC demonstrated yet again nuclear deterrence in such scenarios is not only irrelevant, that, in today’s world, national security no longer is con- but counter-productive, in that the nuclear (and biological fined within national boundaries. Fully one-third of the or chemical) technology and materials developed by such more than 3,000 people killed in the attacks were non- countries could well be turned against them in a terrorist Americans, citizens of more than 60 countries. The eco- attack using weapons of mass destruction. nomic and social impacts of the terror attacks were simi- To be truly effective, an international effort to neutral- larly global; in addition to the loss of hundreds of ize the dangers of horrific terrorist attacks, especially those thousands of jobs in the US and worldwide, World Bank using weapons of mass destruction or those targeted President James Wolfensohn estimated that that “between against nuclear power plants, food and water supplies, 20,000 and 40,000 more children” would die, and and critical infrastructure, must consist of the widest pos- millions of people would be “condemned to live below the sible global coalition. poverty line” because of the global recession that became Forging and maintaining such a coalition will not, of more severe because of September 11. course, be easy. First, there remain tremendous political, The terrorist networks responsible for the attacks ideological, religious, and ethnic differences between the operate in many countries around the world; the financial West, the former socialist countries, Asian, Arab, and network supporting the terrorists is truly global, as must Muslim countries, and Africa and Latin America. Such be the intelligence and law enforcement effort needed to differences are manifest when it comes to issues such as: identify and bring such groups to justice. While the bene- controlling weapons of mass destruction and ensuring fits of globalization are indeed many, it is also true that the regional security; international humanitarian intervention links between different terrorist organizations fighting for to prevent mass killings and gross abuses of human rights; different causes, and the states which harbor and support and fundamental questions of national sovereignty relat- them, are made all the easier by globalizing trends in com- ing to minority rights and self-determination. Through its munications, transportation, technology, and the world of work over more than four decades, the Pugwash Confer- finance. ences have sought to narrow these differences between If the latter half of the 20th century was the nuclear states and peoples in an effort to strengthen the modalities age, the 21st century may well become the age of asym- for greater international cooperation. metrical warfare. It has been estimated that between Such efforts are needed now more than ever if both the $500,000 and one million dollars was needed to plan and manifestations and root causes of terrorism are to be suc- carry out the attacks on the World Trade Center and the cessfully addressed. As symbolized by the awarding of the Pentagon, resulting in global financial and economic losses 2001 Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations and its Sec- of tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars. Small groups retary General, Kofi Annan, these efforts will demand the of individuals, characterized by fanatical commitment, closest possible cooperation between national patience, intelligence, and a ready willingness to die for governments, NGOs, and regional and international insti- tutions such as the UN that can articulate a broad-based the Manifesto in three versions: the folio insert found in vision of human security for the 21st century. this Newsletter, a poster version, and a special leather- bound folio that will be used for special occasions. Lim- The 51st Pugwash Conference ited copies of the unbound folio and poster are available Having postponed the 51st Pugwash Conference (origi- from the Pugwash offices in London, Rome, Geneva and nally scheduled for November in Agra, India) because of Cambridge. the September 11 terror attacks, the Pugwash Council pro- ceeded to meet in London from 8-11 November, at which The 100th Anniversary time it was decided to reschedule the Agra conference to of the Nobel Peace Prize 12-16 March 2002. Council members felt that unfolding A three-day celebration in Oslo from 6-8 December events in Afghanistan, Pakistan, throughout South Asia marked the 100th anniversary of the inauguration of the and globally made it all the more important to proceed Nobel Peace Prize. Sir Joseph Rotblat and Francesco with the 51st Pugwash Conference in India. A central Calogero, the latter representing the Pugwash focus of the conference will be the implications of global Conferences, were among more than 20 Nobel Peace Prize terrorism on national and international security, and in Laureates attending the ceremonies. For more on the particular the prospect of terrorist use of weapons of mass events in Oslo, including a talk by Francesco Calogero on destruction (see the statement of the Pugwash Council on the dangers of nuclear terrorism, and a congratulatory let- page 3). ter from Pugwash to this year’s Nobel Laureate, the United Nations and Kofi Annan, visit the Pugwash web- The Russell-Einstein Manifesto site at www.pugwash.org. As an insert to this issue of the Pugwash Newsletter, read- ers will find a copy of a special commemorative edition of Acknowledgments the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto. This was a project Pugwash would like to thank the Italian National undertaken several years ago by Maxwell Bruce, then Research Council, the German Research Society, the Cyrus revived this year thanks to a special grant from the Toda Eaton Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research. Unfortu- MacArthur Foundation for their support of the Pugwash nately, Max Bruce died this fall before completion of the Newsletter, the Pugwash website, and other Pugwash pub- project (see page 63), but he undoubtedly would have lications. been pleased with the final result. Pugwash has printed

The Editors

2 Pugwash Newsletter, June 2001 PUGWASHSPECIAL MEETING REPORT No. 245

September 11 and Its Aftermath

The Dangers of Nuclear Terrorism diluted with natural uranium to a low-enriched level where it has high Statement of the Pugwash Council commercial value as a proliferation- Monday, 12 November 2001, London, UK proof fuel for civil nuclear reactors. Here again, an important opportu- he horrific nature of the Septem- nuclear weapon than is plutonium, so nity exists for Europe and Japan to Tber 11 attacks has demonstrated much so that even sub-national ter- work with the United States in pur- the ability of international terrorist rorist groups could accomplish the chasing such fuel from Russia and networks to carry out well-planned challenge. European and Asian gov- greatly reducing available supplies of and complex operations that can kill ernments especially need to join the weapons-grade uranium. thousands of innocent civilians. The United States in providing aid to the Much work will be needed on a potential for biological, chemical, Russian government in controlling broad range of fronts, from recogniz- and/or nuclear terrorism has greatly and destroying this fissile material ing and addressing the root causes increased. (enough to build 20,000 nuclear that facilitate the growth of terrorist While there has long been con- bombs) through greatly accelerated networks, to bringing to justice those cern about nuclear material being funding and commitment to such who commit mass murder and crimes acquired by non-state groups, reports programs as the Cooperative Threat against humanity. in the past few days indicate that Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar). In order to safeguard global peace nuclear weapons may now, or soon In addition, the international conven- and security, it is essential that will be, available to terrorist groups. tion on the physical protection of national governments and the world The challenges facing the nuclear materials must be strength- community recognize that the twin international community from terror- ened and expanded, and greater dangers of international terrorism ism have been greatly compounded efforts made to safeguard fissile and nuclear proliferation pose by the world’s failure to reduce and materials in civilian use. entirely new threats that demand eliminate nuclear weapons. HEU can, however, be readily immediate and sustained attention. Most immediately, the members of the United Nations must adopt and effectively implement the proposed international conventions on international terrorism and on nuclear terrorism. More generally, the large quanti- ties of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) that are poorly controlled and otherwise unaccounted for in the for- mer Soviet Union and dozens of other countries demand immediate attention and action by the world community. HEU poses the danger that it is President George W. Bush and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan view the aftermath far easier to manufacture into a of the September 11 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 3 Special Report

Letter to the Editor arranged some years ago between the USA and Russia to dilute 500 tonnes Sir Joseph Rotblat, FRS of the latter’s uranium but, for The Times, 15 September 2001 mainly commercial reasons, this is proceeding at an incredibly slow pace n the agonizing analysis of Tues- managed to acquire such a device (about 30 tonnes per year). President day’s tragic events, two points need and had already smuggled it into a I George W. Bush should authorize an to be stressed germane to future dan- city in the USA, or, indeed, in the UK. acceleration of the programme. gers. One is the complete disregard Try to imagine devastation ten, or There are also large quantities of by the perpetrators for human life, as even a hundred, times greater than plutonium, in the USA and Russia, evidenced by the choice of targets we saw on Tuesday. The mind bog- from the dismantlement of nuclear and the timing of the attacks on New gles. But this is a real threat. warheads. A programme for the dis- York. The second is that the terrorists Urgent measures need to be taken position of the plutonium has been are a powerful organization with to lessen the probability of this occur- prepared but according to recent huge financial, manpower, and very ring, namely by reducing the avail- reports, the design work on a US likely technological resources. This ability of the materials necessary to plutonium immobilization plant has means that much more devastating nuclear weapons - highly-enriched been suspended, apparently for finan- attacks cannot be excluded. uranium and plutonium. cial reasons. The Russian programme One such attack could be by the There are huge quantities of is also ailing for lack of finance. Here use of a biological weapon, and there weapon-grade uranium. Russia has again President Bush should take are plenty of them in the world. But more than 1000 tonnes, enough to action. far worse would be the use of a make 20,000 atom bombs. It is quite Yours faithfully, nuclear device. I would not be sur- easy to render it harmless by mixing Joseph Rotblat prised if a group like Bin Laden’s had it with natural uranium. A deal was

Why Root Causes are Important work; we should act on the root causes instead. Thomas Homer-Dixon But these are grade-school non- Toronto Globe and Mail, September 26, 2001 sequiturs. Let’s start with the first: Do we excuse or legitimize crime hat we urgently need is sub- clouded by sloppy logic and analysis when we examine its causes? Of Wtlety of thought. We need to in the haste to say something – any- course not! And the same holds true be able to make crucial distinctions, thing – that makes sense of the situa- for terrorism. We can explain why a for instance between culpability and tion. One issue that has become person committed a crime – say, a innocence, combatant and noncom- clouded is whether it’s reasonable to murder – by pointing to the factors batant, and the legitimate and illegiti- talk about terrorism’s “root causes.” that caused the person to do it. We mate uses of force. If we make such Some commentators declare that any may even trace these factors far back distinctions, it’s more likely that we’ll discussion of root causes legitimizes into the person’s history – to their guide ourselves successfully through terrorism by making excuses for it. upbringing, their childhood this crisis. Sadly, though, subtlety is Others suggest that people who want economic circumstances and the like. the first casualty of anger. to examine root causes are arguing, But this rarely keeps us from holding The debate surrounding the essentially, that we shouldn’t take the person morally responsible for events of September 11 is being punitive action because it won’t the crime. We can, in other words,

4 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Special Report

we understand the sources of terror- ism and do something about them, we can arm ourselves to the teeth, rampage across the planet with our militaries, suspend many of our civil liberties, and still not protect ourselves from this menace. Now the second argument. Are those who want to examine the root causes of terrorism saying we should delay our efforts to track down and punish those responsible for this lat- est attack? Again, of course not. The analogy of a terrible illness, like cancer, is useful here. We must excise the social pathology of terror- ism - which means we must identify, track down, and destroy the culprits – just as we cut out a cancerous tumor. But when we’re dealing with a critical illness, the task usually does- n’t end there. We also want to change the underlying factors – such as smoking – that make cancer more likely to emerge in the first place. What are terrorism’s underlying factors? They are many, they com- examine and acknowledge the root because they locate the cause in the bine in complex ways, and they vary causes of the person’s behavior, with- nature of the perpetrators or their from one incident to another. out letting them off the moral hook. group. What really infuriates these In the Middle East and South The two issues – of explanation and commentators is any attempt to look Asia, they include a demographic responsibility – are distinct. at factors further afield – especially explosion that has produced a huge One would think this is all pretty those that might lie in the structure bulge of urbanized, unemployed obvious. So why do some commenta- and functioning of the planet’s econ- young men – the most dangerous tors object so vociferously to any dis- omy, politics, and society. Why? social group of all, according to cussion of terrorism’s root causes? I Because such factors could implicate many social scientists. They also suspect it’s because they don’t like us in the West. include environmental stresses – espe- where this discussion may lead. They So, these commentators declare cially shortages of cropland and fresh seem quite willing to accept some any consideration of root causes to water – that have crippled farming in kinds of explanations of the latest be off limits. And they throw calum- the countryside and forced immense barbarity – for instance, that the ter- nies at anyone who raises these issues. numbers of people into squalid urban rorists were depraved, mad, or the Yet by keeping us from learning slums, where they are easy fodder for product of a particularly wicked sub- about the origins of the threats we fanatics. The impact of these factors culture of radical Islam. Such expla- face, this attitude could easily make is compounded by chronic conflict nations aren’t very threatening us less safe over the long run. Until (including the Israeli/Palestinian and

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 5 Special Report

Afghan conflicts) that have shattered poverty, or otherwise treated with miserable, look for an explanation of economies and created vast refugee disrespect. In fact, their relative that misery. Rightly or wrongly, they camps; by the region’s corrupt, wealth and education can reinforce a often focus their anger on those who incompetent, and undemocratic gov- twisted sense of responsibility to do are doing better. Inevitably, in a large ernments; and by an international something for their suffering brothers group, some will be susceptible to political and economic system that’s and sisters. In the case of radical wild and fantastic ideas that say vio- more concerned about Realpolitik, Islamic terrorists, such grievances are lence is the solution. oil supply, and the interests of global often expressed as anger over Ameri- As the disparities of wealth and finance than about the well-being of can policy toward Israel and Iraq and opportunity on our planet widen, this the region’s human beings. American support for “un-Islamic” problem is certain to get worse. We The receptivity of young men to Middle Eastern governments. live in a seething, discontented world, terror’s radical message is People who are miserable, or who and we ignore that fact at our peril. enormously increased by this legacy strongly identify with those who are of conflict, dislocation, and – yes – poverty in the region. From the refugee camps in Pakistan’s North- west Frontier Province to the squalid Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive streets of Gaza, we have ignored – for Test Ban Treaty far too long – festering wounds of Statement of the Pugwash Council discontent. 12 November 1999 At this point, though, many com- mentators stumble into yet another Although issued in November 1999, the Pugwash Council statement, “Nuclear mistake: they say that such disloca- Weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” remains as relevant and tion and poverty in distant lands urgent today. A new sense of momentum in US-Russian cooperation to greatly can’t be among the root causes of ter- reduce nuclear arsenals, tragically spurred by the need for global cooperation in rorism, because the perpetrators of the wake of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks, is a positive sign, but much the New York atrocity apparently remains to be accomplished if the world is to eliminate the nuclear threat. lived among us and were relatively educated and wealthy. But this argu- ince its inception in 1957, and other states to follow suit. ment assumes that people act only in SPugwash has worked assiduously The U.S. Senate voted, however, response to their direct, personal to end nuclear testing; we have seen against ratification of the Treaty last experiences, which is absurd. this as an essential step towards the month, and this should be a matter of Sometimes terrorists are recruited eventual abolition of nuclear great concern because it is evidence directly from communities in misery. weapons. All of the first five nuclear of serious dissension between Presi- This seems to be the case with many weapon states (NWS) undertook to dent Clinton and important elements of the Palestinian suicide bombers forgo further nuclear tests by signing in the Congress: dissension so serious that plague Israel. Sometimes, the CTBT, and to date, 150 other that the United States may be unable though, they are recruited from states have signed it. According to the to act coherently and constructively wealthier and more educated groups agreement, the Treaty will come into on important issues of foreign policy, – precisely because they can penetrate force after being ratified by 44 speci- even when public opinion is strongly our societies more easily. fied states. Two nuclear weapon supportive of its doing so, as was the These people can still powerfully states, France and the UK, ratified the case in the instance of the Compre- identify with communities elsewhere CTBT in April 1998. Ratification by hensive Test Ban Treaty. This is espe- that they believe have been exploited, the United States would have been a cially worrisome at this time consid- victimized, reduced to crushing strong inducement to Russia, China ering that relations between Russia

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We appeal to the first five NWS and NATO to stop blocking discussion on nuclear disarmament at the CD. Finally, we appeal to people of goodwill everywhere to awaken to the perilous situation in which we find ourselves, and which may even be worsening. The abatement of the immediate danger, after the end of the Cold War, produced the percep- tion that the nuclear issue could be taken off the agenda of problems affecting world security. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, and now the inability, because of domestic political considerations, of the United States to play as con- structive a role in respect of nuclear Destruction of a Minuteman III silo weapons issues-and, more generally, international affairs- as it otherwise might, as evidenced by the debacle in and the West have, in important Bangladesh, Chile, China, Colombia, the US Senate over the CTBT, have respects, taken a turn for the worse in Democratic Republic of Congo, demonstrated that this complacency the last several years, because the Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, was misguided. There is an urgent nuclear weapons states have made it North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, need to bring the nuclear problem clear that they continue to see nuclear Turkey, the United States, Ukraine back to the forefront of attention. weapons as critical components of and Vietnam (three of these, India, their military postures and policies, North Korea and Pakistan have also with, in the case of Russia, there yet to sign) to ratify the Treaty at the “For inspiration on the subject being evidence of even increasing earliest opportunity. [of nuclear weapons arms control], emphasis on them, and because of We remind those nuclear weapon continuing, and perhaps even increas- states, parties to the Non-Proliferation I have come across no one more ing, risks of the spread of nuclear Treaty, that have not yet ratified the credible than the noble, Nobel weapons and fissionable materials. CTBT that they are legally bound by For the sake of humanity we Article VI of the NPT to proceed in Laureate Pugwash. No group must avoid a return to the dark age good faith to nuclear disarmament. has made a more invaluable of the Cold War. Accordingly, we We call on the Russian appeal to governments to take action government to ratify START 2 contribution to reversing the to prevent such a catastrophe. In so that the bilateral disarmament Doomsday Clock.” particular: process can proceed under the terms We call on the states that have of START 2 and subsequently The Honorable Abdul Sattar, signed the CTBT to affirm that they START 3. Foreign Minister of Pakistan will not resume testing. We call on members of the Confer- Speech at the 2001 Carnegie International We call on the states whose ratifi- ence on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva Non-Proliferation Conference, cation is necessary for the CTBT to to conclude quickly a treaty to halt the 18 June 2001, Washington, DC come into force, i.e. Algeria, production of fissile materials.

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 7 PUGWASH MEETING No. 262

7th Pugwash Workshop on the Middle East: Palestine, Israel and the Middle East Peace Process Alexandria, Egypt, 26–29 April 2001

Report were conducted in a straightforward, foreseeable failure of the process. business-like atmosphere, notwith- One participant argued that the by John Whitbeck standing the extremely tense and collapse of the Oslo process was vir- grim situation on the ground in Israel tually inevitable from the start and he 7th Pugwash workshop and Palestine as the Al-Aqsa intifada should surprise no one, that no on the Middle East, entitled entered its eighth month. amount of mutual concessions would TPalestine, Israel and the Mid- Discussions during the workshop have changed the results, that the dle East Peace Process, was held in focused on the successes and failures official positions of both sides are Alexandria, Egypt, from 26-29 April, of the Oslo process, refugees, Jeru- irreconcilable and that psychological 2001. Hosted by the Swedish Insti- salem, areas for potential security, developments on both sides in recent tute in Alexandria in coordination economic and scientific cooperation months have made the obstacles to with the Swedish Pugwash Group, and how best to keep hopes for peace peace insurmountable. the workshop brought together 21 alive even if progress toward peace is Another participant cited as a participants from ten countries, unlikely in the near term. principal flaw the procedural goal including six Israelis and three Pales- of relying on a gradual confidence- The Oslo process tinians. Other Palestinians who had building process, with the parties planned to attend were unable to do While some participants cited certain moving from easy questions to more so due to a total blockade imposed successes attributable to the Oslo difficult ones. The possibility was on the occupied Palestinian territories process and asserted that its failure raised that the chances of success in connection with Israel’s indepen- was not inevitable, the emphasis in might have been higher had the par- dence celebrations. The discussions discussions was on the flaws and ties addressed the difficult questions first and attempted a global “one fell swoop” solution. Other “landmines” cited included: (1) the critical role given in the Declaration of Principles to UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the goal of the process, when each side knew well that the other had a radically different view as to what Resolution 242 means; (2) the great emphasis placed by the Declar- ation of Principles on joint economic development schemes (none of which were carried out); and (3) the failure of both sides to deal firmly with their own extremists. Continuing settle- El Iskandarˆıya ment building and expansion was

8 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 262

also cited as an exacerbating element form, as well as personal security for spread Israeli reaction to Palestinian having a major confidence-destroying Israelis from the start of the process, insistence that Israel formally ack- effect on Palestinian opinion. even before the Palestinians could be nowledge the Palestinian right of Another participant, while shar- sure where the process was leading. return (i.e., that this insistence is ing the general view that blame Other participants suggested that proof that the Palestinians still seek should properly be shared by both it may be unfair to say that the Oslo Israel’s destruction and are not inter- sides, felt that it was difficult to process failed, because, like commu- ested in peace), is both illogical and equate the occupier and the occupied. nism, it was never really tried, being dangerous in its consequences. A dis- According to this view, when the overwhelmed by negligence, foot- tinction must be drawn, it was Barak “offer” of July 2000, charac- dragging and sheer bad faith on both argued, between the Palestinian right terized as the most “generous” Israel sides. Perhaps the process failed of return (which exists as a matter of would ever make, failed to constitute because, at various crossroads, the international law and does not a true end to the occupation and a depend on whether people were genuinely independent state in the 22 expelled or not, or on whether Israel percent of historical Palestine con- So-called “terrorism” has been the formally acknowledges it) and the quered in 1967, despair set in and response to occupation throughout actual return of Palestinians to Israel. then exploded. There comes a time It was suggested that, while the Pales- when people simply get fed up, and it history in all kinds of colonial tinian leadership seeks formal recog- should not be forgotten that the situations. nition of Palestinian rights, it does seven-year “peace process” followed not seek the return of huge numbers a six-year intifada. The expectation of Palestinians to Israel. of the Palestinian people was that The challenge presented was one occupation would be replaced by wrong decisions were consistently of finding a way to accommodate the emancipation, but this didn’t happen. made, with both sides choosing to Palestinian right of return to Israel So-called “terrorism” has been the violate agreements and thereby creat- while avoiding any actual return in response to occupation throughout ing distrust rather than trust. numbers so significant as to threaten history in all kinds of colonial situa- One participant expressed the Israel’s character as a Jewish state (a tions. So long as Israel chooses to view that it will be much more diffi- character implicitly accepted by continue the occupation, according cult to relaunch the Oslo process Palestine through its explicit accep- to this view, it will be met with resis- than it was to start it in the first tance of UN General Assembly Reso- tance, and the resistance will be sus- place, as perceptions of the “other” lution 181 in Palestine’s 1988 Decla- pended only when there is an agreed on both sides are now even worse ration of Independence). Thus, the mechanism providing real hope for than pre-Oslo and because the negotiating gap between the two an end to the occupation. enhanced expectations of peace, so sides was perceived as being more Another participant saw the fun- dramatically disappointed, have pro- about conceptualization (absolute damental flaw in the Oslo process as duced a sense of betrayal and right vs. humanitarian generosity) the failure to make the understand- extreme distrust on both sides. than about actual outcomes. ings and expectations of both sides It was suggested that, from a clear at the start. While the Palestini- Refugees Palestinian standpoint, the option to ans assumed that the object of the More encouragingly, a paper was have meaningful choices about process was to end the occupation, presented which convincingly argued whether or not to actually return to this participant felt that most Israelis that viable alternatives for dealing Israel is the central issue. Palestinian assumed that the object of the with the refugee issue and the Pales- leaders need to be able to say to their process was to obtain Palestinian tinian right of return on a mutually people, “Yes, you have an opportu- acquiescence in, and acceptance of, satisfactory basis do exist. nity to return to Israel, but you also the occupation in a restructured This view contends that the wide- have a variety of other options. Some

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intellectually sound, viewed gaining acceptance of them from any level of Israeli society as highly problematic. Another participant stated that any Israeli acknowledgement of the Pales- tinian right of return was out of the question since it would constitute an acknowledgement that Israel was “born in sin” and would thereby be totally contrary to Israel’s national narrative. Another argued that there was no reason to believe that any people given the right to immigrate to a rich state from a poor state would not avail themselves of that right. From another perspective, it was sug- gested that it is illogical to deny a Mohamed Kadry Said and Joseph Alpher right of return to people actually born in a particular place while of them are quite attractive. You turn would mean that opting to granting such a right to others based choose.” Israeli and Palestinian nego- return to Israel would become less on some possible ancestors 3000 tiators should put aside the issue of and less attractive compared to ear- years ago. the basis on which the options are lier resettlement elsewhere, accompa- Jerusalem grounded and concentrate on struc- nied by immediate access to a major turing an attractive “menu” of financial package of assistance and Further long-term encouragement for options from which each individual compensation. the peace process was provided by a refugee could make his or her own It was noted that, from an Israeli paper on Jerusalem suggesting that, personal choice. As a practical mat- point of view, the return of some in the aftermath of the Camp David ter, if refugees are given an attractive refugees is more threatening than the negotiations, which shattered Israel’s set of resettlement options, the great return of others, the least threatening taboo against any discussion of majority would, it was argued, being actual 1948 refugees, of whom “sharing” or “dividing” Jerusalem, almost certainly not choose to reset- the number still living is quite several viable options for a solution tle in Israel. limited. The return of all actual 1948 to the status of Jerusalem acceptable The paper emphasized the desir- refugees, accompanied by their minor to both sides now exist. ability of establishing an agreed “rate children in the rare cases where The legal argument was of return” to Israel rather any total minor children exist, should be possi- developed (seemingly not disputed by cap or time limit on return. The exis- ble. Such refugees would have no any participants) that Israel currently tence of a regulated rate of return long-term impact on Israeli possesses sovereignty (defined here as would mean that, if more Palestini- demographics and would pose no the state-level equivalent of legal title ans seek to return to Israel than this security threat. In the context of or ownership) over no part of rate permits in the near term, candi- refugee resettlement, the possibilities Jerusalem (East or West) and that the dates would have to wait in a queue. of land swaps and bi-national zones only way that Israel will ever acquire The greater the number who seek to were also evoked. sovereignty over any part of return to Israel, the longer the queue In response, one participant, Jerusalem is by agreeing with Pales- and thus the longer the wait. This in while conceding that such ideas were tine on a fair basis for either sharing or dividing sovereignty over the city

