Document of The World Bank Public Disclosure Authorized
Report No: 27265
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (SCL-41270)
ON A
LOAN
Public Disclosure Authorized IN THE AMOUNT OF US$75 MILLION
TO THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
FOR A
NATIONAL HIGHWYAY PROJECT Public Disclosure Authorized April 23, 2004
Finance, Private Sector Development and Infrastructure SMU Caribbean Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective February, 2004) Currency Unit = Dominican Pesos 1 Peso = US$ 0.025 US$ 1 = 40 Pesos
FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ASP Action Sustainability Plan BDR Bank of Reserves (Banco de Reservas) CAS Country Assistance Strategy DGMCCV Directorate of Maintenance (Dirección General de Mantenimiento de Carreteras y Caminos Vecinales) DGSFO Directorate of Works Supervision (Dirección General de Supervision y Fiscalización de Obras) DGTT Directorate of Traffic (Dirección General de Transito Terrestre) EIA Environmental Impact Assessment FHRMP Fifth Highway Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project HDM Highway Design and Maintenance Standards Model ICR Implementation Completion Report QAG Quality Assurance Group MMS Maintenance Management System NDF Nordic Development Fund PCT Project Coordinating Team OSOE Office of Supervision of State Works (Oficina Supervisora de Obras del Estado) SAR Staff Appraisal Report SEOPC Secretariat of State of Public Works and Communications (Secretaría de Estado de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones) STP Technical Secretariat of the Presidency (Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia)
Vice President: David de Ferranti Country Director Caroline D. Anstey Sector Manager Danny Leipziger Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Jose M. Alonso-Biarge
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DO NATIONAL HWY. PROJ.
CONTENTS
Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 6 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 13 6. Sustainability 18 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 20 8. Lessons Learned 22 9. Partner Comments 24 10. Additional Information 25 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 26 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 29 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 32 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 38 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 40 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 41 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 42 Annex 8. Borrower´s Completion Report 44
Project ID: P035722 Project Name: DO NATIONAL HWY. PROJ. Team Leader: Jose Alonso-Biarge TL Unit: LCSFT ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: April 23, 2004
1. Project Data Name: DO NATIONAL HWY. PROJ. L/C/TF Number: SCL-41270 Country/Department: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Region Sector/subsector: Roads and highways (91%); Central government administration (9%) Theme: Rural services and infrastructure (P)
KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 09/29/1994 Effective: 04/17/1997 11/10/1997 Appraisal: 02/15/1996 MTR: 12/10/1999 02/15/2001 Approval: 12/19/1996 Closing: 12/31/2001 10/31/2003
Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOV'T. OF DOM. REP./SEOPC Other Partners:
STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: David de Ferranti Shahid Javed Burki Country Director: Caroline D. Anstey Paul Isenman Sector Director: Danny Leipziger Paul Isenman Team Leader at ICR: Jose Alonso-Biarge Jose Alonso-Biarge ICR Primary Author: Jose Alonso-Biarge
2. Principal Performance Ratings
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: UN Institutional Development Impact: M Bank Performance: HS Borrower Performance: S
QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective:
The main objective of the Project was to improve the transport sector conditions to facilitate the development of major sources of growth, and improve access to markets by eliminating bottlenecks in the trunk network, continuing the rehabilitation of the paved highway network and improving road safety.
The Project also sought to improve the institutional capacity of the Secretariat of State of Public Works and Communications (SEOPC) to maintain the road network in a stable condition without continued donor support and enforce new management practices and policies. This was to be achieved by: (a) strengthening the capacity to implement maintenance programs; (b) improving the quality of pavements using the new technologies introduced under the Fifth Highway Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (FHRMP); (c) introducing routine maintenance and signalization by contract and strengthening the domestic private construction industry; (d) implementing a road fund managed by a new road agency that will ensure adequate and timely release of funds to carry out maintenance programs, and (e) strengthening budget, accounting, and auditing procedures.
3.2 Revised Objective:
There were no revisions to the project objectives.
3.3 Original Components:
The Project consisted of the following components:
(a) Civil Works
(i) Widening existing highway sections to four divided lanes (28.3 km in total) to eliminate congestion along some high-volume sections (about 10,000+ vehicles per day) and a high percentage of trucks (over 20 percent). The following sections were included in this subcomponent: (i) Santiago-Navarrete along the Duarte Highway (20.3 km); (ii) Santo Domingo-San Isidro along the Mella Highway (6.3 km); and (iii) Bajo de Haina-Acceso Refinería along the Sánchez Highway (1.7 km).
(ii) Construction of 3 new bridges (564 m in total) and deck widening of an existing bridge (102 m), where existing bridges have proven to be bottlenecks within the road network. The 3 new bridges included the following: (i) over the Baní River (150 m) in the city of Baní along the Sánchez Highway; (ii) over the Higuamo River (261 m) in the city of San Pedro de Macorís along the East Coast Highway; and (iii) over the Dulce River (153 m) in the city of La Romana along the East Coast Highway. The bridge in Baní was to be completed with the corresponding accesses and the improvement of the existing urban section (3.7 km), while the Higuamo and Dulce bridges were to be part of the bypasses of San Pedro de Macorís (12.3 km) and La Romana (8.0 km), two new highway sections. The deck widening corresponded to the bridge over the Yaque del Norte River (102 m) in Montecristi.
(iii)Reconstruction of 169 km of the highway network. The list of the highways to be reconstructed was agreed upon at appraisal. The SEOPC would annually review the list with the Bank and any modification or addition would be done only after obtaining the Bank's
- 2 - approval.
(iv) Highway resurfacing of 628 km using new pavement technologies tested under the FHRMP (Ln. 3350-DO). The list of the highways was also agreed upon at appraisal. The SEOPC would annually review the list with the Bank and any modification or addition would be done only after obtaining the Bank's approval.
(v) Pilot program of routine maintenance by contract along 640 km (13 percent of the network). Routine maintenance for the rest of the network was to have been contracted out by 2001. The initial programs were agreed with the Borrower at negotiations.
(vi) Road signalization program by contract including informative signals for connection among roads, itineraries for some destinations, tourist locations, and road services provided to the users.
(b) Civil Work Supervision and Technical Auditing
(vii) Supervision of civil works, including technical auditing for widening, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of highway and construction of bridges financed by the Project. These tasks were to have been carried out by independent consultants funded by the Loan to provide quality control and ensure compliance with bid specifications. The highway resurfacing, routine maintenance, and signalization programs would be supervised by the Directorate of Maintenance (Dirección General de Mantenimiento de Carreteras y Caminos Vecinales - DGCCV) staff trained under technical assistance financed by Ln. 3350-DO.
(c) Acquisition of Goods
(viii) Acquisition of vehicles, spare parts, and office equipment. This component included the acquisition of all terrain vehicles to facilitate design and supervision of the highway resurfacing and maintenance programs, spare parts for the operation of existing maintenance equipment, and office equipment (desk-top computers, printers, and photocopy machines).
(d) Consulting Services and Training
(ix) Consulting services for a technical assistance program consisting of: (a) coordination of project implementation; (b) assistance in the use of maintenance systems, in the preparation and monitoring of maintenance contracts, and in implementing a road fund to be managed by a road agency; (c) advise and training in financial management and internal performance audits; (d) strengthening the environmental unit of the SEOPC; (e) establishing a data base on highway accident statistics; (f) preparation of future investment programs in the transport sector; (g) preparation of a development plan for the northwestern region, including feasibility and environmental impact studies and preliminary engineering design of basic infrastructure; (h) preparation of a highway development plan for the eastern coastal region; (i) preparation of a drainage and sanitation plan in the city of Santo Domingo to complement the urban transport study financed by Loan 3350-DO; and (j) preparation of a feasibility study of the widening to four lanes and subsequent maintenance for the concession of the Santo Domingo-Baní Highway. Subcomponents (e), (g) and (h) were to be financed by the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), expectation that did not materialize ahead of negotiations.
- 3 - Project components would be directly implemented by the Secretariat of Public Works and Communications (Secretaría de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones or SEOPC). SEOPC did not require the establishment of a new project implementation unit (PIU) because it used the existing one in charge of implementing the FHRMP, with the head of the unit or General Coordinator appointed by the Secretary of State, and the supporting team financed by the Loan.
3.4 Revised Components:
The overall project components were not revised. Changes however took place on the final list of road segments reconstructed or rehabilitated under the Project. In component (a) (i) Bajos de Haina-Acceso Refineria, (to be substituted with the construction of a link to the oil refinery and the port of Haina under the modernization of the Santo Domingo-San Cristobal motorway) and Santo Domingo-San Isidro (initiated exclusively with local financing and later on withdrawn from the Project) were replaced by 5.7 km of the Avenue of the Americas between bridges Duarte and Juan Carlos. This section was included within the context of the concession of the Avenue of Las Americas up to Boca Chica and the 6 de Noviembre Motorway as a highway concession pilot project. The new section was added after loan effectiveness as a manner to increase and enhance private participation in highway rehabilitation and maintenance by facilitating the concession initiative, through the improvement of the conditions of highway segments that feed into those to be given in concession.
The reconstruction of two roads (Esperanza-Mao, 11 km and San Francisco-Tenares, 13 km) and the construction of the new Baní bridge, all originally included in the Project, were financed by the Government before the effectiveness date.
On September 22, 1998, Hurricane Georges seriously damaged a large number of structures, basically bridges and important road sections from the country's road system. To repair the damages, a road and bridge component was included in the Emergency Recovery Project (Loan 4420-DO). This new loan was approved by the Bank, signed by the Government in December, 1998 and declared effective on June 23, 1999. However, immediately after the disaster, it was agreed, by the Borrower and the Bank, that the most urgent reconstruction works, necessary to restore service in the road network severely damaged by the hurricane, would be financed with funds from Loan 4127-DO, then already underway. The works were directly contracted, as an exceptional and urgent measure, with construction companies that had ongoing contracts under Loan 4127-DO. When these works were being built, Loan 4420-DO was signed for repairing other damages. After the closing date (June 30, 2003) of Loan 4420-DO and during the grace period granted by the Bank to complete disbursements for expenditures made before the closing date, it was clear that about US$1.0 million would remain undisbursed from that loan. Since Loan 4127-DO closed on October 31, 2003, and could easily absorb more funds that the ones already committed, the transfer of funds between loans was partially reversed and US$818,000, were transferred back to Loan 4127-DO, making possible the full disbursement of Loan 4420-DO.
Since construction and reconstruction of roads and bridges were both objectives of the two projects, it was not necessary to formally restructure the National Highway Project because the project description in the Loan Agreement did not need to be modified. Therefore, 12 bridges (totaling 612 m) were completely rebuilt at a cost of US$6.5 million, including civil works and supervision, with US$4.5 million financed by Loan 4127-DO. The financing of part of these bridges was partly compensated with resources from Loan 4420-DO for a road (Sabana Grande de Boyá-Doña María) and a bridge (Benito Monción, in Montecristi) originally intended to be financed by Loan 4127-DO.
- 4 - 3.5 Quality at Entry:
The Project predates the introduction of the QAG process at the Bank. The ICR finds the quality of entry to be highly satisfactory, because the Project was largely consistent with sector needs at the time of appraisal and supported the 1995 CAS objective of backing up the Government’s rehabilitation and reform program to refurbish infrastructure and foster private sector development. The Project was intended to play an important role in removing transport bottlenecks to tourism and free trade zones, two pillars of the country´s economy. It was also in line with the Government's strategy in the transport sector that had focused on reconstruction and maintenance of key links of the highway network. Improvements in maintenance management and consolidation of new pavement technologies introduced under Loan 3350-DO were also pursued. Project design did adequately specify the segments and the number of kilometers to be rehabilitated and did provide a well designed work program and schedule.
SEOPC's weak capability to address environmental issues associated with roads and other transport projects was also considered. An Action Plan for strengthening the Environmental Unit was agreed during project appraisal and an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study was carried out by a group of national and international consultants, financed under Loan 3350-DO. The final EIA report was delivered before appraisal.
During project preparation a broad revision of SEOPC’s administrative structure was performed, as the entity in charge of project execution. Special attention was given to the organization and the functions of the SEOPC’s General Directorate of the Administration and its three basic functions: Accounting, Budget and Treasury.
As part of the project monitoring, reporting and supervision plan, the Project introduced technical auditing. This was an innovation to ensure consistency in work supervision, develop capacity within the SEOPC to monitor work quality, evaluate the results of the introduction of routine maintenance by contract and support annual and midterm reviews of the physical performance of the Project.
The Highway Maintenance Programs for 1997-2000 were prepared with the assistance of consultants implementing the Maintenance Management System (MMS), under technical assistance financed by Loan 3350-DO. The programs were prepared considering a level of maintenance defined by a set of quantity standards with modifying factors according to pavement condition, surface type, climatic regions, pavement age and policies.
The establishment and staffing of the Project Coordinating Team (PCT) was a condition of project effectiveness. The Project financed five local consultants of the PCT: the team head and four professionals, in addition to the consulting services also financed by the Loan.
The SAR correctly identified the main project risks that ended up having a significant impact on project implementation. The main risks included: (a) delays in the widening and reconstruction investments, (b) insufficient maintenance financing and, (c) the proposed Road Fund not implemented before project completion.
- 5 - 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:
The objective of improving transport conditions facilitating the development of the major sources of growth was fully achieved with the widening and construction of bypasses of highways connecting Santo Domingo and Santiago with tourist areas and free trade zones in the northern and eastern regions of the country. The road reconstruction component contributed to the completion of the reconstruction of the paved road network and to improve safety. In addition to the project contribution to the development objective, the Government started in 1999 an ambitious program of highway expansion and network capacity improvement that was continued and even enlarged by the Government who took over (from a different party) as a result of the 2000 presidential elections. This additional program also contributed to the development of tourist areas and free trade zones. Table 4.1 shows the SEOPC investments in the main road network, excluding maintenance, from 1998 through 2003 and the comparison of the total investments with those financed with the Loan. The comparison may help to understand the relative importance given by the Government to some subprojects financed by the Loan.
Table 4.1 Highway Investments RD$ (US$ Equivalent) million (1998-2003) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 With Loan Resources 66.81 166.17 277.35 304.10 360.50 203.25 (including Loan 3350-DO) (4.37) (10.09) (16.48) (17.50) (19.86) (6.70) Total 679.60 854.09 2,353.95 2,169.03 1,165.05 846.04 (44.44) (52.17) (139.85) (124.86) (64.18) (27.88) % Loans of Total 9.83 19.34 11.78 14.02 30.94 24.02
To finance this ambitious investment program the Government issued, in year 2002, US$600 million of “bonos soberanos” (sovereign bonds), using part of the money to pay counterpart funds for subprojects under the Loan of major political interest. In 2002 the SEOPC also started a concession program, under which 30-year concessions are awarded, where the concessionaire finances and carry out improvements to parts of the roads concessioned and maintenance over the life of the concession, and is entitled to collect the revenues from toll on the roads. Two major highways, Santo Domingo-Samaná (US$120 million) and Santo Domingo-La Romana (US$100 million) have been awarded and are underway. It is expected that new concessions will be awarded in the near future, taking into account the need to improve capacity in the main network and the scarcity of resources for the SEOPC, as a consequence of the reduction in the budget for public works during the upcoming process of economic stabilization.
