Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: LBN33809 Country: Date: 2 October 2008

Keywords: Lebanon – Christians – – War – State protection – Internal relocation

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions

1. Is a Christian supporter of the Lebanese Forces who worked for a short time for the US in Iraq likely to be perceived as a supporter of the West and, if so, what are the likely repercussions? 2. Is there any information on the number of people who travelled from Lebanon to work in Iraq during the invasion and the nature of the work they were engaged in? Is there any information on how such people are treated on return? 3. Please advise on the availability of state protection. 4. Is a Christian supporter of the Lebanese Forces likely to be safer in any particular part of Lebanon (i.e. availability of relocation)?

RESPONSE

1. Is a Christian supporter of the Lebanese Forces who worked for a short time for the US in Iraq likely to be perceived as a supporter of the West and, if so, what are the likely repercussions?

No information could be located as to whether Lebanese workers returning from Iraq are likely to be targeted as ―supporters of the West‖. The Lebanese Forces form part of the pro- Western currently in power in Lebanon, and are in conflict with other Christian groups who support the pro-Syrian , namely the and al-Marada. There is also a historic dimension to this conflict, as the various Christian groups, under the same leaders (or families), fought each other during the civil war period. Information on the Lebanese Forces (LF) and the various political groupings currently existing in Lebanon is provided below, along with a collection of current media reports regarding intra-Christian conflict, research reports assessing the position of the various Christian groups and the likelihood of violence being directed toward them by perceived enemies, and previous RRT research responses on the subject of Christians in Lebanon. Please note that references to Lebanese Forces ―members‖ and ―supporters‖ do not seem to make a distinction between the two.

Lebanese Forces and Lebanese politics

The Christian Lebanese Forces, led by , form part of the pro-Western ‗March 14 Alliance‘ presently in government in Lebanon, which is dominated by the Sunni of Saad al-Hariri, and also encompasses the Progressive Socialist Party of , and several smaller parties. The opposition grouping, known as the ‗March 8 Alliance‘, is dominated by the Shia groups Hizbollah and Amal, with support from other small parties, including the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of , and the Marada party of Suleiman Franjieh (for background on the Lebanese Forces, and on other political parties in Lebanon, see: ‗Political Parties in Lebanon‘ (undated), Arab Media Watch website http://www.arabmediawatch.com/amw/CountryBackgrounds/Lebanon/PoliticalPartiesinLeba non/tabid/171/Default.aspx – Accessed 3 September 2008 – Attachment 1; for information on the March 14 Alliance and al-Marada, and intra-Christian conflict in North Lebanon, see: RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response LBN33272, 12 May – Attachment 2).

Background and current situation of Christian groups in Lebanon

An expert opinion provided to the RRT in May 2007 by veteran correspondent Robert Fisk states that tensions between Christian groups in Lebanon exceed those between Muslim and Christian groups:

…the bad feelings between Christian Militiamen, and Christian and Christian here cannot be over-emphasised. They are much more likely to kill than say vs Christians for reasons which I won‘t bore you with now, inter-Christian fighting particularly between Phalange Lebanese forces, and other Militiamen, has always been particularly brutal and that‘s something that you need to bear in mind (Fisk, R. 2007, ‗Comments on situation of Lebanese Forces in Lebanon and those allegedly involved in the murder of Dany Chamoun‘, 23 April – Attachment 3; RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31484, 11 May – Attachment 4).

A selection of recent reports from Lebanese and regional media outlets suggest that tensions between Christian groups have not abated since Fisk provided this opinion. A recent armed clash between supporters of the Lebanese Forces and supporters of al-Marada in Bsarma resulted in two deaths, and a recent apology delivered by LF leader Samir Geagea for atrocities committed during the civil war has reignited public anger between Christian groups. A selection of reports from September 2008 follows below.

An 18 September 2008 article in the Lebanon Daily Star attests to ill-feeling between Christian groups in the north of the country. The article reports on a clash between members of the Lebanese Forces and of the Marada party, a pro-Syrian Maronite organisation based around , in which two people were killed. The conflict took place in Bsarma, Koura, and it may be of interest to note that the Lebanese Forces ―supporter‖ who died is not described as a ―member‖ (Abdullah, A. 2008, ‗Two die in clashes between Marada, Lebanese Forces‘, Daily Star, 18 September http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=96112 – Accessed 23 September 2008 – Attachment 5).

A 24 September opinion piece from Al Hayat newspaper provides a pessimistic appraisal of moves toward reconciliation by the various confessional groups in Lebanon, between Sunni and Shia, Shia and Druze, Shia and Christian, and Christian and Christian. The report notes the recent apology by Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea ―over the war practices of the Lebanese Forces‖ during the civil conflict in Lebanon, and claims that the Lebanese Forces ―may now pay the price of the ongoing reconciliations‖ as it is being isolated by its ―Christian foes‖, primarily the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun and the Maradah party of Sulieman Franjieh:

The excessive talk about reconciliations in Lebanon does not mean that the parties involved are heading toward a minimum common denominator that allows the state to retrieve its role and to preserve the right of the nation to sovereignty or the right of citizens to a decent life. As a matter of fact, reconciliations do not attempt to achieve any of these goals. So far, each of the parties involved seeks goals that serve his interests alone, turning a blind eye to the interests and concerns shared with others.

