The Canadian Arctic Expedition of 1913 to 1918 Author(s): Vilhjalmur Stefansson Source: The Geographical Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Oct., 1921), pp. 283-305 Published by: geographicalj Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1781040 Accessed: 26-06-2016 17:05 UTC

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east of Mount Everest. There we must hope that they may have found some route less formidable than the others have shown themselves on first acquaintance. The idea that the slopes of the mountain towards the Tibetan plateau might, as elsewhere, be much less steep than towards the south is evidently wrong; they could not be much steeper than they are. The difficulties are indeed formidable ; but the " Fading Hopes " of the Times9 poster on September 10 are not yet those of the Mount Everest Committee, still less of the expedition in the field, whose duty this year was to reconnoitre all the approaches to the mountain, but not to spend time early in the season on any one route until they had satisfied themselves that there was none easier that had been overlooked. Up to the present they have had no great temptation. But even if the north-eastern face should prove as forbidding as the others, the question will not be settled. A still stronger climbing party next year, with better fortune in health, will surely find some ridge or other of the mountain worthy of a grand assault.

THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Commander Map following p. 320.

WHILE 1908-1912, I was thereengaged gradually in the tookwork shape of my in polarmy mind expedition the plans of which we were able to carry out under the auspices of the Canadian Government during the years 1913-1918.

In the summer of 1853 Lieut. Mecham said in his report to his com- manding officer, Captain Kellett, that the exploratory journey which he had just finished to the west coast of Prince Patrick Island had been ex? tended in length ten days by the ability of his party to secure game, and that he conceived it difficult to make such a journey successfully and without serious results to the health of the men engaged, without using fresh meat secured along the route to supplement any rations which were brought from the ship. The same year, in his report to the same superior officer, Captain Leopold McClintock made a similar statement at the end of a journey which Sir Clements Markham, in his ' Life of McClintock' (p. 166), has referred to as the greatest polar journey ever undertaken. McClintock as well as Mecham places at ten days the extension of his journey beyond what would have been possible had no game been secured. In Franklin's overland expedition of 1819 little game was secured, and there are few indications in his journal that there was any possibility

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of securing game. On that journey some of the members died of starva? tion, and those who lived through did so only after the greatest hardships. But in 1848, in travelling over the same country, Sir John Richardson, who was one of the survivors of Franklin's disastrous overland journey of 1819, says that in his opinion a single competent hunter such as John Rae on that journey proved himself to be, could support a party of forty men with his rifle and leave them all free to do each his own work. Richardson, therefore, on that journey came to the conclusion that self-support on the Arctic prairies (egregiously miscalled " Barren Ground ") was practicable, and suitable for the maintenance of polar research. During the Franklin research Dr. John Rae proved this to the hilt by wintering comfortably, and without the loss of a single man, on the Arctic coast at a place having the forbidding name of Repulse Bay, under conditions of game supply which are neither markedly better nor worse than those of almost any part of the north coast of Canada or of the archipelago to the northward. But after Dr. Rae's time the advance which he had made in the method of polar travel was lost sight of to such a degree that when David Hanbury at the beginning of the present century made a journey of about six months from Hudson Bay to , depending on food secured by Eskimo hunters whom he had hired, the feat was considered revolutionary. True, Hall (in the period between Rae and Hanbury) had lived as the guest of the Eskimo near King William Island, but he had travelled practically not at all, and had merely lived with the natives on their accustomed hunting grounds. Schwatka and Gilder had travelled a little more in the same region, but had essentially depended on the Eskimo, and on the whole these accomplishments, both of Hall and Schwatka, attracted little attention. Later, Peary used fresh meat more extensively than most explorers, because he had a great belief in its virtue in keeping the men in good health, and also because it was the least expensive food that could be used, for it did not have to be freighted at a high expense from New York, Nansen and Johansen at the end of their remarkable sledge journey after leaving the Fram did live for a winter on game in Franz Josef Land, and that in comfort and perfect health. But since Rae's time it seemed advisable to no one, with the partial exception of Hanbury, to use food resources of the country as the mainstay in a protracted Arctic enterprise involving a good deal of travel. Hanbury depended almost entirely on Eskimo whom he hired, and his journey was hasty, involving sportsmanship rather than scientific pursuit, and through country believed to be better supplied with game than most of the Arctic. But during the years 1908-1912 Dr. R. M. Anderson and I put Rae's methods to the test again. We spent four and a half years in scientific research, living by forage, at times in inhabited and at times in uninhabited portions of the north coast of Alaska, the north coast of Canada, and in

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Victoria Island. The method proved completely successful. Our enter? prise differed from Hanbury's, not only in its scientific character and in being eight or ten times as extensive in time involved, but also in that Dr. Anderson and myself did not depend on the Eskimo to get food for us, but ourselves secured a good deal more than half of the food used by our party. During this time we proved, therefore, what had become evident to me on my first expedition (1906-1907), that white men can easily master every art of the Eskimo that is useful for living safely and comfortably in the Arctic. This was in accord with Rae, who had done his own hunting, and quite opposed to the precepts and practice of Hall, Hanbury, and Peary, who had depended on native hunters. Peary, in fact, says in his last book, e The / that you cannot successfully make a polar journey such as his unless you command the confidence of a sufficient number of Eskimo to go with you and do most of the work for you, including the securing of game in places where game can be secured, and including especially the building of snow houses. But what is most pertinent to our expedition of 1913-1918 is that during the years 1908-1912 I came to the conclusion, which was con? trary to the expressed beliefs of Arctic authorities, whether explorers, whalers, or Eskimo, that it would be possible to travel extensively and, so far as time is concerned, indefinitely over the ice of the polar ocean, de- pending for food and fuel exclusively on the animals found there, and that this journey could be made as easily by white men unsupported by Eskimo as by white men with Eskimo servants. I cannot here go into details of the reasoning which led me to this belief. It was based partly on the results of oceanography as laid down by such authorities as Sir John Murray, and partly on my conclusion that the statements of ex? plorers, whalers, and Eskimo that no food could be secured on the polar sea at a great distance from land, were not based on any observations, but were merely the expression of a belief. A parallel to the statements that sufficient food cannot be secured on the sea ice is found in the numerous statements of Sir Edward Parry and other thoroughly honest and reliable explorers to the effect that musk oxen migrate southward in the fall from the Arctic islands and return to them in the spring. We now know that no musk oxen ever migrate southward in the fall, nor are they, in fact, known ever to have crossed from one Arctic island to another over a strait filled with rough ice. Yet it seemed eminently reasonable to Parry that musk oxen would migrate south in the fall, and he, as a matter of fact, had not seen any during the winter. His theory, combined with lack of observation, led him and many others to the definite affirmation of a thing which we now know never has happened and could not have happened without a fundamental change in the nature and habits of musk oxen. A similar prepossession combined with a similar lack of observation had, in my opinion, led such explorers as Peary and such authorities as

