Glad Intellectual Dependence on God: a Theistic Account of Intellectual Humility"

Center for Faith & Learning Scholar Program Reading for Dinner Dialogue #3 Winter 2020 "Glad Intellectual Dependence on God: A Theistic Account of Intellectual Humility" by Peter C. Hill, Kent Dunnington and M. Elizabeth Lewis Hall From: The Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 2018, Vol. 37, No.3, 195-204 Journal of Psychology and Christianity Copyright 2018 Christian Association for Psychological Studies 2018, Vol. 37, No.3, 195-204 ISSN 0733-4273 Glad Intellectual Dependence on God: A Theistic Account of Intellectual Humility Peter C. Hill Kent Dunnington M. Elizabeth Lewis Hall Biola University We present a view of intellectual humility as it may be experienced and expressed by a theist. From a religious cultural perspective and drawing primarily on Augustine, we argue that intellectual humility for the theist is based on glad intellectual dependence on God. It is evidenced in five markers of IH: (a) proper unconcern about one’s intellectual status and entitlements; (b) proper concern about one’s intellectual failures and limitations; (c) proper posture of intellectual submis- sion to divine teaching; (d) order epistemic attitudes that properly reflect one’s justification for one’s views, including those views held on the basis of religious testimony, church authority, interpreta- tions of scripture, and the like; and (e) proper view of the divine orientation of inquiry. Implica- tions of this perspective for the study of intellectual humility are provided. Positive psychology’s critique that the study especially relevant in an age where people of what is “right” about people has been frequently ignore, belittle, or even aggressive- understudied has opened the door to investi- ly attack alternative ideas, beliefs, or perspec- gate the psychological study of virtue. tives, is intellectual humility. Philosophers Sandage and Hill (2001; also see Hill & have provided a number of accounts of intel- Sandage, 2016, for an update) suggested that lectual humility (IH), some of which also virtue is not only relevant to psychological apply well to understanding humility as a gen- study, but that it can provide a guiding frame- eral motivational construct. work for a science of positive psychology by The purpose of this paper is to apply these suggesting that virtues (a) promote human accounts of IH in light of how people may flourishing and positive health, (b) cultivate actually comprehend and apply humility, intel- human strength and resilience, and (c) pro- lectual or otherwise, in their lives. In so doing, mote positive characteristics not only in the we consider how IH is understood from a the- individual but also in community. This new istic worldview perspective. Our approach in attention to the study of virtue has included this paper is four-pronged. First, we review the psychological study of intellectual virtues. contemporary philosophical accounts of IH. Of the intellectual virtues, one that seems Second, we consider IH within the context of a cultural perspective. Third, we apply a reli- Writing this paper was supported by a generous grant gious cultural perspective, particularly an to Peter Hill from the John Templeton Foundation, Grant No. 60622, Developing Humility in Leadership. Augustinian theistic account, to the study of IH. The paper was also supported by a grant given to Fourth, we explore how this religious cultural Elizabeth Hall by Bridging the Two Cultures of Sci- perspective might influence the study of IH. ence and the Humanities II, a project run by Scholar- ship and Christianity in Oxford, the UK subsidiary of Three Leading Philosophical the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, Accounts of IH with funding by Templeton Religion Trust and The In recent decades, philosophers have Blankemeyer Foundation. All three authors have benefitted through fellowships recovered an interest in the virtues, including received from the Center for Christian Thought (CCT) the virtue of intellectual humility (e.g., at Biola University, with funding by the John Temple- Zagzebski, 1996). The three accounts of IH ton Foundation and the Blankemeyer Foundation. that seem to be receiving the most attention Many of the ideas presented here were formulated are the following. through discussions at the CCT. Correspondence regarding this article should be Low Concern for Status or Self-Importance addressed to Peter C. Hill, Ph.D., Rosemead School of (Roberts & Wood, 2007) Psychology, Biola University, 13800 Biola Ave., La IH is the opposite of intellectual arrogance Mirada, CA 90639; [email protected] or improper pride and therefore consists of a 195 196 A THEISTIC ACCOUNT OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY disposition to an unusually low concern for If Dunnington is correct and insistence on one’s