…Regardless of the objectives of each side behind the type of the opted for reconciliation and the chosen party to the reconciliation, the Christian-Christian reconciliation between the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement is getting more complicated and facing more stumbles. In fact, turbulences and even more violence are likely among the Christian sides.

Until the national dialogue sponsored by the president reaches its farfetched goal, binding agreements to all, the realities on the Christian ground contradict the climate of reconciliation prevailing in other scenes even when the objectives and outcomes of those reconciliations are at best limited.

The ―apology‖ made by Dr. Samir Geagea over the war practices of the Lebanese Forces revealed the weaknesses of these reconciliations, of the national dialogue, and even the Taef Accord that set the grounds for the second republic. The timing of the apology and the generated responses show that none of those who had committed similar practices and are now seeking reconciliation believe that their history is subject to discussion and their policy to review. This is exactly what happened after the Taef Accord, especially with the general pardon which absolved all criminal acts related to those practices. Back then, under the Syrian mandate, the regime had to fabricate charges of bombing a church against Geagea to exclude him from the pardon and ensure another trial for his practices although he had been forced to fight the war of elimination against General Aoun to make the Taef Accord acceptable for the Christians. In other words, the Christian side which paid the heavy price for the Taef Accord is the same side which may now pay the price of the ongoing reconciliations, especially with the efforts to neutralise as many of its allies in March 14 as possible, making it stand alone face to face against its Christian foes such as the Patriotic Movement, the Maradah and other parties in March 8. The focus is on this Christian front in particular because it constituted a central player during the civil war and continues to exercise the capacity to object.

To set the ground for national conciliation, the apology should have been made by all the forces that participated in the war. At the same time, the general pardon should not have been a replacement for the need of every side to review and correct its experience in a direction that makes conciliation with others possible. When the apology finally came, although late, by Geagea alone, his foes saw in it nothing but another condemnation at the time when such an apology should have been a moral and political introduction to national dialogue. If anything, this is a negative indicator of the extent to which this national dialogue will come up with the desired reconciliation. (Iskandar, A. 2008, ‗Lebanon: Reconciliations, Apology & Dialogue‘, Al Hayat, 24 September – Attachment 6).

A 24 September article in the Daily Star quotes a Maronite political analyst and retired General who claims that Christians in Lebanon are ―marginalised‖ from the political process, and that ―intense personal animosity separating the leaders‖ of the major Christian groups continues to hinder reconciliation. The analyst is also quoted stating that Christian areas will be a key battleground in the 2009 national elections, as the results in Sunni and Shia areas are ―apparently secure‖, so the winner may be determined by who can capture the vote of the ―sizeable Christian electoral contingent which is not hitched to either side‖:

The lack of reconciliation between the country‘s Sunnis and Shiites also underscores the major power dynamic in the country, as the growing strength of Hizbullah here mirrors the regional Shiite revival led by , Hanna said. Some Sunnis see Lebanon as the next domino which could ―fall‖ into the Shiite orbit after Iraq, dimming the prospects for a rapid rapprochement, Hanna added.

―The future of Lebanon will be between these two factions,‖ he said. ―The Druze are marginalised, as well as the Christians.‖

Christian reconciliation, meanwhile, continues to founder on the intense personal animosity separating the leaders, despite Geagea‘s weekend mea culpa, Hanna said.

―The personalities involved are very stubborn ... and very narcissistic,‖ Hanna added.

Geagea‘s Lebanese Forces fought during the Civil War against Change and Reform bloc leader Michel Aoun and Marada head Suleiman Franjieh, both part of the March 8 alliance.

The , which traditionally has worked to stifle intra-Christian quarrels, is hesitating to jump into the role of peacemaker after its ―bad experience‖ in trying to mediate the selection of president in the spring, Hanna said. The church presented a handful of names to gatherings of Christian leaders but could not get the feuding factions to agree on any candidate.

―There is no reconciliation on the horizon,‖ added Hanna, who is a member of the Maronite League, which has been pushing behind the scenes for reconciliation. Hanna said the league was ―powerless.‖

The horizon does, however, include general elections slated for next May, and politicians‘ focus on those polls to decide their standoff might well explain their recent reconciliation overtures, Hanna said.

With the outcome in Sunni- and Shiite-dominated areas apparently secure, Christian regions will likely become the elections‘ central battleground, so Geagea‘s apology might have been targeting the favour of the sizeable Christian electoral contingent which is not hitched to either side and more appreciates peaceful approaches than belligerent rhetoric, Hanna said.

―Everything is about the elections,‖ Hanna said. ―Everybody will try to build on this reconciliation to enhance his situation vis a vis the coming election.

―This is about power. Nobody is transcending the current situation for the future of the Christians‖ (Bluhm, M. 2008, ‗‗Reconciliation‘ becomes buzzword as elections near; Analysts say politicians‘ posturing does not reflect sincere drive to resolve differences‘, Daily Star, 24 September – Attachment 7).