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Sir Clements Markham to assert that there is no possibility for human beings to support life on the floating ice of the polar ocean at a great distance from land. Markham has expressed this opinion in several places: one of them is p. 172 of his 'Life of Admiral McClintock,' where he says about Prince Patrick Island, "It forms the boundary between the Arctic paradise of Melville Island and the polar ocean (west of Prince Patrick Island) without life." After asserting (as above) that the to the west of Banks and Prince Patrick islands is without life, Markham (p. 173) goes on to say about the Beaufort Sea, " Its examination is the great desideratum in Arctic geography; . . . there are reasons for thinking that there may be islands in the Beaufort Sea, . . . and there are reasons against this hypothesis. Knowledge of the Arctic regions will remain very incomplete until this area has been discovered and explored. It is one of several geographical undertakings that call for attention, and one of the most important." Everything I knew led me to agree with Markham (and Nansen has said the same thing) that the exploration of the Beaufort Sea was the most important remaining problem in north polar discovery; but what I knew and what I believed upon inference led me to think that Markham and the rest were wrong in speaking of this region as " the polar ocean without life." The central idea of my expedition was to be the proposi- tion that a small party of white men with one or two sledges to haul scientific equipment, cooking gear, clothing, arms, ammunition, and the like, could travel wherever it listed over the polar sea, no matter what the distance from land or what the latitude, and remain indefinitely. To do a unique thing in polar exploration was one of my dreams; to organize a comprehensive scientific expedition was another dream, no less cherished. When I returned home in the fall of 1912, my situation for organizing a new expedition was fortunate. The American Museum of Natural History of New York and the Geological Survey of Canada, under the auspices of which two institutions we had conducted the expedition of 1908-1912, were satisfied with the results and willing to back me in a new venture. I found it equally easy to get a friendly hearing from the National Geographic Society of Washington, and they were, in truth, the first to come forward with an actual offer of money in the support of the undertaking. They promised $22,500, the American Museum promised $22,500, and some friends of mine in Boston, Massachusetts, contributed an additional $5000. Later I came to the conclusion that $25,000 more, invested in the purchase of a steam whaler, the Karluk, would improve the chances of success, and three friends in Philadelphia came forward with an offer of this money. But Mr. R. W. Brock, the Director of the Geological Survey of Canada, was anxious that the Canadian Government should participate, and this also was my dream. I accordingly went to Ottawa to see Mr. Borden (later Sir Robert Borden), then the Prime Minister of Canada.

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Meantime, it had been suggested to me that I shouid submit the plans of the expedition to the International Geographical Congress, which was to meet in Rome early in the spring of 1913. After many conferences with Mr. Gilbert Grosvenor, the Director of the National Geographic Society, and Prof. Henry Fairfield Osborn, the President of the American Museum of Natural History, I formulated for submission to the Inter? national Geographical Congress a programme of which the following is a brief outline: I had planned an expedition in two sections. The main purpose was geographical discovery, but secondarily we wished to contribute as much as possible to every science that can be profitably studied in the Arctic regions. The American Museum of Natural History was especially interested in the biology and ethnology of the lands around Coronation Gulf, and the Geological Survey of Canada (which had already supported my investigations in that district) was interested in the biology, ethnology, and the geology of that region. During the preceding expedition Dr. Anderson had done such loyal and efficient work that both the American Museum of Natural History and the National Geographic Society welcomed my suggestion that I shouid offer him the position of second in command. As the region where new lands might be discovered and unknown oceans explored lay north of Alaska and west of the Parry Islands, while the district ethnographically and biologically most interest? ing lay about Coronation Gulf, I planned to divide the expedition in two parts. While Dr. Anderson was to be second in command of the whole expedition, he was to be in immediate charge of the party detailed to Coronation Gulf. As the plan was submitted to the Geographical Con? gress, it proposed that the party under Dr. Anderson shouid consist of one topographer, one geologist, one zoologist in addition to Dr. Anderson, one magnetician, one meteorologist who shouid also assist in other scientific work, and one expert photographer for still and moving picture work. The Beaufort Sea section of the expedition which was to be under my immediate charge would carry one oceanographer, one surgeon who would also act as marine biologist, one geologist, one topographer. The captain, ship's officers, and myself would attend to the meteorology, fixation of positions by astronomical observations, etc, when the topo? grapher was absent. While it was planned that the Coronation Gulf section of the expedition shouid make considerable use of the principle of living by forage which Dr. Anderson and I had employed so successfully on the previous expedition, it was realized that they were going to operate in a district so accessible and to which supplies could so easily be transported that they might depend largely on provisions brought into the country by ship, the scientists not being expected to hunt except incidentally. Eskimo or white hunters were to be provided to do the hunting for them, but the southern subdivision of the expedition were to depend on game in their

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 288 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 work only when in an emergency they found that by so doing they could extend their journeys in length or improve them in quality. But the Beaufort Sea section were expected to depend largely on living by forage. It was then my opinion, as it is now, that on the principle of hauling with you from a base on shore all the food that you are going to use and all the fuel you expect to burn, it is not possible, be the sledge haulage by men or by dogs, to make over moving polar pack journeys much longer either in time or distance than those already made by Admiral Peary: his journey from his land base to the Pole was about 500 miles and return. In fact, I believe the ice of the Beaufort Sea to be rougher and more mobile, with more hindrance from open water, than where Peary travelled. It would therefore, in my opinion, not be possible to make on the Beaufort Sea journeys as long as Peary had been able to make in the more favourable conditions farther north, unless one could obviate the necessity of transporting heavily laden sledges. This we expected to accomplish by carrying but little food at the start, depending for the indefinite extension of the journeys on meat for food and blubber for fuel, secured by killing seals and polar bears. When I went to Ottawa, and when the Director of the Geological Survey, Mr. Brock, and I went to see the Prime Minister, we found that Mr. Borden thought that Canada should support the expedition with public funds, and that he preferred Canada should pay the entire expense of the expedition. When he made me this proposal I had to say that, while the prospect of Government auspices was agreeable to me, I was not able to accept without the consent of the National Geographic Society and the American Museum of Natural History. Mr. Borden then communicated with these institutions, saying, in substance, that Canada makes a political claim to all territories that may be discovered between the 141st on the west and Greenland on the east as far north as the Pole, and that he believed it should be the privilege as it was the duty of Canada to explore these territories. He accordingly requested that the two societies should surrender the expedition to the Canadian Govern? ment, he promising on behalf of the Government that it should be carried out the same year and according to the plans formulated. Both institutions at once accepted Mr. Borden's offer, saying, in substance, that their aim was the furtherance of scientific discovery, that their resources were inferior to those of the Government in forwarding that aim, and that they would be glad to surrender the expedition if assured that it would be carried forward on substantially the lines which I had formulated under their advice and with their approval. When the undertaking was transferred to the Government no material change was made in the plans as outlined by me before the Geographical Congress in Rome, except that instead of carrying one topographer on each section of the expedition and one geologist on each, it was decided that the geologist who went with the Beaufort Sea section should act as

