International Trade in Durable Goods: Understanding Volatility, Cyclicality, and Elasticities*
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Macroeconomic Theory and Policy Lecture 2: National Income Accounting
ECO 209Y Macroeconomic Theory and Policy Lecture 2: National Income Accounting © Gustavo Indart Slide1 Gross Domestic Product Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the value of all final goods and services produced in Canada during a given period of time That is, GDP is a flow of new products during a period of time, usually one year We can use three different approaches to measure GDP: Production approach Expenditure approach Income approach © Gustavo Indart Slide 2 Measuring GDP Production Approach –We can measure GDP by measuring the value added in the production of goods and services in the different industries (e.g., agriculture, mining, manufacturing, commerce, etc.) Expenditure Approach –We can measure GDP by measuring the total expenditure on final goods and services by different groups (households, businesses, government, and foreigners) Income Approach –We can measure GDP by measuring the total income earned by those producing goods and services (wages, rents, profits, etc.) © Gustavo Indart Slide 3 Flow of Expenditure and Income Labour, land FACTORS Labour, land & capital MARKETS & capital Wages, rent & interest HOUSEHOLDS FIRMS Expenditures on goods & services Goods & services GOODS Goods & MARKETS services © Gustavo Indart Slide 4 Measuring GDP Current Output –GDP includes only the value of output currently produced. For instance, GDP includes the value of currently produced cars and houses but not the sales of used cars and old houses Market Prices –GDP values goods at market prices, and the market price of a good includes -
Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions* 1 Introduction
Ecient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions y Peter Norman May 15, 2002 Abstract This pap er studies \voluntary bargaining agreements" in an environment where preferences over an excludable public go o d are private information. Unlike the case with a non-excludable public go o d, there are non-trivial conditions when there is signi cant provision in a large econ- omy. The provision level converges in probability to a constant, which makes it p ossible to approximate the optimal solution by a simple xed fee mechanism, whichinvolves second degree price discrimination if identities are informative ab out the distribution of preferences. Truth- telling is a dominant strategy in the xed fee mechanism. Being able to limit a public go o ds' consumption do es not make it a turn-blue private good. For what, after all, are the true marginal costs of having one extra family tune in on the program. They are literally zero. Why then limit any family which would receive p ositive pleasure from tuning in on the program from doing so? [Samuelson [24 ], pp 335] 1 Intro duction Virtually all theory on collective goods considers a \pure" public good, which is non-excludable and non-rival in consumption. Obviously, these prop erties need not go hand in hand. In fact, it I'm indebted to Mark Armstrong and two referees who challenged me to write a more interesting pap er than the initial draft. I also thank Ray Deneckere, John Kennan, Bart Lipman, George Mailath, Ro dy Manuelli, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, William Sandholm and participants at several conferences and academic institutions for comments and helpful discussions. -
CRIME and DURABLE GOODS Sebastian Galiani Laura Jaitman
CRIME AND DURABLE GOODS Sebastian Galiani Laura Jaitman Federico Weinschelbaum WORKING PAPER 22788 NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CRIME AND DURABLE GOODS Sebastian Galiani Laura Jaitman Federico Weinschelbaum Working Paper 22788 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22788 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 October 2016, Revised August 2018 The authors thank Omar Chisari, Victor Filipe, Francisco Poggi, and participants at the following seminars for helpful comments: 2018 Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, Wharton School, Fundação Getulio Vargas EESP, Universidad Diego Portales, Academia Nacional de Ciencias Economicas of Argentina, World Bank and LICIP Crime and Policies seminar at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2016 by Sebastian Galiani, Laura Jaitman, and Federico Weinschelbaum. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Crime and Durable Goods Sebastian Galiani, Laura Jaitman, and Federico Weinschelbaum NBER Working Paper No. 22788 October 2016, Revised August 2018 JEL No. K0,K00 ABSTRACT We develop a theoretical model to study how changes in the durability of the goods affects prices of stolen goods, the incentives to steal and the equilibrium crime rate. When studying the production of durable goods, we find that the presence of crime affects consumer and producer surplus and thus their behaviour, market equilibrium, and, in turn, the social optimum. -
Demand Composition and the Strength of Recoveries†
Demand Composition and the Strength of Recoveriesy Martin Beraja Christian K. Wolf MIT & NBER MIT & NBER September 17, 2021 Abstract: We argue that recoveries from demand-driven recessions with ex- penditure cuts concentrated in services or non-durables will tend to be weaker than recoveries from recessions more biased towards durables. Intuitively, the smaller the bias towards more durable goods, the less the recovery is buffeted by pent-up demand. We show that, in a standard multi-sector business-cycle model, this prediction holds if and only if, following an aggregate demand shock to all categories of spending (e.g., a monetary shock), expenditure on more durable goods reverts back faster. This testable condition receives ample support in U.S. data. We then use (i) a semi-structural shift-share and (ii) a structural model to quantify this effect of varying demand composition on recovery dynamics, and find it to be large. We also discuss implications for optimal stabilization policy. Keywords: durables, services, demand recessions, pent-up demand, shift-share design, recov- ery dynamics, COVID-19. JEL codes: E32, E52 yEmail: [email protected] and [email protected]. We received helpful comments from George-Marios Angeletos, Gadi Barlevy, Florin Bilbiie, Ricardo Caballero, Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, Fran¸coisGourio, Basile Grassi, Erik Hurst, Greg Kaplan, Andrea Lanteri, Jennifer La'O, Alisdair McKay, Simon Mongey, Ernesto Pasten, Matt Rognlie, Alp Simsek, Ludwig Straub, Silvana Tenreyro, Nicholas Tra- chter, Gianluca Violante, Iv´anWerning, Johannes Wieland (our discussant), Tom Winberry, Nathan Zorzi and seminar participants at various venues, and we thank Isabel Di Tella for outstanding research assistance. -