A 24 September report from the Daily Star quotes Future Party Leader Saad al-Hariri criticising FPM leader Michel Aoun and leader Suleiman Franjieh for ―seeking to ignite strife within Lebanon‘s Christian community‖ in the wake of LF leader Samir Geagea‘s apology:

Meanwhile, Hariri told an iftar banquet at his residence on Tuesday that ―some parties‖ were seeking to ignite strife within Lebanon‘s Christian community. ―The same parties that succeeded in igniting inter-Muslim strife are now trying to drag the Christians into a similar scenario,‖ Hariri said.

―I simply don‘t understand some parties‘ unjustified reluctance to engage in reconciliation ... On the contrary, they insist on digging up the past,‖ he added, hinting at Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun and Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh.

Both Aoun and Franjieh took hard positions in response to Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea‘s recent apology for mistakes that his party may have committed during the Civil War (Abdullah, H. 2008, ‗Future, Hizbullah pave way toward Nasrallah-Hariri meeting; Rice pledges continued US support for Lebanon‘, Daily Star, 24 September – Attachment 8).

A 23 September analysis of the political situation in Lebanon from Xinhua News Agency quotes an editorial from Lebanese newspaper Al-Balad which claims that ―differences and disputes among Lebanese Christian leaders becomes [sic] deeper and more complicated‖. The report also quotes ―local political observers‖ who believe that ―reconciliation between different parties does not seem to be happening in the near future‖:

While reconciliation efforts between Lebanese Sunni and Shiite leaders is on the way, differences and disputes among Lebanese Christian leaders becomes deeper and more complicated, local Al-Balad daily editorial said Tuesday.

Lebanese Christians are divided into pro-government and opposition supporters.

Christian opposition majority leader MP Michel Aoun and his ally Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh, who is popular in the northern regions of Lebanon, are at odds with pro-government Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea who is trying to regain his presence on the Christian scene following the bad reputation his party gained during 15 years of civil war (1975-1990) in the country.

…Aoun said his Free Patriotic Movement was not involved in violence, and there is no ―blood feud‖ with other groups.

Geagea also lashed out at Aoun and Franjieh on Sunday, accusing them of replacing their traditional slogan ―My country is always right,‖ by the slogan that and Syrian are always right.

…As the inter-Christian conflicts among leaders having been going on for a long time, reconciliation between different parties does not seem to be happening in the near future, or at least, not before the coming parliamentary elections in 2009, local political observers believe (Haidamous, S. 2008, ‗Roundup: Deep differences among Lebanese Christian leaders foil national reconciliation‘, Xinhua News Agency, 23 September – Attachment 9). A July 2008 report from the International Crisis Group (ICG), titled The New Lebanese Equation: the Christians’ Central Role, assesses the situation of the various Christian political forces in Lebanon, particularly in light of the alliances they have formed with Muslim groups. The report also provides information on the history of the Lebanese Christian militias and political parties, their relationships with one another, their stances toward , and present position:

Syria‘s 2005 withdrawal enabled the return and release of key Christian leaders together with the reassertion of core demands. But the Christian political scene split into two camps. On one side, Samir Geagea‘s Lebanese Forces and ‘s Phalanges banked on the end of all residual Syrian influence, joined forces with former pro-Syrian actors (a majority of Sunnis and Druze) and called upon the international community to help restore a sovereign Lebanese state. This latter goal would be achieved, in particular, by setting up an international tribunal charged with investigating former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri‘s murder, imputed to Damascus, and by pressing for Hizbollah‘s disarmament. On the other side, General Aoun‘s Free Patriotic Movement challenged the political system as a whole, breaking its isolation by forging a controversial understanding with Hizbollah, Syria‘s main Lebanese ally.

…As long as legitimate elections do indeed take place, this development will have profound consequences. Against a background of significant polarisation between Sunnis and Shiites, community-based voting ensures that the Muslim electorate is decided in advance (the Sunni community generally follows the Future Movement party led by Saad al-Hariri; most Shiites support Hizbollah). The relative ensuing balance of these parties gives the Christian vote unaccustomed weight, tipping the balance of power in favour of one or other of the groupings which dominate the coalitions in Lebanese politics.

…In terms of their societal base, the Lebanese Forces wanted to expand beyond their traditional areas of influence (the Bécharré region in the North and the poor Christian districts in the large cities), and worked hard to win over the urban middle classes, particularly in professional unions and universities. The party was therefore pulled in two directions by a support base still marked by the militia experience and a new generation still in the process of being established.

The three large Christian groups were badly placed following the withdrawal of Syria (long their cause célèbre) to confront the resulting challenges, be it reform of the political system or defending the community‘s rights. More than ever, the Christians were the most fragile religious block. In contrast to the Sunnis, Shiites and , the Christians do not live under the almost unique authority of one leader (or zaim). They do not enjoy external sponsorship ready to provide massive support (from Iran and Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis Hizbollah and the Future Movement respectively). The Christian community is regionally isolated and internally divided.

…The marginalised Aounist movement also became ensnared in Lebanese realpolitik: against his own pro-sovereignty positions, the General allied himself with some of Damas‘ most notorious allies such as Sleiman Frangié and Michel al-Murr, thereby avoiding an electoral route to the benefit of influential Syrian players in Lebanon.