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(or doing a bit of both) which is rec- and-share solution, under which the important that the religious aspect of ognized as fair and accepted by the “condominium” principle of joint the conflict not move to the international community. Moreover, undivided sovereignty would apply forefront, since this could place the if Israelis perceived sharing or divid- only to the contested core of the city emphasis on absolute and abstract ing sovereignty over Jerusalem as a while sovereignty in the rest of the issues which are impossible to recon- way to acquire or achieve sovereignty city would be divided as in the sec- cile. One participant observed that over Jerusalem, rather than as a giv- ond alternative. It was proposed that putting religious people on any nego- ing up or relinquishing of sovereignty the Palestinians might wisely propose tiating team is the best way to ensure over Jerusalem, then a mutually all three alternatives simultaneously that the problems at issue will not be acceptable resolution of the status of resolved. Jerusalem (and hence peace) would It was noted that there is a clear be vastly easier to achieve. In seeking a solution to the status contradiction between the general It was emphasized that, in seeking consensus of Israelis and Palestinians of Jerusalem, it is essential to a solution to the status of Jerusalem, that Jerusalem must be an open and it is essential to distinguish between distinguish between sovereignty, undivided city and the current strong sovereignty, which is an intensely which is an intensely emotional preference of both peoples for clear, emotional issue, and municipal “hard” borders between the states issue, and municipal administration, which is not, and and peoples. Any peace requires a that negotiators should focus first on administration, which is not. mutually satisfactory solution to the agreeing upon administrative struc- status of Jerusalem, such a solution tures for an open, physically can only be found in the context of a undivided and fully demilitarized city. to Israel and undertake to accept “warm and open” peace with “soft” It was further suggested that, while whichever one Israel prefers. borders, but neither Israelis nor most Israelis and most Palestinians It was noted that, during the Palestinians are thinking any longer view sovereignty over Jerusalem as Camp David negotiations, at the in terms of a “warm and open” an objective of great importance to opposite extreme from the approach peace. be secured, the more rational of finessing the sovereignty issue approach is to view it as an obstacle through joint undivided sovereignty Palestinian-Israeli cooperation to peace to be overcome and to seek over the whole city, minds were Discussion on security cooperation mechanisms and procedures to focused like a laser beam on the issue issues focused on the desirability (and demystify and banalize the issue of of exclusive sovereignty over the implausibility) of including Israel sovereignty. most sensitive square meters of the within a Middle East Nuclear-Free Three viable sovereignty alterna- city for both sides, the Haram al- Zone. While one participant argued tives with the potential to be accept- Sharif/Temple Mount. Without any that security issues cannot be delayed able both to most Israelis and to most credible reason to believe that doing until after the “peace process” is Palestinians were cited: (1) a pure so would prove constructive, this completed and that the creation of “condominium” solution, under approach was almost certainly not such a zone and enhanced security which sovereignty over an undivided constructive. Adopting it risked con- for all in the region should be pur- Jerusalem would be shared, making verting a clash of nationalisms into a sued in parallel with the “peace the city the one, indivisible and inspi- clash of religions, which is potentially process”, another stated that Israel rational capital of two sovereign much more dangerous and difficult would only be interested in such a states; (2) a pure division solution, to resolve. zone once a “comprehensive” peace under which each state would have Several participants agreed that it has been achieved and Israel is con- exclusive sovereignty with respect to was most unfortunate that religious vinced that it will endure. those Jerusalem districts in which its sites had become a focus of attention It was suggested that effective people live; and (3) a mixed divide- at Camp David and that it was most regional security (and not just Israeli-

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 11 Pugwash Meeting No. 262

Palestinian security) is necessary and More generally, it was suggested that Participants that, in the absence of ongoing multi- economic growth in a Palestinian lateral security talks pursuant to the state should be viewed as an essential Madrid process, Pugwash might con- Israeli security imperative. Mr. Joseph Alpher, Independent Writer/Consultant and Director, The sider picking up this responsibility Political Security Domain, Israel and challenge. There was vigorous The future Ms. Carin Atterling Wedar, Lecturer in disagreement as to the reasonableness Little optimism was expressed about History of Religion and Ethics; Secretary- of Arab fears over the threats posed progress toward peace while Ariel General, Swedish Initiative for Peace, by Israel’s weapons of mass destruc- Sharon is Israel’s prime minister. Security and International Relations (SIP- tion and missile capabilities and, in There was a consensus that, in light SIR), Stockholm, Sweden; Board Mem- particular, by statements in April of the current dangerous cycle in ber, Swedish Pugwash Group from Israeli Minister for National which each side disbelieves in the sin- Prof. Amatzia Baram, Lecturer, Depart- Infrastructure Avigdor Lieberman cerity of the other side and sees no ment of Middle East History, and Direc- tor, The Jewish-Arab Center and the Mid- amounting to public threats to bomb hope for peace, the immediate need is dle East Institute, University of Haifa, the Aswan Dam. for short-term crisis management to Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel Security problems at a personal prevent the situation from spiraling Prof. Gabriel Baramki, Consultant to the level were also evoked with respect to completely and irremediably out of Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education, the recent explosive growth in the control. Jerusalem; President, Palestinian Council availability of small arms in the occu- Various suggestions were made for Justice and Peace; Member, Pugwash pied Palestinian territories, both for constructive steps which could, Council among Palestinians and among Israeli nevertheless, be taken in the near Ms. Hania Bitar, Director General, Edi- settlers, resulting in a higher level of term. These suggestions included: (1) tor-in-chief, Palestinian Youth Associa- tion for Leadership and Rights Activation lethal violence during the current replacing the Palestinian Authority (PYALARA), East Jerusalem intifada than in the original one. with an internationally recognized Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director, Among the responses possible, it was Palestinian state; (2) ensuring a total Pugwash Conferences on Science and proposed that the introduction of freeze on all settlement building; and World Affairs, Cambridge, MA, USA international peace-keeping forces, (3) preventing inflammatory unilat- Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom, Senior closer compliance with the Oslo- eral actions by either side. It was also Research Associate, The Jaffee Center for process limitations on arms, strength- suggested that the Palestinian leader- Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel ening Palestinian civil society as an ship needs to put forward publicly a Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of alternative to gun rule, and uni- clear and detailed description of the Theoretical Physics, University of Rome laterally removing some of the most peace that Palestine seeks, in order to “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy; Chairman, provocative settlements (particu- generate more support for the peace Pugwash Council larly in the Gaza Strip) should be process with Israeli public opinion. Dr. Maher El-Kurd, Economic Advisor to considered. Several participants noted that the President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA); Secretary General of Visions of future economic coop- both sides seem to be hoping that if The Higher Commission for Investment eration, particularly with respect to they inflict enough pain on the other, and Finance; Deputy Minister for Econ- water resources, agriculture, and envi- over a long enough period of time, omy & Trade ronmental protection, were also pre- then the other side will lose heart and Amb. Omran El-Shafei, Adviser, National sented. The potential for developing give them what they failed to achieve Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Cairo, desalination plants based on natural through negotiations – an end to the Egypt gas deposits recently found off the occupation or acquiescence in the Amb. Ahmed Haggag, Advisor for Gaza coast was mentioned, and one occupation. However, no participant African Affairs to the Minister of Foreign participant urged the development of expected that such violence would Affairs of Egypt the Ashdod/Gaza/El Arish area as a result in a satisfactory solution for cooperative tripartite “megaport”. either side in the foreseeable future.

12 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 262

Participants Papers

Dr. Fawzy H. Hammad, former WORKING PAPERS BACKGROUND PAPERS President, Atomic Energy Authority Joseph Alpher (Israel): The Oslo Process: Gabriel Baramki (Palestine): “The Neces- (AEA) of Egypt Failures, Lessons, Alternatives. sary Ingredients for a Comprehensive and Lasting Peace in the Middle East from a Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said, Carin Atterling Wedar (Sweden): Is There Palestinian Perspective”, paper presented Head of Military Studies Unit and Tech- a Chosen People? nology Advisor, Al-Ahram Center for at the ISODARCO Winter Course, Jeffrey Boutwell (USA): Light Weapons Andalo (Trento), Italy, 21-28 January Political and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram and Israeli-Palestinian Peace. 2001. Foundation, Cairo, Egypt; Professor of Missile Mechanics of Flight, Military Maher El-Kurd (Palestine): Israeli-Pales- Ove Bring (Sweden): “The Condominium Technical College (MTC), Cairo, Egypt tinian Relations: An Appraisal. Solution as a Gradual Process: Thoughts of an International Lawyer after the Con- Mohamed Kadry Said (Palestine): Crisis Prof. Herbert Marcovich, retired Profes- ference”, Afterword in Negotiating the of Idealism in the Middle East. The sor of the Institut Pasteur, Paris, France, Future: Vision and Realpolitik in the Nuclear Dilemma. and former Member of the Pugwash Con- Quest for a Jerusalem of Peace, ed. by tinuing Committee in 1962, and one of Herbert Marcovich (France): Palestine, Chaia Beckerman (1996). the five members of the Pugwash Execu- Israel and the Middle East Peace Process. David Makovsky (USA): “Middle East tive Committee at its creation in 1963 Gueorgui Mirski (Russia): Arab-Israeli Peace Through Partition”, Foreign Ms. Merri Minuskin, Director, Middle Relations: The Way Forward. Affairs, March-April 2001, pp. 28-45 East Desk, International Institute for Soli- Jerome Segal (Israel): Right of Return darity and Development, Israel; Pedagog- Confusions. ical Advisor, Arab Teachers Training Col- John V. Whitbeck (USA): The Status of lege Jerusalem under International Law, an Prof. Gueorgui Mirski, Chief Research address at the Conference of the United Fellow, Institute of World Economy and Arab Emirates Jurists Association on International Relations (IMEMO), “Human Rights under Israeli Occupa- tion” in Sharjah on April 11, 2001. Moscow, Russia John V. Whitbeck (USA): “Time for a Dr. Jerome Segal, Director, The Jerusalem New Language of Peace,” International, Project, Center for International and March 2001, pp. 22-23. Security Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA; President, The Jewish Peace Lobby

Prof. Emmanuel Sivan, Vice-President, Israel Science Foundation, Hebrew Uni- versity, Jerusalem, Israel; Professor, Hebrew University

Mrs. Charlotta Sparre, First Secretary, Embassy of Sweden, Cairo, Egypt

Mr. John Whitbeck (USA/Ireland), Lawyer, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Dr. Aharon Zohar, Consultant, Regional and Environmental Planning, Carmei- Yosef, Israel

STAFF

Claudia Vaughn - Pugwash Rome Office

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 13 PUGWASH MEETING No. 263

3rd Pugwash Workshop on Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security Castellón de la Plana, Spain, 4–6 May 2001

Report unconstrained by those governments themes were adduced. First is a grow- (Bosnia/Croatia, Rwanda, Somalia, ing recognition that states and gov- by Jeffrey Boutwell Liberia) – remain with us today. ernments have a responsibility to Nonetheless, there also remain quite protect their citizens (a concept far he third meeting of the Pug- different views in the world on the broader than humanitarian interven- wash Study Group on Inter- relationship of the individual to the tion). This then argues for moving Tvention, Sovereignty and state. Similarly, the international from a rights-based to a duty-based International Security was held 4-6 community has seen an advance in framework when it comes to protect- May 2001 in Castellón de la Plana, the clarification of international legal ing individual life and liberty. To do Spain. A total of 20 participants from perspectives, on modalities for pro- so, however, will entail forging broad 12 countries took part in the work- tecting the rights of the individual, mandates that can legitimize inter- shop, which was hosted by the Span- and on the options for intervention. vention as broadly as possible (e.g., ish Pugwash Group, with support Yet at the same time, there is decreas- the East Timor fact finding group). from the Fundacion Caixa Castellón. ing likelihood that action will be Also important is the need for full Special thanks are due to Federico taken, as the appetite for intervention cycle interventions, from pre-conflict García Moliner of Spanish Pugwash is decreasing. prevention to post-conflict and to Antonio Tirado Jiménez and Equally significant in thinking reconstruction. Institutionally, there Luis Barrachina of the Fundacion about humanitarian intervention is remain questions about the standing Caixa Castellón. General support for the fact that the world could well be and capabilities of regional organiza- the Pugwash Study Group has also moving into a period of renewed tions to advance humanitarian con- been provided by The Rockefeller strategic rivalry, marked by a renewal cerns. Finally, looming over all these Foundation. Participants took part in of individual state power, a reduced issues is Banquo’s ghost – the the workshop in their individual reliance on multilateral institutions, conspicuous absence of a specific capacities, and this report reflects and the return of nuclear weapons in American voice in the debate. only the views of the rapporteur. global politics (the latter stimulated In response, it was pointed out by a growing US-China rivalry, that if coalitions of the willing are Whither Humanitarian Intervention? nuclear proliferation concerns and US becoming less feasible, primarily The workshop began with an choices about dealing with those con- because the major actor (the US) is overview of where the international cerns, and nuclear weapons being a opting out, then doesn’t it make sense community currently stands regard- logical choice for countries wanting to to focus even more on pre-interven- ing the necessity and modalities of forestall intervention against them). tion strategies than on relying on mil- humanitarian interventions. It was In this situation, where the legal itary interventions once conflict has observed that the defining moments imperatives supporting humanitarian begun? In this regard, issues to be of the 1990s – where numerous peo- intervention may be strengthening examined would include modalities ples were the victims of pathological but global politics are mitigating of state building, conflict resolution, governments or groups against intervention, a number of coercive inducement, and coercive

14 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 263

cil is deadlocked, others said no, only a unanimous Security Council is empowered to legitimize intervention and the use of force. A different view emphasized that international law is based on nation, state, and sovereignty, and that notions of limited and relative sover- eignty must cut both ways. Moreover, the international community is not doing enough in terms of aid and support to improve conditions in developing countries so that these

Robert Legvold addresses workshop participants. don’t become the kind of failed state necessitating intervention. In response, it was asked whether prevention, and which organizations/ vention, one participant argued developing country opposition to actors are best suited to carry out against the notion that evolving cus- intervention is philosophical or based such modalities. One view noted tomary law is legitimizing humanitar- on the way that interventions have that, given the poor track record of ian intervention, but with an impor- been carried out. There was agree- conflict resolution, there is a need to tant caveat: though the UN Charter ment that the humanitarian rationale look more closely at coercive preven- remains clear on the requirement for for intervention must be broader tion (as formulated by Bruce Jentle- prior Security Council approval, the than the protection of political and son and others) and other early con- UN has given its approval post-facto civil rights, encompassing as well flict intervention strategies. At the by identifying certain crises as threats freedom from need and freedom other end of the spectrum is the need to the peace and to certain actions from fear. It was noted that the Inter- for multilateral involvement in con- (Haiti, Iraqi no-fly zones) as humani- national Commission on Intervention structing trusteeship governments tarian actions. Moreover, it was and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was that can restore stability in post-con- argued that, while Kosovo was not seeking to develop a concept of a flict societies. legitimate under international law, it ‘responsibility to protect’ that could In concluding this session, it was remains the case that international encompass these various components generally agreed that whatever inter- law should not be the final arbiter of of human rights [see page 33]. national consensus on intervention human actions. A different view brought up the did exist in the 1990s was largely due Another participant observed that need for developing a consensus on to the extant honeymoon between the the UN Charter does not contain a what exactly constitutes sovereignty US and Russia, and China’s general complete prohibition on the use of and the role of the state in providing voluntary absence, neither of which force (e.g., rescue of nationals, fight- basic human needs, as in many parts applies today. Even a Kosovo-type ing terrorism, self determination, of the world the state has never been operation will be hard to mount with- gross violations of human rights) and the primary provider of these goods in NATO, and Russia/China won’t that these can be seen as precedents (compared to community, tribe, fam- acquiesce the way they did earlier. in strengthening customary interna- ily, religion). tional law. Although one view held Finally, while recognizing the dif- Legitimacy and International Law that perhaps the 1951 Uniting for ficulty of obtaining legitimacy for In discussing the interplay of interna- Peace resolution could be a way to intervention within the current politi- tional law and humanitarian inter- take action when the Security Coun- cal system (veto power), several par-

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 15 Pugwash Meeting No. 263

ticipants returned to the proposition powers especially need to work with In the US, current debate focuses that actions can be based on consid- each other and with regional powers on assessments of national interest erations that are broader than strict to forge a division of labor on state (isolationists v. internationalists) in legal norms. Thus the process of building that can both protect indi- addition to value-based arguments norm building, and of holding states vidual rights and promote interna- about promoting human welfare (the accountable, is very important in tional stability. US has a special responsibility as a helping to legitimize the concept of Looking at the post-Soviet space, hyperpower to act on values and ‘protection of the individual’. the administrative boundaries of the strengthen norms). Several partici- USSR do not correspond with what pants held, however, that the distinc- Intervention and Great Power should have been the natural borders tion between interests and values is Relations of the newly independent states. artificial, as interests often support The argument was made that if we are Externally, the breakup of the Soviet values and values can underlie inter- moving away from multilateralism to Union as well as Yugoslavia led to a ests. Citing Tony Blair’s Chicago a state-based system, then modified renewal of historic ties (zones of speech on Kosovo, one participant balances of power and not global gov- interest) between indigenous regions stressed the importance of framing ernance are the more appropriate ref- and peoples with outside states that the intervention issue as one where erence points (similar to the 1920s) for had previously been contained (Ger- values inform interests. thinking about safeguarding the mans-Croats). More significantly, the In terms of structural strategies human condition. The key issue here UN was created on the basis of five for preventing conflict, it will be diffi- is the notion of responsibility and great powers, not one hyper-power, a cult to persuade the great powers of commitment to state-building even broken up former superpower, and a the cost-benefits of acting early, espe- when this falls outside areas of reshuffling of the three remaining cially when this is needed in so many national interest. Above all this means great powers (with China ascendent). places. Also difficult will be establish- the desirability of promoting stable, When you add the emergence of ing connections between ends and democratic states (of moving pre- three new nuclear powers (Israel, means, where the latter does matter, modern and modern states to post- India, Pakistan), it is obvious that both in causing injury and in causing modern status) and reducing inequali- new mechanisms, structures, and instability (and undermining long- ties in the international system. norms are needed to deal with a very term prospects for peace and stabil- In addition to issues of human different international situation. ity). This is precisely why this issue is welfare, however, it was argued that, The problem with both China so important, no matter what strat- although international security may and Russia, of course, is what types egy is employed, because in the end have slipped on policy agendas and is of outside engagement the two coun- interests will predominate over values no longer so important in determin- tries will find acceptable so that these in determining action. ing responses to humanitarian crises, regions don’t become major flash this view is myopic and short-sighted. points during a time of renewed Intervention and Military Force Strategic rivalry among the world’s strategic rivalry. At a minimum, it One participant argued in favor of major powers is returning. State was argued, what is needed is a con- maintaining a norm of non-interven- building and state collapse (especially sensus between ‘the West and the tion, but in a context where sover- in and around Asia) are crucially rest’ on issues of sovereignty and eignty entails responsibility for pro- important factors that could affect intervention before one can move to tecting individual rights – where international stability. China is now constructive engagement. In this states and governments need to ‘earn’ 4-5 separate regions proceeding inde- regard, a commitment to liberal the protections of sovereignty. pendently. There is a need to ensure internationalism (Shevardnadze) is an Can human rights be defended that such regional instabilities do not important component which has dis- through force; Can violence and re-ignite strategic rivalry. The great appeared in Russia. threats to the right to life be justified

16 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 263 in defense of human rights? The international community needs to focus on modalities of non-violent humanitarian intervention, while rec- ognizing that these won’t solve emer- gencies of mass killing such as occurred in East Pakistan, Cambodia, and Rwanda. Six principles were enumerated in defense of the use of force: • just cause (supreme humanitarian emergency – “shock to the conscience of mankind”); • last resort, exhausting peaceful solutions (but not in a drawn-out continuum), never forgetting that the use of force will always produce some harmful effects;

• seek to end the catastrophe as KFOR patrol with Kosovar Serb. quickly as possible; • non-combat immunity as the sine arise outside of the UN (e.g., the ties. How does one define non-com- qua non of proportionality; International Criminal Court, the bat immunity, and to what extent are • right intention (while recognizing landmines convention) that could non-military assets justifiable targets that beneficial outcomes can be sanction military intervention? in using force for humanitarian aims? produced from non-humanitarian In the end, international norms It was acknowledged that many intentions, e.g., Vietnam’s interven- can enable intervention, but they people see using military force in tion in Cambodia); won’t guarantee it. Thus it is all the defense of humanitarian aims as an • reasonable prospect of success more important to place the defense oxymoron. Nonetheless, the enumer- (both saving the victims and putting of human rights and values as being ation of principles that can guide the in place structures to safeguard both in the national interest and a use of military force is important not rights, though this will be very diffi- prime responsibility of states. just to shape policy but in the setting cult to do). The point was made that there of benchmarks for outside evaluation Regarding procedural rules will often be tension between the of the use of force by publics, media, underlying the use of force, should principles of proportionality (non- NGOs, etc., all of whom should hold one rely solely on Security Council combat immunity) and seeking to the intervenor accountable. To be authorization? Can there be cases of end a human rights catastrophe as sure, there will be differing interpre- implied authorization, based on quickly as possible. In the case of tations of military actions; for exam- existing UNSC resolutions (recogniz- Yugoslavia, the targeting of power ple, in relation to the 1977 Geneva ing that these could be politically plants, bridges, and economic infra- Protocol, NATO and Human Rights manipulated; e.g., the use of an Arab structure had less to do with degrad- Watch interpreted the bombing of force in defense of the Palestinians)? ing Serb military capabilities in bridges quite differently. The issue of What about General Assembly Kosovo than of putting maximum non-combat immunity is also prob- authorization (again, acknowledging economic pressure on the Milosevic lematic, in that hitting civilian targets that this could be politically misused)? regime to desist, though of course hard early in the Yugoslav campaign Finally, what new legal norms might this risked inflicting civilian casual- might have ended the war earlier,

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 17 Pugwash Meeting No. 263

human rights NGOs themselves organization is not one but many sometimes have to make these trade- actors, with different constituencies, offs in seeking to protect victims (of cultures, and funding levels. The compromising on questions of legiti- problem is exacerbated by the way macy with a regime, of supporting donor countries structure their fund- forceful interventions that might ing (priorities follow the money, not undermine long-term evolution of the other way around). The UN has norms that can protect future neither the time nor money for con- victims). tingency planning on crises and coor- Intervenors need to make provi- dination; Kosovo and Timor sion and elucidate strategies for pro- happened following several years of tecting civilians both during and after budget cuts, where UN departments forceful interventions. Human rights were most concerned with preserving NGOs will react differently to differ- their existence. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and ent types of military interventions Despite these obstacles, the UN is Air Cmde. Jasjit Singh (e.g., Dallaire protecting Rwandans, looking at full cycle planning, and is with suitable forces, and Short mas- the body most well equipped to do thus reducing overall civilian casual- sively bombing Yugoslavia to get so. It should be remembered that it is ties and adhering to the principle of Milosevic back to the negotiating often the poorer developing country proportionality. table). Both operations will entail members of the UN who are the ones It was noted that a US military civilian casualties, and both may be actually providing troops and critical doctrine which focuses on just cause the right strategy for the support for humanitarian operations, and speedy resolution, necessarily circumstances, but NGOs will and it is these same countries who relegating proportionality and civil- nonetheless react differently to them. make up the regional organizations ian immunity to second place, itself The point was also made that not which can provide on the ground constitutes a moral argument for the enough has been learned from knowledge and staying power. best method of reaching the goal. But unarmed responses to defuse conflict. Another challenge for full cycle given this doctrine, US forces are not planning is getting necessary involve- Full Cycle Planning optimally organized and trained for ment from those in the country/soci- humanitarian operations. Discussion began with the observa- ety being intervened against, In the end, the above discussion tion that the CNN effect and the especially in terms of post-conflict points to the need for more work on messiness of democracies precludes reconstruction. This was a problem the extent to which principles under- full cycle planning and full cycle in Somalia, where there was very lit- lying military intervention can shape involvement. Also, a failure to meet tle shared understanding with local decisions to both initiate and carry the stated objectives for interventions Somali leaders. out such campaigns. builds up over time and weakens the Lessons Learned and the prospect for future interventions. Bet- Way Forward NGOs and Humanitarian ter educated publics and improved Intervention communications in developing coun- The UN has been heavily criticized Human rights NGOs especially have tries, among other factors, make it for flawed outcomes that stem from a maximalist goal of protecting every dubious that effective colonial type flawed interventions (whether mili- individual’s rights, which can be in administrations are possible in tary or non-military). Yet the UN has tension with proportionality/net ben- today’s world. to deal with inherently unstable efit calculations of forceful interven- Regarding UN capabilities for full regions, where conflict/post-conflict tions on larger scale. In addition, cycle planning, remember that the is not a continuum but a cycle. The

18 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 263 organization is often called on to components were thought essential: Participants respond with insufficient notice (the assess the objectives; assess the set- post-conflict Kosovo situation was ting and actors involved; assess Ambassador (ret.) Ochieng Adala, Africa dumped on the UN with 3 weeks options; maintain solidarity among Peace Forum (APFO), Nairobi, Kenya notice); insufficient funds; and the coalition of the willing; and do no Prof. Vladimir Baranovsky, Deputy inequality in funding (Kosovo v. harm and stay the course. Director, Institute of World Economy and Sierra Leone). There are also the dif- Problems still remain, however, of International Relations (IMEMO), ficulties of coordination within the how to turn substantive principles Moscow, Russia UN and between UN agencies and into procedures for action; of provid- Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director, NGOs (there were some 200 in ing practical policy guidance on artic- Pugwash Conferences on Science and Kosovo shortly after the end of con- ulating principles and procedures for World Affairs, Cambridge, MA, USA flict) and the manipulation of the intervention. One participant Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of international community by warring thought that this task would be a nat- Theoretical Physics, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy; Chairman, parties. ural one for the ICISS, of specifying Pugwash Council Looking at the case of Africa, principles of legitimacy and opera- Dr. Jane Cocking, Humanitarian Coordi- there is now 40 years of intervention tional effectiveness. nator, Eastern Europe, FSU, Middle East, experience on the continent, but little Others recognized the difficulty of Oxfam GB, Oxford, UK in the way of lessons learned and transforming principles into practical Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Associate, strategizing on how to do it better. policy guidelines, but argued that Carnegie Endowment for International Issues of governance are critical to such an exercise is important in pro- Peace, Washington, DC, USA conflict prevention in Africa, of peo- moting convergence on these issues Dr. Renee de Nevers, Program Officer, ple focusing on what their govern- between the great powers, differing The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur ments can do for them, of holding regions, and different global Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, USA governments accountable. Once con- constituencies (security, development, Prof. Federico García-Moliner, Professor flict does break out, there will be no human rights communities). Also of Contemporary Science, University “Jaume I”, Castellón de la Plana, Spain; quick fixes, so be wary of rushing important is the effort to think about Member, Academic Board, European into a truce that will break down. concepts of national interest that Peace University, Castellón Branch; Vice- While conflict prevention is necessar- incorporate individual rights and the President, IUPAP ily a long-term strategy, this is where dangers posed by failed states that Ms. Michele Griffin, Policy Advisor, the focus should be: democratization, can help strengthen the case for inter- United Nations, New York, NY; Adjunct accountability, transparency, good vention, where needed. Professor, Columbia University School of International Public Affairs governance. In support of these Some participants argued for set- goals, some coercion (diplomatic, ting such issues in a global Dr. Victor Kamyshanov, Vice-Chairman, International Federation for Peace and economic) on the part of the interna- governance framework, where inter- Conciliation, Moscow, Russia; EC mem- tional community will be necessary. vention and human rights protection ber of the Coordinating Council of In terms of the way forward, affect issues of managing strategic NGO’s at the State Duma of the Russian many emphasized the need to recon- rivalry, UN reform and effectiveness, federation; Visiting Assistant Professor, State Academy of State Service for the cile intervention principles and proce- maldistribution of resources, and President of Russian Federation dures, while recognizing that inter- trans-national civil society. Prof. Robert Legvold, Professor of Politi- vention issues are drivers of Of course, the major question cal Science, The Harriman Institute, international relations and can either remains: where is the US in all this? Columbia University, New York, NY, facilitate cooperation or sharpen ten- What happens when the US opts out USA sions between the major powers and of multilateral institutions and coop- between and within different regions. erative arrangements? Regarding how to intervene, five

