DOCSLIB.ORG

RCED-91-150 Disaster Assistance: Supplemental Information On

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
RCED-91-150 Disaster Assistance: Supplemental Information On lJtlit,ttd Statm General Accounting Office Report to the Honorable GAO Ernest F. Hollings, U.S. Senate DISASTER ASSISTANCE Supplemental Information on Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina IllllIllHll 144188 RELEASED --Not fo be mleawd outside the ~~!omceunlessspecin~ appmwd by the OffIce of Congresteionf4l BaldOMB --- ~;Ao/I1~:ISI~-!Jl-lr,o Uuited States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20648 Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division B-242801 May 21,199l The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings United States Senate Dear Senator Hollings: As agreed with you on March 6, 1991, we are providing additional infor- mation to supplement our report entitled Disaster Assistance:Federal, State, and Local Responsesto Natural Disasters Need Improvement (GAO/RCED-91-43,Mar. 6, 1991). This information pertains only to South Carolina and includes: (1) the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency ’s (FEMA)efforts to provide temporary housing assistanceto the victims of Hurricane Hugo, which struck South Carolina on September22, 1989; (2) South Carolina counties’ local emergencymanagement officials ’ responsesto our disaster assistancesurvey; and (3) cost-sharing arrangements between FEMAand state and local governmentsto fund public assistanceprojects in South Carolina. In a federally declared disaster, FEMAcan provide grants directly to vic- tims for housing needswhile other requests affecting the general popu- lation such as water, generators, and debris removal are made by local governments. In South Carolina, the state emergencyoperations plan directs that local governments channel their assistanceneeds through the county to the State EmergencyPreparedness Office established for that purpose. The state can fully respond to somerequests and may request assistancefrom FEMAto meet other needs.Under a cost-share arrangement with state and local governments,FEMA can also provide funds for the restoration of publicly owned facilities damagedor destroyed by a federally declared disaster. To assist victims of Hurricane Hugo, FEMAprovided temporary housing Results in Brief assistanceto about 30,000 victims in South Carolina, which included providing grants to homeowners and renters or providing mobile homes. FEMAmet many of the requests for temporary housing assistancewithin 1 week after it began accepting applications. For example, FEMApro- vided disaster victims with grants to rent housing or make repairs to their homes.Some families began occupying FEMAmobile homes about 1 month after the disaster was declared. FEMAcontinued to move families into mobile homesuntil April 1990. Page 1 GAO/RCED-ol-150 Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina As part of our review, we contactedcounty emergencymanagement officials in the 24 South Carolina counties declared as disaster areasto determine how well their disaster-relatedneeds were met. Most of the officials said that their counties’ needswere met. However, an official from one county told us that a slow responseby the state greatly hin- dered the county’s ability to respond.In this case,the state government did not promptly respondto a request for assistanceto clean up a gaso- line spill. Further, officials of five other counties told us that slow or unfilled requestsplaced with the state somewhathindered their abilities to respond to the disaster. None of the county emergencymanagement officials we interviewed indicated that their requestsfor public assistance(requests to restore publicly owned roads, buildings, or other similar facilities) were delayed or deferred becausethey could not pay their share of the cost of such projects, Hurricane Hugo destroyed or damagedextensive amountsof housing in F’EMA’s Responseto South Carolina. As you know, FEMAis authorized, under section 408 of Disaster Victims’ the Stafford Act, to provide temporary housing assistanceto individuals Requestsfor displacedby a disaster. In accordancewith its legislative authority, FEMAresponded to disaster victims’ requestsfor temporary housing Temporary Housing assistancein a number of ways, including providing grants to home- Assistance owners and renters and providing mobile homes. FEMAprovided housing assistanceto the victims of the hurricane