The General‘s coalition, the change and reform block, obtained 21 seats in total. The Free Patriotic Movement itself created a surprise by taking 14 seats, almost all the seats reserved in , the Maronite Christian fiefdom. Its score should be partly put down to religious impulse. As Crisis Group noted in its report at the end of 2005, ―upon his return he rapidly adjusted to the sectarian dynamics, emerging as protector of the , indeed, their last line of defence‖. But other factors played a role, particularly his populist anti- corruption line which resonated in a Christian community which felt pushed aside from power and therefore receptive to anti-establishment ideas.

…The FPM thus hopes to co-opt a number of independent Christian figures and is counting (possible exaggeratedly) on the return to power of those marginalised during Syrian withdrawal, particularly the leader of Zghorta, Sleiman Frangié.

…The widespread perception that there is a certain amount of submissiveness among Christians in the March 14 Alliance towards their Sunni partners has cost them in terms of popularity in the Christian community. That particularly explains why the Aounist movement, contrary to the repeated forecasts of its detractors, did not collapse after its entente with Hizbollah as the Christian alternative was also ambiguous.

…A survey by Sofres from February 2008 announced that only 29 per cent of Christians considered Michel Aoun to be their political leader, compared to 35 per cent for Samir Geagea and 9 per cent for Amine Gemayel. The Sofres survey was published by the nowlebanon.com website, close to the positions of the March 14 Alliance and vehemently against the Aoun/Hizbollah duo. However, the surveys to which the opposition refer indicate that 40 per cent of votes favour Aoun, less than 20 per cent for Geagea, 11 per cent for Sleiman Frangié and 10 per cent for Gemayel (the rest are divided between local leaders) [footnote].

…For the Lebanese Forces Hizbollah must first be confronted politically not militarily.

…While Geagea benefited from a proper Christian hinterland (around Bsharré in Mount Lebanon)…

…The resulting crisis led to a resolution of the presidency issue (through the Doha Agreement) in a way which did not necessarily serve the interests of the Lebanese Forces, Christian heavyweights in the March 14 Alliance. They had hoped to nominate a president from amongst their own but instead they have to build a relationship with a figure close to Syria and the army (against which they had long fought). Further, the President will very likely have to establish his legitimacy by putting a certain amount of distance between himself and the Sunnis of the Future Movement – and therefore his Christian allies.

…Above all, the March 14 Alliance saw him as a pure product of Syrian domination.

Indeed, Sleiman did climb up the ranks during Syrian occupation and has excellent relations with Damas (International Crisis Group 2008, The New Lebanese Equation: the Christians’ Central Role, Middle East Report No. 78, 15 July – Attachment 10).

An earlier ICG report from July 2006 states that ―[r]eflecting previous political alignments, Maronites are divided between the Lebanese Forces, which sees in Hizbollah a mortal enemy … and its civil war rival, Michel Aoun‖, and that ―Aoun‘s Free Patriotic Movement has stuck to its seemingly unnatural alliance with Nasrallah‖ [leader of Hizbollah] (International Crisis Group 2006, /Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing out of the Abyss, Crisis Group Report No. 57, 25 July, p. 15 – Attachment 11). http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_confl ict/57_israel_palestine_lebanon___climbing_out_of_the_abyss.pdf )

Three reports from the Immigration and Refugee Board of , dated between February 2007 and February 2008, provide information on the position of Christians in Lebanon, violence between Christian groups, and the likelihood of Hezbollah violence against anti- Syrian Christian groups, such as the LF:  A February 2008 report quotes sources suggesting that relations between Christian groups worsened as a result of the Israel/Lebanon conflict in July and August 2006, particularly between the Lebanese Forces, who are strongly anti-Hezbollah, and supporters of Michel Aoun‘s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), allies of Hezbollah. The report also points to the legacy of the civil war as a source of conflict between Christian groups, and is unable to provide any direct evidence of Hezbollah violence toward Christians. The IRB report notes that, according to an International Crisis Group report from October 2007, much of Lebanon‘s Christian community supports Hezbollah, and that a November 2007 Christian Science Monitor report states that Hezbollah ―party leaders state that the role of the party‘s military wing is to defend Lebanon against Israeli attacks, not to fight the ‖. Nonetheless, the report quotes Christian sources from the FPM claiming that Lebanese Christians are marginalised; a report in Le Figaro from August 2007 quoting a Maronite cardinal claiming that Christians are caught between the Sunnis and Shia Muslims in a struggle for power, but that Lebanese Islam is traditionally tolerant toward Christians (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008, LBN102732.FE – Lebanon: Treatment of Christians and availability of state protection for Christians; whether Hezbollah targets Christians in particular (2007 – 2008), 22 February http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451900 – Accessed 25 September 2008 – Attachment 12).

