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Evaluation VHF Intercept and Direction Finding Systems Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1989 Evaluation VHF intercept and direction finding systems. Siddiqui, Muhammad Aleem. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25913 UNCLASSIFIED S.'URiTY CLASS. FiCAT'Orj Qi^ THiS PAGt form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 0MB No 0704 on REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb RESTRICTIVE MARK NGS Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRIBUTION 'AVAHABlLiTV OF PE.-OP" Approved for public release; DECLASSIFICATION ' DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE distribution is unlimited PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER{S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFFICE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION (If applicable) ^aval Postgraduate Schoo] 61 Naval Postgraduate School ADDRESS {City, State, and ZIP Code) 7t) ADDRESS (C/fy State and ZIP Code) Monterey, California 93943-5000 Monterey, California 93943-5000 NAME OF FUNDING SPONSORING Bb OFFICE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBEf ORGANIZATION (If applicable) ADDRESS(C/f> State and ZIP Code) in SOURCE OF FUNDING NjMBE»S P!^'OGRAM PROJECT TASr vvorn unit Element no NO NO -ccession no i TITLE (Include Security Classification) EVALUATION OF VHF INTERCEPT AND DIRECTION FINDING SYSTEMS ! PERSONAL AUTHOR'S; SIDDIQUI, Muhammad Aleem ia TYPE OF REPORT 3b TIME COVERED ^ DATE OF REPOR" (Year Month Day) 3 PAGE COUN' Master's Thesis FROM TO 1989, September 91 j SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION COSATl CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on revefse if necessar-y and identify by block number) ELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Electronic Warfare, Interception, Direction Finding ) ABSTRACT {Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This thesis evaluates VHF Intercept and Direction Finding (DF) collection systems developed by ESL International, Watkins Johnson, and HRB Singer for induction into a divisional level signal battalion of the Pakistan ^rmy. The introduction of the proposed system is expected to enhance Bxisting intercept and Direction Finding (DF) Capabilities. This thesis Bvaluates the three systems on the basis of performance, design, and Bupportability characteristics. In the process each system element is further broken into subelements composed of significant intercept and DF system characteristics. The expected threat environment and the capabil- ities of modern intercept and DF systems provided practical and workable rationale and criteria for this purpose. rhe conclusion is that the system developed by ESL International offers significant capabilities of meeting the needs of expected division;^] IpvpI . D DISTRIBUTION . AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECUR'T-- C ASSinCATiON [^ UNCLASSIFIED UNLIMITED D SAME AS RPT D DTIC USERS Unclassified a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE f/nc/ude Area Code) :2c OFFICE SYMBOl Donald L. Walters 408-646-2267 61We 3 Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous edition: are obsolete SECURiTv CLASSif iCAI l ofy 0^ S/N 0102-LF-01A-6603 Unclassified T243559 Unclassified SECURITY ClAS = !'^iCATIO\ OF ^Hi- PAGE Block 19, Abstract. threat environments. A major recommendation is that the system capabilities be verified by carrying out a dedicated testing operational program before finalizing the acquisition proposal DD Form 1473, JUM 86 ^ir.-- 11 Unclassified Approved for Public Release; distribution is unlimited EVALUATION OF VHF INTERCEPT AND DIRECTION FINDING SYSTEMS by Muhammad Aleem Siddiqui Major, Pakistan Army B.S., Military College of Signal, Pakistan, 1986 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL \ \ y, \ September 1989 C.J ABSTRACT This thesis evaluates VHF Intercept and Direction Finding (DP) collection systems developed by ESL International, Watkin Johnson, and HRB Singer for induction into a divisional level signal battalion of the Pakistan army. The introduction of the proposed system is expected to enhance existing intercept and Direction Finding (DF) capabilities. This thesis evaluates the three systems on the basis of performance, design, and supportability characteristics. In the process each system element is further broken into subelements composed of significant intercept and DF system characteristics. The expected threat environment and the capabilities of modern intercept and DF systems provided practical and workable rationale and criteria for this purpose. The conclusion is that the system developed by ESL International offers significant capabilities of meeting the needs of expected divisional level threat environments. A major recommendation is that the system capabilities be verified by carrying out a dedicated operational testing program before finalizing the acquisition proposal. IV DTTDT,r!YT- 13 AVAL rC L MOIJTEBSY. C- TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1 A. GENERAL 1 B. OBJECTIVE 3 II. ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) MISSION CATEGORIES .... 4 A. GENERAL 4 B. ELECTRONIC RECONNAISSANCE (ER) 5 C. ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM) 7 D. ELECTRONIC COUNTER - COUNTERMEASURES (ECCM) . 10 III. CONCEPT OF COMBAT COMMUNICATION IN A DIVISION . 13 A. ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT 13 B. ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SIGNAL CORPS . 14 C. COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES 15 D. RADIO 15 E. WIRE AND CABLE SYSTEM 17 F. RADIO RELAY 18 G. MESSENGER SERVICE 19 H. COMMUNICATION FOR DEFENSE 19 I. COMMUNICATION FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS .... 21 J. COMMUNICATION FOR ATTACK AND PURSUIT PHASE . 22 K. COMMUNICATION FOR WITHDRAWAL 2 3 IV. MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN COMMUNICATION . 2 6 A. GENERAL 26 V B. SPREAD SPECTRUM COMMUNICATION 27 C. METEOR BURST COMMUNICATION (MBC) 29 D. FIBER OPTICS 31 E. MILLIMETER WAVELENGTH 3 4 F. LOCAL AREA NETWORKS (LAN) 35 G. SATELLITE COMMUNICATION 3 6 V. INTERCEPT AND DIRECTION FINDING SYSTEMS 4 A. GENERAL 4 B. INTERCEPT RECEIVERS 41 C. DF SYSTEM 4 4 j/ D. CLASSIFICATION OF DF SYSTEM 46 1. Scalar Systems 46 2. Vector or Phaser Systems 49 E. ESM SYSTEM IN OPERATIONS OF WAR 51 VI. SYSTEM EVALUATION 53 A. GENERAL 53 B. LIMITATIONS 54 C. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA 54 1. Performance Characteristics 55 2. Design Characteristics 61 3. Multipliers 63 D. SYSTEM COMPARISON 63 E. SUMMARY 7 2 VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 73 A. CONCLUSIONS 73 VI 1 B. RECOMMENDATIONS 74 APPENDIX A: LIST OF MANUFACTURERS 7 6 APPENDIX B: FIGURES 78 LIST OF REFERENCES 8 BIBLIOGRAPHY 81 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 82 VI I . INTRODUCTION A. GENERAL Electronic devices have become an essential part of a military force for command and control, logistic support and control of weapons. On one hand, use of such electronic devices extend excellent command and control opportunities, and on the other, their increased use has inherent risks and vulnerabilities. These dangers have established themselves as important weapons of war. The threat of Electronic Warfare (EW) is fact and in any future war we will have to face an organized electronic warfare effort by the enemy. Electronic warfare is becoming one of the most effective weapons in the armory of any nation facing a sophisticated threat. Properly used in support of a tactical plan, electronic warfare can turn out to be a battle winning factor. Therefore, the need for having a sizable capability in this area must be considered. Because of its clandestine nature and the high security barriers erected around it, EW is one of the least-understood aspects of military activity of our times and has for many come to represent a "black art" to which only a chosen elite are permitted access. To some extent this is necessary, since electronic warfare must by its nature keep its secrets, as far as possible, to be effective. On the other hand, electronic warfare must absorb the latest advances in electronics technology if they are perceived to be of potential value. Despite these factors, electronic warfare is not fundamentally a complex subject and is as old as the technology of electronics itself. Historically, electronic warfare in its most basic form, that of interception of other people's communication has been with us almost since the introduction of communication via radio. As soon as radio communications came into general use, there was always some unauthorized person prepared to eavesdrop on them. Apart from realizing that he may be overheard, there was little that the user could do to counter this. In the modern electronic battle field, communication plays a pivotal role to control forces, to know their deployment and maneuvers, and to fire weapons. Thus, there are tactical reasons for the presence and activity of each transmitter. Each higher headquarters needs two-way communications with each of its subordinate headquarters; each element of a fire control network must talk to other elements; and each mobile unit must communicate with its commander. Under this saturated communication scenario modern intercept and direction finding (DF) systems provide timely and accurate information that allow a decision maker to determine the strength and location of enemy forces and enemy tactical intentions. They also support electronic countermeasures (ECM) activities, which can prevent the enemy from effectively controlling his forces or using his weapons. Thus a clear understanding of the theoretical basis of selected electronic warfare (EW) missions, the concept of combat communication, and the characteristics of the latest intercept and DF systems is essential. B. OBJECTIVE The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the technological
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