3. the Distortion in Consumer Goods This Section Calculates the Welfare Cost of Distortions in the Allocation of Consumer Goods
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Bjertnæs, Geir H. Working Paper The Welfare Cost of Market Power. Accounting for Intermediate Good Firms Discussion Papers, No. 502 Provided in Cooperation with: Research Department, Statistics Norway, Oslo Suggested Citation: Bjertnæs, Geir H. (2007) : The Welfare Cost of Market Power. Accounting for Intermediate Good Firms, Discussion Papers, No. 502, Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192484 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Discussion Papers No. 502, April 2007 Statistics Norway, Research Department Geir H. Bjertnæs The Welfare Cost of Market Power Accounting for Intermediate Good Firms Abstract: The market power of firms in intermediate good markets is found to generate a substantial welfare cost. -
1 Non-Rival Productive Inputs
1 Non-rival productive inputs. Consider a general production technology: Y = Y (A ; K ; L ) t t t t (1) K L A We conventionally label t as “capital”, t as labor and t as an index of technical knowledge. I will now try to be more fundamental, and single out a classi…cation of the productive inputs which is not based on some statistical aggregate, but, rather, on some economic properties which are relevant for the problems which we study in the theory of growth. Let us recall some basic notions of public economics. Private good RIVAL + EXCLUDABLE ² ´ Public (collective) good NON-RIVAL + NON-EXCLUDABLE ² ´ EXCLUDABILITY - problem of property rights. A good is perfectly ² excludable when the holder can withhold the bene…ts associated with the commodity from others without incurring signi…cant costs (an ex- ample of non excludable good is …sh in a certain segment of the ocean). RIVALROUSNESS - A good is rival in nature when the use of that ² good by one agent preclude the simultaneous use of the same good by other agents. An example of non-rival good is radio broadcast. Let me add a notion which is relevant in growth theory. REPRODUCIBILITY - An input is reproducible in nature if it can ² be accumulated in time by (directly or indirectly) foregoing present consumption. The stock of land is the most obvious example of non- reproducible factor. However, also goods which are accumulated ac- cording to some exogenous (e.g. demographic) dynamics enter this group. 1 K L In general, t is a reproducible, private input, while t is a non-reproducible private input. -
GDP and Beyond
GDP and beyond Adolfo Morrone Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) Head of Measures of well-being unit (Bes/Urbes) [email protected] Module content 1. Quick introduction on GDP 2. Shortcomings of GDP as indicator of well-being 3. Alternative approaches a. Historical background b. Recent perspectives 4. The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report a. Classical Gdp issues b. Quality of life 5. International experiences Definition of GDP 1. Quick introduction on GDP GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is the market value of all final goods and services produced in a country in a given time period. This definition has four parts: – Market value – Final goods and services – Produced within a country – In a given time period Definition of GDP 1. Quick introduction on GDP Market value GDP is a market value—goods and services are valued at their market prices. To add apples and oranges, computers and popcorn, we add the market values so we have a total value of output in euro/dollars. Definition of GDP 1. Quick introduction on GDP Final goods and services GDP is the value of the final goods and services produced. A final good (or service) is an item bought by its final user during a specified time period. A final good contrasts with an intermediate good, which is an item that is produced by one firm, bought by another firm, and used as a component of a final good or service. Excluding intermediate goods and services avoids double counting. Definition of GDP 1. Quick introduction on GDP Produced within a country GDP measures production within a country. -
Defensive Innovations
IZA DP No. 454 Defensive Innovations Winfried Koeniger DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES DISCUSSION PAPER March 2002 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor Defensive Innovations Winfried Koeniger IZA, Bonn Discussion Paper No. 454 March 2002 IZA P.O. Box 7240 D-53072 Bonn Germany Tel.: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-210 Email: [email protected] This Discussion Paper is issued within the framework of IZA’s research area The Future of Labor. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by the Deutsche Post AG. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor, (2) internationalization of labor markets, (3) the welfare state and labor markets, (4) labor markets in transition countries, (5) the future of labor, (6) evaluation of labor market policies and projects and (7) general labor economics. -
The Durapolist Puzzle: Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets
The Durapolist Puzzle: Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets Barak Y. Orbacht This Article studies the durapolist, the durable-goods monopolist. Durapolists have long argued that, unlike perishable-goods monopolists, they face difficulties in exercising market power despite their monopolistic position. During the past thirty years, economists have extensively studied the individual arguments durapolists deploy regarding their inability to exert market power. While economists have confirmed some of these arguments, a general framework for analyzing durapolists as a distinct group of monopolists has not emerged. This Article offers such a framework. It first presents the problems of durapolists in exercising market power and explains how courts have treated these problems. It then analyzes the strategies durapolists have devised to overcome difficulties in acquiringand maintainingmonopoly power and the legal implications of these strategies. This Article's major contributions are (a) expanding the conceptual scope of the durapolistproblem, (b) presenting the durapolist problem as an explanationfor many common business practices employed by durapolists, and (c) analyzing the legal implications of strategies employed to overcome the durapolistproblem. Introduction ........................................................................................... 68 I. The Durapolist Problem: Extracting Rent for Future Consumption ................................................................................. 69 A. Durablesvs. Perishables...................................................... -
PUBLIC GOODS Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21St Century
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2012/23 ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES Global Governance Programme-18 MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21st Century Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed) EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21st Century ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN (ED) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2012/23 This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. ISSN 1028-3625 © 2012 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed) Printed in Italy, June 2012 European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ www.eui.eu cadmus.eui.eu Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. -
Market Structure and Entry: Evidence from the Intermediate Goods Market
DPRIETI Discussion Paper Series 15-E-081 Market Structure and Entry: Evidence from the intermediate goods market NISHITATENO Shuhei RIETI The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/ RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15-E-081 July 2015 Market Structure and Entry: * Evidence from the intermediate goods market NISHITATENO Shuhei Kwansei Gakuin University/RIETI Consulting Fellow Abstract The question of whether incumbent firms could deter new entrants in a more concentrated market has been a major concern by both antitrust authorities and industrial economists. This study is the first attempt to analyze the relationship between the market structure and entry in the intermediate goods market, utilizing unique data on auto parts transactions between automakers and auto parts suppliers in Japan during the period 1990-2010. The results suggest that there exists a U-shaped relationship between market concentration and entry, which sees entry decreasing and then increasing as markets concentrate. This result could emanate from a significant role of multi-product and multi-customer firms. Keywords: Entry, Market structure, Multi-product firms, Multi-customer firms, Automobiles JEL classification: L22, L25, L60 RIETI Discussion Papers Series aims at widely disseminating research results in the form of professional papers, thereby stimulating lively discussion. The views expressed in the papers are solely those of the author(s), and neither represent those of the organization to which the author(s) belong(s) nor the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. * This study is conducted as a part of the Project “Competitiveness of Japanese Firms: Causes and Effects of the Productivity Dynamics” undertaken at Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). -
Paul M. Romer
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES ENDOCENOUSTECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE Paul M.Romer Working Paper No. 3210 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 December 1989 repared for the conference "The Problem of Economic Development,"SUNY uffalo,May 1988. 1 have benefitted from the comments of manyseminar and onference participants and two discussants (Rob Vishny, Buffalo May 1988,and ale Jorgenson, NBER Economic Fluctuations meeting, July 1988). Discussions ith Gary Becker, Karl Shell, Robert Lucas, Gene Grossman, and Elhanan Helpinan ere especially helpful. Research assistance was provided by DanyangXie. The riginal work was supported by NSF grant #SES-8618325. It wasrevised while I as a visitor at the Center for Advanced Study in the BehavioralSciences and upported by NSF grand #BNS87-00864. This paper is part of NBER'sresearch rogram in Growth. Any opinions expressed are thoseof the author not those of he National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper #3210 December 1989 ENDOGENOUSTECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ABSTRACT Growth in this model is driven by technological change that arises from intentional investment decisions made by profit maximizing agents. The distinguishing feature of the technology as an input is that it is neither a conventional good nor a public good;it is a nonrival, partially excludable good. Because of the nonconvexity introduced by a nonrival good, price-taking competition cannot be supported, and instead, the equilibriumis one with monopolistic competition. The main conclusions are that the stock of human capital determines the rate of growth, that too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium, that integration into world markets will increase growth rates,and that having a large population is not sufficient to generate growth.