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Country Advice Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: LBN33809 Country: Lebanon Date: 2 October 2008 Keywords: Lebanon – Christians – Lebanese Forces – Iraq War – State protection – Internal relocation This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Is a Christian supporter of the Lebanese Forces who worked for a short time for the US in Iraq likely to be perceived as a supporter of the West and, if so, what are the likely repercussions? 2. Is there any information on the number of people who travelled from Lebanon to work in Iraq during the invasion and the nature of the work they were engaged in? Is there any information on how such people are treated on return? 3. Please advise on the availability of state protection. 4. Is a Christian supporter of the Lebanese Forces likely to be safer in any particular part of Lebanon (i.e. availability of relocation)? RESPONSE 1. Is a Christian supporter of the Lebanese Forces who worked for a short time for the US in Iraq likely to be perceived as a supporter of the West and, if so, what are the likely repercussions? No information could be located as to whether Lebanese workers returning from Iraq are likely to be targeted as ―supporters of the West‖. The Lebanese Forces form part of the pro- Western March 14 Alliance currently in power in Lebanon, and are in conflict with other Christian groups who support the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance, namely the Free Patriotic Movement and al-Marada. There is also a historic dimension to this conflict, as the various Christian groups, under the same leaders (or families), fought each other during the civil war period. Information on the Lebanese Forces (LF) and the various political groupings currently existing in Lebanon is provided below, along with a collection of current media reports regarding intra-Christian conflict, research reports assessing the position of the various Christian groups and the likelihood of violence being directed toward them by perceived enemies, and previous RRT research responses on the subject of Christians in Lebanon. Please note that references to Lebanese Forces ―members‖ and ―supporters‖ do not seem to make a distinction between the two. Lebanese Forces and Lebanese politics The Christian Lebanese Forces, led by Samir Geagea, form part of the pro-Western ‗March 14 Alliance‘ presently in government in Lebanon, which is dominated by the Sunni Future Movement of Saad al-Hariri, and also encompasses the Druze Progressive Socialist Party of Walid Jumblatt, and several smaller parties. The opposition grouping, known as the ‗March 8 Alliance‘, is dominated by the Shia groups Hizbollah and Amal, with support from other small parties, including the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun, and the Marada party of Suleiman Franjieh (for background on the Lebanese Forces, and on other political parties in Lebanon, see: ‗Political Parties in Lebanon‘ (undated), Arab Media Watch website http://www.arabmediawatch.com/amw/CountryBackgrounds/Lebanon/PoliticalPartiesinLeba non/tabid/171/Default.aspx – Accessed 3 September 2008 – Attachment 1; for information on the March 14 Alliance and al-Marada, and intra-Christian conflict in North Lebanon, see: RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response LBN33272, 12 May – Attachment 2). Background and current situation of Christian groups in Lebanon An expert opinion provided to the RRT in May 2007 by veteran Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk states that tensions between Christian groups in Lebanon exceed those between Muslim and Christian groups: …the bad feelings between Christian Militiamen, and Christian and Christian here cannot be over-emphasised. They are much more likely to kill than say Muslims vs Christians for reasons which I won‘t bore you with now, inter-Christian fighting particularly between Phalange Lebanese forces, and other Militiamen, has always been particularly brutal and that‘s something that you need to bear in mind (Fisk, R. 2007, ‗Comments on situation of Lebanese Forces in Lebanon and those allegedly involved in the murder of Dany Chamoun‘, 23 April – Attachment 3; RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response LBN31484, 11 May – Attachment 4). A selection of recent reports from Lebanese and regional media outlets suggest that tensions between Christian groups have not abated since Fisk provided this opinion. A recent armed clash between supporters of the Lebanese Forces and supporters of al-Marada in Bsarma resulted in two deaths, and a recent apology delivered by LF leader Samir Geagea for atrocities committed during the civil war has reignited public anger between Christian groups. A selection of reports from September 2008 follows below. An 18 September 2008 article in the Lebanon Daily Star attests to ill-feeling between Christian groups in the north of the country. The article reports on a clash between members of the Lebanese Forces and of the Marada party, a pro-Syrian Maronite organisation based around Zgharta, in which two people were killed. The conflict took place in Bsarma, Koura, and it may be of interest to note that the Lebanese Forces ―supporter‖ who died is not described as a ―member‖ (Abdullah, A. 2008, ‗Two die in clashes between Marada, Lebanese Forces‘, Daily Star, 18 September http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=96112 – Accessed 23 September 2008 – Attachment 5). A 24 September opinion piece from Al Hayat newspaper provides a pessimistic appraisal of moves toward reconciliation by the various confessional groups in Lebanon, between Sunni and Shia, Shia and Druze, Shia and Christian, and Christian and Christian. The report notes the recent apology by Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea ―over the war practices of the Lebanese Forces‖ during the civil conflict in Lebanon, and claims that the Lebanese Forces ―may now pay the price of the ongoing reconciliations‖ as it is being isolated by its ―Christian foes‖, primarily the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun and the Maradah party of Sulieman Franjieh: The excessive talk about reconciliations in Lebanon does not mean that the parties involved are heading toward a minimum common denominator that allows the state to retrieve its role and to preserve the right of the nation to sovereignty or the right of citizens to a decent life. As a matter of fact, reconciliations do not attempt to achieve any of these goals. So far, each of the parties involved seeks goals that serve his interests alone, turning a blind eye to the interests and concerns shared with others. …Regardless of the objectives of each side behind the type of the opted for reconciliation and the chosen party to the reconciliation, the Christian-Christian reconciliation between the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement is getting more complicated and facing more stumbles. In fact, turbulences and even more violence are likely among the Christian sides. Until the national dialogue sponsored by the president reaches its farfetched goal, binding agreements to all, the realities on the Christian ground contradict the climate of reconciliation prevailing in other scenes even when the objectives and outcomes of those reconciliations are at best limited. The ―apology‖ made by Dr. Samir Geagea over the war practices of the Lebanese Forces revealed the weaknesses of these reconciliations, of the national dialogue, and even the Taef Accord that set the grounds for the second republic. The timing of the apology and the generated responses show that none of those who had committed similar practices and are now seeking reconciliation believe that their history is subject to discussion and their policy to review. This is exactly what happened after the Taef Accord, especially with the general pardon which absolved all criminal acts related to those practices. Back then, under the Syrian mandate, the regime had to fabricate charges of bombing a church against Geagea to exclude him from the pardon and ensure another trial for his practices although he had been forced to fight the war of elimination against General Aoun to make the Taef Accord acceptable for the Christians. In other words, the Christian side which paid the heavy price for the Taef Accord is the same side which may now pay the price of the ongoing reconciliations, especially with the efforts to neutralise as many of its allies in March 14 as possible, making it stand alone face to face against its Christian foes such as the Patriotic Movement, the Maradah and other parties in March 8. The focus is on this Christian front in particular because it constituted a central player during the civil war and continues to exercise the capacity to object. To set the ground for national conciliation, the apology should have been made by all the forces that participated in the war. At the same time, the general pardon should not have been a replacement for the need of every side to review and correct its experience in a direction that makes conciliation with others possible. When the apology finally came, although late, by Geagea alone, his foes saw in it nothing but another condemnation at the time when such an apology should have been a moral and political introduction to national dialogue. If anything, this is a negative indicator of the extent to which this national dialogue will come up with the desired reconciliation.
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