DOCSLIB.ORG

Economics of Illicit Behaviors: Exchange in the Internet Wild West

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Economics of Illicit Behaviors: Exchange in the Internet Wild West ECONOMICS OF ILLICIT BEHAVIORS: EXCHANGE IN THE INTERNET WILD WEST by Julia R. Norgaard A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of George Mason University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Economics Committee: ___________________________________________ Director ___________________________________________ ___________________________________________ ___________________________________________ Department Chairperson ___________________________________________ Program Director ___________________________________________ Dean, College of Humanities and Social Sciences Date: _____________________________________ Spring Semester 2017 George Mason University Fairfax, VA Economics of Illicit Behaviors: Exchange in the Internet Wild West A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University By Julia R. Norgaard Master of Arts George Mason University, 2015 Bachelor of Arts University of San Diego, 2012 Director: Dr. Thomas Stratmann, Professor and Dissertation Chair Department of Economics Spring Semester 2017 George Mason University Fairfax, VA Copyright 2017 Julia R. Norgaard All Rights Reserved ii Dedication This is dedicated to my wonderful parents Clark and Jill, who introduced me to economics and taught me how to be a dedicated scholar and a good and faithful person. iii Acknowledgements Thank you to my family and friends who have supported me throughout my graduate journey. My boyfriend, Ennio, who gave me feedback on my research and provided helpful comments and encouragement. My colleagues who have provided me with fruitful discussion, endless support, and wonderful friendship. My committee who has provided me with invaluable help and guidance. iv Table of Contents Page List of Tables…………………………………………………………………..……..xi List of Figures …………………………………………………………………..….. xii Abstract ………………………………………………………………………..……..ix Chapter 1 …………………………………………………………….………………..1 1. Introduction……………………………………………………….………………..1 2. An Overview of the Deep Web………………….…………………………………4 3. Reputation as a Mechanism for Market Accountability………………………..….8 4. Theoretical and Empirical Model……………………………………….………..12 5. Empirical Model …………………………………………………………………20 6. Data from the Silk Road………………………………………………………….21 Data Collection Procedure……………………………………………………….…..22 Variables Used in Empirical Analysis……………………………………………….24 7. Results……………………………………………………………………...……..26 Estimating Beta………………………………………………………………………29 8. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..……31 Chapter 2 ………………………………………………………………………….…34 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………….……34 2. The Dark Net……………………………………………………………………...37 3. The Economics of Anonymity, Private Governance, and Club Goods…………..40 Anonymity………………………………………………………………………...…40 Private Governance and Club Goods……………………………..……...…………..44 4. A Model of the Internet Black Market………………………………………...….46 The Anonymity Problem………………………………………………...………...…46 5. Evidence…………………………………………………………………………..50 Private Governance in The Dark Net……………………………………...………....50 Residual Claimancy……………………………………………………………...…..52 Exclusion……………………………………………………………………….….…54 Advertising…………………………………………………………………….……..55 Branding…………………………………………………………………………...…57 Contract Enforcement……………………………………………………………..…59 Fraud Prevention……………………………………………………………………..60 Provision of Club Goods in the Dark Net…………………………………..………..62 Personal Security Services…………………………………………………..……….62 Conflict Resolution Services……………………………………………...………….65 6. Conclusion...………………………………………………………………………67 Chapter 3……………………………………………………………………….…….69 v 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………...………..69 2. The Digital Marketplace for Illicit Goods……………………………….…….….71 The Dark Net………………………………………………………………….……...71 Tor: The Onion Router………………………………………………………....……72 Cryptomarkets……………………………………………………………….……….73 3. Markets and Hierarchies……………………………………….…………………76 Organized Crime………………………………………………………….………….76 Networks and Hierarchy……………………………………………………………..80 Hypothesis……………………………………………………………………..……..82 Preliminary Evidence……………………………………………….………………..82 4. Testing our Hypothesis Using Agent Based Modeling……………...……………83 Purpose……………………………………………………………………………….83 The Mechanics of Agent Based Modeling……………………….…………………..85 Our Model………………………………………………………...………………….88 Model Visuals……………………………………………..…………………..……..91 Entities, State Variables, and Scales………………………………………..………..96 Process Overview and Scheduling………………………………….………………..99 Process Overview of Ground Model……………………………………..…………100 Process Overview of Virtual Model….……………………………………….…….101 Design Concepts…………………………………………………………….…..…..102 Results……………………………………………………………………….…..…..105 5. Conclusion…………………………………………………...…………….