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 19 Pugwash Meeting No. 263

Participants Papers

Mr. Liam Mahoney, Lecturer, Princeton WORKING PAPERS BACKGROUND PAPERS University, Princeton, New Jersey, USA, Victor Kamyshanov (Russia): Thesis to Michele Griffin (USA): “Where Angels and Private Consultant to the Rockefeller the 3rd Seminar of the Pugwash Study Fear to Tread,” Security Dialogue, vol. Foundation Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and 31, no. 4, December 2000, pp. 421-435 International Security (Revised) Ms. Laila Manji, Strategic Planning Unit, Bruce W. Jentleson (USA): “Coercive Pre- Executive Office of the Secretary-Gen- Gwyn Prins (UK): Thinking about Inter- vention: Normative, Political and Policy eral, United Nations, New York, NY vention: An essay reflecting upon the Dilemmas,” USIP, Peaceworks 35, Octo- Dr. Gwyn Prins, Principal Research Fel- state of the debate ber 2000 low, The European Institute, London Jorge Rodriguez Grillo (Cuba): Are Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (USA): School of Economics, UK; Visiting Senior Changes Possible in the Nature of the “Humanitarian Intervention: The Lessons Fellow, Defence Evaluation & Research Sovereignty of the States?: Reconciliation Learned,” by, Current History, December Agency (MoD); Senior Fellow, Office of among different perspectives 2000, pp. 419-429 the Special Adviser on Central & Eastern European Affairs, Office of the Secretary- Laszlo Valki (Hungary): The Post-World- Liam Mahony (USA): “Military Interven- General, NATO War-Two International Legal System and tion in Human Rights Crises: Responses Humanitarian Intervention and Dilemmas for the Human Rights Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General, Movement,” slightly edited version of the Nick Wheeler (UK): Legitimating Pugwash Conferences on Science and paper presented to the recent consultation Humanitarian Intervention: Principles World Affairs; Professor Emeritus, Mass- of the International Council on Human and Procedures achusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Rights Policy on Military Intervention in Cambridge, MA, USA Human Rights Crises: Responses and Dr. Taylor Seybolt, Project Leader, Con- Dilemmas for the Human Rights Move- flict & Peace Enforcement Project, Stock- ment holm International Peace Research Insti- tute (SIPRI), Solna, Sweden

Dr. Jorge Rodriguez-Grillo, Political Offi- cer, Cuban Peace Movement, Habana, Cuba; Professor, Methods of Investiga- tion and Chancellor of the International Pugwash Conferences on Association of Educators for World Peace Science and World Affairs Pugwash Air Cmde. Jasjit Singh, Director, Institute OCCASIONAL PAPERS OCCASIONAL PAPER

issued by the Council of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs for Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA), Nobel Peace Prize 1995 from the New Delhi, India; Member, Pugwash Volume 2 Number 3 September 2001 50th PUGWASH CONFERENCE: Executive Committee Eliminating the Prof. László Valki, Professor of Interna- tional Law, Eötvös University, Budapest, Causes of War Hungary; Director, NATO Information and Research Center, Eötvös University Essays by

50th PUGWASH CONFERENCE: Dr. Nicholas Wheeler, Senior Lecturer, Eliminating the ROBERT HINDE & LEA PULKKINEN; Causes of War HELEN WATSON & JACK BOAG; Department of International Politics, Uni- Cambridge, UK, August 2000 ALEXANDER NIKITIN; MORRIS versity of Wales, Aberystwyth, Ceredi- Essays by ROBERT HINDE & LEA PULKKINEN; HELEN WATSON & JACK BOAG; ALEXANDER NIKITIN; MORRIS MILLER; ANNE H. EHRLICH, PETER GLEICK & KEN CONCA; JOSEPH ROTBLAT, MILLER; ANNE H. EHRLICH, PETER gion, UK MATTHEW MESELSON, RALPH BENJAMIN, ANA MARÍA CETTO & MICHAEL ATIYAH Foreword by ROBERT HINDE & JOSEPH ROTBLAT GLEICK & KEN CONCA; JOSEPH PUGWASH STAFF ROTBLAT, MATTHEW MESELSON, RALPH BENJAMIN, ANA MARÍA Rome Pugwash Office – Claudia Vaughn CETTO & MICHAEL ATIYAH Foreword by ROBERT HINDE & JOSEPH ROTBLAT

20 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 PUGWASH MEETING No. 264

15th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions: Approaching the First CWC Review Conference Oegstgeest, The Netherlands, 23–24 June 2001

Report the Spring of 2003, that being in the fifth problems that had been overshadowed year after entry into force of the Con- during the first four years of the Con- by Pamela Mills vention. vention’s implementation have in the last Issues that it would be important for year emerged to trouble the Organiza- his was the fifteenth of the cur- the Review Conference to address were tion.The first is the delay in Russia’s pro- rent workshop series on chem- duly considered by workshop gram of chemical weapons destruction. Tical and biological warfare participants, as well as the form to be Although there has been a marked (CBW) that Pugwash has convened in taken by the review process as a whole. improvement over last year, achieved by collaboration with the Harvard Sussex This was after an initial agenda item in placing the destruction program under Program on CBW Armament and Arms which the workshop heard reports on civilian control in the form of the Russ- Limitation (HSP) and the ninth to be progress in implementation of the CWC ian Munitions Agency and increases in hosted in the Netherlands by the Dutch and the Biological and Toxin Weapons both budgetary allocation and political Pugwash Group.The workshop was held Convention (BWC) and related activi- attention, a revised program for destruc- at the Congreshotel “Oud Poelgeest”. ties.The workshop closed with discus- tion must still be submitted to the Orga- Participating by invitation were 37 peo- sion of the future work of the Pugwash nization. More consultations between ple from 14 countries (Belgium, Canada, Study Group, including possible topics Russia and the OPCW,and between China, Cuba, Germany,India, Iran, Mex- for further workshops. Russia and individual member states, are ico, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, required if the CWC deadlines are to be CWC: Progress in Implementation Switzerland, the UK and the USA), all of extended.The program recently them doing so in their private capacities. Recent successes of the Organization for approved by the Russian government The present report is the sole responsi- the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons expects destruction to be completed in bility of its author, who was asked by the (OPCW) were identified.They include 2012, with one percent of Russia’s Cate- meeting to prepare a report in consulta- the establishment of the inspection gory 1 chemical weapons destroyed by tion with the Steering Committee. It regime for industrial facilities producing 2003.To achieve these ends, increased does not necessarily reflect a consensus discrete organic chemicals (DOC), near international support is a necessity. of the workshop as a whole, or of the completion of the 1000th inspection, Second, there is a need for balance in Study Group. adoption by the Executive Council of application of the verification regime. The workshop was intended to pro- the UN-OPCW relationship agreement, Currently 80 percent of the OPCW’s vide an early opportunity for interested progress in the destruction of chemical resources are spent on the verification of people from the international commu- weapons in all the possessor states except chemical weapons destruction, while 20 nity to discuss what might best be done Russia, and the re-organization of the percent are spent on the industrial at the First Review Conference of the International Cooperation and Assistance regime.Also, inspections should be 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention Division to include the Implementation applied equally across geographic (CWC), which is scheduled to be held in Support Branch. However, five potential boundaries to avoid the over-inspection

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 21 Pugwash Meeting No. 264

of certain states parties. the states parties. measures now in place within the Third, in order to ensure the effec- Fifth, the financial crisis that has OPCW include a hiring freeze, cuts in tive prohibition of chemical weapons, haunted the OPCW over the course of non-essential programming, and a policy some of the unresolved issues with the last six months is in the process of of keeping 30 fixed-term posts vacant; respect to chemical industry need to be being resolved. Since the time of its however, verification and international addressed.Accurate statistics on the trade Preparatory Commission, the OPCW cooperation activities are being pursued in scheduled chemicals, along with has had to cope with an inherently as fully as possible.The budgetary prob- agreement on the declarable thresholds unbalanced budget, latterly compounded lems must be resolved, and the states par- and definition of the relationship by the “fictitious income” generated by ties must recognize the need for growth between the Australia Group and the the process of reimbursement for the in the OPCW budget, before 2003, CWC, will all contribute to the effective costs of inspections carried out under when the need for a more extensive prohibition of chemical weapons world- Articles IV and V of the CWC. OPCW inspection regime will become urgent wide. budgets have failed appropriately to take with the full functioning of new chemi- Fourth, all states parties are obligated into account inflation, exchange rates, cal weapons destruction facilities in at to enact the appropriate legal increases in the UN salary pay scale, and least two states parties. Discussions mechanisms to fully implement the increases in the pace of work of the between the Secretariat and the states Convention both nationally and interna- OPCW,resulting in a policy not just of parties on the 2003 budget are set to tionally.Discrepancies between the states zero growth but actually of negative begin this summer. parties’ domestic legislation need to be growth.These budget realities led to a addressed.Also, more facility agreements, cash deficit in 2000 and a 2001 budget BWC: Work of the Ad Hoc Group above the present 34, need to be deficit, which has prompted the current A Special Conference of the States Par- concluded between the Secretariat and austerity program.The austerity ties to the BWC established the Ad Hoc

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Group (AHG) in 1994 to negotiate a rion (GPC) to define its scope.The GPC report, participants focused on the avail- protocol that would strengthen the provides the mechanism both for accom- able alternatives to a Protocol, if states BWC, particularly through mechanisms modating technological change and for parties to the BWC failed to come to an designed to address concerns about com- controlling dual-use technology; the agreement on a draft Protocol at or pliance.The Conference asked the AHG Protocol would in no way limit the before the Fifth Review Conference. to finish its work at the earliest possible GPC. In contrast to the CWC, however, One suggestion was that the overlap date and report to a further Special Con- the Protocol does not address the between the BWC and the CWC ference.A particularly important devel- destruction of weapons or their develop- should be built upon so as to extend the opment of the last few months coming ment, production or stockpiling since CWC verification system into biotech- out of the AHG negotiations in Geneva provisions regarding all of these activities nological manufacturing industry. has been the release of a Composite Text are among the express obligations of the by the Chairman of the AHG,Ambas- BWC itself. Instead, the Protocol UNMOVIC sador Tibor Toth (Hungary).This hap- includes provisions designed to deter The UN Special Commission on Iraq pened at the end of March when a sub- such activities and to enhance (UNSCOM), established in 1991 by stantial proportion of the draft Protocol confidence in compliance with the Security Council Resolution 687 in thus far negotiated, the Rolling Text,was BWC.Also, while the CWC contains in order to verify Iraq’s compliance with still in square brackets signifying its Schedules lists of “chemicals which cease-fire obligations to dismantle and dissensus.The Composite Text represents have been identified for the application destroy its WMD programs, was evacu- the results of informal consultations of verification measures”, the Composite ated from Baghdad on 15 December between Ambassador Toth and the vari- Text for the BWC Protocol includes lists 1998.A series of panel discussions early ous delegations in Geneva, and his deci- of agents and toxins certain activities the following year led to the passage of sions on the compromises necessary for with which on the territory of a state Resolution 1284 in December 1999. consensus.At the April/May session of party would trigger a declaration. More This resolution—from which China, the AHG, the Composite Text was for- differences do exist in the details, but France, and Russia abstained— mally presented to the delegations.As in overall, the two regimes are similar and established the UN Monitoring,Verifica- the Rolling Text,the principal elements complementary.Furthermore, the Com- tion and Inspection Commission of the new draft Protocol are its provi- posite Text goes a considerable way in (UNMOVIC). UNMOVIC, under the sions for declarations (now Article 4), providing for compliance-verification of leadership of Executive Chairman Dr. measures to ensure submission of decla- the BWC itself—which lacked any Hans Blix, was charged with continuing rations (Article 5), declaration-followup requirement for declarations or investiga- the work of UNSCOM.To date, the procedures (Article 6), measures to tions—thereby strengthening the inter- main work of UNMOVIC has been strengthen Article III of the BWC (Arti- national norm against biological training, since they have yet to be cle 7), consultation, clarification and weapons and enhancing deterrence.The allowed to enter Iraq. Four such training cooperation (Article 8), investigations presentation concluded with an expres- sessions have been held, in New York, (Article 9), assistance and protection sion of optimism that, despite the Paris,Vienna, and Ottawa; over 400 (Article 13), international cooperation numerous and large political obstacles, a potential inspectors have participated. (Article 14), the organization (Article Protocol could be concluded in time for These sessions cover both general topics 16), and national implementation mea- the Fifth BWC Review Conference in and specialized knowledge, such as sam- sures (Article 17). November of this year. States parties to pling and analysis.The staff of the New The close relationship between the the BWC were encouraged to “seize the York office, including a number of CWC and the future BWC Protocol opportunity” to take a large step toward lawyers, has drafted an operating hand- was highlighted as important for both the total worldwide elimination of the book and established a legal basis for regimes.The two regimes overlap with threat from weapons of mass destruction UNMOVIC’s work in Iraq, as well as respect to toxins and bioregulators. Each (WMD). formulating a comprehensive health and convention uses a general purpose crite- During subsequent discussion of this safety policy.UNMOVIC has also com-

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 23 Pugwash Meeting No. 264 pleted extensive work on the chemical agents.The HSP draft conven- devices”.The ICC Statute contains no import/export lists for Iraq and in the tion to this end was published in the explicit reference to biological weapons, area of site definition and categorization; December 1998 issue of The CBW Con- and it applies only to actual use, not to it also reports on a quarterly basis to the ventions Bulletin.The draft would make it development, production, stockpiling or UN Security Council. a crime under international law for any transfer. So far, the drafters of the HSP There is still much work to accom- individual, regardless of citizenship or convention have encountered much pri- plish before UNMOVIC enters Iraq, official position, to order, direct, or vate support and no serious objection which appears to be a long-term knowingly to render substantial from the various government officials prospect. Even so, UNMOVIC is pre- assistance in the development, produc- with whom they have held discussions pared to begin to pursue its mission in tion, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, on the draft. However, no government the country on short notice. Outside of transfer or use of biological or chemical has yet taken the lead in seeking to refer the technical questions surrounding the weapons, to threaten the use of such the draft convention to the Sixth (Legal) extent and sophistication of Iraq’s WMD weapons, or to create or retain facilities Committee of the UN General Assem- programs, UNMOVIC faces the formi- intended for the production of such bly for negotiation, to be followed by dable consequences of Iraqi noncoopera- weapons.Any person who knowingly signature and ratification by states.Work tion, the impact of the projected BWC commits any of the prohibited acts any- in this regard, that is finding a group of Protocol (Iraq is a state party to the where, worldwide, would face the risk of governments interested in sponsoring BWC, which it was required to ratify apprehension, prosecution, and punish- the draft, or one similar to it, is expected under the terms of the cease-fire), and ment if found in a state party to the pro- to gain pace in the coming months.As the difficulty of maintaining staff conti- posed convention. well, funds are being raised to translate nuity if the current situation continues as The HSP draft is modeled on recent the draft convention into the six official is for years or even decades. In the report international conventions now in force UN languages—English, French, Span- that was given to the workshop, the fol- that seek to establish universal jurisdic- ish, Chinese,Arabic, and Russian—and lowing conclusions were drawn from tion for such crimes as aircraft hijacking, to complete an extensive legal commen- recent events in Iraq, and from torture, hostage taking, theft of nuclear tary to accompany the convention text. UNMOVIC’s work so far: that Iraq is materials, and harming internationally not disarmed of weapons covered by the protected persons.These conventions, The First CWC Review cease-fire agreement; that politics and like the HSP draft convention, do not Conference (2003) not inspections will determine Iraqi establish international tribunals but The CWC requires under Article VIII, compliance with the relevant UN reso- instead provide for the specified offenses paragraph 22, that the “Conference shall lutions; that the CWC and BWC will to be adjudicated in national courts on not later than one year after the expiry of struggle to survive without significant the territory where the alleged offender the fifth and the tenth year after the progress in disarming Iraq; and that the is found or to which such person may be entry into force of this Convention, and failure of the international community extradited. In contrast, the International at such other times within that time to accomplish this task will continue to Criminal Court (ICC), expected to be period as may be decided upon, convene be viewed as a flaw inherent to multilat- established in The Hague, can accept a in special sessions to undertake reviews eral verification and inspection. case only if the state which has jurisdic- of the operation of this Convention. tion over that case is unable or fails to Such reviews shall take into account any International Criminalization of carry out the investigation or prosecu- relevant scientific and technological CBW Armament tion.As regards chemical weapons, the developments.At intervals of five years The reports segment of the workshop ICC Statute prohibits, under the cate- thereafter, unless otherwise decided concluded with an update on the HSP gory of war crimes, the employment of upon, further sessions of the Conference proposal that an international criminal “poison or poisoned weapons” and of shall be convened with the same objec- law be created that would be applicable “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, tive.”The Verification Annex to the to the weaponization of biological or and all analogous liquids, materials or CWC additionally requires in Part IX,

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paragraph 26 that “at the first special ses- sion of the Conference . . . the provisions of this Part of the Verification Annex [pursuant to the regime for other chemi- cal production facilities] shall be re- examined in the light of a comprehen- sive review of the overall verification regime for the chemical industry on the basis of experience gained.The Confer- ence shall then make recommendations so as to improve the effectiveness of the verification regime.”The CWC enters its fifth year in April 2001, and it is expected that the first special session or “Review Conference” for the CWC will take Experience from Other Review implementation of the Convention, sci- place in the spring of 2003. Conferences entific and technological developments, The fact that the OPCW has organs and working papers. Workshop participants were first that, in effect, continuously review the presented with an overview of the con- NGOs have played a discernible role operation of the CWC means—so it was duct of past review conferences for mul- in the BWC review conferences and in generally agreed among the workshop tilateral treaties comparable to the CWC, the AHG negotiations.At the last BWC participants—that the Review Confer- such as the BWC and the NPT. review conference, NGOs that had ence process should be concentrated on Three review conferences for the demonstrated “serious intentions” were the larger issues that tend to evade day- BWC have been held since the first in able to make statements during a special to-day attention.What most needed 1980; the fifth will be held from 19 informal session, and there has been dis- review,in other words, was longer-term November to 7 December 2001.These cussion within the preparatory commit- strategy for implementation of the Con- sessions have examined scientific and tee for the next BWC review conference vention. Further, the process should pro- technological developments of relevance toward allowing NGOs to submit writ- vide opportunity for groups that mostly not only to Article I of the Convention, ten material as well as to speak during lie outside the OPCW institutions to but also to all articles. From the review plenary sessions. express their views to the OPCW in conferences, extended understandings of As to the role that NGOs might play expectation of being heard—groups that the original definitions and obligations in the review process for the CWC First are either affected by the Convention or of the BWC have come about.The Review Conference, some participants otherwise have a constructive interest in approach taken at the BWC review con- held that NGOs should use their influ- its proper application. Such groups exist ferences has been to address the pream- ence to lobby for official recognition at in industry,in academia, and in other ble and each article of the Convention the First Review Conference as well as a non-governmental organizations individually,systematically combing degree of participation in it. Other par- (NGOs) and organs of civil society. through the Convention.The Confer- ticipants observed that it might be more This general theme—that the ence results in a Final Declaration useful for NGOs to become active in Review Conference should reflecting the consensus of the states par- substantive aspects of the review process, complement, not replicate, review activi- ties.The Review Conference typically or, in capitals, to engage themselves in ties that take place anyway within the lasts for three weeks; six months in the policy-shaping work associated with OPCW—recurred throughout the pre- advance of the start of the Review Con- the process. Noted as a promising exam- sentations on the component issues and ference a preparatory committee meets ple of substantive OPCW-NGO cooper- their discussion, which are now summa- for 2-3 days to draft an agenda and invite ation was the recent undertaking by the rized in turn. states parties to submit information on International Union of Pure and Applied

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Chemistry (IUPAC) to review relevant Conference.One proposal for considera- attention,not the shorter-term issues that scientific and technological develop- tion is amendment of the rules of proce- were in any case bound to become the ments for the OPCW. dure to allow greater participation by day-to-day business of OPCW organs if The NPT review mechanism has NGOs in the annual Conference of the they were not so already.Robustness been in place since 1975 and thus is a States Parties and thus in special sessions towards political change required contin- very different process.Yet,it was high- like the Review Conference.NGOs uing review of the structure and modus lighted that NGOs have been able to would,under this proposal,be able both operandi of the OPCW institutions. attend not only the extension or review to submit written material and to make Robustness towards technological change conferences themselves but also to par- statements to the assembled states parties. required sustained attention to ticipate in the preparatory committee In concert with this request is a desire, implementation of the GPC in the light meetings. shared by the chemical industry associa- of advances in science and technology. The workshop was later told of three tions and other NGOs,for greater trans- The workshop was reminded that specific NGO projects. parency on the part of the OPCW. the OPCW was a frontrunner organiza- First, preparations are now far tion in the field of multilateral disarma- advanced for a CWC Appeal. This docu- Issues for the First CWC ment, meaning that the First Review ment, on which there has been extensive Review Conference Conference of the CWC will be viewed consultation, will appeal to states parties There was no disagreement with the as a signifier, not only of the to uphold the international norm with view expressed that the first four years of Convention’s success, but also of the respect to chemical weapons and gener- the CWC regime had been successful. future prospects for similar arms agree- ate political and financial support for the Despite the repercussions of the current ments—the BWC Protocol, the CTBT, OPCW.The Appeal is being circulated financial crisis,there is no real “crisis of and so on. For this reason, particular care for signatures among those who took part confidence”in the CWC regime.Instead, should be put into preparations for the in the negotiations in Geneva that gave current problems have highlighted the review,beginning as soon as possible. It birth to the CWC and other current and need for states parties to make a financial was noted that the OPCW Technical former ambassadors and government commitment to the OPCW.The work- Secretariat has announced its intention leaders. shop did not,however,regard the finan- of starting its own work on the formal Second, an Internet discussion forum cial crisis as a fitting topic for the agenda review process in 2002, and the Execu- is being established for the benefit of of the First Review Conference.Some tive Council has recently proposed the those in academia and elsewhere in the participants considered universality,com- formation of a working group in order NGO community who conduct research pliance,and destruction of Russia’s to coordinate work toward the Review into issues of chemical and biological chemical weapons stockpile examples of Conference. It was agreed that these weapons and their worldwide control topics more suited to such a forum.Also, mechanisms should now set about the and elimination.The forum is intended the challenge inspection mechanism,not task of categorizing those issues identi- to stimulate debate on policy,to design yet invoked,needed to be explored and fied as key to the review,thus construct- and pursue research questions, and to some sort of accommodation achieved ing a framework for discussions at the disseminate information relating to the over the Australia Group.Other partici- Review Conference itself. CWC and the BWC. pants,while not disagreeing that these Third,there is an initiative for repre- questions,and also ones relating to the Advances in Science and Technology sentations to be made to the OPCW,ini- industry regime,might be addressed con- The use of a GPC in both the CWC and tially through a coalition letter to the structively during the Review Confer- the BWC ensures that all past, present Director-General,expressing the desire of ence,saw the review process more as and future chemical and biological war- NGOs to play a larger role in the imple- opportunity for strategic assessment.In fare agents are subject to the prohibitions mentation of the Convention,the work this respect,it was the overall vitality of of the two treaties. Moreover, because of of the OPCW,and consequently in both the regime in the face of changes in its the breadth of definition set out in the the review process and the 2003 Review environment that should be given express CWC for the “toxic chemicals” that it

26 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 264

covers, the CWC GPC overlaps signifi- A further compromising factor the development of novel agents applica- cantly with that of the BWC. Participants addressed by participants was the increas- ble to law enforcement or to non-lethal noted the increasing salience of this con- ing investment in non-lethal weapons— weapons.Although apparently benign, sideration to (a) the rapidly increasing technology now evident in countries research in these areas could induce understanding of life processes at the that were becoming intolerant of deaths development of delivery systems for molecular level, and hence the fading of among their combat forces.There was more malignant or even lethal agents distinctions between biology and chem- discussion of the pressure upon the GPC There was, therefore, a proposal that the istry,and (b) the increasingly uncertain that was being created by the desire to definition of “munitions” and “devices” prospects for a BWC compliance-verifi- preserve an open option on use of non- in the CWC should be further cation system comparable to that of the lethal chemical weapons. One of the developed and strengthened. CWC.The workshop agreed that, so vital workshop papers described an episode It was also proposed that the Review is the GPC to the future of the treaty from the 1960s in which the promise Conference concentrate on means of regime, the importance of implementing then encapsulated by incapacitating delivery to discriminate between it properly must be reaffirmed during the chemical weapons caused the British intended military use and use for domes- First CWC Review Conference. government not only to abandon its no- tic riot control or other forms of law Discussion turned to factors that first-use policy on chemical weapons but enforcement.The suggestion here was operated to compromise the GPC.The also to restart, in secret, its development that delivery systems useful for law application of chemical “riot control of the weapons, lethal as well as non- enforcement would likely be inconsistent agents” was considered in this regard, for, lethal. Partly it was in part the start of with military utility.If certain delivery although such agents are unquestionably CBW arms-control talks in Geneva that systems—those likely to be used in large- among the toxic chemicals to which the had brought this little-known happening scale conflict—were prohibited, then the CWC applies its GPC, their use as a to a halt. chances of legitimate scientific research “method of warfare” is nevertheless the The huge advances in humankind’s being diverted for purposes prohibited subject of a special prohibition in Article understanding of genetics in recent years under either the CWC or the BWC I.5 that is separate from the general pro- has given scientists access to a gigantic would be diminished. However, some hibition of use of chemical weapons store of knowledge on the human participants pointed out that this differ- contained in Article I.1(b).The fact that genetic code.Through genomics, this entiation was not effective enough since such separate treatment has been knowledge has the potential to bring it would create a loophole permitting accorded to no other category of dual- about the development of new,more research, development, production, and use chemical has led to claims that riot- targeted, and thus more effective agents, testing at high levels, just one step below control agents somehow lie beyond the including the horrific prospect of ethnic full-out weaponization. GPC, thereby implying that the criterion weapons or agents that attack specific Participants identified a need to is actually of only limited application. It strains of plants or animals.These devel- increase awareness of the GPC and the was pointed out that the historical record opments have great implications for overall protection it provides. One way of the CWC negotiation provided negli- industry,academia, and both the BWC of implementing the GPC, should scien- gible support for any such claim, yet sev- and CWC.Through the mechanisms of tific advance lead to discovery of regime- eral participants continued to dwell on combinatorial chemistry,researchers endangering new agents, would be to the negative impact of this apparent might identify upwards of 50,000 highly amend the Schedules. But this was seen ambiguity.They recommended that the toxic compounds per year.A handful of by several participants as an unwieldy provision of the CWC that allows the these would turn out to be applicable for and possibly counter-productive use of toxic chemicals for “[l]aw enforce- purposes of biological or chemical war- approach. Instead, the importance of the ment including domestic riot control fare. Furthermore, programs that had GPC should be reaffirmed by the purposes”,Article II.9(d), be given par- failed in the past to produce usable OPCW at every opportunity,thereby ticular attention during the CWC agents might now succeed: genomics and causing it to enter the implementation review process. proteomics might, for example, lead to culture of the CWC National Authori-

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On export controls, industry contin- ues to be opposed to further restrictions on trade in Scheduled chemicals, although such measures would have only a minimal impact and are a viable tool in the pursuit of universality.Of the 50 states not party to the Convention, only six use Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals.There- fore, to restrict transfers of these agents both to and from these states would not significantly damage the cause of inter- national trade. Despite the obvious bene- fit accrued from a 100 percent match between import and export data, such an achievement is nearly impossible. Indus-