in South Carolina at a total cost of over $31 million. FEMAreceived over 42,000 requestsfor temporary housing assistancefrom South Carolina residents.FEMA determined that nearly 30,000 residents,or about 70 percent who applied, were eligible for sometype of temporary housing assistance.FEMA provided grants to over 8,600 applicants to rent housing and to over 21,000disaster victims to repair their own homes. FEMAalso provided about 100 victims with transient housing, such as hotel accommodations(generally limited to 30 days), until they could find more permanent housing.FEMA began issuing temporary housing checksto eligible disaster victims by October 2, 1989-6 days after acceptingthe first assistanceapplications. FEMAdetermined that about 30 percent of the 42,000 requests,or about 11,600applicants, were not eligible for temporary housing assistance because(1) property damagewas not sufficient to qualify for assistance a+ (over 6,000 requests),(2) housing needswere satisfied by other means Page 2 GAO/RCED-91-150 Hurricane Hugo in Soutb Carolina B-242801 such as their homeowners’insurance (over 3,000 requests),and (3) dam- aged property was not the applicants’ primary place of residence(over 1,000 requests).The remaining requestswere not eligible for other reasons. Table 1 provides information on temporary housing assistance requestedfro m and provided by FEMA. Table 1: Dlaporitlon of Temporary Houring Awlatance Requwta in South Disposition Number Carolina (As of Feb. 1991) ADDlications received 42,656 Applications ineligible 11,606 Applications withdrawn 1,070 Applications eligible 29,980 Families Type of assistance provided to eligible applicants assisted Existing resource9 8,664 Minimal reoair broaramb 21,072 Mobile homes 243 Wnder existing resources, FEMA provides grants to disaster victims to (1) rent locally available govern- ment owned or assisted properties, or private or commercial properties; (2) acquire transient accommo- dations; or (3) stay with family or friends. bUnder the minimal repair program, FEMA provides grants (generally limited to $5,000) to victims to make repairs to their homes to quickly restore habitability. Source: FEMA. FEMA Provided Mobile Mobile homeswere requestedfro m and provided by FEMAto 243 fami- lies. According to F’EMAmobile, homesare the least preferred option in Homesto Disaster Victims providing temporary housing assistancebecause of the time it takes to move mobile homesto neededlocations, and the time neededto develop suitable sites. In addition, most disaster victims considermobile homes as a last resort to meetingtheir temporary housing needs.As of January 1990, about 97 percent of the families who had applied for temporary housing assistancerequested monetary payment (checks).FEMA identi- fied about 3 percent of the applicants for its mobile homes. FEMAtook several steps to begin placing families in mobile homes.To more quickly determinethe number of mobile homesthat would be needed,FEMA established a priority-processing procedure basedon the extent of damageto disaster victims’ homes.By mid-October1989, FEMA transported 96 mobile homesto Shaw Air Force Base,which was used as a staging area, In addition, FEMAidentified about 1,700 suitable sites for Page 3 GAO/RCED-gl-160 Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina R-242901 mobile homesshould they be needed.The first family occupied a FEMA mobile home on October 19, 1989. In April 1990,FEMA provided a mobile home to the last of the 243 families who had requestedone. Placement of Mobile In early October 1989, FEMAmet with Charleston County Council mem- Homes in Flood-Prone bers to discussthe temporary housing program. The Council pointed out A-#.a..... that most of Charleston County is flood prone, and that alternatives tkl[-e&la would needto be developedbefore mobile homescould be,usedbecause FEMArestricts mobile home placement in flood-prone areas. In response to such concerns,in mid-October 1989, FEMAgranted a 6-month waiver for the temporary placement of mobile homesdonated by religious groups in certain flood-prone areas,such as parts of Charleston County, if the mobile home foundation pier was 3 feet above the natural ground level. In addition to the 228 mobile homesFEMA provided in South Caro- lina, FEMAofficials told us that about 30 mobile homeshad been donated by a religious group.’ Becauserequests for assistanceusually originate at the local level, and County Preparedness becauseofficials at this level are amongthe first to identify the nature and ResponseSurvey and extent of the damage,we contacted local emergencymanagement officials in each of the 24 counties that was declared a disaster area. South Carolina’s state emergencyoperations plan specifies that local assistancerequests are to be channeledthrough the county emergency managementdirectors to the State EmergencyPreparedness Office establishedto handle these requests.The state can fully respond to somerequests, but when it exhausts its resources,it can request supple- mental assistancefrom FEMA.We asked county officials if, after their counties had beendeclared disaster areas,they received the assistance they had requestedfrom the state on a timely basis. Most of the officials surveyed said their counties’ requests had been met. However, the following are examplesof counties’ requeststo the state for assistancethat were not met on
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1989 Hurricane Hugo - September 1989
    1989 Hurricane Hugo - September 1989. Category 4 hurricane devastates SC and NC with ~ 20 foot storm surge and severe wind damage after hitting PR and the U.S. Virgin Islands; over $9.0 (13.9) billion (about $7.1 (10.9) billion in Carolinas); 86 deaths (57--U.S. mainland, 29--U.S. Islands). Hurricane Hugo was a powerful Cape Verde hurricane that caused widespread damage and loss of life in Guadeloupe, Saint Croix, Puerto Rico, and the Southeast United States. It formed over the eastern Atlantic near the Cape Verde Islands on September 9, 1989. Hugo moved thousands of miles across the Atlantic, rapidly strengthening to briefly attain category 5 hurricane strength on its journey. It later crossed over Guadeloupe and St. Croix on September 17 and 18 as a category 4 hurricane. Weakening slightly more, it passed over Puerto Rico as a strong category 3 hurricane. Further weakening occurred several hours after re-emerging into the Atlantic, becoming downgraded to a category 2 hurricane. However, it re-strengthened into a category 4 hurricane before making landfall just slightly north of Charleston, on Isle of Palms on September 22 with 140 mph sustained winds (gusts to more than 160 mph). It had devolved to a remnant low near Lake Erie by the next day. As of 2016, Hurricane Hugo is the most intense tropical cyclone to strike the East Coast north of Florida since 1898. Hurricane Hugo caused 34 fatalities (most by electrocution or drowning) in the Caribbean and 27 in South Carolina, left nearly 100,000 homeless, and resulted in $9.47 billion (1989 USD) in damage overall, making it the most damaging hurricane ever recorded at the time.
    [Show full text]
  • Storm Tide Simulations for Hurricane Hugo (1989): on the Significance of Including Inland Flooding Areas
    STORM TIDE SIMULATIONS FOR HURRICANE HUGO (1989): ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INCLUDING INLAND FLOODING AREAS by DANIEL DIETSCHE B.S. Basle Institute of Technology, Switzerland, 1993 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering in the College of Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Summer Term 2004 ABSTRACT In this study, storm tides are simulated by performing a hindcast of water surface levels produced by Hurricane Hugo (1989). The region of interest incorporates inundation areas between Charleston and Shallotte Inlet (120 miles northeast of Charleston) and includes Bulls Bay where the highest storm surge of about 20 feet occurred. The study domain also contains an important riverine system which is connected to the Winyah Bay: the Waccamaw River up to Conway including all pertinent tributaries (Sampit River, Black River, and Pee Dee River), and the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway (AIW) within the Grand Strand (Myrtle Beach). Five different two-dimensional finite element models with triangular elements are applied in order to simulate the storm tides, allow for inundation, and provide a basis of comparison to assess the significance of including inundation areas and two extents of spatial discretization. Four computational regions comprise a semicircular mesh encompassing the South Carolina coast including all relevant estuaries and bays as well as the continental shelf. Two of these four computational regions include inland topography allowing the model to simulate inland flooding. One of the floodplain meshes is then incorporated into the Western North Atlantic Tidal (WNAT) model domain to produce a fifth computational region.