 A November 2007 report provides information suggesting that there is little evidence of mistreatment of Lebanese Forces members and supporters by Lebanese authorities or Hezbollah since the release of Samir Geagea from prison in July 2005. The report quotes ―an assistant professor of social sciences at the Lebanese American University‖ who suggests that the LF and its sympathisers are no longer mistreated following Geagea‘s release, and that the party is free to organise and act without state or other interference. Nonetheless, the report notes the killing of two LF members by a supporter of Suleiman Franjieh‘s Marada, and that Franjieh had refused to concede defeat to the LF in northern Lebanon in the June 2005 general elections. The report also quotes sources stating that publicly anti-Syrian journalists and LF supporters have been injured and killed in car bomb attacks. The aforementioned ―assistant professor of social sciences at the Lebanese American University‖ is quoted claiming that he was not aware of any anti-LF activities by Hezbollah, and noting the geographical separation of the two organisations (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, LBN102623.E – Lebanon: Treatment of members and supporters of the Lebanese Forces (LF) by the Lebanese and Syrian authorities, and by Hezbollah (March 2005 – October 2007), 1 November http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451547 – Accessed 25 September 2008 – Attachment 13).

 A report from February 2007 quotes a ―a professor of history from the University of Balamand specialising in the Middle East‖ who claims that the geographical separation of Christians and Muslims is clear-cut, and that the majority of Christians in Lebanon live in areas where there are very few Muslims. The professor specifies the area from East up the coast to the southern suburbs of Tripoli, and from the coast to the Mount Lebanon range between these areas, as almost exclusively Christian areas, apart from a handful of Shia Muslim villages (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, LBN102320.E – Lebanon: Treatment of Christians, particularly Maronites; the availability of state protection (2006), 19 February – Attachment 14).

Three previous RRT research responses provide pertinent information regarding the security situation for Christians in Lebanon:

 Question 2 of RRT Research Response LBN33661, of September 2008, provides information on the ability of Hezbollah to operate in the north of Lebanon. The response quotes sources suggesting that Hezbollah‘s operations are generally considered to be limited to the south of Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, but also locates recent information claiming that Hezbollah may be arming proxy groups in the north to engage followers of the 14 March Alliance (RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response LBN33661, 9 September, pp. 36- 45 – Attachment 15).

 Question 2 of RRT Research Response LBN31266, of 24 January 2007, provides information on violence between the LF and other Christian groups (RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31266, 24 January – Attachment 16).

 RRT Research Response LBN31756, of 30 May 2007, provides advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade regarding the position of the Lebanese Forces and the safety of members and followers:

Membership of the Lebanese Forces is no longer banned in Lebanon. LF congregate openly, display their flag on t-shirts, houses and vehicles and participate in Parliament. However, the current political climate in Lebanon is volatile and tense. Some members of the opposition grouping are vehemently opposed to the policies of the Government coalition, of which the Lebanese Forces are a part. While we are not aware of a campaign by any group to target LF members, targeting of individual LF members cannot be ruled out (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2007, DFAT Report No. 648 – Lebanon: RRT Information Request: LBN31756, 30 May – Attachment 17; RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31756, 30 May – Attachment 18).

2. Is there any information on the number of people who travelled from Lebanon to work in Iraq during the invasion and the nature of the work they were engaged in? Is there any information on how such people are treated on return?

No specific information could be located on the number of people who travelled from Lebanon to work in Iraq, or how such workers were treated on their return to Lebanon. Sources indicate that many foreign nationals, with estimates ranging from 30,000 security staff, to more than 100,000 overall, have been employed in Iraq through contractors engaged by the US government, mainly by smaller subcontracting companies engaged by logistics and security companies such as Bechtel, Halliburton, and Blackwater. A source reporting on kidnappings in Iraq states that Lebanese electrical workers, construction workers, and travel agency workers are among those abducted.

A Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on private security contractors in Iraq states that ―some 50 private security contractors employing more than 30,000 employees are working in Iraq for an array of clients‖, and that ―citizens of some 30 countries are employed by private security companies in Iraq‖:

It is estimated that some 50 private security contractors employing more than 30,000 employees are working in Iraq for an array of clients, including governments, private industry, and international organisations such as the United Nations. Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution estimates that citizens of some 30 countries are employed by private security companies in Iraq. Many PSC employees are security professionals from western countries — such as the or British Commonwealth countries — with experience in the military or law enforcement. Others are third-country nationals, coming from such countries as Chile, Fiji, Nepal, and Nigeria. A third category of PSC employees consists of local Iraqis. Most of those working in Iraq as private security contractors are Iraqi, according to Doug Brooks of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), an industry group. Some of the third-country nationals and local Iraqis working for PSCs have extensive military training and experience (Congressional Research Service 2008, ‗Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues‘, Federation of American Scientists website, August 25 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf – Accessed 1 October 2008 – Attachment 19).

An October 2007 post on the Lebanese Tag blog website quotes a news story sourced from The Guardian, which provides June 2006 figures from the U.S. Government Accountability Office stating that ―there were 181 security companies with 48,000 employees in Iraq‖:

Under the terms of the department‘s Worldwide Personal Protective Security contract, which covers privately contracted guards for diplomats in Iraq, Blackwater, Dyncorp and Triple Canopy are the only three companies eligible to bid on specific task orders there … In June 2006 the U.S. Government Accountability Office said there were 181 security companies with 48,000 employees in Iraq. The more recent Congressional Research Service report said there were as many as 30,000 security workers (‗US, Iraq Negotiate Blackwater Expulsion‘ 2007, Lebanese Tag blog website (source: The Guardian), 15 October http://blog.lebanesetag.com/2007/10/us-iraq-negotiate-blackwater-expulsion.html – Accessed 1 October 2008 – Attachment 20).