Dr. Walter Krutzsch, Dr. Ralf Trapp, Dr. Mark Wheelis, try would like to emphasize the role Mr. Douglas MacEachin, and Mr. Ian Kenyon played by international programs, run by industry itself, designed to monitor and ties. It was stated that, too often, the the transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals. track the global travels of its products. OPCW,even the Executive Council, “Managed access” procedures need to be acted as though the GPC did not exist. accepted as part of the inspection process National Implementation Measures and the definition of a “plant site” is the The question was put to the workshop Regime for Chemical Industry subject of continuing consultations of how much of the monitoring of com- The GPC ensures that normal between the Secretariat and certain states pliance with the Convention is actually operations of the chemical industry parties. Industry continues to voice a carried out by the OCPW.In reality,the worldwide, including those areas where desire for greater communication with National Authorities are entrusted with the potential is high for chemical the OPCW and a better system for con- much of the responsibility for ensuring weapons development, remain sultations, as well as greater transparency compliance. For this reason, all states par- unharmed by the strictures of the treaty. on the part of the OPCW.It was, how- ties must designate national authorities— Workshop participants were informed of ever, emphasized that many of the most to date only 109 have done so—and the seriousness with which the industry serious conflicts between the chemical these bodies must function as more than takes its role within the CWC regime. In industry and the OPCW have been suc- post offices and escorts.The need for the course of implementation, industry’s cessfully resolved. strong, effective, implementing legisla- original concerns for the protection of Participants were also told of the dif- tion was also stressed—only 55 states confidential business information (CBI) ficulties encountered in ensuring the parties have enacted such legislation.The have decreased and are no longer of great completeness of a state party’s industry OPCW needs to provide comprehensive relevance, even though recent develop- declarations.These problems arise from support to states parties and national ments, such as the pursuit of the inspec- complex ownership and production authorities in their efforts to fully imple- tion regime for DOC facilities, have arrangements at industrial facilities, the ment the CWC.As the Convention enlarged industry’s responsibility and also co-location of declared and undeclared matures, the national authorities will be the number of important questions in sites, and the definition of what is declar- expected to assume more responsibility, need of answers. Coherent policies need able. Currently,many states parties think especially in areas where the division of to be put in place both in respect to the only in terms of final production and not labor between them and the Secretariat threshold requirements for declarations processing when assessing concentration is currently undefined, notably imple- of Schedule 2A and 2A* chemicals and limits and declaration thresholds. mentation of the GPC.A fully function-

28 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 264

ing network of national authorities must tance for the peaceful uses of chemistry export policies and restrict transfers to therefore be established as soon as possi- —is to ensure that developing countries states that they feel pose a proliferation ble.At the Review Conference, the role without past or present chemical risk—is seen as an obstacle to achieving of national authorities vis-à-vis the weapons programs or significant chemi- the object of purpose of Article XI by OCPW and the Convention needs to be cal industry stand to benefit from mem- some state parties. States parties have revisited. bership in the OPCW. This in turn pro- been divided over whether the contin- motes the universality of the ued existence of the Australia Group Role of the Scientific Advisory Convention. In its implementation, the does or does not undermine Article XI Board CWC must avoid hampering the scien- of the CWC, which instructs states par- The workshop heard that, in the past, the tific and economic development of its ties “not [to] maintain among themselves SAB had been seen, and used, by both states parties and encourage international any restriction, including those in any the Secretariat and the states parties, as a trade for peaceful purposes.The work- international agreements, incompatible “dumping ground” for awkward ostensi- with the obligations undertaken under bly technical issues. However, the SAB is this Convention, which would restrict or well placed to contribute substantively to Currently, many states parties impede trade and the development and the Review Conference, as it has been think only in terms of final promotion of scientific and technologi- actively discussing the review process cal knowledge in the field of chemistry production and not processing over the past year.The SAB has also been for industrial, agricultural, research, med- in contact with outside bodies, like when assessing concentration ical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful IUPAC, about their relationship with the limits and declaration thresholds. purposes”. Members of the Australia Convention and their role in the review Group insist that their practices do not process. Participants involved in the contravene the Convention, and that IUPAC review noted that the project has shop was told that, in order to accom- only when the CWC’s provisions for yet to identify specific issues of sub- plish this task, some members of the control of exports and imports of chemi- stance, and has so far been a procedural Executive Council have proposed the cal agents are being fully implemented to exercise.There are a small number of establishment of an International Coop- the satisfaction of Group members, and broad issues—science and technology, eration Committee—similar to the one they are certain that the CWC is verification and destruction technolo- proposed in the BWC Protocol Com- precluding proliferation, will the gies, industry verification—and an ever- posite Text—that would oversee the Australia Group be disbanded. expanding list of more detailed topics implementation of this Article. However, In support of the Australia Group’s that IUPAC faces as it embarks upon its the issue has been the subject of fierce position, workshop participants were review of the scientific and technological debates in the Executive Council, as informed that less than one-third of foundations of the Convention. other states parties (mostly members of states parties are in compliance with the Concerns were raised about how the the Australia Group) do not think that Convention’s provisions on national IUPAC findings would be received and such a body is necessary and that the implementation, and that only a minor- how any conclusions or recommenda- International Cooperation and Assistance ity of states parties have fully integrated tions would be implemented.The call Division of the OPCW Secretariat satis- the use of end-use certificates into their was made for all those involved in these factorily pursues programming in sup- national export control regimes.There is issues to submit information or material port of Article XI, helping the OPCW a consensus among states parties that that may prove helpful to IUPAC. to strike a balance between disarmament Article XI needs to be applied in a more and development. coherent manner. International coopera- International Cooperation and The continued existence of the Aus- tion activities continue to suffer without Assistance tralia Group—which was described to a decision in the Executive Council on The purpose of Article XI of the CWC the workshop as an informal group of the establishment of an International —international cooperation and assis- states that coordinate their national Cooperation Committee, which will

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 29 Pugwash Meeting No. 264 certainly be influenced by any provisions from internal or external politics.The states, necessitating the allocation of made for such a body within the frame- recently revised destruction program greater OPCW resources to the moni- work of the projected BWC Protocol. It increases the budgetary allocation six- toring and inspection regime for such was proposed that, in preparation for the fold to just over 3 billion rubles and pro- facilities. First Review Conference, the OPCW vides for the complete destruction of the should take actions to enforce its own stockpiles of chemical weapons at Gorny Summary policies on trade in Scheduled chemicals (1160 agent-tons) and Shchuch’ye (5440 To summarize, the workshop was able to (i.e. bans on Schedule 2 transfers to states agent-tons), representing a combined identify many issue areas in need of not party,and the requirement for end- total of 16.5 percent of Russia’s total attention both during the review process use certificates when transferring Sched- stockpile.The last year has seen signifi- and at the 2003 Review Conference. ule 3 chemicals) and strengthen such cant progress: the opening of the Central These issues apply to the practical imple- policies where necessary to ensure non- Analytical Chemical Weapons Destruc- mentation of the Convention, as well as proliferation. tion Laboratory,the designation of the to the political environment in which There was discussion of the impor- Russian Munitions Agency as the CWC this implementation must occur. Specific tance of the Review Conference as a National Authority,the establishment of actions recommended during the work- forum in which to examine OPCW the State Commission on Chemical Dis- shop include: preparations to provide protection armament, the start of Category 2 and 3 • focussing the review process on the and/or assistance to states parties in the destruction activities, and the revision of strategic aspects of CWC implementa- event of an accidental or intentional the original 1996 program for destruc- tion rather than on the specific shorter- release of chemical agents. One of the tion. However, much work remains to be term issues that are likely to engage main issues in this context is the threat done and increased international fund- organs of the OPCW in their routine of use by non-state actors, or chemical ing, including the release of funding for business; terrorism.The workshop heard that the the construction of a large-scale destruc- • reaffirming the central importance of Secretariat has recently drafted a strategic tion facility at Shchuch’ye by the U.S. the GPC and considering how its concept for the provision of assistance, Congress, will be needed to complete implementation could be improved; including responses to acts of terrorism, the destruction of chemical weapons in • assessing the impact of recent advances but there are still many gaps to be Russia. It was stated that this goal could in science and technology on imple- bridged in its implementation. For only be achieved through extensive mentation of the Convention; example, only 56 states parties have made cooperation of governments with sup- • revisiting the law enforcement provi- either bilateral or unilateral offers of port from citizens groups, other NGOs, sions of the CWC; assistance.The voluntary fund for assis- the expert community and the mass • promoting decisions on many of the tance stood at about NLG 1.3 million media. It was proposed that the Review unresolved issues under Article VI,such as of 31 December 2000, the result of Conference should explore the ways in as low concentration thresholds and pledges by 25 states parties.There is also which the OPCW may be able to move boundaries of production, prior to the the question of how,in accordance with destruction efforts in Russia ahead. convening of the Review Conference; Article X.4, states are to declare any The workshop was told that other • promoting full implementation of Arti- chemical defense or protective programs possessor states—the United States, cles X and XI, including engagement pursued nationally. India, and a state party of withheld iden- with the states of the Australia Group tity—are in compliance with the Con- in order to address their concerns about Destruction of Chemical Weapons vention’s destruction deadlines.Very few proliferation of chemical weapons, The major difficulties encountered in problems have been associated with these while at the same time pursuing the the destruction of chemical weapons destruction programs. In the coming demands of developing states parties for are in Russia, so participants were told. year, additional chemical weapons development and greater exchanges of These problems were said to stem from destruction facilities are planned to go technology; a lack of financial resources rather than into operation in at least two of these • supporting any moves toward the

30 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 264

destruction of Russia’s chemical Participants weapons stockpile, and helping Russia to collect international aid for this pro- Amb. Serguei Batsanov, Director, Special Dr. Alexander Kaliadine, Deputy ject; and, Projects, Organization for the Prohibition of Director, Centre for Political and Military • changing the rules of procedure to Chemical Weapons (OPCW),The Hague, Forecasts, Institute of World Economy and The Netherlands International Relations (IMEMO), Russian allow greater involvement of the chem- Academy of Sciences, Moscow,Russia ical industry and other affected NGOs Ms. Magda Bauta, Head, Implementation Support Branch, International Cooperation Dr. David Kelly, Senior Adviser, in the review process and the First and Assistance Division (ICA), Organisation Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Review Conference itself. for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Ministry of Defence, London, UK (OPCW),The Hague,The Netherlands Mr. Ian Kenyon, Visiting Fellow, Future Work of the Study Group Dr. Henk L. Boter, former Head (now Mountbatten Centre for International The workshop learnt that the Study retired), Research Group on Analytical Studies, Department of Politics, University of Group will next meet in Geneva during Chemistry,TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, Southampton, Highfield, Southampton, UK Rijswijk, as well as former Consultant,TNO Mr. Mohammad Khodadadi, Counsellor, 24-25 November, which falls at the end Defence Research, and Advisor Ministry of Deputy Representative of Iran to the of the first week of the Fifth BWC Foreign Affairs,The Netherlands OPCW,Iranian Embassy,The Hague,The Review Conference. It was accordingly Mr. Gordon M. Burck, Principal Policy Netherlands proposed that the workshop should focus Analyst, EAI Corporation,Alexandria, Dr.Walter Krutzsch, CWC Consultant, Virginia, USA; Senior Scientist, Chemical & on the prospects for the projected BWC Berlin, Germany Protocol.A further workshop, focussed Biological Arms Control Institute Mr. Douglas MacEachin, retired from Mr. Richard H. Burgess, Consultant (in on the CWC, is envisaged in 2002, its U.S. Government, now Senior Fellow, trade, treaty compliance and patents) to timing dependent upon the date of the National Security Studies, Harvard DuPont Company and others, Newark, University,Cambridge, MA, USA seventh OPCW Conference of the Delaware, USA States Parties. Meanwhile, participants Mr. Ron Manley, Director of Verification, Mr. Bijoy Chatterjee, International Organisation for the Prohibition of considered it of utmost importance for Cooperation Branch (ICA), Organisation for Chemical Weapons (OPCW),The Hague, Pugwash and other NGOs to strive to the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons The Netherlands influence the CWC review process (OPCW),The Hague,The Netherlands Dr. Hassan Mashhadi, Head,Assistance through all possible channels. Prof. Malcolm Dando, Professor of and Protection Branch, International International Security,Department of Peace Workshop participants also recom- Cooperation and Assistance Division (ICA), Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford, mended that the Study Group should Organisation for the Prohibition of UK address the moral dimension of the work Chemical Weapons (OPCW),The Hague, of Pugwash and of the CBW disarma- Mr. Sylwin Jerzy Gizowski, Director, The Netherlands Secretariat for the Policy-Making Organs, Prof. Matthew S. Meselson, Thomas ment regimes, a topic that has received Organisation for the Prohibition of Dudley Cabot Professor of the Natural some attention recently within the Sec- Chemical Weapons (OPCW),The Hague, Sciences, Department of Molecular and The Netherlands retariats of both the United Nations and Cellular Biology,Harvard University, the OCPW. The general opinion of par- Ms. Elisa Harris, former Director for Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA Nonproliferation and Export, National ticipants was that now is a watershed Ms. Pamela Mills (USA), Harvard Sussex Security Council (1993-2001), USA moment for multilateral arms control Program Researcher at the Organisation for and disarmament regimes. In the next Dr. Alastair Hay, Reader in Chemical the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons two years, the world will come to a deci- Pathology,School of Medicine, University of (OPCW),The Hague,The Netherlands Leeds, UK sion on strengthening the BWC; it will Prof. Kathryn Nixdorff, Dept. of review the first five years of implementa- Mr. Huang Yu, Director of External Microbiology and Genetics, Darmstadt Relations, Organisation for the Prohibition University of Technology,Darmstadt, tion of the CWC; and, hopefully,it will of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),The Hague, Germany begin implementing other similar The Netherlands treaties.

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 31 Pugwash Meeting No. 264

Participants

Prof. Graham S. Pearson, Visiting Dr. Jan Van Aken, Director, Sunshine Dr. Mark Wheelis, Senior Lecturer, Section Professor of International Security, Project, Hamburg, Germany of Microbiology,University of California, Department of Peace Studies, University of Davis, California, USA Mr. René Van Sloten (Netherlands), Bradford, Bradford,West Yorkshire, UK; Head of Trade Policy and Economic Affairs, Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders, Project Leader, Member, HSP Advisory Board European Chemical Industry Council CBW Project, SIPRI, Frösunda, Solna, Mr. Julian P.Perry Robinson, Senior (CEFIC), Brussels, Belgium Sweden Fellow,Science & Technology Policy Mr.Wang Xiaoning, Policy and Review Research (SPRU),University of Sussex, STAFF Branch,Verification Division, Organisation Brighton, UK for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Claudia Vaughn – Pugwash Rome Office Dr. Stephan Robinson, International (OPCW),The Hague,The Netherlands Programme Coordinator, Green Cross Switzerland, Basel, Switzerland Papers Mr. Martin Rudduck, Head of UK Chemical Weapons Convention National WORKING PAPERS ence & Technology.Insights from the NATO Authority,Department of Trade & Industry, ARW Prague, 31 May-2 June 2001, address- London, UK Gordon Burck (USA): Preparing for the ing Scientific & Technological Developments First CWC Review Conference, Regime for Mr. Nicholas Sims, Senior Lecturer in Relevant to the BTWC Fifth Review Con- the Chemical Industry (Article VI).Compli- International Relations, London School of ference BTWC (transparencies of his presen- ance by the United States (Abstract only) Economics and Political Science (LSE), tation) University of London, London, UK Malcolm Dando (UK): Future Mental Graham S. Pearson (UK):The Protocol to Incapacitant Chemicals :The Impact of Dr.Thomas Stock, Sales Manager Strengthen the Effectiveness and Improve the Genomics Thermal Processes,Technip Germany Implementation of the BTWC (transparen- GmbH, Düsseldorf, Germany Daniel Feakes (UK) and Julian Perry cies of his presentation) Robinson (UK): National Implementation Ms. Maria Norma Suarez Paniagua, J P Perry Robinson (UK):The General Measures: Role of the OPCW Secretariat Counsellor of the Mexican Embassy,and Purpose Criterion and the New Utility of Alternate Representative of the Mexican Elisa D. Harris (USA):The CWC:A Glass Toxicants as Weapons Delegation to the OPCW,The Hague,The Half-Empty or Half-Full? Mark Wheelis (USA): Biotechnology and Netherlands Alexander Kaliadine (Russia):The prob- the Development of NovelChemical Prof. Ron Sutherland, Department of lem of the timely implementation of the Weapons Agents Chemistry,University of Saskatchewan, CWC in Russia Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada ; Member, BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS Mohammad Khodadadi (Iran): Imple- Governing Board, Stockholm International mentation of Article XI of the CWC Richard H. Burgess (USA): “ Chemical Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden Industry and the CWC”, Chapter 6 in The Caitríona McLeish (Ireland) and J P Dr. Ralf Trapp (Germany), Head, Chemical Weapons Convention Four Years On: Perry Robinson (UK): Candidate Agent Government Relations and Political Affairs Implementation Challenges and Solutions, TL 2636:A Cautionary Tale for the General Branch, External Relations Division, Jonathan Tucker, Editor, Monterey Institute Purpose Criterion Organisation for the Prohibition of of International Studies Chemical Weapons (OPCW),The Hague, Pamela Mills (USA):The First Review Walter Krutzsch (Germany): For the sake The Netherlands Conference of the Chemical Weapons Con- of peace and humanity: Uphold the chemical vention: Possibilities and Preparations Ms. Emmanuelle Tuerlings (Belgium), weapons ban! [Appeal concerning the CWC] (including Appendix) Dphil Student, Science and Technology Ron G. Sutherland (Canada): Chemical Policy Research Unit (SPRU),and Research Graham S. Pearson (UK):The CWC First and Biological Weapons:Proliferation, Non- Officer for the Harvard Sussex Program, Review Conference: Learning from the proliferation and Conventions for their Con- University of Sussex, Brighton, UK experience of the Biological and Toxin trol Weapons Convention BTWC (transparencies Mr. Gordon Vachon, Alternate Permanent of his presentation) Non-Lethal Chemical Weapons Research in Representative to the OPCW,Canadian the USA : Exploitation of grey areas in the Embassy,The Hague Graham S. Pearson (UK): Preparing for CWC,The Sunshine Project,Austin,Texas the First CWC Rev Con:Advances in Sci- and Hamburg, Germany

32 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 PUGWASH MEETING No. 265

Joint Meeting of the Pugwash Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 20–21 July 2001

Report and this report is the responsibility of Through its work so far, the ICISS the rapporteur alone. has seen a consensus forming that: by Jeffrey Boutwell (1) humanitarian intervention is a Whither Humanitarian Intervention? problem that needs addressing; (2) he 4th workshop of the The meeting began with brief reviews that the United Nations’ Security Pugwash Study Group on of the work of the Pugwash Study Council is the preferred vehicle, TIntervention, Sovereignty and Group and the International Com- despite its shortcomings, for taking International Security, held jointly mission on Intervention and State the lead when intervention is deemed with the International Commission Sovereignty (ICISS), a body set up by necessary; but that (3) the Security on Intervention and State the Canadian government in 1999 to Council will not necessarily always Sovereignty, took place in Pugwash, prepare a report for UN Secretary be the final word in determining Nova Scotia from 20-21 July 2001. General Kofi Annan, due to be deliv- when and where interventions occur. A total of 17 participants from seven ered in late 2001. Co-chaired by For many on the commission, these countries participated in the joint Gareth Evans (Australia) and points give hope that the inter- consultation, which was hosted by Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria), the national community can forge com- the Pugwash Park Commission at ICISS has held a series of mon ground on humanitarian inter- Thinkers’ Lodge, the home of Cyrus international consultations to solicit vention, despite continued skepticism Eaton and site of the first Pugwash views on differing perspectives and among many non-western and devel- Conference in July 1957. Special modalities regarding humanitarian oping countries – that the west seeks thanks are due to Patrick Boyer and intervention and its impact on con- carte blanche to do what it wants – Giovanni Brenciaglia of the Pugwash cepts of state sovereignty. as well as among western states – Park Commission, to Douglas Roche Previous meetings of the Pugwash that too many countries seek to hide and Leonard Johnson of the Cana- Study Group have been held in behind the protection of sovereignty. dian Pugwash Group, and to Heidi Venice (December 1999), Como, What is encouraging for many is Hulan of the Canadian Department Italy (September 2000), and Castel- that, while there are certainly of Foreign Affairs and International lón de la Plana, Spain (May 2001), elements of truth in both the afore- Trade, for their help in making the and have resulted in the publication mentioned positions, opposition and meeting possible. Pugwash would of two Pugwash Occasional Papers mistrust regarding the concept and also like to thank The Rockefeller covering a broad array of the interna- practice of humanitarian intervention Foundation for its support of the tional legal, military, and political stems as much from the need to solve Pugwash Study Group on Interven- issues involved when the the practical modalities of deciding tion, Sovereignty and International international community seeks to when, where and how the interna- Security. Participants attended the intervene on behalf of individual tional community should intervene meeting in their individual capacities, human rights. when events warrant.

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 33 Pugwash Meeting No. 265

As a needed step in this direction, For its part, the ICISS, in its Such criteria should be “high and there is much discussion of the wis- report, is likely to limit its definition narrow”, involving mass killing, the dom of changing the parameters and of intervention to military and other imminent threat of such killing, and terminology of the debate. Above all types of coercive actions. In doing ethnic cleansing, i.e., where the dam- this means making states and govern- so, it will frame issues of responsibil- age is “immediate and irreparable.” ments more accountable for their ity as resting primarily with the state Others raised the issue of interven- actions vis-à-vis their citizens, so that in question, with a residual responsi- tions to restore democracy. the issue becomes one of a responsi- bility for intervening to protect the In terms of carrying out interven- bility to protect on the part of states, individual falling to the international tions, the ICISS is thinking of precau- rather than a right to intervene on the community only when that state has tionary principles (just war part of the international community. failed in its responsibility to protect. principles, likelihood of success, right Similarly, humanitarian intervention Mention was made in this regard of motive, intervention as last resort) becomes rather protective interven- article 24 of the UN Charter, where providing a guide to action. On the tion when states and governments the Security Council has a duty to question of legitimacy, discussion still have failed their responsibility. For respond, not just a responsibility. continues on whether, if a formal its part, however, the international Regarding this responsibility/duty request is blocked in the Security community has the responsibility to to respond, what happens if the UN Council, either the UN General assist states and governments in pro- Security Council is either unwilling Assembly or regional organizations viding the means by which or unable to act? While believing (of which the offending state is a fundamental human rights can be that a formal request to intervene member) could provide such legiti- assured in the first place, before inter- should always be made first to the macy. More difficult will be cases of vention becomes necessary, and then Security Council, several participants ad hoc coalitions (coalitions of the to adequately follow up in post-con- thought that threshold criteria should willing) and unilateral interventions. flict reconciliation and reconstruction be established so that the Some of the unresolved issues fac- should intervention occur – in short, international community could act ing the commission are: (1) how nec- full cycle involvement. even without formal SC approval. essary is it to redefine sovereignty

34 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 265 and its relationship to human rights? of intervention (across the spectrum what the US might choose to do, or (many believe that current notions of from consensual to coercive) were not do. sovereignty are already expansive reviewed: The discussion that followed enough to incorporate notions of a • conflict prevention: the mismatch touched on a number of points. One responsibility to protect); (2) how far between needs and means, and dis- concerning legal instruments was that have legal norms evolved to permit crediting through overselling the the extradition of Milosevic to the extraordinary action in defense of prospect of complex packages (e.g., Hague tribunal is not an unalloyed humanitarian values? (again, some the Oslo accords); benefit, either for domestic Yugoslav believe there is a natural law on the • sanctions, where there are more politics (the extradition being a clear right to protect, while others believe problems than opportunities, and violation of the Yugoslav constitu- such norms have not evolved nearly where it’s difficult to show causal tion) or in terms of setting a prece- enough in contradistinction to state effect and avoid injuring the inno- dent that confirms the concerns of sovereignty); and (3) the use of ad cent; many in the US and elsewhere about hoc coalitions and unilateral actions • legal instruments, where definitions international law exceeding the stipu- (are such actions always impermissi- of sovereignty are conditional on lated boundaries of competence, thus ble, even if the cause is just?). norms developed through the infringing upon domestic sovereign In sum, the intervention vs. sover- Nuremburg, Yugoslav and Rwanda law. eignty debate is, in many ways, one tribunals, by the International On conflict prevention, more of “universal righters vs. state Criminal Court, by legal intrusion needs to be done regarding effective firsters.” What provides room for into the conduct of military opera- modalities (e.g., Bruce Jentleson’s consensus between such conflicting tions; and by expanding case law concept of coercive prevention), espe- views, however, is that broad agree- that provides for domestic jurisdic- cially as these affect great power rela- ment remains that the international tion over international behavior tions (e.g., the positive role of the norm should remain one of non- (e.g., the US Alien Torts Compensa- OSCE commission on minorities). It intervention, while allowing for tion Act [US code 1350] of 1789 was argued that the salience of expanding concepts that legitimize an which was employed successfully in humanitarian intervention goes international responsibility to modern times first to a case of tor- beyond cases of state failure to affect protect. ture in Paraguay in 1980 and lat- the process of great power relations terly to a Bosnian case); and global governance. The impor- The Modalities of Intervention • military intervention, of three types: tance of these issues especially for Despite numerous cases of state fail- (a) coalition action without a direct Russia and China (and their domestic ure and internal instability in Africa, UN mandate (Kosovo); (b) a UNSC space) will affect how the the post-Soviet space, and southeast mandate with a framework nation international community reacts to Asia, the current international envi- in the lead (Australia in East Timor); future Rwandas and Kosovos. ronment is not at all conducive to and (c) an independently legitimated Regarding global governance and well-planned, well-carried out, well action to rescue and restore a UN the UN, it was asked, how different supported interventions that can stay effort (the UK in Sierra Leone); would the UN Charter look if it were the course. Especially in a period of • full cycle planning, noting how crafted now; i.e., should we be think- generalized retreat from multilateral strategic opportunities created by ing of revising the Charter to reflect institutions, the re-empowerment of military interventions have been current international realities? state agency may, while seeming a squandered by lack of post-conflict Responses displayed little appetite for paradox, be all the more important in administration and reconstruction such revision, with several terms of strengthening notions of a (Angola, East Timor, Kosovo). participants feeling that the Charter responsibility to protect. Throughout discussion of all five is not itself an obstacle (Article 39 Five categories of the modalities categories loomed the question of providing wide latitude for defining