    [Show full text]
  • Hurricane & Tropical Storm
    5.8 HURRICANE & TROPICAL STORM SECTION 5.8 HURRICANE AND TROPICAL STORM 5.8.1 HAZARD DESCRIPTION A tropical cyclone is a rotating, organized system of clouds and thunderstorms that originates over tropical or sub-tropical waters and has a closed low-level circulation. Tropical depressions, tropical storms, and hurricanes are all considered tropical cyclones. These storms rotate counterclockwise in the northern hemisphere around the center and are accompanied by heavy rain and strong winds (NOAA, 2013). Almost all tropical storms and hurricanes in the Atlantic basin (which includes the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea) form between June 1 and November 30 (hurricane season). August and September are peak months for hurricane development. The average wind speeds for tropical storms and hurricanes are listed below: . A tropical depression has a maximum sustained wind speeds of 38 miles per hour (mph) or less . A tropical storm has maximum sustained wind speeds of 39 to 73 mph . A hurricane has maximum sustained wind speeds of 74 mph or higher. In the western North Pacific, hurricanes are called typhoons; similar storms in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific Ocean are called cyclones. A major hurricane has maximum sustained wind speeds of 111 mph or higher (NOAA, 2013). Over a two-year period, the United States coastline is struck by an average of three hurricanes, one of which is classified as a major hurricane. Hurricanes, tropical storms, and tropical depressions may pose a threat to life and property. These storms bring heavy rain, storm surge and flooding (NOAA, 2013). The cooler waters off the coast of New Jersey can serve to diminish the energy of storms that have traveled up the eastern seaboard.
    [Show full text]
  • Hurricane Marãa Tripled Stem Breaks and Doubled Tree Mortality Relative
    ARTICLE https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-09319-2 OPEN Hurricane María tripled stem breaks and doubled tree mortality relative to other major storms María Uriarte 1, Jill Thompson2 & Jess K. Zimmerman3 Tropical cyclones are expected to intensify under a warming climate, with uncertain effects on tropical forests. One key challenge to predicting how more intense storms will influence these ecosystems is to attribute impacts specifically to storm meteorology rather than dif- 1234567890():,; ferences in forest characteristics. Here we compare tree damage data collected in the same forest in Puerto Rico after Hurricanes Hugo (1989, category 3), Georges (1998, category 3), and María (2017, category 4). María killed twice as many trees as Hugo, and for all but two species, broke 2- to 12-fold more stems than the other two storms. Species with high density wood were resistant to uprooting, hurricane-induced mortality, and were protected from breakage during Hugo but not María. Tree inventories and a wind exposure model allow us to attribute these differences in impacts to storm meteorology. A better understanding of risk factors associated with tree species susceptibility to severe storms is key to predicting the future of forest ecosystems under climate warming. 1 Department of Ecology Evolution and Environmental Biology, Columbia University, 1200 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027, USA. 2 Centre for Ecology & Hydrology Bush Estate, Penicuik, Midlothian EH26 0QB, UK. 3 Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00925, USA. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to M.U. (email: [email protected]) NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | (2019) 10:1362 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-09319-2 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 1 ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-09319-2 yclonic storms (hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons) exposure to wind or the structure and composition of forests at Crepresent the dominant natural disturbance in coastal the time the storm struck.
    [Show full text]
  • Hurricane Andrew in Florida: Dynamics of a Disaster ^
    Hurricane Andrew in Florida: Dynamics of a Disaster ^ H. E. Willoughby and P. G. Black Hurricane Research Division, AOML/NOAA, Miami, Florida ABSTRACT Four meteorological factors aggravated the devastation when Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida: completed replacement of the original eyewall by an outer, concentric eyewall while Andrew was still at sea; storm translation so fast that the eye crossed the populated coastline before the influence of land could weaken it appreciably; extreme wind speed, 82 m s_1 winds measured by aircraft flying at 2.5 km; and formation of an intense, but nontornadic, convective vortex in the eyewall at the time of landfall. Although Andrew weakened for 12 h during the eyewall replacement, it contained vigorous convection and was reintensifying rapidly as it passed onshore. The Gulf Stream just offshore was warm enough to support a sea level pressure 20-30 hPa lower than the 922 hPa attained, but Andrew hit land before it could reach this potential. The difficult-to-predict mesoscale and vortex-scale phenomena determined the course of events on that windy morning, not a long-term trend toward worse hurricanes. 1. Introduction might have been a harbinger of more devastating hur- ricanes on a warmer globe (e.g., Fisher 1994). Here When Hurricane Andrew smashed into South we interpret Andrew's progress to show that the ori- Florida on 24 August 1992, it was the third most in- gins of the disaster were too complicated to be ex- tense hurricane to cross the United States coastline in plained by thermodynamics alone. the 125-year quantitative climatology.