An October 2004 report on the Baltimore WBALTV.com website states that at least six Lebanese nationals working in Iraq had been kidnapped, including two electrical workers, three travel agency workers, and one construction worker, who was reportedly killed by his captors. The report also lists ten Lebanese citizens as being among those released by their captors, although no details are provided as to the nature of their employment in Iraq (‗Information About Kidnappings In Iraq‘ 2004, WBALTV.com website, 8 October http://www.wbaltv.com/news/3751149/detail.html – Accessed 1 October 2008 – Attachment 21).

An October 2005 report, sourced from Corpwatch, on the AlterNet news website provides information on the treatment of ―Third Country Nationals‖ (TCN), or foreign workers employed by American contractors in Iraq. The report claims that ―such TCN labourers have helped set new records for the largest civilian workforce ever hired in support of a U.S. war‖, and notes the difficulty in tracking such labourers, as the network of subcontracting companies creates an ―untraceable trail of contracts that clouds the liability of companies and hinders comprehensive oversight by U.S. contract auditors‖. The report quotes Halliburton figures suggesting that it alone employs 35,000 TCNs, and that the overall number is estimated to be ―100,000 or more‖: That simple dream drives hordes of low-wage workers…to travel to Iraq from more than three dozen countries. They are lured by jobs with companies working on projects led by Halliburton and other major U.S.-funded contractors hired to provide support services to the military and reconstruction efforts.

Called ―third country nationals‖ (TCN) in contractor‘s parlance, they hail largely from impoverished Asian countries such as the , India, Pakistan, , Nepal, and Pakistan, as well as from Turkey and countries in the Middle East. Once in Iraq, TCNs earn monthly salaries between $200 to $1,000 as truck drivers, construction workers, carpenters, warehousemen, laundry workers, cooks, accountants, beauticians, and similar blue-collar jobs.

…Tens of thousands of such TNC labourers have helped set new records for the largest civilian workforce ever hired in support of a U.S. war. They are employed through complex layers of companies working in Iraq. At the top of the pyramid-shaped system is the U.S. government which assigned over $24 billion in contracts over the last two years. Just below that layer are the prime contractors like Halliburton and Bechtel. Below them are dozens of smaller subcontracting companies – largely based in the Middle East – including PPI, First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting and Alargan Trading of Kuwait, Gulf Catering, Saudi Trading & Construction Company of Saudi Arabia. Such companies, which recruit and employ the bulk of the foreign workers in Iraq, have experienced explosive growth since the invasion of Iraq by providing labour and services to the more high-profile prime contractors.

This layered system not only cuts costs for the prime contractors, but also creates an untraceable trail of contracts that clouds the liability of companies and hinders comprehensive oversight by U.S. contract auditors. In April, the Government Accountability Office, an investigative arm of the U.S. Congress concluded that it is impossible to accurately estimate the total number of U.S. or foreign nationals working in Iraq.

… ―It is difficult to aggregate reliable data,‖ said the GAO report, ―due in part to the large number of contractors and the multiple levels of subcontractors performing work in Iraq.‖

…While the exact number of TCNs working in Iraq is uncertain, a rough estimate can be gleaned from Halliburton‘s own numbers, which indicate that TCNs make up 35,000 of KBR‘s 48,000 workers in Iraq employed under sweeping contract for military support. Known as the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), this contract – by far the largest in Iraq – is now approaching the $15 billion mark. Citing security concerns, however, the Houston-headquartered company and several other major contractors declined to release detailed figures on the workforce that is estimated to be 100,000 or more (Phinney, D. 2005, ‗Using Asia‘s Poor to Build U.S. Bases in Iraq‘, AlterNet website (source: Corpwatch), 15 October http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/26660/?page=entire – Accessed 1 October 2008 – Attachment 22).

A 2006 report from the Corpwatch website which states that the manager of First Kuwaiti Trading and Contracting, the company contracted by the US Government to build the new US embassy in Baghdad, is named Wahdid al-Absi, and is ―a Christian Lebanese who may have growing political influence in Lebanon‖ (‗U.S. Embassy in Baghdad built by trafficked workers in squalid working conditions‘ 2006, Corpwatch website, 17 October http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14181 – Accessed 1 October 2008 – Attachment 23).

3. Please advise on the availability of state protection. The issue of state protection for those perceived to be under threat from Hezbollah or allied forces has been addressed in several recent responses, four of which follow in summary form and which are provided in their entirety as attachments:

 Question 3 of RRT Research Response LBN33661, of 9 September, provides extensive information regarding the composition, role and function of the various security agencies in Lebanon, and the availability of state protection for those perceived to be at risk of harm from Hezbollah. Of major interest in this response is the analysis of the changes in the Interior Security Force (ISF), which under the Future Movement-led government has been transformed from a Syrian-dominated, marginalised entity into a Sunni-dominated, anti-Syrian and far better resourced and trained agency. This could be perceived as potentially beneficial for the protection of Future Movement-aligned Christian organisations such as the Lebanese Forces, but the response also notes that sources indicate that Hezbollah remains largely outside ISF control, particularly in areas controlled by Hezbollah (RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response LBN33661, 9 September, pp. 60-74 – Attachment 15).