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 35 Pugwash Meeting No. 265 threats to the peace). Moreover, the even in the event of the SC being Security Council, the Kosovo inter- lack of a formal SC mandate has not deadlocked, that only a decisive “no” vention was justified by NATO on proven an obstacle to action (Liberia on the part of the Security Council primarily humanitarian grounds. and Kosovo), reinforcing the view would prevent intervention. Should These were amplified in public only that the SC has primary but not a veto block SC approval, an appro- by the British government, which exclusive responsibility. The prob- priate regional body (one including refuted the accusation of illegitimacy lems, rather, are political will and the offending country), or a variant, by pointing to the framing authority capabilities for full cycle intervention. which might include willing and able of past UNSC resolutions on Others held that the flexibility of out-of-area actors, would be empow- Yugoslavia as well as to the six non- the UN Charter in defining threats to ered to act. One participant referred aligned states in the Security Council the peace is both a strength and a back to the Melian dialogue (the which joined western nations in vot- weakness, and that codification of strong do what they want and the ing against the Russian resolution criteria for intervention could regu- weak put up with what they must), (condemning the NATO action), larize UN actions and reduce the adapted it, and asserted that the hard which could be taken as implicit inappropriate use of the P-5 veto case that should be considered is approval. The wider international (especially on procedural issues such what happens if the strong and virtu- response was either sympathetic or as fact-finding missions). Along the ous refuse to act. muted. same lines, the concept of a responsi- Pushing the envelope further, this Issues of Legitimacy bility to protect is designed to view held that there are three ways empower and impel the SC to act, One view held that, from East Pak- the Kosovo intervention could be especially in cases where it is difficult istan in 1971 to East Timor in 1999, said to be legitimate: (1) while not to argue that an internal conflict con- the notion of sovereignty as a respon- legal, the NATO action was moral; stitutes a threat to international sibility to protect has come a long (2) new legal norms are evolving that, peace and security. Mention was also way. From this perspective, interven- in cases like Kosovo, justify acting made of Article 51 of the Charter, of tion is not an action violating sover- outside of a Security Council man- the right to individual and collective eignty, but rather one forcing states date; (3) Kosovo can be viewed as the self-defense (also found in customary to live up to their responsibilities. domestic legal equivalent of mitiga- law), tantamount to being a right to One way of considering the legiti- tion, where the law allows for miti- be rescued. macy of humanitarian interventions gating circumstances. A comparison It was noted that the Security is to place such interventions along a was made here with euthanasia in Council is steadfastly adverse to any consensual/coercive continuum. Holland, where judges were lenient attempt to impose codes of conduct Applying this framework to the three because of mitigating circumstances that might constrain its freedom to cases of military intervention raised (even though euthanasia was illegal) act – or not to act. On the other earlier in the discussion, Sierra Leone and over time, norms evolved to the hand, transparency would be served poses no problem concerning legiti- point where the law was changed. by requiring P-5 states to explain macy, as the government in Freetown Discussion followed, with the why they invoked the veto (when requested international aid. Regard- point strongly reiterated by one par- they do) to reduce its willful misuse ing East Timor, the consent of the ticipant that the Kosovo operation (France has suggested no vetoes in Indonesian government was granted, was illegal, not having been cases of humanitarian emergency). albeit following strong international sanctioned directly by the UN. In As a way of ensuring that a P-5 diplomatic and economic coercion. light of the divergence of views veto did not block needed interven- Kosovo represents the most difficult within this discussion, the question tion, it was suggested that, not only case. While not legitimate in the nar- was raised on how the ICISS report would reasons be required for casting row sense of not having the approval will treat Kosovo, given the impor- a veto, but that action could proceed of a direct mandate from the UN tance of consensus if the report is to

36 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 265

ing a human security agenda, of pro- tecting peoples not states, he neces- sarily does so within a state-based organization. Normative change may be coming, but it is coming slowly, and primarily among western countries. Kofi Annan has laid down a moral imperative (what do we do about future Rwandas?) which he knows the system cannot deliver on consistently, but which nonetheless has the value of advancing norms of a responsibility to protect. At the same time, it must be granted that concerns about interven- UN outpost in Macedonia tion on the part of non-western coun- tries are both emotional and real gain wide acceptance. authority, but a ground operation (e.g., India’s argument about the KLA The difficulty of reaching consen- from the outset would have had to provoking repression that triggered sus on Kosovo was acknowledged, destroy the Yugoslav Army in order the NATO intervention, giving the but the point was also made that to protect the Kosovars, probably KLA what they could not achieve Kosovo is controversial in large part with far greater loss of life and prob- legitimately). Unfortunately, General because of the perceived arrogance ably no better chance of protecting Assembly debates often fail to come with which NATO acted without at Kosovar civilians. To the question, to grips with what happens when least tabling a resolution in the Secu- which would have been better, a sovereignty and human rights clash. rity Council. There are some in questionable air campaign or noth- Quite often, sovereignty concerns are NATO who now regret not having ing, one response thought the ques- not really the issue; it is the selective tabled such a resolution, realizing tion misplaced, as the fault lay earlier nature of interventions. Non-western that trying to spare Russian embar- in mishandled negotiations that countries know that interventions rassment at having to cast a veto if a should not have led to a military will not happen against the P-5, their motion was introduced was ill- option in the first place. Another major allies, or the major regional judged. On the other hand, the point believed that the principal value of powers (without their consent, most was made that had Russia been the air campaign was not military at probably coerced). And, when inter- forced into a veto, the subsequent all, but lay in having facilitated the ventions do occur, they will be based (and indispensable) diplomatic role circumstances and will within NATO on a strongly perceived national that Russia played might have been to allow preparation of the ground interest (on the part of the jeopardized; the judgment call made invasion force, based on the ARRC, intervenors) and the calculation of a was not casually made. Some sug- which signal was important in the reasonable chance of success at gested that, in the future, the legiti- diplomacy which finally ended the acceptable cost (Kosovo, yes; the macy of interventions can only be crisis. Democratic Republic of Congo, no). assured if resolutions are at least What can be done about this The UN and Regional Organizations introduced in the Security Council. reluctance to intervene where and The point was also made that the The reality of the intervention issue when it is needed? Reference was conduct of the air operation might within the UN is that, although the made to the French proposal for not have compromised NATO’s moral Secretary General has been promot- using the veto in the Security Council

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 37 Pugwash Meeting No. 265 in cases of massive violations of In the discussion of capacity of regional organizations (such as the human rights, but Russian and Chi- building, reference was made to how EU coalition force of 60,000 troops) nese agreement is not likely. the UK responded to the deteriorat- could increase the means available Sanctions are usually neither effective ing situation in Sierra Leone within for intervention, such developments or timely. While a UN military force four days, stabilized the situation, would also gradually erode the might be the logical way to go, oppo- and then helped build a workable monopoly of authority currently held sition from the US and G-7 make it a coalition between the Sierra Leone by the SC. non-starter. Private armies may be government and UNAMSIL. Are more professional and cheaper than there lessons here for building future The Future of Humanitarian some forces that the UN has fielded in capacity? Intervention the past, but are too politically While another view held that For one participant, the political unpalatable for many states to accept. ECOMOG is a poor example of debate over sovereignty and interven- Interventions by regional organiza- regional organization peacekeeping, tion is more accurately a clash of tions are a logical solution, but have several positive developments were apprehensions: the fear of too many inherent problems stemming from cited, including Canada’s lead in interventions masking the reality of lack of capacity and partiality (bias). forming an international peacekeep- too few interventions. Noted also Discussion of the role of regional ing brigade and the implementation were the often paradoxical positions organizations acknowledged the of at least some of the Brahimi pro- of countries (e.g., Algeria is against problems of national self-interest and posals (12 standing officers to pro- intervention in theory, but was push- agenda-setting by major regional vide intelligence and warning for the ing the west to act in Sierra Leone). powers within such organizations Secretary General). It was suggested that the toughest (e.g., Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG), a A question was raised about challenges may lie in the “middle fundamental lack of capacity, and the South Africa’s role in OAU and sub- space” between the current ICISS lack of moral authority (which only regional peacekeeping, both in terms remit and all-out war, and be found the UN has). Ideally, interventions by of providing political support and geographically in the post-Soviet regional organizations should occur capacity building. It was noted in space and in Asia. under a UN mandate with adequate response that the prospects for a To the question posed by Kofi support provided by the international more active South African role are Annan, will there be another community. Yet issues of selectivity not good, given Johannesburg’s expe- Rwanda, one response was quite pos- (why Kosovo and not Rwanda?), and rience in Lesotho and residual suspi- sibly, but in a far more difficult coun- sensitivity to casualties on the part of cion in black Africa about South try such as the DRC or Indonesia western countries argue for building African motives (e.g., South Africa (West Papua, Aceh). One view held regional capacity within giving priority to trade relations with that, in such cases, the outcome is organizations like the OAU. Indeed, the EU, not neighboring countries). unlikely to be UN-mandated Africans are requesting help in capac- Moreover, the South African govern- responses, but emergency responses ity building, with many advocating ment doesn’t feel in total control of like that of the UK in Sierra Leone. the creation of what Nkrumah in the its own armed forces. One view was Others disagreed, seeing the DRC 1960s proposed as an ‘African high even more pessimistic, thinking the and Indonesia as far less hospitable command’ and rapid deployment South African domestic situation is to such actions as a small country force. Yet the OAU is moving slowly, extremely volatile (AIDS, land distri- like Sierra Leone. It was also noted focusing more on conflict prevention bution, unemployment, race that the humanitarian imperative and resolution, and building capacity relations) and could lead to does not seem to be responding to the in subregions to contain conflicts, not widespread disorder. gradually evolving genocide in on building up intervention capabili- Discussion ended on the point Burundi. ties per se. that, while strengthening the capacity On the question of the motives

38 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 265 underlying intervention, one view held that economic and narrow national interests can still promote humanitarian ends, one example being Vietnam’s incursion into Cam- bodia. Operation Tourquoise in Rwanda was also cited, as both serv- ing French national interests yet sav- ing 15,000 to 20,000 lives. Another participant strongly disagreed, noting that the saving of some lives was out- weighed by the French facilitating the escape of tens of thousands of Hutu genocidaires into eastern Zaire. In Andrew Mack, Gwyn Prins, and Robert Legvold this view, Operation Tourquoise has given humanitarian protection a bad that the issue will be taken out of the ernments (the UK, Mozambique, name, especially in Africa. France UN’s hands. Chile were mentioned), regional should not have been given a man- The government of Canada will organizations, NGOs, and the acade- date, as their motives were patently be involved in follow-up efforts to mic/research community in support not to promote humanitarian aims, promote the recommendations of the of the ICISS process. The difficulty and this should have been ICISS report, but this strategy will of this is not to be underestimated, recognized. depend on circumstances and the however, whether with national gov- Ultimately, the issue of what preferences of the Secretary General. ernments or NGOs, given the essen- motives for intervention are accept- Short-term goals are seen to be stimu- tial proposition of intervention being able to the international community, lating formal General Assembly dis- the use of military force in support of and which are unacceptable, will cussion, while longer-term aims are humanitarian aims. impinge directly on the issue of how those of promoting norms in support Discussion emphasized the impor- to mobilize the necessary political of a responsibility to protect. Ques- tance of the ICISS being truly a con- will to act when the need is there. tions still to be decided concern sensus document, focusing on the options of formal codification of concept of a responsibility to protect. The ICISS Report and Beyond principles (a separate treaty, UN Issues of law and morality must be A summary was provided of the ori- Charter amendment, or UNGA reso- front and center so as to resonate gins of the ICISS, with the Canadian lution) and where to locate follow-on with the public. Previous commis- government providing the initiative efforts (Security Council, General sions (Brandt, Brundtland, etc.) have but not seeking to have substantive Assembly, New York or Geneva, contributed to concepts of responsi- input while the commission prepares and/or outside the UN). In many bility within the global community, its report. Wide-ranging consulta- ways, the process is seen as more and combining the moral imperative tions have been held to solicit differ- important than the report itself, with with practical steps for implementa- ing national and regional 2002 discussions envisioned with tion could do the same for humani- perspectives, with the express aim of regional organizations, national gov- tarian intervention. being a confidence-building exercise ernments, and civil society, once the Canada’s role was seen as espe- in transparency that can help lay report has been made public. cially important, with no loss of groundwork for follow-up efforts, A major challenge in this process momentum despite the transition overcome the perceived faults of the is finding partners; of putting from Axworthy to Manley, in finding Brahimi experience, and allay fears together a coalition of national gov- like-minded governments for a true

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 39 Pugwash Meeting No. 265 multilateral initiative that can reach Watch and Amnesty International network of some 50 national groups out to broader civil society. Also need to be engaged and directly to promote similar efforts. mentioned was the need to focus on involved. National militaries are also In the end, framing the report, national parliaments, the European important, already being heavily and thus the debate, will be critically Parliament, groups like the engaged in issues of peacekeeping important, and there was much sup- Parliamentarians for Global Action, and peace enforcement; the report port for advancing concepts such as a and appropriate bodies within orga- could be the basis of discussions at responsibility to protect on the part nizations like the OSCE. Specific institutions such as the Australian of states and governments. Such a suggestions were made about engag- defence college, CINCPAC, and strategy could help bridge the gap ing the Commonwealth secretariat national military academies. between governments, multilateral and emphasizing hearings by select Regarding Pugwash, suggestions organizations, and NGOs on issues committees in important countries were made about Canadian Pugwash that go to the core of the relative (UK, New Zealand, Australia, the US sponsoring symposia on issues con- competencies and responsibilities of Senate) rather than parliamentary tained in the ICISS report, while the nation state and the international debates. Going beyond the like- international Pugwash could use its community. minded states will be important; think of getting Vladimir Lukin to Participants promote debate in the Russian Duma. Ambassador (ret.) Ochieng Adala, Africa Dr. Gwyn Prins, Principal Research Fel- In terms of coalition building, a Peace Forum (APFO), Nairobi, Kenya low, The European Institute, London parallel was drawn with the Middle School of Economics, UK Ambassador Ken Berry, ICISS Powers Initiative on nuclear weapons Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General, Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director, issues, focusing above all on the inter- Pugwash Conferences on Science and Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs relationship between governments World Affairs, Cambridge, MA and civil society. Yet the difficulty of Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., Chairman, Prof. Patrick Boyer, Q.C., Chairman, Canadian Pugwash Group forging a coalition on an issue such Pugwash Park Commission, Nova Scotia, as humanitarian intervention was not Canada Mr. Stanlake Samkange, Co-Director, ICISS underestimated. Nonetheless, effec- Mr. Giovanni Brenciaglia, Pugwash Park tive use of the ICISS research volume Commission, Nova Scotia, Canada Dr. Axel Wennmann, Dept. of Political Affairs, United Nations, New York (especially making 2-3 page Dr. Walter Dorn, Visiting Professor, summaries of major issues available Royal Military College of Canada Dr. Nicholas Wheeler, Senior Lecturer, Department of International Politics, Uni- to editorial writers, NGOs, policy- Prof. John (Jack) Harris, Editor, Interdis- versity of Wales, Aberystwyth, makers, etc.) could help stimulate ciplinary Science Reviews, UK public attention and discussion. Ms. Heidi Hulan, Dept. of Foreign PUGWASH STAFF Comparisons were made to the Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Pugwash Rome Offices – Claudia Vaughn World Development and Human Canada Development reports, where presen- Dr. Leonard V. Johnson, Member, Pug- tation of the issues is key (both wash Council, Retired Major General, Canada printed and website). The work of Edward Luck on the Prof. Robert Legvold, Professor of Politi- cal Science, The Harriman Institute, failure of previous UN blue-ribbon Columbia University, New York commissions was mentioned, espe- Prof. Andrew Mack (UK/Australia), for- cially the need to engage skeptics and mer Director, Strategic Planning, Execu- bring them on board. While gener- tive Office of the Secretary-General, ally supportive, both Human Rights United Nations, New York, NY

40 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 PUGWASH MEETING No. 266

2nd Pugwash Workshop: Nuclear Stability and Missile Defenses Como, Italy, 6–8 September 2001

Report One obvious change is growing doubt, especially in the United States, by Clayton Nall about the continued strategic relevance of the 1972 ABM Treaty. he Pugwash Workshop on When the Treaty was signed, both the Nuclear Stability and Missile US and USSR were rapidly building TDefenses was held in Como, and modernizing their strategic Italy from 6-8 September 2001. offenses; the ABM Treaty and SALT Twenty-one participants from ten agreements were designed to prevent countries attended the meeting, an offense-defense arms race. The which was hosted by the Municipal- strategic parity that the Treaty codi- ity of Como and the Landau Network fied in 1972 is less relevant now. Centro Volta. The following report is Therefore, for many Americans, there the responsibility alone of the is less reason for Moscow to object to rapporteur. US deployment of missile defenses. Participants discussed a wide Even with Russian objections, range of issues related to missile Moscow’s opinions now matter less, defense, with the immediate concern according to many, given its inability Launch of Trident missile. being announced U.S. intentions to to conduct a strategic arms buildup. move beyond the ABM Treaty and Thus, by some measures, the cost- construct a limited national missile benefit balance has shifted in favor of defense (NMD) system. There was The Current Strategic Context and deploying missile defenses. also much discussion of the potential Missile Defenses This notion that previous strate- affects of missile defense on strategic The first session provided broad gic concerns no longer apply, it was stability, non-proliferation efforts, overviews of the current strategic argued, does not mean that strategic and arms control, as well as environment, with particular atten- concerns in general are irrelevant to European missile defense options. tion paid to missile defenses and the ongoing debate. It was suggested The workshop took place just potential nuclear threats. that strategic logic does underlie days before the terrorist attacks on In terms of the changing US-Russ- Russian reluctance to abandon or New York and Washington, DC., ian relationship, one participant renegotiate the ABM Treaty, as Rus- which dramatically changed the observed that it has become “banal” sia has a “very modest” second-strike global political environment. While to observe how the bipolar Cold War deterrent that could be diminished by summarizing the discussion as it took conflict is over, and that never-ending US missile defenses, and that its place, this report does take into debates about what constitutes the weakened deterrent might even make account the post-September 11 situa- “New World Order” are likely to it vulnerable to Chinese strategic tion, particularly in terms of work- change in tone as new threats make nuclear forces. shop discussion of non-state threats. themselves known. In terms of its negotiating strat-

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 41 Pugwash Meeting No. 266

In this changed for many Russian officials. strategic context, one Regardless of one’s views on mis- participant took his sile defense, participants agreed that cue from former Soviet deep cuts in US and Russian nuclear Premier Kosygin’s line forces are both needed and feasible, that “defense is good, and would go far to lessen the wide- offense is bad” and spread fear that US missile defenses asked: Shouldn’t sup- would stimulate a new arms race. porters of MAD and One positive development on this offense-based strate- front was President Bush’s campaign gies, which are hard to promise to reduce the US nuclear defend morally, have a arsenal to around 1,500 deployed greater burden of warheads, which he reaffirmed in his proof than supporters May 1 speech at the National of defense-based Defense University. One participant strategies? argued that both Moscow and Wash- Discussion then ington could go further and reduce ensued regarding the their strategic arsenals to the same likelihood of a U.S.- levels as France and the United King- Russian “deal” on dom, with little concern for the via- “Arrow” interceptor. missile defenses, bility of nuclear deterrence. which was clearly a Missile Defenses and Strategic/Crisis egy, Moscow also has quite rational high priority for many workshop Stability: The Offense-Defense reasons to maintain the status quo. participants. In this view, not only is Equation With the Bush administration making US-Russian agreement needed to clear its intention to “move beyond” “detoxify” the issue of missile Since 1972, the ABM Treaty has pre- the ABM Treaty, Russia has nothing defense, but also to keep on track a vented the deployment of nationwide to lose in seeking to extract as many broad array of bilateral programs to missile defenses by either of the Cold concessions as it can, or in diplomati- reduce nuclear dangers, including the War superpowers, thereby simplifying cally isolating the US for abandoning Nunn-Lugar nuclear threat reduction the offense-defense equation through the treaty. programs. the (near total) prohibition of defens- A second changed component of The likelihood of US-Russian es. As noted above, the renewed strategic stability is criticism, again agreement on missile defenses will debate on missile defense has reintro- especially in the US, that deterrence depend on a number of factors, duced core issues of how changing based on ‘mutual assured including: Congressional and NATO levels of offense and defense affect destruction’ is unreliable and support for (or acquiescence in) mis- strategic and crisis stability. immoral. President Bush’s speech on sile defenses, and genuine Russian The next speaker reviewed some May 1 announcing US missile defense interest in such a deal, as opposed to of the problems with defense-based intentions repeated many of the tra- causing diplomatic trouble for the strategies. While “morally impecca- ditional arguments against relying on United States. Much will also depend ble and easy to sell,” missile defenses nuclear deterrence alone: that certain on the extent to which Russia feels against nuclear weapons will never hostile states are undeterrable, and secure about the deterrent viability of be 100 percent effective, and they that deterrence is immoral, danger- its aging nuclear forces, which, could well be destabilizing. For ous, and a thing of the past. despite recent statements to the con- example, given NMD dependence on trary, is a definite cause of concern space-based assets, deployment could

42 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 266 stimulate development of anti-satel- Saddam Hussein in 1991 if Iraq had tions were thought to have lite weaponry (ASAT) and other had nuclear weapons. After all, this eliminated lingering Cold War con- offensive military activities in space. participant mentioned, far less power cerns that “national” missile defense Aggressors might also resort more was sufficient to force US troops out would cause the US to pull inside its often to asymmetrical responses, of Somalia in 1993. shell and retreat de facto from its especially, as seen on September 11, In terms of the challenges posed European security guarantees. There including terrorist actions. Thus, cri- by missile defenses for East Asian sta- now seems to be less concern that the sis stability could be worsened by the bility, important factors include Chi- US might abandon its “extended deployment of missile defenses. nese concern over US-Japanese coop- deterrent” in Europe, not only Several other participants cited eration on theater missile defenses, because that deterrent is seen as less examples of crisis behavior to suggest which could lead to Japan abandon- necessary today, but because the Bush that offensive nuclear deterrence is ing its post-World War II restraint in administration has done more than resilient even when arsenals are at the region, and the extent to which previous administrations to keep low levels, and that the added factor Europe informed. A different take on of missile defenses would have little events held that, while European con- effect on decision-making in crises. cerns may have diminished, it is also We should anticipate that hostile Examples of where nuclear true that the Europeans’ “role in the deterrence worked, even when one proliferators such as North Korea debate has diminished considerably,” side appeared to have a greater and Iraq will place great value on with the US no longer having the strategic advantage, include the same need for European support in obtaining nuclear weapons in order Cuban Missile Crisis, where the pos- the post-Cold War era. Others dis- sible existence of operable nuclear to prevent future interventions agreed, noting the importance of weapons in Cuba deterred the United European support for eventual US- by foreign powers. States from mounting an invasion, Russian agreement on missile even though the US had a 17-to-1 defenses, and the permission needed numerical advantage in strategic missile defense deployments could from the UK and Denmark for nuclear weapons over the Soviet spark a general arms race in the upgrading US NMD radar systems. Union. Similarly, another participant region. [Editor’s note: The terror attacks of noted that evidence strongly suggests September 11 and the need for a that US Secretary of State James Europe and Missile Defenses global coalition to fight terrorism Baker’s thinly veiled warning to Iraq An opening presentation focused on have changed the dynamics of the regarding US nuclear retaliation suc- the new security environment and US-European missile defense discus- ceeded in deterring Iraq from using how the Bush Administration’s sion; see Thérèse Delpech, “A New weapons of mass destruction during strong backing of missile defense had Transatlantic Deal on Missile the Gulf War. caused European governments to Defenses After the Terrorist Attack?” If it is true that great powers are both give in to the Administration’s on the Pugwash website.] deterred so easily, one individual proposed changes and to seek ways Important questions do remain responded, then we should anticipate to incorporate missile defense into about Europe’s role in US missile that hostile proliferators such as their own military strategies. defense plans. Should Europe play a North Korea and Iraq will place great Several participants thought that more significant role as a broker in value on obtaining nuclear weapons US consultations with its European US-Russian relations? How many in order to prevent future interven- allies had ameliorated concerns that times can Europeans challenge US tions by foreign powers. It was pro- Washington would proceed with missile defense intentions without posed that the United States would NMD without taking into account giving Moscow too good a bargain- not have been so willing to counter European interests. Such consulta- ing position in the missile-defense

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 43 Pugwash Meeting No. 266 talks? To what extent do Europeans Union ought to engage in more dis- the portal so she will be in Oz after need to take seriously those in the US cussions about cooperative responses the administration.” This does lead who criticize Europe for constantly to crises, especially if the EU intends one to ask, which side of the portal is advocating multilateral measures yet to implement new security policies fantasy and which is reality? Another failing to take action? based on capabilities such as rapid noted that a “whole hog” defense is Europe’s own missile defense reaction forces. “a tremendously unlikely scenario,” plans were also discussed. There are saying that the administration is far many in Europe who support missile Missile Defenses, Politics, and more likely to deploy a system on par defense (primarily theater missile Arms Control with that postponed by Clinton than defenses to cope with limited threats Of all the topics at the Como work- that contemplated by President Rea- and for protection of deployed shop, the role of politics in the missile gan and still backed by groups such troops). In terms of non-proliferation defense debate may be the most as the Heritage Foundation. challenges, one participant criticized changed by the events of September One intensively discussed issue Europe for not doing enough to 11, 2001. The relationship between was the Bush administration’s offer address the ballistic missile threat, the United States and the rest of the to make unilateral cuts down to saying that Europe should at least world appears to have changed dra- 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear war- deploy its own early warning system. matically. Nonetheless, certain obser- heads as it pursues missile defenses. Others concurred with this goal, say- vations made during the workshop Most participants favored such cuts ing that Europe should have more but thought them inadequate and information at its disposal, and that strategically irrelevant, with many an early warning system would not in Borrowing a cinematic metaphor, disturbed by the “strong affirmation” itself be destabilizing. by the administration “that the secu- one participant speculated that There was much discussion of rity of the United States is based on reported interest in Europe for boost- missile defense supporters in the the presence in perpetuity of US phase intercept (BPI) defenses to nuclear weapons.” It was noted that administration want simply “to get defend against regional missile part of the Bush position calls for threats. Several participants Dorothy through the portal so she maintaining large numbers of non- questioned the technical feasibility of will be in Oz after the deployed warheads as a “huge BPI in the European context, how- hedge,” thus making the cuts administration.” ever, with others noting that BPI reversible. In short, the deep reduc- would require costly space-based tions promised by the Bush adminis- assets that the Europeans do not have tration could have very little impact and would not be interested in devel- concerning the arms control and on reducing the role of nuclear oping. In addition to BPI only being political implications of US NMD weapons in US policy. feasible if deployed adjacent to the plans remain relevant. Several participants also raised countries of concern, questions were Regarding when and how the US concerns about the effect on arms also raised about how BPI would would deploy a missile defense sys- control if the US were to resume work in NATO’s joint decision-mak- tem, most participants anticipated nuclear testing in conjunction with ing process, given the short response that nothing more than a symbolic missile defense, as some members of time necessary. What would be the system would be deployed during the administration have proposed. rules of engagement, and would a President Bush’s first term. Borrow- They cited the “tremendous fast-reaction missile defense system ing a cinematic metaphor, one partic- pressure” that exists in various cor- even work in a multilateral context? ipant speculated that missile defense ners of the Bush administration to Apart from missile defenses, sugges- supporters in the administration resume testing. They argued that tions were made that the European want simply “to get Dorothy through such a step would be highly destruc-

44 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 266

tive of arms control and would more than offset whatever benefits would arise from unilateral deep cuts by the United States. A contrary view was that missile defense could be helpful to arms con- trol and could actually encourage nuclear restraint. In particular, mis- sile defense could contribute to non- proliferation programs by reducing the incentive for states hostile to the United States to obtain a mere hand- ful of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons. An effective, lim- ited missile defense system would require states to deploy a higher number of missiles before their effec- tiveness could be guaranteed. The costs of such a program could discourage a state from developing long-range ballistic missiles or Russian SS-23 Spider nuclear weapons at all. In addition, Finally, there was the argument Russian prohibition on INF systems. the deployment of effective missile that missile defense could simply be A global ban on missiles with ranges defenses to protect the territory of US neutral when it comes to non-prolif- between 500 and 5500 km could help allies could discourage them (espe- eration and arms control. After all, prevent regional missile proliferation, cially Japan) from pursuing their own North Korea, Iraq, and Iran have not just as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation offensive programs. Thus, US missile faced US missile defenses, yet have Treaty (NPT) had succeeded in reduc- defense systems could actually help had, or continue to have, active bal- ing nuclear weapons proliferation and to prevent an arms race in East Asia. listic missile and nuclear weapons promoting regional stability. Others objected strongly to these programs. Perhaps missile defense Others pointed out potential assessments, arguing that missile does not matter one way or the other. problems with such a “multilateral- defense would raise the perceived ized INF Treaty.” First, there is the likelihood that the US would “inter- Meeting the Nuclear Threat: double standard of states with vene with impunity,” and that this Alternatives to Missile Defenses ICBMs advocating the total elimina- would place hostile states under great Given the prevalence of opposition to, tion of intermediate range missiles. pressure to develop and deploy or skepticism about, missile defense Second, eliminating INF would “turn nuclear weapons. Thus, missile among most of the participants, many the world over to manned aircraft” defense could be an inducement to individuals proposed alternatives to to the benefit of those countries with weapons proliferation. Another missile defense that would rely upon advanced fighters and bombers. Oth- argued that the “stability” argument both offensive military force and mul- ers noted that comparing a multilat- for missile defense is specious, asking tilateral diplomatic measures to eral INF Treaty to the NPT is rhetorically, “Is there any precedent counter proliferation threats. misleading, as there are two types of for one side arming itself with shields, One such idea was to make signatories to the NPT, with the and the other side giving up swords?” global and multilateral the US- treaty providing material inducements The implied answer was “No.”

