Glad Intellectual Dependence on God: a Theistic Account of Intellectual Humility"

Center for Faith & Learning Scholar Program

Reading for Dinner Dialogue #3 Winter 2020

"Glad Intellectual Dependence on God: A Theistic Account of Intellectual Humility"

by Peter C. Hill, Kent Dunnington and M. Elizabeth Lewis Hall

From: The Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 2018, Vol. 37, No.3, 195-204 Journal of Psychology and Christianity Copyright 2018 Christian Association for Psychological Studies 2018, Vol. 37, No.3, 195-204 ISSN 0733-4273 Glad Intellectual Dependence on God: A Theistic Account of Intellectual Humility Peter C. Hill Kent Dunnington M. Elizabeth Lewis Hall Biola University

We present a view of intellectual humility as it may be experienced and expressed by a theist. From a religious cultural perspective and drawing primarily on Augustine, we argue that intellectual humility for the theist is based on glad intellectual dependence on God. It is evidenced in five markers of IH: (a) proper unconcern about one’s intellectual status and entitlements; (b) proper concern about one’s intellectual failures and limitations; (c) proper posture of intellectual submission to divine teaching; (d) order epistemic attitudes that properly reflect one’s justification for one’s views, including those views held on the basis of religious testimony, church authority, interpretations of scripture, and the like; and (e) proper view of the divine orientation of inquiry. Implica- tions of this perspective for the study of intellectual humility are provided.

Positive psychology’s critique that the study especially relevant in an age where people of what is “right” about people has been frequently ignore, belittle, or even aggressive- understudied has opened the door to investi- ly attack alternative ideas, beliefs, or perspec- gate the psychological study of virtue. tives, is intellectual humility. Philosophers Sandage and Hill (2001; also see Hill & have provided a number of accounts of intel- Sandage, 2016, for an update) suggested that lectual humility (IH), some of which also virtue is not only relevant to psychological apply well to understanding humility as a gen- study, but that it can provide a guiding frame- eral motivational construct. work for a science of positive psychology by The purpose of this paper is to apply these suggesting that virtues (a) promote human accounts of IH in light of how people may flourishing and positive health, (b) cultivate actually comprehend and apply humility, intel- human strength and resilience, and (c) pro- lectual or otherwise, in their lives. In so doing, mote positive characteristics not only in the we consider how IH is understood from a the- individual but also in community. This new istic worldview perspective. Our approach in attention to the study of virtue has included this paper is four-pronged. First, we review the psychological study of intellectual virtues. contemporary philosophical accounts of IH. Of the intellectual virtues, one that seems Second, we consider IH within the context of a cultural perspective. Third, we apply a reli- Writing this paper was supported by a generous grant gious cultural perspective, particularly an to Peter Hill from the John Templeton Foundation, Grant No. 60622, Developing Humility in Leadership. Augustinian theistic account, to the study of IH. The paper was also supported by a grant given to Fourth, we explore how this religious cultural Elizabeth Hall by Bridging the Two Cultures of Sci- perspective might influence the study of IH. ence and the Humanities II, a project run by Scholar- ship and Christianity in Oxford, the UK subsidiary of Three Leading Philosophical the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, Accounts of IH with funding by Templeton Religion Trust and The In recent decades, philosophers have Blankemeyer Foundation. All three authors have benefitted through fellowships recovered an interest in the virtues, including received from the Center for Christian Thought (CCT) the virtue of intellectual humility (e.g., at Biola University, with funding by the John Temple- Zagzebski, 1996). The three accounts of IH ton Foundation and the Blankemeyer Foundation. that seem to be receiving the most attention Many of the ideas presented here were formulated are the following. through discussions at the CCT. Correspondence regarding this article should be Low Concern for Status or Self-Importance addressed to Peter C. Hill, Ph.D., Rosemead School of (Roberts & Wood, 2007) Psychology, Biola University, 13800 Biola Ave., La IH is the opposite of intellectual arrogance Mirada, CA 90639; [email protected] or improper pride and therefore consists of a