The objective to improve the institutional capacity for highway maintenance was only partially achieved. Details are in sections 4.4 and 4.5. Pilots of maintenance by contract, for routine as well as comprehensive road maintenance, were carried out that provided useful models of ways to improve efficiency in the execution of road maintenance. The comprehensive model also included new pavement technologies introduced under the previous loan. A new financial management system was put in place, and has resulted in better accounting controls, easier preparation of disbursement requests and audits and better project financial reporting. The most problematic issue is the financing of maintenance. The 2003 SEOPC annual budget included several road maintenance related activities that, if grouped and put together under a maintenance program, prepared based on the actual needs of the network and managed by a solid
- 6 - management unit, could have met the maintenance objectives. However, those resources were allocated and awarded in an ad-hoc manner, without a proper maintenance strategy and planning. Effectiveness in the use of resources was further hampered by lack of an appropriate procurement process for some of the works financed solely by the government budget.
Table 4.2 below shows the expenditures for maintenance in the period of the Project. Four different departments within the SEOPC were in charge of carrying out these activities. The Directorate of Maintenance (Dirección General de Mantenimiento de Carreteras y Caminos Vecinales-DGMCCV) was in charge of routine maintenance activities mostly carried out by force account; the Directorate of Traffic (Dirección General de Tránsito Terrestre-DGTT) was in charge of road safety activities carried out by contract, including road signalization, installation of safety barriers and minor safety works (among them "black spots" improvement); the Directorate of Works Supervision (Dirección General de Supervision y Fiscalizacion de Obras-DGSFO) was in charge of road rehabilitation and periodic maintenance not financed by the Loan, also carried out by contract; and finally, the project coordination unit was responsible for the routine and periodic maintenance programs financed by the Loan, carried out by contract. Coordination among these four different departments was almost nonexistent along the life of the Project, because there is no other authority than the Secretary of State to impose that coordination among units at the level of General Directorates and the Secretary of State did not exert that authority.
The level of implementation of the 2003 maintenance budget was more than 100% with respect to the originally planned, if we include RD$263.2 million in safety barriers (financed with a credit from a commercial bank). The remainder includes other road safety activities mentioned above. However, if we consider this a one-time event, the budget for the remaining maintenance activities goes down to RD$803.75 million (US$27.55 million equivalent) and the level of implementation to about 93.6%, still a remarkable achievement. While activities related to road safety and periodic maintenance were largely funded and executed, routine maintenance did not receive neither sufficient resources nor support. Almost all routine activities were carried out under the corresponding project component. Therefore, to achieve the objective of maintaining the road network in a stable condition without continued donor support, it is of the utmost importance to get an adequate distribution of the resources available for maintenance through adequate planning, based on the most urgent maintenance needs, and to execute the plan under the coordination of a unit with authority enough to coordinate all units involved in maintenance activities.
Table 4.2 Maintenance Expenditures RD$ (US$ equivalent) Million (1998-2003) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2003 Planned Executed Directorate of Maintenance 52.97 49.11 41.71 47.35 36.00 56.00 55.34 (DGMCCV) (3.60) (3,10) (2.58) (2.84) (2.06) (1.92) (1.90) Directorate of Traffic 139.12 208.68 485.34 684.26* (DGTT) (8.33) (11.95) (16.64) (23.46)* Directorate of Works 139.52 11.72 315.65 295.73 Supervision (DGSFO) (8.36) (0.67) (10.82) (10.14) Project Coordination Team 28.37 153.85 121.30 31.00 59.22 (PCT) (1.75) (9.21) (6.95) (1.78) (2.03) TOTAL 52.97 49.11 70.08 479.84 377.70 888.00 1094.75** (3.60) (3,10) (4.33) (28.73) (21.64) (30.44) (37.53)** % Contracted out 40.48% 90.13% 90.47% 93.70% 95.00% *421.06 (14.23) excluding safety barriers **831.55 (28.51) excluding safety barriers and 410.49 (14.07) excluding all safety activities
- 7 - The intended creation of a Road Maintenance Fund with dedicated funds for road maintenance did not materialize due to lack of political will. As a provisional measure, the SEOPC agreed to establish a Road Maintenance Account, administered by the SEOPC, which could have served as a gradual step toward the eventual establishment of a road maintenance fund. This measure could not be implemented due to legislation enacted by Congress later on, leading to the creation of a Single Account within the National Treasury for all government revenues. Since the Fund was not established, the intended creation of a new agency to manage road maintenance budgeted under the Fund did not take place.
In summary, the data show that the resources available in 2003 for maintenance would have been sufficient to meet requirements, if they had been spent with adequate planning and satisfactory management. Current uncertain political and economic conditions of the DR make it unlikely that allocation of resources will be corrected in the near future. However, the SEOPC contracted out a Road Condition Survey at the end of the Project (financed by the Loan) to collect data in the field on the road condition of about 2,000 km of the main road network. The data were utilized to feed the Highway Design and Maintenance Standards Model, version 4 (HDM-4 model) and prepare a rehabilitation and maintenance program of the roads surveyed, which should serve as a model for the SEOPC to prepare future maintenance and rehabilitation programs.
Table 4.3 and the figure below, show the investments and maintenance expenditures together from 1998 to 2003, and the percentage of the latter with respect to the former, which confirms that the overall budget for maintenance activities (with the caveats of road safety) substantially improved in the last two years of the Project.
Table 4.3 Investments and Maintenance RD$ (US$Equivalent) million (1998-2003) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Maintenance 52.97 49.11 70.08 479.84 377.70 1,094.75* (3.60) (3,10) (4.33) (28.73) (21.64) (37.53)* Investments 679.60 854.09 2,353.95 2,169.03 1,165.05 846.04** (44.44) (52.17) (139.85) (124.86) (64.18) (27.88)** Total 732.57 903.20 2424.03 2,648.87 1,542.75 1940.79 (48.04) (55.27) (144.18) (153.59) (85.82) (65.41) % Maintenance / Total 7.49 5.61 3.00 18.71 25.22 57.38*** *831.55 (28.51) excluding safety barriers and 410.49 (14.07) excluding all safety activities **1,109.24 (37.11) including safety barriers as investments and 1,530.30 (51.34) including all safety activities as investments ***43,59 considering safety barriers as investments and 21.51 considering all safety activities as investments
- 8 - Figure 1
160 140 120 100 Maint. 80 Invest. 60 Total 40 20 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
4.2 Outputs by components:
The Project had seven components/sub-components. Main outputs delivered under these components are discussed below (see also Table in Annex 1). All components were completed by the closing date with the exception of three civil works (roads) to be completed with local funds. The completion of these roads at a higher standard of pavement and with all the complementary signalization and ancillary services would have required a new extension of the closing date (eight months), which was requested by the Borrower but not granted by the Bank, for reasons not related to the Project, but to the political, economic and fiscal problems in the country. Two factors prevented the completion of those three works at those higher standards by the closing date. First, the insufficient amount of counterpart funds necessary to complete the works. Second, the unforeseeable suspension of asphalt products supplies from Venezuela, at the time the only supplier. This suspension affected also other civil works under the Project.
Road Widening Program (expansion to 4 lanes). This program originally included 3 sections of which the Santiago-Navarrete (17.8 km) section was completed and inaugurated on April 28, 2002. The second section, Bajos de Haina-Acceso Refinería, will be substituted with a link to the Refinery and the port of Haina included in a highway concession recently awarded but not started. The third section, Santo Domingo-San Isidro was initiated by the Office for Supervision of State Works (Oficina Supervisora de Obras del Estado-OSOE) with local financing but the works were not completed. The SEOPC decided to withdraw this subproject from the list financed by the Loan. Replacing these two sections, the widening of the Autopista Las Americas between bridges Duarte and Juan Carlos (5.7 km), a major work, was included under the Loan during the implementation period, as a result of an agreement with the SEOPC concerning the Highway Concession Pilot Project (see Section 3.4). It was split into two segments: Segment I, between Puente Duarte and Av. San Vicente de Paul, already completed and inaugurated on August 1st, 2003, and Segment II, between San Vicente de Paul and Juan Carlos bridge. This segment is already in service, but it will be completed with an asphalt course with local funds. All loan funds for these works have been disbursed. The total length of widening under the Project is finally 23.52 km, against 28.3 km (with lower engineering standards) in the SAR.
Bridge and Bypass Construction Program. The first phase of the San Pedro de Macorís bridge and bypass, which includes just one roadway of the bypass connected to the existing bridge (once this was fixed to allow the crossing of two lightweight vehicles) was completed and is in service. The second phase, which includes the second roadway of the bypass, was included in the concession Santo Domingo-La Romana. A new bridge over the Higuamo River is under construction with local funds and is expected to be completed within two years, together with the second phase of the by-pass. The construction of the
- 9 - Montecristi bridge (once the foreseen deck widening was discarded for technical reasons), was financed under Loan 4420-DO, as a partial compensation for the emergency works financed under Loan 4127-DO.
Works in La Romana bridge and bypass were well advanced at the closing date, but the bridge over the Dulce River, the asphalt layers on the bypass and the signalization and ancillary services, envisioned in the expanded design approved by the SEOPC, are being completed with local funds. This contract initially included new construction of 8.0 km and the bridge for a by-pass that avoided the most congested part of the existing road crossing the city of La Romana, but ended in a semi-urban area. With the works just started, the SEOPC decided to expand the by-pass 5.2 km to the west, to avoid that semi-urban growing populated area as well. The cost of the additional works could not be completely covered by the Loan and the Bank’s no objection to the expansion was conditioned to the commitment by the Government to finance the difference. Economic circumstances in the DR prevented the SEOPC from getting the funds when required and this resulted in the slower than expected progress of the works. The total length of the bypasses under the Project is finally 25.74 km (29.44 km, including the access to Baní financed only with local funds) against 24.00 km in the SAR.
In addition to the above mentioned bridges, Loan 4127-DO also financed 12 bridges located practically along the path of Hurricane Georges, completely rebuilt at a cost of US$6.5 million. This cost included civil works and supervision and were financed with US$4.5 million from the Loan. The 12 bridges were completed before the end of the Project. The financing of these bridges was "compensated" with resources from Loan 4420-DO for a road (Sabana Grande de Boyá-Doña María) and a bridge (Montecristi) originally intended to be financed by Loan 4127-DO, and the transfer of US$818,100 from loan 4420-DO back to loan 4127-DO in July 2003. The total length of bridges under the Project is 1,061.20 m (1,211.20 including the Baní bridge financed only with local funds) against 563.80 in the SAR.
Road Reconstruction Program. The program included three groups of works with an approximate total length of 124 km, plus 24 km included in the SAR, but financed only with local funds. The scope of all these works was also expanded with local funds. The works have been completed with the exception of the Cruce Pajón-Doña María road, (28.5 Km) and Boronga-Boyá-Sabana de Boyá (18 km) roads, which would also have required an additional eight-month extension to be completed. These works particularly the former have been severely affected by the scarce supply of asphalt binders. The technical standards for these works were substantially upgraded by the SEOPC (to the point that they became those of construction of a new road rather than reconstruction) under similar arrangements than in the case of La Romana by-pass and shared with it similar problems and solutions. Those roads close a circuit in the central part of the country with high expectations on agricultural production. The reconstruction of two roads (Esperanza-Mao, 11 km and San Francisco-Tenares, 13 km), originally included in the Project, was entirely financed by the Government and started before the effectiveness date. The total length of road reconstruction under the Project is finally 123.95 km (147.95 km including 24 km financed only with local funds) against 168.90 km (at lower engineering standards) in the SAR.
Highway Resurfacing of 628 km using new pavement technologies tested under the FHRMP. This program was merged with other maintenance programs to design and test a comprehensive maintenance three-year program (by contract) discussed below.
Maintenance by Contract Pilot Program. This program included two different types of contracts: (i) three routine maintenance one-year contracts (one for Autopista Duarte and two for the eastern region); and (ii) three comprehensive maintenance three-year contracts, each one corresponding to a different area in the country (Northwest, Cibao and South). This maintenance by contract program was piloted because there
- 10 - was no previous experience with comprehensive maintenance contracts in the Dominican Republic. These contracts include routine and periodic maintenance, rehabilitation of selected road segments and bridges, training and program management.
The first phase of the routine maintenance contracts was not satisfactorily completed, partly because of the delays in payments, but also because of lack of interest by the contractors. It was agreed not to extend these three routine maintenance contracts when they expired but to proceed with the bidding of the maintenance activities for shorter lengths of roads of the network and contract periods (so that contracts will be smaller than US$250,000). The new bid terms were expected to attract smaller contractors that should show greater interest and effectiveness in executing the works. This second approach of the program was satisfactorily implemented. The contracts included a total of 370 km of roads.
The three comprehensive maintenance three-year contracts were tendered under ICB and awarded to international firms. The contracts included routine and periodic maintenance, some minor rehabilitation works, signalization, training provisions for all professional and labor levels in the SEOPC and the local subcontractors and program management. The implementation of these contracts for comprehensive maintenance of about 630 km concluded satisfactorily. The contracts were later extended to rehabilitate the Otra Banda-Verón road (20 km), leading to the tourist eastern area of Punta Cana, with new pavement technologies introduced under Loan 3350-DO.
Acquisition of goods. This program consisted of the acquisition of office equipment and vehicles for the PCT and was satisfactorily concluded. Some of the goods, initially included under the Loan, were finally financed by a parallel IDB loan.
Informative Signalization Program. The program was also completed as designed. Some of the signalization works initially included in the Project were carried out as part of the reconstruction works financed by the Loan and local funds.
Technical Assistance. All consulting services financed by the Loan were satisfactorily completed, with the exception of the development plans of the North-Western and Eastern costal regions. These services were to be financed by the NDF, but ahead of negotiations the NDF did not renewed its initial commitment. The cost of supervision of civil works substantially increased, due to the necessary adjustments forced by the slower execution pace and wider scope of most civil works, to the point that the resources in the Loan for this category were exhausted and in the last phase of the Project it had to be completely financed with local counterpart funds by the SEOPC.
The contract for developing the Accident Information System, also included in the Project with NDF financing, was finally financed by the Loan as part of the institutional strengthening program and was successfully completed, including the arrangements for its implementation.
Road Condition Survey. This contract was added at the end of the Project to collect data in the field concerning the condition of about 2,000 km of the main road network to prepare a rehabilitation and maintenance program of the roads surveyed. This program should serve as a model for the SEOPC to prepare future rehabilitation and maintenance programs. Based on the results of the roads surveyed, the actual condition of the paved network, compared to the existing one in 1995 and the estimated in the SAR for 2001, is presented in Table 4.4 below.
- 11 - Table 4.4 Condition of the Road Network (1995-2001-2003) 1995 2001 2003 (SAR estimate) (Actual) Paved Network 3831 100% 4240 4240 Good and Fair Condition 3110 81% 4240 100% 4,028 95% Poor Condition 721 19% 0 0% 212 5%
4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:
An ex-ante economic evaluation was done at the time of project preparation using the Highway Design and Maintenance Standards Model (HDM-III) that evaluated the road widening, bypass construction and the highway reconstruction and resurfacing programs, which yielded a Net Present Value (NPV) of US$ 99.3 million and an overall Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 24.5 percent.
The ex-post economic evaluation was done using the HDM-4, (an updated version of the HDM-III), for the road subprojects implemented under the Project. Some subprojects planned at appraisal (Santo Domingo – San Isidro and Bajos de Haina – Refinería widening, Baní access, and Esperanza – Mao, San Francisco – Tenares and Boyá – Doña Maria reconstructions) were not implemented under the Project; therefore, they were not submitted to an ex-post evaluation. During project implementation, the scope of most of the works changed from necessary repairs of surface distress to full rehabilitation and reconstruction. This change was due to higher-than-estimated traffic growth on the main roads and faster than expected road deterioration. The ex-post HDM-4 evaluation considered: (i) actual costs; (ii) actual traffic; (iii) actual timing and duration of road works; and (iv) 20 years evaluation period with 12 percent discount rate.