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 45 Pugwash Meeting No. 266

however, especially in terms of inter- national law and world opinion. Others were far more skeptical, doubting that preemption could ever be feasible or moral as a way of com- bating hostile proliferators. Finally, discussion focused on the need for the United States in particu- lar to publicly reevaluate its nuclear policy. One participant argued that the American public needs to be bet- ter educated about US nuclear policy so that it can play a more important role in reforming it. There was general agreement that such a review is necessary, especially Chinese ICBM DF-31. in light of the Bush administration’s pronouncements that it is moving to non-nuclear-weapons states in the into the discussion to highlight the beyond Cold War constructs. Pres- form of civilian nuclear assistance. shortfalls shared by the range of sure also needs to be brought to bear One participant went so far as to defensive schemes against ballistic on the US Congress, where the Senate question the effectiveness of the NPT, missiles armed with nuclear saw fit to reject ratification of the noting that both North Korea and warheads. One participant said of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Iraq had clearly violated the treaty. civil defense that digging holes and (CTBT) without any prior discussion Citing two major failures (the belated expecting people to go into them was or hearings. discovery of Iraq’s program and the not a good model during the 1960s, Most participants agreed that ability of North Korea to blackmail yet now everyone is expected to sup- publics, not only in the US but else- the international community even port a different form of defense that where, have opted out of direct though it clearly violated the treaty), also provides very little protection. involvement in thinking about or dis- this speaker called into question the Others made a different point, saying cussing the role of nuclear weapons effectiveness of non-proliferation that if NMD is to be deployed, then in the current strategic environment. treaties of any kind. The very states civil defense should be a priority as Over and above the pros and cons of that must be stopped are those most well (while acknowledging that the missile defenses, a far broader discus- willing to violate the treaties. taboo against civil defense is likely to sion is needed on threats posed by Doubts were raised by another persist). nuclear and other weapons of mass participant about the effectiveness of Military preemption was also destruction, the continued utility of the current agreement to control the proposed as an alternative to missile nuclear deterrence, and the best way spread of ballistic missiles, the Mis- defense, and became the subject of of ensuring that such weapons are sile Technology Control Regime heated discussion. One participant never used. Particularly in light of the (MTCR). One participant noted how supported preemption if carried out tragedy of September 11, policymak- the status quo, and in particular as a joint effort among “like-minded ers and the public around the world China’s proliferation behavior, “has nations”, with clearly stated policy need to arrive at a far better calculus been so deplorable that there is no objectives. Even those supporting of the tradeoffs involved among a sense preserving it.” preemption as a counter-proliferation wide range of national security Civil defense was also brought tool recognized its shortcomings, policies.

46 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Meeting No. 266

Participants

Prof. Vladimir Baranovsky, Deputy Prof. Maurizio Martellini, Secretary Gen- Mr. Walter Slocombe, Partner, Caplin & Director, Institute of World Economy and eral, Landau Network-Centro Volta Drysdale, chartered (law firm), Washing- International Relations (IMEMO), (LNCV), Como, Italy; Professor of ton, DC, USA; Senior Associate, CSIS; Moscow, Russia Physics, University of Insubria, Como, Member of Board, Atlantic Council and Italy American Council for Germany; Member, Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director, Advisory Council, Geneva Center for Pugwash Conferences on Science and Mr. Robert S. McNamara, former U.S. Democratic Control of Armed Forces World Affairs, Cambridge, MA, USA Secretary of Defense; former President of the World Bank; former President, Ford Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh (Germany/ Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of Motor Company South Korea), Member, Pugwash Coun- Theoretical Physics, University of Rome cil; Senior Researcher, Free University of “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy; Chairman, Dr. Steven Miller, Director, International Berlin, Berlin, Germany; President, Pugwash Council Security Program, Center for Science & Korean Pugwash Group International Affairs (CSIA), Harvard Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Professor of University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, STUDENT/YOUNG PUGWASH Mathematical Physics, University of USA; Editor-in-Chief, International Secu- Milan, Italy; Secretary General, Union of Mr. Clayton Nall, Intern, Arms Control rity; Member, Pugwash Council; Co- Italian Scientists for Disarmament Association, Washington DC, USA Chair, U.S. Pugwash Group (USPID); Director, Program on Disarma- OBSERVER ment and International Security, Landau Prof. John Polanyi, Department of Chem- Network – Centro Volta, Como, Italy istry, University of Toronto; Member, Ms. Alessandra Londero (Italy), Knowl- Canadian Pugwash (since 1959); Co-Edi- Ms. Thérèse Delpech, Director of Plan- edge Management Consultant, Post Con- tor, The Dangers of Nuclear War, 1979; ning, Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), flict Unit-The World Bank Group, Wash- President, Canadian Committee of Scien- Paris, France ington, DC tists and Scholars (presently); Co-Chair, Dr. Victor Gilinsky, Energy Consultant, Department of Foreign Affairs Interna- STAFF Glen Echo, Maryland, USA tional Consultative Committee on a Claudia Vaughn – Pugwash Rome Office Rapid Response Capability for the United Mr. Ejaz Haider, News Editor, The Friday Nations, 1995; Nobel Prize, Chemistry, Times, Lahore, Pakistan ; Project Coordi- 1986 nator for Asia-Europe Dialogue (a project of Heinrich Boell Foundation, Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General, www.ased.org) and member of the Inter- Pugwash Conferences on Science and national Institute for Strategic Studies World Affairs; Professor Emeritus, Mass- (IISS), London achusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA, USA Prof. John (Jack) Harris, Editor, Interdis- ciplinary Science Reviews, UK; Member, Honorable John B. Rhinelander, Senior British Pugwash Council Counsel, Shaw Pittman, Washington, DC, USA; Vice Chairman, Lawyers Dr. Leonard V. Johnson, Member, Pug- Alliance for World Security (LAWS) wash Council Mr. Paul Schulte, Director Proliferation Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said, and Arms Control, Ministry of Defence, Head of Military Studies Unit and Tech- London, UK nology Advisor, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Air Cmde. Jasjit Singh, retired Director, Foundation, Cairo, Egypt; Professor of Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses Missile Mechanics of Flight, Military (IDSA), New Delhi, India; Member, Pug- Technical College (MTC), Cairo wash Executive Committee

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 47 Pugwash Meeting No. 266

Papers

WORKING PAPERS BACKGROUND PAPERS Clayton Nall (USA): “Pursuing a Heav- enly Peace: An Analysis of Nuclear Paci- Victor Gilinsky (USA): Is Missile Defense Thérèse Delpech (France): George W. fism, Environmentalism, and Anti-BMD Really Such a Bad Idea? Bush’s Uncertain Success in Europe Activism from a Just War Perspective Jack Harris (UK): Britain and National Michael Krepon (USA): “Moving Away (Excerpt from senior honors thesis, Live Missile Defence—The Political Scene from MAD”, Survival, vol. 32, no.2, by the Shield, Die by the Shield: An Summer 2001, pp. 81-95 Analysis of the Ethical Dimension of the Len Johnson (Canada): National Missile U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Debate, Defence (NMD) Robert S. McNamara and James G. University of Wisconsin-Madison, May Blight (USA): Antiballistic Missile Sys- Mohamed Kadry Said (Egypt): Layered 2001.) tems: The Pros and Cons of Their Defense-Layered Attack’s Rally: The Deployment, under “Avoiding Nuclear Paul Schulte (UK): “Assessing NMD’s Middle East Missile Race Catastrophe: Moving steadily and safely Overall Impact – An illustrative frame- John Polanyi (Canada): The Nuclear to a nuclear-weapons-free world”, Chap- work for evaluation and comparison of Threat and Missile Defence ter 4 in Wilson’s Ghost: Reducing the judgments based on the most frequent Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe publicly expressed arguments” (survey). George Rathjens (USA): Perceptions of in the 21st Century, PublicAffairs: New Paul Schulte (UK): “NMD and Moral Utility of Nuclear Weapons and ABM York, 2001, pp. 192-200 Defenses Arguments,” paper presented to the Steven E. Miller (USA): “Defenses are Council on Christian Approaches to John Rhinelander (USA): The Washing- Coming: The National Missile Defense Defence and Disarmament (CCAD) on ton Politics of NMD Debate in the United States,” presented at Tuesday 24 April 2001 Chu Shulong (China): Missile Defenses the Conference on the Missile Threat and and East Asian Stability Plans for Ballistic Missile Defense, Lan- dau Network Centro Volta, Rome, Italy, Jasjit Singh (India): Missile Defences and 18-19 January 2001 [published in Paolo the Dynamics of Stability in the Nuclear Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Defence-Offence Equation Martellini, eds., Missile Threats and Bal- Walter Slocombe (USA): Stability Effects listic Missile Defense: Technology, Strate- of Limited Missile Defenses: The Case for gic Stability, and Impact on Global Secu- (Como, Italy: Landau Network the Affirmative rity Centro Volta, 2001), pp. 123-145)] Gerald Steinberg (Israel): One of These Steven E. Miller (USA): “Indefensible Things Is Not Like the Other One: A Arguments?: Missile Defenses in the New Comparison of the Strategic Implications Strategic Environment,” Survival, of the American and Israeli Missile Autumn 2001 (forthcoming), revised Defense Programs (very preliminary draft 13 July 2001 draft: 23 July 2001, prepared for discus- sion at the Pugwash workshop in Como) (in absentia)

48 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 SELECTED ESSAYS

Israeli-Palestinian Relations: An Appraisal

Essay and people, was never fully implemented. Palestinian fail- ures at institution building and establishing a democratic by Maher El-Kurd and civic society contributed to worsening the situation. Ramallah – Palestine, April 2001 The assassination of the late Prime Minister Rabin marked the beginning of the end for both societies. For the aving had the opportunity to participate in the early Palestinians, what was supposed to be a peace process that HOslo talks of late 1992 and 1993, and, eight years would have created real interests in a peaceful settlement later, observing the stream of comments and analyses turned into a nightmare of closures, security checks every declaring the “death of the Oslo process”, I find it neces- 5 kilometers, restrictions on movement, more settlements, sary to propose a concise interpretation of the experience an inefficient government apparatus, and, according to the of the past and an appraisal of the present state of affairs. IMF and WB, a decrease of more than 20% in real per I continue to believe that the principal premises of the capita GNP over the years of 1994 – 1999. The seven Oslo accords remain correct. The over-riding concept of years of the peace process have worsened the socio-eco- the Declaration of Principles (DOP) was to work towards nomic situation instead of creating political and material achieving political separation while developing interests in the process. institutional economic and social cooperation; the interim For the Israeli society, the assassination of Rabin period was aimed at providing both societies and both invoked the polarization that had divided Israeli society peoples with the necessary transitional mechanisms which since 1977 (the election of the first Likud Government): cumulative effects over the years of the interim period i.e., the division between the 50% or so of Israeli society would enable them to mature towards facing the issues of that believed in retaining the unity of Eretz Israel at the the permanent status. expense of a large non-Jewish minority to be ‘transferred’ The Oslo process has been going through a long and at a later stage, and the other 50% or so that believe in the tormenting death since the very beginning of the process. foremost importance of preserving the Jewish character of Once the jubilation and festivities had come to an end in the State at the expense of ‘sacrificing’ Arab densely popu- 1994, the (Israeli) security establishments took over the lated territories captured in 1967. This schizophrenia in interpretation and implementation of the accords, turning Israeli society sent no clear message of peace to the Arab the direction from institutionalizing economic and social world as it reflected an unexpected fact: that there existed cooperation into the direction of full separation. The three no clear and determining majority in Israeli society for a most significant “peace dividends” for the Palestinians in ‘land for peace’ and ‘implementation of 242’ peacefully the Oslo accords: the three redeployment phases, the return negotiated settlement. Disillusionment in the Palestinian of the 1967 displaced persons through the quadruple com- society accumulated frustration, resentment and antago- mittee, and the two safe passages connecting Gaza Strip nism – the contrary process in both societies to the one and the West Bank, were implemented in a manner of ‘too anticipated in the DOP. little too late’ for the redeployments and the safe passages, This process, despite its maladies and shortcomings, and ‘not at all’ for the 1967 displaced persons. Most of the could have muddled on for a longer period had it not been joint (Israeli/Palestinian) committees in the appendices of for the unfortunate Camp David Summit. Most of the the DOP have never been set up. The main concept of the Palestinian political elite was against the whole idea of the Economic (Paris) Protocols, i.e., the free movement of goods summit: a 100 year existential conflict could not have and

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 49 Selected Essays cannot be dealt with in such a superficial manner; the have inflicted serious damage. The effect on both societies seven years that preceded the summit did not prepare is deeper and more wide-spread than the growing either party to reach an agreement on the permanent sta- confrontational spirit in Palestinian society and the demise tus issues in two weeks. of the narrow and isolated ‘peace camp’ in Israeli society. The so-called ‘generous and far reaching offers’of It will therefore be simplistic and naïve to suppose that Camp David, once leaked to the Palestinians, turned frus- ordinary measures and political statements will be enough tration and resentment into despair: 52 years after the to break the current deadlock and move out of the abyss. nakba, with 33 years of occupation and seven years of a The situation is moving quickly from a failed peace failed peace process, Israel still claimed control of the West process to a new phase in the 100 years conflict: a South Bank’s prime lands and control of the water aquifers, African model of Apartheid in the Middle East. The state- offered diminished sovereignty, imposed the settlers but ments of Palestinian leaders and intellectuals in the past few rejected the refugees. Sharon’s provocative visit to Al-Aqsa weeks, the general spirit of the Arab summit which accom- was the last straw. modates the Arab emotions, the early symptoms of - mar- Most of the post-mortem comments and analyses deal- ginal so far, but spreading – European calls for anti-Israel ing with the failed Camp David talks attempt to explain, sanctions, and, indeed, the statements and actions of the from either point of view, the factors that contributed to leading Israeli political and intellectual figures (including the failure. The Clinton proposals and Barak’s ‘generous’ Amos Oz et al ) are strikingly reminiscent in their arrogance offers were symptoms of a serious and profound gap and inherent racism of the aura that surrounded the last between the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives of a per- white generations that governed Rhodesia and South Africa. manent peacefully negotiated settlement of 100 years of Among those Palestinian and Arab intellectuals who conflict. The Israeli ‘moderate’ position represented in characterize the present phase of the conflict as a South Barak’s generosity presumed to end the conflict and put an African model of Apartheid, only a minority would believe end to all Palestinian claims through a compromise on the this trend to be a negative one. To them, of the peoples results of the 1967 war – hence the Camp David offer. living west of the Jordan river, ‘only’ 50% (due to the The Palestinian perspective was outlined at the PLO’s large number of Russian Christian emigrants) at present 1988 Algiers meeting of the Palestine National Council are Jews; it will take one, or at most two more generations and the declaration of the Palestine State. It defines the for the Apartheid policy imposed by Israel to run its full historical reconciliation and the end of the 100 years con- course and reach its logical conclusion, an historical flict through presenting a compromise on the nakba of process that will avoid the partition of Palestine between 1948; i. e., the recognition of Israel’s right to exist and the the two peoples, and the eventual creation of a democratic partition of Palestine into two states, of which the State of and secular state for all its citizens west of the Jordan river. Palestine is to be established along the borders of June The proponents of this view recognize the poetic jus- 4th 1967 and the settlement of the refugees issue in accor- tice in this ‘let the apartheid run its course’ slogan (as dance with UN Resolution 194. It is this gap between the opposed to the ‘let the IDF win’ slogan supported by the two perspectives, the fact that there existed (during the majority in Israeli society). Camp David talks) in Israel no clear majority for a com- The South African-Development phase of the conflict prehensive peace settlement, and the failures of the past is still in its very early stage, and thus reversible. Whatever seven years that underlined the Palestinian resistance, that its merits, the suffering that it will inflict on both societies doomed the Camp David conference. for another generation or two in the Apartheid model can In the past six months, the Israeli excessive use of force – and must – be avoided. What is needed is a fair and and collective punishments, encirclements and blockades humane way out of the present deadlock. fed more resentments and antagonisms. State terrorism It is idle to expect to resuscitate the peace process with was inevitably confronted by mass popular resistance as a Sharon- and Likud-led government, in which a Nobel well as sporadic underground and fundamentalist armed Peace Prize laureate acts as a Minister for Propaganda and resistance. The cumulative effects of the past six months a Labor Defense Minister needed to be restrained by the

50 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Selected Essays

very Sharon of the Lebanon war. It is not unrealistic, how- sent situation drag on and drive the region out of the ever, to explore areas of joint interest in stabilizing the sit- peace process era into the era of Apartheid and the Rhode- uation and moving it from a situation of the confrontation sian and South African model of development? Unfortu- between state-terror and growing popular resistance to a nately, very little time is available before the region enters situation of stability through ending mass punishment and this new, non-reversible, phase of development that is blockades. Meetings between the two sides are necessary entirely different from the failed peace process of the to agree on security, economic and political steps to be 1990s. jointly agreed upon and implemented. Could the presence of a Labor faction in the present Dr. Maher El-Kurd is Economic Advisor to the President of government be the one factor that could act as the neces- the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Secretary Gen- sary and indispensable catalyst to organize the first of such eral of the Higher Commission for Investment and Finance, meetings without impossible pre-conditions? Will the pre- and Deputy Minister for Economy & Trade of the PNA.

SELECTED ESSAYS

The Oslo Process: Failures, Lessons, Alternatives

Essay The current impasse was not predestined. At and after Camp David, the PLO was presented with a reasonable set by Joseph Alpher of proposals by an Israeli prime minister who, along with November 2001 all his mistakes, was prepared to continue to negotiate additional compromises and could have achieved popular he Oslo process has collapsed and the al-Aqsa support for an agreement. The PLO opted instead for vio- TIntifada continues to rage. Both the PLO and the new lence. The reasons why are one of the subjects of this Israeli government have thus far offered little by way of inquiry. either military or political solutions to the impasse. There are some on each side who suspect the other of Indeed, the two sides appear to have lost their capacity to never having been sincere in their desire to make Oslo communicate in a constructive manner. At such a juncture work. If they are right, then Oslo was an exercise in decep- in the fortunes of the Middle East it is important, indeed tion at the strategic level. This is a legitimate line of imperative, to look back over the past eight years and ask inquiry, but for the purposes of this analysis we shall ourselves what flaws in the Oslo process contributed to assume that both sides indeed were originally sincere. the current state of affairs.1 Such an inquiry is not merely This analysis is about the Oslo process; we are not of historical importance. For if we can identify flaws, we looking here specifically at the causes of the current can hopefully learn from them. And while the discussion Intifada. Yet the Intifada in effect concided with, or sig- of possible alternative new tracks for an Israeli-Palestinian naled, the collapse of the Oslo track, and it is obvious that settlement is already underway, it could surely benefit sig- some of its causes also contributed indirectly to the nificantly from an attempt to apply the lessons learned collapse of Oslo. For example, the Israeli unilateral with- from Oslo. drawal from Lebanon in May 2000 was interpreted by An inquiry into Oslo is inevitably, at least in some Palestinians in two ways that contributed to the Intifada ways, a subjective exercise, influenced by the experiences and proved detrimental to the Oslo process. First, Israel’s and political perceptions of the inquirer. This analysis withdrawal to a UN-designated border with Lebanon rein- acknowledges the following assumptions and experiences: forced the PLO demand that Israel withdraw to its 1967

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borders with the West Bank and Gaza—a demand that tried, i.e., the failure was in the execution, not the agree- Israel refused to countenance. Secondly, the unilateral ment. Many also contend quite persuasively that the 1993 nature of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in the face of DOP was ‘the best we could do at the time.’ Then there is Hizballah’s attacks persuaded Palestinians that the use of the argument that Oslo actually succeeded, in that it was force, rather than negotiations, could oblige Israel to with- only designed to lead Israel and the PLO into final status draw from remaining occupied areas in the West Bank and negotiations—not to ensure their success. None of these Gaza. considerations detracts from the need to examine the flaws By way of full disclosure, the author notes that he was in both the agreement and the process as a whole. involved with the Oslo process in a number of ways. He was associated with track II efforts between Israelis and Flaws Palestinians, and with research on Israeli-Palestinian Oslo’s first and most obvious failure concerns the building peace, that preceded and paralleled the original Oslo of trust and confidence between Israelis and Palestinians. track. At the time of Camp David II in July 2000 he served This was a key objective of the introduction of phasing as a Senior Advisor to Prime Minister Barak. into the process. The interim step-by-step process was sup- Finally, this is a very preliminary investigation of a posed to generate trust. Yet arguably, the prolongation of topic that requires considerable additional discussion and a gradual, step-by-step process in a tense atmosphere has debate, and probably the simple passage of time, in order inevitably generated major episodes of violence; gradual- to be better clarified. ism seems merely to extend the vulnerability of the process as a target for the extremists on both sides. In many ways Achievements it is the failure of the Oslo interim process (land transfer, An exploration of the flaws of the Oslo process is not cessation of settlement building and state-building for the meant to denigrate from the historical importance of the Palestinians, security for Israel) rather than of the final sta- Oslo breakthrough and the net gains of the past eight tus phase, that produced the Intifada. All this calls into years of the peace process. Today, compared to 1993, the question the advisability of breaking such a process down gaps separating Israelis and Palestinians are radically nar- into interim phases. rowed and the issues far better defined. Indeed Oslo, When Oslo was born, it was Abba Eban who noted which reflected considerable personal courage on the part this vulnerability and suggested that it might have been of Israeli and Palestinian leaders, provided the two sides preferable to do the job in ‘one fell swoop.’ But here we their first opportunity to engage the core issues in depth. must note that this was precisely what Ehud Barak—him- Oslo strengthened the centrality of negotiated, land-for- self no adherent of the phasing principle—tried to do dur- peace settlements between Israel and its neighbors, and ing his 19 months in office, with equally unsuccessful specifically legitimized a two state solution between Israel results. Moreover, in the Intifada Palestinians are fighting and Palestine. It transformed the psychological environ- for a number of demands, e.g., removing provocative iso- ment, initiated a modest process of ‘de-demonization’ on lated settlements, that Israel already effectively signaled it both sides, and created political-legal norms—in effect, an would comply with under agreed final status terms. While agreed vocabulary—for discussing Israeli-Palestinian rela- this does not mean that a phased process could necessarily tions. Oslo enabled Israel to negotiate a peace agreement have been avoided, we nevertheless must conclude that the with Jordan and to radically improve relations with a host Oslo interim process failed entirely to create trust and con- of additional countries, with positive consequences for fidence between the parties. Israeli strategic security and for the Israeli economy. An additional assumption of the Oslo interim concept Oslo provided the Palestinians with a territorial base, a and timetables for autonomy and final status talks is that degree of self rule, and a potentially fruitful relationship the Palestinian people and their leadership, the PLO, are— with the United States. or quickly will become—‘ripe’ for self-government. While Some observers would argue that Oslo, like true com- it may seem ‘politically incorrect’—in an age that recog- munism, did not in fact fail because it was never really nizes the universal right to self determination—to question

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this assumption, it must be acknowledged that historically ate final status believing it was entering into an additional Palestinians have never been sovereign, and never process of mutual compromise on all fronts. It held fast to managed their own affairs. Thus one could argue that the the ‘territories’ (as opposed to ‘the territories’) language of interim process, far from being eliminated, should have the English original of 242, along with its mention of been spread over a far longer period of time. ‘secure borders’: Israel understood these phrases to mean Another failed objective of phasing and the generation that it did not necessarily have to evacuate all the territo- of trust was to provide an instrument for the economic ries occupied in 1967. Moreover, it argued that 242 did development of the Palestinian Authority. Fully one-third not apply to the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem in of the Oslo DOP of September 1993 concerns joint eco- the way it had applied to Israel’s international borders nomic development plans that proved abortive. These with Egypt (back to the ’67 lines) and Jordan (one-on-one were based on the concept of economic integration cham- territorial swaps) and would presumably apply to the bor- pioned by Shimon Peres within the framework of his New der with Syria (’67 lines). After all, Israel claimed, the Middle East concept, which has itself proven to be radi- Palestinian territories had not constituted a sovereign cally premature if not totally misplaced. In reality, Pales- state, or the Green Line an international border, prior to tinians’ productivity and standard of living dropped con- 1967. siderably during the Oslo period—by 20% between 1994 The PLO, for its part, cited both the language of 242 and 1999, according to the IMF and World Bank. Reasons that it preferred (evacuation of ‘the territories’, meaning for this include corruption, high natural population all the territories, in the Russian and Arabic versions) and increase that the PA made no effort to reduce, and Israel’s the precedents of Israel’s previous peace negotiations, to security needs. back up its demand that negotiations center on the 1967 In this context, it is instructive to note that on the border. Moreover, the PLO came to the final status negoti- Israeli side, Oslo embodied the problematic combination of ating table with a well developed narrative that placed it two very different fundamental strategic concepts: on the essentially only on the potential receiving end of conces- one hand, the security-minded ‘separation’ espoused by sions regarding territory. According to this concept, the Yitzhak Rabin (and later Ehud Barak), and on the other, Palestinian people made a single huge concession when it Shimon Peres’ ‘integration’ with its economic emphasis (the agreed to a two-state solution based on the existence of ‘New Middle East’). Over time the concepts have proven to Israel within 77% of Mandatory Palestine (the 1967 be incompatible and at times even contradictory (e.g., boundaries). While minor symmetrical territorial adjust- when Israel responded to Palestinian suicide bombings by ments were possible, the basic Palestinian demand for the invoking closures and other security restrictions, with dev- remaining 23% was non-negotiable. This fundamental astating economic effect on the Palestinians), to the detri- contradiction between the two sides’ core approaches ment of Israel’s overall policy for administering Oslo. regarding territory has not been resolved to this day. Cer- A second structural flaw in the Oslo DOP is its determi- tainly Oslo provided no mechanism for a preliminary dis- nation that final status negotiations, regarding a specified cussion of the applicability of 242. list of topics, would “lead to the implementation of Secu- Moving from the DOP to the peace dynamic it gener- rity Council Resolutions 242 and 338”. Resolution 242 as ated, the Oslo process also reflected a failure of leadership a formula for peace is interpreted very differently by on both sides. Israeli and Palestinian leaders alike found it Israelis and Arabs. The framers of Oslo were undoubtedly expedient to ignore, and at times even encourage, activities aware of the two sides’ contradictory interpretations, but by their extremist opposition that were explicitly or nevertheless determined in advance that the basis for final implicitly prohibited by Oslo—all in the interest of concili- status talks would be disputed from the outset. Presumably ating the opposition and buying political time, even as they reasoned that time, and the confidence-building these same opposition elements became yet more extreme. process which never took off, would render the contradic- Thus prime ministers Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu and Barak tions more amenable by the time final status talks arrived. all, to one extent or another, allowed settlement building This did not happen. Israel came to the table to negoti- to proceed, avoided carrying out interim further redeploy-