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 289 topographer as well, while both the topographers shouid accompany the Coronation Gulf section. This modification was made at the suggestion of the Director of the Geological Survey. The scientific staff as finally constituted consisted of fifteen men, thirteen of whom were professionally engaged in and expected to devote their lives to the work which they were doing on the expedition. Three of the staff came from the British Isles, one from , one from New Zealand, one from , one from Norway, one from Denmark, two from the United States, and five from Canada. About half of these men had after graduation from college taken three years or more of post- graduate work in some leading university. The following universities were represented in the training of the men : Edinburgh, Glasgow, Oxford, Paris, McGill, Toronto, Iowa, Yale, Harvard, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Two of the men, Murray the oceanographer and Mackay the surgeon, had been with Shackleton in the Antarctic; Johansen, one of the zoologists, had been with Mylius Erichsen in East Greenland; and Mamen, the assistant to the geologist of the Beaufort Sea section, had been on a Norwegian expedition to Spitsbergen; Dr. Anderson, second- in-command and chief zoologist of the Coronation Gulf section, had been with me for four and a half years (the length of my second Arctic expedi? tion) ; I myself had spent six years north of the in Canada and Alaska, in addition to an earlier archaeological expedition to Iceland. In a sketch such as this we cannot go into the details of journeys, and the results will have to be briefly summarized. Eventually the Coronation Gulf section spent the winter of 1913-1914 on the north coast of Alaska at Collinson Point and the following two winters on Dolphin and Union Straits, just west of Coronation Gulf. The first winter they used automatic instruments to record the tides and currents in the shore waters north of Alaska, and made a detailed survey of the Canadian coast from the 141st meridian east to the Mackenzie delta. During the spring of 1914 the two topographers, K. G. Chipman and J. R. Cox, each in charge of his own party, made surveys and sound? ings of several of the channels of the Mackenzie delta, with a purpose not purely topographical, for an immediate object was to determine how deep of draft a vessel might be which could come down the river and success? fully enter the polar ocean. These river channels shift and vary from year to year, but one conclusion of the survey was that ships drawing 6 or 6\ feet of water can, when the river is buoyed, reach the ocean. This is especially fortunate, for that is just the draught which experience has shown can be carried by a vessel 1500 miles up the river across to the head of navigation at Smith Fails. This depth makes the Mackenzie one of the finest rivers to navigate in the world. In the development of Alaska the Yukon has already played a controlling part, although the draught of steamers on that river is 2 feet less than our surveys indicate can be carried by boats on the Mackenzie.

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The same spring J. J. O'Neill (the geologist) and Cox made a topo? graphical and geological survey of the Firth River, which comes from the Endicott Mountains and enters the sea just west of Herschel Island. During the following two years Chipman and Cox completed the survey of , left unfinished and dotted in by Sir John Richardson, and re-surveyed the coast eastward from there to Coronation Gulf and beyond to the neighbourhood of the Kent Peninsula. They rectified certain errors in existing charts, and notably added to the complicated groupings in Coronation Gulf and Bathurst Inlet scores of islands not previously indicated on the maps. They, as well as O'Neill, ascended several of the rivers flowing northward into the straits and into the gulf, making both topographical and geological surveys. O'Neill, who, subsequent to his taking a doctorate in geology at Yale University, had prepared himself for the work by two years of exploration of the copper district near Lake Superior, gave most of his attention during two years to the copper- bearing rocks of the islands in Coronation Gulf and the mainland to the south. In so vast a mineral region as this his work, although consider? able, can be considered only as preliminary. During the same two years (autumn 1914 to spring 1916) the two zoologists of this section, Anderson and Johansen, did much valuable work in collecting mammais, birds, insects, and forms of water life. They also, and especially Johansen, made considerable botanicai collections. Apart from birds and mammais, several new species have been discovered in every department of investigation. It was a capital misfortune of the expedition that Henri Beuchat, the distinguished French anthropologist, was never able to bring his training and unusual ability to bear upon the ethnologtcal problems of Coronation Gulf, for he lost his life after the sinking of the Karluk. However, Diamond Jenness, a New Zealander, trained in anthropology at Oxford, and who had previously done field work in , secured during two years of living with the Eskimo of Coronation Gulf a mass of information which will be an important contribution to knowledge in the various departments of anthropology. The ordinary meteorological observations as well as some tide obser? vations and soundings were made, but the magnetic section of the work fell out completely with the separation from this party of William McKinlay, who through accident was with the Karluk when she drifted off into the ice. The Coronation Gulf division of the expedition finished its field work and returned to Ottawa in the autumn of 1916, after which some of the members served at the front in France, while others were employed in Ottawa working up the results of the expedition or doing scientific field work in southern Canada.

When the Karluk was beset in the ice off the north coast of Alaska

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 291 at Camden Bay in August 1913, and finally drifted in the ice westward toward Wrangel Island, she had on board, of the scientific staff, Murray, Mackay, McKinlay the magnetician, and Beuchat the anthropologist. That Mackay shouid be on the Karluk was intentional, but it had been my purpose to give Murray the separate command of the Mary Sachs to use her mainly for oceanographical work, and McKinlay and Beuchat shouid have been with the Coronation Gulf section of the expedition. These three men were aboard the Karluk merely as passengers on their way to Herschel Island, where McKinlay and Beuchat intended to join Dr. Anderson's ship, the Alaska, and Murray to take command of the Mary Sachs. Entirely apart from the tragedy which finally resulted, it was, from a scientific point of view, a misfortune that these three men shouid have been on the Karluk. As the Karluk drifted westward towards Wrangel Island a portion of her course was over ocean that had previously been sounded and traversed by both exploratory and whaling vessels. But for a part of her course she got as far north as 730 N.s and was then and also earlier well beyond any soundings that had previously been taken, as is best shown by the fact that the nearest old soundings of the charts are less than 150 fathoms, while some of the bottom soundings of the Karluk were 1100 fathoms. A good deal of dredging and other scientific work was done during the months from September to January while she was moving with the pack 1100 miles in a generally westerly direction. A few of the results of these investigations have been preserved through the memory of some members of the party who were saved, and some in the notes of Captain Bartlett, but in general it is unfortunately true that when the Karluk sank and when Murray died most of the scientific results of the journey were lost. The Karhtk sank about 60 miles north-east of Wrangel Island and about 150 miles from the Siberian coast. After the sinking of the ship, eleven of the twenty-five persons aboard were lost. Many of the details of these happenings have been told by Captain Bartlett in a book published by Small> Maynard and Company of Boston, under the title 'The last Voyage of the Karluk' [see also uThe Voyage of the Karluk and its tragic ending," by E. F. Chafe, Geog. Jour., 51, 318, May 1918]. When in the fall of 1913 the Karluk drifted away from the north coast of Alaska, we had safe at Collinson Point the two ships Alaska and Mary Sachs, each capable of carrying about sixty tons of freight. The Karluk had been carrying some of the stores intended for these ships, and they were no longer available. For that reason and because I wanted to carry out the geographic plans of the Karluk, I purchased from traders on the north coast of Alaska several tons of supplies and the little schooner North Star, drawing 4 feet 2 inches of water, and capable of carrying about twenty tons of freight. In many seasons a boat of that particular kind is better than any other on the north coast of Alaska, for, while the grounded ice lies thick in the deep water offshore, the thaw water from

