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ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2012/23 ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES Global Governance Programme-18 MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21st Century Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed) EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21st Century ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN (ED) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2012/23 This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. ISSN 1028-3625 © 2012 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed) Printed in Italy, June 2012 European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ www.eui.eu cadmus.eui.eu Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union. Details of the research of the Centre can be found on: http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website: http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). The Global Governance Programme at the EUI The Global Governance Programme (GGP) aims to share knowledge, and develop new ideas on issues of global governance, serve as a bridge between research and policy-making, and contribute the European perspective to the global governance debate. The GGP comprises three core dimensions: training, research and policy. The Academy of Global Governance is a unique executive training programme which combine EUI’s top-level academic environment with some of the world’s leading experts in the field of global governance and is targeted to young executives and policy-makers, public sector officials, private sector professionals, junior academics, and diplomats. Diverse global governance issues are investigated in research strands and projects coordinated by senior scholars, both from the EUI and from internationally recognized top institutions. The policy dimension is developed throughout the programme, but is highlighted in the GGP High-Level Policy seminars, which bring together policy-makers and academics at the highest level to discuss issues of current global importance. For more information: www.globalgovernanceprogramme.eu Abstract This publication includes papers of an interdisciplinary conference in 2011 analysing multilevel governance problems of the international trading, environmental, development and rule-of-law systems as interdependent ‘aggregate public goods’. It begins with policy-oriented analyses from leading practitioners on the ‘gap between theory and practice’ in multilevel governance. The analyses of the ‘collective action problems’ are supplemented by case-studies on the world trading, environmental, development and related rule-of-law systems. Apart from assessing existing multilevel governance arrangements (such as the G20 meetings), the conference papers explore alternative strategies for rendering multilevel governance more effective, for instance by promoting public-private partnerships, empowering private actors through stronger cosmopolitan rights, enhancing legal- judicial accountability of governments and by promoting overall coherence through transnational rule- of-law systems. The papers explore emerging principles for multilevel political governance (like ‘responsible sovereignty’, unilateral protection of ‘common concerns’) as well as new forms of multilevel judicial governance strengthening transnational rule-of-law in international trade, investment and environmental regulation. Keywords Carbon emission reductions; climate change prevention; environmental law; EU; European Economic Area; G20; IMF; international trading system; Kyoto Protocol; public goods; rule of law; UNFCCC; World Bank; WTO. Table of Contents Introduction and Overview: Lack of Adequate Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21st Century? Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ..................................................................................................................... 1 I. Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods: Approaches by Political Practitioners Global Governance: From Theory to Practice Pascal Lamy ...................................................................................................................................... 25 The EU and the European Parliament in International Trade and Climate Change Negotiations Josep Borrell ...................................................................................................................................... 31 II. Collective Action Problems Impeding Collective Supply of Interdependent Public Goods: Economic, Political and Legal Analyses Global Public Goods: Explaining their Underprovision Inge Kaul ........................................................................................................................................... 41 Problems of Policy-Design based on Insufficient Conceptualization: The Case of “Public Goods” Friedrich Kratochwil ......................................................................................................................... 61 III. Case Studies on Multilevel Governance of ‘Interface Problems’ of the International Trading, Environmental and Development Systems The G20 and Global Economic Governance: Lessons from Multilevel European Governance? Jan Wouters and Thomas Ramopoulos ............................................................................................. 73 Multilevel Governance Problems at the Intersection of Trade, Health and the ‘Global Knowledge Economy’’ Frederick M. Abbott .......................................................................................................................... 95 Can the 'Development Dimension' of the WTO Be Secured Without Stronger Synergies Between the WTO and the World Bank? Anna Pitaraki ..................................................................................................................................... 99 Why Climate Change Collective Action has Failed and What Needs to be Done within and without the Trade Regime Daniel Esty and Anthony Moffa ..................................................................................................... 119 Global Public Goods and Asymmetric Markets: Carbon Emissions Trading and Border Carbon Adjustments Moritz Hartmann ............................................................................................................................. 131 International incentive mechanisms for conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services Jerneja Penca ................................................................................................................................... 151 IV. Constitutional and Legal Problems of Multilevel Governance of Citizen-driven International Public Goods The Emerging Principle of Common Concern: A Brief Outline Thomas Cottier ................................................................................................................................ 185 Cosmopolitan ‘Aggregate Public Goods’ Must be Protected by Cosmopolitan Access Rights and Judicial Remedies Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ................................................................................................................. 195 Introduction and Overview: Lack of Adequate Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21st Century? Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann* Globalization has entailed not only more freedoms than citizens have ever enjoyed before; it also continues to make people’s life ever more interconnected and ‘public’ (e.g. through the Internet), thereby contributing to the transformation of ever more local and national goods into international public goods requiring new forms of governance, regulation and justification. The more these new private and public spheres (e.g. of globally integrated financial markets) lack adequate regulation and provoke systemic crises, the more citizens and civil society organizations (like the ‘occupy Wall Street’ movements) criticize their governments for failure to protect public goods like ‘financial stability’ and the human rights obligations of all UN member states. This symposium focuses on the interdependent 'public goods' of efficient world trading, environmental, development and rule-of-law
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