…….116 Appendix……………………………………………………………………….……118 List of References……………………………………………………………….…..136 Biography……………………………………………………..………………….….148 vi List of Tables Table Page 1. Summary Stats …………………………………………………………………...26 2. GLS Regressions of Effect of Reputation on Log Price per Gram……………….28 3. ß…………………………………………………………………………….……..30 4. Unedited List of Drug Types Parsed from Dark Web Data…………...….Appendix vii List of Figures Figure Page 1. Darknet Markets 1 …………………………………………………….….Appendix 2. Darknet Markets 2……………………………………………..………….Appendix 3. Silk Road 1………………………………………………………………. Appendix 4. Silk Road 2………………………………………………………………. Appendix 5. Feedback………………………………………………………………….Appendix 6. Item View……………………………………..………..………………….Appendix 7. Initial Scenario …………………………..………………………………….……47 8. Provision of Private Governance and Club Goods…………………………….…49 9. Darknet Market Lifespan ……………………………………………...…Appendix 10. Support………………………………………………….……………….Appendix 11. Product on Dream Market………...……………………………………. Appendix 12. Product on AlphaBay…………………………………..………………. Appendix 13. Listing Feedback on AlphaBay……………...…………………………. Appendix 14. Listing Feedback on Wall St. Market…………………….……………. Appendix 15. Forums Hansa 1……………………………………………………..…. Appendix 16. Forums Hansa 2……………………………………………..…………. Appendix 17. Hansa Top Vendors………………………………….…………………. Appendix 18. Wall St. Market Featured Listings………………..……………………. Appendix 19. Hansa Drugs……………………………………………………………. Appendix 20. All Products on Valhalla…………………….…………………………. Appendix 21. Free Sample Hansa…………………………………..…………………. Appendix 22. Dream Market Forums 1…………………….…………………………. Appendix 23. Dream Market Forums 2…………………….…………………………. Appendix 24. Shop Dream Market……………………………………………………. Appendix 25. Remove Feedback………………………………………...……………. Appendix 26. PGP 1……………………………………………………..……………. Appendix 27. PGP 2………………………………………………..…………………. Appendix 28. Forbidden Goods on Hansa……………………………………………. Appendix 29. Hansa Knowledge Base and Support……….…………………………. Appendix 30. Vendors…………………………………………………………...……. Appendix 31. To Setup…………………………………………………………..……. Appendix 32. Decide to Buy More Drugs Virtual 1……..……………………………. Appendix 33. Decide to Buy More Drugs Ground 1……………….…………………. Appendix 34. Turtles……………………………………………………………….…. Appendix 35. To Setup 2………………………………………………………...……. Appendix viii 36. Set up Agents………………………………………………..…………. Appendix 37. Decide to Buy More Drugs Virtual 2…..………………………………. Appendix 38. Decide to Buy More Drugs Ground 2…………….……………………. Appendix 39. Controller Setup for Virtual Network……………………………………..…….91 40. Model Outcomes………………………………………………………..……….92 41. Output and Layout………………………………………………………...…….93 42. Output Ground Network…………………………………………………..…….94 43. Network Connections Ground Network………………………………..……….95 44. Network Connections Ground Network Layout…………………………..…….95 45. Network structure of Virtual network (Average Degree: 2.03, Density: 0.014)……………………………………………………………………………….106 46. Network structure of Ground network (Average Degree: 1.17, Density: 0.008) ………………………………………………………………………………………106 47. Average Path Length in Virtual and Ground Networks after 100 runs…….….108 48. Average Degree in Virtual and Ground Networks after 100 runs……….….….111 49. Average Betweenness in Virtual and Ground Networks after 100 runs….…….112 50. Average Network Density in Virtual and Ground Networks after 100 runs…....112 51. Average number of “strong” clusters in Virtual and Ground Networks….…….114 52. Average number of “weak” clusters in Virtual and Ground Networks…………114 53. Average Percent of Possible Transactions in Virtual and Ground Models…......115 ix Abstract ECONOMICS OF ILLICIT BEHAVIORS: EXCHANGE IN THE INTERNET WILD WEST Julia R. Norgaard, Ph.D. George Mason University, 2017 Dissertation Director: Dr. Thomas Stratmann The first paper is an analysis of the role reputation plays in the Deep Web using data from the Internet black market site, The Silk Road. This encrypted online marketplace employed crypto currency and functioned over the Tor network. Utilizing a modeling technique, informed by trade auction theory, we investigate the effect of seller reputation. Analysis of the seller’s reputation gives us insights into the factors that determine the prices of goods and services in this black marketplace. Data on cannabis listings is parsed from the Silk Road website and covers an 11-month time period, from November 2013 to October 2014. This data demonstrates that reputation acts as a sufficient self- enforcement mechanism to allow transactions. These findings exemplify the robustness of spontaneous order with respect to the Deep Web as an emergent marketplace. The second paper examines how the platform providers in the Internet Black Market, one of the world’s largest international markets for illicit
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Internet and Drug Markets