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 292 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 the land in the early spring opens up a lane along the coast through which a ship of very light draft can work her way when strpnger vessels of greater draft would be powerless to force a road through the dense pack outside. In view of my plans for the spring, the North Star was an ideal vessel. In December 1913, after acquainting the crews of the two ships at Collinson Point with my purpose to conduct a sledge exploration north into the JBeaufort Sea from Alaska after Christmas, I proceeded eastward to the delta of the Mackenzie to purchase dogs there and to make all arrange? ments for the survey of the delta the following spring by boats commanded by Chipman and Cox. While I was engaged in this preparatory work in the delta I sent written instructions to Collinson Point for the estab? lishing of an outfitting base at Martin Point, near the 143rd meridian. These instructions were, however, in the main not carried out, and when all purchases of dogs and other preparations in the Mackenzie delta were finished, and when I went to Martin Point, expecting every thing to be ready for a start out on the ice the first week in March, I found that most of the preparations had, as a matter of fact, not been carried forward. Upon my arrival this work of preparation was commenced with energy, but invaluable time had been lost, and our start out on the ice could not be made until towards the end of the month. This was very unfortunate, especially as a warm spell set in just then. It is well known that for the exploration of the moving pack the coldest weather is best suited, for then lanes of water that open through ice movement caused by winds or currents will freeze over in a night or two, while if the temperature is as high as zero Fahr. it takes several days for leads to freeze over, and delays are frequent in consequence. We finally got away from the coast on March 27 and proceeded northward. Through various untoward circumstances we were able to have only one sled and six dogs, though I had intended to have two sleds and twelve dogs. For the first 50 miles we had a support party, but after that the journey was made with one sledge by three men, two beside myself. When the support party turned back at a point 50 miles from land, I sent with them to my second-in-command orders which may be summarized as follows : There were three ships belonging to us available on the north coast of Alaska. Of these three, I directed Dr. Anderson to take the largest, the Alaska, for his exclusive use. He was also to take two small gasoline launches which Chipman and Cox had been using in the survey of Mackenzie delta. This ship and the two launches he was to use for the Coronation Gulf section of the expedition, with no reference to the Beaufort Sea party. But, as I expected that the Alaska could not carry to Coronation Gulf all the supplies desired by Dr. Anderson, I directed him to take with him also the Mary Sachs, the second largest ship. She was to land her cargo wherever Dr. Anderson might desire in the vicinity of the Dolphin and Union straits, after which she was to

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 293 return to Herschel Island and pick up from our supplies there a cargo which she was to take to Cape Kellett at the south-west corner of , where she was to establish a base and maintain it for several years if necessary, until she received definite orders from me to move or, in the other event, until our death had been credibly established. With definite relation to my own plans, I directed Dr. Anderson to send the North Star, the little ship I had purchased for that particular purpose, under the command of George H. Wilkins, eastward along the north coast of Alaska so soon as the ice shouid move in the spring. She was then to follow the Canadian mainland to Cape Bathurst or Cape Parry, and was thence to cross the narrow strait to Banks Island and go up the west coast of Banks Island as far as the north-west corner. There she was to look for messages from us at Norway Island. If none were found, she was to proceed, if possible, across McClure Strait to Prince Patrick Island on the theory that we might join her there. If she did not find us at this second rendezvous, she was to spend a winter there, doing such exploration as was found possible, and was to return to Alaska, if she could, the summer of 1915. I emphasized in conversation and in these written instructions my intention not to come back to Alaska if we found conditions at sea that fitted our theories. We would proceed northward indefinitely, hoping to find new land. If land were found, we would spend a year upon it, exploring it. If it were a large and comparatively fertile land, we expected musk oxen and caribou on which we could live. But if it were a barren land, it would at least have a coastline, along which we could find seals and polar bears for food and fuel. After spending a year upon this land we would return south to Alaska the spring of 1915. But shouid no land be found, we would travel northward until the approach of summer made journeying over the ice difficult. We would then turn east and land on the north-west corner of Banks Island to meet the North Star, or possibly on the south-west corner of Prince Patrick Island. When we left land it was known that we had with us food and fuel to last us about forty days. So far as I know it was without exception the opinion of all members of the expedition as well as of all the whalers and Eskimo in that vicinity (there were two whaling ships and about four hundred Eskimo) that we would have to return before the forty days' provisions were done, for it was considered certain that we shouid find no seals when we got to deep water and far from land. Accordingly, when the forty days were over and we did not come back, it began to be feared that we were lost, and two or three weeks later this belief grew to a certainty in the minds of nearly every one. Our death was, accordingly, in due course reported to and announced by the newspapers. The Canadian Government, after consultation with most or all of the well- known polar explorers, gave us up for dead, and for a year no orders were

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sent to me, but only to my second-in-command. Another- result of the certainty of our death (or of the opinion that no valuable results could be obtained by such an enterprise as ours) was that the North Star was not sent to co-operate with me as I had directed, but was taken instead to Coronation Gulf to assist in the survey work there. The Mary Sachs did come to Banks Island and established a base at Cape Kellett, but though she was fairly well suited for work between the mainland and Banks Island, because of the slackness of the ice there in an ordinary season, she was, because of her two propellers, not adapted for going beyond Kellett trying to thread the channels for which I had intended the North Star. It was, therefore, quite proper for her commander not to try to reach the rendezvous at Norway Island. Meantime our party, which consisted besides myself of two Nor? wegians, Storker Storkerson and Ole Andreasen, travelled northward, according to schedule. We soon got into abysmal depths. We had several miles of sounding wire to begin with, but through an accident we lost much of this at the first deep sounding, and from that point our soundings, which we took on an average every 20 miles, were 1386 metres with no bottom until we again approached land. At first we and our dogs lived almost exclusively on the provisions brought from shore, but as we travelled we kept our eyes open and everywhere saw evidence that seals were to be found under the ice, even where no water was found and where, consequently, they could not be seen. On account of our late start summer was imminent. We therefore did not pause to hunt, although we felt sure we could get seals whenever we should do so, but pushed on energetically so as to make good as high a northing as possible before the weather became too warm. When our food was nearly done we went on food ralions (for the only time in my experience as an explorer) for three or four days because we grudged the time to hunt. Eventually, however, we had to stop. After some temporary failures, we secured seals, as expected, with a total delay for hunting of something less than a day's travelling time before we were successful. After that we continued the journey for fifty-six more days. The highest latitude attained was 740 North, which was about 300 miles north of the mainland and about west of the north-west corner of Banks Island. We had frequently to contend with adverse currents, and the warmer the weather became the greater trouble we had in crossing from ice-floe to ice-floe. No new land was found, and, after ninety-six days at sea, we finally landed at Norway Island, exactly where we had told the North Star to call for tidings of us. We spent a day on Norway Island, and built a beacon in which we left a message, saying that we were proceeding thence to the mainland of Banks Island to hunt caribou, intending to wind-dry the meat to make portable dog food for the sledge journeys of the coming year, while we also cured skins to be used for clothing the next winter. Our instructions left in the cairn directed the North Star to come to the