195 196 A THEISTIC ACCOUNT OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY disposition to an unusually low concern for If Dunnington is correct and insistence on one’s intellectual status and entitlements. The uncovering a unitary account is misguided, it intellectually humble person is less interested does not mean that psychologists will find in being recognized for his or her intellectual these intense philosophical efforts useless. accomplishments than in promoting the sub- There is considerable value for the psycholo- ject matter itself. This approach stresses the gist studying IH, or perhaps any other virtue lack of vices of pride that, in themselves, take (intellectual or otherwise), to be well-ground- on a socially comparative importance. ed in the philosophical literature that often provides a number of coherent structures from Limitations Owning (Whitcomb, Battaly, which to understand the construct of interest. Baehr, & Howard-Snyder, 2015) IH consists of a disposition of having the However, though each of these views of right stance toward one’s intellectual limita- humility have merit, our approach as psycholo- tions while proper pride is having the right gists is to follow Dunnington’s (2017) advice stance toward one’s intellectual strengths. This and consider each of these accounts as markers involves proper attentiveness to—and owning or indicators of humility. Thus, psychologists of—one’s limitations for which the humble are well-advised to ground their research in, for person will try to responsibly compensate. example, a limitations owning humility, a low concern for status humility, a proper belief Proper Beliefs (Church & Samuelson, 2017; humility, an accurate estimate of strengths Hazlett, 2012) humility, or potential others. In fact, it may be Also sometimes referred to as the doxastic the case that all of these accounts, plus more mean account, IH is a disposition to form that are yet to be developed, when taken proper beliefs about the epistemic status of together are what will best propel the empirical one’s beliefs in that it consists in finding the study of humility, intellectual or otherwise. mean between over-estimating and under-estimating the positive epistemic status of one’s A Cultural Perspective on IH beliefs. The intellectually humble person is the one who tends to have an accurate sense One key element not emphasized in the con- of the varying levels of epistemic strength that temporary philosophical literature on intellectu- characterize his or her own views; this person al humility is its cultural variety. Positive is accurate about which ones amount to psychology’s assumption of being an objective knowledge, which ones are well-established science that can “transcend particular cultures beliefs, etc., all the way down to which ones and politics and approach universality” (Selig- are mere assumptions or working hypotheses. man & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5) has been There are other philosophical accounts (e.g., increasingly questioned by evidence that an Accurate Estimation of Strengths account virtues are most fully understood in the context [Flanagan, 1990; Richards, 1988]; an Overesti- of cultural particularity (Cook, Sandage, Hill, & mation of Weaknesses account [Driver, 1989]), Strawn, 2009; Sandage & Naicker, 2009). but these three accounts are the most perti- The failure to acknowledge the dependence nent for the purpose of this paper. Regardless, of virtues on specific traditions has led, accord- all of the accounts are unitive in nature in that ing to philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), they try to ascertain IH’s essential core—that to the unintentional prioritizing of contempo- is, the conditions which are constitutive of rary moral and political assumptions about the what it means to be intellectually humble. By world, however inadequate or confused they focusing on the two accounts that have may be. This is certainly the case in psycholo- received the most attention by philosophers gy, where the renewed interest in the virtues (the low concern for status account and the due to the popularity of positive psychology limitations owning account), Dunnington has led to the widespread attempt to define (2017) has argued through counterexamples virtues in ways that are independent of specif- that neither account is foolproof and thus the ic traditions, resulting in thin, lowest-common- search for a unified account of IH is likely denominator views of these virtues. This untenable. Rather, Dunnington recommends move in psychology has not been without its that we consider these characteristics as mark- detractors. For example, Hill and Hall (2018) ers or indicators of IH. have argued that this presumed neutrality HILL, DUNNINGTON, AND HALL 197 regarding the virtues may hide assumptions contemporary philosophical and empirical such as the universality of virtues, human study. Religion provides “a set of practices, a autonomy, the superiority of objective quanti- web of relationships and beliefs, a grammar of tative methods, and moral relativism. motives, an array of rituals and institutional With regard to IH, Paine and colleagues arrangements” (Dueck & Reimer, 2003, p. 427) (Paine, Moon, Hauge, & Sandage, 2018) point within which particular virtues are embedded. out that: In fact, one might argue that theism—and, for Subjective and formal definitions of Western culture, Christianity especially—is why the good promote a humility root- today we think of humility, including intellec- ed in positive emotions and gener- tual humility, as a virtue. Pre-Christian ancient ally valued patterns, without Greco-Roman culture had nothing positive to articulating the ends to which say about humility at all. The “humble” humility ought to be directed (i.e., people—the humiliores—were just the lowly, before what should we humble the poor, the massive underclass of society ourselves?). Also, the process by who were of no interest to those who mat- which positive psychologists identi- tered, the few well-bred elites whose privilege fy and define virtues may ultimate- allowed them to aspire to virtue and excel- ly marginalize or discard aspects of lence. The Christian tradition, on