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Early Banks in Victoria Shearer: Early BC Banking BANKING ON THE FRONTIER: NOTES ON EARLY BANKING IN BRITISH COLUMBIA Ronald A, Shearer Department of Economics The University of British Columbia #997 - 1873 East Mall Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z1 [email protected] Paper prepared for the Conference on the Application of Quantitative Methods to Canadian Economic History May 1997 This paper reports on work in progress. Because the paper is subject to revision, it should not be quoted without permission of the author c:\frasrer\banks\bnkfront 1 1/14/2017 2:11 PM Shearer: Early BC Banking Abstract Two banks chartered in Britain began banking in British Columbia during the gold rush: the Bank of British North America opened in Victoria in 1859 and the Bank of British Columbia in 1862. These banks were required to make quarterly reports of assets and liabilities to the colonial government and they continued to report after British Columbia became a province of Canada. One result is a 20-year run of quarterly data on two banks that operated in a relatively isolated, economically unstable gold mining region. The paper uses these data to analyze aspects of the banking operations of these firms. The balance sheet data permit the estimation of a money supply series for the region in the years 1864-1885. This series provides an index of fluctuations in the economy. It reveals a very unstable economy, affected both by the international business cycle and local macroeconomic forces emanating from the ebb and flow of the gold rush and preliminaries for the construction of the transcontinental railway. The data also permit the estimation of demand for cash reserve functions. Given a legal cash reserve requirement in both the banks’ charters and colonial legislation, estimates are reported for the demand for excess cash reserves. The preliminary evidence suggests that the banks worked to a target level of cash reserves that changed over time rather than the target reserve ratio beloved by monetary economists. Fluctuations in the circulation of banknotes and payment for purchases of raw gold with gold coin produced departures from the desired level of reserves. Deficiencies elicited the importation of coin from San Francisco. In normal banking operations after the ebb of the gold rush the two banks followed very different strategies. Initially the inexperienced Bank of British Columbia committed almost all of its capital to its speculative venture in British Columbia. The collapse of the gold rush and injudicious lending brought it to the brink of failure. It retrenched and withdrew a substantial amount of capital to the relative safety of London, but it remained committed to banking in British Columbia. It became the primary source of commercial loans and circulating money for the province. The larger, older, more experienced and widely diversified Bank of British North America allocated but a token amount of capital to British Columbia. After the gold rush it provided some banking services to the province but primarily collected savings for investment by offices abroad. Both banks opened offices in San Francisco and Portland in this period. Available balance sheets suggest they were important components of the California banking system. For the Bank of British North America these were additional offices in a continent-wide banking organization. For the Bank of British Columbia they represented important diversification of an otherwise dangerously specialized banking organization. c:\frasrer\banks\bnkfront 2 1/14/2017 2:11 PM Shearer: Early BC Banking Contents I. THE EARLY BANKS ................................................................................................ 6 A. Express Companies. ..................................................................................................................................... 8 B. Private Banks ............................................................................................................................................. 11 C. The Chartered Banks. ............................................................................................................................... 13 II. THE DATA. ............................................................................................................ 14 III. A MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE BC ECONOMY. ...................... 17 IV. CASH MANAGEMENT. ....................................................................................... 20 V. BANKING ON THE GOLD MINING FRONTIER .................................................. 27 A. Banking During the Gold Boom and Bust, 1859-1866. ........................................................................... 27 B. Banking under “normal“ conditions, 1866-1885. .................................................................................... 30 VI. OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES . ......................................................... 32 VII. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................. 33 c:\frasrer\banks\bnkfront 3 1/14/2017 2:11 PM Shearer: Early BC Banking BANKING ON THE FRONTIER: NOTES ON EARLY BANKING IN BRITISH COLUMBIA* Ronald A, Shearer Department of Economics The University of British Columbia The standard estimates of the pre-gold rush, non-aboriginal, adult population of British Columbia place it in the hundreds. Victoria, the major population and commercial centre, probably had less than 500. 1 With so few people, commercial and financial activity was very limited, dominated by the Hudson Bay Company who also controlled commercial relations with the much larger aboriginal population. As in other frontier areas, some informal banking was probably undertaken by merchants and by the Hudson Bay Company, but specialized banking firms did not exist. The Fraser River gold rush brought about an abrupt change. The non-aboriginal population took a sudden jump and changed its character.2 Not only miners, hardened in the California gold fields, but also business people arrived by the boat load, seeking their fortunes. Largely Americans, the newcomers had a profound impact, direct and indirect, on the legal and economic institutions of the colony. While population estimates for the British Pacific coast a this time are * I am grateful for the excellent research assistance of Jennifer Reid and Andrew Creech. 1 Barman reports that in 1855 "... Victoria contained about two hundred non-native inhabitants, with seventy-nine residences and a dozen shops" (Barman 1991, p. 61). Phillips suggested that on the eve of the gold rush the population of Victoria was about 500 (Phillips 1967, p. 45). Taking a broader compass, Ormsby reported "White settlers on Vancouver Island, numbering with their children no more than 1000 persons ..." (Ormsby 1958, p. 127). This implies a somewhat larger population for Victoria than the other estimates. Deaville is more cautious: “The total population of Vancouver Island at this time has been variously estimated at from six to eight hundred white persons” (Deaville 1928, p. 30).On the mainland, a very small non-aboriginal population was scattered, adjunct to Hudson Bay Company posts. 2 Referring to the first on rush, Howay notes “This rush was in reality merely the transporting of a part of California and the Pacific states to a land under the British flag.” (Howay 1942, p. 141). c:\frasrer\banks\bnkfront 4 1/14/2017 2:11 PM Shearer: Early BC Banking highly speculative, it has been suggested that as many as 30,000 people arrived in the summer of 1858 (Deaville 1928, p. 32; Phillips 1967, p. 45)]. 3 Many did not stay long and the non-aboriginal population appears to have fluctuated widely as the gold rush ebbed and flowed. The accepted guess for 1871 is under 11,000 (Urquhart 1965). However, the economy was transformed from one with a fur trade base and a modest fringe of agriculture and coal to one based on the search for and extraction of gold, with new requirements for equipment, supplies, construction materials, internal and external transport, civil and legal administration, the means of subsistence for the expanded population, and banking facilities. Despite the pretensions of New Westminster, Victoria remained the commercial and financial centre, and after the 1866 union of the mainland and island colonies, the political and administrative capital. It was the port-of-call for the all-important mail steamship to the commercial and financial hub of the Pacific coast, San Francisco, and the port for the express forwarding of raw gold to the San Francisco branch of the US Mint. Not surprisingly, Victoria also became the base for the colony’s banking system. The purpose of this paper is to examine some aspects of the early operations of two banks that opened in Victoria in the early phases of the gold rush and continued their operations long after the rush subsided -- banks that traded in gold but also made loans, accepted deposits and issued notes to be used as money. In the first section I describe the banking institutions of British Columbia between 1858 and 1885. This is followed by a discussion of a new set of data on the British Columbia offices of the Bank of British Columbia and the Bank of British North America. Both were chartered in England. These data permit an approximation to the money supply of British Columbia in this period. The macroeconomic perspective on the BC economy provided by the money supply estimates is briefly reviewed in Section 3. The management of cash reserves in an isolated and
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