CED-80-61 Conrail's Attempts to Control Labor Costs and Improve Its

REPORTBY THE Comptroller General OF THE UNITEDSTATES Conrail’s Attempts To Control Labor Costs And Improve Its Labor Productivity If Conrail is to attain financial self-sufficiency, it must gain better control of its labor costs, which are considerably higher than those of other railroads. Some of the reasons for Con- rail’s high labor costs are linked to the nature of its labor agreements. Conrail is taking action to improve its labor productivity. One major accomplishment has been an agreement with the United Transpor- tation Union to reduce the size of train crews. GAO believes that Conrail’s productivity, and labor productivity in the rail industry as a whole, could be improved if management and labor worked together to change outmoded or restrictive work rules. CED-80-61 JUNE 20.1980 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITE0 STATES WAsHINQToN. DC. 20&m B-198888 The Honorable Birch Bayh Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Senate Committee on Appropriations The Honorable Russell B. Long Chairman, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation The Honorable Robert B. Duncan Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation House Committee on Appropriations The Honorable James J. Florio Chairman, Subcommittee on Trans- portation and Commerce House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce This report discusses Conrail's attempts to improve its labor productivity. The report summarizes Conrail's progress to date in improving its labor productivity and discusses related industrywide work rule issues. We made this review because labor expenses are Conrail's largest cost and because control of labor cost and improvement of labor productivity is critical to Conrail's becoming financially self-sufficient. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Transportation: the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Consolidated Rail Corporation; the Chairman and Chief Exec- utive Officer, United States Railway Association; various Senate and House committees; and other interested parties. C~~KCie&!al'~ of the United States REPORT BY THE CONRAIL'S ATTEMPTS TO COMPTROLLERGENERAL CONTROL LABOR COSTS AND OF THE UNITED STATES IMPROVE ITS LABOR PRODUCTIVITY ------DIGEST In 1978 Conrail's $2.1 billion labor expenses amounted to 63 percent of its total revenues compared to the rail industry average of 51 percent. (According to Conrail, the figure was 58 percent in 1979.) Con- rail recognizes that its labor costs must be reduced if it is to become financially self- sufficient. Conrail's labor costs have been high for a number of reasons including the poor condition of its tracks, yards, and equipment; the layout of its system and the type of traffic it carries, which requires a relatively large amount of switching; and a legacy of weak management from the bankrupt predecessor railroads. (See pp. 2 to 7.) CONRAIL'S PROGRAMTO REDUCEITSI_- LABOR COSTS -___AND IMPROVE ITS PRODUCTIVITY Conrail's goal is to reduce labor expenses as a percentage of total revenues to about 51 percent by 1983. It believes its goal can be achieved by improving its collective bargaining agreements, improving its management of the railroad, and continuing to improve the physical condition of its facilities. With these improvements, Con- rail believes it can operate with 20,000 fewer employees by 1983. (See p. 24.) Some improvements have already been made. Conrail has negotiated new collective bargaining agreements with most of the employee organizations to replace the multiple agreements that it inherited from its bankrupt pKedeCeSSOKS, and it has negotiated an agreement with the United TKanSpOKtatiOn Union to reduce the size of yard and road freight crews. Programs are also underway to I-. Upon removal, the report cover date should be wted hereon. 1 CED-80-61 suffer financial loss due to changes in work rules OK operating practices that are designed to improve system productivity. (See ch. 2.) USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS-- TO -PAY =PARATION ALLOWANCESNOT WITHINI~TENT--- 0~ LAW - The agreement Conrail negotiated to KedUCe the size of train crews provides fOK separation allowances for employees who give up their jobs as a result of the agreement. Conrail has been using Federal funds pKO- vided under title V of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act (3R Act), as amended (45 U.S.C. 701), to pay these separation allowance;. The Congress originally pro- vided $250 million to protect employees who were adversely affected by the KailKOad reorganization and formation of Conrail. These funds were exhausted by February 1980. However, employee separations resulting from the agreement to reduce crew size are not a direct result of the formation of Conrail. GAO believes that while the use of the employee protective funds in this context does not violate the law, it was not the use intended by the Congress. (See pp. 27 and 28.) RECOMMENDATIONSTO THE CONGRESS GAO recommends that the Congress evaluate whether title V is the proper vehicle for funding actions such as the "crew consist" (crew size) separations. If the Congress determines that Conrail's use of title V funding is appropriate, it should reguire Conrail to provide an estimate of the title V funds needed for separation payments relating to the crew size agreement as well as for any future employee disloca- tions that would involve payments from Federal funds. (See p. 35.) _..Contents - - - - _ - - Page CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 To succeed, Conrail must control its labor costs 1 Conrail continues to have higher labor costs than the rest of the industry 2 Scope of review 8 2 WORK RULES AND PAY SYSTEMS IN THE RAIL INDUSTRY ARE A TARGET OF CRITICISM 9 Work rules: What are the criticisms? 