 Question 5 of RRT Research Response LBN32797, of 7 February 2008, provides information on the availability of state protection for those seen to be under threat from Hezbollah, and links to previous responses assessing related issues (RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response LBN32797, 7 February – Attachment 24).

 Question 5 of RRT Research Response LBN31811, of 5 June 2007, provides information on the availability of state protection in North Lebanon. This response states that sources indicate there is limited protection available from security forces, but that corruption, lack of resources and the instability in the country hinder the effectiveness of the state security apparatus (RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31811, 5 June – Attachment 25).

 Question 5 of RRT Research Response LBN31663, of 3 May 2007, provides similar sources, which suggest that corruption, instability, the power vacuum left by the 2005 Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, and an under-resourced security setup are all factors in a perceived lack of public faith in official security and justice (RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31663, 3 May – Attachment 26).

The US Department of State‘s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007 – Lebanon provides information on the structure and actions of the Lebanese security forces, suggesting that there exists a ―climate of impunity‖, and that ―corruption and a lack of transparency remained problems‖:

In a climate of impunity, there were instances of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life, torture, and other abuses. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals, while poor prison conditions, lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in the court system remained serious problems. The government violated citizens‘ privacy rights… Government corruption and a lack of transparency remained problems.

The security forces consist of the LAF [] under the Ministry of Defense, which may arrest and detain suspects on national security grounds; the ISF [Internal Security Forces] under the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), which enforces laws, conducts searches and arrests, and refers cases to the judiciary; the State Security Apparatus, which reports to the prime minister; and the SG under the MOI. Both the State Security Apparatus and the SG collect information on groups deemed a possible threat to state security.

Laws against bribery and extortion by government security officials and agencies also apply to the police force. In practice, however, a lack of strong enforcement limited their effectiveness. The government acknowledged the need to reform law enforcement, but the lack of political stability and security hampered these efforts. The ISF maintained a hotline for complaints (US Department of State 2008, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007 – Lebanon, 11 March – Attachment 27).

A February 2007 report from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides information from a professor of history from the University of Balamand who claims that Christians in Lebanon, including Maronites, ―are not in any way persecuted, politically or otherwise‖, and that, given the geographical separation of Lebanon‘s confessional groups, ―is quite possible for a majority of Lebanon's Christians to live on a day-to-day basis without any personal contact with (or perceived threat from) any Lebanese Muslims or Druze‖ (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, LBN102320.E – Lebanon: Treatment of Christians, particularly Maronites; the availability of state protection (2006), 19 February – Attachment 14).

4. Is a Christian supporter of the Lebanese Forces likely to be safer in any particular part of Lebanon (i.e. availability of relocation)?

A map sourced from the Lebanon Support website provides information on the confessional , and suggests that the of the governorate of North Lebanon is predominantly Orthodox. It may be of interest to note that the district of , stronghold of the Lebanese Forces, adjoins Koura to the west. The map suggests that large areas of the North Lebanon and Mount Lebanon regions are predominantly Maronite or Orthodox, with some mixed regions and small pockets of Shia. Nonetheless, please refer to Question 1 above, which provides information suggesting that violence between Christian groups is more of a problem in North Lebanon than violence between Christians and Muslims (‗Lebanon Support (June 2008): Mapping of Vulnerabilities in Lebanon (SE-1) (Deprivation Indicators, 1996)‘ 2008, Lebanon Support website, June http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/00BD785A71C24C8885257474007 067B1/$File/ls_SEC_lbn080626.pdf – Accessed 1 September 2008 – Attachment 28; for the administrative divisions of northern Lebanon, see: ‗Administrative Map of Northern Lebanon‘ (undated), UN Lebanon website http://www.un.org.lb/unnew/files/southleb/maps/ADMINISTRATIVE/Admin%20map%20of %20Northern%20Lebanon_A4.pdf – Accessed 20 August 2008 – Attachment 29).

The February 2007 report from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada cited in questions 1 and 3 above refers to a Lebanese academic source who claims that the geographical separation of Christians and Muslims is clear-cut, and that the majority of Christians in Lebanon live in areas where there are very few Muslims. The source specifies the area from East Beirut up the coast to the southern suburbs of Tripoli, and from the coast to the Mount Lebanon range between these areas, as almost exclusively Christian areas, apart from a handful of Shia Muslim villages (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, LBN102320.E – Lebanon: Treatment of Christians, particularly Maronites; the availability of state protection (2006), 19 February – Attachment 14). Questions 1 and 4 of RRT Research Response LBN32813, of 27 December 2007, provide information on Christian demographics in Lebanon. Question 1 quotes sources suggesting that the Christian of Lebanon is estimated to be around 39%, although this may be falling, and two specific recent assessments suggesting that the Christian population is somewhere between 30 and 36 percent. Question 4 provides maps and limited information regarding the distribution of the major confessional groups (RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response LBN32813, 27 December – Attachment 30).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Government Information & Reports UK Home Office http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ US Department of State http://www.state.gov/ United Nations (UN) UNHCR Refworld http://www.refworld.org UNRWA website http://www.un.org/unrwa/ Non-Government Organisations Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/ Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/ Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre http://www.internal-displacement.org ReliefWeb http://www.reliefweb.int International News & Politics BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/ The Independent website http://news.independent.co.uk Region-specific sources The Daily Star website http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ The Middle East Times website http://www.metimes.com/ The Middle East Research and Information Project website http://www.merip.org/index.html Search Engines Google http://www.google.com.au/ Silobreaker http://www.silobreaker.com/ Staggernation Google API Proximity Search http://www.staggernation.com/cgi-bin/gaps.cgi Yahoo http://search.yahoo.com/