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mainland of Banks Island for us, where we would be on the look-out for her. It was June 26 when we landed in Banks Island, and through July and August and into September we passed the time pleasantly, living mainly on caribou. The musk oxen which McClure had reported as abundant in Banks Island had since become extinct. As we now know, the reason for this was that after McClure's departure the Eskimo discovered the Investigator in Mercy Bay and began to plunder her, chiefly for her iron. Mercy Bay thus became a Mecca for the Eskimo, and every year they made pilgrimages to her in scores or hundreds from all over Island and even from the mainland. During these summer visits to Banks Island most of the Eskimo lived on musk oxen, with the inevitable extinction of these quiet animals, which do not flee from their enemies, and are therefore an easy prey to the hunters with their bows and spears. During the latter part of summer the easterly wind blew off Banks Island, driving the ice well to the west, and in September the sea appeared as open as the Atlantic. Day after day we watched from the tops of the highest hills, but no ship came. When the nights began to lengthen and the frosts to be more severe, we at last concluded that no ship was coming and that the North Star might conceivably have been wrecked along the coast further south. We therefore buried our supply of meat and skins in a stone-lined pit, excavated for the purpose, covered the whole with stones as protection from wolves, and started south along the coast, searching for the North Star, our six dogs carrying pack-loads of dried meat. As we proceeded south game became somewhat less abundant, but nevertheless we had no trouble on that score. Each day's march was more discouraging, however, than the one before, for we intended the coming year to explore the region west of Prince Patrick Island, and the farther south we had to go before finding a ship we could use for a base, the more difficult would be our work of the coming year. Eventually at Cape Kellett we found the Mary Sachs. Unfortunately she was not afloat, but had been hauled up on the beach for safety from the ice, for there is no harbour at that point. Wilkins had been removed from the command of the North Star when she was diverted to the Coronation Gulf work and had been put in charge of the Mary Sachs. By conditions which fully justified his action, to my mind, he had been compelled to haul his ship out on the beach about 5 miles east of Cape Kellett. Now that she had been hauled out she could not be re-launched, for we had no beams upon which we could slide her back into the water. Perforce, therefore, this became our base from which we had to do most of our work for the rest of the expedition. Had this base been 150 miles farther north on the north side of Banks Island, or 250 miles north in either Prince Patrick or Melville Island, the difficulties under which our work had to be done would have been greatly lessened. The spring of 1915 we commenced the exploratory work on January 9.

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With a party of three men besides myself, two sledges and twelve dogs, we travelled first from Cape Kellett northward along the west coast of Banks Island to the north-west corner of it, and thence northward over the moving pack until we got to a point about 100 miles offshore, west of Land's End, Prince Patrick Island. We found now, as we had found the previous year, that there was a strong current (varying from 2 miles per day to 10 or 15 miles per day) running south-west along the west coast of Prince Patrick Island and south along the west coast of Banks Island, to turn upon approaching the mainland and flow west along the coast of Alaska. While we still held on our north-westerly course, this current threatened to carry us south into the region explored the previous year. We accordingly were forced to turn north-east, facing the current directly and travelling against it for several days, until we were opposite the middle of Prince Patrick Island. Spring was again approaching. The food brought from Banks Island had given out; but there was no difficulty on that score, for, although bears were absent, seals were sufficiently abundant. But the trouble was that, with each day becoming a little warmer than the day before, we were having more and more trouble with open water between the moving floes. Accordingly, I attempted to go ashore at the north-west corner of Prince Patrick Island to finish the bit of unmapped coastline left between the farthest points reached by McClintock and Mecham when they were exploring Prince Patrick Island from their base on Melville Island. Now the current, however, became stronger than it had been and the open water delayed us more and more, so that instead of making headway against it, iwe were actually carried back until it was with the greatest difficulty that we finally made a landing on the south-west corner of Prince Patrick Island at Land's End. We found the coast as devoid of vegeta? tion and animal life as Mecham had found it sixty-two years before when he originally traversed it. As it happened, we were there at the identical time of year, and, like him, we found that the weather was foggy and snowing six days out of the seven. When we came ashore we had with us seal meat and blubber enough to last a few days, and this took us half of the way north along the west coast of Prince Patrick Island. During this time we were able to confirm Mecham's observations that there were no traces of game of any kind on the land. We had, however, a familiarity with the habits of seals which Mecham unfortunately had lacked, and when our supplies were done we turned to the west, travelling io or 12 miles till we came to the edge of the land-fast ice, where along the shore floe we knew that seals were to be expected. The weather was for the moment too bad to allow hunting, but when it cleared sufficiently we secured the seals, which again enabled us to proceed northward. In due course we came to Mecham's farthest and plotted the outline of the Prince Patrick coast from there to McClintock's farthest. We then continued to the north tip of Prince Patrick Island, where we picked up

