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Lawyer that Results in a Jail Sentence: Can the Client Recover Noneconomic Damanges Due to the Wrongful Incarcercation? By Anthony Viorst

Introduction recently filed a legal case against a crimi nal 1. The defendant was negligent; Idefense attorney, in which counsel made a clear error that 2. The defendant’s negligence created an unreasonable caused his client to spend several years in prison. If counsel risk of physical harm to the plaintiff; had not committed the error, the client’s criminal charges 3. The defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff to be would have been dismissed. As counsel was court-appointed, put in fear for her own safety and such fear was shown and was paid by the State of Colorado, the client suffered by physical consequences or long continued emotional little or no economic damages, but indisputably suffered disturbance, rather than only momentary fright, shock, significant emotional distress associated with her time as or other similar and immediate emotional distress; and an inmate in the Colorado Department of Corrections. After the case was filed, defense counsel moved, pursuant 4. The plaintiff’s fear caused her injuries, damages, to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), to dismiss any claim for noneconomic or losses. damages, under the authority of Aller v. Law Office of Carole Regarding the second element–that defendant’s negli gence C. Schriefer P.C.1 The matter was briefed and, based upon created an unreasonable risk of physical harm—Colorado the reasoning set forth below, the trial court denied the mo- law does not define the term “physical harm,” but it does tion to dismiss. define the term “bodily injury,” which is essentially synon- In Aller, supra, a panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals ymous. The term “bodily injury” is statutorily defined as held that “emotional distress or other non-economic dam- “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental 3 ages resulting solely from pecuniary loss are not recoverable condition. ” This definition, which is satisfied merely by in a legal malpractice action based on negligence2.” Thus, showing that a victim suffered “physical pain,” is very broad. under Aller, if a causes a client to lose money, the Arguably, the risk of being wrongfully incarcerated—which emotional distress that the client suffers due to the loss of necessarily involves regular shackling, sleeping on a hard that money is not compensable. However, the Aller panel surface, and confinement in a small space—also creates the did not address the recover-ability of noneconomic damages risk of physical pain, thereby satisfying the definition of which are unrelated to pecuniary loss, but instead are related bodily injury or physical harm. to wrongful incarceration. Although this issue has not been Regarding the third element, Plaintiff need not prove that directly addressed by the Colorado appellate courts, those she suffered actual physical harm, but rather need only prove Colorado cases that have addressed the issue indirectly, as that she was placed in fear for her own safety, and that she well as persuasive authorities and cases from other juris- suffered a “long continued emotional disturbance.” Although dictions, suggest that such damages can be recovered. there is no Colorado case directly addressing whether wrong - ful incarceration meets this standard, an element of the Colorado Authorities of is “restriction of the plaintiff’s free- Colorado recognizes the tort of negligent infliction of dom of movement,4” and there are several cases addressing emotional distress. The elements of this tort, as set forth in the damaging emotional effects of such a restriction.5 Sig- CJI-Civ. 9:2, are as follows: nificantly, on at least two occasions, a lawyer has been

Colorado Trial Association Trial Talk December/January 2019 17 DAMAGES | Viorst found liable for the tort of false im- In Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 defense, all of which culminate in prison ment, based upon professional F.2d 196, 221-22 (1st Cir. 1987), an economic loss. In contrast, the misconduct.6 the First Circuit Court of Appeals criminal defendant’s main injury upheld an award for emotional is a loss of liberty.13 The case of Gordon v. Boyles,7 also distress damages in a malpractice supports the view that a wrongful con- Recognizing this distinction, the case based on negligence because viction and incarceration can cause a majority of courts that have addressed the attorney’s negligence resulted significant emotional disturbance. In the issue have held that the client of in the plaintiff’s being dispatched Gordon, the Court of Appeals stated a criminal defense attorney may sue to a mental hospital and deprived that “[i]f a libelous communication is and recover damages for the loss of of his liberty. These circumstances defamatory per se, damage is presumed, that client’s liberty.14 The grounds are not present here. and a plaintiff need not plead special for this