    [Show full text]
  • Learning from Hurricane Hugo: Implications for Public Policy
    LEARNING FROM HURRICANE HUGO: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY prepared for the FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 500 C Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20472 under contract no. EMW-90-G-3304,A001 June 1992 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................... 1.............I PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STORM . 3 Wind Speeds .3 IMPACTS ON NATURAL SYSTEMS 5 ................................ Biological Systems ....... .................................5 Dunes and Beaches ....... .5............................... Beach Nourishment . .................................7 IMPACTS ON HUMANS AND HUMAN SYSTEMS ............................ 9 Deaths and Injuries ............................ 9 Housing ............................ 9 Utilities ................... 10 Transportation Systems .1................... 10 The Economy ................... 11 Psychological Effects ................... 11 INSURANCE .......................... 13 COASTAL DEVELOPMENT .......................... 14 Setbacks ........................... 15 Coastal Protection Structures .......................... 16 PERFORMANCE OF STRUCTURES ..... .... 18 Effects of Wind and/or Water ...... .... 18 Effects of Water, Waves, or Erosion . .. .18 Effects of Wind .............. .... 19 Foundations .................. .... 21 Slabs ................ .... 22 Piers and Columns ....... .... 22 Pilings............... .... 22 Elevation .................. .... 23 Lower Area Enclosures .... .... 23 Connections ................. ....24 Manufactured Housing .......... .... 24
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing Natural and Mechanical Dune Performance in a Post-Hurricane Environment
    Journal of Marine Science and Engineering Article Assessing Natural and Mechanical Dune Performance in a Post-Hurricane Environment Jean T. Ellis * and Mayra A. Román-Rivera Department of Geography, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] Received: 1 April 2019; Accepted: 29 April 2019; Published: 2 May 2019 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to document the geomorphic evolution of a mechanical dune over approximately one year following its installation and compare it to the recovery of a natural dune following the impact of Hurricane Matthew (2016). During the study period, the dunes’ integrity was tested by wave and wind events, including king tides, and a second hurricane (Irma, 2017), at the end of the study period. Prior to the impact of the second hurricane, the volumetric increase of the mechanical and natural dune was 32% and 75%, respectively, suggesting that scraping alone is not the optimal protection method. If scraping is employed, we advocate that the dune should be augmented by planting. Ideally, the storm-impacted dune should naturally recover. Post-storm vegetation regrowth was lower around the mechanical dune, which encouraged aeolian transport and dune deflation. Hurricane Irma, an extreme forcing event, substantially impacted the dunes. The natural dune was scarped and the mechanical dune was overtopped; the system was essentially left homogeneous following the hurricane. The results from this study question the current practice of sand scraping along the South Carolina coast, which occurs post-storm, emplacement along the former primary dune line, and does not include the planting of vegetation.