the other humility emphasized by certain cul- hand, affirmed that humility is a virtue, per- tures (e.g., surrender, self-empty- haps a preeminent Christian virtue, by placing ing, social activism, or connections humility at the center of the moral life in an to nature), indirectly excluding unprecedented way. Jesus apparently thought some communities from knowl- of humility as the best measure of a person’s edge production. (p. 285) spiritual maturity. “Whoever becomes humble like this child is the greatest in the kingdom of Culture takes on many forms, and cultural heaven,” he taught (Matthew 18:4). Philippians variation can be sliced in a number of ways. 2 identifies humility as the defining characteris- In acknowledging the many definitions and tic of the incarnate Christ and one that his fol- forms of culture, Triandis (2007) suggests that lowers should seek to imitate. there are three characteristics that most schol- ars agree upon: culture emerges in adaptive A Theistic Perspective on IH interactions between people and their envi- ronments, culture involves shared elements, Thus, we propose that an accounting of IH and culture transcends lengthy time periods, is incomplete if a religious perspective is including generations. ignored. There are a number of reasons why Cohen (2009) argues that one especially we recommend that a religious perspective pertinent form of culture is religion and, in so must be included. First, it is an approach that doing, utilizes the anthropologist Clifford has not received much attention by psycholo- Geertz’s (1973) definition of religion as: gists. Second, as noted above, unlike the ancient Greeks as well as philosophers like a system of symbols which acts to Hume and Nietzsche, religious traditions have (2) establish powerful, pervasive, extolled humility as a virtue (Bollinger & Hill, and long lasting moods and moti- 2012; Porter et al., 2017). Third, there may be vations in men by (3) formulating collective wisdom from religious traditions conceptions of a general order of that will benefit a psychological understanding existence and (4) clothing these of IH and humility in general. Fourth, there is conceptions with such an aura of limited evidence that religious individuals factuality that (5) the moods and value humility more than non-religious people motivations seem uniquely realis- (Van Tongeren, Davis, Hook, Rowatt, & Wor- tic. (p. 90, as quoted in Cohen, thington, 2017). Fifth, religious people not 2009, p. 96) only see themselves as more humble than Though humility is culturally grounded in non-religious people, but they are also seen many of the world’s religious traditions, such by others as being more humble (Rowatt, grounding has been largely disregarded in Kang, Haggard, & LaBouff, 2014). Finally, 198 A THEISTIC ACCOUNT OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY religious people may understand and there- Rather, we modestly propose that an IH char- fore interpret what it means to be humble acter trait, such as those just presented with through a religious lens. scriptural support, may be differentially expe- Up front, we want to be clear that we are rienced and perhaps displayed due to its inter- not proposing a competing view to the under- connection with a distinctive theistic standings presented by philosophers above orientation or set of beliefs. As a result, a the- that is somehow distinctly religious. In fact, istic perspective should be included for a the positions articulated above by philoso- thorough accounting of IH. phers have Christian scriptural support, and We will make the case for our proposal by likely support from other religious traditions considering specifically an Augustinian as well, and therefore should not be discount- account of humility. Perhaps St. Augustine ed as somehow antithetical to a religious per- was not exaggerating when he wrote that spective. Consider, for example, the following “almost the whole of Christian teaching is passage from Paul in the book of Romans humility” (de Virginitate 31). This does not which seems clearly in line with the willing- mean that humility is disregarded or ignored ness to see oneself accurately, including an in other religious and spiritual traditions. Nor awareness of one’s limitations but also one’s are we asserting that there is a distinctive strengths and contribution potential (a combi- character trait called “Christian IH.” Again, we nation of positions 2 and 3 outlined above): simply suggest that how humility, including 3 For by the grace given me I say IH, is understood and experienced may be to every one of you: Do not think considerably different for, as an example, a of yourself more highly than you Christian theist than for someone with a more ought, but rather think of yourself secular orientation and, therefore, it will be with sober judgment, in accordance imperative that empirical approaches take with the faith God has distributed such a distinctive into account. to each of you. 4 For just as each Augustine’s Confessions is the seminal of us has one body with many account of “intellectual humility” because members, and these members do Augustine’s central concern in that book is not all have the same function, 5 how his intellectual life changed dramatically so in Christ we, though many, form when he became a Christian. Augustine’s gen- one body, and each member eral account of humility as a posture of glad belongs to all the others. 