The HDM-4 Model estimated the net benefits of each project in terms of reduction of vehicle operating costs, passenger time costs and road maintenance expenditures, which occurs after periodic maintenance or rehabilitation works. The results show (see Annex 3) that, with the exception of the Boronga-Boyá-Sabana Grande de Boyá section, all subprojects are economically justified, under the ex-ante or ex-post scenarios, with rates of return higher than 12 percent. The Boronga-Boyá-Sabana Grande de Boyá section has an ex-post economic rate of return of 7 percent, due to the high actual project costs and low traffic. Nevertheless, this is a road, practically new, that links the road network surrounding Santo Domingo with the road circuit in the central part of the country (reconstructed under the Project) with high expectations on agricultural production and annual traffic growth probably higher that the 3% used in the analysis. For the eleven projects, the overall ex-post IRR is 22.3 percent corresponding to a total NPV of US$ 81.94 million.
4.4 Financial rate of return:
NA
4.5 Institutional development impact:
The Project had a positive impact on institutional development, particularly during the first half of implementation when various institutional strengthening activities were implemented. They included the preparation and implementation of an environmental manual, the strengthening of the SEOPC's environmental unit and the development of a financial management system. This system was taken as a model for the agencies implementing a parallel emergency relief operation. As planned, significant transfer
- 12 - of technology and knowledge took place during project implementation, studies and specific training courses. Seminars on road maintenance and highway concessions were also organized by the SEOPC with presentations from local and foreign experts, including the SEOPC and Bank project teams. Professionals from the SEOPC team (and the private sector at their own cost) attended courses in Spain on Planning and Programming of Highway Investments with the HDM-4, organized by Spanish highway institutions and the Bank.
Pilots of comprehensive maintenance programs (which include all necessary maintenance activities) and of routine maintenance by contract were successfully implemented in various road sections, and should serve as useful models for future application to other parts of the road network. Technical audits were designed and introduced, which would be expected to become standard requirements of the highway agency. A Road Condition Survey was added at the end of the Project to collect data in the field concerning the condition of about 2,000 km of the main road network and prepare a rehabilitation and maintenance program of the roads surveyed, which should serve as a model for the SEOPC to prepare future programs.
In summary, the overall impact of the project on institutional development is positive, although below original expectations.
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:
The Project was approved by the Board on December 19, 1996 and the Loan Agreement was signed on January 17, 1997. However, congressional approval was delayed and the Loan was not declared effective until November 10, 1997, eleven months after Bank’s approval. As a result, the original project implementation period was actually reduced to three years. The defeat of the governing party in the May 1998 congressional elections redirected all parties’ attention towards short-term political considerations aimed at ensuring victory in the 2000 presidential elections. This political impasse, together with the change of government that resulted from the May 2000 elections, slowed down project implementation, especially during the May-October 2000 transition period.
Considering the above factors, the Bank granted a first extension of the Loan Closing Date from December 31, 2001 to December 31, 2002. To facilitate the achievement of project objectives, two more extensions were subsequently given, to January 31, 2003, and October 31, 2003. The second extension was only for one month to facilitate the submission by the Borrower of evidence of compliance with the conditions requested by the Bank for granting the third and final extension to October 31, 2003. The final extension until October 31, 2003 was agreed primarily to allow the completion of the road and bridge components. The road works were affected by a suspension of supplies of asphalt products during the January-April 2003 crisis in Venezuela, the only supplier at the moment, which paralyzed some major road works (the suspension extended beyond April 2003, due to political problems that developed between the two countries)*. A fourth extension requested by the Government to June 30, 2004, just to complete three contracts - two under Loan Category 1 (Civil Works) and one under Loan Category 4 (Consultant’s Services and Training) - was not granted by the Bank, due to the prevailing political, fiscal and economic conditions in the country.
______*The Venezuelan President accused the Dominican Government of giving political asylum to a former Venezuelan president and plotting to overthrow him.
- 13 - In September 22, 1998, Hurricane Georges produced heavy rains and flooding that washed away many roads and bridges and created tremendous loss of life. As a result, some of the project funds were redirected for emergency works (reconstruction of 12 destroyed bridges).
In 2003, project implementation was also affected by the deteriorating economic and fiscal outlook of the country. There was a severe deterioration of macro-economic conditions in the last phase of implementation, including poor economic performance, high inflation, and the exchange rate depreciation. Economic growth slowed down significantly while the fiscal situation became more difficult. At the same time, the Dominican peso lost more than half of its value vis-a-vis the dollar. Furthermore, a banking crisis not only strained the government's treasury, but also created inflationary pressures. Moreover, the country also experienced some political unrest.
5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:
The key factor subject to government control was provision of counterpart funds. Despite the commitment given to the Project at appraisal, there was continuous lack of counterpart funding particularly in the second half of project implementation. Lack of counterpart funding accumulated and became the key factor of project implementation delays.
This, coupled with a continued expansion in the scope of subprojects, through adjustments to contracts, caused delays in those contracts. As a result, three such contracts were only partly completed by the final closing date. The enlargements in scope were mostly due to traffic growth and road deterioration higher than anticipated, and to improvements in driving safety and comfort. These measures, although technically correct, resulted in additional costs that could not be completely covered by the Loan. The Bank’s no objection to the expansion was conditioned to the commitment by the Government to finance the difference. When the DR economy started to worsen, it was increasingly difficult for the SEOPC to get the funds when required, and this was reflected in the slower than expected progress of the works. The lack of progress in bringing counterpart funds in a par with the disbursement of Loan funds exacerbated the difficulties of contracting firms in carrying out their activities, delaying their program of works and further increasing the costs of the contracts, due to the adjustments to the relevant prices mandated by contractual clauses. Cumbersome requirements by the Office of the Comptroller's General, only simplified at the very end of project implementation, hindered the necessary flow of project funds, further complicating the issue of management of relations with the different contractors and consultants.
The serious damages to the road network, particularly to some bridges, caused by Hurricane Georges in September 1998, forced the Government to redirect resources from the Loan to the urgent reconstruction of 12 bridges, further increasing the demand for Loan and SEOPC resources.
A road maintenance fund to ensure maintenance financing beyond project implementation was not enacted by Congress. A provisional measure, -requested by the Bank as a condition to grant the second / third extension - to establish a Road Maintenance Account, administered by the SEOPC could not be implemented due to legislation, enacted by Congress later on, leading to the creation of a Single Account within the National Treasury for all government revenues. While congressional approval of the Road Fund was necessary, the Government was not pro-active enough in submitting to Congress a proposal for approval nor in following the recommendations of the Study prepared by the Bank's team (see Annex 7) looking for financing alternatives and the implementation of adequate maintenance strategy and planning, and solid management to meet the maintenance objectives.
- 14 - Another factor under government control that negatively affected project implementation, particularly at some of its stages, was the interference and lack of coordination of programs and projects carried out by institutions outside the SEOPC - the Office of Supervision of State Works (Oficina Supervisora de Obras del Estado (OSOE) - and between units inside the institution (DGTT, DGSFO and DGM, and the PCT).
Although the pilot concession contract was awarded following criteria of transparency and competitiveness and later on approved by Congress, the Government never issued the corresponding presidential decree awarding the contract and therefore, the concession contract was canceled. At the bottom of this decision, was the discrepancy between the SEOPC (favorable to the concession) on one side and the OSOE, reporting directly to the Presidency, and some presidential advisors (opposed to the concession) on the other. A major reason for this discrepancy was that the OSOE itself wanted to implement the widening to six lanes of the section of the Las Américas Highway between the Juan Carlos bridge and the access to the International Airport (16 km), included in the concession contract. Despite the opposition by the SEOPC, the OSOE went ahead with its plan and awarded the widening works in an opaque fashion with no competition or public bidding. As a consequence, the concession contract was canceled and the Bank withdrew its support to this activity. More than two years and a half later, the widening works had yet not been completed and costs were much higher than initially estimated.
It should be noted that the OSOE was created more than 15 years ago under one of the Balaguer administrations. The OSOE had its own funds, which allowed it to carry works of political or social interest not included in the budget of any other government agency. In the past, the OSOE did not intervene in the national highway network. However, during the project period, the OSOE got involved in highways, took over some SEOPC actions and responsibilities and sometimes held opposite positions. This had negative consequences for the Project, particularly concerning the works to be financed with loan resources. (In addition to the case of the highway concession initiative, the widening of the Santo Domingo-San Isidro section, mentioned above, was withdrawn from the Project by the SEOPC because it was also started but not completed by the OSOE).
Once the concession contract was canceled, the SEOPC requested the Bank advice to find a replacement that allowed resuming the agreement to finance with the Loan the section between bridges Duarte and Juan Carlos. The Bank suggested an alternative with a high maintenance component to be included as part of the Action Sustainability Plan (ASP). Following the advice, the Government chose the concession of the corridor Santo Domingo-La Romana (about 120 km), which includes maintenance of the entire corridor (the subject of several works financed by this and previous Bank loans) and widening of a part of it, the section between San Pedro de Macorís and La Romana (about 37 km). This concession meets the requirements of the ASP to improve highway maintenance in a sustainable way. The corresponding contract was signed by the SEOPC and ratified by Congress and its implementation is underway. Therefore, it was finally possible to finance with loan resources the four lanes of the 5.7 km of the Avenue of the Américas between bridges Duarte and Juan Carlos, which was completed by project's end.
5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:
This project was more complex and on larger scale than the previous ones. The changes in the scope of many of the project components added more complexity to the implementation. These changes had required more implementation support from the SEOPC, particularly concerning the sufficient allocation of counterpart resources to finance the enlargement of subprojects, an to develop a strict and close supervision of work contracts to comply with the agreed timetable. The hard competition for funds as a consequence of the ambitious program to expand the road network capacity, implemented in parallel, was negative for the Project, as its subprojects were sometimes a second priority with respect to other works of more political
- 15 - impact. Furthermore, the SEOPC did not follow up the lessons learned from the Comprehensive Maintenance Program by Contract introduced by the Project as a pilot, and did not take advantage of those lessons to prepare a similar program for the following years. Likewise, the SEOPC made little progress in moving ahead with a credible program of outsourcing routine maintenance activities after the Project and did not make the necessary efforts to promote and get approved the Road Fund or a similar financial mechanism for maintenance.
On the other hand, a positive factor was the decision of the SEOPC to substantially keep and support the same PCT than in the previous operation, trough a succession of several SEOPC's Secretaries of State from different parties in the course of the Project. The General Coordinator, a senior official, interfaced well with each incoming Secretary of State, even through the changes of government and of the party in power. The PCT also kept excellent and highly efficient relations with the Bank team, which was reflected in the additional project implementation capacity that was developed under the Project. On the technical side, the PCT developed a smooth flow of information and communication necessary for efficient project execution.
5.4 Costs and financing:
Total project cost at appraisal was estimated at US$122.5 million, including physical and price contingencies. The Bank was expected to finance 70 percent of Components (a)(i), (a)(ii) and (a)(vi) (see Section 3.1), 60 percent of Components (a)(iii) and (b), 50 percent of Components (a)(iv) and (a)(v), 90 percent of Component (c) and 80 percent of Component (d), or an average of 64 percent of the total project cost.
As a result of the changes in the project components mentioned in Sections 3.4 and 4.2 the final total project cost was US$180.91 million, out of which the Bank financed 30 percent of Component (a)(i), 52.1 percent of Component (a)(ii), 70 percent of Component (a)(vi), 46.8 percent of Component (a)(iii), 42.4 percent of Component (b), 50 percent of Components (a)(iv) and (a)(v), 90 percent of Component (c) and 79.2 percent of Component (d), or an average of 41.5 percent of the total project cost with the results shown in Tables 5.1 (Project Final Cost) and last Table in Annex 2 (Project Financing by Component).
Table 5.1 Project Final Costs (US$ million equivalent) Original Final Costs Counterp. Debt Counterpart Debt Contracts Total Counterpart Loan Total Strict* Other** Project Costs 122.50 180.91 105.91 75.00 2.7 1.4 1.3 *Counterpart funds according to the paripassu (US$47.5 million) ** Counterpart funds in excess, to finance expansion of contracts not financed by the loan
(a)(i) Highway Widening Component (expansion to 4 lanes). The final cost of this component was US$75.79 million, or 360.9% of appraisal, which was financed by US$22.14 million from the Loan (an increase of 35.9%) and US$53.65 million from the Government (an increase of 751.6%). The reason for the increase was the higher technical standards of the works with respect to the initial design and the inclusion of important urban works in the contracts, not financed by the Loan.
(a)(ii) Bridge and Bypass Construction Component. The final cost of this component was US$29.73 million, or 182.4% of appraisal, which was financed by US$15.49 million from the Loan (an increase of 9.65%) and US$14.24 million from the Government (an increase of 190.6%). The reason for the increase was the higher technical standards of the works, the extension from 8.0 km to 13.2 km of the La Romana
- 16 - by-pass to avoid a semi-urban growing populated area (see Table 5.2), and the inclusion of the reconstruction of 12 bridges destroyed by Hurricane Georges. The Baní bridge, originally included in the Project, was entirely financed by the Government and was completed during the first year of project implementation.
Table 5.2 (US$ million equivalent) Final Cost and Financing Pending Original Total Total Total Counterpart Local % of Contract Cost Loan Counterpart Debt Funds Total Puente Río Dulce y 4.76 13.95 7.35 6.60 0.30 2.03 14.6 Variante La Romana
(a)(iii) Road Reconstruction Component. The final cost of this component was US$33.50 million, or 118.4% of appraisal, which was financed by US$15.67 million from the Loan (a decrease of 7.8%) and US$17.83 million from the Government (an increase of 59.6%). As mentioned before, the reason for the increase was the higher technical standards of the works with respect to the initial design. Two of those roads - C/Pajón-Don Juan-Doña María and Boronga-Boyá-Sabana Grande de Boyá will be completed after the closing date with local funds (see Table 5.3). By contrast, the reconstruction of two roads (Esperanza-Mao, 11 km and San Francisco-Tenares, 13 km), originally included in the Project, was entirely financed by the Government and completed during the first year of project implementation.
Table 5.3 (US$ million equivalent) Final Cost and Financing Pending Original Total Total Total Counterpart Local % of Contracts Cost Loan Counterpart Debt Funds Total C/Pajóm-Don Juan-Doña 7.16 11.04 5.38 5.66 0.28 1.80 16.3 María y C/Rincón El Pino (completed) Boronga-Boya-Sabana 2.89 4.77 2.07 2.70 0.08 0.83 17.4 Grande de Boya SUBTOTAL 10.05 15.81 7.45 8.36 0.36 2.63 16.6
(a)(iv) and (a)(v) Comprehensive Maintenance by Contract Pilot Program including Resurfacing with New Technologies and Routine Maintenance by Contract Pilot Program. These two components were considered together and included in two different types of contracts: (i) three routine maintenance one-year contracts (one for Autopista Duarte and two for the eastern zone); and (ii) three comprehensive maintenance three-year contracts, each one corresponding to a different area in the country (Northwest, Cibao and South). The final aggregate cost of these two components was US$21.72 million, or 98.2% of appraisal, which was financed by US$10.9 million from the Loan and 10.9 million from the Government.
(a)(vi) Informative Signalization Component. The final cost of this component was US$0.43 million, or 43% of appraisal, which was financed by US$0.30 million from the Loan (43% of appraisal) and US$0.13 million from the Government (43% of appraisal). The reason for the decrease was that many of the signals supposed to be financed by the Loan were installed through the new construction and reconstruction works carried out by the Government within and outside the Project.
- 17 - (b) Civil Work Supervision and Technical Auditing. The final cost of this component was US$13.92 million, or 217.96% of appraisal, which was financed by US$5.90 million from the Loan (155.3% of appraisal) and US$8.02 million from the Government (308.5% of appraisal). The reason for the increase was the enlargement of the civil work contracts and the longer period that took its implementation.