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ments and opening safe passages between the West Bank The leadership failures climaxed in the year 2000. and Gaza Strip, and refused to release prisoners—all in Ehud Barak demonstrated a painful lack of personal polit- contradiction to the spirit and/or the letter of Oslo, even as ical skills that prevented him from building a direct rela- Arab and American policymakers pointed out the devas- tionship with Arafat (or, for that matter, with most of his tating effect this was having on the Palestinian own coalition). As for the PLO leader, not only Israel and commitment to the process. Note, for example, the clash the US but many in the Arab world too recognize his key between Rabin’s open antagonism toward the settlers mistake. In the words of commentator Fahd al-Fanek (“propellors,” “political settlements”) and his reaction to (generally a tough Arab critic of Israel), “the Palestinian the Baruch Goldstein massacre in Hebron in February side made a mistake when it allowed a unique opportunity 1994: after a single settler murdered 30 Palestinians as . . . to slip by . . . at Camp David and Taba. . . . The previ- they prayed, and the Israel Defense Forces, in suppressing ous century has witnessed a number of opportunities that the ensuing riots, then killed some 20 more, Rabin were rejected by the leadership of the Palestinian people, imposed a heavy closure regime on the city’s battered only for them to come back later and make the same Palestinian population and refused to remove the provoca- demands accepting what they had previously rejected.”3 tive and extremist Jewish settlers. Some Palestinians cite The consequences of these failures of leadership—particu- this as a major turning point in their attitude toward Oslo. larly those regarding Israeli settlement-building and Pales- Arafat, for his part, never collected arms from the pub- tinian incitement, hoarding of arms and failure to ready lic as directed by Oslo, never seriously suppressed the the public for a compromise peace—were abundantly evi- Islamic opposition, and never came to terms with the dent in the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada that marked demand to cease anti-Israeli incitement. At key junctures the termination of the Oslo process. in the process, when he apparently assessed that he had Thus far this assessment of the failings of Oslo has exhausted his reserve of diplomatic options, he violated focused on flaws shared, or mistakes committed, by both his commitment (embodied in his letter to Israeli PM Israelis and Palestinians. Additional flaws were specific to Rabin of Sept. 9, 1993 that accompanied the Oslo DOP) each of the parties. A succession of Israeli governments, to refrain from “terrorism and other acts of violence.”2 for example, failed to factor in the ramifications of Oslo Nor did he ever display public empathy for Israel’s con- for the Israeli Arab community. On the one hand Israel cern with personal security. Basically, he never educated insisted, and the PLO accepted, that the status of Israel’s his people for peace. million strong Palestinian Arab community was an inter- Apropos settlements, the 1993 DOP specifies that their nal issue that should in no way be a subject for negotia- fate is a final status issue, to be negotiated between the tion. But on the other, Israel ignored the radicalizing effect two sides. The PLO, which sees settlements as a colonialist on its Arab citizens—in particular, a sharp rise in socioeco- statement of Israeli aggression, understood this and addi- nomic expectations and increasing demands for greater tional references to territorial issues in the DOP to mean autonomy and even for Israel to cease to be a ‘Jewish that settlements would not be expanded in any way in the state’—of the anticipated ‘end of conflict’ agreement and interim. But successive Israeli governments insisted that emergence of an independent Palestinian state. The conse- Oslo did not prohibit ‘natural growth’ to satisfy settler quences were evident in the violent Israeli Arab participa- needs. Interpreted liberally—and in many cases tion in the early stages of the al-Aqsa Intifada in October cynically—this position brought about an increase in the 2000, which was also nurtured by a parallel growth in settler population from 120,000 in 1992 to around Arab Islamic extremism in Israel. 200,000 by 2001. A portion of the new settlers live in new The PLO, for its part, and Arafat specifically, contin- ‘neighborhoods’ and ‘outposts’ that are really new settle- ued to exhibit a reliance on the use of violence—specifi- ments in all but name. The Oslo language on settlements is cally prohibited by Oslo—that ultimately helped destroy yet another example of the dangerous ambiguities that the process. It also emerged that the PLO leadership were tolerated in the DOP in the interest of reaching a deal brought with it from the Diaspora elements of a systemic that advanced the process. corruption that eventually threatened to alienate it from

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its own constituency in the West Bank and Gaza. Many resolved to discuss only the future—not the past. To do Palestinians cite Palestinian Authority corruption as a key otherwise, they reasoned, would doom the process to fail- domestic cause of the Intifada, and explain that in some ure. They may have been right, in the sense that their ways the uprising is directed as much against the PA lead- approach enabled the two sides to create a pragmatic for- ership as against Israeli occupation. mula for temporary coexistence that advanced the cause of At the strategic level, each side based its acceptance of Middle East peace. But by postponing discussion of the Oslo on a set of assumptions that proved to be largely contradictions between the most fundamental Israeli and unfounded. The Israeli signers of the Oslo DOP held the Palestinian narratives, they also allowed the Israeli-Pales- false expectation that Israel was exchanging land for strict tinian dynamic to be invaded by a virus that has now par- Palestinian enforcement of security for Israelis; and that alyzed it. settlement expansion during the interim period would be Stated plainly, Oslo has failed to resolve these contra- tolerated by Palestinians. The Palestinian leadership and dictions. When the process ended in late January 2001 at public believed mistakenly that Israel’s signature meant it Taba, Palestinians were still insisting that Israel admit the was prepared to acquiesce in Palestinian core positions ‘original sin’ of its very existence, blame itself officially for regarding sovereign statehood, Jerusalem and refugees. causing the Palestinian refugee problem, accept a principle Perhaps the ultimate case study in mutual misperceptions of ‘return’ that implies (to Israelis) that Israel should not emerging from the Oslo process is Jerusalem: at Camp be a Jewish state, and absolve the PLO of the need for David it emerged that neither side really understood the additional compromises. They also denied any Israeli/Jew- religious-national significance of the city to the other. ish spiritual or national link to the Temple Mount. These From here to the ill-fated Sharon visit to the Temple demands, coupled with growing Israeli Arab calls for Mount on September 28, 2000 that catalyzed the Intifada, ‘deZionizing’ Israel and with the violence of the Intifada, we can trace a direct line of misunderstanding and suspi- left the Israeli public thoroughly traumatized. That same cion. public still supports the original substance of the process, Finally, there is the American element. Throughout the as well as Barak’s far-reaching formulation for a two-state process Washington—the principal international guaran- solution, but only on condition that it enshrine Israel’s tor of the Oslo agreement—was aware of the destructive legitimacy as a Zionist Jewish state with deep historic and effect of both parties’ non-compliance with Oslo obliga- religious links to Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, and be tions, yet failed to demand their compliance effectively. based on a spirit of mutual compromise. Toward the end of the process, during the Netanyahu and If Oslo proved unable to resolve—or, alternatively, Barak premierships, the US became overinvolved, moving bypass or even postpone—these near primordial contra- from a facilitator mode to the role of active mediator and dictions, perhaps there are alternatives that can. The fol- even arbiter. Initially, under Netanyahu, this had the lowing brief survey assesses alternative peace process con- understandable goal of simply keeping the process alive. cepts. The author himself does not necessarily endorse or Ultimately, under Barak, the frenetic pressures of his and advocate any particular option; rather, they are cited here Clinton’s ‘lame duck’ timetables of the last months because they have recently appeared, or are judged likely distorted the capacity of Israel and the PLO to reach and to appear, on the Israeli national agenda. Nor are all nec- keep agreements, and led to a strong devaluation of Amer- essarily mutually exclusive; some could coexist or ican political capital in the Middle East. The eventual coincide. ‘hands off’ reaction of the Bush administration—which at least initially disassociated itself from the Oslo process— Possible Alternative Israeli-Palestinian Peace Tracks was, under these circumstances, inevitable. There are those, like Yossi Beilin, who continue to believe that the Oslo final status track can succeed. If only the Lessons negotiators could have “a few more weeks,” they might be When Israel’s Uri Savir and the PLO’s Ahmed Qurei (Abu able to reach a package deal that comprises everything: Alaa) began their Oslo dialogue in the spring of 1993, they Jerusalem, refugees, borders, security, and ‘end of

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conflict.’4 This route reflects progress made at Taba in transfer of West Bank territory, measures to enhance terri- January 2001, on issues like borders, settlements and torial contiguity within the Palestinian areas, economic refugee compensation. But it appears to ignore the very concessions and incentives, and the declaration of a Pales- basic contradictions regarding essential narratives and tinian state. The PLO would agree to a non-belligerency positions that emerged in the course of the past year’s final pact and a postponement of final status talks for, say, five status talks, were apparently not resolved at Taba, and or ten years. Unconfirmed but reliable reports—denied which must be clarified before a final status agreement can vigorously by Sharon for the time being—indicate that he be concluded. has even offered to remove outlying settlements in the Some Palestinians, like West Bank Fatah leader Gaza Strip and West Bank in order to ensure greater sta- Marwan Barghuthi, also argue that a return to the Oslo bility and territorial contiguity for the Palestinians. Mean- framework is impossible, and that “the Palestinians and while, Israel would retain the Jordan Valley and united the Arabs must find a new formula for the negotiations.”5 Jerusalem. While a final status track might be reopened, it In any case, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, represent- is not expected to register progress. All these elements of ing a widespread sentiment in Israel, has indicated that he an agreement have apparently been relayed to the PLO has no near-term intention of pursuing the Oslo final sta- through unofficial contacts, some at ministerial level, held tus formula. Hence this track appears to have little imme- over recent months. diate relevancy. Yet in the medium or long term, Israel and Thus far the Palestinian response to this set of propos- the Palestinians will inevitably have to return to these als appears to be a conditioned rejection. While Arafat issues, more or less in the Camp David/Taba format, if presumably would not object to receiving an additional they are to resolve the conflict. increment of land and declaring a state under agreed con- A second alternative that is increasingly prominent ditions, he would nevertheless insist that Sharon’s scheme may be termed ‘short term crisis management.’6 It assumes fit in with the overall Oslo framework, which provides the that, whatever developments take place in the near future, ‘international legitimacy’ that is so important to the PLO. the gap separating the two parties’ basic narrative Thus the land transfer must be called the ‘3rd FRD’, i.e., positions will prevent a solution that ends the conflict. the final stage in the interim process that Ehud Barak pre- Hence means must be developed for both sides to manage, ferred to ignore in favor of a final status agreement. It rather than resolve, the conflict—to draw back from con- must be considerably more substantial than the 10% of frontation, until such time as the process may be renewed. the West Bank that Sharon has thus far intimated he These could comprise a renewal of security coordination, would consider. And it must not constitute an alternative a third party role, and perhaps agreement by both sides to to final status talks, but rather complement them—again, observe mutual constraints—for example on violence, on in the spirit of Oslo. incitement or on settlement construction. An existing This does not mean that Arafat necessarily expects that example of such crisis management is the two sides’ tacit Sharon will participate in a breakthrough on final status understanding to avoid taking violent or unilateral actions talks, but rather that the format of Oslo, and the concom- that might affect their shared water supply. This option, mitant commitment to final status, must be honored. But like the one following (no. 3, below), is also roughly com- by the same token, Arafat would presumably also not patible with the path toward renewed negotiations out- agree to a prolonged postponement of a final status agree- lined in the Mitchell Commission recommendations of the ment. Instead, he would seek to reduce and mitigate the spring of 2001. terms of postponement to a manageable minimum, while Prime Minister Sharon’s official position advocates implicitly brandishing the threat of a renewed Intifada if postponing final status talks and returning to an interim the postponement turned into a freeze. mode—ostensibly because of the unbridgeable gap Under current conditions, some variation on this between the sides, but also because Sharon is not prepared option appears to be the most probable of the alternatives to offer the concessions Barak proposed for final status. for renewing negotiations. Under an interim deal, Israel would agree to an additional Before he left office, Ehud Barak trumpeted the option

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of unilateral or ‘bilaterally coordinated unilateral’ steps. ment—in effect, abandon territory and perhaps The objective would be to achieve a high degree of separa- settlements—in sensitive areas like Bethlehem, Hebron tion even without a peace process. Under this alternative, and Jerusalem. If the Intifada continues, some aspects of Israel would inform or signal the Palestinians regarding a this scenario could become increasingly probable, insofar series of moves designed to define its border with the West as inadvertent heavy loss of life is almost certain to happen Bank unilaterally, by building fences and paving bypass eventually. roads that include the major settlement blocs within Three additional options appear at present to be some- Israel’s borders, and setting up new border crossing points what counter-intuitive, but could well become more accordingly. In return it would not object to certain unilat- prominent on the Israeli public agenda if the current polit- eral Palestinian steps, such as a declaration of ical impass continues. One is to revert to the thinking independence. All this, without specific reference to the regarding federal and confederal options that character- ongoing violence. In fact, some of these fencing and ized the pre-Oslo period, and that has remained fashion- paving activities began under the Barak government, prin- able with anti-Oslo Palestinian intellectuals. These options cipally as a response to the security challenges of the would seek to bypass some of the most intractable final Intifada.7 status issues—borders, settlements, refugees—through The primary drawback of the unilateral approach is new concepts of flexibility regarding political borders and that it is limited geographically. It cannot be applied in definitions of citizenship. Jerusalem, where geographic separation is impossible due One such possibility might be to involve Jordan in con- to mixing of neighborhoods, or in the Jordan Valley, federal arrangements with Israel and a Palestinian state in where for security reasons Israel is not likely even to con- a manner calculated to soften territorial demands. template withdrawing its military presence prior to a final Another is to exploit the increasingly controversial status agreement. In the settlement blocs where it can be support of Israel’s Arabs for the Palestinian cause, together applied, it does not rationalize the status of Arab villages with the growing demographic concerns of Israel’s Jewish located within the blocs—which presumably would have majority, and suggest that Israel compensate the PLO for to be negotiated. And in the Gazan and West Bank heart- settlement bloc annexations very generously, by moving land, it would have to involve unilateral dismantling of the border so as to place several hundred thousand Israeli isolated and provocative settlements in order to have any Arabs (in the Triangle, Wadi Ara and Northern Negev effect—a politically explosive option, albeit one that is regions), with their lands and dwellings, inside a Palestin- gaining increasing public support.8 ian state. Alternatively, or in parallel, Israeli Arabs who As noted, unilateral separation was proposed by Ehud object to Israel’s status as a Jewish state might be encour- Barak while he was prime minister. Ariel Sharon has stated aged to exchange Israeli for Palestinian citizenship—while that he sees no practical possibility of carrying out a policy continuing to live in Israel—even as settlers could remain of separation. Indeed, Sharon claims to oppose the very as Israelis living deep inside Palestinian territory. This notion of separation, and argues that “I don’t believe in would produce a measure of demographic separation to ‘us here and them there.’ . . . I always said we could live overlap geographic separation.10 with the Arabs”9—albeit, presumably, only on Sharon’s This option, with its variations, has the advantage of own political-ideological terms. mustering creative thinking and seeking to integrate The PLO’s efforts at ‘internationalization’ of the con- related issues—Jordan’s welfare and political status, the flict, e.g., by calling for intervention by a UN force, are Israeli Arab problem—into a peace process. One designed to impose elements of a settlement on Israel. This disadvantage is that it involves political frameworks that option could reach a degree of fruition if the military situ- presume a complex and ‘warm’ peace and soft borders at ation deteriorates seriously, as a result of large scale loss of a time of growing mutual suspicion and demand for sepa- life on one or both sides due to deliberate attacks or inad- ration rather than integration. Many Israelis—Jews and vertent error. Heavy international pressure on Israel could Arabs—as well as the international community, are likely be designed to force it to alter its military or police deploy- to object to the notion of ‘trading’ with the citizenship

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rights of Israeli Arab citizens. As for Jordan, it has long Joseph Alpher is an Israeli writer and consultant on peace held that it will not be a part of an Israeli-Palestinian final process related issues. He is the Israeli editor of status agreement. bitterlemons.org, an internet-based Israeli-Palestinian A second counter-intuitive option would involve agree- strategic dialogue. He is a former Director of the Jaffee Cen- ment by both sides to abandon the notion of final status as ter for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. a complete package involving complex trade-offs, and agree to discuss specific final status issues separately, one- by-one. Thus for example, the parties would seek to solve Notes the related issues of security, borders and settlements 1 alone, agreeing in advance not to discuss in parallel A preliminary version of this paper was presented at a work- shop sponsored by the Bertelsmann Foundation, in conjunc- refugees or Jerusalem. Or, they would attempt to reach tion with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in Jerusalem on separate agreement on the refugee/right of return issue. March 15-16, 2001. Themes discussed in the paper were also This option has the advantage of being compatible with presented by the author at the Seventh Pugwash Workshop on other partial solutions, such as a new interim agreement or the Middle East in Alexandria, Egypt, on April 26-29, 2001, unilateral separation. It also might inject new momentum and in a Backgrounder prepared for Americans for Peace Now into an otherwise stagnant process. Its great disadvantage in April 2001 and published on their website. The author is is that, by breaking up the final status package, it denies indebted to a number of individuals present at these meetings, and in APN, as well as additional Israelis, Palestinians and both parties the room for trade offs that might enhance Americans, for their insights on the issues in question. their capacity to reach agreements. In particular, it neutral- 2 izes Israel’s demand for an ‘end of conflict’ pledge by the For the text of the Arafat letter, the Oslo DOP and other key documents, see Mahdi Abdul Hadi, ed., Documents on Pales- PLO in return for a comprehensive agreement embodying tine, Vol. II, PASSIA, 1997. Israel’s final status concessions. 3 Finally, precisely because the interpretation of 242 Al-Rai, Jordan, April 2, 2001. appears to be such a fundamental sticking point, it might 4 Personal conversation, April 16, 2001. be advisable for the parties to engage in direct negotiations 5 Al-Hayat al-Jadida (PA), May 8, 2001, citing Al-Bayan (UAE). aimed at reaching an agreed interpretation of this key UN Cited by MEMRI. resolution—following which a number of controversial 6 I am indebted to Maher el-Kurd, Economic Adviser to the Pres- final status issues might more easily fall into place. Of ident of the Palestinian National Authority, for the use of this course, failure in such a venture would, in turn, have a term. detrimental effect on the overall process—which is 7 For a fairly comprehensive exposition of this option, see David presumably why the drafters of Oslo avoided such a Makovsky, “Middle East Peace Through Partition,” Foreign debate. Affairs, March/April 2001.

8 Conclusion See for example the poll in Yediot Aharonot, May 4, 2001, according to which 44% of Israelis favor unilateral disman- This paper has briefly examined Oslo’s flaws and the tling of outlying settlements and determination of the border lessons and alternatives that they suggest at this critical with the Palestinians.

juncture. Its conclusions point to the need for policymak- 9 Interview in Haaretz weekend magazine, April 4, 2001. ers, as well as academic and other interested circles, to 10 For a presentation of this approach based on a recent discus- expand their search for a renewed peace process. In this sion in Israel, see “Balance of National Security and Strength: regard, creative thinking regarding new ways to advance Policy Directions—Executive Summary” (Hebrew), summary an Israeli-Palestinian settlement could focus on a variety of of the “Herzlia Convention,” 2001, Herzlia Interdisciplinary interim, partial, unilateral and confederal solutions, and Center, Institute for Policy and Strategy. could revisit 242 and other traditional underpinnings of the process.

58 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 NATIONAL PUGWASH GROUPS

The US Pugwash Group from engaging in joint clinical trials. Cuba has also developed fetal moni- Scientific Cooperation and the House of Representatives, with toring equipment that is being used in the US Embargo of Cuba the Dear Colleague letter reprinted Canada, the United Kingdom and below. Sen. Christopher Dodd (D- twenty other countries, but not the Following up the Pugwash workshop Conn) later did the same to all mem- United States. on medical research held in Havana, bers of the US Senate. While only lifting the embargo Cuba in February 2001, and publica- will make these drugs, medical tion of a Pugwash Policy Brief (June The following letter was accompa- devices and opportunities for joint 2001) on the effects of the embargo nied by the Pugwash Policy Brief on research truly available for all Ameri- for patients in both Cuba and the Cuba and distributed to all members cans, H.R. 2138, the Bridges to the United States who suffer from sickle of the US House of Representatives. Cuban People Act of 2001, takes cell anemia, several members of US important steps forward. For exam- Pugwash participated in a July 6, 2001 ple, it would allow the import into symposium sponsored by the Ameri- Dear Colleague, the United States of Cuban- can Association for the Advancement I would like to bring to your originated medical devices and medi- of Science (AAAS) on the benefits of attention the June 2001 policy brief cines that are not commercially avail- greater exchanges of people, informa- produced by the Pugwash Confer- able in the U.S. already. tion and research between the US and ences on Science and World Affairs, I encourage you to read the arti- Cuba. The AAAS symposium was the 1995 recipient of the Nobel Peace cles in the attached newsletter, and I held on 18 June 2001 in Washington, Prize. This newsletter explores the encourage you to contact the offices DC and included representatives effects of the U.S. embargo on US- of Representatives Jose Serrano and from the Smithsonian Institution, the Cuban medical cooperation. I espe- Jim Leach to become a cosponsor of American Chemical Society, and a cially encourage you to read the arti- H.R. 2138. wide variety of NGOs. The US Pug- cle by Dr. Kenneth R. Bridges, Sincerely, wash members attending were Ken- Director of the Joint Center for Sickle James P. McGovern neth Bridges, M.D. (Brigham and Cell and Thalassemic Disorders at Member of Congress Women’s Hospital, Boston), Elliott Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Schiffmann (National Institutes of Boston, Massachusetts. [EDITOR’S NOTE: On July 25, 2001, Health), and Jeffrey Boutwell (Pug- As you know, drugs and medical the US House of Representatives wash Conferences), all of whom later devices developed by Cuba are not passed an amendment by a vote of that afternoon visited several Senate available to Americans. This includes 240 to 186 (supported by 67 Republi- and House offices on Capitol Hill to vaccines for heart disease, cancer, cans) that would greatly ease restric- discuss the prospects for relaxing the hepatitis-B and meningitis-B, tions on Americans traveling to Cuba. US embargo to allow greater scien- although for the latter a special pro- Then, on December 18, the US Senate tific and academic cooperation tocol is being negotiated because the moved a step closer to easing the embargo by voting 61 (including 21 between the US and Cuba. One out- drug is so needed and desired by the Republicans) to 33 to defeat the come of the visit was an initiative U.S. medical and pharmaceutical Torricelli amendment that would taken by Rep. James McGovern (D- community. Common areas of have made more difficult the private Mass) to circulate the Pugwash Pol- research requiring clinical trials, such financing of food and medical sup- icy Brief to the other 434 members of as sickle cell disease, are also denied plies to Cuba.]

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 59 National Pugwash Groups

52nd Pugwash Conference University), are working with a con- Muir College), Susan Shirk (East on Science and World Affairs ference advisory committee that Asian studies), and Mark Thiemens nd Planning continues for the 52nd Pug- includes Ruth Adams, Marvin Gold- (Dean, Physical Sciences). The 52 wash Conference, to be held on the berger, John Holdren, and Herb York, Conference is also a Pugwash quin- campus of the University of Califor- as well as several faculty and adminis- quennial conference which will see nia, San Diego (UCSD) from 9-14 trators from UCSD, among them the installation of a new Secretary August 2002. The co-chairs of US Richard Attiyeh (Vice Chancellor for General, President, and Council. For Pugwash, Lynn Eden (Stanford Uni- Research), Stephan Haggard (School more information, visit the Pugwash versity) and Steven Miller (Harvard of International Relations/Pacific website at www.pugwash.org. Studies), Patrick Ledden (Provost,

Pugwash Nederland tion – Species”. The workshop will bring together thirty to forty knowl- A National Workshop of the World at the Crossroads (1994) a edgeable participants and respected Netherlands Pugwash Group: Pugwash study group presented a cri- personalities, who will examine the Sharing the Planet: tique on humanity’s tendency to seek subject of sustainability from a multi- Population–Consumption– one-dimensional and simplistic disciplinary and multicultural Species answers to today’s intertwined and approach, in which both scientific 13-15 June 2002, University of complex global problems. According and ethical arguments play an impor- Groningen, The Netherlands to its conclusions, the world is “on tant role. A significant representation Seeking to contribute to the debate the wrong fork of the crossroads - the of perspectives from developing on what a sustainable world might fork leading to disaster”, and recom- countries and the participation of look like and how it can be reached, mendations were given regarding the developing-country specialists will be the Pugwash Council stated in its steps required to get on the right indispensable for the workshop to 1988 Dagomys Declaration that envi- fork, that is, the one leading to sus- succeed. The workshop participants ronmental and developmental prob- tainability. will discuss strategies for realizing the lems are intimately linked, and that Continuing the analysis of how to goal of a sustainable sharing of our destruction of the environment on a get on the right track, Pugwash planet among humans and all species. global scale and denial of basic needs Netherlands is now organising a For more information on the for a growing majority of humankind national workshop entitled “Sharing workshop, please contact Johan van are interrelated dangers. In The the Planet: Population – Consump- Klinken (e-mail: [email protected]).