6 We dependence on God (in contrast to a quest for have different gifts, according to independence) transferred naturally into the the grace given to each of us. If domain of his intellectual life (see Dunning- your gift is prophesying, then ton, 2016 for a development of Augustine’s prophesy in accordance with your account of humility). Although Augustine faith; 7 if it is serving, then serve; if never used the phrase “intellectual humility,” it is teaching, then teach; 8 if it is his account of his intellectual life is character- to encourage, then give encourage- ized by what we will call a “glad intellectual ment; if it is giving, then give gen- dependence on God,” for both one’s intellec- erously; if it is to lead,[b] do it tual identity and one’s intellectual quest. In diligently; if it is to show mercy, do other words, we suspect that IH for theists it cheerfully. (Romans 12: 3-8; NIV) captures several interrelated characteristics of dependence upon God for one’s intellectual Similarly, Paul’s letter to the church in Philippi identity and aspiration. extols a low concern for status with an other-ori- In this way, the motivations behind humility ented regard (position 1 presented above) are distinctly theistic, grounded in a particular 3 Do nothing out of selfish ambi- kind of relationship of glad dependence on an tion or vain conceit. Rather, in omniscient, omnipotent, and loving God. humility value others above your- Here is where a departure from more generic selves, 4 not looking to your own accounts of intellectual humility might occur. interests but each of you to the As noted above, the apparent neutrality of con- interests of the others. (Philippians temporary accounts of intellectual humility may 2:3-4; NIV) mask unacknowledged assumptions. One such HILL, DUNNINGTON, AND HALL 199 assumption appears to be the Enlightenment Because Augustine’s sense of personal sig- ideal of intellectual autonomy which permeates nificance was found in his relationship with contemporary culture. In his famous article, God, he no longer sought to establish his own “What is Enlightenment?” (1784), Emmanuel worth through the attainment of intellectual Kant defined Enlightenment as, superiority or, conversely, the avoidance of intellectual embarrassment. He connects his man’s leaving his self-caused imma- former concern about these things to his turity. Immaturity is the incapacity “worldly pride,” and attests how reading to use one’s own understanding Cicero converted him to the discovery that without the guidance of another. such things were pure vanity. Pride in the Such immaturity is self-caused if its intellectual domain, for Augustine, was dis- cause is not lack of intelligence, played by an obsession with intellectual status but by lack of determination and and a corresponding reluctance to admit fail- courage to use one’s intelligence ure and limitations. Humility in the intellectual without being guided by another. domain, conversely, was displayed by a free- The motto of enlightenment is dom from status-obsession and from the hor- therefore: Sapere aude! Have ror of intellectual failure or limitation. courage to use your own intelli- How might these markers of low status con- gence! (quoted in Jacob, 2001, pp. cern and limitations-owning differ from non- 202-208) theistic accounts? In contrast to contemporary The emphasis on intellectual autonomy stands accounts of IH where theistic elements are in stark contrast to a Christian tradition (as ignored or disregarded, the motivational pro- well as other theistic traditions) of prioritizing file of Augustine’s unconcern about intellectual dependence on God, in ways that we will elu- status is distinctively theistic. Had Augustine cidate below. been asked why he didn’t care any more In the following sections we explore how a about receiving accolades for his rhetorical Christian theist might experience the three performances, he would have talked about predominant markers of intellectual humility how such accolades are vanity given that found in the philosophical literature—low sta- God’s love for him is all that matters for his tus concern, owning of limitations, and proper personal significance. In this way, the low beliefs—in distinctive ways. concern for status is directly tied to a particular kind of glad dependence on a loving God. In Low Status Concern and Owning of contemporary accounts, a lack of concern for Limitations status appears to be primarily motivated by a As Dunnington (2017) points out, Augustine greater concern for promoting the subject mat- highlights two key features in which his new ter of the intellectual endeavors. While this is dependence upon God transformed his pos- not necessarily absent in Christian accounts, it ture toward his accomplishments and failures is not the primary motivational force. in the intellectual domain. These two new Similarly, Augustine agrees that humility in insights correspond closely to the first two the intellectual domain will make one quick contemporary views of IH listed above: low to own up to failure, but whereas the contem- concern for status and limitations owning. porary limitations-owning account thinks the First, he was freed (gradually) of his obsession intellectually humble person will be motivated over his intellectual status, just as he was solely by epistemic aspirations (namely, own- freed (gradually) from concerns about his sta- ing up to limitations better positions one with tus in general. Second, he was freed (gradu- respect to truth), Augustine thinks that limita- ally) of his fear of intellectual tions-owning is a natural response of one who failure/limitation, just as he was freed (gradu- has grasped his or her complete dependence ally) from fear of limitation/finitude in gener- upon God. Thus, in the contemporary limita- al. For Augustine, humility changed his tions-owning account, one owns up to one’s fundamental posture toward intellectual suc- limitations but wishes one did not have them; cess and failure; humility made him less con- the attitude toward them may be characterized cerned about the former and more concerned by regret, sadness, or anger. In contrast, to own up to the latter. Augustine either embraces limitations as clues 200 A THEISTIC ACCOUNT OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY to his finitude or he tries to accept them with- We are not arguing here that divine revela- out regret or sadness because he believes that tion should (or should not) be considered a our ultimate security is not a function of our legitimate epistemic source, but simply note intellectual prowess. that for many Christians it is, in fact, an impor- The concept of finitude merits further elabo- tant (for some, the most important) epistemic ration here, as a Christian understanding of fini- source. As already noted, humility, whether tude is key to differentiating between intellectual or otherwise, is a common theme in non-Christian and Christian accounts of limita- religious sources of knowledge and may there- tion-owning. According to the Christian story, fore serve as a guiding principle to religiously humans were created as finite creatures by a faithful adherents, just as it was to Augustine. loving God to live in loving dependence on Thus, to study how IH (as well as humility in God. Human finitude, including the finiteness general) may function in the life of a religious of human knowledge and power, is part of believer, we should take into account the con- God’s good creation. Consequently, our fini- tent of the sources of knowledge that are con- tude is something to be embraced as part of sidered legitimate by the people we study. our loving dependence on a God who is not In light of the high epistemic status of divine finite. It is not something that we should revelation for Christians, a disposition to form aspire to transcend. In fact, theologian Rein- proper beliefs about the epistemic status of hold Niebuhr (1943) considered sinful the one’s beliefs might more specifically be evi- attempt to overcome our creaturely limits and denced in two interrelated markers of intellectu- the unwillingness to accept our finitude in that al humility having generally to do with proper they constitute attempts to escape our depen- beliefs: 1) a proper posture of intellectual sub- dent relationship on God. Theologian Wolfhart mission to divine teaching and 2) higher order Pannenberg (1994) further affirmed the impor- epistemic attitudes that properly reflect one’s tance of accepting our finitude by pointing to justification for including those views held on Jesus’ example: “Jesus … accepted his fini- the basis of religious testimony, church authori- tude, and with it the finitude of the human ty, interpretations of scripture, and the like. creature and of all creaturely existence in rela- First, proper inquiry is carried out in sub- tion to God by honoring God as his own mission to God. This means that persons rec- Father and Creator, and as the Father and Cre- ognize the weight of revelation, whether ator of all creatures” (p. 24). A key distinction through direct communication from God between Christian and non-Christian versions (often in prayer), through holy scripture, or of intellectual humility, then, is how intellectual through church teaching, and they place limits are experienced: as part of a created themselves in a position of submission to such good that can be embraced because it repre- divine teaching. Here we see how studiositas sents our glad dependence on God, or as a (the Augustinian notion of a proper intellectu- negative barrier to be lamented or overcome. al appetite, further discussed below) has been self-consciously rejected by post-Enlighten- Proper Beliefs ment norms of inquiry, which treat the inquir- Theistic commitments also affect what reli- er as an autonomous intellectual agent whose gious adherents consider to be proper beliefs dependence on any authority beyond him or about the epistemic status of their beliefs. For herself would be a failure of heteronomy. early Christian thinking, divine revelation is not Second, higher order epistemic attitudes only a legitimate epistemic source, it is the most rightly reflect one’s justification for one’s legitimate epistemic source. Thus, we do not views, including, in addition to scientific find Augustine, for example, classifying his the- observation and reason, those views held on ological views as mere opinion or hypothesis. the basis of religious testimony, church Rather, since they are based on divine teaching, authority, interpretations of scripture, or sup- they have an even greater claim to knowledge posed direct communication from God. than the deliverances of the other sciences (see Augustine and many other early Christians the first few articles of Aquinas’s Summa for the recognized a distinction between the deliver- characteristically early and medieval Christian ances of divine revelation (especially scrip- view of the “science” of doctrine). ture) and our interpretation of them, and HILL, DUNNINGTON, AND HALL 201