(c)Acquisition of goods. The final cost of this component was US$0.25 million, or 20% of appraisal, which was financed by US$0.23 million from the Loan (20.9% of appraisal) and US$0.02 million from the Government (20% of appraisal). The reason for the decrease was that many of the vehicles and office equipment supposed to be financed by the Loan were financed under a parallel loan from IDB.
(d) Institutional Strengthening and Studies. The final cost of this component was US$5.57 million, or 139.3% of appraisal, which was financed by US$4.41 million from the Loan (an increase of 37.8%) and US$1.16 million from the Government (an increase of 45.0%). The reason for the increase was the inclusion in the program of the Road Condition Survey, the financing of the Accident Information System, initially supposed to be financed by the NDF, and the expansion of the scope of other studies.
6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:
Under the political and economic conditions in the Dominican Republic at the project end, sustainability remains uncertain. On one hand, the impact of the Project on the network with the road and bridge new construction, rehabilitation and maintenance, and building of institutional capacity and technical expertise financed by the Loan provide support for sustainability. On the other hand, scarcity of resources, among other things, will make it difficult for the Government, particularly in the current difficult economic and political environment, to guarantee continued budgetary or institutional support to maintain the new and reconstructed infrastructure. In the case of SEOPC, the main problem lies in the lack of both a sustainable financing mechanism for road maintenance and of an effective unit for road maintenance planning and management. The failure to implement a road maintenance fund or similar financial mechanism, even in the more modest version of a Road Maintenance Account, administered by the SEOPC, adds to uncertainty.
However, the funds allocated and spent in maintenance in 2003 roughly met the financing needs, estimated by the Study prepared in 2002 by the Bank's supervision team in about RD$750 million -- US$25 million at the time-- per annum. As a matter of fact, the 2003 SEOPC annual budget, implemented at about 94% at the end of the year, included several road maintenance related activities that, if grouped and put together under a maintenance program, based on the actual needs of the network and managed by a solid management unit, could have met the maintenance objectives. Nevertheless, the resources were allocated and awarded in an ad-hoc manner, lacking a solid maintenance strategy and planning, and an appropriate procurement process. The lack of maintenance planning led to a distribution of resources among maintenance activities that put more emphasis in some maintenance activities (road safety, periodic maintenance) and neglected others (routine maintenance). The lack of a maintenance coordination unit for the maintenance programs implemented by different SEOPC´s directorates led to interference and duplicity that were negative for the implementation of those programs. In summary, the sustainability objective could have been reached with the resources available in 2003 for maintenance with adequate planning and satisfactory management. It is highly unlikely that all these factors will be corrected in the short term, considering the current uncertain political and economic conditions of the DR.
- 18 - The above mentioned Study also identified other sources of financing, the most relevant being revenues generated from toll roads managed by the Government and not transferred to the private sector, which could immediately generate roughly US$12.5 million per annum, about half the maintenance needs. Additional maintenance financing could be generated by maintaining under public sector control some toll booths to be installed in the next two years.
Another important aspect of sustainability is the institutional strengthening. In this area, the Project has helped to take some steps towards developing institutional capacity and improving the SEOPC long term organizational framework. However, the consolidation of institutional gains at the national and local levels achieved under the Project faces an additional challenge in the absence of continued Bank support in the road sector.
In summary, for the above reasons, it is difficult to accurately predict project sustainability in the medium term. If forced now to choose among the possible ratings, we would use the more conservative unlikely rating to characterize project sustainability. However, the elements (professionals, models, sources of funds) are in place to compose a framework for sustainability. The only factor missing for now is the political willingness to put all of them together and make them effective in a more favorable political and economic environment. A new Bank operation could support this target, if the Government is strongly committed to allocate sustainable resources (from toll revenues, for instance) to maintenance and to create a solid and, to a certain extent, autonomous maintenance management unit.
6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:
In the absence of a follow on project, the SEOPC will continue to carry out its maintenance activities for the roads financed by the Loan through its DGMCCV, DGTT and DGSFO Directorates. This minimizes the need for a special transition. However, at least in the short run, there will be no adequate coordination and clear definition of responsibilities among those directorates. On the other hand, the Road Condition Survey of about 2,000 km of the main road network, which was carried out at the end of the Project and the rehabilitation and maintenance program of the roads surveyed that followed should serve as a model for the SEOPC to prepare future maintenance and rehabilitation programs, therefore contributing to the longer term sustainability of the Project, as lack of maintenance planning has been one of the main reasons for the project uncertain sustainability.
Furthermore, collection and management of road tolls has been recently put under the full responsibility of the Banco de Reservas (BDR), a bank owned by the Government. Part of the revenues will be used to repay a long-standing debt of the SEOPC with BDR. An amount not yet determined could be allocated to maintenance. If the proper amounts are allocated in line with maintenance needs, the charges collected from users will contribute to the upkeep of road assets.
Finally, highway concessions to the private sector, already awarded by the SEOPC and some others to be awarded in the future, will also contribute to sustain maintenance activities, but this shift to more private sector involvement, together with the need to improve maintenance management in general, will require a reorganization of the structure and legal framework of the SEOPC, responding to those new responsibilities.
- 19 - 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending:
Bank performance in regard to lending is rated as highly satisfactory. The Project included a concrete and detailed implementation framework and work schedule for the road components, the largest investment component of the Project. The SAR listed road works by number of kilometers and the segments to be rehabilitated or improved. This provided the SEOPC with guidance regarding the specific subprojects to be developed, the prioritization of works, and implementation timing. Project preparation was also devoted to a broad revision of the administrative, environmental, managerial and other aspects of the SEOPC structure and, as a result, the Project included technical assistance to improve the related issues.
The Project also included the framework for an appropriate financing mechanism for sustainable road maintenance. Moreover, the SAR provided adequate direction to an implementation agency with experience in executing Bank projects in the road sector. During project preparation, the SEOPC also had input as to which rehabilitation and construction projects were to be undertaken and was to commit in principle. There was also good coordination with the SEOPC during preparation, resulting in a project that avoided duplication of efforts and fostered collaboration among the Borrower and the Bank. (See also section 3.5).
7.2 Supervision:
Bank supervision is considered to be highly satisfactory. On average, the Bank fielded three supervision missions per year. The earliest supervision missions were combined with the final missions for Loan 3350-DO. An important contribution to the successful supervision was the continuity of the Bank's project task team (the task manager remained the same during the preparation and entire implementation period and had also supervised the previous project), which allowed a positive dialogue with the SEOPC, timely identification of issues and valuable assessment of project progress. It was also critical in guiding the Project during implementation and overcoming early implementation difficulties. In particular, the supervision team demonstrated the ability to balance conflicting priorities within the country, thereby avoiding possible problems. Moreover, the supervision team took an active role assisting in the management of road sector activities and also worked with the implementing unit in SEOPC to address the issues as they emerged. In the last phase of implementation, the Bank team also prepared a Study to analyze compliance with the project objectives and covenants, including recommendations to the SEOPC to implement activities leading to the successful completion of the Project. Without the intensity of Bank supervision, level of staff commitment and its dedication and flexibility in seeking solutions to keep the Project viable and adapting to unforeseen circumstances, the Project performance could have been more problematic.
In addition, the Bank served as an intermediary between the SEOPC and the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency (Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia-STP) to assist in channeling counterpart funds for the Project. To speed up disbursements, the Bank supervision team lowered disbursement limits for direct payment of civil works from US$300,000 to US$50,000 during the last two years of the Project. This change improved the flow of funds to the suppliers as well as the implementation of medium and small-sized contracts. These actions helped to relieve some of the bottlenecks that effectively blocked project implementation time.
- 20 - Bank supervision was also extremely responsive and flexible in adapting the lending program to carry out emergency works due to the effects of Hurricane Georges and was able to adjust the road and bridge components to the urgent reconstruction of some infrastructure severely damaged or destroyed by the hurricane. It also provided valuable advice to the SEOPC concerning the highway concession pilot project and its replacement.
Furthermore, an amendment to the Loan Agreement dated December 5, 2001 made the following modifications: (i) required the preparation of an action plan listing the remaining project activities and timetable for carrying out these activities from the date specified; (b) authorized the extension of the project closing date from December, 31 2001 to December, 31 2002; (iii) required the Borrower to carry out the project in accordance with the Highway Investment and Maintenance Programs, the Institutional Development Program, the Environmental Manual and the Action Plan, with due regard to the Performance Monitoring Indicators; and (iv) required the Borrower to allocate in its annual budgets the minimum counterpart funds necessary for project implementation. In December 2003, the closing date was extended again to October, 31 2003.
7.3 Overall Bank performance:
In general, Bank performance is considered to be highly satisfactory as the lending program was designed to meet the extensive needs in the sector and the supervision team took an active role in implementing the Project. Specifically, the Bank supervision team overcame critical administrative bottlenecks and placed great emphasis on institutional development. Bank supervision was also highly responsive in meeting emergency needs in the sector caused by Hurricane Georges in 1998. However, the Bank could have helped more to complete the development components (civil works), had it granted the fourth extension of the closing date, once it was recognized that three civil works would need about eight additional months to be completed. Disbursement pace was uneven and relatively slow throughout the life of the Project, particularly in its second half, despite the Bank endeavor to facilitate disbursements -- by lowering the threshold for direct disbursements, first from US$300,000 to US$150,000 and then to US$50,000.
Borrower 7.4 Preparation:
Borrower performance during preparation was highly satisfactory. The Government, by way of the SEOPC and the STP, was very active in supporting project preparation. The implementing agency, at the same time, worked closely with the Bank, to identify road reconstruction, improvement and maintenance needs and define the overall project program. Much of the credit must go to the good relationship with the Bank's team, which allowed a productive dialogue and enhanced collaboration between the two sides. One contributing factor was the continuity of the SEOPC's General Project Coordinator and his support team from previous projects.
7.5 Government implementation performance:
Government implementation performance is rated as unsatisfactory. Although relatively outside its control, the Government could have taken a more proactive and conciliatory stance to solve the political impasse in Congress and expedite project approval. More critically, despite its professed commitment to the Project, the Government did not take sufficient interest in ensuring that the effectiveness conditions of the Loan would be met on a timely manner. There were extensive difficulties in providing counterpart funds. The Government did not take the necessary steps to ensure that counterpart funds would be available when needed. Furthermore, the often continued expansion of the scope of civil works, through adjustments to
- 21 - contracts, caused some of those contracts to be only partly completed at the closing date. Cumbersome internal procedures to complete the payment process to contractors and consultants were also a reason for delays. These procedures were only simplified at the end of the Project. In addition, there were a number of critical delays in preparing the framework of the maintenance fund, which precluded its consideration by the Congress during the implementation period.
Finally, the Government was unable or unwilling to put an end to the interference and lack of coordination of programs and projects among institutions outside the SEOPC (the OAOE) and between units inside the SEOPC (DGTT, DGSFO and DGM, and the PCT), particularly concerning the highway concession pilot and maintenance activities by contract, which negatively affected project implementation, particularly at some of its stages.
On the other hand, the Government provided enough support to the project coordination team and ensured continuity of its staff – a critical factor to maintain and improve the project implementation pace.
7.6 Implementing Agency:
The implementing agency (SEOPC) is rated as marginally satisfactory. At the start, the SEOPC showed great commitment to the Project and most of the institutional components were initiated and several of them completed (environment, transport plan, financial management) during the first half of implementation. Likewise, most of the civil work contracts were awarded and started in that period. However, starting in 2000, when the ambitious program of road capacity expansion began and the scope of many of the project components was enlarged, the SEOPC support to some project components started to decline, particularly concerning the sufficient allocation of counterpart resources. Furthermore, there was no strict and close supervision by the SEOPC of work contracts to comply with the agreed timetable. The SEOPC did not follow up the lessons learned from the Comprehensive Maintenance Program by Contract to prepare a similar program for the following years nor did it make progress towards establishing a credible program of outsourcing routine maintenance activities after the Project. Likewise, the SEOPC did not make worthy efforts to promote and get approved the Road Fund or a similar financial mechanism for maintenance. On the other hand, the commitment of the PCT, which was kept without substantial changes, remained strong throughout the project life.
7.7 Overall Borrower performance:
In general, borrower performance is rated as marginally satisfactory.
8. Lessons Learned 8.1. Operational
Delays in effectiveness and possible consequences: One negative element in the implementation of this operation in particular, and in all projects with external financing in the Dominican Republic, is the delay in the date of project effectiveness, due to the extremely slow process in Congress to ratify the loan agreements. In the case of this Project it took almost ten months from the date of signature. These delays take a particular toll in projects that entail major rehabilitation and maintenance programs, because as time passes, the roads continue to deteriorate and the work initially planned is not longer adequate. This leads to higher costs and lower returns on investments. The lesson learned is that either the Borrower streamlines its ratification process or future projects should take into account the average delay in effectiveness in the
- 22 - design of the rehabilitation and maintenance works. A positive step in the right direction has been the agreement reached with the Bank, during the last Country Portfolio Performance Review, to establish a closer link between the Executive (via the STP) and Congress, to sensitize the latter on the objectives of externally-funded projects, as well as on the need to guarantee their prompt implementation.
Changes in the scope of project components: If despite the provision to accelerate project effectiveness and to use conservative criteria for engineering design, some project components require modifications that by far cannot be financed by the loan, those changes should be carefully considered before authorizing them under the project, even if the past experience in the country, concerning payment with local funds of the modifications, is positive (as in this case). An option to consider should be restructuring the project programs to accommodate the changes to the project resources.
Routine Maintenance Contracts: With respect to Routine Maintenance by Contract, the lesson of the Project is that big and medium size contractors are not interested in routine maintenance contracts. Therefore, this type of contracts should be tailored to smaller contractors, which should show greater interest and effectiveness in executing them, with short lengths of the road network and contract periods (so that contracts would be smaller than US$250,000 and awarded based on price quotations).
8.2 Legal
Counterpart Funds: Lack of counterpart funds is an endemic problem in the DR and many other countries. However, in none of the previous projects financed by the Bank in the DR the problem was so acute as in this operation. It was exacerbated by the changes to the contracts explained above, and finally by the deterioration of the economic and fiscal conditions of the country in the last period of project implementation. As the deficit in counterpart funding accumulated, the problem became increasingly difficult, contributing to implementation delays. To prevent this, in addition to the clauses usually included in other agreements, this Loan Agreement included a clause requesting the Government to open and maintain an account in a bank acceptable to the Bank to deposit the counterpart funds with an initial deposit of the equivalent in Dominican Pesos to US$1,500,000. The Government initially complied with this condition, but later on the balance was never kept in compliance, particularly when the economic conditions deteriorated. Future projects should take into account the experience with this Project in order to ensure that counterpart funds will be available when needed, adjusting the paripassu to the level that the country can afford, even if this mean to reduce the scope of the project. Likewise legal provisions should be established to automatically suspend disbursements when the lag in counterpart funding reaches a predetermined level.
Maintenance Financing and Management: Lessons here are that compliance with covenants that requires approval of Congress or similar institutions is difficult to achieve and should be replaced by covenants more modest in scope, but easier to comply with and/or specific conditions for appraisal. In this sense, future road projects in the DR should focus in financing mechanisms not requiring congressional approval, initially funded by the project, and require, at the same time, the establishment of a solid maintenance management unit and the implementation of appropriate maintenance planning in the way initiated with the road condition survey contract, implemented in the last months of the Project.
Adequate Coordination among the Institutions involved in Project Implementation: The discrepancy on the initial pilot highway concession project between the SEOPC (favorable to the concession) and the OSOE and some presidential advisors (opposed to the concession) led to the cancellation of the concession contract after its awarding and signature and even its approval by Congress. Likewise, lack of coordination among some departments of the SEOPC, mainly concerning periodic maintenance and road
- 23 - safety activities by contract, led to duplicities that required some changes in the programs contracted out under the comprehensive maintenance program financed by the Loan.
