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SIRC Annual Report 1996-1997

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SIRC Annual Report 1996-1997 Introduction i possible within the constraints of Introduction national security and without jeopar­ dizing the safety of Canadians. This year's Annual Report is presented in a new format and its Finally, the Committee will place contents are organized so as to be renewed emphasis on the practice of accessible and readable. To meeting academic experts and other reflect these changes and to more well­informed individuals in every precisely describe the subject of region of the country. Their views the Report, the title now includes and assessments help guide Mem­ the phrase �An operational audit bers' decisions when making . a core strategic of CSIS activities." The revised judgements about complaints cases, objective: to be the Annual Report is but one of the Ministerial reports, or the appropri­ most trusted and initiatives undertaken by the ateness of particular CSIS activities. Security Intelligence Review Clearly, the threat environment widely used indepen­ Committee in its continuing effort evolves and the1 circumstances of dent source of infor­ to meet a core strategic objective: Canadians change; an action or mation about to be the most trusted and widely policy appropriate at one time may used independent source of no longer be acceptable. Only by esls activities information about CSIS activities. staying in close touch with public and expert opinion can the Commit­ The Committee has set up a Web tee hope to make judgements that site! that includes its annual reports are consonant with prevailing as well as a wealth of other infor­ standards. mation and relevant documents. A list of the Committee's classified The CSIS Act, though not flaw­ reports is also available, and there less, established a governance are cross references to books, structure for security intelligence monographs, articles, and other matters that is being emulated in Web sites that we believe would be many other countries. Our senior worthwhile reading for those officials are invited to describe interested in security intelligence Canada's system to the emerging matters. The Web site, since its democracies in Central and inception in October 1996, has Eastern Europe, and foreign already received over eighty­five delegations visit Canada and the thousand visits. Committee for the same purpose. However, it sometimes seems that A third focus of the Committee's our accountability structure is less efforts is the ongoing professional well­regarded here at home than it working relationship with the Parlia­ is abroad. The Committee hopes mentary Sub­Committee on National to change this perception by Security. The Chair and Members of demonstrating to Canadians that it the Review Committee will continue is fulfilling the role set out for it to make every effort to provide the in the CSIS Act transparently and Sub­Committee with the information with considerable effectiveness. it seeks, and to answer MP's ques­ The Committee welcomes com­ tions as fully and forthrightly as 1. www.sirc-csars.gc.ca SIRe Annual Report 1996 - 1997 ii Introduction ments on the format, utility, or any governance system to protect other aspect of its Annual Report or Canada and Canadians from threats its Web site. to security. How slRe's Annual • Section 1 presents the Committee's Audit Report is review and audit of what the Service Organized does and how it does it. The sub­ sections represent the different Readers familiar with past SIRC methods the Committee employs on annual reports will find all of the an ongoing basis to make this information presented in previous assessment. years. However, the material is presented in a new and, we believe, • Section 2 deals with the more functional format. Committee's role as a quasi­judicial tribunal with the power to investi­ We have also attempted to make a gate complaints of various kinds. clear differentiation between Com­ mittee comments, observations and • Section 3 brings together under a recommendations bearing directly on new heading - CSIS Accountabil­ our major task - reviewing CSIS ity Structure - the Committee's and associated activities for a certain review of the multiple administra­ period of time - and the more tive and legal mechanisms that hold general background material we are the Service accountable to govern­ making available with the aim of ment, Parliament and the people of assisting Canadians and other readers Canada. to understand the context in which security and intelligence work is carried on. The Review The latter category consists of shaded boxes set apart from the main eommittee will text that address single topics the continue to make Committee believes will be of every effort to historical, background or technical interest to readers. Unlike the main provide the body of the report, they do not reflect sub­eommittee Committee opinion or conclusions as such and are intended to be strictly with the information factual in nature. it seeks In general, the report is organized to reflect the Committee's primary functions: first, to review CSIS intelligence activities, second, to investigate complaints about CSIS and associated matters, and third, to act in concert with other parts of the SIRe Annual Report 1996 - 1997 Section 1: A Review of CSIS Intelligence Activities 1 Section 1: by which the Service manages human sources, CSIS efforts in A Review of addressing economic espionage, and the Service's activities concerning a particular homeland conflict. eSIS Intelligence lnvestigations of Emerging We concluded that Activities Threats the esls investiga­ Since the end of the Cold War, tions were entirely A. Areas of special many states and intelligence ser­ appropriate, given the lnterest for vices of former foes have undergone rapidly changing 1996­1997 a major transition. We reviewed how CSIS investigated the new and political environment Titled �Case Studies" in past emerging threats to Canada's at the time reports, this part of the audit report national security posed by the presents the results of major re­ intelligence agencies of these states. search and analysis carried out by the Committee in the course of the The Service's investigations of year. As the new title implies, these these threats were launched at the inquiries are in addition to, and are beginning of the decade. CSIS intended to complement and obtained information from foreign reinforce, the other forms of audit intelligence agencies and inter­ research the Committee undertakes. viewed Canadians with a knowledge of developments in the states The Committee's selection of topics concerned. to be the subject of in­depth inquiry (this year there are five) is influ­ After several years of monitoring the enced by a number of factors situation, CSIS terminated most of the including inter alia, shifts in the targeting authorizations against the nature of the international threat foreign states, owing to the absence of environment, changes in technol­ evidence that they were conducting ogy, the need to monitor or follow intelligence activities against Canada. up on past Committee recommenda­ The Service retained, however, a tions, significant alterations in general authorization to cover new Government policy which the threats which might arise. We con­ Committee believes could have cluded that the CSIS investigations implications for Service activities, were entirely appropriate, given the changes in organizational structure rapidly changing political environ­ or operational emphasis within the ment at the time. Service itself, and the interests of individual Committee Members. Below, we present our conclusions about certain of CSIS activities in this This year, the subjects of the area. In most of the investigations that Committee's special interest are we examined, the Service's actions CSIS activities in the investigations were prudent. of emerging threats, the Service's foreign liaison program, the means SIRe Annual Report 1996 - 1997 2 Section 1: A Review of CSIS Intelligence Activites In one case, however, we saw seemed to place a negative interpre­ contradictory information about the tation on one activity which taken in seriousness of the threat and the context seemed to us to be relatively Service's actions appeared to be benign. We found that the reports excessive. CSIS provided to consumers in other parts of the government A foreign intelligence service suggested that most of the alleged investigation of note intelligence activities were innocu­ ous. Finally, we took note of the In the case of one foreign state, CSIS fact that an intelligence service conducted an extensive investigation. allied to Canada decided not to The Service believed that the foreign pursue investigations of the foreign . foreign intelli­ intelligence services continued to intelligence services in question. target ethnic Canadians at home and gence services were abroad. Furthermore, a foreign The Committee did encounter some attempting to agency clandestinely collected evidence that the foreign intelli­ reactivate sources information in Canada, some of gence services were attempting to which was economic, and attempted reactivate sources in Canada used in eanada . to sway Canadian government by the previous regime. The policies. Service's focus, however, was not so much on the current activities of The Committee examined the the foreign services, but rather on Requests for Targeting Authority for their preparations for future intelli­ this investigation.2 gence activities. The Requests hypothesized that the Other emerging threat new intelligence services
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