    INSIGHTS EN ISSN THE INTERNET AND DRUG MARKETS 2314-9264 The internet and drug markets 21 The internet and drug markets EMCDDA project group Jane Mounteney, Alessandra Bo and Alberto Oteo 21 Legal notice This publication of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is protected by copyright. The EMCDDA accepts no responsibility or liability for any consequences arising from the use of the data contained in this document. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the official opinions of the EMCDDA’s partners, any EU Member State or any agency or institution of the European Union. Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). More information on the European Union is available on the internet (http://europa.eu). Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 ISBN: 978-92-9168-841-8 doi:10.2810/324608 © European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2016 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. This publication should be referenced as: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2016), The internet and drug markets, EMCDDA Insights 21, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. References to chapters in this publication should include, where relevant, references to the authors of each chapter, together with a reference to the wider publication. For example: Mounteney, J., Oteo, A. and Griffiths, P.
    [Show full text]
  • Into the Reverie: Exploration of the Dream Market
    Into the Reverie: Exploration of the Dream Market Theo Carr1, Jun Zhuang2, Dwight Sablan3, Emma LaRue4, Yubao Wu5, Mohammad Al Hasan2, and George Mohler2 1Department of Mathematics, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 2Department of Computer & Information Science, Indiana University - Purdue University, Indianapolis, IN 3Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Guam, Guam 4Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, AK 5Department of Computer Science, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Abstract—Since the emergence of the Silk Road market in Onymous" in 2014, a worldwide action taken by law enforce- the early 2010s, dark web ‘cryptomarkets’ have proliferated and ment and judicial agencies aimed to put a kibosh on these offered people an online platform to buy and sell illicit drugs, illicit behaviors [5]. Law enforcement interventions such as relying on cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin for anonymous trans- actions. However, recent studies have highlighted the potential for Onymous, along with exit scams and hacks, have successfully de-anonymization of bitcoin transactions, bringing into question shut down numerous cryptomarkets, including AlphaBay, Silk the level of anonymity afforded by cryptomarkets. We examine a Road, Dream, and more recently, Wall Street [6]. Despite these set of over 100,000 product reviews from several cryptomarkets interruptions, new markets have continued to proliferate. The collected in 2018 and 2019 and conduct a comprehensive analysis authors of [7] note that there appears to be a consistent daily of the markets, including an examination of the distribution of drug sales and revenue among vendors, and a comparison demand of about $500,000 for illicit products on the dark web, of incidences of opioid sales to overdose deaths in a US city.
    [Show full text]
  • Honeypots: Not for Winnie the Pooh But
    2018] 259 HONEYPOTS: NOT FOR WINNIE THE POOH BUT FOR WINNIE THE PEDO — LAW ENFORCEMENT’S LAWFUL USE OF TECHNOLOGY TO CATCH PERPETRATORS AND HELP VICTIMS OF CHILD EXPLOITATION ON THE DARK WEB Whitney J. Gregory* Cruelty, like every other vice, requires no motive outside itself—it only requires opportunity.1 INTRODUCTION Lawyers, doctors, teachers, politicians, and Hollywood stars—what do they all have in common? Smarts? Success? Wealth? Respect in their com- munities? Demonstrating the terrible divergence between appearance and re- ality, some members of these professions are also frequent customers and producers of child pornography. Contrary to what some may assume, child pornographers are not just antisocial, out-of-work, reclusive basement dwellers. They may be people you would least expect.2 Take, for instance, the teen heartthrob Mark Salling, who starred on Fox’s hit show Glee as handsome bad-boy Puck from 2009 to 2015. Twenty-fifteen was also the year Salling was arrested and charged * Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, J.D. Candidate, May 2019; Articles Editor, George Mason Law Review, 2018–19. This Comment is dedicated to the memory of my grandfa- ther Guido A. Ianiero. 1 George Eliot, Janet’s Repentance, in SCENES OF CLERICAL LIFE 102, 146 (Harper & Bros. 1858). 2 Judges have described child pornography defendants as seemingly ordinary, even upstanding, men (and a few women). “The defendants’ professional careers [are] often highlighted, including Air Force Captain, physician, trust specialist, and teacher.” Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN.