To avoid these problems, the projects should clearly establish the responsibilities, concerning project implementation, of the different institutions of the Government and the departments inside the implementing agency (as in this Project) including provisions in the loan agreements to remedy possible noncompliance with the agreed responsibilities, particularly if it negatively affects project implementation. In the most serious cases, noncompliance could lead to the cancellation of the part of the Loan financing the components affected by interference and duplicities.
8.3 Institutional
Maintaining Continuity in the Implementation Team: Throughout most of the project implementation period, the composition of the Bank supervision team remained relatively unchanged, with the same task manager during the entire life of the Project, from preparation to closing, despite a number of reorganizations within the Bank. Maintaining continuity was an important factor in enabling the Bank to build relationships with the Borrower over the long-term. Both parties pursued the same objectives and discussed the project goals, problems and changes with flexibility and willingness to examine workable alternatives. This allowed for the comprehensive identification of Borrower needs as well as the resolution of implementation difficulties. Stability during supervision was also instrumental in designing and implementing technical assistance activities to strengthen institutional capacity at the national level. Finally, maintaining continuity permitted the Bank to properly identify and prepare a fast response to the damage caused to the road infrastructure by Hurricane Georges in 1998. One contributing factor was the continuity, not only of the Bank's task manager, but of the SEOPC´s General Coordinator and his supporting team (the PCT).
9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency:
Main comments given by the implementing agency, SEOPC, are presented below. A more detailed discussion is included in the Borrower's Project Completion Report (Annex 8).
Achievement of Project Objectives The Borrower considers that the Project as a whole had a positive impact regarding mainly the development objective, which was satisfactorily reached. Concerning the sustainability objective, the Borrower considers that the results were mixed, with some related activities fully accomplished, but with the failure in implementing the Road Fund and Agency.
Performance of the Government and Implementing Agencies The Borrower considers that in general the SEOPC performed well. However, they acknowledged that some of the project implementation delays could have been avoided streamlining bureaucratic procedures (i.e, evaluation of proposals, negotiation and signing of contracts, internal process for payments to contractors and consultants, etc.) and ensuring an adequate flow of project funds and availability of counterpart funds.
- 24 - Bank Performance The Borrower's report expresses great satisfaction with Bank performance during project preparation and supervision. They appreciated the guidance given during project implementation and highlighted the flexibility and willingness of the Bank team to discuss workable alternatives to the implementation problems and to find solutions to solve them.
(b) Cofinanciers:
N/A
(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):
N/A
10. Additional Information
- 25 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix
Outcome / Impact Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate Road Condition (See *Table 1 below) Road Condition (See Table A1.1 below) Road Condition (See Table A1.1 below)
Progress on routine maintenance by contract 80 95 (2003)
Planned, allocated and spent resources for 100 94 (2003) maintenance
Funds committed (%) 98 100
Funds disbursed (%) 90 100
Infrastructure rehabilitated / reconstructed to Most physical work targets had been met by Works targets met, although three works will improved hazard-resistant standards October 2003, and infrastructure was be completed after the loan closing date rehabilitated utilizing improved standards.
Congestion in key sections reduced Average speed increased to 75 km/h and Average speed increased to 75 km/h and above, except in the three roads not yet above in the roads improved. completed Safety improved in the roads financed NA NA
Vehicle operation costs (VOC) reduced NA VOC reduced, as an average, from 0.33 to 0.22 US$
Technical capacity and knowledge in Studies and technical assistance related to Studies and technical assistance related to financial management and environmental financial management and environmental financial management and environmental assessment assessments completed by the project assessments completed by the project mid-term. Environmental Manual prepared mid-term. Environmental Manual prepared and implemented and implemented
Highway Maintenance management included Technical assistance completed. Road Road Survey and the preparation of a survey in progress at the end of the Project Maintenance and Rehabilitation Program in 2,000 km of the main network completed
Average Annual Daily Traffic NA (See *Table A1.3 below)
- 26 - *Table A1.1 Condition of the Road Network (1995-2001-2003) 1995 2001 2003 (SAR) Actual Paved Network 3831 100% 4240 4240 Good Condition 3110 81% 4240 100% 4028 95% Poor Condition 721 19% 0 0% 212 5%
Total Network 5053 100% 5167 5167 Good Condition 3477 69% 4607 89% 4289 83% Poor Condition 1576 31% 560 11% 878 17%
*Table A1.2 Average Annual Daily Traffic 2001 2001 Actual Road Section 2001 Ex-ante Ex-post Actual 2001 2003 Estimate Estimate per Estimate Santiago-Navarrete 11,825 17,580 1.5 22,757 Ampliación Avenida las Américas N.A. 40,000 47,330 San Pedro de Macorís Bypass 12,127 14,180 1.2 14,180 La Romana Bypass 5,359 8,700 1.6 8,700 C/Pajón - Don Juan - Doña Maria 619 929 1.5 929 Romana-C/Pintao 2,474 3,607 1.5 1,692 C/Pintao-Higuey 541 1,909 3.5 2,051 Boronga-Boya-Sabana Grande de Boya 510 836 1.6 333 Acceso a Refineria – Refinería 5,679 5,678 1.0 5,890 Rincón - El Pino 4,221 4,220 1.0 2,095 Otra Banda – Bavaro N.A. 2,761 3,793 Average 1.6
- 27 - Output Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate (a) Highway Widening (Four Divided Lanes, 23.5 km widened (Santiago-Navarrete, 17.80 23.5 km widened (Santiago-Navarrete, 17.80 28.3 km) km and Avenida Las Americas 5.7 km) with km and Avenida Las Americas 5.7 km). two marginal roads of two lanes each. Section Boca Chica-San Pedro de Macoris (Autovia del Este), 37 km, widened with local funds.
(b) Bridge (3) and Highway By-pass 13 new bridges (1 over the Dulce River -not 13 new bridges (1 over the Dulce River -not Construction (2) yet completed and 12 replacing the ones yet completed and 12 replacing the ones destroyed by Hurricane Georges), 1 bridge destroyed by Hurricane Georges), 1 bridge rehabilitated (over the Higuamo River) and 2 rehabilitated (over the Higuamo River) and 2 by-passes, San Pedro de Macoris and La by-passes, San Pedro de Macoris, Romana) completed, and La Romana, being completed with local funds.
(c) Highway Rehabilitation (169 km) 124.50 km of roads reconstructed at higher 123.95 km of roads reconstructed at higher standards than planned and 28.50 km under standards than planned (out of which 37.20 construction km are being completed with local funds). Additional 24 km reconstructed by the Government only with local funds
(d) Pilot three-year Program of Pilot Program completed in 638.50 km of Pilot Program completed in 630.50 km of Comprehensive Maintenance by Contract comprehensive maintenance and 28 km comprehensive maintenance and 20 km including Highway Resurfacing Using New additional of resurfacing with new additional of resurfacing with new Technologies (628 km) technologies) technologies) e) Pilot four-year Program of Routine Pilot Program completed in 370 km. Pilot Program completed in 370 km. Maintenance by Contract (640 km) Additional routine maintenance in 638.50 km Additional routine maintenance in 630.50 km was carried out under the comprehensive was carried out under the comprehensive maintenance program above maintenance program above
(f) Road Signalization by Contract Completed Completed. In addition, all civil works above included signalization
(g) Supervision and Technical Auditing of Completed. Exceeded the amount in the Completed. Civil Works Applied to Components (a), (b) loan, due to the extension of the contracts. and (c) The excess was financed with local funds.
(h) Vehicles, Spare Parts and Office Only some vehicles and office equipment Only some vehicles and office equipment Equipment were acquired under the loan were acquired under the Loan. Other vehicles were purchased under an IDB loan
(i) Institutional Strengthening and Studies Consulting services completed including a Consulting services completed, including the Road Survey to prepare a Rehabilitation an Road Survey and the preparation of a Maintenance Program in 2,000 km. This was Maintenance and Rehabilitation Program in underway at the end of the Project. 2,000 km of the main network.
1 End of project
- 28 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing
Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Component US$ million US$ million Civil Works 21.00 75.79 360.9 (a) Highway Widening (Four Divided Lanes, 28.3 km)
(b) Bridge (3) and Highway By-pass Construction (2) 16.30 29.73 182.39
(c) Highway Rehabilitation (169 km) 28.30 33.50 118.37
(d) Pilot three-year Program of Comprehensive 16.80 20.20 120.4 Maintenance by Contract including Highway Resurfacing Using New Technologies (628 km) e) Pilot four-year Program of Routine Maintenance by 5.40 1.52 28.2 Contract (640 km)
(f) Road Signalization by Contract 1.00 0.43 42.85
Civil Work Supervision 6.40 13.92 217.96 (g) Supervision and Technical Auditing of Civil Works Applied to Components (a), (b) and (c)
Goods 1.20 0.25 20 (h) Vehicles, Spare Parts and Office Equipment
Consulting Services 4.00 5.57 139.3 (i) Institutional Strengthening and Studies (ii) Nordic Fund Financing 2.80 0.00 0 Total Baseline Cost 103.20 180.91 Physical Contingencies 8.30 Price Contingencies 11.00 Total Project Costs 122.50 180.91 Total Financing Required 122.50 180.91
- 29 - Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost NCB Other 1. Works 80.10 24.70 8.80 0.00 113.60 (52.80) (12.30) (5.10) (0.00) (70.20) 2. Goods 0.80 0.00 0.60 0.00 1.40 (0.70) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00) (1.20) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 4.50 3.00 7.50 (0.00) (0.00) (3.60) (0.00) (3.60) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 80.90 24.70 13.90 3.00 122.50 (53.50) (12.30) (9.20) (0.00) (75.00)
Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost NCB Other 1. Works 165.32 1.12 8.65 0.00 175.09 (64.85) (0.56) (4.95) (0.00) (70.36) 2. Goods 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.25 (0.00) (0.08) (0.15) (0.00) (0.23) 3. Services 1.99 0.00 3.58 0.00 5.57 (1.59) (0.00) (2.82) (0.00) (4.41) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 167.31 1.21 12.39 0.00 180.91 (66.44) (0.64) (7.92) (0.00) (75.00)
1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.
- 30 - Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. (a) Highway Widening 14.70 6.30 22.14 53.65 150.6 851.6 (Four Divided Lanes, 28.3 km)
(b) Bridge (3) and Highway 11.40 4.90 15.49 14.24 135.9 290.6 By-pass Construction (2)
(c) Highway Rehabilitation 17.00 11.30 15.67 17.83 92.2 157.8 (169 km)
(d) Pilot three-year 8.40 8.40 10.10 10.10 120.2 120.2 Program of Comprehensive Maintenance by Contract including Highway Resurfacing Using New Technologies (628 km) e) Pilot four-year Program 2.70 2.70 0.76 0.76 28.1 28.1 of Routine Maintenance by Contract by Contract (640 km)
(f) Road Signalization by 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.13 42.9 43.3 Contract
(g) Supervision and 3.80 2.60 5.90 8.02 155.3 308.5 Technical Auditing of Civil Works Applied to Components (a), (b) and (c)
(h) Vehicles, Spare Parts 1.10 0.10 0.23 0.02 20.9 20.0 and Office Equipment
(i) Institutional 3.20 0.80 4.41 1.16 137.8 145.0 Strengthening and Studies (j) Unallocated 12.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0
- 31 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits The ex-ante economic evaluation was done using the Highway Design and Maintenance Standards Model (HDM-III) that evaluated the road widening, bypass construction and the highway reconstruction and resurfacing programs, which yielded a Net Present Value (NPV) of US$99.3 million and an overall Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 24.5 percent. The ex-post economic evaluation was done using the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4), which is the new version of the HDM-III model, for the road projects implemented under the project. Some projects planned at appraisal (Santo Domingo – San Isidro and Bajos de Haina – Refinería widening, Baní access, and Esperanza – Mao, San Francisco – Tenares and Boya – Dona Maria reconstructions) were not implemented under the project; therefore, were not submitted to an ex-post evaluation. During project implementation, the scope of most of the works changed from necessary surface distress repair to full rehabilitation and reconstruction, due to higher-than-estimated traffic growth on the main roads and faster than expected road deterioration. The ex-post HDM-4 evaluation considered: (i) actual costs; (ii) actual traffic; (iii) actual timing and duration of road works; and (iv) 20 years evaluation period and 12 percent discount rate.
Road Works
The ex-post study evaluated eleven projects, comprising 203.3 km, which required an investment of US$ 132.10 million, representing 85% of the project costs for civil works of new construction, widening, bridges, reconstruction and maintenance of highways. Table A3.1 below presents the road works evaluated at the ex-post study.
Table A3.1 Road Works Evaluated at the Ex-Post Study Existing Road Bypass Road Road Road Traffic Road Traffic Section Road Section Length Roughness Width 2001 Length 2001 Number (km) (IRI) (m) (AADT) (km) (vpd) 1 Santiago-Navarrete 17.8 3.5 7.0 17,580 2 Ampliación Avenida las Américas 5.7 4.5 14.0 60,000 3 San Pedro de Macorís Bypass 18.0 2.5 15.0 14,180 12.3 8,508 4 La Romana Bypass 17.4 3.0 7.0 8,700 13.2 5,220 5 C/Pajón - Don Juan - Doña María 28.4 7.0 7.0 929 6 Romana-C/Pintao 35.7 4.9 7.3 3,607 7 C/Pintao-Higuey 28.8 5.9 6.6 1,909 8 Boronga-Boyá-Sabana Grande de Boyá 17.2 8.3 6.0 836 9 Acceso a Refinería - Refinería 3.9 4.5 4.2 5,678 10 Rincón - El Pino 10.4 5.4 6.0 4,220 11 Otra Banda - Bávaro 20.0 3.5 8.5 2,761 Total 203.3
- 32 - All widening, bypass and reconstruction projects were evaluated, as well as a sample periodic maintenance project (Otra Banda – Bavaro). Table A3.2 below shows the investment costs, in 2001 US Dollars.
Table A3.2 Road Works Evaluated at the Ex-Post Study Project Project Section Road Section Road Work Investment Investment Number (US$ M) (000US$/km) 1 Santiago-Navarrete Widening 2 to 4 lanes 41.88 2,353 2 Ampliación Avenida las Américas Widening 4 to 8 lanes 33.91 5,928 3 San Pedro de Macorís Bypass Bypass and Bridges 9.08 738 4 La Romana Bypass Bypass and Bridges 13.13 995 5 C/Pajón - Don Juan - Doña María Reconstruction 50/250/250 9.11 321 6 Romana-C/Pintao Reconstruction 50/200 9.46 265 7 C/Pintao-Higuey Reconstruction 114/200 6.52 226 8 Boronga-Boyá-Sabana Grande de Boyá Reconstruction 50/250/250 5.74 334 9 Acceso a Refinería - Refinería Reconstruction 100/350/300 0.88 226 10 Rincón - El Pino Reconstruction 75/250/250 1.79 172 11 Otra Banda - Bávaro Overlay 50 mm 0.60 30 Total 132.10 650 Reconstruction Thickness, mm: AC Surface/Base/Subbase Costs in 2001 US Dollars
The investments represent actual expenditures on each project. Table A3.3 presents the resulting average unit road works costs for different work types. On the ex-ante evaluation, the estimated average reconstruction unit costs was 242,500 US$ per km, expressed in 2001 US Dollars, which indicates that the actual reconstruction costs are 6 percent higher than the average costs assumed on the ex-ante evaluation.