Augustine cautioned humility with respect to IH, they also retain many commonalities with our confidence in our interpretations: these views. We turn now to a marker of In matters that are so obscure and humility that appears to be novel in a Chris- far beyond our vision, we find in tian account of intellectual humility: a proper Holy Scripture passages which can view of the divine orientation of inquiry. be interpreted in very different Augustine thought that a Christian would ways without prejudice to the faith conduct his inquiries differently than a non- we have received. In such cases, Christian because a Christian would hold that we should not rush in headlong the ultimate goal of inquiry is union with and so firmly take our stand on God. Augustine drew a distinction between one side that, if further progress in improper intellectual appetite (curiositas) and the search of truth justly under- proper intellectual appetite (studiositas). mines this position, we too fall Pride-driven inquiry was curiositas, mimicking with it. That would be to battle not Adam and Eve’s fatal desire to pursue knowl- for the teaching of Holy Scripture edge in abstraction from dependence upon but for our own, wishing its teach- God. Humble inquiry was studiositas, an ing to conform to ours, whereas attempted recovery of the pre-Fall norm of we ought to wish ours to conform knowing all things in God. As Aquinas put it, to that of Sacred Scripture. (de the person of studiositas is always “referring Genesi ad litteram, 41) his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God” (ST2-2.167.1). Here, Augustine points out that personal There are many ways in which studiositas biases often lead us to overestimate our war- directs and constrains intellectual inquiry (see rants for the beliefs we hold. Augustine cau- Dunnington, 2018), but in broad-strokes, tions Christians not to confuse their zeal for the proper inquiry is oriented to God, which Lord with zeal for particular doctrinal positions means that any legitimate inquiry will be that are not essential to the faith. We hypothe- undertaken with the hope that it will direct a size that theists who have a high degree of person toward wisdom about God. This intellectual humility will exhibit a similar sensi- means that certain topics take precedence; tivity about the epistemic warrants of their spe- theology is a genuinely more worthy science cific beliefs, including their peculiarly religious than biology, for Augustine. It also means that ones. For instance, we think a theist who is certain topics are off-limits; Augustine men- humble will not confuse his or her stance on tions things that are beyond human compre- evolution with “holy teaching,” and will there- hension (like the day of the Lord’s return) and fore say things like, “I believe in theistic evolu- things that are beneath human dignity (like tion, but I recognize many Christians hold celebrity gossip) as subjects that a person of other views and mine are based on limited studiositas will simply ignore. As Alan Jacobs exposure to the topic and challengeable inter- (2001) put it, “Augustine . . . would …have pretations of scripture.” Following Hazlett, we added a warning: If attention to God does don’t think intellectual humility requires that a not precede and envelop observations of the theist abandon his or her controvertible beliefs, world, then those observations are simply but we do think intellectual humility requires a idolatrous” (p. 21). truthful acknowledgement of such beliefs’ war- The contrast with contemporary accounts of rants and a lack of fearfulness or defensiveness humility are clear. The intellectual autonomy about their epistemic fragility. characteristic of post-Enlightenment culture does Proper Goals not recognize the validity of external limitations To this point, we have argued that a glad on the pursuit of knowledge. Knowledge is intellectual dependence on God will result in seen as neutral and always worth pursuing. different motivations for low status concern, a Jacobs (2001) quotes poet W. H. Auden as say- different posture toward owning of limitations, ing, … “it is difficult for us to believe that intel- and differences in what are considered to be lectual curiosity is a desire like any other, and to proper beliefs about the epistemic status of recognize that correct knowledge and truth are beliefs. While differing in some ways from not identical. To apply a categorical imperative existing contemporary accounts of markers of to knowing, so that, instead of asking, ‘What can 202 A THEISTIC ACCOUNT OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