    [Show full text]
  • Cryptocurrency: the Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues
    Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues Updated April 9, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45427 SUMMARY R45427 Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and April 9, 2020 Selected Policy Issues David W. Perkins Cryptocurrencies are digital money in electronic payment systems that generally do not require Specialist in government backing or the involvement of an intermediary, such as a bank. Instead, users of the Macroeconomic Policy system validate payments using certain protocols. Since the 2008 invention of the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies have proliferated. In recent years, they experienced a rapid increase and subsequent decrease in value. One estimate found that, as of March 2020, there were more than 5,100 different cryptocurrencies worth about $231 billion. Given this rapid growth and volatility, cryptocurrencies have drawn the attention of the public and policymakers. A particularly notable feature of cryptocurrencies is their potential to act as an alternative form of money. Historically, money has either had intrinsic value or derived value from government decree. Using money electronically generally has involved using the private ledgers and systems of at least one trusted intermediary. Cryptocurrencies, by contrast, generally employ user agreement, a network of users, and cryptographic protocols to achieve valid transfers of value. Cryptocurrency users typically use a pseudonymous address to identify each other and a passcode or private key to make changes to a public ledger in order to transfer value between accounts. Other computers in the network validate these transfers. Through this use of blockchain technology, cryptocurrency systems protect their public ledgers of accounts against manipulation, so that users can only send cryptocurrency to which they have access, thus allowing users to make valid transfers without a centralized, trusted intermediary.
    [Show full text]
  • Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies? *
    Sex, drugs, and bitcoin: How much illegal activity is financed through cryptocurrencies? * Sean Foley a, Jonathan R. Karlsen b, Tālis J. Putniņš b, c a University of Sydney b University of Technology Sydney c Stockholm School of Economics in Riga January, 2018 Abstract Cryptocurrencies are among the largest unregulated markets in the world. We find that approximately one-quarter of bitcoin users and one-half of bitcoin transactions are associated with illegal activity. Around $72 billion of illegal activity per year involves bitcoin, which is close to the scale of the US and European markets for illegal drugs. The illegal share of bitcoin activity declines with mainstream interest in bitcoin and with the emergence of more opaque cryptocurrencies. The techniques developed in this paper have applications in cryptocurrency surveillance. Our findings suggest that cryptocurrencies are transforming the way black markets operate by enabling “black e-commerce”. JEL classification: G18, O31, O32, O33 Keywords: blockchain, bitcoin, detection controlled estimation, illegal trade * We thank an anonymous referee, Andrew Karolyi, Maureen O’Hara, Paolo Tasca, Michael Weber, as well as the conference/seminar participants of the RFS FinTech Workshop of Registered Reports, the Behavioral Finance and Capital Markets Conference, the UBS Equity Markets Conference, and the University of Technology Sydney. Jonathan Karlsen acknowledges financial support from the Capital Markets Co-operative Research Centre. Tālis Putniņš acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council (ARC) under grant number DE150101889. The Online Appendix that accompanies this paper can be found at goo.gl/GvsERL Send correspondence to Tālis Putniņš, UTS Business School, University of Technology Sydney, PO Box 123 Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia; telephone: +61 2 95143088.