Table A3.3 Average Actual Unit Road Works Number Cost Cost Work Class Predominant Work Activity Projects (US$/km) (US$/m2) Periodic Maintenance Overlay 50 mm 1 30,000 4.3 Reconstruction Reconstruction Asphalt Concrete 6 257,271 36.8 Bypass Bypass and Bridges 2 866,454 N.A. Costs in 2001 US Dollars
- 33 - Table A3.4 below presents the estimated at appraisal, contract and actual costs, per km, expressed in 2001 US Dollars, and the ratios between the actual per estimated costs and between the actual per contract costs. The average actual per estimated ratio is 1.3 indicating that the actual costs, on average, increased in real terms around 30 percent above the estimated costs. The average actual per contract ratio is 1.8 indicating that the actual costs, on average, increased in real terms around 80 percent above the contract costs.
Table A3.4 Estimated, Contract and Actual Unit Cost for Road Works Estimated Contract Actual Actual Actual Road Section Cost Cost Cost per per (M US$/km) (M US$/km) (M US$/km) Estimated Contract Santiago-Navarrete 0.885 0.670 2.353 2.7 3.5 Ampliación Avenida las Américas N.A. 3.600 5.928 1.6 San Pedro de Macorís Bypass 0.782 0.370 0.738 0.9 2.0 La Romana Bypass 0.791 0.460 0.995 1.3 2.2 C/Pajón - Don Juan - Doña María 0.326 0.360 0.321 1.0 0.9 Romana-C/Pintao 0.140 0.120 0.265 1.9 2.2 C/Pintao-Higuey 0.171 0.140 0.226 1.3 1.6 Boronga-Boyá-Sabana Grande de Boyá 0.223 0.090 0.334 1.5 3.7 Acceso a Refinería - Refinería 0.377 0.220 0.226 0.6 1.0 Rincón - El Pino 0.217 0.360 0.172 0.8 0.5 Otra Banda - Bávaro N.A. 0.040 0.030 0.8 Average 1.3 1.8
Table A3.5 below presents the ratio of actual execution time per expected execution time when the contract was signed, showing that all projects exceeded the expected execution time. The average ratio is 2.30 indicating that, on average, road works to be completed took around two times the expected time. At the signature of the contracts, it was expected that the works would be done, on average, in around 17 months but the average actual execution time was 39 months.
Table A3.5 Actual and Contract Execution Time Contract Actual Actual Road Section Time Time per (months) (months) Contract Santiago-Navarrete 24 30 1.3 Ampliación Avenida las Américas 20 55 2.8 San Pedro de Macorís Bypass 24 36 1.5 La Romana Bypass 18 43 2.4 C/Pajón - Don Juan - Doña María 18 64 3.6 Romana-C/Pintao 18 60 3.3 C/Pintao-Higuey 14 21 1.5 Boronga-Boyá-Sabana Grande de Boyá 18 62 3.4 Acceso a Refinería - Refinería 6 19 3.2 Rincón - El Pino 18 30 1.7 Otra Banda - Bávaro 6 6 1.0 Average 17 39 2.3
- 34 - Originally the scope of works planned for each road were designed to provide a minimum desired level of service, but during the execution of the road works, it was determined that there were enough project resources to perform works that would increase the level of service of each road. Therefore, the changes on the scope of works partially explain the cost increases and the increase on the execution times.
Traffic
Table A3.6 below presents, for each road section, the estimate of the actual annual average daily traffic (AADT) in 2001 and the vehicle composition. These estimates are based on traffic counts and engineering inferences. The average daily traffic is 10,945 AADT, varying from around 800 to 60,000 AADT. The study found that the average vehicle fleet composition is a) 29% cars, b) 37% pickups, c) 1% buses, d) 9% light trucks, e) 10% medium trucks, f) 7% heavy trucks, and g) 5% articulated trucks.
Table A3.6 Average Annual Daily Traffic Composition in 2001 Road Section Total Light Medium Heavy Articulated Traffic Cars Pickups Bus Truck Truck Truck Truck (AADT) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Santiago-Navarrete 17,580 32% 32% 2% 9% 12% 8% 5%
Ampliación Avenida las Américas 60,000 43% 32% 0% 8% 4% 3% 3%
San Pedro de Macorís Bypass 14,180 31% 31% 2% 13% 15% 3% 6%
La Romana Bypass 8,700 31% 31% 2% 13% 15% 3% 6%
C/Pajón - Don Juan - Doña María 929 11% 41% 0% 4% 18% 21% 4%
Romana-C/Pintao 3,607 28% 36% 1% 12% 13% 3% 7%
C/Pintao-Higuey 1,909 35% 24% 2% 8% 12% 6% 13%
Boronga-Boyá-Sabana Grande de 836 22% 66% 1% 3% 6% 2% 1% Boyá Acceso a Refinería - Refinería 5,678 35% 31% 0% 10% 4% 15% 6%
Rincón - El Pino 4,220 47% 30% 1% 6% 3% 11% 2%
Otra Banda - Bávaro 2,761 10% 52% 5% 13% 12% 3% 5%
Average 10,945 29% 37% 1% 9% 10% 7% 5%
- 35 - Tables A3.7 and A3.8 below presents a comparison between the estimated actual daily traffic in 2001 and the ex-ante estimates, which shows that on average the actual traffic is 60 percent higher than the appraisal estimates.
Table A3.7 Average Annual Daily Traffic in 2001 2001 2001 Actual Road Section Ex-ante Ex-post per Estimate Actual Estimate Santiago-Navarrete 11,825 17,580 1.5 Ampliación Avenida las Américas N.A. 60,000 San Pedro de Macorís Bypass 12,127 14,180 1.2 La Romana Bypass 5,359 8,700 1.6 C/Pajón - Don Juan - Doña María 619 929 1.5 Romana-C/Pintao 2,474 3,607 1.5 C/Pintao-Higuey 541 1,909 3.5 Boronga-Boyá-Sabana Grande de Boyá 510 836 1.6 Acceso a Refinería - Refinería 5,679 5,678 1.0 Rincón - El Pino 4,221 4,220 1.0 Otra Banda - Bávaro N.A. 2,761 Average 1.6
Table A3.8 Estimated Average Annual Daily Traffic on Bypasses Actual Road Section Ex-ante Ex-post per Estimate Actual Estimate San Pedro de Macorís Bypass 3,595 8,508 2.4 La Romana Bypass 2,154 5,220 2.4 Average 2.4
Economic Evaluation
The HDM-4 Model estimated the net benefits of each project in terms of reduction of vehicle operating costs, passenger time costs and road maintenance expenditures, which occurs after periodic maintenance or rehabilitation works. The following table presents ex-ante and ex–post economic evaluations results, presenting for each project, the Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and the corresponding ratios of the ex-post results per ex-ante results.
Table A3.9 shows that, with the exception of the Boronga-Boya-Sabana Grande de Boya section, all projects are economically justified, under the ex-ante or ex-post scenarios, with rates of return higher than 12 percent. The Boronga-Boya-Sabana Grande de Boya section has an ex-post economic rate of return of 7 percent, due to the high actual project costs and low traffic. For the eleven projects, the overall ex-post IRR is 22.3 percent corresponding to a total NPV of US$ 81.94 million.
- 36 - Table A3.9 Economic Evaluation Results Internal Rate of Return (%) Net Present Value (Million US$) Ex-ante Ex-post Ex-post Ex-ante Ex-post Ex-post Road Section Evaluation Evaluation Ratio Evaluation Evaluation Ratio Santiago-Navarrete 9.73 7.24 0.74 18.6% 15.5% 0.83 Ampliación Avenida Las Américas N.A. 24.12 N.A. 26.4% San Pedro de Macorís Bypass 1.92 21.67 11.30 15.5% 39.9% 2.57 La Romana Bypass 3.13 3.32 1.06 20.1% 16.4% 0.82 C/Pajón - Don Juan - Doña María 1.70 1.54 0.91 17.1% 14.9% 0.87 Romana - C/Pintao 13.22 11.64 0.88 37.8% 33.5% 0.89 C/Pintao - Higuey 1.13 3.33 2.95 16.1% 23.3% 1.45 Boronga-Boya-Sabana Grande de Boya 3.84 -1.42 -0.37 15.6% 6.7% 0.43 Acceso a Refineria - Refineria 0.57 3.51 6.22 82.4% 64.2% 0.78 Rincon - El Pino 7.01 5.11 0.73 46.0% 52.0% 1.13 Otra Banda - Bavaro N.A. 1.87 N.A. 44.5% Average 2.71 1.09 Total 81.94 22.3%
- 37 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 02/1996 5 TASK MANAGER/HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); ENVIRONMENTAL SPEC. (1); PROCUREMENT SPEC. (1); SPEC IN ECONOMIC ANALISIS (1); HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1)
06/1997 1 TASK MANAGER/HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1)
09/1997 5 TASK MANAGER/HIGHWAY ENGINEER (2); ECOLOGIST (1); TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); SPEC. IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1)
Appraisal/Negotiation 10/1996 5 TASK MANAGER/HIGHWAY ENGINEER (3); ENVIRONMENTAL SPEC. (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1) Supervision
04/11/1997 1 TASK MANAGER (1) S S
09/04/1997 1 TASK MANAGER (1) S U
12/11/1997 2 TASK MANAGER (1); S S PROCUREMENT ASSISTANT (1)
03/28/1998 1 TASK MANAGER (1) S S
04/30/1998 1 TASK MANAGER (1) S S
09/27/1998 1 TASK MANAGER (1) S S
05/14/1999 1 SR. HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1) S S
05/14/1999 1 SR. HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1) S S
12/09/1999 1 SR. HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1) S S
- 38 - 03/16/2000 1 SR. HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1) S S
08/28/2000 1 LEAD HIGHWAY ENGINEER U S (1)
02/15/2001 3 LEAD HWY ENGINEER (1); U S SR. TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); FINANCIAL MGMT OFFICER (1)
05/31/2001 1 TTL & HIGHWAY ENGINEER S S (1)
10/05/2001 2 LEAD HWY ENGINEER (1); S S SR. TRANSP. ECONOMIST (1)
10/05/2001 1 LEAD HWY ENGINEER (1) S S
01/25/2002 3 TTL HIGHWAY ENGINEER S S (1); TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); HDM SPECIALIST (1)
02/14/2003 1 HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1) S S
06/11/2003 1 HWY ENGINEER (1) S U
ICR 02/10/2003 1 CONSULTANT (1) S S
(b) Staff:
Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 57.90 164.60 Appraisal/Negotiation 17.70 47.70 Supervision 79.80 284.36 ICR 3.5 11.44 Total 158.9 508.1
- 39 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA
Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA
- 40 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)
6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU
6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU
- 41 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 1. Informe final, asistencia técnica a la SEOPC para el estudio informativo de la ampliación carretera Santo Domingo – Baní (Auding, S.A. Marzo /1998).
2. Documento base de la licitación publica internacional 03-98, para la ampliación de la Autopista las Américas desde el Puente Juan Carlos hasta la rotonda de Boca Chica y Conversión en autopista de la nueva ruta de Santo Domingo a San Cristobal (Proyecto Piloto de Concesión Vial) (Auding, S.A., Abril /1998).
3. Informe final, consultoría para elaboración de un plan de inversiones del sector transporte en la República Dominicana (Inocsa, S.A., Junio /1998).
4. Manual ambiental para el diseño y construcción de proyectos viales, segunda edición (revisión del año 1999, realizada por la consultora Inarsa & Tecnoamérica, a la primera edición de dicho manual preparada por los consultores Hernán Aristazábal G. y Constanza Moreno C.).
5. Informe final, consultoría de implementación de un sistema administrativo y estructural para la gestión financiera de la SEOPC (Horwath Consulting, Mayo/2000).
6. Informe final, auditoria técnica de ingeniería del Proyecto de Carreteras Nacionales, Préstamo BIRF 4127-DO (Typsa – Mendar, Noviembre/2000).
7. Informe final, consultoría para el fortalecimiento del Departamento de Protección de la Corteza Terrestre de la SEOPC en la gestión ambiental de proyectos viales (Inarsa & Tecnoamérica, Diciembre/2000).
8. Informe final, asistencia técnica a la SEOPC en el desarrollo del plan director de drenaje pluvial y saneamiento de aguas de la ciudad de Santo Domingo (Auding – Watson – Isco, Junio /2001).
9. Informe sobre procedimientos de adquisición de terrenos y propiedades, del Proyecto de Carreteras Nacionales (Préstamo BIRF 4127-DO) (especialista ambiental del equipo de apoyo al coordinador, Octubre /2001).
10. Informe sobre la ejecución del Programa de Desarrollo Institucional (PDI) (SEOPC, Marzo /2002).
11. Estudio del cumplimiento de objetivos y perspectivas del Proyecto de Carreteras Nacionales, Préstamo BIRF 4127-DO (Banco Mundial, Febrero /2003).
12. Informe final, programa piloto de mantenimiento integral de carreteras por contrato (Aunding – Transvialsa, Mayo /2003).
13. Informe final, consultoría implementación sistema de estadísticas y análisis de accidentes de transito en la República Dominicana (Sercitec – Inocsa, Octubre /2003).
14. Informe final, consultoría asistencia técnica en el relevamiento del estado de la red principal de carreteras de la República Dominicana y del tránsito de la misma (Auding – Transvialsa, octubre /2003).
- 42 - 15. Programa de rehabilitación y mantenimiento de 2,000.00 Km de carreteras principales de la República Dominicana. (Auding – Transvialsa, octubre /2003).
- 43 - Additional Annex 8. Borrower's Project Completion Report ([Informe de Cierre del Proyecto)
1. PERIODO DE EJECUCION DEL PROYECTO
El Acuerdo de Préstamo BIRF 4127-DO, correspondiente al Proyecto de Carreteras Nacionales, fue firmado entre el Gobierno Dominicano y el Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento (BIRF) en fecha 17 de enero de 1997, entrando en vigencia a partir del 10 de noviembre de 1997. Se contempló inicialmente desarrollar la ejecución del Proyecto en el período 1997-2001, teniendo como fecha de cierre el 31 de diciembre del 2001. En el mes de diciembre del 2001, el BIRF concedió una extensión de este plazo de vencimiento del Préstamo por un (1) año adicional, es decir hasta el 31 de diciembre del año 2002. Ha sido necesaria una segunda extensión de la fecha de vencimiento del Préstamo, por diez (10) meses adicionales, esto es hasta el 31 de octubre del año 2003. Estas extensiones de la fecha de cierre del Préstamo, se han debido principalmente a retrasos en la terminación de los trabajos de las componentes de obras civiles.
2. OBJETIVOS Y COMPONENTES DEL PROYECTO
El proyecto de Carreteras Nacionales tiene dos (2) objetivos generales (igualmente importantes) :
Primer Objetivo: “Aumentar la contribución del Sector de Transporte al desarrollo de las principales fuentes de crecimiento económico y brindar un mayor acceso a los mercados”
Segundo Objetivo: “Consolidar los Avances logrados en materia de capacidad institucional con respecto a la SEOPC con el Préstamo 3350-DO para mantener la red de carreteras en condiciones estables sin el respaldo de los donantes, y adoptar las nuevas prácticas y políticas estipuladas conforme a dicho préstamo”.
De conformidad con el Acuerdo de Préstamo, el Proyecto consistía en los siguientes componentes, sujetos a posibles modificaciones tanto por parte de la SEOPC como del Banco, por mutuo acuerdo, con tal de alcanzar los objetivos anteriormente indicados:
a. Obras Civiles:
a.1: Ampliación de algunos tramos ya existentes de carreteras a cuatro carriles separados (28.30 KMS. en total).
a.2: Construcción de Puentes (564.00 M.L.) y Carreteras de circunvalación (24.00 KM).
a.3: Reconstrucción de 169.00 KMS. de la red de carreteras.
a.4: Programa de Revestimiento Asfáltico de 628.00 KMS. de carreteras, utilizando nuevas tecnologías adoptadas con el Préstamo 3350-DO.
a.5: Programa Piloto de Mantenimiento Rutinario por Contrato en 640.00 KMS. de carreteras.
a.6: Contratación de un Programa de Señalización de Carreteras (Señales Informativas).