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 297 a record left by McClintock. It happened curiously that we came to the cairn at nine o'clock on the evening of June 19, and that the record was dated "June 19th, p.m., 1853." The next day we proceeded north from Cape McClintock about 20 miles. That day after camping Storkerson climbed to the top of an ice hummock of over 20 feet elevation and from it saw on the sky line to the north-eastward an extensive new land. Next day we landed upon it, and, according to our instructions from the Government, hoisted the British flag and took possession. During the two or three following days we traced the coast south-eastward for about 30 miles. After that, on climbing a hill about 1500 feet in height, I formed the opinion that the land extended at least 50 miles beyond. The weather had now become very warm. As I wanted to communicate with our base at Cape Kellett, I did not dare to remain longer for fear of not being able to cross McClure Strait from Melville Island to Banks Island. Accordingly we proceeded south, exploring on the way Fitzwilliam Owen Island, which had been sighted from a distance by McClintock, and plotting (partly then and partly later) the coastline of Emerald Island, about half of which had been determined by McClintock. We also discovered just east of Fitzwilliam Island a second island of about the same size, distant from it about 5 miles. We then passed south through Fitzwilliam and Kellett straits to Cape Russell and thence across to Mercy Bay. According to the Admiralty charts, our course across McClure Strait from Cape Russell to Mercy Bay shouid have been less than half a point west of south. Mercy Bay can be plainly seen from the high land at Cape Russell, and, as we ascertained, the course to it is actually more than two points west of south. Evidently then, either Mercy Bay or Cape Russell must be wrongly located and our observations eventually showed that the chief discrepancy is in Mercy Bay. However, at the time we assumed that McClure's winter quarters at that place, because he had occupied that site two years, must have been correctly determined. We therefore spent several days at the monument erected by McClure, taking observa? tions for time and rating our watches. Of the ship itself, the most substantial remains we found were pieces of anchor chain. For the rest, there was a heap of half-decomposed coal, and there were a great many pieces of wood, chiefly barrel staves, scattered about. The place was everywhere littered with adze-chips and with shavings, showing the activity of the Eskimo. In one place only we discovered what may have been traces of food?a little brown heap, thoroughly decomposed, that might have been cheese or peas or flour or almost anything. After rating our watches and sewing pack saddles for the dogs out of some pieces of cloth we had with us, we struck diagonally across Banks Island to Cape Kellett. We found that by far the greatest river on the whole island drains into a bay a little smaller than Mercy Bay, which lies x

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 298 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 to the west of Mercy Bay, separated from it by a ridge about 6 miles in width. Curiously enough, this great bay is not indicated on the chart as laid down by McClure, although he shows another bay some 30 or 40 miles to the westward in size as large as Mercy Bay, where, as a matter of fact, no bay deeper than half a mile in reality exists. The previous year we had also found that , laid down by McClure at 730 45' N. on the west coast of Banks Island, does not exist, but that a great bay about 20 miles deep and 15 miles across does exist where none is indicated, just north of 720 45'. We also found that the west coast of Banks Island, which appears on the Admiralty chart as remarkably free of indentations, is instead a deeply embayed coast. Although it seems likely that during the last short period the coast of Banks Island has risen 5 or 10 feet, still it is clear that in the long period preceding the coast sank, " drowning " the mouths of the river-valleys, with a result that long arms of the sea reach inland here and there and that this is an embayed coast, full of harbours for small vessels where the chart does not lead us to expect any such. We arrived at the Kellett base on August 9, having been absent on this journey about 160 days. Making allowance for the various crooks in our trail and for the drift we had to fight on the ocean west of Prince Patrick Island, the total distance covered was probably beyond 2000 miles. Afew days after our arrival at Kellett a whaling vessel, the Polar Bear, Captain Louis Lane, which had been cruising to the south-westward in search of whales, was driven to the cape for shelter from a gale. This accident brought us the news of the world war which had already been raging over eleven months when the Polar Bear left the last telegraph station at Nome, Alaska, in July. The shock of this news was great, but perhaps not greater than it had been to every one else a year earlier. Captain Lane said, and it seemed so to us, that undoubtedly the war would be over before the following summer, and we accordingly decided to carry on our work. Captain Lane also gave us the news that we were supposed to be dead. He now took out for us despatches giving the news that we were alive and successful to the extent of having demonstrated the feasibility of our plan of travelling where we listed on the sea ice without carrying food, and also that we had discovered a new land of considerable but as yet undetermined extent, which land we intended next year to explore, as well as the regions beyond. The season of 1916 we left Cape Kellett in January, travelling up the west coast of Banks Island and around the north end, and crossing from Mercy Bay to . We then proceeded up the gulf and crossed the narrow part of Melville Island from Bushman Cove to Hecla Bay. We followed the coast north to Cape Grassy, and then struck across to our new land. From the point where we struck the new land we followed it west, losing a good deal of time in determining the detail of a very

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 299 large bay. We found, as McClintock and Mecham had found before us, that in the spring this region is so beset with fogs that he who travels every day is half of the time in doubt as to where he is going, and never knows whether he is headed inland or out to sea until he either stumbles against a cut bank or finds himself floundering among the hummocks of the offshore pack. It may be said that no good mapping can be done in this sort of weather, and that is true. Mecham and McClintock realized that and commented on it. In those cases where we have been fortunate in having clear weather on the same ground where they had snow or fog (in Prince Patrick Island), we have found their maps incorrect (as they expected and foretold), but no more incorrect than must be the case when one stumbles ahead in a fog. And so it will doubtless prove with our work shouid some one follow us in more fortunate weather. But, like our predecessors, we at least determined the great features of the land. Whenever the sun came out we took observations for latitude and . After exploring this large bay and determining the west and north-west coasts of our new land, we proceeded north-eastward to Cape Isachsen on Ellef Ringnes Island. In going there we followed the edge of the shore floe which runs nearly straight, living exclusively on seals as usual, and having their blubber for fuel. Our purpose now was to explore the region north of Ellef Ringnes Island, thinking that the floe might turn northward from Cape Isachsen, as it was almost bound to do if " Crocker Land " were there. We found, however, that the floe runs north-eastward in almost a straight line for Cape Thomas Hubbard. After following it about 50 miles we came upon a new land, which we have temporarily called " Second Land," because it was the second island of considerable size to be discovered by us. We found the island roughly three-cornered, with its north tip in 8i? 10' N., in the vicinity of ioo? W. After deter? mining the outline of this island fully and ascertaining that it has a diameter of about 40 miles, we started south towards Hassel Sound. In- cidentally, we discovered a number of small islands that lie in the strait between our Second Land and Axel Heiberg Island. Passing south through Hassel Sound we found it to be over 15 miles wide at its narrowest point instead of about 3 miles, as indicated on Admiralty Chart No. 2118. Near the south tip of Ellef Ringnes Island we found a record deposited by the commander of the Crocker Land Expedition, Donald MacMillan, who had been there at Easter time. It was now late in July of the same year (1916). The record told us that MacMillan had come all the way from Etah in North Greenland for the purpose of exploring Findlay Island, and that he had barely reached the island when, because his supplies of pemmican and the like had nearly run out, he had to start back. Besides running short of food, MacMillan had the hard luck to strike Findlay Island in thick weather, for his record told us that after remain-