I know’ we ask, ‘What, at this moment, am I grammar of a virtue is to have a meant to know?’—to entertain the possibility schematic notion of the kind of that the only knowledge which can be true for “life” lived by someone who pos- us is the knowledge that we can live up to—that sesses the virtue in question. (p. seems to all of us crazy and almost immoral” 193, italics original) (pp. 21-22). We have argued that IH is perhaps concep- Summary tualized and expressed with a different gram- In summary, we have articulated here a mar by people who are religiously committed. view of intellectual humility as it may be There is empirical support for this general experienced or displayed by a Christian. notion. Van Tongeran et al. (2017) found that Drawing primarily on Augustine, we argue an experimentally primed humility (via a writ- that intellectual humility for the Christian is ten induction to describe a time when they based on glad intellectual dependence on acted humbly) led to less defensiveness (i.e., God. It is evidenced in five markers of IH: less imagined retaliation toward someone who (a) proper unconcern about one’s intellectual strongly disagreed with them on a topic of status and entitlements; (b) proper concern personal importance) among religious partici- about one’s intellectual failures and limita- pants but increased defensiveness among tions; (c) proper posture of intellectual sub- nonreligious participants. However, in a fol- mission to divine teaching; (d) order epistemic low-up study, they controlled for shame and attitudes that properly reflect one’s justifica- embarrassment in order to reduce the possi- tion for one’s views, including those views bility that the prime made people think of held on the basis of religious testimony, humiliation rather than humility (a tendency church authority, interpretations of scripture, expected more among the nonreligious). In and the like; and (e) proper view of the the follow-up study, recalling humility led to divine orientation of inquiry. We turn now to reduced defensiveness for both religious and implications of this perspective for the study nonreligious participants. Thus, it appears of intellectual humility. that humility is understood differently between people who are religious and people Implications for the Study of IH who are not. So, what is the missing element, if indeed There is now research showing that reli- there is one, in more fully describing the expe- gious individuals value humility more than rience of humility from a theistic perspective? non-religious people (Van Tongeran et al., We suggest it is summed up well in Micah 6:8, 2017) and both self-report being more humble a passage frequently found on bumper stickers as well as being seen by others as being more as a theme of core Christian identity: “And humble (Rowatt, et al., 2014). The virtue-the- what does the Lord require of you? To act justly orist philosopher Robert Roberts (1987) has and to love mercy and to walk humbly with suggested that to understand how one con- your God” (NIV). Thus, within a Christian ceives and practices a virtue, one must take worldview—a Christian “grammar”—the call to into account that person’s “grammar,” which is humility is first and foremost a vertical call of developed within a larger belief structure or how one stands in relationship to God. The logic. This is what he says: other indicators are understood as figures only …the rules for the virtue name within the context of this background. It is the are, in their turn, determined by context by which humility is understood and the concept of the virtue in ques- practiced. That is, for the theist, an accurate tion—which is to say, what the understanding of humility must first be contex- virtue is like, what it includes and tualized in what is understood by that person excludes, what it is connected with, to be an obedient relationship to God. Thus, and so forth. To say that Christian what might be seen as tension-producing para- gratitude or Aristotelian pride or doxes about humility (e.g., believing one is Rogerian congruence each have a chosen by God without believing one is spe- “grammar” is just to say that the cial; believing that one owns the truth through concepts of these virtues differ in the exclusionary claims of the gospel, yet being determinate ways …. To know the willing to own limitations of understanding; HILL, DUNNINGTON, AND HALL 203 believing that Christ is a model of humility Hazlett, A. (2012). Higher-order epistemic attitudes while also acknowledging the extraordinary and intellectual humility. Episteme, 9, 205–223. claims of being the Messiah, the Son of God) is Hill, P. C., & Hall, M. E. L. (2018). Uncovering the understood by the Christian as simply humble good in positive psychology: Toward a world- obedience to God’s will. view conception that can help positive psycholo- The implications for empirical research are gy flourish. In N. J. L. Brown, T. Lomas, & F. J. Eiroa-Orosa (Eds.), The Routledge international numerous. What we have suggested, with- handbook of critical positive psychology (pp. 245- out an explicit declaration, is that research 262). Abingdon, UK: Routledge. on IH should adopt a first person accounting, Hill, P. C., & Sandage, S. J. (2016). The promising especially since understanding it, like under- but challenging case of humility as a positive standing other virtues, is philosophically sen- psychology virtue. Journal of Moral Education, sitive. For example, the committed theist, the 45, 132-146. doi: 10.1080/03057240.2016.1174675 agnostic, and the atheist all have worldviews Jacob, M. C. (2001). The enlightenment: A brief histo- through which IH, and virtues in general, are ry with documents. Boston, MA: St. Martin’s Press. interpreted and understood. Without taking Jacobs, A. (2001). A theology of reading: The into account their worldview perspective, hermeneutics of love. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. measures of IH may not capture what they MacIntyre, A. (1984). After virtue (2nd ed.