Databases:

FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIAC Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Research & Information database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments 1. ‗Political Parties in Lebanon‘ (undated), Arab Media Watch website http://www.arabmediawatch.com/amw/CountryBackgrounds/Lebanon/PoliticalParties inLebanon/tabid/171/Default.aspx – Accessed 3 September 2008.

2. RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response LBN33272, 12 May.

3. Fisk, R. 2007, ‗Comments on situation of Lebanese Forces in Lebanon and those allegedly involved in the murder of Dany Chamoun‘, 23 April.

4. RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31484, 11 May.

5. Abdullah, A. 2008, ‗Two die in clashes between Marada, Lebanese Forces‘, Daily Star, 18 September http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=96112 – Accessed 23 September 2008.

6. Iskandar, A. 2008, ‗Lebanon: Reconciliations, Apology & Dialogue‘, Al Hayat, 24 September. (FACTIVA)

7. Bluhm, M. 2008, ‗‗Reconciliation‘ becomes buzzword as elections near; Analysts say politicians‘ posturing does not reflect sincere drive to resolve differences‘, Daily Star, 24 September. (FACTIVA)

8. Abdullah, H. 2008, ‗Future, Hizbullah pave way toward Nasrallah-Hariri meeting; Rice pledges continued US support for Lebanon‘, Daily Star, 24 September. (FACTIVA)

9. Haidamous, S. 2008, ‗Roundup: Deep differences among Lebanese Christian leaders foil national reconciliation‘, Xinhua News Agency, 23 September. (FACTIVA)

10. International Crisis Group 2008, The New Lebanese Equation: the Christians’ Central Role, Middle East Report No. 78, 15 July.

11. International Crisis Group 2006, Israel/Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing out of the Abyss, Crisis Group Report No. 57, 25 July.

12. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008, LBN102732.FE – Lebanon: Treatment of Christians and availability of state protection for Christians; whether Hezbollah targets Christians in particular (2007 – 2008), 22 February http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451900 – Accessed 25 September 2008.

13. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, LBN102623.E – Lebanon: Treatment of members and supporters of the Lebanese Forces (LF) by the Lebanese and Syrian authorities, and by Hezbollah (March 2005 – October 2007), 1 November http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451547 – Accessed 25 September 2008. 14. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, LBN102320.E – Lebanon: Treatment of Christians, particularly Maronites; the availability of state protection (2006), 19 February. (REFINFO)

15. RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response LBN33661, 9 September.

16. RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31266, 24 January.

17. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2007, DFAT Report No. 648 – Lebanon: RRT Information Request: LBN31756, 30 May.

18. RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31756, 30 May.

19. Congressional Research Service 2008, ‗Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues‘, Federation of American Scientists website, August 25 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf – Accessed 1 October 2008.

20. ‗US, Iraq Negotiate Blackwater Expulsion‘ 2007, Lebanese Tag blog website (source: The Guardian), 15 October http://blog.lebanesetag.com/2007/10/us-iraq-negotiate- blackwater-expulsion.html – Accessed 1 October 2008.

21. ‗Information About Kidnappings In Iraq‘ 2004, WBALTV.com website, 8 October http://www.wbaltv.com/news/3751149/detail.html – Accessed 1 October 2008.

22. Phinney, D. 2005, ‗Using Asia‘s Poor to Build U.S. Bases in Iraq‘, AlterNet website (source: Corpwatch), 15 October http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/26660/?page=entire – Accessed 1 October 2008.

23. ‗U.S. Embassy in Baghdad built by trafficked workers in squalid working conditions‘ 2006, Corpwatch website, 17 October http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14181 – Accessed 1 October 2008.

24. RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response LBN32797, 7 February.

25. RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31811, 5 June.

26. RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31663, 3 May.

27. US Department of State 2008, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007 – Lebanon, 11 March.

28. ‗Lebanon Support (June 2008): Mapping of Vulnerabilities in Lebanon (SE-1) (Deprivation Indicators, 1996)‘ 2008, Lebanon Support website, June http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/00BD785A71C24C8885257 474007067B1/$File/ls_SEC_lbn080626.pdf – Accessed 1 September 2008.

29. ‗Administrative Map of Northern Lebanon‘ (undated), UN Lebanon website http://www.un.org.lb/unnew/files/southleb/maps/ADMINISTRATIVE/Admin%20ma p%20of%20Northern%20Lebanon_A4.pdf – Accessed 20 August 2008.

30. RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response LBN32813, 27 December.