10 Crew consist rules 11 The dual basis of pay rule 13 Arbitraries 16 Craft and class divisions 17 Examples of pay computations 18 Example 1 18 Example 2 19 Are work rule ci-anges needed? 19 Conclusions 22 3 CONRAIL'S PROGRAMSTO IMPROVE ITS LABOR COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY 24 Agreement improvements 25 Negotiation of single collective bargaining agreements 25 Negotiation of agreement to reduce size of train crews 27 Separation payments to employees are not within the intent of the 3R Act 27 Savings from reduced size of train crews have been less than anticipated 29 Management improvement 29 Terminal Improvement Project 29 Car Repair and Inspection Productivity Project 30 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On April 1, 1976, Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) took over the operations of six bankrupt railroads in the Northeastern United States under a reorganization plan developed by the United States Railway Association (USRA). The reorganization was carried out under the provi- sions of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, as amended (45 U.S.C. 701). Known as the 3R Act, this legisla- tion was to restructure the bankrupt Northeast railroads into an economically workable rail system. USRA planners expected that Conrail would become profitable by 1979 and that the Government's $2.1 billion investment would be enough to restore the railroad to physical and financial health. However, Conrail now estimates that it will not become profitable until 1981 at the earli- est. Also, the Federal investment in Conrail has grown from the $2.1 billion originally authorized to $3.3 billion now. A recent analysis by USRA--which monitors the Federal investment in Conrail --said that Conrail may need another $1.4 billion in Government financing before 1983. A previous GAO report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation, House Committee on Government Operations, L/ discussed Conrail's deteriora- ting financial condition compared to USRA's original expec- tations. In that report, we stated that to turn this condition around, Conrail management would have to improve customer service, increase labor productivity, modernize yards and terminals, and eliminate nonessential and redun- dant activities in the physical plant. TO SUCCEED, CONRAIL MUST CONTROL ITS LABORI_- COSTS Conrail is attempting to deal with its labor problems by (1) reducing its labor costs as a percentage of revenues and (2) increasing its labor productivity. Currently, Conrail's labor costs (wages and salaries, fringe benefits, and payroll taxes) consume a much greater proportion of its revenues than do other railroads' labor costs. In 1978 Conrail reported labor expenses to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) totaling $2.1 billion, representing about 63 percent of its $3.3 billion in revenues. In comparison, labor expenses for all railroads in the United States averaged only 51 percent r/l;$y;rail Faces Continuing Problems," CED-78-174, Oct. 6, . New York Central Railroad] that got even further out of control after the merger. * * * “Part of the explanation for the unfavorable showing of both the Penn Central companies is found in the relatively large number of employees per mile of track operated.” ‘* * * evidence of employment excesses is suggested by the sharp post bankruptcy declines and by prebankruptcy management statements about anticipated work force reductions it expected to accomplish. It appears that there was really inefficient labor utilization primarily attributable to inadequate management control .‘I We found that the bankrupt railroads did reduce employment by 28 percent between 1967 and 1975, but not enough to keep labor costs from increasing more than revenues. Labor costs went up 47 percent between 1967 and 1975, while revenues went up only 41 percent. In contrast, another Eastern carrier, the Baltimore and Ohio, reduced its employment 30 percent. Although its labor costs increased 40 percent, its revenues increased 56 percent. The following chart shows that only Conrail’s predecessors had labor cost increases that outstripped revenue gains. The chart also shows that Conrail’s predecessors’ revenues increased less than the average for the entire industry. 3 After Conrail began operations, its ratio of labor expenses to revenue continued to exceed the industry average by a wide margin.

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