    [Show full text]
  • Hurricane Sandy: an Educational Bibliography of Key Research Studies
    HURRICANE SANDY: AN EDUCATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF KEY RESEARCH STUDIES Chris Piotrowski University of West Florida (Research Project Completed on April 10, 2013) HURRICANE SANDY: AN EDUCATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF KEY RESEARCH STUDIES ABSTRACT There, undoubtedly, will be a flurry of research activity in the ‘Superstorm’ Sandy impact area on a myriad of disaster-related topics, across academic disciplines. The purpose of this study was to review the disaster research related specifically to hurricanes in the educational and social sciences that would best serve as a compendium bibliography for researchers, academic faculty, and policymakers in the Hurricane Sandy impact area. To that end, this study, based on a content analysis procedure, identified key articles on hurricanes based on the extant literature indexed in the database PsycINFO. Of the 1,408 references identified, 1000 were scholarly qualitative and quantitative research articles. The author developed a bibliography of 100 key citations to articles, categorized across select topical areas, based on issues central to investigatory efforts following natural disasters. Future research should recommend research designs that address specific concerns of both researchers and policymakers in high-impact, heavily populated areas of the U.S. susceptible to major tropical storm or hurricane damage. Introduction The field of disaster studies has grown at an exponential pace over the past 30 years and, accordingly, the knowledge base of the field is presently quite voluminous (Rodriguez et al., 2007)). While investigations on the impacts of natural disasters in the areas of climate science and the general sciences have a long history, research on the human impact of hurricanes is a more recent phenomenon in the social sciences.
    [Show full text]
  • What Happened? Irma and Maria -- the Back-To-Back Category 5 Hurricanes of September 2017 in the US Virgin Islands
    What Happened? Irma and Maria -- the back-to-back Category 5 Hurricanes of September 2017 in the US Virgin Islands OCEAN AND COASTAL OBSERVING – VIRGIN ISLANDS, INC. (OCOVI) WWW.OCOVI.ORG Two weeks apart, hurricanes Irma (September 6th) and Maria (September 20th) followed paths that sandwiched the Virgin Islands. Both remained Category 5 storms as they transited the VI region. Irma set a record of ~ 3¼ days in Category 5. What makes our region particularly prone to tropical storms or hurricanes? Abundant warm ocean water, Temperature ≥ 80◦F (26.5◦C) --the ocean water’s heat provides the energy for convection which creates storms; Start-up moisture and spin from pre-existing systems (e.g., waves coming from the African continent); Favorable distance from the equator in order to maximize the spin (Latitude > 4◦ is necessary to maintain the necessary spin; the VI is located around 18◦ N); Remoteness from competing continental systems which can deplete atmospheric moisture; Remoteness from sources of wind shear; Wind shear disrupts Minimal land surface (less debilitating friction, less convection deprivation of moisture). columns Who are we? Where are we? Hurricanes since 1851 Significant quote Alexander Hamilton describing the 1772 hurricane on St. Croix in the Royal Danish American Gazette, August 31,1772: … Good God! what horror and destruction—it's impossible for me to describe—or you to form any idea of it…. A great part of the buildings throughout the Island are levelled to the ground—almost all the rest very much shattered—several persons killed and numbers utterly ruined …our harbour is entirely bare…”.
    [Show full text]
  • Getting Ready for the Next Storm By: Shanti Menon
    SPECIAL REPORT FALL 2020 Prepared for EDF Members Getting ready for the next storm By: Shanti Menon Attorney Agustín Carbó survived Hurricane Maria and the devastating blackout that followed. Now he’s working to build a stormproof energy system for Puerto Rico. Three years have passed since Hurricane Maria tore into Puerto Rico, uprooting trees, utility poles and cellphone towers; flooding homes; and plunging the entire island into darkness. The storm destroyed the island’s fragile electric grid, battered two weeks earlier by Hurricane Irma. Without access to power, clean water, refrigeration and health care, an estimated 3,000 people died. Some remained without power for nearly a year. Today, Puerto Rico’s grid is still unstable, and thousands of families endured this hurricane season with nothing over their heads but tattered blue FEMA tarps installed after Maria tore off their roofs in 2017. It’s only a matter of time before the next big storm hits. Puerto Rico lies in Hurricane Alley, a system of warm Atlantic waters that fuels hurricanes, now supercharged by climate change. Agustín Carbó, a former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency attorney, Puerto Rico’s first energy commissioner and founder of a U.S.-Latin American climate think tank, lived through the tragedy of Hurricane Maria and is now leading EDF’s work on energy policy reform in his native island. “I have a responsibility on my shoulders to make sure what we do is helping the people,” he says. “We have been through so much.” It took nearly a year to fully restore electric service after Hurricane Maria.