rule is that incarceration is [economic] damages” whereas “[i]f the The implication of this comment a foreseeable result of a criminal statement is defamatory per quod, special by the Aller Court is that, if the circum - attorney’s negligence: damages must be alleged to sustain the stances present in Wagenmann had When an attorney’s negligence claim8.” The Court then listed the cate- been present, the aggrieved plain- causes a client’s loss of liberty, gories of slander per se as “imputation tiff/client would have been entitled courts have been willing to step of (1) a criminal offense; (2) a loath- to compensation. away from the general rule some disease; (3) a matter incompatible Three years after the Aller opinion, in barring damages for emotional with the individual’s business. . . or (4) Schultz v. Boston Stanton,12 the plaintiff distress. Generally, these cases serious sexual misconduct9.” Gordon is brought a legal malpractice claim against hold that when an attorney instructive because it clearly shows his former criminal defense attorneys, represents a criminal defendant, that there are some types of negligent alleging that as a direct and proximate incarceration is the foreseeable or reckless conduct that give rise to a result of their professional negligence, result of negligence. Accordingly, claim for noneconomic damages, even he had “been damaged by being incar- damages for the mental anguish in the absence of economic damages or cerated in a federal prison.” In Schultz, arising from that foreseeable physical injury. And, it is noteworthy the Court of Appeals reversed the trial result, a non-pecuniary damage, that Gordon lists one of the categories 15 court’s summary judgment order (which should not be barred. of slander per se as imputation of a was based upon grounds other than dam- criminal offense. If a plaintiff can re- Due to the foreseeability of this harm, ages), and remanded the case for trial. cover noneconomic damages after being many courts have also found that when falsely accused of a criminal offense, a Other Authorities an attorney commits legal malpractice plaintiff would likely be able to recover in a criminal case, and causes the client A leading commentator in the field to be wrongfully incarcerated, the noneconomic damages after being of legal malpractice has noted that the falsely convicted of a criminal offense. traditional elements of a negligent- measure of damages in legal malpractice infliction-of-emotional-distress claim Finally, although the Aller Court cases based upon criminal litigation is need not be proven.16 To the extent that denied recovery for noneconomic dam - different from the measure of damages a legal malpractice plaintiff must show ages resulting solely from pecuniary in legal malpractice cases based upon that placing a person in prison subjects loss,10 the Court also cited an Illinois civil litigation. He has described that that person to an unreasonable risk of case, Doe v. Roe, for the proposition difference as follows: physical harm (an element of a claim that “when the attorney has reason to The many decisions that make of negligent infliction of emotional know that a breach of his duty up the body of existing law con- distress), case law from other juris dic- is likely to cause emotional distress, cerning the measure of damages tions supports the position that wrongful for reasons other than pecuniary loss, in a legal malpractice action usu- incarceration creates a substantial risk that damages will be given as compen- ally are not helpful where the injury of physical and emotional harm.17 sation for mental suffering11.” Similarly, arose out of the handling of a Conclusion the Aller Court cited Wagenmann v. criminal defense. Most reported Adams, supra, as follows: cases are concerned with injuries As shown above, there is significant to property, a or a implicit Colorado case law, as well as

18 DECEMBER/JANUARY 2019 Trial Talk Colorado Trial Lawyers Association Viorst | DAMAGES explicit authorities and cases from other procured a void arrest order from a court 15 Rhoades and Morgan, Recovery for jurisdictions, suggesting that noneco- acting without jurisdiction). Emotional Distress Damages in Attorney nomic damages can be recovered by a 7 Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75 (Colo. Malpractice Actions, 45 S.C. L. Rev. legal malpractice plaintiff who has App. 2004). 837, 845 (1994). 16 been wrongfully incarcerated. 8 Id. at 79. See Rowell v. Holt, 850 So.2d 474, 480 (Fla. 2003) (“[T]he citizens of a free 9 Id. Endnotes: society can conceive of no greater injury 10 1 Aller v. Law Office of Carole C. Schriefer, Aller, supra, 140 P.3d at 26. than the continued unjust deprivation of P.C., 140 P.3d 23 (Colo. App. 2005). 11 Aller, supra, 140 P.3d at 29 (citing Doe liberty. The special duty undertaken by 2 Aller, supra, 140 P.3d at 27-28 (citing v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640 (Ill. App. 1997)) . Rowell’s attorney, along with the foresee - Gavend v. Malman, 946 P.2d 558, 563 12 Schultz v. Boston Stanton, 198 P.3d ability of the harm that would flow from (Colo. App. 1997)). 