intellectual status and entitlements. The uncovering a unitary account is misguided, it intellectually humble person is less interested does not mean that psychologists will find in being recognized for his or her intellectual these intense philosophical efforts useless. accomplishments than in promoting the sub- There is considerable value for the psycholo- ject matter itself. This approach stresses the gist studying IH, or perhaps any other virtue lack of vices of pride that, in themselves, take (intellectual or otherwise), to be well-ground- on a socially comparative importance. ed in the philosophical literature that often provides a number of coherent structures from Limitations Owning (Whitcomb, Battaly, which to understand the construct of interest. Baehr, & Howard-Snyder, 2015) IH consists of a disposition of having the However, though each of these views of right stance toward one’s intellectual limita- humility have merit, our approach as psycholo- tions while proper pride is having the right gists is to follow Dunnington’s (2017) advice stance toward one’s intellectual strengths. This and consider each of these accounts as markers involves proper attentiveness to—and owning or indicators of humility. Thus, psychologists of—one’s limitations for which the humble are well-advised to ground their research in, for person will try to responsibly compensate. example, a limitations owning humility, a low concern for status humility, a proper belief Proper Beliefs (Church & Samuelson, 2017; humility, an accurate estimate of strengths Hazlett, 2012) humility, or potential others. In fact, it may be Also sometimes referred to as the doxastic the case that all of these accounts, plus more mean account, IH is a disposition to form that are yet to be developed, when taken proper beliefs about the epistemic status of together are what will best propel the empirical one’s beliefs in that it consists in finding the study of humility, intellectual or otherwise. mean between over-estimating and under-estimating the positive epistemic status of one’s A Cultural Perspective on IH beliefs. The intellectually humble person is the one who tends to have an accurate sense One key element not emphasized in the con- of the varying levels of epistemic strength that temporary philosophical literature on intellectu- characterize his or her own views; this person al humility is its cultural variety. Positive is accurate about which ones amount to psychology’s assumption of being an objective knowledge, which ones are well-established science that can “transcend particular cultures beliefs, etc., all the way down to which ones and politics and approach universality” (Selig- are mere assumptions or working hypotheses. man & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5) has been There are other philosophical accounts (e.g., increasingly questioned by evidence that an Accurate Estimation of Strengths account virtues are most fully understood in the context [Flanagan, 1990; Richards, 1988]; an Overesti- of cultural particularity (Cook, Sandage, Hill, & mation of Weaknesses account [Driver, 1989]), Strawn, 2009; Sandage & Naicker, 2009). but these three accounts are the most perti- The failure to acknowledge the dependence nent for the purpose of this paper. Regardless, of virtues on specific traditions has led, accord- all of the accounts are unitive in nature in that ing to philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), they try to ascertain IH’s essential core—that to the unintentional prioritizing of contempo- is, the conditions which are constitutive of rary moral and political assumptions about the what it means to be intellectually humble. By world, however inadequate or confused they focusing on the two accounts that have may be. This is certainly the case in psycholo- received the most attention by philosophers gy, where the renewed interest in the virtues (the low concern for status account and the due to the popularity of positive psychology limitations owning account), Dunnington has led to the widespread attempt to define (2017) has argued through counterexamples virtues in ways that are independent of specif- that neither account is foolproof and thus the ic traditions, resulting in thin, lowest-common- search for a unified account of IH is likely denominator views of these virtues. This untenable. Rather, Dunnington recommends move in psychology has not been without its that we consider these characteristics as mark- detractors. For example, Hill and Hall (2018) ers or indicators of IH. have argued that this presumed neutrality HILL, DUNNINGTON, AND HALL 197 regarding the virtues may hide assumptions contemporary philosophical and empirical such as the universality of virtues, human study. Religion provides “a set of practices, a autonomy, the superiority

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