    [Show full text]
  • 1.1 the Climatology of Inland Winds from Tropical Cyclones in the Eastern United States
    1.1 THE CLIMATOLOGY OF INLAND WINDS FROM TROPICAL CYCLONES IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES Michael C. Kruk* STG Inc., Asheville, North Carolina Ethan J. Gibney IMSG Inc., Asheville, North Carolina David H. Levinson and Michael Squires NOAA National Climatic Data Center, Asheville, NC landfall than do weaker storms. For these reasons, the 1. Introduction primary impact areas of tropical cyclones are generally found along coastal (or near coastal) regions. Most In the United States, the impacts from tropical previous studies involving the inland-extent of tropical cyclones often extend well-inland after these storms cyclones have generally focused on their expected or make landfall along the coast. For example, after the modeled rate of decay post landfall (e.g., Tuleya et al. passage of Hurricane Camille (1969), more than 150 1984, Kaplan and DeMaria 1995; Kaplan and DeMaria casualties occurred in the state of Virginia, some 1300 2001), while others have focused on recurrence km inland from where the storm originally made landfall thresholds or probabilities of landfalls along a given along the Louisiana coast (Emanuel 2005). According to portion of the United States coastline (e.g., Bove et al. Rappaport (2000), a large portion of fatalities often occur 1998; Elsner and Bossak 2001; Gray and Klotzbach inland associated with a decaying tropical cyclone’s 2005; Saunders and Lea 2005). Results from Kaplan winds (falling trees, collapsed roofs, etc.) and heavy and DeMaria (1995) showed an idealized scenario for flooding rains. In the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s, freshwater the maximum possible inland wind speed of a decaying floods accounted for 59 percent of the recorded deaths tropical cyclone based on both intensity at landfall and from tropical cyclones (Rappaport 2000), and such forward motion for the Gulf Coast and southeastern floods are often a combination of meteorological and United States, and for the New England area (Kaplan hydrological factors.
    [Show full text]
  • Marine Damage Report & Dive Sector Needs Assessment Commonwealth of Dominica, Post Hurricane Maria Funded By
    Marine Damage Report & Dive Sector Needs Assessment Commonwealth of Dominica, Post Hurricane Maria Funded by OAS Consultant Arun Madisetti Independent Marine Biologist Needs Assessment for Commonwealth of Dominica Following Hurricane Maria Introduction The Commonwealth of Dominica is known for experiencing extreme weather conditions and earthquakes. The island lies within the hurricane belt and has been impacted by many hurricanes and tropical storms. The most damaging storms in recent years include Hurricane David in 1979, Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Hurricane Marilyn in 1995, Hurricane Lenny in 1999, and Tropical Storm Erika in 2015.2 On August 27, 2015, Tropical Storm Erika hit Dominica. Rainfall of approximately 38 centimeters was recorded in southern Dominica, but because of the peaked topography of the island, it is likely that even higher levels of rainfall occurred in the interior of Dominica due to Tropical Storm Erika. The large amount of rainfall over such a short period caused landslides and flash-floods which resulted in carnage throughout much of the country—the most severe of which was reported on the western and south-eastern coasts. Tragically, 31 people died as a result of the storm and many more were displaced or experienced property loss or damage. The total estimated damage from T.S. Erika in Dominica alone was $483 million USD. The extensive impact of Tropical Storm Erika on Dominica emphasized the significance of hazard preparedness and climate change risk management, particularly at the government level.2 Most recently, Hurricane Maria (Figure 1) struck Dominica the evening of September 18, 2017 and bisected the island from southeast to northwest (Figure 2) during a period of about 8 hours with sustained wind speeds of 160 miles per hour (mph) and wind gusts well in excess of 250 mph (Figure 3).
    [Show full text]