    [Show full text]
  • Cybersecurity-The Silk Road Market
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Open Educational Resources Hostos Community College 2020 Cybersecurity-The Silk Road Market Amy J. Ramson CUNY Hostos Community College How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/ho_oers/7 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] CYBERSECURITY: SILK ROAD MARKET These slides describe an account of how the Department of JusEce through the FBI and DEA successfully brought the mastermind, Ross Ulbricht, behind the DARK WEB drug bazaar, SILK ROAD, to jusEce Silk Road Professor Amy Ramson, Esq. This OER material was produced as a result of the PIT-UN network Challenge Grant – New America Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License Ulbricht-head of the Silk Road market Ø Ross Ulbricht was born on March 27, 1984 Ø Ulbricht created the Silk Road website in 2011 Ø Ulbricht earned millions of dollars in profits from the commissions collected on purchases Ø Around January 2012, he adopted the username Dread Pirate Roberts referring to the pirate in the popular novel and film The Princess Bride that is passed to whom ever was wearing the mask Ø In order to assure users that posts from by DPR were his own, DPR authenEcated his posts using an electronic signature known as a PGP key. Ø See explanaon of PGP key signature authenEcaon on next slide PGP electronic signature authenEcaon Ø When sending digital signatures, PGP uses an algorithm that generates a hash (a mathemacal summary) which is encrypted with the sender's private key Ø The receiver uses the sender's public key to decrypt the hash code.
    [Show full text]
  • The Legal Status and Regulation of Bitcoin in Australia
    The University of Notre Dame Australia ResearchOnline@ND Theses 2017 Future digital money: The legal status and regulation of bitcoin in Australia Chinelle van der Westhuizen Follow this and additional works at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses Part of the Law Commons COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regulations 1969 WARNING The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further copying or communication of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act. Do not remove this notice. Publication Details van der Westhuizen, C. (2017). Future digital money: The legal status and regulation of bitcoin in Australia (Master of Laws (Thesis)). University of Notre Dame Australia. https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses/160 This dissertation/thesis is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The University of Notre Dame Australia School of Law FUTURE DIGITAL MONEY: THE LEGAL STATUS AND REGULATION OF BITCOIN IN AUSTRALIA Chinelle van der Westhuizen LLB, LLM (University of Pretoria) This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Master of Laws by Research 2017 DECLARATION This thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge, contain previously published or written material by another person except where due reference is made in the text, or any material previously submitted for a degree in any higher degree institution. _________________________________ Chinelle van der Westhuizen _________________________________ Date i ACKNOWLDEGEMENTS First and foremost, I thank God for his abundant love and goodness throughout this research period and for Blessing me with the talents to endure such a challenging research project.
    [Show full text]
  • Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code Jeanne L
    University of Miami Law School Institutional Repository University of Miami Business Law Review 6-1-2016 Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code Jeanne L. Schroeder Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons Recommended Citation Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2016) Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol24/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code Jeanne L. Schroeder* Much of the discussion of bitcoin in the popular press has concentrated on its status as a currency. Putting aside a vocal minority of radical libertarians and anarchists, however, many bitcoin enthusiasts are concentrating on how its underlying technology – the blockchain – can be put to use for wide variety of uses. For example, economists at the Fed and other central banks have suggested that they should encourage the evolution of bitcoin’s blockchain protocol which might allow financial transactions to clear much efficiently than under our current systems. As such, it also holds out the possibility of becoming that holy grail of commerce – a payment system that would eliminate or minimize the roles of third party intermediaries. In addition, the NASDAQ and a number of issuers are experimenting with using the blockchain to record the issuing and trading of investments securities.
    [Show full text]
  • Deepweb and Cybercrime It’S Not All About TOR
    A Trend Micro Research Paper Deepweb and Cybercrime It’s Not All About TOR Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Marco Balduzzi, Max Goncharov, and Robert McArdle Forward-Looking Threat Research Team Trend Micro | Deepweb and Cybercrime Contents Abstract ..................................................................................................................................................3 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................3 Overview of Existing Deepweb Networks ......................................................................................5 TOR ............................................................................................................................................5 I2P ...............................................................................................................................................6 Freenet .......................................................................................................................................7 Alternative Domain Roots ......................................................................................................7 Cybercrime in the TOR Network .......................................................................................................9 TOR Marketplace Overview ..................................................................................................9 TOR Private Offerings ..........................................................................................................14
    [Show full text]
  • How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth?