- 44 - b. Supervisión y Auditoría Técnica de las Obras Civiles de ampliación, Reconstrucción y Rehabilitación de Carreteras y Construcción de Puentes, financiados en el marco del Proyecto.
c. Adquisición de Bienes (Vehículos, piezas de repuestos y equipo de oficina).
d. Servicios de Consultoría y Capacitación:
d.1: Coordinación de la Ejecución del Proyecto; d.2) asistencia en el uso de los Sistemas de Mantenimiento, en la preparación y el seguimiento de los contratos de Mantenimiento y en la realización de un estudio para diseñar e instaurar un fondo de carreteras administrado por un nuevo organismo de carreteras; d.3) asesoramiento y capacitación en materia de gestión financiera y evaluación interna del desempeño; d.4) fortalecimiento de la Unidad de Medio Ambiente de la SEOPC; d.5) creación de una base de datos estadísticos sobre Accidentes de Carreteras (a financiar por el Fondo Nórdico de Desarrollo-FND); d.6) preparación de futuros Programas de Inversiones en el Sector de Transporte (a financiar por el FND); d.7) preparación de un Plan de Desarrollo de la Región Noroccidental, incluidos Estudios de Factibilidad e Impacto Ambiental, y Diseño Técnico Preliminar de Infraestructura Básica (Documentación del Proyecto). (A financiar por el FND). (No Ejecutado); d.8) preparación de un Plan de Desarrollo de Carreteras para la Región costera Oriental (Documentación del Proyecto). (A financiar por el FND). (No Ejecutado); d.9) preparación de un Plan de Alcantarillado y Saneamiento para la Ciudad de santo Domingo, comocomplemento del estudio sobre el Transporte Urbano financiado con el préstamo 3350-DO; and d.10) preparación de un Estudio de Factibilidad de la Ampliación a cuatro carriles, y posterior Mantenimiento en Régimen de Concesión de la Carretera Santo Domingo- San Cristóbal – Baní.
Durante la ejecución del Proyecto, fue necesario modificar algunos de estos componentes, tanto en su contenido como en su alcance, costo y estructura de financiamiento, debido a las variaciones ocurridas al cambiar las estimaciones consideradas en el Informe de Evaluación Inicial (nov.1996), así como a las incidencias del Huracán Georges, que azotó a la República Dominicana en el mes de Septiembre del año 1998. Estas modificaciones se indicarán en detalle, más adelante en este Informe.
3. ORGANIZACIÓN Y GESTION DEL PROYECTO
La ejecución del Proyecto ha estado a cargo de la Secretaría de Estado de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones (SEOPC). La coordinación administrativa general y las relaciones con el BIRF ha sido competencia del coordinador General del Proyecto, asistido por unidades de apoyo y control (Departamento Administrativo de Recursos Externos (DARE), Equipo de Apoyo al Coordinador, Unidad Ejecutora Sur / Este, y Unidad Ejecutora Norte / Central). Además se ha contado con la participación, para asuntos específicos y puntuales, de Direcciones y Departamentos de la SEOPC (Dirección General de Carreteras y Caminos Vecinales, Dirección General de Planificación y Programación de Inversiones, Dirección General de Tránsito Terrestre, Dirección General de Supervisión y Fiscalización de Obras, Departamento de Mecánica de Suelos y Pruebas de Materiales, Departamento de Gestión Ambiental y Riesgo, Comisión de Avalúos).
En general, la labor administrativa y técnica de la SEOPC para la ejecución del Proyecto, se ha realizado con la debida diligencia en las diferentes fases del mismo, teniendo como referencia los lineamientos y parámetros incluidos en el Acuerdo de Préstamo.
- 45 - Las Obras civiles se han realizado mediante contratos con empresas constructoras nacionales y extranjeras, especializadas en trabajos viales. Un total de quince (15) empresas y/o consorcios fueron seleccionados y contratados, utilizando la documentación de Licitación estándar del BIRF para tales fines. Por su parte, la supervisión de las obras civiles, también ha sido contratada con firmas consultoras nacionales y extranjeras especializadas en este tipo de servicios. Un total de siete (7) firmas fueron seleccionadas y contratadas para estos servicios de supervisión. Una de estas firmas, en coordinación con el Equipo de Apoyo al Coordinador y la Dirección General de Mantenimiento de Carreteras y Caminos Vecinales, ha tenido la responsabilidad del seguimiento y control del componente de mantenimiento de carreteras.
Por otro lado, un total de siete (7) consultorías de asistencia técnica fueron contratadas para la realización de las actividades de fortalecimiento institucional, mientras que otra consultora tuvo a su cargo una Auditoría Técnica de Ingeniería del Proyecto de Carreteras Nacionales.
Asimismo, se ha contado durante la ejecución del Proyecto, con la participación y seguimiento del BIRF, en los diferentes aspectos de su incumbencia, tales como coordinaciones de acciones administrativas y técnicas, procesamiento de las no objeciones, (Licitaciones, contrataciones, financiamiento, etc.), desembolsos de recursos del Préstamo, acciones de seguimiento de la ejecución de los componentes del Proyecto, Supervisión y evaluación de la marcha general del Proyecto, concesión de dos (2) prórrogas a la fecha de cierre del préstamo. En general esta participación del BIRF ha estado orientada a encontrar conjuntamente con la SEOPC, el cumplimiento de los objetivos y metas del Proyecto.
4. COSTO Y FINANCIAMIENTO DEL PROYECTO.
La inversión total estimada en el Acuerdo de Préstamo para el Proyecto de carreteras Nacionales, fue de US$122.50 millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, a ser financiados como sigue: 44.5 millones (36.3%) el Gobierno Dominicano (contrapartida), 75.0 millones (61.2%) el BIRF y los 3.0 millones (2.5%) restantes, el Fondo Nórdico para el Desarrollo (FND).
En el transcurso de la ejecución del Proyecto, no se ha contado con el financiamiento de los US$3.0 millones correspondientes al Fondo Nórdico para el Desarrollo, en razón de que dicha institución desestimó su participación en el mismo al cambiar las prioridades de países y de sectores de financiamiento, con posterioridad a la fecha de efectividad del Préstamo 4127-DO. Parte de la actividades contempladas con este financiamiento fueron ejecutadas con financiamiento del BIRF.
El aporte del BIRF de US$75.00 millones de dólares se ha ejecutado en su totalidad, mientras que el aporte de la contrapartida del Gobierno Dominicano ha llegado a US$105.91 millones, que representa aproximadamente un 238.00%, en comparación a los US$44.5 millones considerados en el Informe de Evaluación Inicial. En el cuadro anexo -1 se presentan un desglose del costo y financiamiento del proyecto por componentes, tanto las estimaciones iniciales como los valores finalmente ejecutados. El monto total del Poyecto resultó de US$180.91 millones, lo que representa un 147.68% en relación a los US$122.50 millones estimados inicialmente.
En los cuadros del Anexo -2 y el Anexo - 3 se presenta un resumen del costo del proyecto por componentes y por procedimientos de adquisición, según las estimaciones iniciales y los valores finalmente ejecutados respectivamente. Como se puede apreciar en ambos cuadros, en los que respecta a los valores del Préstamo, las adquisiciones correspondientes a Licitación Internacional se incrementaron de US$53.50 millones estimado inicialmente a US$66.44 millones ejecutadas, mientras que las adquisiciones con Licitación Nacional se redujeron de US$12.30 millones estimados inicialmente a US$0.64 millones ejecutados. Esto se ha debido a que las obras del Programa de Mantenimiento de Carreteras fueron
- 46 - estimadas para adquirirse mediante Licitación Nacional, pero la parte más importante de dichas obras correspondiente a los Contratos de Mantenimiento Integral, finalmente fueron adquiridas mediante Licitación Internacional.
5. CUMPLIMIENTO DE LOS COMPONENTES DEL PROYECTO.
5.1 Ejecución de Componentes Bajo el Programa de Obras Civiles.
Durante la ejecución del Proyecto, fue necesario modificar los componentes del programa de obras civiles, tanto en su contenido como en su alcance, costo y estructura de financiamiento. Esta revisión se ha debido, por un lado, a las variaciones experimentadas al cambiar las estimaciones consideradas en el informe inicial del proyecto, y por el otro lado, a las incidencias del Huracán Georges, que azotó a la Republica Dominicana en el mes de septiembre de 1998, originando nuevos requerimientos del trabajo en las obras civiles. En el cuadro del Anexo-4 se presenta un resumen de las metas físicas correspondientes a cada uno de los componentes de las obras civiles, en que se incluyen las metas iniciales y los resultados finales de ejecución. Y en el Anexo – 5 se incluye una relación de las obras civiles ejecutadas, su longitud y valor. A continuación se describe cada uno de los componentes:
Ampliación de Carreteras.
Se realizo una longitud total de 23.52 kms (83% en relación a la longitud estimada inicialmente), compuesto por la carretera Santiago – Navarrete (17.80 kms), y la Avenida Las Américas (entre el puente Duarte y el Puente Juan Carlos), Tramo I y Tramo II (long. 5.72 kms), en la ciudad de Santo Domingo. La carretera Santiago – Navarrete (incluida originalmente en el proyecto) fue ampliada de dos (2) a cuatro (4) carriles y facilita el acceso a la región noroeste del país (Productora Agrícola y Polo Turístico). Los tramos de la Avenida las Américas, se incorporaron durante la ejecución del proyecto, para completar el corredor “Autopista 6 de noviembre – Avenida 27 de Febrero – Autopista Las Américas” (el de mayor volumen de trafico vehicular del país), consistiendo los trabajos en la reconstrucción de los cuatro (4) carriles centrales, convertidos en carriles expresos, así como en la construcción de las vías marginales norte y sur, para el tráfico local. Con la incorporación de estos tramos de la Autopista Las Américas, se reemplazó a dos tramos de carreteras con una longitud total de 8.00 Km., incluidos originalmente para ampliarse, y que el Gobierno Dominicano decidió realizar fuera del proyecto. Con cargo a este componente se realizó, además, la reconstrucción de cinco (5) puentes, con una longitud total de 125.00 ML, que fueron destruidos por el Huracán Georges, y ubicados en una de las carreteras reconstruidas con el Préstamo anterior (BIRF 3350-DO).
Construcción de Carreteras de Circunvalación y Puentes
Se realizó la reconstrucción de una longitud total de 25.70 KM de carreteras de circunvalación (107% en relación con la longitud originalmente estimada), compuesto por la Circunvalación San Pedro de Macorís (12.50 Km) y la Circunvalación de La Romana (13.24 KM). En la circunvalación de San Pedro de Macorís se terminó una calzada (con dos carriles de circulación) (como estaba previsto originalmente) y se rehabilitó el puente existente para tráfico de vehículos livianos (longitud de 282.10 ML). Una segunda calzada (con dos carriles de circunvalación) que se incluyó en una reformulación del proyecto, se dejó a nivel de movimiento de tierras, para ser terminada junto a la construcción del nuevo puente, por el Gobierno Dominicano, en razón de que su costo sobrepasó significativamente el monto asignado en el Informe de evaluación inicial del proyecto. En la circunvalación de La Romana, se terminó la construcción del Puente sobre el Río Dulce (longitud 167.20 ML), así como la calzada (de dos carriles), cuya longitud se aumentó a 13.24 KM, en lugar de los 8.00 KM estimados inicialmente, en razón del crecimiento urbano
- 47 - en el extremo occidental de la ciudad. El Puente sobre el Río Baní (150.00 ML) fue construido fuera del Proyecto, con recursos del Gobierno Dominicano mientras que la ampliación del Puente Benito Monción sobre Río Yaque del Norte, carretera Montecristi – Dajabón, se ha financiado con el préstamo BIRF 4420-DO (Programa de Emergencias Huracán Georges) como compensación de las obras de este programa ejecutado con fondos del Préstamo BIRF 4127-DO. Con cargo a este componente se realizó, además, la construcción de doce (12) puentes de hormigón armado y vigas postensadas, con una longitud total de 612.00 ML, destruido por el Huracán Georges en diferentes carreteras del país.
Reconstrucción de Carreteras
Se realizó la ejecución de 123.95 KM de carreteras (74% en relación a la longitud estimada originalmente). Este porcentaje ejecutado se convierte en un 87% si se incluye el tramo de la carretera Sabana Grande de Boyá - Doña María, el cual ha sido rehabilitado con el préstamo BIRF 4420-DO (Programa de Emergencia Huracán Georges), como compensación de las obras de ese programa ejecutadas con fondos del préstamo BIRF 4127-DO. El restante 13% no ejecutado, corresponde a tramos de carreteras incluidos en programas de reconstrucción con fondos del Gobierno Dominicano.
Programa Piloto de Mantenimiento por Contrato
A partir del año 2000, y hasta el mes de junio/2003, la SEOPC ejecutó un programa piloto de mantenimiento de carreteras por contrato, que ha consistido en las dos modalidades siguientes: a) Contrato de Mantenimiento Integral de Carreteras; y b) Contratos de Mantenimiento Rutinario. Los contratos de Mantenimiento Integral permitieron realizar el mantenimiento de un total de 630.50 kms. de carreteras, con actividades de mantenimiento periódico (Recapeo de pavimento con nuevas tecnologías, colocación de barreras laterales de defensa, pintura de líneas de señalización horizontal, construcción de muro de gaviones, colocación de hitos kilométricos, construcción de cunetas encachadas), así como con actividades de mantenimiento rutinario (bacheo asfáltico, limpieza de drenajes, control de vegetación, etc.), con una inversión total de RD$322.05 millones de pesos. Se realizaron tres (3) contratos de mantenimiento integral, con una duración treinta y seis (36) meses cada uno, como sigue: Contrato de mantenimiento Integral Grupo CIBAO:166.20 kms; Contrato de Mantenimiento Integral Grupo Noroeste: 216.90 kms y Contrato de Mantenimiento Integral Grupo Sur: 247.40. En el Anexo - 6 se incluye una relación de las carreteras integrantes de cada uno de estos contratos.
Con la modalidad de “Mantenimiento Rutinario: de Carreteras por Contrato, fueron atendidos un total de 369.59 kms, ubicados en la red troncal de la región Este del país y en un tramo de la autopista Duarte, mediante tres (3) contratos de un (1) año de duración y dos (2) contratos de seis (6) meses de duración, teniendo una inversión total RD$30.55 millones de pesos. En el Anexo -7 se incluye una relación de las carreteras mantenidas con este tipo de contratos.
En total se ha mantenido 1,000.09 kms de carreteras con los dos tipos de contratos, que representan el 79% en relación a las longitudes estimadas en el informe de evaluación inicial del proyecto. Esta longitud mantenida resultó de una reformulación de los trabajos a realizar así como de la identificación de los tramos de carreteras a seleccionar, como consecuencia de los cambios experimentados en la red en los años subsiguientes a la evaluación inicial (Año 1995. En efecto, algunos tramos de carreteras fueron rehabilitados con recursos del Gobierno Dominicano; otros fueron incluidos en los contratos de concesión; por lo que la integración de los grupos de carreteras finalmente mantenidas en el programa piloto, representa un nivel aceptable de priorización en relación a los requerimientos del momento por zonas geográficas del país.