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. are intended to measure. The substance of Niebuhr, R. (1943). The nature and destiny of man. what a person believes does matter in term A Christian interpretation. New York, NY: of how IH functions in his or her life. This Scribner’s Sons. will require more multi-method assessments, Paine, D. R., Moon, S. H., Hauge, D. J., & including qualitative methodologies. Sandage, S. J. (2018). Cultural and racial perspectives on positive psychologies of humility. In N. J. L. Brown, T. Lomas, & F. J. Eiroa-Orosa (Eds.), References The Routledge international handbook of critical Bollinger, R. A., & Hill. P. C. (2012). Humility. In T. positive psychology (pp. 281-298). Abingdon, UK: G. Plante (Ed.), Religion, spirituality, and positive Routledge. psychology: Understanding the psychological fruits Pannenberg, W. (1994). Systematic theology (Vol. of faith (pp. 31-47). Westport, CT: Praeger. 2). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Church, I., & Samuelson P. (2017). Intellectual Porter, S. L., Rambachan, A., Velez de Cea, A., Rabi- humility: An introduction to the philosophy and nowitz, D., Pardue, S., & Jackson, S. (2017). Reli- science. London, UK: Bloomsbury. gious perspectives on humility. In E. L. Cohen, A. B. (2009). Many forms of culture. Ameri- Worthington, D. E. Davis, & J. Hook (Eds.), Hand- can Psychologist, 64, 194-204. book of humility (pp. 119-133). New York, NY: Cook, K., Sandage, S. J., Hill, P. C., & Strawn, B. D. Routledge. (2009). Hermeneutic analysis of virtuous exem- Richards, N. (1988). Is humility a virtue? American plar narratives of Cambodian-American Buddhists Philosophical Quarterly, 25, 253–259. and Christians. Mental Health, Religion & Culture, Roberts, R. (1987). Psychotherapeutic virtues and 12, 315-338. doi: 10.1080/13674670902734563 the grammar of faith. Journal of Psychology and Driver, J. (1989). The virtues of ignorance. The Theology, 15, 191-204. Journal of Philosophy, 86, 373–384. Roberts, R., & Wood, J. (2007). Intellectual virtues: Dueck, A., & Reimer, K. (2003). Retrieving the virtues An essay in regulative epistemology. Oxford, UK: in psychotherapy. American Behavioral Scientist, Oxford University Press. 47, 427–441. doi:10.1177/0002764203256948 Rowatt, W. C., Kang, L. L., Haggard, M. C., & Dunnington, K. (2016). Is there a Christian virtue LaBouff, J. P. (2014). A social-personality perspec- epistemology? Res Philosophica, 93, 637-652. tive on humility, religiousness, and spirituality. Dunnington, K. (2017). Intellectual humility and the Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 31-40. ends of the virtues: Conflicting aretaic desiderata. Sandage S. J., & Hill, P. C. (2001). The virtues of Political Theology, 18, 95-114. doi:.1080/ positive psychology: The rapprochement and 1462317X.2016.1224049 challenges of an affirmative postmodern perspec- Dunnington, K. (2018). Premodern Christian perspective. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, tives on curiosity. In I. Inan, L. Watson, D. Whit- 31, 241-260. comb, and S. Yigit (Eds.), The moral psychology of Sandage, S. J., & Naicker, M. S. (2009). Indigenous curiosity (pp. 79–96). New York, NY: Rowan & Lit- positive psychology. In S. J. Lopez & A. tlefield. Beauchamp (Eds.), The encyclopedia of positive Flanagan, O. (1990). Virtue and ignorance. The psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 514–517). Oxford, UK: Journal of Philosophy, 87, 420–428. Wiley-Blackwell.

204 A THEISTIC ACCOUNT OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University Positive psychology: An introduction. American (CA) and Editor of the Journal of Psychology and Psychologist, 55, 5-14. Christianity. Dr. Hill’s interests include measure- Triandis, H. C. (2007). Culture and psychology: A history of the study of their relationship. In S. ment issues in the psychology of religion, the inte- Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.), Handbook of cul- gration of psychology and religion, religious tural psychology (pp. 59-76). New York, NY: fundamentalism, and the positive psychology study Guilford Press. of humility and gratitude. Van Tongeren, D. R., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Rowatt, W., & Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2017). Reli- Kent Dunnington (Ph.D. in Philosophy, Texas gious differences in reporting and expressing A&M University) is Associate Professor of Philosophy humility. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, at Biola University (CA). He is the author of Addic- 10, 174-184. doi: 10.1037/rel0000118 tion and Virtue (InterVarsity Academic, 2011) and Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Sny- Humility, Pride, and Christian Virtue Theory der, D. (2015). Intellectual humility: Owning our limitations. Philosophy and Phenomenological (forthcoming from Oxford University Press). Research, 94, 509-539. doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12228 M. Elizabeth Lewis Hall (Ph.D. in Clinical Psy- Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An chology, Biola University) is Professor of Psychology enquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Oxford, UK: Oxford at Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University University Press. (CA) and Associate Editor of Psychology of Religion and Spirituality. Dr. Hall's research interests Authors include the integration of psychology and theology, Peter C. Hill (Ph.D. in Social Psychology, Univer- gender issues in evangelicalism, and meaning- sity of Houston) is Professor of Psychology at the making in suffering. Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.