    How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir Department of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, The Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel {dorit.ron,adi.shamir}@weizmann.ac.il Abstract. The Bitcoin scheme is one of the most popular and talked about alternative payment schemes. It was conceived in 2008 by the mysterious Satoshi Nakamoto, whose real identity remains unknown even though his bitcoin holdings are believed to be worth several hundred million dollars. One of the most active parts of the Bitcoin ecosystem was the Silk Road marketplace, in which highly illegal substances and services were traded. It was run by another mysterious person who called himself Dread Pirate Roberts (DPR), whose bitcoin holdings are also estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars at today's exchange rate. On October 1-st 2013, the FBI arrested a 29 year old person named Ross William Ulbricht, claiming that he is DPR, and seizing a small fraction of his bitcoin wealth. In this paper we use the publicly available record to trace the evolution of his holdings in order to find how he acquired and how he tried to hide them from the authorities. For example, we show that all his income from the months of May, June and September 2013, along with numerous other amounts, were not seized by the FBI. One of the most surprising discoveries we made during our analysis was the existence of a recent substantial transfer (which was worth more than 60,000 dollars when made on March 20-th 2013, and close to a million dollars at today's exchange rate) which may link these two mysterious figures.
    [Show full text]
  • United States District Court Southern District of New York ------X
    Case 1:14-cr-00068-KBF Document 21 Filed 03/29/14 Page 1 of 64 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------X UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : 14 Cr. 68 (KBF) - against - : (Electronically Filed) ROSS ULBRICHT, : Defendant. : ------------------------------------------------------X MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT ROSS ULBRICHT’S PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS CHALLENGING THE FACE OF THE INDICTMENT JOSHUA L. DRATEL JOSHUA L. DRATEL, P.C. 29 Broadway, Suite 1412 New York, New York 10006 (212) 732-0707 Attorneys for Defendant Ross Ulbricht – Of Counsel – Joshua L. Dratel Lindsay A. Lewis Whitney Schlimbach Case 1:14-cr-00068-KBF Document 21 Filed 03/29/14 Page 2 of 64 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents.. i Table of Authorities. iv INTRODUCTION. 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS. 3 ARGUMENT POINT I COUNTS ONE, TWO, AND THREE SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE CONDUCT CHARGED THEREIN AGAINST MR. ULBRICHT DOES NOT STATE AN OFFENSE UNDER THE ENUMERATED STATUTES AND BECAUSE EVEN IF THE CONDUCT DID STATE AN OFFENSE, THOSE STATUTES WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE. 6 A. The Applicable Law Regarding Challenges to the Sufficiency of an Indictment.. 7 B. The Statutes Cited In Counts One, Two, and Three Do Not Cover the Conduct Alleged Against Mr. Ulbricht.. 9 1. Count One: The Controlled Substances Trafficking Conspiracy. 9 2. Count Two: The Continuing Criminal Enterprise. 13 a. Count Two Fails to Allege Sufficiently That Mr. Ulbricht Occupied a “Position of Organizer, a Supervisory Position, and a Position of Management” Necessary to a CCE Violation.. 14 b. Count Two Fails to Enumerate the Requisite Predicate Series of Violations Necessary to a Violation of 21 U.S.C.
    [Show full text]
  • A Broad Evaluation of the Tor English Content Ecosystem
    A Broad Evaluation of the Tor English Content Ecosystem Mahdieh Zabihimayvan Reza Sadeghi Department of Computer Science and Engineering Department of Computer Science and Engineering Kno.e.sis Research Center, Wright State University Kno.e.sis Research Center, Wright State University Dayton, OH, USA Dayton, OH, USA [email protected] [email protected] Derek Doran Mehdi Allahyari Department of Computer Science and Engineering Department of Computer Science Kno.e.sis Research Center, Wright State University Georgia Southern University Dayton, OH, USA Statesboro, GA, USA [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT It is an open question whether the fundamental and oen nec- Tor is among most well-known dark net in the world. It has noble essary protections that Tor provides its users is worth its cost: the uses, including as a platform for free speech and information dis- same features that protect the privacy of virtuous users also make semination under the guise of true anonymity, but may be culturally Tor an eective means to carry out illegal activities and to evade law beer known as a conduit for criminal activity and as a platform enforcement. Various positions on this question have been docu- to market illicit goods and data. Past studies on the content of mented [16, 22, 30], but empirical evidence is limited to studies that Tor support this notion, but were carried out by targeting popular have crawled, extracted, and analyzed specic subsets of Tor based domains likely to contain illicit content. A survey of past studies on the type of hosted information, such as drug tracking [12], may thus not yield a complete evaluation of the content and use of homemade explosives [20], terrorist activities [7], or forums [39].
    [Show full text]