1253, 1255 (Colo. App. 2008). his breach of that duty, lead us to conclude that the impact rule [for negligent inflic- 3 C.R.S. §18-1-901(2)( c). 13 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, tion of emotional distress] should have 4 §27:62, at 1392 (2017 ed.). CJI-Civ. 21:1. no application here . . .”); Holliday v. 14 5 See, e.g., Crews-Beggs Dry Goods Co. v. See, e.g., Drollinger v. Mallon, 260 P.3d Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 458 (Cal. App. Bayle, 5 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Colo. 1935) 482, 490 (Or. 2011) (“To the extent that 1989) (“If the purpose in prohibiting the (upholding false imprisonment judgment plaintiff alleges damages that are associated award of emotional distress damages in favor of plaintiff where “a corporation with his continued incarceration–damages absent physical injury or intentional or operating a department store in Pueblo, like loss of freedom, loss of income, and affirmative misconduct is to screen out Colo., through its agents, servants, and loss of companionship of family and fraudulent or speculative claims, the employees, imprisoned her at its store friends –he must plead and prove” that for such screening is simply without probable cause, and, in the pre- those damages would not have been nonexistent here when loss of liberty sence of customers, rudely and roughly incurred in the absence of attorney and its consequent impact on [the client] searched her person, and accused her of malpractice); Macias v. Moreno, 30 S.W.3d is not only a reasonable and foreseeable having stolen articles of merchandise”); 25 (Tex. App. 2000) (affirming judgment consequence of [the attorney’s] profes- Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Dennis, against criminal-defense lawyer who sional incompetence in defending [the 213 P. 332, 334 (Colo. 1923) (upholding committed legal malpractice where client client] in his murder trial, but virtually a false imprisonment judgment in favor of suffered emotional distress due to in- guaranteed result.”) carceration); Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. plaintiff where “he was taken from his 17 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. Supp. 91, 95 (D. N.J. 1988) (under New home in the nighttime, subjected for 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from im- Jersey law, “and considering the weight hours to a rigid examination, transported prisonment—from government custody, of authority in other jurisdictions, this to the city of Denver, confined in the city detention, or other forms of physical court holds that . . . plaintiff should be jail for six days, refused bail, photographed restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty” allowed to prove damages for emotional for the newspapers, denied communication protected by the constitution); Seretse- distress attributable to the extra twenty with friends, family or counsel, detained Khama v. Ashcroft, 215 F.Supp.2d 37, 53 months of confinement” resulting from in unsanitary quarters, in degrading com- (D. D.C. 2002) (“The deprivation of one’s the legal malpractice of his criminal pany, and given insufficient sustenance”); physical liberty for almost four years and defense attorney); Wagenmann v. Adams, Grimes v. Greenblatt, 107 P. 1111, 1113 continuing into the future is an undeni- 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987) (under (Colo. 1910) (upholding false imprison- ably substantial and irreparable harm”); Massachusetts law, plaintiff was entitled ment judgment against private party who Wanatee v. Ault, 120 F.Supp.2d 784, 788 to recover noneconomic damages for caused plaintiff to be “arrested, detained, (W.D. Iowa 2000) (“[E]very day of loss of liberty; “Were we to accept the and imprisoned . . . and confined in the unconstitutional incarceration generally notion that a client’s recovery on the city jail for the period of about 10 hours”). constitutes irreparable harm to the person grim facts of a case such as this must be 6 See Havens v. Hardesty, 600 P.2d 116, in such custody”); Cobb v. Green, 574 limited to purely economic loss, we (Colo. App. 1979) (upholding judgment F.Supp. 256, 262 (W.D. Mich. 1983) would be doubly wrong. The negligent for false imprisonment against attorney (“There is no adequate remedy at law for lawyer would receive the benefit of an where “mistake in initiating an action a deprivation of one’s physical liberty”) enormous windfall, and the victimized which forced an innocent party to be (emphasis supplied). client would be left without fair recourse named as ‘judgment debtor’ was the . . . Despite having caused his client a cause of the innocent party’s arrest”); substantial loss of liberty and exposed Pomeranz v. Class, 257 P. 1086, 1087 him to a consequent parade of horribles, (Colo. 1927) (upholding judgment for counsel would effectively be immunized false imprisonment against attorney who from liability . . .”).

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