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 3oo THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 ing in camp there for two days, he had been forced to start back without having any opportunity to look about him. It was for this reason that, although he visited the island several months ahead of us, he failed to discover that it does not exist in any such form as indicated on the Admiralty chart, where it has a diameter of 70 or 80 miles from north-east to south-west. As a matter of fact, there is a little island of about 10 or 12 miles in "diameter where the Admiralty chart show the north-east corner of the great (supposed) Findlay Island. It was on this little island that MacMUlan's party had been encamped during the two or three days of storm. Passing around the south end of this island, we could see no land to the south-west where Sherard Osborn had reported the land which he originally named Findlay Island. I had no doubt, however, that such a land must exist, for Osborn's description of it, as seen from the north- west corner of Bathurst Island, is quite clear. We accordingly headed south-west. After travelling 30 miles or so we finally sighted three islands. The most easterly of these is about 3 miles in diameter and is undoubtedly Patterson Island; the most westerly is undoubtedly Findlay Island; and an island about the size of Patterson but somewhat lower lies halfway between them, and apparently was not seen by Osborn. Findlay Island is about 10 miles in diameter and 600 or 700 feet high. To the westward of Findlay Island lies a new island which, in the order of discovery, we have temporarily called " Third Land." This island is long and narrow, with its main axis running north-north-west and south-south- east, and a diameter in that direction of about 45 miles, with a transverse diameter averaging about 12 miles. When we landed on Third Land it was August 9, and we had already for more than a month been wading every day through water on top of the ice. The dogs had to swim every now and then, and the sledge floated after them. We had in the bottom of the sledge two or three empty tin cans which acted as buoys, and the men walked with the sledge to keep it from capsizing in the water, while I waded ahead. This is much more unpleasant work than exploration at fifty below zero, but it was not the discomfort of it that stopped us, but rather the danger to our sledge, for the ice was now so unbelievably cut up into deep ravines of all sizes that, although the sledge was of the strongest, we were in fear of breaking it. This we could not afford to do, for the autumn was coming on with more favourable weather for exploration. In order to save the sledge, to rest ourselves and the dogs, to explore Third Land, and to get a good rating of our watches, we went ashore and remained encamped for about three weeks, making side excursions for the exploration of the island. Shortly after we got ashore the ice began to move slightly, and we never thereafter dared to go out on it to hunt seals for fuel, thinking that on such an excursion we might be carried off, should the floes begin to move in earnest. It was a rather disagreeable feature of the summer, therefore, that our fuel was exceedingly limited. Fortunately, the caribou

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were remarkably fat, and we were able to cook one meal a day with caribou tallow without killing any more animals than were necessary to feed ourselves and the dogs. It was rather exasperating that when we visited this island a year later we discovered a beautiful coal-mine about 9 miles away from the place where we had spent three weeks almost without fuel. The reason we had not found the coal the first year was that it was surrounded by some hills* covered with a remarkably sticky mud and nearly devoid of grass. This is a sort of country not only difficult to travel over but also sure to be without game, and we had never gone into it. When we came to the.same place the following spring snow was still on the ground, and in crossing with sledges we came upon an unlimited supply of coal easily accessible at the surface. We have seen coal in Amund Ringnes Island, Third Land, Melville Island, and Banks Island, and it is probable that none of the islands we have investigated, with the possible exceptions of Second Land and Victoria Island, is devoid of coal. The quality varies greatly, from deposits that consist of coniferous tree-trunks that can scarcely be called coal at all, to deposits of good lignite such as we found at Cape Grassy on Melville Island. There are bituminous coal and shale, and mineral tar is also found in connection with some of the deposits. By the first week of September it was clear that the ice between these islands was not going to move, and by then the water on top of it had frozen sufficiently to carry a sledge without breaking through except now and then. Accordingly, we struck west from the north end of our Third Land for the east coast of the island first discovered [(First Land). We then followed the east coast south and the south coast west to the south- west corner. The reason for doing so was that I had sent a party of hunters the previous spring, some of them to spend the summer in Melville Island, securing skins for clothing and drying meat for winter and spring use, and some to meet me at the south-west corner of First Land (near lat. 780 N., long. 1150 W.) with the idea that we might possibly be able to spend the winter there if the sealing proved good. For in our system of exploration the seal is ever the most important animal, as he gives us not only food but light and fuel as well. On arrival at the rendezvous we found no one and no messages, so evidently this part of our programme had failed. We then struck south towards Melville Island, travelling in thick and disagreeable weather, for there was no longer much daylight on cloudy days (it was mid-October). At Cape Grassy we met the party that we shouid have found in First Land. It turned out that they had separated from the main party on Liddon Gulf the previous summer with the best of intentions of coming to First Land. But by the time they reached Cape Grassy the same ice con? ditions which had stopped our summer travel at Third Land had brought them to the pass which we had feared?they had broken their sledge so badly that they could not proceed. Luckily they found a very good coal-mine

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 302 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 near the place where the sledge broke (the mine is just west of Cape Grassy). They also found this part of Melville Island reasonably, although not abundantly, supplied with game. Winter darkness was now fast approach? ing, and they had secured about enough meat to last them till the sun would return. From this camp I proceeded south to Liddon Gulf, where our other hunting party had been more successful (under the command of Storker Storkerson), and here we spent the winter. This winter (1916-1917) there were seventeen of us in Melville Island, with about fifty dogs. We lived in houses of musk-ox skins and burned coal in sheet-iron stoves which we made of tin cans that we happened to have with us. For light we used musk-ox tallow. We were able to clothe ourselves suitably with caribou skins that had been secured during the summer, and we spent the winter in comfort and the best of health. The following spring (1917) we struck north-eastward from Cape Grassy for the south-east corner of First Land, followed the east coast of it to the north-east corner, and then travelled out upon the moving ice a distance of about 140 miles from First Land (N. lat. 8o? 30', W. long. 1130). At this point two of our party of four were taken ill with a disease that had nothing to do with any hardships suffered, and we had to give up the journey, starting back for Cape Isachsen. It was with some difficulty that we got ashore, for one of the men was so ill that he had to ride on the sledge, and another was barely able to walk. The first day we struck land we saw no signs of game, but the second day we came upon twenty- three caribou, all of which we killed. We were thus enabled to establish a hospital camp, where inside of three weeks, on a diet of caribou meat eaten mainly raw, as I considered to be" indicated " for this disease, both invalids became well. We then travelled south, revisiting the point on Third Land where we had rated our watches the year before and taking observations there again. It was at this time that we discovered the coal-mine which would have been so useful to us the previous year. We then proceeded south along the west coast of north-western Bathurst Island and then across to Melville Island near Bradford Point, and so south along the east coast and west along the south coast to Kellett and McClintock's depot at Dealy Island and Parry's Rock at Winter Harbour. Parry's Rock has been located by occultation and chronometer observation, not only by Parry, but by Kellett and McClintock and by members of the Canadian Geological Survey who were there with Captain Bernier. This is, therefore, the best located point in the whole archipelago. After getting good observations there for latitude and time, we crossed Melville Sound to Point John Russell at the north-east corner of Banks Island, where we picked up McClure's record announcing that from that point the autumn of 1850 he had seen to the north-east the waters of Melville Sound and had realized that he had discovered the North-West Passage. By reference to Parry's Rock our observations showed that Point John