Scientists, Wars, and Diplomacy: A European Perspective Guest Editors: JESSE H. AUSUBEL, ALEXANDER KEYNAN and JEAN-JACQUES SALOMON Technology In Society An International Journal Volume 23, Number 3, August 2001

60 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 STUDENT/YOUNG PUGWASH

Excerpts from the ISYP Newsletter September 2001

FROM THE EDITOR The Newsletter, which will hence- of mass destruction eventually would On 11 September the world as we forth be published only every second be used. Changing a belligerent know it changed a little bit. Much month, is also available online at mindset and devoting scientific and interesting debate has evolved inside www.student-pugwash.org for those technological resources to improve- ISYP and elsewhere, with many very of you who prefer to access it in ment of human life, instead of different views of the attack and the HTML format and you are welcome putting it at risk, was the clear mes- shape which the response to these to request it from me in Microsoft sage repeatedly sent by Pugwashites attacks should prevail. Many of these Word or Word Perfect format (gina- to scientists, world leaders and deci- appear irreconcilable, but within [email protected]). Mater- sion-makers. Pugwash, and around the world we ial for the newsletter should be sent Global war was narrowly avoided should bear in mind our common to me at this address: ginavanschalk- more times than those publicly humanity and seek the most peaceful [email protected]. Thank you. acknowledged. But still, disregard for and least harmful solutions to our —Gina Van Schalkwyk human lives, rights and dignity are differences. The Board is happy to tolerated as the sad - though have reached consensus on a state- unchangeable - reality. Raw national- FROM THE INTERIM COMMITTEE ment, published below. ism, religious fundamentalism and The new ISYP Board has consti- A Call for World Peace and Justice “low intensity” conflicts were tuted itself with Hugo Estrella being Almost half a century ago the Pug- weapons of the East and the West elected as Chairperson and Magda wash Movement was founded. Now during the Cold War decades. Kropiwnicka as Treasurer. We have a new generation of young people in Today’s terrorist minds were forged divided into working groups similar International Student/Young according to those manoeuvres. to those within the Interim Commit- Pugwash (ISYP) accepts the moral Today’s disregard for human life can tee and look forward to reporting on challenges of its elders. be an effect of the daily violence our specific activities. The first group We are heirs of a Humanist tradi- against the forgotten margins of our will be responsible for communica- tion, moved by the desire and deter- civilisation. tions, including contact with national mination to achieve world peace. The There exists no more a rationale groups and the distribution of the time has now come to face our of struggle for world domination. newsletter; the second group is responsibilities on the eve of the new Our responsibility as individuals, charged with funding and other international conflict initiated by the concerned educated citizens is, there- financial matters; while the third terror actions in the USA. But this fore, paramount. group will deal with legal issues time there are no longer two There is a grave danger that vio- including the holding of elections, confronting sides to be challenged. lent retaliation will trigger a spiral of etc. We act on behalf of the National Warnings have been raised in the growing violence. But a safer world Groups and always welcome any sug- Russell-Einstein Manifesto, and at cannot be achieved without justice. It gestions and proposals coming from Pugwash Conferences on Science and is the time to think and act in global Student/Young Pugwash members World Affairs about the dangers of terms. everywhere. pursuing a struggle where weapons The United Nations has created

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 61 Student/Young Pugwash adequate organs to ensure fair trials in criminal justice. Any crime against humanity has to be judged by those organs. International law is to be reinforced. Making institutions Forthcoming Biography on responsive in the defence of civiliza- tion entails the commitment to respect international rules of civilized CyrusEaton coexistence. As a tribute to our forebears, as an allegiance to each other, we, the Featuring the Formation and young Pugwashites, are the first to Early Years of Pugwash say that we want to live. In these times of anger, sorrow The small village of Pugwash in Nova Scotia, whose name was and death, we express our determina- tion to make this world a more equal, appropriated in the late 1950s for our world-wide organiza- safer and peaceful place for us to live, tion for nuclear disarmament and peace, was the birthplace and the following generations to enjoy. Our knowledge, our feelings in 1883 of Cyrus S. Eaton. The dramatic episodes of Eaton’s and our actions are committed to remarkable and controversial career (“one of the most hard- that goal. We call upon our fellow bitten capitalists in America” who also won the Lenin Peace human beings to join us. Prize) form the basis for a new and comprehensive biography Approved by the Board of International Student/Young now being written by Patrick Boyer, himself a Pugwashite. Pugwash, 26 September 2001 A number of Pugwashites, including Sir Joseph Rotblat, have Tom Børsen Hansen (Denmark) already spoken at length with Patrick Boyer about their Cyrus Hugo Estrella Tampieri (Argentina) Magdalena Kropiwnicka (Italy) Eaton connection. Clayton Nall (USA) Alberto Salazar Martínez (Mexico) Prof. Boyer continues his research for what he is determined Gina van Schalkwyk (South Africa) should be a complete and well-rounded account; if you have Joe Wemin (Papua New Guinea) insights or interpretations, anecdotes or episodes, to share,

based on your own experiences with or about Cyrus Eaton,

please contact Patrick at: [email protected]. He

can also be reached by telephone at 416-255-3930, fax at

416-252-8291 or mail at 2583 Lakeshore Boulevard West,

Toronto, Ontario, Canada M8V 1G3.

62 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 OBITUARIES

Johan Lundin (1928-2001)

r. Johan Lundin, a distinguished Swedish chemist expert advisor to Sweden’s Supreme Commander and also Dspecializing in defense against biological and chemi- spent five years doing research in arms control at the cal warfare and in related arms control issues, died on 8 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). August 2001 of cancer at the age of 73. He served as a coordinator for SIPRI’s chemical and bio- Lundin received his Ph.D. from the University of Upp- logical activities and also contributed to its well known sala and served most of his life in the Swedish Defence Yearbook of World Armament and Disarmament. Research Institute in Stockholm. In the 1960s, he Johan was very active in the Pugwash and attended conducted pioneering work to develop an enzyme-based some 40 meetings beginning with the 23rd Pugwash Con- method to detect the presence of nerve gases. The enzyme ference in Aulanko, Finland, in 1973. He participated in was extracted from plaice, the salt water fish. This the series of Pugwash workshops on chemical weapons, cellbound enzyme could be liberated by a bacteria and from the first meeting in Helsinki in 1974 through all sub- could then be purified and characterized. The method is sequent meetings into the 1990s, including the 1979 work- still in use by, among others, Swedish civil and military shop in Stockholm which he organized. He served as the defence. Since 1969, he also served as an advisor to the executive secretary of the Swedish Pugwash Group for Swedish delegation in the Geneva Disarmament Confer- more than a decade and was the group’s treasurer until the ence and played an important role in the preparatory late 1990s. work to elaborate the treaties on prohibiting biological Johan had the true Pugwash spirit in seeking solutions weapons in 1972 and chemical weapons in 1993. to global security problems in the area of weapons of mass At the end of his career, Johan was for some time the destruction and will be remembered with great affection.

Maxwell Bruce

axwell Bruce, O.C., Q.C., a Pugwash stalwart, died A lawyer by profession, his interests included the aquatic Min Toronto on 25 October 2001 as a consequence of environment, particularly the oceans, and he took an active injuries incurred in a tragic car accident, in which his wife, part in drafting international laws for the protection of the Nina, was killed instantly. Max was an extraordinary per- oceans. He was a member of the Planning Council of the son with an active interest in many areas, such as the International Ocean Institute based at the University of improvement of international relations, and the building of Malta, and participated in many Pacem in Maribus Convo- lasting peace in the world, contributing significantly to them. cations. Canadian by birth, he had residences in Toronto, Lon- At the same time he was actively engaged in a variety of don and Valletta. Apart from commuting between these professional and voluntary organizations. Thus, he held the cities, he frequently traversed the globe, usually accompa- posts of President (later permanent Vice-President) of the nied by Nina. These travels were not for sightseeing but to Canadian Red Cross Society; served on the Council of the participate in international meetings of the various organi- Canadian Bar Associates; and was Chairman of the Cana- zations of which he was a member. This made him a world dian Parks and Wilderness Society. citizen, a description justified by the nature of his activities. In 1977 he took up residence in London, as representa-

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 63 tive of the British branch of his firm. Soon afterwards, and sibility and Desirability of a World Energy Organization”. purely by chance, he walked into a meeting of the British Starting in 1981, Max attended 25 Pugwash Conferences Pugwash Group at my College in Barts. This turned out to and workshops, to many of which he made significant con- be a decisive moment in his life; he became enthusiastic tributions. He was particularly active in the British Pugwash about the objectives of Pugwash in its quest for global peace, Group of which he was honorary secretary for a number of and remained a devotee of Pugwash in its pursuit of nuclear years. In that capacity he was mainly responsible for orga- disarmament until the end of his life. Although Pugwash is nizing the 40th Conference in Egham in 1990. His wife, primarily a movement of natural scientists, the nature of our Nina, who also took an interest in Pugwash, was in charge activities brings it to problems of international law, in for- of the Ladies Programme. mulating or interpreting international treaties and conven- As a person, Max was charming, witty, invariably polite, tions. The collaboration between scientists, who have exper- extremely reliable, and though somewhat reserved, very car- tise in the technical aspects, and lawyers, with their ing. He was indefatigable in seeking and obtaining financial knowledge of the legal side, proved to be a very efficient way support for his various projects, even from people antago- to tackle such problems, and Max soon found his niche in nistic to them. He never refused any task, however onerous, Pugwash activities. Thus, together with a few other lawyers and worked on his causes for their own sake and not for his that he recruited, Max contributed to our project on the self-aggrandisement. Nevertheless, he was pleased when the desirability and feasibility of a nuclear-weapon-free world, Canadian Government appointed him recently an Officer of by setting out the legal aspects of a Convention on the Elim- the Order of Canada. ination of Nuclear Weapons. I cannot end this tribute to Max without mentioning two He devoted much time and energy, in collaboration with more examples of his care for Pugwash and his friends. One me, on the World Energy Organization project. The idea was was the production, together with Tom Milne, of the book to set up an organization analogous to the World Health The Force of Reason, in honour of my 90th birthday; this Organization, which would do for energy problems what required a huge effort, particularly since it was all done in WHO is doing for health. The paper we wrote drew the the London Pugwash Office, without my being aware of it! attention of experts in the field; and at a meeting we attended The second was his idea of giving the Russell/Einstein Man- with the relevant UN authorities in New York, much sym- ifesto a wide circulation. This project has come to fruition pathy was expressed for the project. However, it did not get only just now, in the production of the beautiful folio off the ground because of the vested interests of other orga- (inserted in this issue) and posters with the text of the Man- nizations concerned with energy. Believing that this was an ifesto. Alas, he did not live to see the final product. idea whose time would come, Max Bruce organized a Pug- He will be sorely missed by a large number of friends. wash workshop in 1995, in Malta, on the topic: “The Fea- —Joseph Rotblat

Paul Warnke (1920–2001)

mb. Paul Warnke, director of the US Arms Control government sevice, and later went on to become chair of Aand Disarmament Agency during the Carter adminis- the Committee for National Security and a long-time tration and a decades-long fixture in the American arms member of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security. In the control community, died in October 2001 at the age of 81. 1960s, Warnke served under Secretaries of Defense Robert Amb. Warnke attended the 31st Pugwash Conference in McNamara and Clark Clifford and was a forceful advo- Banff, Canada in August 1981, a few years after leaving cate for US disengagement from Vietnam.

64 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 ISODARCO

International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts Italian Pugwash Group

23rd ISODARCO Summer Course on Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs: Real Threats and Virtual Myths TRENTO - ITALY 3 - 13 August, 2002 Director of the School: Carlo Schaerf Directors of the Course: Gary Chapman and Diego Latella

PURPOSE

This will be the second time an ISODARCO summer the threat of “cyberterrorism” as well as “cyberwar”; course will focus on information technologies and new forms of group organization like “networks” and their relation to war and international relations. A how information technology supports them; the course on “Computers, Networks and Prospects for impact of information technology developments on European and World Security” was held in 1999. The military doctrine and organization of military forces. 2002 course will be less broad in scope than the first Without any doubt, some of the above issues are con- one and, in particular, it will be focused on Cyberwar nected to real threats, but the dimension of such (CW), Netwar (NW), the current Revolution in Mili- threats is far from being fully assessed and under- tary Affairs (RMA) and related issues. stood. Thus, as often happens when new scenarious Despite there being no unique definitions for CW, NW are elaborated, a proliferation of myths related to CW, and RMA yet, a lively discussion on their nature, the NW and RMA is also taking place and it brings with threats they bring, the possible counter-measures to be it a possible real threat of widespread global surveil- undertaken by nation states, as well as other organi- lance. zations, is taking place in political and military circles Ironically enough, information technology is itself sup- as well as academia. porting such a proliferation by providing a “virtual Issues of major importance in such a discussion are: space” where a great deal of the ongoing discussion the relation between computers and regional defense; on the above issues is taking place.

For more information, contact Prof. Carlo Schaerf, Director, Department of Physics University of Rome “Tor Vergata” 39-06-7259.4560 [email protected]

65 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 65 Pugwash Council for the 1997–2002 Quinquennium

Prof. Ulrich Albrecht graduated in aero- F-75015 Paris, France, Tel. (++33-1) Dr. Martin Kaplan, an American living in nautical engineering, political science and 4568 4720, Fax: (++33-1) 4568 5823, E- Switzerland, is a former director of economics at Stuttgart University. Since mail: [email protected] (*) research at the World Health Organiza- 1972, he has been professor of peace and tion and former Secretary-General of Lt.-Gen. Emmanuel Erskine is a retired conflict studies at the Free University of Pugwash (1976-88); Pugwash Office, 69 general from Ghana who served in sev- Berlin. He has worked as a consultant rue de Lausanne, CH-1202 Geneva, eral commanding capacities with United for the UN (Dept. of Disarmament Switzerland, Tel. (++41-22) 906-1651, Nations Peacekeeping Forces, especially Affairs), and served as head of planning Fax: (++41-22) 731-0194, E-mail: pug- in the Middle East; PO Box 8843, Accra- in the East German Ministry for Foreign [email protected] North, Accra, Ghana, Tel. (++233-21) Affairs during the reunification process; 775 946, Fax: (++233-21) 765571 (*) Dr. Catherine M. Kelleher, Naval War Free University of Berlin, FB PolWiss. College, is former Director of the Aspen WE4, Kiebitzweg 3, 1000 Berlin 33, Ger- Dr. Esmat Ezz is a toxicologist and retired Institute Berlin in Germany, and was for- many, Tel. (++49-30) 8385-2360, general from Egypt who has been deeply merly Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Fax: (++49-30) 8385-5013, E-mail: involved in international negotiations and Studies at the Brookings Institution in [email protected] verification activities on chemical Washington, D.C., DASD for Russia, weapons. Currently he is a professor at Sir Michael Atiyah, President of Ukraine, and Eurasia (RUE), the Military Academy in Cairo; 43 Misr Pugwash, is a mathematician, Master at International Security Policy, Office of the Helwan Road, Maadi, Cairo, Egypt, Tel. Trinity College in Cambridge (1990- U.S. Secretary of Defense (1996-1998); (++20-2) 350-5899, Fax: (++20-2) 340- 1997), and former president of The Royal Secretary of Defense’s Personal Represen- 7915, E-mail: [email protected] Society (1990-1995). He was the first tative in Europe and Defense Advisor to director (1990-1996) of the Isaac Newton Chen Jifeng is Secretary General of the the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Brussels, Institute for Mathematical Sciences, and Chinese People’s Association for Peace Belgium (1994-1996); Faculty Member received the Fields Medal in 1966; Dept. and Disarmament (CPAPD), Beijing, and Consultant, National War College of Mathematics & Statistics, James Clerk China. Formerly he served as Council (1980-1985); Vice Chair, Committee on Maxwell Building, King’s Buildings, May- Member of the Chinese Association for International Security and Arms Control field Road, Edinburgh EH9 3JZ, Scot- International Understanding. CPAPD, (CISAC), National Academy of Sciences land, E-mail: [email protected] (*) 15 Wanshou Road, P.O. Box 188, Beijing (1987-1994); Long-term Consultant and 100036, China, Tel. (++86-10)68271736, Staff Member, National Security Council Prof. Gabriel Baramki, a Palestinian liv- Fax: (++86-10)6827 3675, E-mail: (1977-1980) ing in Ramallah on the West Bank, is a [email protected] chemist, former secretary-general of the *Office: CNWS/SRD, MLH231, Naval Council for Higher Education, consultant Maj.-Gen. Leonard Johnson is a retired War College, 686 Cusing Rd., Newport, on higher education to the Ministry of Canadian general who served at interme- RI 02841, Tel.: (++1-401) 841-4613; Fax: Higher Education, and former vice presi- diate and high levels of command and (++1-401) 841-4161; Email: dent (acting president) of Birzeit Univer- staff during 35 years in the Canadian [email protected] sity; Council for Higher Education, P.O. Forces. On retirement, he had completed Prof. Michiji Konuma is professor and Box 17360, Jerusalem (via Israel), Tel. four years as Commandant of the dean at the Faculty of Environmental and (++972-2) 995-4490, Fax: (++972-2) National Defence College at Kingston, Information Studies, Musashi Institute of 995-4518, E-mail: [email protected] Ontario. A Pugwashite since 1985, he Technology; professor emeritus at Keio was until now chairman of the Canadian Prof. Francesco Calogero is professor of University; president of the Association of Pugwash Group; 172 Sunnyside Road, theoretical physics at the University of Asia Pacific Physical Societies, member of RR2, Westport, Ontario K0G 1X0, Rome “La Sapienza”, former Secretary- the UNESCO Physics Action Council, Canada, Tel. (++1-613) 273-3000, Fax: General of Pugwash (1989-1997), and and former president of the Physical Soci- (++1-613) 273-4269, E-mail: Chair of the Pugwash Council; Pugwash ety of Japan; past president of the Associ- [email protected] Conferences, via della Lungara 10, I- ation of Asia Pacific Physical societies; 00165 Roma, Italy, Tel. (++39-6) 687- Dr. Venance Journé is a physicist now Musashi Institute of Technology, 2606, Fax: (++39-6) 687-8376, E-mail: working at the International Centre for Ushikubo-Nishi 3-3-1, Tsuzukiko, Yoko- [email protected] (*) Research on Environment and Develop- hama 224-0015, Japan, Tel. (++81-45) ment (CIRED) in Paris; CIRED, 45 bis, 910-2661, Fax: (++81-45) 910-2662, E- Prof. Ana María Cetto is head of the Avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 mail: [email protected] department of theoretical physics, former Nogent sur Marne CEDEX, France, Tel. dean of the faculty of sciences at the Mr. Sverre Lodgaard, a Norwegian politi- (++33-1) 43 94 73 98, Fax: (++33-1) 43 National University of Mexico, Chair of cal scientist, is director of the Norwegian 94 73 70, E-mail: [email protected] the Pugwash Executive Committee; and Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), (*) for 1999, a consultant on the World Con- former director of the United Nations ference on Science for UNESCO in Paris; Institute for Disarmament Research in UNESCO, Science Sector, 1 rue Miollis, Geneva, and former director of the Peace

66 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Research Institute of Oslo; NUPI, Grön- 02109 Warsaw, Poland, Tel (48 22 658- Ilha do Fundão 21 945-970, Rio de landsleiret 25, POB 8159 DEP, 0033 Oslo 2877), Fax: (48 22 658-2872), email: Janeiro, Brazil, Tel. (++55-21) 562-7029 1, Norway, Tel. (++47-22) 177050, Fax: [email protected] or 562-8327, Fax: (++55-21) 290-6626, (++47-22) 177015, E-mail: E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Alexander Nikitin is director of the [email protected] Center for Political and International Prof. Joseph Rotblat is emeritus professor Luis Masperi is professor of physics at the Studies (CPIS), vice chairman of the Russ- of physics at the University of London, Centro Atomico Bariloche and Instituto ian Pugwash Committee of Scientists for former Secretary-General (1957-73) and Balseiro of Argentina, former chairman Disarmament and International Security, former President (1988-97) of Pugwash, of the Asociacion Fisica Argentina and professor at the Moscow State Institute and a recipient of the 1995 Nobel Prize currently director of the Latin American for International Relations and at the for Peace; 8 Asmara Road, London NW2 Center for Physics; Av. Venceslau Braz Russian Academy of Military Sciences, 3ST, UK, Tel. (++44-20) 7405-6661, Fax: 71 Fundos, 22290-140 Rio de Janeiro, and chair of the section of international (++44-20) 7831-5651, E-mail: Brazil, Tel.: (++55 21) 295 5096, Fax: relations at the Russian Academy of [email protected] (*) (++55 21) 295 5145, E-mail: Political Science; CPIS, Prospect Mira 36, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, [email protected]. Moscow, Russian Federation 129010, VrC, VM, is former director of the Insti- Tel. (++7-095) 280-3536, Fax: (++7-095) Dr. Steven Miller is director of the Inter- tute for Defence Studies and Analyses 280-0245, E-mail: [email protected] national Security Program of the Belfer (IDSA) in New Delhi, a visiting lecturer at Center for Science and International Prof. Amnon Pazy is professor of mathe- Defence and War Colleges in India and Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy matics at the University of Jerusalem and abroad, and a consultant to the Standing School of Government, editor-in-chief of former chairman of the Planning and Committee of Defence and Parliament. A the quarterly, International Security, and Budgeting Committee of the Council for former veteran fighter pilot and Director co-chair of the American Pugwash Com- Higher Education in Israel; Department of Operations of the Indian Air Force, he mittee. Formerly, he was a senior of Mathematics, Hebrew University, has published extensively on strategic and research fellow at the Stockholm Interna- Jerusalem 91904, Israel, Tel. (++972-2) security issues; 18/803 Manhattan Apart- tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 658-5127, Fax: (++972-2) 563-0702, ments, Heritage City, Mehrauli road, and taught defense and arms control E-mail: [email protected] Gurgaon–122002, India, studies in the political science department Tel. (++91-11) 916-665192, Dr. Sebastian Pease is a physicist and con- at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol- Fax: (++91-11) 618-9023, sultant who directed the UK fusion ogy; CSIA, J.F.Kennedy School of Gov- E-mail: [email protected] (*) energy programme, and a fellow and for- ernment, Harvard University, 79 JFK mer vice president of The Royal Society; Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh, a South Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, The Poplars, West Ilsley, Newbury, Berk- Korean political scientist, is senior Tel. (++1-617) 495-1411, Fax: (++1-617) shire RG16 0AW, UK, Tel. (++44-1635) research associate in the division of East 495-8963, E-mail: Steven_Miller@ 281237, Fax: (++44-1635) 281688 E- Asian politics of the department of politi- harvard.edu mail: [email protected] cal science at the Free University of Berlin Prof. Marie Muller is professor of inter- in Germany, and a visiting scholar (1997- Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General national politics, head of the department 98) at the Modern Asia Center in of Pugwash, was professor (now emeri- of political sciences at the University of Budapest, Hungary; Schlieperstr. 12, D- tus) of political science at the Massachu- Pretoria, and chair of the advisory board 13507 Berlin, Germany, Tel. (++49-30) setts Institute of Technology. He was for- of the Institute for Strategic Studies there; 433-8574, Fax: (++49-30) 433-2896, merly in the U.S. Departments of Defense Dept. of Political Sciences, Univ. of Preto- E-mail: [email protected] and State, in the U.S. Arms Control and ria, Pretoria 0002, Gauteng, Republic of Disarmament Agency and on the White (*): Member of Executive Committee South Africa, Tel./Fax: (++27-12) 420- House staff; Pugwash Conferences. 4066/2464, E-mail: American Academy of Arts & Sciences, [email protected] 136 Irving St., Cambridge, MA 02138, Professor Maciej Nalecz is Director of the USA, Tel. (++1-617) 576-5022, Fax: International Centre of Biocybernetics of (++1-617) 576-5050, E-mail: the Polish Academy of Sciences in War- [email protected] (*) saw, and a member of the Polish Acad- Prof. Luiz Pinguelli Rosa is professor and emy of Sciences (1967) and the Interna- vice director of the Graduate School of tional Academy for Medical and Engineering at the Federal University of Biological Engineering (1997). He is a Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), and professor and foreign member of the Russian (1976) researcher in the Energy Planning Pro- and Georgian (1996) Academy of gram. A physicist by training, his research Sciences. He is the Chairman of Polish activities now lie in nuclear energy and National Group and Past Chairman of nuclear policy, energy planning and envi- the Pugwash Council (1974-1997). Inter- ronment, and greenhouse gas emissions; national Centre of Biocybernetics, Polish COPPE/UFRJ, Centro de Tecnologia, Academy of Sciences, ul. Trojdena 4, PL- Bloco G, Sala 101, Cidade Universitária,

67 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2001 67 PHOTO CREDITS page 3 Bush and Annan at World Trade Center UNITED NATIONS PHOTO page 5 Afghanistan map Richard Ferno, THE WASHINGTON POST page 7 Destruction of Minuteman silo DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PHOTO page 17 KFOR with Kosovar Serb DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PHOTO page 37 UN outpost in Macedonia UNITED NATIONS PHOTO page 41 Launch of Trident missile DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PHOTO page 42 Arrow Interceptor DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PHOTO page 45 Russian SS-23 Spider from FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS website page 46 Chinese ICBM DF-31 from FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS website Calendar of Future Pugwash Meetings

7–9 March 2002 Pugwash Meeting no. 268: Pugwash Workshop: East Asian Security Beijing, China

12-16 March 2002: 51st Pugwash Conference: Challenges for Peace in the New Millennium Agra, India

April 2002 Pugwash Meeting: 8th Pugwash Workshop on the Middle East Alexandria, Egypt

May 2002 Pugwash Meeting: 17th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group Oegstgeest, on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions The Netherlands

23-24 May 2002 Pugwash Meeting: Pugwash Workshop: Tactical Nuclear Weapons Sigtuna, Sweden

June 2002 Pugwash Meeting: Pugwash Workshop: Impact and Threats of Mexico City, Mexico Agricultural Biotechnology-Environmental and Food Security

27 June–2 July 2002 Pugwash Meeting: Pugwash Workshop: The Evolution of Strategic St. Petersburg, Russia Stability

9-14 August 2002 52nd Pugwash Conference: Science, Sustainability, Security La Jolla, California

September 2002 Pugwash Meeting: Pugwash Workshop: Terrorism, Nuclear Weapons, Como, Italy and International Security

November 2002 Pugwash Meeting: 18th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on Geneva, Switzerland the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions

November 2002 Pugwash Meeting: Pugwash Workshop: No-First-Use of Nuclear London, UK Weapons

July 2003 53rd Pugwash Conference Halifax, Nova Scotia

2004 54th Pugwash Conference South and North Korea Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

President Sir Michael Atiyah

Secretary General Professor George Rathjens

Pugwash Council

Chairman Professor Francesco Calogero

Members Professor Ulrich Albrecht Professor Luis Masperi Sir Michael Atiyah Dr. Steven Miller Professor Gabriel Baramki Professor Marie Muller Professor Ana María Cetto Professor Maciej Nalecz Lt.-Gen. Emmanuel Erskine Dr. Alexander Nikitin Dr. Esmat Ezz Professor Amnon Pazy Professor Chen Jifeng Dr. Sebastian Pease Maj.-Gen. Leonard Johnson Professor George Rathjens Dr. Venance Journé Professor Luiz Pinguelli Rosa Dr. Martin M. Kaplan Professor Joseph Rotblat Dr. Catherine M. Kelleher Air Commodore Jasjit Singh Professor Michiji Konuma Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh Mr. Sverre Lodgaard

Pugwash Executive Committee

Chairman Professor Ana María Cetto

Members Sir Michael Atiyah Professor Maciej Nalecz Professor Francesco Calogero Professor George Rathjens Lt.-Gen. Emmanuel Erskine Professor Joseph Rotblat Dr. Venance Journé Air Commodore Jasjit Singh

Cambridge Office Geneva Office London Office Rome Office American Academy of Arts 16 rue de la Voie-Creuse Flat A Museum Mansions Accademia Nazionale and Sciences 1211 GENEVA, Switzerland 63A Great Russell Street dei Lincei 136 Irving Street Phone: **41-22-919-7920 LONDON WC1B 3BJ, England via della Lungara, 10 Cambridge, MA 02138 USA Fax: **41-22-919-7925 Phone: **44-20-7405-6661 1-00165 ROME, Italy Tel: (++1-617) 576-5022 E-mail: [email protected] Fax: **44-20-7831-5651 Phone: **39-06-6872606 Fax: (++1-617) 576-5050 E-mail: [email protected] Fax: **39-06-6878376 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]

For biodata and addresses, see page 66.