- 48 - En los contratos de mantenimiento integral, cabe resaltar la ejecución de trabajos de nuevas tecnologías de pavimento, consistentes en un recapeo de Hormigón Asfáltico Modificado con polímeros (capa delgada), en la carretera “Cruce de Otra Banda – Cruce de Bávaro _ Entrada Aeropuerto Punta Cana”, en el municipio de Higuey, Provincia La Altagracia, en una longitud aproximada de 20.00 Km, y un costo total estimado de RD$30.86 millones de pesos. La Cantidad de trabajo bajo este acápite que se ha realizado finalmente, significativamente inferior al contemplado en el componente de “nuevas tecnologías de pavimentos” previsto en el Informe de Evaluación Inicial del Proyecto, se ha debido a la reformulación efectuada, como se ha indicado anteriormente, para dar origen a la modalidad de Contratos de Mantenimientos Integral, en los cuales se han ejecutado importantes volúmenes de trabajos de “mantenimiento periódico”, tales como: “Recapeo con Hormigón Asfáltico modificado con polímeros” (20.00 Km). “Colocación de barreras laterales de defensa” (53.81 KM), “Construcción de Muros de gaviones” (7,110.00 m3), “Pintura Líneas de señalización horizontal” (490.00 Km), “Colocación de Hitos Kilométricos” (565 unidades), “Construcción de cunetas encachadas” (49.00 KM) y “Trabajos mayores misceláneos” (Reparación Pilas de Puentes, rehabilitación puntual de pavimentos, canalización mayor de drenajes transversales / longitudinales), con un costo total estimado de RD$101.4 millones de pesos.
Programa de Señalización de Carreteras.
Se ejecutó mediante contrato un programa de señalización informativa de las carreteras troncales del país (Carretera Duarte, Las Américas/Costa Este y Sánchez (Circuito del Lago Enriquillo), conteniendo datos sobre el acceso de unas carreteras a otras, los itinerarios para algunos destinos, puntos de interés turístico y de interés general para los usuarios. Fueron colocadas un total de 311 señales informativas, desglosadas en 27 pórticos, 72 tipo bandera, 90 informativas triples, 68 informativas dobles y 54 informativas sencillas, con lo que se supera en gran medida la cantidad de señales informativas estimadas en e Informe de Evaluación Inicial del Proyecto. Incluye Además la colocación de 416 escudos y/o flechas direccionales.
5.2 Ejecución de Componentes Bajo el Programa de Desarrollo Institucional.
Esta importante parte del Proyecto, se desarrollo mediante la ejecución de diversas consultorías de asistencia técnica previstas originalmente en el Informe de Evaluación Inicial, así como con las gestiones administrativas de la SEOPC relacionadas con aspectos estructurales y funcionales para mantener los beneficios en infraestructura vial y en aspectos institucionales, logrados hasta la fecha con la participación del BIRF. A continuación se describen estas actividades de desarrollo institucional.
Adquisición de Bienes.
Este componente se ha ejecutado en términos de adquisición de vehículos para la supervisión del proyecto, reconstrucción de locales de oficinas y adquisición de mobiliario y equipo de oficina (Coordinador General del Proyecto, Equipo de Apoyo al Coordinador, Departamento Administrativo de Recursos externos y las Oficinas Ejecutoras del BIRF Sur / Este y Norte / Central). Se ha ejecutado aproximadamente un 17% del total de los recursos estimados inicialmente para este componente. La parte no ejecutada corresponde a la adquisición de repuestos para el equipo de mantenimiento de carreteras de la SEOPC (Administración directa), que se estimó no prioritario y los recursos correspondientes fueron asignados a otros componentes del Proyecto.
- 49 - Fortalecimiento de los Programas de Mantenimiento de Carreteras.
Durante la ejecución del proyecto la SEOPC ha contado con la asistencia técnica de una firma consultora, cuyos esfuerzos se han concentrado por una parte, a reforzar los procedimientos del Sistema de Administración de Mantenimiento de Carreteras (SAMC) de la Dirección General de Mantenimiento de Carreteras y Caminos Vecinales (DGMCCV), con los Distritos y Ayudantías a nivel nacional, y por otra parte, al establecimiento de los mecanismos de mantenimiento de carreteras mediante contrato, con la participación del Sector privado. En lo que concierne al procedimiento tradicional de administración directa del mantenimiento, se ha asistido a la DGMCV con la capacitación del personal técnico (ingenieros, administradores), tanto a nivel central como en los Distritos y Ayudantías, en los aspectos de presupuestación, programación, ejecución y control de las actividades de mantenimiento, incluyendo tareas importantes como el levantamiento de los datos de inventario de las condiciones de la red principal de carreteras. En los que respecta al Programa de Mantenimiento por Contrato, se elaboraron los términos de referencia y la documentación de licitación de los trabajos, así como las instrucciones para la correcta aplicación del SAMC por parte de contratistas y supervisores. Se ha llegado a una fase en que se requiere una gestión más moderna del mantenimiento, en que se conecten la planificación que permite el SAMC y la información suministrada por los sistemas de ejecución de los contratistas, para obtener un sistema completo y adaptado a las necesidades de la DGMCV, que será el que los futuros contratistas estarían obligados a alimentar. Dicho sistema se emplearía para darle seguimiento a los trabajos, la fiscalización de los mismos y al estado secuencial de los elementos de la carretera en función de las operaciones de mantenimiento realizadas sobre ellos.
Financiamiento del Mantenimiento de Carreteras.
Con el objeto de lograr la sostenibilidad y autofinanciamiento del mantenimiento de carreteras, la SEOPC ha contado con servicios de asistencia técnica iniciados en el Proyecto anterior (Préstamo BIRF 3350-DO), dirigidos al diseño de un Anteproyecto de Ley para la creación de un Fondo Vial, a ser administrado por un organismo independiente. En el Proyecto de Carreteras Nacionales, se continuó con esta asistencia técnica, incorporando diferentes ideas y alternativas de adaptación a la realidad actual del país. Estos esfuerzos se han multiplicado a partir del año 2000, con las revisiones realizadas por la SEOPC con la asistencia de la firma consultora contratada y la incorporación de comentarios del BIRF al Anteproyecto de Ley. El trámite para la aprobación del Anteproyecto de Ley requiere de su sometimiento al Congreso Nacional, hasta la fecha no se han logrado las condiciones adecuadas para su realización. En consecuencia, y dada la urgencia de contar con el mecanismo de autofinanciamiento del mantenimiento de carreteras, algunas alternativas han sugerido la creación de un fondo provisional a lo interno de la SEOPC, que destine algunos recursos para la contratación de trabajos prioritarios de mantenimiento. En el plan de sostenibilidad para la aprobación de la última extensión de la fecha de cierre del Préstamo se planteó un mecanismo gradual, consistente en la creación de una Cuenta de Conservación Vial, previa a la Ley de Fondo Vial, a ser establecida en el último cuatrimestre del 2003, y a ser manejada por una comisión de Alto Nivel Jerárquico de la SEOPC. Esta opción aunque no se realizó durante el periodo de vigencia del Préstamo, sigue teniendo validez para una etapa transitoria hasta que finalmente sea aprobada y puesta en marcha la Ley de Fondo Vial.
Mejoras en el Sistema Contable – Financiero.
Con el objeto de reforzar las deficiencias existentes en el Sistema Contable – Financiero de la SEOPC, con recursos del Proyecto se realizó en los años 1999 y 2000, una consultoría de asistencia técnica para la Implementación de un Sistema Administrativo y Estructural de la Gestión Financiera, obteniéndose
- 50 - resultados satisfactorios en lo que respecta a capacitación del personal, y formulación de recomendación de mejoras en las áreas de contabilidad, auditoría interna y programas y presupuestos de corto y largo plazo. Se realizó un análisis y evaluación de la función financiera- contable en los aspectos de: estructura organizativa, distribución del personal, sistema de información y control. Asimismo se enfatizó el análisis y evaluación de auditoría interna (normas y manuales de capacitación), los procesos y registros contables, contabilidad de costos, presupuesto, tesorería, administración pública y requisitos de organismos internacionales.
Fortalecimiento del Departamento de Protección de la Corteza Terrestre.
Con financiamiento del Préstamo BIRF 4127-DO, se desarrolló una consultoría de asistencia técnica para el fortalecimiento del Departamento de Protección de la Corteza Terrestre de la SEOPC, en el manejo de los asuntos ambientales del área de carreteras, tanto para las obras del Proyecto de Carreteras Nacionales como para futuros proyectos sectoriales. La consultoría se realizó en los años 1999 y 2000, obteniéndose los objetivos propuestos de implementación de mecanismos y procedimientos de gestión ambiental, formación y capacitación del personal, producción de la Segunda Edición (Revisión del año 1999) del Manual Ambiental para Diseño y Construcción de Proyectos Viales” Un objetivo de la asistencia técnica que era establecer una Unidad Ambiental en el Departamento de Protección de la Corteza Terrestre, se interrumpió al promulgarse la Ley No. 64-00, que creó la Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, a finales del año 2000. Sin embargo, bajo el amparo de la nueva ley, se creo en la SEOPC el Departamento Ambiental y de Riesgo, mediante Orden Departamental No. 76/01, de fecha 21/agosto /2001). Este departamento cuenta actualmente con dos dependencias: La Sección de Gestión Ambiental y La Sección de Riego. La Sección de Gestión Ambiental, está a cargo del seguimiento a los proyectos viales, para asegurar se cumplan las especificaciones técnicas de aquellos elementos que contribuyen a prevenir o mitigar los impactos ambientales de las obras ejecutadas por la SEOPC.
Creación de una Base de Datos Estadísticos sobre Accidentes de Tránsito.
Se desarrolló en los años 2002 y 2003, una consultoría de asistencia técnica para crear en la Dirección General de Tránsito Terrestre de la SEOPC y en la Policía de Tránsito (Urbana y de Carreteras), un sistema de registro y avalúos de accidentes viales. Este sistema de registros y análisis ha permitido la presentación de los accidentes por tipo, fecha, hora, lugar, tipo de vehículo involucrado, edad y sexo de las víctimas. Además, la preparación de un Guía para el llenado del registro de accidentes, manual de operaciones de la base de datos; Manual de análisis de accidentes, y Guía para el calculo de costos de accidentes viales en la República Dominicana. Se ha realizado un análisis del Sistema de multas y cargos panales involucrados en los accidentes y establecimientos de un reglamento de sistema de puntos. Asimismo se ha dotado a la Dirección General e Tránsito Terrestre de la SEOPC y a la Policía Nacional, de los e quipos y requerimientos computacionales para desarrollar estas actividades. Esta consultoría se financió con recursos del préstamo BIRF 4127-DO, en razón de la no disponibilidad de recursos del Fondo Nórdico de Desarrollo (FND).
Auscultación del Estado de la Red Principal de Carreteras (A incluir en caso de que se contrate/ejecute).
En el año 2003, la SEOPC realizó la auscultación del estado de la red principal de carreteras del país, con una longitud aproximada de 2,000.00 KMS. Este trabajo fue llevado a cabo con la asistencia técnica de una firma consultora especializada en este tipo de servicios, contando con el financiamiento del Préstamo 4127-DO. La información básica levantada ha consistido en el tránsito clasificado, geometría de la vía (ancho curvatura, pendiente), estado superficial del pavimento (fisuración, desprendimiento de áridos,
- 51 - rotura borde, baches), regularidad superficial del pavimento mediante la mancha de arena (sand match) (equivalente MAE), coeficiente de razonamiento del pavimento, deflexión del pavimento bajo la carga estándar del eje de diseño de 80 KW, uso equipo de carga de impacto FWD. Con esta información se elaboró un programa de rehabilitación y mantenimiento de las indicadas carreteras, utilizando como herramientas de análisis el modelo HDM-4.
Capacitación de Personal.
Como parte importante del programa de desarrollo institucional implementado con recursos del Préstamo 4127-DO, se encuentra la participación de personal técnico de la SEOPC, en cursos de capacitación sobre diversos tópicos administrativos, contable – financiero y técnico – vial, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional, lográndose tener un personal actualizado en estos tópicos para cumplir con sus obligaciones en la institución. Se puede mencionar en forma especial, la participación de ingenieros civiles de la SEOPC en el Curso “Programación y Evaluación de Inversiones en Redes de Carreteras con el Modelo HDM – 3/ (HDM – 4)”, efectuado en España, en cada uno de los años 1998, 1999, 2001 y 2002 organizado por el Banco Mundial y la Asociación Técnica de Carreteras de España.
6. LECCIONES APRENDIDAS
Dos factores con mucha incidencia en los incrementos del costo de algunas obras, han sido la actualización del proyecto (rediseño) y el retraso en su ejecución, pues han generado volúmenes adicionales de trabajo y reajustes de precios unitarios, que necesariamente conllevan a un aumento del costo de terminación. De ahí que, para mantener al proyecto en un entorno de costo prudente, es necesario contratar las obras con un diseño lo más actualizado posible, así como neutralizar adecuadamente las causas que motivan retrasos en la ejecución, tal como demoras en los pagos y en las tomas de decisiones y los retrasos en las expropiaciones de terrenos.
En el caso de proyectos viales con requerimientos importantes de expropiaciones de terrenos y mejoras, tales como ampliaciones y construcciones de nuevas vías, es recomendable tener un estimativo de su cuantía y de las alternativas de solución al momento de formular el Proyecto, con el objeto de atenuar los retrasos en la ejecución de las obras por este motivo.
La contratación de varias obras con una misma empresa contratista, en algunos casos ha creado dificultades operativas, pues incidencias en una de las obras se refleja en las otras, sin que necesariamente tengan una relación causa – efecto. Por esto, es recomendable en el proceso de licitación, establecer mecanismos administrativos que limiten la cantidad de lotes que puedan ser adjudicados a un mismo licitante.
La disponibilidad en el momento oportuno de los recursos de contrapartida, es un elemento esencial para la ejecución a tiempo de las obras. No obstante, en algunos casos, retrasos no significativos en el pago de la contrapartida, han originado paralización de los trabajos, incompatibles con la solvencia y capacidad económica ofertada y evaluada del contratista. En consecuencia es importante establecer mecanismo práctico de manejo eficiente de la obra, mediante un equilibrio de la capacidad y solvencia del contratista con el nivel de desembolsos y pagos correspondientes.
En la determinación del costo de inversión en una obra vial, sujeto a evaluación de su rentabilidad económica, es necesario diferenciar el costo de los rubros propios de la funcionabilidad en términos de transporte de dicha obra, de aquellos rubros complementarios y no indispensables, como aceras, pasos peatonales, trabajos de embellecimiento, etc.
- 52 - En general la SEOPC ha ejecutado diversas actividades de mantenimiento de carreteras, a través de diferentes departamentos, que en su conjunto son de una cuantía significativa, pero al no estar coordinada por una única estructura administrativa, como la Dirección General de Mantenimiento de Carreteras y Caminos Vecinales, no refleja su verdadero valor y peso como contribución en la sostenibilidad de mantenimiento. Se requiere de una reformulación en este sentido.
Para la ejecución de los programas de mantenimiento de carreteras, su planificacións y control, en importante desarrollar una más efectiva labor de control del derecho de vía.
Tomando en consideración las posibles economías por aplicación de la tasa de cambio que se pueden generar en la ejecución de los diferentes componentes de inversión del Préstamo, después de dos (2) o más años de implementación, es recomendable realizar una evaluación general intermedia de los desembolsos. El superávit no comprometido que pudiera existir, se pudiera reasignar en un orden prioritario en base a la efectividad de su inversión.
En el proceso de licitación de las obras de mantenimiento de carreteras es importante establecer un mecanismo lo más amplio posible de promoción dentro de las empresas constructoras nacionales, con el objeto de contar con el mayor nivel de motivación y participación de las mismas.
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