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO r9i8 303

Russell is really a full degree of longitude farther west than indicated on the Admiralty charts. In general this applies to most of Banks Island, for different points of that island will have to be moved anything from half a degree to a degree farther west than now shown on the charts. We reached Point Russell late in July, and by the middle of August we were back at our base at Kellett. After some complications, into which we will not go here, we were able to leave Kellett late in August 1917, intending to make our way to the Pacific Ocean, but our ship was overtaken by the freeze-up and compelled to winter on the north coast of Alaska at Barter Island. It had been our intention to finish the expedition that year, but, as we were compelled to winter in any case, I decided not to keep the men idle, but to make a last journey northward into the Beaufort Sea. In this case my intention was to travel 200 or 300 miles from shore, so as to reach a point at least 200 miles farther north than the course taken by the Karluk on her drift from this point westward to Wrangel Island. I thought that were we to camp on an ice-floe about 200 miles north of the Karluk track, we would probably drift westward on a course approximately parallel to that of the Karluk and 200 miles north of it, finding ourselves at the end of a year of drifting somewhere north of Siberia, where we could easily get ashore by commencing to travel in February or March, landing in Siberia in April or May. I intended to command this party in person, and Mr. Storkerson was to be one of my companions; but during the winter on a visit to the settlement at Herschel Island I somehow caught typhoid fever. There were three of us who got it, including one of the Mounted Police, and of the three I was the only one to live through. This illness took me early in January, when it was my intention to start out on the ice late in that month. At first we did not realize how serious the illness was, and I had hope of recovering and being able to lead the ice party. When that hope was finally given up I asked Storkerson to take command, but so much time had now been lost that he was not able to start until early in March. This was, however, an earlier start than we had been able to make from a similar point four years before. Besides that, Storkerson now had a larger number of dogs and better ones, and more and better sledges. They also found very low temperatures as compared with the unfortunate warm weather we had been compelled to struggle against in 1914, and therefore made much better progress. They travelled north from Cross Island approximately on the route followed by Mikkelsen and Leffingwell in 1907, when Storkerson was a member of their party. But now Storkerson was able to send back his first support party from about the same point where their advanced party had to turn back in 1907. The second support party accompanied Storkerson about a degree of latitude north beyond Mikkelsen's and LeffingwelPs furthest. It was at first Storkerson's intention to travel

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 304 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF 1913 TO 1918 some distance further north, but at this. point they met a wide lead that remained persistently open for a long time, and so he concluded to send the support party back and to make here his permanent camp. They selected a stout floe about 7 miles in diameter and 15 or more miles in length and remained encamped on it for six months. During this time they drifted in various directions, mainly according to the local winds, though there may have. been currents also. Although their drift was a total of over 450 miles, they made good north-westward only about a degree, reaching 740 N. latitude in the vicinity of 1510 W. longitude. During this drift they passed over the site of Keenan Land as reported by the whaling captain, Keenan, and recorded on many circumpolar charts. On the site of Keenan Land, as shown on the American Geographical Society's circumpolar chart of 1912, they got a sounding of over 3000 metres, and the deepest sounding secured on this trip was 4700 metres, with bottom sample secured. At the end of six months of drifting, Storkerson concluded that there was little chance of their moving west so as to be north of Siberia in the spring. The main consideration, however, which inclined him to start ashore was that he himself was taken ill with asthma?a curious thing, for there is no known connection between any circumstance of his life on the ice and the coming on of this disease. The men who were with Storkerson all agreed that they had so far had no hardships, and that they could see no danger for either themselves or the dogs, for food was abundant and the floe so solid that it promised to give a fairly safe home during the winter. Nevertheless, it is pretfcy clear that the men were getting homesick (Storkerson had four men besides himself), and this homesickness doubtless was a contributing cause in their eagerness to have Storkerson's illness taken as a reason for going ashore. The season was almost the worst of the year for travel. It was the first week of October; the sun was about to disappear for the winter; the young ice which had cemented the old floes together was weak and treacherous underneath its blanket of soft snow that hid all the danger spots. I should say that of all times of year this is the most dangerous, although perhaps not the most difficult time to travel. However, in his report to me Storkerson covers his journey of 300 miles to land by saying, " We started on October 9, and reached the north coast of Alaska on November 6 without any trouble." They had been on the ice altogether about eight months. In a letter which I wrote to the Royal Geographical Society, and which was printed in the Journal for October 1918, I have already summarized the main scientific results of the expedition, and it is not necessary to do so here. I should like to say, however, that although we have discovered lands of considerable size and made scientific observations of various sorts, the most important result of our expedition is that we have demonstrated the fact that men, unaided by. any such modern contrivance as, for instance,

This content downloaded from 131.232.13.6 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:05:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION OF1913 TO 1918 3?S the aeroplane, but depending on rifles and other things that can easily be carried in one or two sledges, can travel in the Arctic regions (with the single exception of the interior of Greenland) without carrying food with them, and they can do this not only in safety but in comfort. No one who has taken part in any of our more extensive ice journeys has found the life uncomfortable or has seen anything which leads him to consider the work dangerous. We have established that the ^umber of seals and the ease with which they may be obtained have no definite relation to latitude or depth of the ocean or to distance from land. So far as we know, they shouid be as easily obtained and as numerous at the North Pole as at any other latitude. No region has, for instance, been described as more desolate than the " polar ocean without life" of Markham north- west of Prince Patrick Island, and yet we never missed a meal or lacked for fuel. We could, so far as we can see, have lived there for years. In 1916, as we proceeded north along our First Land to Cape Isachsen and thence northward to Second Land, seals became gradually more numerous all the way. The fact might have been that they became fewer as we travelled north, but their increase (as it was) or their decrease (as it might have been) would in either case have no connection with latitude. In the work of this expedition we have had two main handicaps. One was the continual hope that our various ships might be able to co-operate with us. It was for this reason I used to make long journeys back to our southerly base, and always without any result. Once we had the strength of mind to spend the winter in Melville Island, which saved us about 400 miles of a return journey, and had we done similarly every year our geographic accomplishments would have been greater. The other handi- cap has been homesickness. I have always had a few men, such as Storkerson, who have not been homesick. But I have also on every party, unfortunately, had men who were not bound to the expedition by any agreement that I could force them to keep, and who were always anxious to get back south ; not because they were suffering any hardship or found themselves in any danger, but merely because they had "had enough." The conclusion is that with a small party of adaptable and ambitious men, prepared to remain away from civilization for three or four years and to spend the winter wherever the end of the summer finds them, be it on land or on moving ice, every part of the at present unexplored north polar ocean can be reached without the co-operation of a ship except to carry the party north and land them at some suitable base. One of the most, desirable of the places easily accessible would be Melville Island, but the work could be done from the north coast of Alaska or from Wrangel Island. I hope to organize such an expedition as soon as the scientific results of the one of ^3-1918 are in a fair way of being all published. I hope we can go north in ^22.

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The Work of the CANADIAN ARCTIC EXPEDITION

Vilbjalmur Stefansson ComxDander. 1913-1918.

From a Chart prepared by the Geodetic Survey of Canada.

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